SEXTUS EMPIRICUS
OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM
© George MacDonald Ross, 1975–1999
Book I
1. The main differences between philosophies
When people are looking for something, the likely outcome is either that they will find it; or that they will
give up the search and admit it cannot be found; or that they will carry on looking for it. It is exactly the
same with people looking for a philosophy. Some say they have found the truth; some assert that it cannot be
attained; and some go on looking for it. The ones who think they have found it are called ‘dogmatists’ in the
strict sense — examples being Aristotle, Epicurus, the stoics, and various others. The ones who assert that it
cannot be found are the school of Cleitomachus and Carneades, and other members of the Academy. Those
who are still looking for it are the skeptics. So it seems reasonable to say that the three main philosophies are
the dogmatic, the Academic, and the skeptical. I leave it to others to expound the first two. My present
enquiry is about the skeptical school, which I shall present in outline. But before I do so, I must warn you
that I do not positively assert that anything I say is wholly as I say it is. I merely report empirically how each
thing appears to me at the moment.
2. Two ways of expounding skepticism
The skeptical philosophy can be expounded generally, or in detail. A general exposition covers the
distinguishing features of skepticism — its definition, principles, reasonings, criterion, goal, modes of
suspension of judgment, how we understand skeptical affirmations, and the distinction between skepticism
and related philosophies. A detailed exposition provides the antithesis to every thesis of what is claimed to
be genuine philosophy. The first part of my book consists in a general exposition, and I shall begin the
overview with the names given to the skeptical school.
3. The names of the skeptical school
As well as being called the ‘skeptical’ school, it also has the following names:
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the ‘enquiring’ school, because its followers do not merely think, but actively enquire;
the ‘suspensive’ school, because of the thinker’s state of mind after an enquiry;
the ‘wondering’ school, whether because of their wondering and enquiring about everything (as some
say), or because of their inability to accept or deny anything;
the ‘Pyrrhonian’ School, because Pyrrho seems to have embodied skepticism more conspicuously than
anyone before him.
4. What skepticism is
Skepticism is the ability to find the opposites both of objects of experience and of objects of the in any way
whatever. Because the opposed things or reasonings have equal force, we are led first to suspension of
judgment, and then to serenity.
I do not mean ability in any technical sense, but simply in the sense of ‘being able.’
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By objects of experience I mean things given to our senses, which is why I contrast them with objects of
thought.
The phrase in any way whatever can be taken as qualifying either ‘ability’, or ‘the opposites of both objects
of experience and objects of thought.’ In the former case, it emphasises what I have already said — that
‘ability’ is to be taken in its everyday sense. In the latter case, I say in any way whatever in order to cover all
kinds of opposition: between one object of experience and another; between one object of thought and
another; and between objects of experience and objects of thought. Or it can be taken as qualifying ‘objects
of experience and objects of thought,’ so that we do not worry about how it comes about that objects of
experience are experienced, or how objects of thought are thought, but we simply take these terms at face
value.
By opposed reasonings, I do not mean absolutely any assertion and its denial, but only conflicting reasonings.
By having equal force, I mean being equally probable and equally improbable, so that neither of two
conflicting reasonings is more probable than the other.
Suspension of judgment is when the process of thinking comes to an end, without our denying or asserting
anything.
Serenity is freedom from disturbance, and calmness. I shall explain how serenity accompanies suspension of
judgment in the chapter on the goal of skepticism.
5. The skeptic
The definition of the Pyrrhonian philosopher follows from the definition of the skeptical school. He is the
one who has the ability referred to.
6. The principles of skepticism
We say that the fundamental principle of skepticism which provides its rationale is the hope of attaining
serenity. The greatest minds of humanity were disturbed by the capriciousness of nature, and they were at a
loss what they should believe in. They were led to search for what is true and what is false in nature, so that
they would attain serenity by coming to a solution. Skepticism, on the other hand, was constituted on the
principle that for every reasoning there is an equal and opposite reasoning; for we believe that this is the way
to stop dogmatizing.
