Self- and Collective Interests in Public Organizations:
An Empirical Investigation
Peter J. Robertson
Associate Professor
School of Policy, Planning, and Development
University of Southern California
Supamas Trivisvavet
Bangkok Metro Company
Feng Wang
Doctoral Candidate
School of Policy, Planning, and Development
University of Southern California
Presented at the
Public Management Research Conference
September, 2005
Self- and Collective Interests in Public Organizations:
An Empirical Investigation
Abstract
Organization and management scholars have long been interested in the question of how to get
individual employees to contribute high levels of effort and performance to their organization’s
collective interests. In addressing this issue, a primary assumption held by many scholars is that
self-interests and collective interests are in conflict, such that appropriate control and incentive
mechanisms must be utilized to insure that employees act in the organization’s interest. In
contrast, other scholars have assumed that there is no inherent conflict between individual and
collective interests, such that employees are readily inclined to contribute to the organization’s
well-being. These two theoretical orientations – labeled here the rational-economic and
humanistic views – thus constitute well-established yet contradictory perspectives regarding the
nature of and relationship between self- and collective interests. The goal of this study is to
empirically investigate the nature of the relationship between self- and collective interests as
perceived by employees themselves. Analysis of data collected from a sample of graduate
students in public service-oriented programs at a major university reveals a complex and
somewhat paradoxical picture of the nature of the conflicts of interest they experience at work.
Findings reveal that, in most cases, the self-interests identified by respondents do not necessarily
run counter to the organization’s overall interests, in that they reflect a desire to make a useful
contribution to the performance of their organization. These findings suggest that the
assumption of an inherent conflict between self- and collective interests is not always valid,
particularly in a public sector context, and that organizational designs and managerial strategies
should take into account the fact that many employees want to contribute more to their
organization than they are given the opportunity to do.
2
Self- and Collective Interests in Public Organizations:
An Empirical Investigation
A fundamental concern in the study of organizational behavior is the question of how best
to get individual employees to contribute high levels of effort and performance to their
organization’s collective interests. In pursuit of this knowledge, various theoretical perspectives
have been brought to bear on questions pertaining to the relationship between self- and collective
interests and how best to use incentives and control mechanisms to achieve greater alignment
between the two. On one hand, the practice and study of organizations has long reflected the
dominant assumption that individuals as well as organizations are rational actors pursuing their
own self-interests in an essentially competitive context in which multiple parties are striving for
limited resources. As a result, many organization and management scholars and practitioners
have readily assumed that self- and collective interests are inherently at odds (Cyert & March,
1963; Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1988), and thus have focused on the incentives that would
help align individual action with collective interests and the controls that would help constrain or
prevent individuals from acting in ways that are counter-productive for the organization. The
use of employment contracts, compensation systems, performance appraisals and monitoring
mechanisms in organizations reflect their desire to mitigate the pursuit of self-interest by
individual employees.
In contrast, other scholars have argued that this belief – that self- and collective interests
are in conflict – is too readily assumed but not necessarily an adequate reflection of human
nature. This perspective holds that individual interests oftentimes are compatible with
organizational interests, or that the two sets of interests are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
For example, it has been noted that employees can pursue their self-interests by accomplishing
3
organizational missions and values (Perry & Wise, 1990), and they can derive satisfaction
through work that enables them to fulfill their higher-order needs (Herzberg, 1968). In other
words, the intrinsic interests of individuals may naturally lead them to act in ways that are
beneficial to the organization. According to this view, external incentives and controls derived
from rational-economic assumptions about human nature can actually discourage the potential
collective orientation of employees (Donaldson, 1995; Ostrom, 2000; Perrow, 1986). Greater
autonomy, discretion, and involvement in decision-making are typically advocated as means
through which to tap into employees’ desire to perform well and contribute to organizational
performance.
These alternative theoretical perspectives thus make very different assumptions about
human nature and the relationship between self- and collective interests in organizations. While
these contrasting assumptions have typically been used, explicitly or implicitly, as the starting
point for research into organizational phenomena, empirical investigation of the actual
relationship between self- and collective interests in organizational settings remains quite
limited. Given the alternative perspectives regarding this issue, we believe that more research on
this topic is warranted. Thus, the study presented below explores the nature of self- and
collective interests as perceived by individuals, focusing in particular on the nature of the
conflicts of interest, or incompatibility between self- and collective interests, identified by
individuals in reference to their own work experiences. Our data, collected from masters-level
students in public service-oriented programs at a major university, enable us to discern different
categories of conflicts of interest identified by the respondents in our sample and thus to evaluate
the nature of the relationship between self- and collective interests reflected in these various
types of conflict. The results enable us to address our primary research question: How do
4
people perceive the relationship between their own self-interests and the interests of the
organization for which they work?
In the remainder of the paper, we first provide an overview of the two main theoretical
perspectives pertaining to the relationship between self- and collective interests in organizations.
Next, we describe the research methods utilized to collect and analyze the data, followed by an
overview of the results of this analysis. The paper concludes with a discussion of some
implications of these results.
Theoretical Perspectives
In this section, we review the two major theoretical perspectives relevant to our research
focus, which we label the rational-economic and the humanistic views. Under the rationaleconomic view, we discuss bureaucratic-hierarchical organizational theory and neo-institutional
economic theory. Under the humanistic view, we address communitarian theory and
collaboration theory. These theoretical orientations can be seen as reflecting an historical shift in
basic assumptions regarding human nature and behavior, away from a belief in the most
narrowly-defined rational, self-interested individuals toward greater recognition of the
willingness and ability of individuals to act in more collaborative, other-oriented ways.
The Rational-Economic View
The underlying assumption of the rational-economic perspective is that individuals are
atomistic agents who rationally pursue those courses of action that maximize their own selfinterests and are primarily motivated by economic considerations. This view was described by
McGregor (1960) in terms of a set of “Theory X” assumptions regarding human nature, which
include the premises that employees are by nature lazy and dislike work, they are reluctant to
contribute to organizational objectives, they work only for money and security, and thus they
5
need to be directed and controlled by the organization’s management. Given these assumptions,
the objective of organizations is to control individual behavior to be consistent with
organizational interests and goals – i.e., efficiency, productivity, and stability – by rationalizing
and economizing organizational structures and processes. Tasks are designed according to the
classical economic principles of division of labor and efficiency maximization (Taylor, 1911;
Fayol, 1949; Gulick & Urwick, 1937). Control is achieved primarily through authority systems,
written rules and regulations, and coercion and punishment, along with the use of incentives such
as compensation and career advancement. In short, organizational design, administrative
arrangements, and management approaches adhere to the bureaucratic-hierarchical form (Weber,
1947).
More recently, neo-institutional or organizational economics has emerged as a popular
theoretical perspective that applies rational-economic assumptions to organizational analysis
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Coleman, 1990; Fama, 1980; Williamson, 1975). Neo-institutional
economics relaxes the narrow assumptions of economic rationality by incorporating ideas from
the Carnegie school of behavioral decision-making (March & Simon, 1958) that emphasizes the
assumption of bounded rationality. Neo-institutional economic scholars argue that this extension
or modification of the rational-economic perspective is a departure from its much-criticized
simplistic and negative view of human nature. Nevertheless, the underlying assumption remains
that individuals are intendedly rational, primarily self-interested, and readily opportunistic.
