REVISED
Failure of policy regarding smokefree bars in the Netherlands
Mariaelena Gonzalez, Ph.D.
Stanton A. Glantz, Ph.D.
Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco
Corresponding Author:
Stanton A. Glantz
Center for Tobacco Control Research & Education
UCSF
530 Parnassus Ave.
Box 1390
San Francisco, CA 94143-1390
Phone: 1-415-476-3893
Fax: 1-415-514-9345
Email: glantz@medicine.ucsf.edu
Sources of Support: This research was funded by NCI grants CA-113710 and CA-87472.
The funding agency played no role in the selection of topic, conduct of the research or
preparation of the manuscript.
Word Count:
Abstract: 216
Text: 3,542
Tables: 1
Figures: 3
1
Abstract:
Background: Tobacco companies consistently work to prevent and undermine smokefree
laws. The tobacco industry and its allies have funded hospitality associations and other third
parties to oppose smokefree laws, argue that smokefree laws will economically damage
hospitality venues, promote ventilation and voluntary smoker “accommodation” as an alternative
to smokefree laws, and to challenge smokefree laws in court. In 2008 the Netherlands
extended its smokefree law to hospitality venues. Method: We triangulated news articles,
government documents, scientific papers, statistical reports, and interviews to construct this
case study. Results: Despite widespread public support for smokefree hospitality venues,
opponents successfully represented these laws as unpopular and damaging to small bars.
These challenges and related smokers’ rights activities resulted in non-compliance among all
bars and reinstating an exemption for small, owner-run venues. This policy reversal was the
result of a weak implementing media campaign (which failed to present the law as protecting
nonsmokers), smoking room exemptions, and reactive (vs. proactive) measures by the Ministry
of Health and civil society. Conclusion: The policy failure in the Netherlands is the result of
poor implementation efforts and the failure to anticipate and deal with opposition to the law.
When implementing smokefree laws it is important to anticipate opposition, used the media to
target nonsmokers to reinforce public support, and actively enforce the law.
Keywords: Tobacco Industry, Tobacco Smoke Pollution, Policy Development
2
INTRODUCTION
The tobacco industry has made maintaining smoking in hospitality venues a priority
worldwide1-5 by organizing and sometimes financing hospitality1, 6 and “smokers’ rights” groups1,
4, 7-9
to oppose smoking restrictions. Bars are particularly important to the tobacco industry
because they are adult only venues where young adults can be targeted.10-12 As claims of
adverse economic effects on restaurants have lost credibility,13, 14 the tobacco industry has
focused on bars as a wedge to undermine 100% smokefree laws,4, 15, 16 including in the
Netherlands.
In July 2008, the Netherlands ended hospitality’s exemption to legislation[1] which
prohibited smoking in most public places. Despite strong initial public support for smokefree
hospitality venues, opponents successfully represented smokefree regulations as harmful to
small and employer-run bars and encouraged noncompliance in all bars. In November 2010,
the Minister of Health announced that bars without employees under 70 m2 would be reexempted from the smokefree law[2] and non-compliance continued into 2011.[3] This case
illustrates that strong tobacco control policies are not enough; it is important to have a strong
implementation campaign that anticipates continuing organized opposition and a law that does
not allow exemptions.
METHODS
We triangulated17 news articles, government documents, scientific papers, and other
media with 14 interviews conducted between January 2010 and February 2011 to construct this
case study. From May to September 2010, we searched the entire Legacy Tobacco Documents
Library (legacy.library.ucsf.edu) of tobacco company documents between May and September
2010 beginning with “Netherlands,” politicians, and other named individuals and organizations
using standard techniques,18 yielding 5 relevant documents. An expanded Methods section is
available in the supplemental materials online at the EJPH website. A supplemental
3
bibliography listing original source materials (indicated in the text in square brackets) and
interviewees is in the supplemental materials online at the EJPH website.