7. Does the skeptic dogmatize?
We say that the skeptic does not dogmatize. But we do not mean this in the wider sense of ‘dogma’
according to which some people say that it is a dogma to assent to anything whatever. After all, the skeptic
submits to his feelings brought about by sense impressions. So if he were hot or cold, he would not say it
seemed to him that he was not hot or was not cold. No, we mean that the skeptic does not dogmatize in the
sense in which others say it is a dogma to assent to one of the imperceptible objects of scientific research. A
Pyrrhonian never assents to any imperceptible objects.
Nor does the skeptic dogmatize when uttering any of the skeptical slogans about imperceptible objects, such
as ‘Nothing is truer than anything else,’ or ‘I determine nothing,’ or any of the other slogans I shall discuss
later. The dogmatist asserts the objective validity of what he is said to be dogmatizing about, whereas the
skeptic does not claim universal and objective validity for his slogans. The skeptic is well aware that the
slogan ‘Everything is false’ proclaims its own falsehood as much as that of any other proposition. Similarly,
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‘Nothing is true,’ or ‘Nothing is truer than anything else’ declare that they too are no truer than anything else,
and therefore cancel themselves out along with the rest. We say the same about all the other skeptical
slogans.
However, given that the dogmatist asserts the objective validity of what he is dogmatizing about, and the
skeptic utters his slogans as having self-limiting force, then the skeptic would not be said to be dogmatizing
when uttering them. And, most importantly, in uttering these slogans, he says what appears to himself and he
reports his own feelings undogmatically, since he is making no claims about external objects.
8. Does skepticism have a distinctive system?
We give a similar answer to the question of whether skepticism has a distinctive system. If, on the one hand,
you mean by system, adherence to a number of interconnected dogmas consistent with experience, and by
dogma, acceptance of something imperceptible, then we have no distinctive system in this sense. On the
other hand, we do have a distinctive system, if you mean by this, a philosophy of life which embraces a
distinctive method of reasoning, and which accepts what is given in experience. This method of reasoning
includes the ability to suspend judgment, and it suggests what seems to be the right way of life (where ‘right’
is taken in the widest sense, and not just restricted to morality). For we follow a certain method of reasoning
which, on the basis of experience, suggests that we should live in accordance with traditional customs, the
law, our philosophy of life, and our own feelings.
9. Does the skeptic do natural science?
Our answer to the question of whether the skeptic does natural science takes the same form. On the one hand
we do not do natural science if that means declaring positive convictions about any of the issues treated
dogmatically in natural science. On the other hand, we do touch on natural science in so far as we provide
equal and opposite reasoning for any given piece of scientific reasoning, and thus achieve a state of serenity.
We also have the same approach to the logical and ethical parts of what is claimed to be philosophy.
10. Do the skeptics deny the world of experience?
Those who say that the skeptics deny the world of experience do not seem to have listened to what we have
said. As I said at the beginning, we do not deny that we are involuntarily led to assent to the impressions of
sense, which experience consist in. And when we enquire whether an object is as we experience it, we accept
that we experience it. We are not enquiring about the experience, but about what is said about the
experience. This is very different from enquiring about the experience itself. For example, we experience
honey as sweet. This we accept, since our senses are affected by sweetness. But we are enquiring whether it
is also sweet at the rational level, which is not a question of how we experience it, but of what is said about
the experience. And if we do the opposite, and raise arguments against experience, we present them not as
wanting to deny experience, but as pointing out the rashness of the dogmatists. For if reason is so deceptive
that it can steal our world of experience almost from under our very eyes, we must be all the more suspicious
of it in matters not given in experience, so as not to follow it rashly.
11. The criterion of skepticism
That we adhere to experience is obvious from what we say about the criterion of the skeptical approach. The
word ‘criterion’ has two senses. In one sense, it is the criterion used for deciding whether to believe that
something exists or not (which I shall refute later). In the other sense, it is the criterion for action, so that by
following it in our lives, we either do something or refrain from doing it. It is the latter sense I want to
discuss now.