Thus, it is believed that individuals are likely to shirk, withhold effort, or act with guile in order
to pursue their own interests (Kidwell & Bennett, 1993; Williamson, 1994), and the divergence
of self and collective interests remains a key problem (Robertson & Tang, 1995). In other
6
words, self-interests are seen to be in conflict with collective interests, and self-interests precede
collective interests as the determinants of individuals’ decisions and actions.
These premises are reflected in such neo-institutional approaches as agency theory,
public choice theory, and collective action theory. Agency theory emphasizes the relationship
between principals (e.g., managers) and agents (e.g., employees) and posits that: a) the principal
cannot perfectly and costlessly acquire information about the agent’s skills and behaviors; b) the
principal cannot perfectly and costlessly monitor the agent; and c) the interests of the principal
and agent differ and the agent will not honor their covenant unless controlled by the principal
(Barney & Hesterly, 1996; Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1994). Likewise, in public choice and
collective action theory (Downs, 1967; Olson, 1965), self- and collective interests are seen as
usually being in conflict and individual employees are not expected to contribute to the collective
good. Scholars adhering to these theories argue that individual contributions to the collective
interest have characteristics of a public good – the collective outcome or accomplishment of
shared objectives is non-rivalrous and non-excludable, such that rational self-interested
individuals are more likely to free-ride than to contribute (Stevens, 1993).
Based on the assumption of rational agents whose self-interests are in conflict with those
of principals and organizations, agency theorists argue for the need to adopt incentive,
monitoring, and control mechanisms that align the interests of principals and agents and/or
prevent agents from pursuing their self-interests at the expense of the principal or the
organization. Following the same logic, scholars attempting to solve collective action problems
advocate the use of various mechanisms that encourage individuals to contribute to collective
interests by forsaking the pursuit of their self-interests, making individual contributions (or the
lack thereof) more distinguishable and thus subject to appropriate incentive or sanction
7
mechanisms (Wilson, 1995). While these neo-institutional scholars often propose external
incentive and control mechanisms to mitigate agency, public choice, and collective action
problems, some also advocate the use of credible commitment, trust, and norms of reciprocity to
complement the external mechanisms (Miller, 2000; Ostrom, 2000; Robertson & Tang, 1995).
Despite the significant influence of the rational-economic perspective on both the theory
and practice of organizations, it has also been subject to considerable criticism over the years.
For example, the bureaucratic-hierarchical model of organization has long been criticized for
being dysfunctional and pathological (Crozier, 1964; Merton, 1940) and for inhibiting human
growth and development (Argyris, 1957). In particular, the structures and processes associated
with a command-and-control approach to management have been identified as contributing to a
lack of organizational flexibility, responsiveness, and adaptability and reducing employee
satisfaction, morale, and creativity. Furthermore, the primary emphasis on monetary incentives
and external control mechanisms resulting from this perspective is seen as reinforcing egocentric
behavior and lowering the prospects for more collaborative behavior that advances the
organization’s interests (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003; Ostrom,
1999). In short, it is suggested that management practices driven by this pessimistic view of
human nature may actually generate and/or justify the negative behaviors anticipated by the
theory (Donaldson, 1995; Perrow, 1986), thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that can
undermine organizational effectiveness.
The Humanistic View
Challenging the core premises of the rational-economic perspective, the humanistic view
reflects a broader orientation regarding human nature and the motivations underlying human
behavior. For example, in contrast to the “Theory X” assumptions noted above, McGregor
8
(1960) articulated a set of “Theory Y” beliefs that capture the essence of the humanistic
perspective. These include the notion that individuals are not by nature self-centered and lazy,
but rather are willing to work hard, assume responsibility, and be self-directed. Such
assumptions served as the foundation for considerable effort by those affiliated with the
Organization Development movement to bring about changes in bureaucratic-hierarchical
organizations to make them more compatible with this humanistic perspective (Burke, 1982;
French & Bell, 1973). Generally speaking, the goal of these efforts has been to create
organizations that provide greater opportunity for employees to pursue their higher-order needs
for self-esteem and self-actualization (Maslow, 1943), rather than focusing primarily on their
lower-order survival and security needs.
Compatible with this humanistic perspective, communitarian theory (Bellah, Madsen,
Sullivan, Swidler & Tipton, 1985; Etzioni, 1996) argues that the concept of individuals as
atomistic, egocentric, rational agents pursing only their self-interests is a product of an
inadequate paradigm and does not really reflect the true nature of human beings (Sen, 1977), not
even in their economic transactions (Collard, 1978). Communitarians claim instead that
individuals are both rational and social agents at the same time, pursuing both self-interests and
moral values. They posit that people want to be part of and identify with a group, organization,
or community – something larger than themselves (Bellah et al., 1985; Sen, 1999) – and they
want to contribute to the collective good. For example, the human ability to have sympathy for
others and to demonstrate commitment to other-oriented values and principles is a clear
departure from the self-interested focus posited by the rational-economic view (Farina, Hahn &
Vannucci, 1996; Sen, 1977).
9
When individual self-interests are in conflict with social-moral values and commitments,
communitarian theory suggests that the latter usually supersede the former as the basis for
individual decision-making (Etzioni, 1988; Selznick, 1992). In other words, while recognizing
the role of both social and economic factors as determinants of human behavior, communitarians
emphasize the overriding role of the former, i.e., the collectivity before the atomistic self.
Furthermore, to encourage social and moral behavior among individuals, communitarian scholars
generally advocate participation, involvement, and engagement in collective, civic, and social
activities and processes. This is based on the premise that greater alignment between self- and
collective interests can be readily fostered through the use of a combination of economic
incentives and intrinsic motivational factors. A natural result of such a strategy can be an
internalized, rather than incentivized or induced, moral commitment towards the collective good.
The humanistic view is also reflected in a variety of theoretical orientations, analytical
frameworks, and practical strategies that can be subsumed under the rubric of collaboration
theory (Robertson, 1999; Wood & Gray, 1991). Generally speaking, collaboration theorists
believe that individuals are inherently collaborative and/or have considerable social-moral
potential to pursue collective interests. While not denying the existence of self-interested
behavior, this perspective also suggests that, due to the self-fulfilling prophecy noted above,
some of this behavior is actually the consequence of the various approaches and mechanisms
used by bureaucratic hierarchies to prevent dysfunctional pursuit of self-interest by employees.
Furthermore, it is commonly argued that the old model of organizing based on the rationaleconomic perspective is no longer functional in the dynamic, networked systems of an
information-based society (Cleveland, 1985; Drucker, 1988; Peters, 1988). It is thus posited that
new organizational structures, management approaches, and incentive mechanisms more
10
consistent with collaborative assumptions could have a number of positive benefits, for example,
enhancing motivation and willingness to perform (Lawler, 1986), increasing the level of
organizational citizenship behavior (Organ, 1988), improving the quality of team-based work
(Cohen, 1993; Hackman & Walton, 1986), facilitating high levels of morale and creativity
(Haskins, Liedtka, & Rosenblum, 1998), supporting the use of win-win approaches to problem
resolution (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Levine, 1998), and allowing for greater systemic coordination
(Hammer & Champy, 1993).