RESULTS
The Netherlands and Smokefree Policy before 2005
In 2002, the Dutch Parliament amended the Tobacco Act to require smokefree
workplaces and public transportation, and strengthened enforcement provisions.[1,4-6] The Act
granted the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports (Minister of Health) authority to issue
regulations granting exemptions.[1] After intensive lobbying by the hospitality industry,
Parliament passed the Amendment with the understanding that hospitality would be initially
exempted, and smokefree environments phased in over time.19[1] The 2005 and 2006 plan
goals were not met.19[1,7]
2005-2007 Placing Smokefree Hospitality on the National Agenda
In late 2005, the three major Dutch health non-governmental organizations (NGOs) -Astma Fonds (Asthma), Nederlandse Hartstichting (Heart), KWF Kankerbestrijding (Cancer)
together with STIVORO (Smoking and Health Foundation for a Smokefree Future, the main
tobacco control NGO in the Netherlands), decided to integrate lobbying into their tobacco
control activities.[8] In 2006, the health NGOs and STIVORO developed a policy agenda which
included ending the Tobacco Act hospitality exemption, raising tobacco taxes, requiring that
health insurance plans cover tobacco cessation, and increasing government spending on
tobacco control.[8] They expanded their smokefree coalition to include Partnership Stop Met
Roken, Clean Air Nederland (CAN), and other groups.[8] During the November 2006 election
campaign the smokefree coalition lobbied to include their policy package in the new
government’s post-election agenda.[8]
The hospitality industry and its allies opposed smokefree regulations , arguing they cost
jobs.[8] In response, the smokefree coalition spotlighted venues interested in going smokefree,
and argued that hospitality workers’ health needed protection. CAN collected petition
4
signatures supporting smokefree hospitality, which was presented to members of Parliament
during a smokefree breakfast.[9] This lobbying drew media attention and support. The coalition
government that emerged in February 2007 included smokefree hospitality by the end of its
term on its agenda.[10] However, before the first meeting of the Council of Ministers in January
2007, the new Minister of Health, Abraham Klink, announced his intention to implement
smokefree hospitality within a year.[8] The next day Klink backpedaled, saying he needed to
talk to other stakeholders.[8]
2007-2008 Realizing an End to the Exemption
Minister Klink met with the three health NGOs, STIVORO, and CAN in March 2007 and
other stakeholders, including KHN, regarding smokefree regulations beginning in April.[11] The
two Dutch tobacco manufacturers associations, Stichting Sigarettenindustrie (SSI, cigarettes)
and Vereniging Nederlandse Kerftabakindustrie (VNK, rolling tobacco) participated in the
stakeholder meetings.[11,12] Meanwhile, the NGOs and STIVORO continued to pressure
Parliament on the issue.[13]
Throughout 2007, the hospitality industry and smokers’ rights organizations continued to
oppose ending hospitality’s exemption, generating increasingly negative media.20 Hospitality
organizations, individual venue owners, and the Dutch employers’ association complained to
Parliament and the media that the Minister was not working with them and failed to consider
KHN’s proposal that the laws be phased in from 2008-2011.[10,14,15]19 When the Minister resisted
this proposal, KHN asked that small bars and owner-run venues (bars without employees) not
be exempt on the grounds that larger venues would lose business to them.[13] Minister Klink
investigated the possibility using ventilation as an alternative to smokefree laws,[13] but rejected
this.[11,12]
Because of KHN’s stance, several small bars and owner-run bars publicly stated that
KHN did not represent them and began lobbiying separately.[16] They argued the Act was meant
5
to protect employees, and did not apply to owner-run bars. Small bars argued they would lose
patronage to larger venues with smoking rooms, a claim widely reported in the media.[17]
Ending the exemption
On June 8, 2007, Minister Klink sent a letter to Parliament outlining why the hospitality
exemption would end on July 1, 2008 (smoking rooms were allowed).[18] He rejected KHN’s
phase-in proposal; all hospitality venues would be subject to the same regulation.[7]
Parliamentary oversight of the implementation process still had to be negotiated.[8,12] Parliament
engaged in a long discussion in September 2007 and asked interested parties to submit written
comments,[11, 12] then asked the Minister to respond.[11,12] about ventilation as an alternative to
going smokefree, requests for exemptions, alleged economic loss and requests for government
compensation to hospitality venues for the expected loss.[11,12] The Minister held firm regarding
implementation, while throughout late 2007, hospitality representatives dragged out
implementation talks.
