How to Use this Script: These Sample Exam Answers are based on problems done in the past two years. Since these answers were written the law may have changed and/or the subject may have changed. Additionally, the student may have made some mistakes in their answer, despite their good mark. Therefore DO NOT use this script by copying or simplifying part of it directly for use in your exam or to supplement your summary. If you do so YOUR MARK WILL PROBABLY END UP BEING WORSE! The LSS is providing this script to give you an idea as to the depth of analysis required in exams and examples of possible structures and hence to provide direction for your own learning. Please do not use them for any other purposes - otherwise you are putting your academic future at risk. TORTS End of Semester Exam – 2001 Overall Mark 80% Q1)(a) Mark 56/70 Q1)(b) Mark 8/10 Q2)(b) Mark 16/20 QUESTION 1 Peter has claims against both Elspeth and E.A.C.T. for damages for his injuries. [] Elspeth As an occupier of land, Elspeth (E) owes a duty of care to anyone coming onto her land (Australian Safeway Stores v Zaluzna) [] Peter (P) was told he could come into the yard at anytime. In order for P’s claim to succeed he must demonstrate that it was reasonably foreseeable to E that he could be injured. That he and E were in a relationship of proximity and that E failed to act as a reasonable person would with regard to the injury foreseeable to P.[] On the facts it seems likely that all these points may be demonstrated. P and E were neighbours and she had invited him onto her land, therefore proximity is demonstrated. It also seems likely that P’s injuries would be found to be foreseeable. Jolly v Sutton found that children were capable of infinite mischief. The advertising campaign by EACT on the danger of trees/power lines also demonstrates forseeability.[] A reasonably person may well have trimmed the tree. Elspeth may argue that it was not practice or possible for her to trim the tree, Caledonian Collieries v Spiers and therefore she was justified in taking the risk. [] However, even if P’s action against E would be successful, it seems an impractical course to take, given that as an aged pensioner E is likely to be a poor loss bearer [Home insurance?] Thus, Peter could combine his action against E and EACT as they would both be concurrently liable. [] S11(3) of Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions Act allows Peter to do this and makes it more beneficial for him to combine his actions rather than pursue two separate actions. [] Peter’s claim against EACT As a statutory authority, EACT are more likely to have liability insurance and will therefore make better loss bearers. Under S11(4) of Law Reform Miscellaneous Provisions Act, EACT may, if judgment is found against them, claim a contribution from Elspeth. [] Peter must once again demonstrate all the elements of the tort of negligence for his claim to succeed. The main problem of this case will be proving EACT owed him a duty of care [] Duty of care: Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman held that if P can demonstrate a reliance upon EACT to keep him safe from danger, then this will establish the necessary proximity of relationship for EACT to owe P a duty of care. Sutherland held there is no reason a statutory authority should be found not to have a duty of care under common law when exercising its statutory power. The difficult for P’s case here will be that Sutherland Shire also found that there can be no duty, if the statutory authority omitted to perform its function – in this case the pruning of the tree – due to policy decisions. [] We are told in the facts that the cessation of tree trimming by EACT was an efficiency measure. [However, not budgetary but due to 2003 privatisation therefore it is arguably an operational decision. More discussion required] However, given the vulnerable nature of P as a child, his reliance upon the authority is likely to outweigh policy decisions and it seems likely a duty of care will be found to be owed to him [] Once duty is found, it seems likely EACT will be said to breach this duty by not trimming the tree – the failure of which is clearly the cause of P’s injuries. Burns from electrocution are also a reasonably foreseeable consequence of this type of accident. [] Contributory Negligence: If P’s claim against EACT is successful, EACT may seek to lower the damages payable by arguing P was failing to take reasonable care for his own safety, Froom v Butcher. They (EACT) must prove that P failed to act as a reasonable person would in apprehending the risk of danger to themselves. [] Kelly v Bega Valley Country Council established that an objective standard of a reasonable 11 year old would be the criteria for judging P’s conduct to be contributorily negligent or not. If it is found that a reasonable 11-year-old would have known of the dangers and not climbed the tree, then P may well be found contributorily negligent with regard to his injuries [] Apportionment of Peter’s Damages Damages payable to P should his claim succeed will be discussed under two headings: Pecuniary – these will include Loss of earning capacity – This head of damage is P’s entitlement to recover for any diminution in his capacity to earn to the extent that this creates a financial loss. This would be difficult to assess as an 11-year-old child does not yet have an established career path by which this loss could be measured [] Damages will include earnings for his whole lifespan, rather than his shortened life – although expenditure on self maintenance would be deducted from these ‘lost years’.