Another premise of collaboration theory is that there is no inherent conflict between the
self-interests of individuals and the collective interests of organizations, since the well-being of
any system is interdependent with the well-being of its component parts (Harder, Robertson, &
Woodward, 2004). For example, research on organizational culture has popularized the notion
that organizational effectiveness can be enhanced when employees are bound together by shared
beliefs, values, and practices (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Denison & Mishra, 1995), since they are
then naturally inclined to protect and advance their collective interests. Likewise, considerable
evidence suggests that organizations that better meet the needs and expectations of their
members perform more effectively (Pfeffer, 1998). To establish this pattern of mutual benefit,
the role of managers and leaders is to articulate a collective vision and reinforce shared values
that intrinsically motivate employees and facilitate the development of their collaborative
capacity (Collins & Porras, 1994; Schein, 1985). In other words, instead of using traditional
principal-agent management strategies that rely on hierarchical authority to direct and control
employees, collaboration-oriented scholars advocate a stewardship approach to management
(Block, 1993; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997) that focuses on meeting the needs of
11
various stakeholders while serving the interests of the organization as a whole (Dicke, 2002;
Gibson, 2000).
Like communitarianism, collaboration theory promotes the humanistic notion that
organizations can benefit from design features and managerial practices that are oriented towards
sharing power with employees by increasing levels of co-leadership, self-management,
empowerment, autonomy, and participation (Bennis, 2000; Collins, 1997; Hock, 1999; Purser &
Cabana, 1998; Quinn & Spreitzer, 1997). Yet these recommendations are not without criticism
from those who are skeptical about the viability of relying on employees’ goodwill and/or
creating a culture in which shared interests take priority over the conflicting interests that
inevitably arise under conditions of scarce resources. Critics argue that the premise that
individuals are moral in nature, able to trust and be trusted, and willing to collaborate and
contribute to organizational goals is overly optimistic and under-estimates the pervasiveness of
self-interest, the significance of existing power relations, and the risks of establishing reciprocal
relationships (Albanese, Dacin, & Harris, 1997).
Research Focus
As indicated by the above discussion, these two key theoretical perspectives constitute
well-established yet contradictory explanations regarding the nature of and relationship between
self- and collective interests, with contrasting implications for the design and management of
organizations. The rational-economic view tends to see these interests as being in conflict, with
employees naturally inclined to pursue their own self-interests at the expense of the organization,
whereas the humanistic view tends to believe that self- and collective interests are not necessarily
at odds, with employees readily willing to act in ways that benefit the organization. In other
words, the former perspective primarily reflects a “zero-sum” orientation regarding the
12
relationship between self- and collective interests, while the latter approach is more open to the
possibility of a “positive-sum” relationship. Assuming that each perspective has some validity,
one conclusion is that the nature of the relationship between self- and collective interests is rather
complex, with their compatibility or incompatibility likely to be a function of the particular
interests, people, and organizations involved.
Given this conclusion, a number of interesting questions can be posed: How do people
perceive the relationship between self- and collective interests in an organizational context? Do
they tend to perceive more conflict or more alignment between their own personal interests and
those of the organizations they work for? What are the kinds of conflicts of interest that are most
salient to them? Despite the fact that the two alternative theoretical perspectives reviewed above
have each provided the foundation for a considerable body of organizational research, there has
not been much empirical research directly addressing these kinds of issues. In other words,
many scholars have based their research on one or the other of these two perspectives without
explicitly investigating their underlying assumptions regarding the nature of the relationship
between self- and collective interests. In light of this tendency, the goal of this study is to
empirically investigate the question of how employees characterize the nature of the conflicts
they experience between their own self-interests and the collective interests of their
organizations. By adopting an exploratory approach using an open-ended questionnaire, our
intent is to explore this issue without imposing a priori either of the two theoretical perspectives.
Methods
Sample and Data Collection
The sample was comprised of graduate students in public administration, public policy,
and health administration enrolled in an organizational behavior course at a large western
13
university, most of whom were also working either as part-time or full-time employees. Data
were collected from a total of 182 respondents over an eight-year period, from 1994 to 2002.
For analytical purposes (as described below), the full sample was divided into two subsets. The
first includes the 69 respondents from whom data, but not demographic information, were
collected between 1994 and 1996. The second includes the 113 respondents from whom data
were collected between 1997 and 2002. According to the demographic information they
provided, the mean age of this sub-sample was 27 years, and 58 percent of them were women.
About 60 percent of the respondents were working full-time, while only 30 percent of them had
work experience in a managerial position. Respondents had been working in their organization,
either full-time or part-time, for an average of 32 months.
Data were collected through the use of a short questionnaire comprised of five openended questions that asked respondents to describe particular experiences at work and certain
attitudes towards their organization. Prior to completing the questionnaire, the respondents were
informed that the information they provided was to be used for a research project, that their
participation was completely voluntary (i.e., they could elect not to fill out the questionnaire),
and that their responses would remain entirely anonymous. The analysis for this study focuses
on the responses to only one of the five questions. In order to explore how individuals
characterize the conflicts they experience between their own self-interests and the interests of
their organization, respondents were asked to “briefly describe two or three types of situations
that are common or typical in your work experience, in which you perceive some degree of
incompatibility between your own ‘self-interest’ (i.e., your own needs, interests, values, etc.) and
the ‘collective interests’ of the organization you work for (i.e., organizational needs, interests,
values, etc.).” Their responses served as the data set regarding the types of conflicts between
14
self- and collective interests experienced by the individuals in this sample. Since most
respondents provided more than one answer, there was a total of 331 responses that were each
coded separately.
Data Coding and Analysis
The data collected between 1994 and 1996 were used to create a coding scheme with
which to code the responses and to establish adequate inter-rater reliability between the two
researchers doing the coding. After creating an initial set of coding categories based on a
preliminary overview of the responses, the two coders independently coded the 129 responses
from these 69 respondents in four stages. First, ten questionnaires were coded to ascertain
whether the set of coding categories needed to be clarified or modified. After making some
changes and developing a better shared understanding of the categories, approximately half of
the questionnaires (including the initial ten) were coded, with an inter-rater reliability of 81.5%.
After meeting with the senior author to discuss the coding conflicts and to further clarify the
remaining ambiguity, the two coders coded the remaining responses from the 1994-1996 data,
but this time with a reduced inter-rater reliability of 70.3%. After another discussion of the
coding conflicts intended to reduce these differences by fine-tuning the coding categories, all the
responses from the 1994-1996 data were coded again, this time resulting in a solid inter-rater
reliability of 90.6%.
This process generated a set of seven categories reflecting different types of conflicts
between self-interests and collective interests as perceived by these respondents. These seven
categories focus on: 1) the amount of time devoted to work activities; 2) preferred organizational
missions, goals, and values; 3) job descriptions and task priorities; 4) opportunities for personal
growth or advancement; 5) the nature of the work environment; 6) the level of employee input
15
and autonomy concerning work-related activities; and 7) the level of compensation and
recognition. Using this final set of coding categories, the two coders then coded all the responses
from the entire sample, achieving an overall inter-rater reliability of 87.8%. All coding conflicts
were resolved through a discussion among all three researchers. Fifteen responses did not fit into
any of the seven categories or did not seem to reflect any incompatibility between individual and
organizational interests. These responses were omitted from the analysis.