Counter-pressures and media coverage
The smokefree coalition continued to advocate for smokefree regulations and sent out
press releases and briefing papers countering allegations of economic loss and rejecting
ventilation as an alternative.[13] (None of the health organizations raised the issue of continuing
smoking rooms, because of concern that doing so would delay smokefree hospitality
venues.[13]) They also conducted a letter writing campaign to Parliament,[19-21] brought patients
to Parliamentary hearings, and presented a petition to individual legislators.[20]
During elections and the beginning of 2007, media coverage of the push for smokefree
hospitality venues was positive. The public relations campaign by small bars, throughout 2007
and 2008 resulted in the Minister received increasingly negative press regarding smokefree
hospitality.20 Newspaper coverage increased in July 2008 and again in Autumn 2008, focusing
on economic issues rather than health gains.20 Echoing tobacco industry messaging,9, 21
opponents accused the government of violating individual freedom, and called Minister Klink a
6
“nanny.”[8,13,17] The four NGOs could not generate enough positive earned (unpaid) media to
counteract the negative press[22] and did not fund paid media. The Minister began distancing
himself from the smokefree regulations. In July 2008, he refused to participate in ceremonies
marking the beginning of smokefree hospitality.[8] In September 2008, he gave a speech at the
inauguration of a smoking room sponsored by SSI and VNK.[8,23] The Minister did not publically
respond to media coverage of bar owners arguing that the law did not apply to them.[13]
2007-2008 Preparing to Implement Smokefree Hospitality Regulations
In late 2007 and early 2008, the Ministry conducted an educational campaign aimed at
venue owners, workers and smokers,[10,24] including a television advertisement in which an
anthropomorphic cigarette was depicted as enjoying activities with smokers, who were deprived
of their friend (the cigarette) when it was forcibly ejected from in hospitality venues (Figure 1).
The content focused on the fact that cigarettes were not allowed rather than on the benefits of
the new smokefree regulations. It did not target the general public and made no mention of
health reasons for smokefree laws or benefits to workers and the public.[25] The Ministry’s nosmoking signage also used anthropomorphic cigarettes (Figure 1).[24]
The Ministry blocked the health NGOs from running alternate ads , arguing that notifying
the public was the Ministry’s responsibility.[8,13] The health NGOs wrote to Klink stating they did
not support the media campaign and worried about its effectiveness.[8,17,22,26]
To support the smokefree regulations, the National Tobacco Control Plan (NTCP, a joint
venture between the Ministry of Health and Cancer, Asthma, and Heart) planned an intensive
well-publicized quit-campaign timed to run in early 2008 before the regulations took
effect.[19,22,27] In addition, the NCTP and STIVORO successfully lobbied for a tobacco tax
increase in 2008.[8,20,22,28] The Minister announced a period of adjustment where venues would
be warned but not fined, without setting an end date for this period.[26,29,30]
7
2008-2009 Pro-Tobacco Opposition
Organized tobacco industry opposition
In April 2008, the chairman of Forces Nederland and a lobbyist for Stichting
Rokersbelangen [SRB] (smokers’ rights groups ) helped found “Save the Small Cafe Owners”
(KHO)[31] as part of a network of smokers rights’ activities (Figure 2) to fight smokefree
regulations. KHO co-founder Ton Wurtz, regularly met with SSI to discuss his work as a
lobbyist for SRB and occasionally discussed KHO.[31] Other small bar owners formed protest
groups.[16] These groups ran a hard-hitting public relations campaign claiming that regulations
caused revenue losses that resulted in substantial earned media coverage.[29,30,32-36]
Declining public support for smokefree hospitality venues
Smokefree hospitality regulations began July 1, 2008. Similar to California’s 1998
experience of the initial rate of compliance regarding smoking in bars ,22 from July to September
2008, 79% of bars and nightclubs and 94-99% of other hospitality venues inspected by the Food
and Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) were complying with smokefree regulations
(Figure 3).19[37]
Bars claimed economic loss and continued violating regulations.[29,33,40-42] Media
coverage of these actions created an atmosphere in which small bars felt they were supported
by the general public. Some bars made pacts with nearby bars to defy smokefree regulations,
others became aggressive with VWA inspectors.[30,33,43,44] By October 2008, only 62% of bars,
nightclubs, and activity centers VWA inspected were in compliance, dropping to 53% by
November (Figure 3).[45]
Claims of economic loss and failure to generate positive media coverage
After July 2008, the smokefree coalition started to dissolve, leaving the health NGOs,
and STIVORO as the NGOs working to support the regulations. Throughout 2008-2009 these
NGOs continued seeking positive media coverage, but failed to generate much sympathetic
coverage. They highlighting the protection of workers, health benefits of smokefree air and the
8
fact that there had been no adverse economic effects in other countries.[17] They also publically
recognized venues that complied with the regulations.[19,21] The health organizations and
STIVORO attempted to pressure Parliament to respond to the increasing violations. The
Asthma Fund ran a survey in 2008 in which members identified adverse experiences with
smoking in bars and sent the results to members of Parliament.[21] Perhaps because of the
dominance of the pro-industry messaging in the media, the health groups did not gain much
traction.