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Now we say that the criterion of the skeptical approach is experience, calling it that by virtue of its sensory
imagery. For since this imagery depends on our being passively subjected to an involuntary feeling, it is
unquestionable. This is why probably no-one doubts the experience of this or that object, but what is
questionable is whether it really is as we experience it.
So, adhering to experience, we live undogmatically in the conduct of life, since we cannot be totally
ineffectual. It seems that this conduct of life has four aspects: (1) guidance by nature; (2) submission to our
feelings; (3) traditional laws and customs; and (4) skills training. We should be guided by nature, since it is
only thanks to nature that we are capable of experiencing and thinking. We should submit to our feelings,
since it is only thanks to hunger and thirst that we are led to eat and drink. We should observe traditional
laws and customs, since it is only thanks to them that we learn to see piety in life as good, and impiety as
evil. And we should undergo skills training since it is only thanks to training that we are effectual in the skills
we practice.
All this I say undogmatically.
12. The goal of skepticism
Following this, I should discuss the goal of the skeptical approach. Now a goal is that for the sake of which
anything is undertaken in the realm of action or thought, and is not itself for the sake of anything else — in
other words, it is the ultimate objective aimed for. So far we have been saying that the goal of the skeptic is
serenity in matters of opinion, and moderation of emotion in face of the inevitable.
In order to achieve serenity, the skeptic started philosophizing about the fact that he evaluated his sensory
images, and realized that some were true and some were false. He then fell into contradictions between
equally good arguments on either side, and not being able to decide one way or the other, he suspended
judgment. Finally, suspension of judgment led by fate to serenity in matters of opinion. Someone who
believes that anything is objectively good or evil is perpetually disturbed. When he lacks the things he thinks
good, he thinks he is being tormented by things which are objectively bad, and he strives after things which
are good (as he thinks). But when he has obtained them, he falls into even greater disturbance because of his
irrational and immoderate elation; and fearing a reversal of fortune, he does everything to avoid losing the
things which seem good to him. But the person who has come to no opinion as to which things are
objectively good or evil puts no effort into avoiding or striving after them. This is because he is in a state of
serenity.
In fact, the skeptic has had the same experience as is reported to have happened to Apelles the painter. It is
said that he was painting a horse, and was trying to represent the horse’s foam in the picture. But he was
making such a mess of it that he gave up, took the sponge which he used for cleaning the paints off his brush,
and threw it at the picture; and where it touched the picture, it made a perfect representation of the horse’s
foam. So the skeptics hoped to achieve serenity by coming to a decision about the capriciousness of the
objects of experience and of thought; but since they could not do this, they suspended judgment. By fate,
serenity followed for those who suspended judgment, just as the shadow follows the body.
We do not think that the skeptic is wholly undisturbed, since we say that he is disturbed by things which
cannot be avoided. We admit that he is sometimes cold, or thirsty, or suffers in other such ways. But in such
cases, ordinary people are distressed by two conditions: not only by the sufferings themselves, but no less by
the belief that their condition is objectively evil. On the other hand, the skeptic suffers less even in these
circumstances, since he eliminates the additional opinion that each of these sufferings is objectively evil. So
this is why we say that the goal of the skeptic is serenity in matters of opinion, and moderation of emotion
when faced with the inevitable. However, some distinguished skeptics have added to these suspension of
judgment in enquiries.
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13. The modes of suspension of judgment in general
Since we said that serenity follows suspension of judgment about everything, it would be appropriate for us
to say next how suspension of judgment is brought about. Speaking generally, it is brought about by putting
things in opposition to each other. We either oppose objects of experience to objects of experience, or objects
of thought to objects of thought, or a combination of the two. An example of objects of experience opposed
to objects of experience is when we say that the same tower appears round from a distance and square from
close to. An example of objects of thought opposed to objects of thought is when the existence of providence
is inferred from the regularity of the heavens, and we oppose to this the fact that often the good are
unfortunate, and the evil prosper; and on these grounds we conclude that there is no providence. And an
example of objects of thought opposed to objects of experience is when Anaxagoras opposed to [the
experience] that snow is white, [the argument] that snow is frozen water; water is black; therefore snow is
black.