Each of the seven types of conflict identified through the coding process included two or
more conflict themes that, while similar enough to be grouped into the same category, also
demonstrated subtle differences. The analysis entailed an assessment of the nature of these
issues in terms of the extent to which the self-interests and the organizational interests specified
or implied by the responses are indeed in conflict with each other. In particular, an attempt was
made to ascertain whether the two sets of interests reflect a zero-sum relationship, as suggested
by the rational-economic perspective, or whether the conflicts of interest can be understood as a
positive-sum situation, more compatible with the humanistic perspective. The results of this
analysis are presented next.
Results
The frequency distribution of responses for the seven types of individual-organizational
conflict is summarized in Table 1. These categories and the themes in each category are
described below, with representative responses for each theme provided in the Appendix.
Table 1
Frequency Distribution of Responses across Conflict of Interest Categories
Types of
Conflicts
Time
Frequency
Percentage
75
23.7
Organizational Job description
Personal
mission
and task
growth and
and values
priorities
advancement
63
19.9
46
14.6
40
12.7
16
Work
environment
Individual
input and
autonomy
Compensation
and recognition
35
11.1
33
10.4
24
7.6
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Time. The most frequent type of incompatibility between self- and organizational
interests noted by these respondents (23.7% of the responses) are conflicts regarding the amount
of time devoted to the organization. These time conflicts can be categorized into three themes:
a. work time vs. personal or leisure time – most of the responses indicated that individuals
desire to put less time into their work and more time into other activities, or they would
prefer more flexibility regarding when they work or how they allocate their time between
work and non-work activities;
b. work time vs. family time – family responsibilities were mentioned several times, with
respondents indicating that an excessive amount of time devoted to work was
incompatible with their desire to spend more time with their families or in other social
activities;
c. work time vs. study-related time – many responses indicated that the amount of time
allocated to work was incompatible with individuals’ desire to pursue personal
development activities such as education or career training, which is not surprising since
most of the respondents were trying to balance their jobs with their graduate education.
This type of conflict reflects employees’ perceptions that their organizations want them to
work more and/or to put work first and comply with organizational rules regarding work time
and scheduling. However, employees also have other priorities (leisure, family, and school) to
which they want to allocate time. Since time is a limited resource, this category of conflict
constitutes a zero-sum situation. However, it should be noted that these time conflicts do not
suggest that employees simply desire to minimize their time at work. In fact, many of the
respondents identified this as a conflict when their organizations expect or demand extra work
17
time (after hours or weekends), which interferes with what is supposed to be their well-deserved
personal time. Thus, their self-interest in this context does not seem to be a desire to shirk or
withhold effort, but rather to maintain what they see as a fair balance between work and nonwork activities while fulfilling their basic obligations to their organization.
Organizational mission and values. Incompatibilities regarding the preferred
organizational mission or values are the second most frequently reported type of conflict (19.9%
of the responses). Most of the responses in this category reflect differences of opinion regarding
what the organization should stand for, or what strategies and practices should be adopted to
improve organizational performance. The responses reflect two main themes:
a. conflicts regarding primary organizational missions, objectives, and/or strategies – such
conflicts arise because employees perceive that the stated mission or goals of the
organization are not reflected in its priorities as expressed through its actions;
b. conflicts regarding underlying ideologies and values – these responses suggested a lack
of congruence between the respondents’ personal beliefs and moral or ethical practices in
the organization, such as the perceived organizational interest in maintaining its tradition,
culture, and power structure even though employees might not deem them ethical or
moral.
The conflicts in this category clearly do not originate from a purely selfish logic on the
part of employees. Instead, these conflicts arise when people perceive that their organizations
are not upholding socially and/or morally desirable missions, goals, strategies, or values. In
essence, the responses in this category suggest that employees want their organizations to
maintain their integrity by using appropriate means to achieve desirable ends – in short, they
want their organizations to be good. Such conflicts thus do not appear to be zero-sum in nature,
18
and can reasonably be viewed as positive-sum situations in that the individuals’ self-interests are
compatible with what they see as the collective interests of the organization. Furthermore, it is
possible that organizations could benefit from increased employee satisfaction, motivation, and
commitment if their actions were more congruent with the missions and values desired by their
employees. While organizational actions may well be driven by a set of interests that are not
compatible with those of their employees, the responses in this category do not indicate that
employees are unconcerned about their organization’s well-being.
Job description and task priorities. Conflicts regarding job descriptions and task
priorities comprise the third most frequently reported category (14.6% of the responses). Most
of these issues reflect differences of opinion between the individual and the organization
regarding which tasks are most important, who should perform a particular task, and/or the best
way to accomplish tasks. This category can also be grouped into two main themes:
a. conflicts about the type and scope of work – these arise when employees are not clear
about or satisfied with the job or tasks they are required to perform;
b. conflicts about how to do and prioritize work – respondents indicated that their ideas
regarding the best way to perform their jobs or accomplish particular tasks were
sometimes incompatible with the information or requirements specified by the
organization.
Similar to the previous category of conflicts, the issues raised concerning job and task
requirements do not reflect a desire on the part of employees to do less work or to simply avoid
doing what the organization needs or wants them to do. Rather, these conflicts tend to reflect
their dissatisfaction with having to do what they perceive as menial tasks instead of being able to
make a more significant contribution to the organization, or their frustration with ill-defined job
19
descriptions that leave them confused about what they should be focusing on. In other words,
some of the incompatibilities between self- and collective interests identified by these employees
reflect their desire to add more value to the organization than they are given the opportunity to
do. The organization may, of course, have good reasons for maintaining constraints and/or
ambiguity regarding the tasks employees are expected or required to perform. But it is worth
noting, then, that the conflict of interest here is between employees who want to do more and
organizations that act to limit them. To the extent that meeting employees’ needs for greater
clarity or responsibility could serve to increase their effectiveness, the potential exists for a winwin resolution to this conflict.
Personal growth and advancement. Ranking fourth in frequency (12.7% of the
responses), this category includes employees’ concerns regarding insufficient opportunities for
personal development or advancement in their organizations. While their self-interests reflect a
desire to learn new skills, take on new challenges, or advance to higher positions, they perceived
their organizations as unwilling or unable to facilitate this process or provide the necessary
experiences. This type of conflict can be divided into two main themes:
a. incompatibilities regarding opportunities to develop new skills and/or to take on new
challenges at work – these conflicts arise when the organization is perceived as not
willing or able to facilitate the training and education of employees;
b. incompatibilities regarding opportunities for promotion and career advancement –
employees experience these conflicts when they think they deserve to be promoted but
they are instead expected to remain in their current position.
On one hand, the conflicts in this category might be characterized as zero-sum in that the
resources available for training and development and the number of higher-level positions in the
20
organization are invariably limited, with more claims on them than typically can be
accommodated. Furthermore, organizations may believe it is not in their interest to invest in the
education of their employees only to have them leave after they have acquired new and improved
skills. Thus, some of the respondents perceived that their organization hired them only to do
their current job, not to prepare them better for their future career. On the other hand, the
conflicts in this category once again reflect the fact that some employees want to take on more
responsibility and make a more significant contribution to their organization, with these selfinterests undermined by organizational structures and cultures that prevent this from happening.
In this sense, there is a positive-sum quality to these conflicts as well, in that meeting employees’
needs for greater growth and advancement might also have positive effects for the organization.
Work environment. Conflicts of interest regarding the nature of the work environment
are the fifth category (11.1% of the responses), reflecting employees’ dissatisfaction with
particular working conditions and/or discomfort with relational aspects of their work contexts.