Continuing claims of economic losses
The worldwide economic collapse that began in 2007 (and continuing in 2011) affected
public perceptions. KHN hired a research firm, which issued a report in October 2008 claiming
half the economic loss bars experienced was due to smokefree regulations.[18]
The Minister of Health commissioned the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (the
governmental statistical agency) and TNS NIPO (a market research firm) to analyze prices,
sales volume, sales trends, and revenue growth, as well as consumer confidence to test these
claims.[18] These two analyses concluded the decline in the hospitality sector began before the
regulations took effect and that all sectors of the hospitality business were reporting sales loss
due to a variety of factors including the worldwide recession (but not including smokefree
regulations).[18,30] There was no difference in sales between venues with and without smoking
rooms.[18,30]
In December 2008, the Minister wrote Parliament outlining these findings.[18] Small bar
owners and their allies continued to claim economic loss, and Parliament continued to ask
Minister to investigate alternatives to smokefree regulations and respond to questions regarding
these claims in 2009.[46,47]
Continued declines in compliance and support
In December 2008 a European Commission survey of tobacco control attitudes in EU
countries showed thatIn the Netherlands, 52% opposed regulations.23 To study the extent of
9
noncompliance, the VWA commissioned an anonymous quarterly compliance survey.[38] The
late 2008 to early 2009 almost a quarter of the bars and nightclubs were noncompliant,
compared to only 5-10% in other hospitality areas (Figure 3).[38]
Litigation
Because of well-publicized, repeated violations, Minister Klink announced that starting
October 1, 2008, the government would impose administrative fines on venues that repeatedly
violated the regulations.[29,48,49] The VWA began issuing fines, and[29,33,45] in mid-November, the
Minister announced that bars who repeatedly violated regulations would additionally face
criminal prosecution, and closure.[30,33,41,43-45]
In February 2009, owners of Cafe de Kachel in Groningen, were the first individuals
found guilty in criminal court and the bar was ordered closed for one month.[34,49,50] The criminal
prosecution of other bar owners followed,[34,49,50] and compliance improved (Figure 3).[38]
With KHO’s financial support, the owners of Café de Kachel and several other bars
appealed their sentences. In 2009, several appellate courts reversed lower court decisions,
rulingthe Tobacco Act did not apply to bars without employees and distorted competition
between small and large bars.[51-56] The Ministry of Health appealed to the Supreme Court and
announced plans to amend the Tobacco Act and its implementing regulations to clearly specify
that the law applied to venues with and without employees.[30,52,53,57-61]
Citing ongoing litigation, members of Parliament requested that the Minister exempt
owner-run venues, asked him to respond to more questions regarding the law, and pressured
him to exempt small and owner-run bars.[12, 60-63] In July 2009, the Minister directed the VWA to
suspend enforcement in bars without employees pending the Supreme Court’s ruling.[30,59,60]
Pressure from Parliament forced the Minister to reopen the possibility of using
ventilation.[13,60,61] The major health NGOs and STIVORO opposed this decision and attempted
to get media coverage of the fact that ventilation would not protect hospitality employees and
10
customers from the health dangers of SHS.[27,30,64] Compliance among bars and nightclubs
continued to decline (Figure 3).[65]
In February 2010, the Supreme Court ruled owner-run bars were subject to the Tobacco
Act,[4,66-68] and VWA resumed enforcing the regulations in owner-run bars. Compliance
increased during summer 2010, 72% of bars and nighclubs were in compliance with the law
(Figure 3).[16,39]
Political fallout
In spring 2010, the Dutch coalition government collapsed over involvement in
Afghanistan. Shortly after the 2010 June election, members of Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en
Democratie (VVD) stated that they wanted bars without employees to determine their own
smoking policies.[16, 27] (A 2011 Dutch television documentary entitled “Minister van Tabak”[69,70]
[Minister of Tobacco] presented evidence that Minister Schipper and other VVD members had
contact with tobacco and KHO lobbyists as part of efforts to oppose the restaurant and bar
restrictions as early as 2007.) In September 2010, the new governing coalition included the
VVD and the Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA). The coalition agreement included exempting
small, owner-run bars and reducing funding for tobacco control.[13] In November 2010, the new
Minister of Health, Edith Schippers (VVD), wrote Parliament announcing her intention to exempt
owner- or family-run bars under 70 m2 from the Tobacco Act. As a result, compliance for
hospitality sectors other than bars was above 90%, but only 50% in bars and nightclubs.[3]
DISCUSSION
The case of the Netherlands shows the importance of framing the discussion of
smokefree laws. The Ministry’s poorly designed media campaign generated sympathy for
smokers and the cigarette instead of promoting the health benefits of the new regulations for
workers and the nonsmoking public, combined with the exemptions clause in the Tobacco Act,
provided a foundation from which opponents used small bars as a wedge to undermine
11
smokefree hospitality venues, encourage non-compliance among all bars, and re-exempt
owner-run bars.