In a different sense of ‘oppose’, we sometimes oppose present things to present things (as in the above
examples), and sometimes to past or future things. For example, when someone makes a dialectical move
which we can find no answer to, we present him with the following argument: Before the birth of the founder
of the school he belongs to, its distinctive theory lay hidden in nature, even though its soundness had not yet
been revealed. Similarly, it is possible that the opposite of the theory now put forward in debate lies hidden
in nature, but has not yet been made evident to us. Consequently, we should not yet assent to a theory which
seems sound at the moment.
In order to master these antitheses, we need to go into greater detail. I shall propose a number of modes
through which suspension of judgment is achieved. However, I make no claims about their number or
validity, since it is possible that they are unsound, and that there are others which I have not mentioned. . .
14. The ten modes
....
The fourth mode
This is called the mode of condition, since by ‘condition,’ we mean ‘disposition.’ We say that it covers the
following dispositions:
natural or unnatural;
waking or sleeping;
age;
moving or at rest;
liking or disliking;
hungry or full;
drunk or sober;
predispositions;
brave or cowardly;
sad or happy.
Natural or unnatural.
Things come to us differently depending on whether we are in a natural or an unnatural state. For example,
people suffering from inflammation of the brain or possessed by the gods think they hear demonic voices;
but we do not. Similarly, they often say they can smell incense, or frankincense, or some such, or many other
things, even though we cannot smell them. The same water poured on an inflamed part of the body seems hot
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to the sufferer; but lukewarm to us. The same coat seems reddish to someone with a blood-clot in their eye;
but not to me. The same honey seems sweet to me; but bitter to someone with jaundice.
Suppose someone says that it is an irregular mixture of humours which distorts the perceptual images of
objects when people are in an unnatural state. The reply is that people in good health also have a mixture of
humours. So it could be that the people we describe as in an unnatural state perceive external objects as they
really are, whereas the mixture of humours in healthy people makes them perceive them differently. It is
entirely arbitrary to endow the humours of the sick with the power of distorting objects, but not those of the
healthy. The healthy are in a state which is natural for the healthy, but unnatural for the sick; and the sick are
in a state which is unnatural for the healthy, but natural for the sick. So we must believe the sick as far as
concerns what is natural to them.
Waking or sleeping
We have different perceptual images when we are asleep from when we are awake — we do not have the
same sort of images when we are awake as we do when we are asleep, and we do not have the same sort of
images when we are asleep as we do when we are awake. Consequently, the question of whether they are real
or not is not absolute, but relative — relative to whether we are asleep or awake. So it seems likely that in
sleep we see things which are not absolutely non-existent, but which merely do not exist for us when we are
awake. They are real for us in sleep in the same way as things are real for us when we are awake, even
though we are not aware of them when we are asleep. . . .
19. The slogan ‘not one rather than another’
. . . . So even though the slogan ‘nothing rather than another’ looks like an assertoric claim, we do not use it
this way. We are using it loosely and elliptically — instead of a question, or of saying, ‘I do not know which
of these alternatives I ought to accept or reject.’ It is a question of expressing what appears to us, and we are
indifferent as to the form of words we use to express it. It must be stressed that when we utter the slogan
‘nothing rather than another,’ we are not asserting that it is true and certain of objective reality, but using it to
talk about what appears to us to be the case.