The responses in this category can be grouped into two main themes:
a. issues involving relationships with people in the work place such as co-workers,
supervisors, or clients – this theme reflects respondents’ frustration from having to
interact with unpleasant people or deal with challenging interpersonal relationships at
work;
b. issues concerning the organizational structure or culture – these reflect negative reactions
by employees to norms or conditions they perceive as not conducive to personal or
organizational effectiveness.
Both of these themes reflect situations in which the employees dislike some feature of the
work setting but are expected to tolerate it because, presumably, the organization is unwilling or
21
unable to change the undesirable conditions. In other words, while the social context in which
people work impacts their feelings and attitudes, organizations may be inclined to treat these
features as givens and thus not allocate the time, attention, and/or resources needed to bring
about meaningful improvements. Individuals then experience a conflict of interest when they
perceive their organization as indifferent to their desire for a positive work environment. From
this perspective, such conflicts may appear to be zero-sum in nature, in that the organizational
costs associated with trying to change the work environment may easily outweigh the benefits to
be gained by individuals unhappy with the status quo. From the employees’ perspective,
however, the conflict may seem to be more positive-sum if they assume the organization as a
whole would be better off if the work environment were more supportive of happy, productive
workers.
Individual input and autonomy. The sixth category (10.4% of the responses) includes
incompatibilities regarding respondents’ level of input and autonomy concerning their workrelated activities. The issues identified indicate that employees desire greater input into
decisions that affect them as well as appropriate discretion over their own duties. Respondents
expressed frustration with their organizations’ tendency to exert too much control, which
precludes individuals from being able to make the decisions that affect the quality of their own
work. These conflicts can be grouped into two themes:
a. input and autonomy regarding specific work-related issues – these issues reflect
individuals’ desire to be able to do their work more independently and/or to provide more
input into decisions about the work they do, rather than being overly constrained by
organizational rules and practices;
22
b. input and autonomy regarding more general issues – these issues reflect individuals’
frustration with organizational constraints regarding personal or broader organizational
issues and/or their inability to influence the nature of these constraints.
The conflicts in this category reflect a preference among employees for being able to
exert greater influence over their work life rather than being bound by organizational constraints
they see as unnecessary or counterproductive. For their part, organizations may be reluctant to
increase the level of employee autonomy and input, as this would likely require costly and/or
difficult changes in existing policies and procedures, not to mention in the organizational culture
and/or power structure. To the extent that there is an inevitable tradeoff between organizational
control and employee discretion, this conflict of interest can be viewed as a zero-sum situation.
However, some of the responses indicated that employees believed that their relative lack of
input and autonomy undermined their ability to perform their jobs effectively, and that they
desired greater influence over their work so as to be able to improve their performance. While
time, energy, and resources would have to be allocated to the process of making the necessary
changes, the possibility exists that efforts to empower employees could pay off in terms of
greater morale and effectiveness. From this perspective, then, there is also a positive-sum
quality to this conflict, with the possibility of a win-win solution that would benefit employees
and their organizations.
Compensation and recognition. The last category of conflicts, mentioned least
frequently by these respondents (7.6% of the responses), has to do with the rewards received by
employees in exchange for the work they perform for the organization. This category can be
divided into two rather distinct themes:
23
a. extrinsic rewards – these concerns focused primarily on the level of compensation or pay
received by the employee;
b. intrinsic rewards – these concerns focused primarily on the amount of recognition they
were given by the organization in return for a job well-done.
The basic issue reflected in this category is the employees’ desire for more extrinsic
and/or intrinsic rewards than the organization was providing, or their frustration with
organizational demands for more or higher levels of work without any corresponding increase in
compensation or recognition. Clearly, salary or wage issues are essentially a zero-sum conflict,
with employees typically seeking higher levels of pay and organizations desiring to minimize
their costs while having a limited budget to allocate among a host of competing demands. In
contrast, it is not inherently costly to the organization to provide higher levels of recognition and
other intrinsic rewards, such that it is not clear why it would be in an organization’s interest to
limit the amount of appreciation communicated to its employees. In other words, incompatibility
regarding the level of recognition desired and provided does not seem to constitute a zero-sum
conflict, and organizational efforts to insure that employees feel valued and appreciated could
readily improve morale and, in turn, encourage higher levels of performance.
Discussion
Overall, the findings from this study indicate that the incompatibilities between
individual and organizational interests experienced by the respondents in our sample cover a
broad range of issues, presenting a rather complicated and even paradoxical picture of the nature
of these apparent conflicts of interest. Taken together, the data do not yield an image of
employees who are reluctant to contribute to their organization’s goals, who wish to minimize
their level of effort and responsibility, or who are inclined to pursue their own interests at the
24
expense of their organization. Instead, the concerns they raised suggest that they want to
perform their jobs well, to increase their capacity and opportunity to add value, and to be part of
an effective and humane organization. Most of their frustrations stemmed from organizational
tendencies to constrain their behavior, discount their priorities, and undervalue their
contributions. All in all, the data describe employees who desire to help their organization
succeed but who feel that their ability to do so is sometimes undermined by organizational
policies and practices.
One important conclusion, then, is that the conflicts of interest identified by the
respondents in this study do not, for the most part, reflect the kind of zero-sum situations in
which narrowly defined self-interests are inherently at odds with the collective interests of the
organization. Only a few of the issues and a minority of the responses focused on conflicts in
which meeting the employees’ needs would have a clear and direct cost to the organization
without any compensating benefits. In particular, organizations’ desire to have employees
allocate more of their time to work is naturally incompatible with employees’ desire to allocate
more of their time to their families, their studies, and other personal and leisure activities.
Likewise, even though employees’ want better compensation and more opportunities for
promotion and advancement, budget constraints and a limited number of higher level positions
constrain organizations’ ability to respond to these desires. In such cases, the conflicts of interest
cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of both the individual and the organization, and each
employee must determine whether the basic conditions of exchange (pay and promotion potential
in return for time and effort invested) are sufficient to remain with the organization.
In contrast, many of the situations described by the respondents reflect issues where the
organizations’ interests are not as straightforward, and thus potential may exist for resolving the
25
conflicts in ways that benefit the individual as well as the organization. When employees have
concerns about the mission, objectives, or strategies being pursued by the organization, it may be
useful to understand the basis for their reservations and make adaptations as appropriate, since
congruence between organizational and individual missions and values can increase employee
commitment and contribute to an effective organizational culture (Balfour & Wechsler, 1996;
Cooke & Rousseau, 1988; Wilkins & Patterson, 1985). Likewise, employee frustration with job
descriptions and task assignments could motivate the organization to reconsider its division of
labor and standard operating procedures and make changes that would improve the overall
effectiveness of its operations. While modifications of the organization’s priorities as reflected
in its mission, strategies, structure, and processes certainly require time, effort, and resources,
such changes could improve organizational flexibility and responsiveness and thereby create net
gains in its performance. Rather than viewing these conflicts simply as dysfunctional employee
dissatisfaction with the organizational status quo, they could instead stimulate the kind of
continuous improvement that has been acknowledged as an important component of highperforming organizations (Cohen & Brand, 1993; Schmidt & Finnigan, 1992).