While the tobacco companies did not play an open public role in these events, the
strategies and rhetoric deployed to oppose the smoking restrictions parallels tobacco industry
global strategies, including arguing that smokefree laws represent a form of intolerance and
extremism2,9,21,24 and that, despite consistent evidence to the contrary,25-27 smokefree laws harm
bars. Other industry tactics are to encourage and publicize venues flouting the law to create the
perception of widespread noncompliance, to encourage (and fund) hospitality venues to
challenge the law in court, and to promote ventilation.1,3-6,8,15,16,28,29
Many of the Minister of Health’s decisions regarding implementing and enforcing
smokefree venues were consistent with WHO best practices, including treating all hospitality
venues the same, including both civil society and the hospitality industry in implementation
discussions, and promoting smoking cessation together with smokefree laws.30 The Ministry
educated business owners and building managers regarding compliance, eventually
aggressively enforced the law, and arranged for independent compliance monitoring. The health
NGOs and STIVORO, together with the smokefree partnership, engaged the public during 2006
and 2007 to build widespread support for ending hospitality’s exemption from the Tobacco Act.
The 2006 policy package that they sought in Parliament was consistent with WHO best
practices. Once the law took effect, the health organizations worked to promote and defend it.
At the same time, neither civil society nor the Ministry anticipated heavy opposition,
including the use of third parties by smokers’ rights groups. Minister Klink included the tobacco
industry as a stakeholder in the policy-making process. The Ministry’s failure to use appropriate
and continuous messages promoting the law’s health benefits was a key determinant of the
outcome because it allowed opponents to control public perception and promote small bars as
the victims of the law.
12
Framing and compliance
Countering opposition to smokefree laws has been done elsewhere with well-planned
implementation campaigns that used the media to target nonsmokers to reinforce public
support, and by active enforcement of the law after a specified introductory period.4,30,31 The
Ministry and four NGOs’ focus on smokers and smoking cessation campaign allowed KHO to
control public perception. The initial lack of a specific date on which vigorous enforcement of
the law would begin, allowed KHO and other bar groups several months to build momentum to
defy and challenge the law.
As elsewhere,4,32 compliance increased with enforcement. However the small bars and
KHO pursued litigation, and victories in the appellate courts reinforced claims that the law
damaged small bars. The Minister’s reopening of the possibility of ventilation, and Parliament’s
ongoing promotion of the alleged economic impact claims, further undermined implementation.
Public opinion regarding smokefree bars declined and the tobacco control advocates were not
able to regain public support.
The danger of exemptions
The Ministry exempted smoking rooms in private workplaces in the original
implementation of the Tobacco Act Amendment in 2004 and continue to do so as it extended
the law into different sectors. Small bar groups linked smoking rooms and economics, arguing
small bars were at a competitive disadvantage to larger venues with smoking rooms. The
smoking room exemption allowed the small bar groups to continue to promote ventilation as an
alternative to smokefree laws. Furthermore, Minister Schippers was able to re-exempt ownerand family-run pubs from the law, weakening tobacco control policy in the Netherlands.[2]
The Netherlands and the FCTC
Implementing guidelines for Article 8 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC), which the Netherlands ratified in 2005, call for parties “to provide universal
protection” and argue “[n]o exemptions are justified on the basis of health or law
13
arguments.”33,Section6 The exemption for smoking rooms, and the re-exemptions of owner-run
bars violates these guidelines.33 Furthermore, the Netherlands acted inconsistently with the
guidelines of FCTC Article 5.3, which state “[p]arties should protect the formulation and
implementation of public health policies for tobacco control from the tobacco industry to the
greatest extent possible.”34 During implementation talks the Minister met with both SSI and
VNK as stakeholders.