20. Non-assertion
What we say about non-assertion is as follows. There are two senses of ‘assertion’: the ordinary and the
special. In the ordinary sense, it means an utterance which expresses something, whether positive or negative
— for example, ‘It is day,’ or ‘It is not day.’ In the special sense, it is restricted to positive assertions, so that
denials are not called assertions. Non-assertion is abstention from assertion in the ordinary sense (i.e.
covering both the positive and the negative). So non-assertion is a state of mind in which we say neither that
something is, nor that it is not. From this it is obvious that, in the case of non-assertion as well, we do not
take it as meaning that things are objectively such as to give rise to absolute non-assertion. Rather, we make
it known that we, at the time of utterance, are in this mental state regarding the matters in question. And it is
important to note that the things we neither affirm nor deny are dogmatic assertions about what is
imperceptible. For we cannot resist the things which give rise to our sensations, and compel us into accepting
them. . . . .
23. The slogan ‘I determine nothing’
The following is what we say about ‘I determine nothing.’ We think that to determine something is not
merely to say something about it, but to refer to the thing itself as an imperceptible object, and to accept its
existence. It will surely be realised that, since the skeptic does not determine anything in this way, he does
not even determine the slogan ‘I determine nothing.’ For it is not a dogmatic assumption (that is, acceptance
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of something imperceptible), but a verbal expression of our mental state. So when the skeptic says ‘I
determine nothing,’ what he means is ‘I am now in a state of mind such that I neither affirm nor deny
dogmatically any of the matters under discussion.’ And he says this describing what appears to himself on
the subject at issue — not dogmatically, with a display of conviction, but reporting on his feelings. . . . .
27. The slogan ‘For every argument there is an equal and opposite one’
When we say that ‘For every argument there is an equal and opposite one,’ we mean every argument we
have gone through. By argument, we don’t mean ‘argument’ in its everyday sense, but one that purports to
establish something dogmatically (i.e. by reference to imperceptibles) in any way whatever, and not
necessarily by means of premises and conclusions. By equal, we mean equally plausible or implausible; and
opposite is to be taken in the everyday sense of ‘conflicting’. The qualification ‘as it seems to me’ is taken
for granted. So, when I say ‘For every argument there is an equal and opposite one,’ I am in effect saying
‘For every argument I have considered, which purports to establish something dogmatically, it seems to me
that there is another argument purporting to establish something dogmatically, which is opposite to it, and
which is equally plausible or implausible.’ Consequently, uttering these words is not a piece of dogmatism,
but the expression of a human feeling experienced by the subject.
Some formulate the slogan in the following way: ‘For every argument there is to be given an equal and
opposite one.’ That is, they formulate it as an exhortation in the imperative mood: ‘For every argument
which purports to establish something dogmatically, let us give an argument with a dogmatic conclusion,
which is equally plausible or implausible, and which is in conflict with it.’ Their intention is to address the
skeptic, even though they use the infinitive instead of the imperative (‘to be given’ instead of ‘let us give’).
And the reason why they address the skeptic is in case he is tripped up by the dogmatist, and gives up his
questioning of him too soon, thus missing out on the serenity which the skeptics experience, and which they
believe depends on suspension of judgment about everything (as I said earlier).
28. Supplementary remarks on the slogans
I have gone through enough slogans for what is only an outline. Besides, it is possible to deduce the rest from
the ones I have mentioned here.
In the case of all the skeptical slogans, it must be understood right from the start that we make absolutely no
claims as to their truth. We even say that they can be self-defeating, since they refer to themselves as well as
to other things. They are like laxatives, which not only expel fluids from the body, but also expel themselves
together with the fluids.
We also say that we do not use the slogans to make authoritative statements about imperceptible objects
referred to. We do not worry about technical distinctions; and we might even be accused of misusing
language. But it is not appropriate for the skeptic to quibble about words.
Besides, it supports our case to say that even our own slogans do not have absolute meaning, but only
relative to the matter in hand and to us skeptics. In addition, it must also be remembered that we do not utter
them universally about all things, but only about the imperceptible objects of dogmatic research. We say how
things appear to us, but we do not make any positive assertions about the nature of external objects. I think
this is enough to overturn any fallacious arguments brought against any skeptical slogan. . . . .