It also seems clear that organizations could benefit from finding ways to utilize more of
the potential of their human resources. Many of the respondents indicated that they would like to
do more interesting or significant work, have more meaningful input into decisions, and/or be
given more opportunities to develop and apply their skills and abilities. The primary barriers to
meeting these needs appear to be rooted in bureaucratic practices that reflect organizational
preferences for predictability, stability, and control. The key question, then, is how the various
costs and benefits associated with this traditional approach compare to the costs and benefits
associated with contemporary approaches that focus on more effective utilization of an
26
organization’s human assets (Dess & Picken, 1999; Lawler, 1992; Pfeffer, 1998). Giving
employees more autonomy and discretion, providing them with opportunities for on-going
training and development, factoring their knowledge and preferences into relevant decisions, and
recognizing them for their good work could reap considerable benefits in terms of higher levels
of satisfaction, motivation, commitment, and productivity that would offset the downside to the
organization of implementing such changes.
Whether or not organizations would indeed benefit from relaxing bureaucratic constraints
that employees experience as undesirable and counterproductive, the data from this study do not
provide much support for the rational-economic view regarding the nature of the relationship
between individual and collective interests in organizations. The fact that only a few of the
respondents expressed a desire for better compensation indicates that economic issues are not
first and foremost in these employees minds. Indeed, a number of them pointed out that,
although they felt their pay was relatively low, the opportunity to do interesting and/or
meaningful work served as a worthwhile trade-off. More generally, most of the self-interests
identified by these respondents, while incompatible with some of the organization’s interests,
were also compatible with others. By and large, these employees identified self-interests that,
from their perspective, are congruent with the collective interests of a good, effective
organization. This pattern of evidence is more compatible with the humanistic view, which is
optimistic about the possibility of alignment between individual and organizational interests.
The nature of the sample may have influenced these findings. In particular, since the
respondents were graduate students in public-oriented programs, they display the tendency found
among public sector employees to be driven more by missions and values (Balfour & Wechsler,
1996; Buchanan, 1974; Perry & Wise, 1990; Rainey, 1982). Given the respondents’ intentions to
27
pursue professional or managerial careers in a public service context, it is not surprising if they
tend to develop normative rather than simply utilitarian relationships with their organizations
(Etzioni, 1961). It would be inappropriate, however, to assume that other groups of employees –
for example, those working in the private sector, or those not in graduate school – would identify
the same kinds of conflicts of interest and display a similar pattern of alignment with their
organizations. But to the extent that the sample for this study represents an important and
valuable component of the public sector workforce, the findings outlined above provide useful
insights regarding the kinds of organizational features and management practices they desire. It
is reasonable to assume that organizations that adopt these features and practices will be more
likely to attract and retain talented and dedicated employees like those in this sample.
On the other hand, continued reliance on bureaucratic control mechanisms may have
dysfunctional consequences in terms of the attitudes and behavior of valuable employees. This,
of course, has long been a primary message conveyed by advocates of the humanistic
perspective, and the notion that public organizations will be more effective if they shed some of
the trappings of bureaucracy seems to have gained some traction in recent years (Barzelay, 1992;
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Unfortunately, efforts to implement the requisite changes are still
readily undermined by continued adherence to the belief – among practitioners as well as
scholars – that such design features or managerial practices as flexible work arrangements,
participative decision-making, greater discretion for lower-level workers, investment in human
resource development, and pleasant work climate are inefficient, impractical, or irrelevant
(McCaffrey, Faerman, & Hart, 1995; Reger, Gustafson, DeMarie, & Mullane, 1994). Many
managers, for example, are reluctant to give up power and control, and many are unwilling or
unable to create a motivating environment for their employees. Among scholars, the ascendancy
28
of the “new public management” movement (Kettl, 1997; Lynn, 1998) – rooted primarily in the
rational-economic perspective – serves to maintain and reinforce the focus on efficiency,
predictability, and accountability that is also reflected in bureaucratic designs and practices. It is
little wonder, then, that efforts to de-bureaucratize public organizations (rather than simply
privatizing them) are frequently unsuccessful or have limited, incremental success (Brudney,
Hebert, & Wright, 1999; Thompson, 2000).
In essence, the rational-economic perspective reflects the premise, implicitly if not
explicitly, that the potential downside of such organizational features as increased discretion,
relaxed constraints, and more broad-based decision processes is greater than their potential
upside. But the findings from this study suggest that the opposite may be true, at least for this
group of young, talented, achievement-oriented public service professionals. One useful line of
research in the field of public management would be to investigate this issue more directly and
explicitly. Rather than simply assuming what costs or benefits would accrue to one or another
approach to organization design and management, it would be useful to assess empirically an
array of positive and negative consequences of varying organizational arrangements in order to
accumulate data regarding the trade-offs involved. Rather than relying primarily on ideological
foundations as the basis for recommendations regarding design and management issues, it would
be helpful to have more valid information regarding the actual effects of alternative
arrangements on organizations and their employees. In short, more research that helped to
answer the complex questions raised by the two theoretical perspectives considered in this study
would be a valuable contribution to the field.
29
References
Albanese, R. A., Dacin, M. T. and Harris, I. C. (1997). Agents as stewards. The Academy of
Management Review, 223: 609-611.
Alchian, A.A. and Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic
organization. American Economic Review, 62: 777-795.
Argyris, C. (1957). The individual and the organizations: Some problems of mutual adjustment.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 2: 1-24.
Balfour, D. L. and Wechsler, B. (1994). A theory of public sector commitment: Towards a
reciprocal model of person and organization. In J. Perry (Ed.), Research in public
administration, Vol. 3, pp. 281-314. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Barney J. and Hesterley W. (1996). Organizational economics: Understanding the relationship
between organizations and economic analysis. In S.R. Clegg, C. Hardy, and W.R. Nord
(Eds.), Handbook of organization studies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Barzelay, M. (1992). Breaking through bureaucracy: A new vision for managing in
government. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., and Tipton, S. M. (1985). Habits of the
heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Bennis, W. (2000). Managing the dream: Reflections on leadership and change. Cambridge,
MA: Perseus Publishing.
Block, P. (1993). Stewardship: Choosing service over self-interest. San Francisco: BerrettKoehler Publishers.
Brudney, J. L., Hebert, F. T., and Wright, D. S. (1999). Reinventing government in the American
states: Measuring and explaining administrative reform. Public Administration Review, 59:
19-30.
Buchanan, B. (1974). Government managers, business executives, and organizational
commitment. Public Administration Review, 35: 339-347.
Burke, W. W. (1982). Organization development: Principles and practices. Boston: Little,
Brown.
Cleveland, H. (1985). The twilight of hierarchy: Speculations on the global information society.
Public Administration Review, 45: 185-195.
Cohen, S. and Brand, R. (1993). Total quality management in government: A practical guide
for the real world. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
30
Cohen, S. G. (1993). New approaches to teams and teamwork. In J. R. Galbraith, E. E. Lawler,
III and Associates (Eds.), Organizing for the future: The new logic for managing complex
organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Collard, D. A. (1978). Altruism and economy: A study in non-selfish economics. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Collins, D. (1997). The ethical superiority and inevitability of participatory management as an
organizational system. Organization Science, 8: 489-507.
Collins, J. C. and Porras, J. I. (1994). Built to last: Successful habits of visionary companies.
New York: HarperCollins.