[] Damages will also be reduced for any residual earning capacity Peter has. This may be quite substantial, as we are told his injuries preclude him from manual work – which may mean he is quite capable of making a living in another, non-manual field. [] Obviously evidence would be required with regard to P’s specific talents or abilities. He may have already been a gifted pianist for example. A discount of 3% will be deducted from P’s lump sum to account for any benefits derived from lump sum payment – the idea of damages being to restore P to his original position, rather than see him making a profit. [] Similarly, an additional 15% will be deducted for vicissitudes of life – although Peter may argued this should be decreased if any extenuating circumstances – such as particular talents or abilities apply. Cost of medical care Would also be payable if the court holds this to be within reason. Thus, physio, rehab or nursing care [] will be compensated for , but recuperative Polynesian mud baths may be though excessive! [Why? Sounds good to me!] Griffiths & Kerkemeyer damages: This would apply if, for example P’s mother gave up work to care for him. [She suffers from nervous shock. How does this affect damages?] This need for care is felt to be P’s loss and therefore compensation would be granted. This would be the replacement cost of the care his Mum provides, not the cost of lost wages to her. [] Collateral source and replacement cost for services provided by P are unlikely to apply as P is a child. [] Non pecuniary loss: Pain and suffering: Skelton v Collins held that this, whilst a subjective measure, must be reasonable and not rule by emotion. P is likely to recover a substantial amount as he is in continual pain and awareness of his condition, Sharman v Evans. [] Loss of amenities: This is also judged subjectively and the impact of the injuries on P’s life taken into account. If he were a talented pianist then it is likely the amount would be higher. [] Loss of expectation of life: Generally a nominal, fixed amount for all claimants. This is because courts do not feel this is a quantifiable thing and that it is something that is impossible to compensate for. [This is an excellent answer. You have identified all the major issues – however you needed to discuss the position of EACT in more detail. Your answer was well structured and reasoned.] Jack and Ruby: Both have a nervous shock claim against both Elspeth and EACT – would more likely pursue EACT for reasons outlined in Peter’s claims. [] S24 of Law Reform Miscellaneous Provisions Act allows J and R to claim for injury sustained, if it is a mental injury alone. S24 of Law Reform Miscellaneous Provisions Act established that J and R have a statutory course of action as well as an action at common law. [] Under S24 Ruby has an action as P’s mother, despite the fact she did not witness the injury. [However J may not satisfy the criteria in S24(1)(b)] Both J and R have a common law claim. For this to succeed the nervous shock must be a recognisable psychiatric injury and not merely grief. Jaensch v Coffey [] J and R must demonstrate that they both had a relationship with Peter, which they can clearly do as his mother and brother. Mt Isa Mines v Pusey Another aspect is the proximity of J and R to P when his injury occurred. Clearly J, in discovering P so shortly after the injury was proximate to it. Alcock v South Yorkshire Police [] Even R, coming as she did to the hospital after the event is likely to be held to be sufficiently in the aftermath of the injury for nervous shock to occur. Jaensch v Coffey[] J and R must demonstrate that the defendants (Elspeth and EACT) should reasonably have had them in contemplation as a class of plaintiffs likely to suffer nervous shock, arising from the negligence. If P’s claim against the defendants succeeds, then it seems likely, given the family ties between he and J and R that the defendants will be found to have also owed J and R a duty of care. [] QUESTION 2) b One of the major criticisms of the trend towards loss distribution is that people are now being forced to compensate others for accidents in which they played no role. Albeit, this compensation is generally hidden in higher insurance premiums or increased cost of goods to offset a companies increasing works compensation or public liability costs. [] Some may see the doing away with fault and the maximisation of distribution as not a desirable course of actions. The idea of liability based on fault has often been in accordance with community expectations and concepts of fairness and justice. [] People who wrong others should be forced to pay or atone. The existence of insurance has meant that many who are committing wrongs are not paying for their mis-deeds out of their own pockets, but that of other policy holders. [] Arguments have also been put forth that fault based liability acts as a deterrent and thereby prevents wrongs being committed. This argument may not be a strong one though, as the case of Froom v Butcher did not increase the incidence of seat belts being worn. However, the idea of insurance and loss distribution in its way also accords with community ideals. For it hardly seems in accordance with fairness and justice to have two vastly different outcomes for seriously injured plaintiffs dependent upon who their tortfeasors may be. A plaintiff “lucky” enough to be injured by a negligent wealthy man for example, would be better compensated than one injured by a penniless university student. [] The idea that premiums for insurance are marginally increased across the board may be more just than having seriously injured P’s uncompensated. This being so, it seems that further reform is necessary. Perhaps an abolishment of the “at fault” scheme all together and the setting up of compensation funds for accident victims – like those in existence for workers injured whilst at their job. This would have the benefit of being far more equitable – those with the money/time and inclination to pursue common law claims would not be equal with those people who cannot afford legal representation. Further reform to the system would have benefits for the courts as well. Decreasing congestion in the system and reducing delays in matters coming to trial. [] It would also do away with the long court delays which many victims find so distressing and which may indeed by contributing to further injury – that of compensation neurosis. A no fault system would also do away with the great [You obviously ran out of time. However this is an extremely well written and insightful analysis.]