Limitations
A limitation to all qualitative methodologies to study high stakes policy processes is the
possibility of obtaining incomplete or biased information. We compensated for these limitations
by triangulating17 informant accounts against each other and publicly available documents.
While there are often differences of opinion and recollection of events, it was possible to arrive
at an overall consensus regarding the history of the policy-making process. While the authors
attempted to interview representatives of as many stakeholders as possible, representatives of
SSI, VNK, and KHN did not respond to requests for interviews.
Conclusion
Owner-run bars in the Netherlands have been used by tobacco industry allies as a
wedge to undermine public perception of and encourage noncompliance with smokefree
regulations. (Compliance remained high in other hospitality venues). The reversal in the
Netherlands was the result of a failure to present and defend the law as a way to protect
nonsmokers, together with continuing to allow smoking rooms. There is a danger that the
Netherlands may be cited by the tobacco industry and its allies as evidence that 100%
smokefree bar laws are unpopular and unenforceable and that tobacco control best practices
embodied in the FCTC do not work. Partial legislation in Europe was promoted by the tobacco
industry as the “Spanish model.”35 In 2011, Spain strengthened its law and became 100%
smokefree. It remains for advocates to see that the Netherlands follows suit to avoid having a
new “Netherlands model” of partial exemptions to bar laws emerge in Europe.
14
FUNDING
This work was supported by National Cancer Institute at the National Institute of Health
[grants number CA-113710, CA-87472]. The funding agency played no role in the selection of
topic, conduct of the research or preparation of the manuscript.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Lies van Gennip,Marc Willemsen, and Fleur van Bladerenfrom STIVORO, as
well as the Astma Fonds, Kanker Bestrijding, Nederlandse Hartstichting, and other interviewees
for their willingness to provide us information for the research study. We would also like to
thank Lyske Bouma, Hedda van 't Land, and Hendrika Reinerink for their help with translation.
This research was funded by NCI grants CA-113710 and CA-87472. The funding agency
played no role in the selection of topic, conduct of the research or preparation of the manuscript
CONFLICTIONS OF INTEREST
In 2010, Dr. Glantz presented preliminary findings regarding this case at a conference
supporting tobacco control in the Netherlands sponsored by STIVIRO, which paid his travel
expenses. In 2010, Drs. Glantz and Gonzalez drafted briefing papers regarding industry
interference in tobacco control policy-making and comparisons of the Netherlands to other case
studies that were provided to STIVORO.
15
KEYPOINTS

Despite initial widespread support for implementation of smokefree hospitality venues in
the Netherlands, opponents have successfully represented these laws as unpopular and
damaging to small bars.

These challenges were part of smokers’ rights activities, and resulted in non-compliance
among all bars and the exemption of small, owner-run venues from the law.

As a result, incomplete pre-implementation strategy, poor implementation, lack of
support from the government generally, and weak NGO mobilization opened possibilities
for weakening the law through exemptions.

Policy failure in the Netherlands is the result of poor implementation efforts and the
failure to anticipate opposition to the law, and not a result of the failure of the concept of
smokefree policies or the fact that Dutch people are not ready for smoke-free laws.

When implementing smokefree laws it is important to anticipate opposition, used the
media to target nonsmokers to reinforce public support, and actively enforce the law.
16
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FIGURE LEGENDS
Figure 1: (A) The Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sports smokefree media campaign
presented the new law from the point of view of an anthromorphized cigarette being forceably
ejected from bars rather than stressing the benefits of smokefree bars for everyone. (The text
of this television commercial is in the online supplemental materials.) (B) Free posters provided
to hospitality venues by the Ministry of Health also stressed the role of the cigarette rather than
the benefits of being smokefree. Source: Ministry of Health Welfare and Sport.[24, 25]
Figure 2: Organizational linkages between opponents of the smokefree hospitality law,
including the tobacco companies and KHO and other smokers’ rights activities. Source: Een
rokende Gideonsbende.[31]
Figure 3: Percentage of Bars and Nightclubs observed violating the smokefree law
(observation of smoking in venue or of ashtrays on table). Source: Study commissioned by the
VWA of representative sample of catering establishments in the Netherlands visited by
INTREVAL[38, 39]
22