Cooke, R. A. and Rousseau, D. M. (1988). Behavioral norms and expectations: A quantitative
approach to the assessment of organizational culture. Group & Organization Studies, 13:
245-273.
Crozier, M. (1964). The bureaucratic phenomenon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., and Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of
management. Academy of Management Review, 22: 20-47.
Deal, T. and Kennedy, A. (1982). Corporate cultures: The rites and rituals of corporate life.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Deci, E., Koestner, R., and Ryan, R. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments examining
the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 125: 627-668.
Denison, D. R. and Mishra, A. K. (1995). Toward a theory of organizational culture and
effectiveness. Organization Science, 6: 204-223.
Dess, G. G. and Picken, J. C. (1999). Beyond productivity: How leading companies achieve
superior performance by leveraging their human capital. New York: AMACOM.
Dicke, L. (2002). Ensuring accountability in human services contracting: Can stewardship
theory fill the bill? American Review of Public Administration, 32: 455-470.
Donaldson, L. (1995). American anti-management theories of organization: A critique of
paradigm proliferation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown .
31
Drucker, P. F. (1988). The coming of the new organization. Harvard Business Review, 66: 4553.
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management
Review, 14: 57-74.
Etzioni, A. (1961). A comparative analysis of complex organizations: On power, involvement
and their correlates. New York: Free Press.
Etzioni, A. (1988). The moral dimension: Toward a new economics. New York: Free Press.
Etzioni, A. (1996). The new golden rule: Community and morality in a democratic society.
New York: BasicBooks.
Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88:
288-307.
Farina, F., Hahn, F., and Vannucci, S. (Editors). (1996). Ethics, rationality, and economic
behaviour. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fayol, H. (1949). General and industrial management (trans.). London: Pitman Publishing.
(First published in 1919.)
Fehr, E. and Rockenbach, B. (2003). Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism.
Nature, 422:137-140.
Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1981). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
French, W. L. and Bell, C. H., Jr. (1973). Organization development: Behavioral science
interventions for organization improvement. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Gibson, K. (2000). The moral basis of stakeholder theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 19: 245257.
Gulick, L. and Urwick, L. (Eds.). (1937). Papers on the science of administration. New York:
Institute of Public Administration, Columbia University.
Hackman, J. R. and Walton, R. E. (1986). Leading groups in organizations. In P. S. Goodman
(Ed.) Designing effective work groups. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Hammer, M. and Champy, J. (1993). Reengineering the corporation: A manifesto for business
revolution. New York: HarperBusiness.
Harder, J. W., Robertson, P. J., and Woodward, H. (2004). The spirit of the new workplace:
Breathing life into organizations. Organizational Development Journal, 22: 79-103.
Haskins, M. E., Liedtka, J., and Rosenblum, J. (1998). Beyond teams: Toward an ethic of
collaboration. Organizational Dynamics, 26: 34-50.
32
Herzberg, F. W. (1968). One more time: How do you motivate employees? Harvard Business
Review, 46: 53-62.
Hock, D. (1999). Birth of the chaordic age. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
Kettl, D. F. (1997). The global revolution in public management: Driving themes, missing
links. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 16: 446-462.
Kidwell, R E., Jr. and Bennett, N. (1993). Employee propensity to withhold effort: A conceptual
model to intersect three avenues of research. Academy of Management Review, 18: 429-456.
Lawler, E. E. (1986). High-involvement management. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Lawler, E. E., III. (1992). The ultimate advantage: Creating the high-involvement organization.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Levine, S. (1998). Getting to resolution: Turning conflict into collaboration. San Francisco:
Berrett-Koehler.
Lynn, L. E., Jr. (1998). The new public management: How to translate a theme into a legacy.
Public Administration Review, 58: 231-237.
March, J. G. and Simon, H.A. (1958). Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50: 370-396.
McCaffrey, D. P., Faerman, S. R., and Hart, D. W. (1995). The appeal and difficulties of
participative systems. Organization Science, 6: 603-627.
McGregor, D. M. (1960). The human side of enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Merton, R. (1940). Bureaucratic structure and personality. Social Forces, 18: 560-568.
Miller, G. (2000). Above politics: Credible commitment and efficiency in the design of public
agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10: 289-327.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Organ, D. W. (1988). Organizational citizenship behavior: The good soldier syndrome.
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is
transforming the public sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Ostrom, E. (1999). Coping with tragedies of the commons. Annual Review of Political Science,
2: 493-535.
33
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 14: 137-158.
Perrow, C. (1986). Complex organizations: A critical essay (3rd ed.). New York: Random
House.
Perry, J. L. and Wise, L. R. (1990). The motivational bases of public service. Public
Administration Review, 50: 367-373.
Peters, T. (1988). Restoring American competitiveness: Looking for new models of
organizations. Academy of Management Executive, 2: 103-109.
Pfeffer, J. (1998). The human equation: Building profits by putting people first. Boston:
Harvard Business School Press.
Purser, R. E. and Cabana, S. (1998). The self-managing organization: Transforming the work of
teams for real impact. New York: Free Press.
Quinn, R. E. and Spreitzer, G. M. (1997). The road to empowerment: Seven questions every
leader should consider. Organizational Dynamics, 26: 37-49.
Rainey, H. G. (1982). Reward preference among public and private managers: In search of the
service ethic. American Review of Public Administration, 16: 288-303.
Reger, R. K., Gustafson, L. T., DeMarie, S. M., and Mullane, J. V. (1994). Reframing the
organization: Why implementing total quality is easier said than done. Academy of
Management Review, 19: 565-584.
Robertson P. J. (1999). Collaborative organizing: An ideal type for a new paradigm. In R. W.
Woodman and W. A. Pasmore (Eds.), Research in organizational change and development,
Vol. 12, pp. 205-267. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Robertson, P. J. and Tang, S. Y. (1995). The role of commitment in collective action: Comparing
the organizational behavior and rational choice perspectives. Public Administration Review,
55: 67-80.
Schein, E. H. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Schmidt, W. H. and Finnigan, J. P. (1992). The race without a finish line: America’s quest for
total quality. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Selznick, P. (1992). The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Sen, A. (1977). Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory.
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6: 317-344.
Sen, A. (1999). The possibility of social choice. American Economic Review, 89: 349-378.
34
Stevens, J. B. (1993). The economics of collective choice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Taylor, F. W. (1911). The principles of scientific management. New York: Harper.
Thompson, J. R. (2000). Reinventing as reform: Assessing the National Performance Review.
Public Administration Review, 60: 508-521.
Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization (trans). New York: Oxford
University Press. (First published in 1924.)
Wilkins, A. and Patterson, K. J. (1985). You can't get there from here: What will make culturechange projects fail. In R. H. Kilmann, M. R. Saxton, and R. Serpa, (Eds.), Gaining control
of the corporate culture. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications: A study
in the economics of internal organization. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1988). The logic of economic organization. Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, 4: 65-93.
Williamson, O. E. (1994). Transaction cost economics and organization theory. In N. J. Smelser
and R. Swedbery (Eds.), The handbook of economic sociology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Wilson, J. Q. (1995). Political organizations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wood, D. J. and Gray, B. (1991). Toward a comprehensive theory of collaboration. Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science, 27: 139-162.
35
Appendix
Examples of Conflicts between Self-Interest and Collective Interest
1. Incompatibility regarding the amount of time devoted to the organization.
a. work time vs. personal or leisure time
“My work often demands for me to stay on evenings and often work weekends so that our
department can finish our tasks in a timely manner. However, this is often incompatible with
my personal need to have ‘my time.’”
“Other times I feel obligated to put in extra time with the organization when in fact I have
other pressing issues in my life to deal with.”
“The organization demands total commitment during work hours and I comply but often
further demands are made after normal business hours and my organization commitment is
tested.”
b. work time vs. family time
“I value being with my family. Sometimes my work will involve traveling out of the state
for weeks at a time, which is something I would not choose to do but do it because the
organization is counting on me.”
“We sacrifice the needs of our own families for our clinical families. I’m sick of it.”
“Time commitment, for instance, the CEO expects his workers to work during the weekend
to finish the unfinished projects. However, the worker(s) might have other prior engagement,
or plans (such as taking kids to the park).”
c. work time vs. study-related time
“Taking time off from work for exams or class schedule conflicts.”
“Flexibility of schedule. As a working student in a job that often necessitated significant
hours of overtime, my class schedule often conflicted with my work schedule; study time
was often sacrificed for overtime.”
“Time to complete academic work. For example, understanding the need for time off during
finals. Or course, this conflicts with company’s goals and needs.”
36
2. Incompatibility regarding preferred organizational mission and values.
a. primary organizational missions, objectives, strategies
“Recently, we had to make a performance assignment in mathematics for the third-grade.
We had to come up with rubric to quantify the results. I felt that it was unfair for the students
to have to fit a box. You just can’t fit kids in a box. The district wants to quantify
everything!”
“Production of information for economic use. I thought that the primary focus of the
academic world is to understand the world, not to produce ‘commercial’ information.”
“I work for an organization that perceives itself solely as an institution for fundraising. I on
the other hand think it is more than just an institution to raise money. I think it uses the
philanthropy as a tool to build community – but it doesn’t. I specifically work in the
Planning & Allocations department. I think we should be assessing where the most need is
in the community and making the appropriate allocations. However, the organization falls in
line with the politics of allocating. Therefore, the money doesn’t always go to the greatest
need.”
b. underlying ideologies and values
“I think women should be treated the same as men. But in our organization, the women are
given more credit for accomplishing the same objective and this causes men to become
hostile towards the women.”
“Expectation that employees/management will buy into organizational malfeasance, ‘illegal’
conduct.”
“I value loyalty, so when a coworker is fired because her new boss, who has history of being
dissatisfied with secretaries, I have a problem with this (gets terminated as opposed to
finding some other solution). The loyalty between employees and employers should work
both ways.”
3. Incompatibility regarding job descriptions and task priorities.
a. the type and scope of work
“Spending my time checking phone numbers or making faxes for my boss when it would be
easier if he just did it himself.”
“I don’t like to do some boring work, for example, copy, arrange some files. But for the
collective interest, someone has to do these things so I do it.”
37
“My supervisor has given me several projects without giving me much guidelines to follow.
I feel that I am expected to know what to do with these projects but I have many questions.
My major project is in an area that is very unfamiliar to me.”
b. how to do and prioritize the work
“There are times when I am torn between following the school’s curriculum or developing
my own. Lesson plans which I think are more in keeping with the students’ best interest.”
“I like to get things done as soon as possible while my boss takes his time. This makes it
difficult for me to complete my duties to my fullest potential. The organization is very
relaxed which is good sometimes, but often times it prevents us from getting things done.”
4. Incompatibility regarding opportunities for personal growth or advancement.
a. opportunities to develop new skills and/or take on new challenges
“Training: limited growth opportunities, no effort to cross train, introduce new managerial
practices, allow for input of new ideas and outside growth influences. Maintaining status quo
is basis.”
“I often have an interest to continue to learn even after I understand the components of my
job description. The interest of the organizations for which I have worked want me to remain
doing the duties I was [hired] for. They don’t want me to branch out.”
“I want to develop as a person and expand my responsibilities, but the organization wants me
to do the same thing over and over. There is no growth potential in my job.”
b. opportunities for promotion and career advancement
“My interest for advancement and learning about the next level of the company becomes an
issue because my supervisor/manager directly feels threatened.”
“My need to move up in the organization vs. their need to keep someone in my position.”
“The whole law firm wants the secretaries to be in a long-term, stable position handling
administration things. Due to the limit of the size of the firm, there is no sufficient
promotion to satisfy individual career growth.”
38
5. Incompatibility regarding the nature of the work environment.
a. relationships with people in the work place such as co-workers, supervisors, or clients
“Certain individuals in my organization who hold leadership positions happen to lack a sense
of self-esteem and self-confidence. They therefore spend considerable time on criticizing the
work of others rather than focusing on efficiently completing their work.”
“I work for a doctor office answering phones and making appointments. Many times,
patients were unbelievably rude. Although, I was personally hurt and upset, I had to control
my emotions for the good of the company.”
“Many times I want to work without talking about non-work matters such as sports, movies,
etc. but others take large portions out of their day to do so.”
b. organization structure or culture
“My co-workers enjoy throwing parties for every occasion – babies, birthdays, anything.
For them it is an organizational “value” to recognize these events and take time off from
work as well. This conflicts with my need to finish whatever I was working on and have a
productive day.”
“I value humanizing the office atmosphere; organization sometimes dictates non flexibility.”
“Physical space. It would be much better for me not to work where I am located. It is
distracting and uncomfortable.”
6. Incompatibility regarding level of input and autonomy concerning work-related
activities.
a. specific work-related issues
“Sometimes I want to be flexible to handle things such as decisions of giving subordinates
more rewards or compensation, but I am not allowed to do it because some people will think
that I’m practicing favoritism.”
“In interpreting policy and guidelines to constituents, I think individuals do want to explain
the full scope of their rights; however, the organization wants to keep explanations limited to
‘need to know basis’.”
“The higher-ups want you to implement a procedure or program that you know is a bad idea
that reflects their lack of understanding about what happens at the “street-level”. You tend
not to want to implement their idea when you know it’s a bad idea and you will be the one
who is held responsible, even though it was not your idea.”
39
b. general personal or organizational issues
“The hierarchy that is in place (the highest level of the organization). It seems so ‘old
school’ and male dominated – where whatever the boss says is right and it shouldn’t be
questioned. ”
“I also had many problems with the way things were organized. I often felt that I had better
ideas but I had to follow the directions of management.”
“Wearing professional clothing – too much work, too constrictive. I have to wear formal
clothing for my job with the city of Paramount. However, as a student, I spend more time
out of work and it is a hassle to carry extra clothes just to be comfortable for the rest of the
day.”
7. Incompatibility regarding level of compensation and recognition.
a. extrinsic rewards
“Management is sometimes ‘slow’ in giving me raises, promotions, etc. even when my
workload and level of responsibility has increased enough to warrant a raise or promotion.
They say they cannot appear to the rest of the staff to be promoting me too fast, since I have
only been there a few years and they do not want to make more senior employees resentful.”
“With regards to pay, employee may feel the necessity of more pay for the work they
perform, but the company may not be able to provide the necessary pay.”
b. intrinsic rewards
“I am paid for 8 hours of work. However, my ability to do exceptional work takes extra
time. I will donate the extra time for recognition, but there is little opportunity for such
recognition.”
“Management demands considerable effort from employees but they don’t provide reward
and recognition.”
40