Institutionally Induced Autonomy: The Case of Andalusia
Angustias Hombrado Martos
University of Kent at Canterbury (England)
&
UNED University at Madrid (Spain)
ahombrados@yahoo.com
Prepared for the Northern PSA Postgraduate Conference
Edinburgh, 6th June 2008
Self-government institutions were established in Andalusia back in the early
1980s, according to the harsh rules laid down by the 1978 Spanish Constitution in its
Article 151. A strong socio-political mobilization enabled to overcome the difficulties
of the constitutional procedure; consequently, the “surprising and brilliant conquest of
the Statute and full self-government”1 became a major landmark in the region’s political
life (Acosta 2002: 106) 2. At state-wide level, moreover, the approval of the Andalusian
Statute of Autonomy (its regional constitutional law) represents the first unequivocal
expression of how decentralization dynamics in Spain have responded to a principle of
“multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence” (Lecours 2004; Moreno, 1994). If we agree
with L. Moreno that the quest for autonomy in Andalusia has irreversibly influenced the
construction of the Autonomous Communities System (Moreno 1997: 108), it comes as
a surprise how little scholarly attention has been paid to this region3, in contrast to the
burgeoning literature focused on the so-called “historical nationalities” -namely
Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia.
From an empirical point of view, therefore, Andalusia stands out as an
interesting under-researched case whose study can significantly improve our
understanding of political decentralization in Spain. By making Andalusia the core of
this paper, I want to point up the convenience of widening the traditional analytical
focus on well-known examples of national minorities, to include other territorial
communities that are allegedly part of the national majority4. This is, in my opinion, the
only way to properly address the issue of how the initial asymmetrical institutional
design has affected the development and performance of the Spanish political system as
a whole.
From a theoretical point of view, on the other hand, the study of Andalusia will
contribute to the literature on the causes of regional autonomy, by challenging the
general validity of approaches based on cultural and economic factors. Provided that
Andalusia’s autonomy quest is better explained as the articulation of “catching-up”
dynamics in order to gain a similar status and degree of autonomy as those achieved by
Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, this analysis advocates for a politicalinstitutional explanation of regional autonomy. In that respect, historically non-assertive
regions or those regions that have previously posed a low level of assertiveness, are
more likely to demand self-government and to play “catching-up” dynamics when
exposed to an asymmetrical constitutional design. That is to say, their autonomy claim
is institutionally induced by the constitutional design and the political dynamics of the
system.
In order to address the question about the driving forces behind the demands for
self-government, this paper presents an explorative single case study and, it undertakes
three main tasks: First and very briefly, I will define various socio-structural hypotheses
derived from the literature on variation in regional assertiveness, together with the new
alternative political-institutional hypothesis here proposed. Second, the constitutional
1
Original quote in Spanish: “sorprendente y brillante conquista del Estatuto y del autogobierno pleno”.
Not in vain, the “Day of Andalusia” -28th of February- commemorates the anniversary of the date when
the referendum for the self-government initiative was successfully passed in 1980.
2
3
Valuable exceptions are Acosta 2002; Bukowski 2004; Ruiz Romero 2003.
4
Opposing the existence of a unified national identity of “Spanishness”, see Stapell 2007.
2
framework and political process carried out in Andalusia to get its Statute of Autonomy
approved will be described. Finally, those hypotheses will be tested against the evidence
offered by the case of Andalusia.
If “regional assertiveness” occurs when a change in the territorial distribution of
powers is demanded in favour of the regional level of government (Van Houten 2001),
why, when and how does this claim take place? Most of the literature on the causes of
regional assertiveness explicitly recognises –or implicitly assumes– a “structural
approach” (Jenne 2004; López Aranguren, 1981). Accordingly, it is the existence of
particular socio-economic and cultural features that distinguish a region from the rest of
the country what is thought to account for the claim for self-government. More
explicitly, various structural hypotheses have been derived from this general argument.
First, a “cultural distinctiveness hypothesis” will argue that ethnic and cultural
distinctions between a region and the rest of the state are a necessary -and even
sufficient- condition for regional mobilisation and demands for autonomy (Connor
1994; Horowitz 1985). On the other hand, some authors have also recognised the
importance of the level of economic development of the region, relative to the country
as a whole. And this has resulted in two alternative economic hypotheses:
-
-
In accordance with what I have elsewhere called the “over-development hypothesis”
(Hombrado 2005: 13), regions that are economically better off are likely to be more
assertive (Gourevitch 1979; Harvie 1994).
On the other, the “under-development hypothesis”, based on the internal colonialism
model, will assert that regional assertiveness comes as a response to internal
colonisation and economic deprivation; in other words, economically disadvantaged
regions are more likely to rebel against their state and to support devolution
(Hechter 1985; Rokkan and Urwin 1983).
Apart from these three structural arguments, the hypothesis I want to put forward
theoretically draws on “actor-centred institutionalism”5, and some recent works on
regional identity and politics, that accurately appreciate the impact of both, the
contingent decisions of political actors and the institutional context. In this vein, for
example, A. Lecours has suggested that it is the form of the Spanish state throughout
history, more than cultural markers themselves, that constitutes the “key variable in
shaping regional-cultural identification in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and
other areas” (2001: 210). In his statistical analysis of the most assertive regions in six
Western European countries, P. Van Houten concludes that there are the features of the
party system and the conditions of electoral competition that better account for the level
of regional assertiveness (2001: 3). As far as minority mobilisation in ex-Yugoslavia is
concerned, E. Jenne stresses that regional political elites have tended to
opportunistically decide to radicalise or moderate their autonomy claims, taking into
account their internal electoral strength and whether or not a powerful external actor
supports their position (2004: 732).
Grounding in the aforementioned works, I will argue that political actors -not
socio-structural factors- play the key role in explaining political outcomes. Yet, this
argument should also be qualified in the sense that all political decisions -institutionbuilding decisions included- are never made in an institutional vacuum. On the contrary,
5
F. W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play. Actor-centered Institutionalism in Policy Research. Oxford:
Westview Press, 1997.
3
there is always an institutional context that defines the constellations of actors involved,
provides for incentives and restrictions to decision choices and, determines the most
basic rules of the decision-making process. Therefore, strategic interactions among
political elites are fundamentally influenced by the wider institutional framework.
Bearing this in mind, my political-institutional hypothesis reads as follows:
asymmetrical devolution is likely to trigger the multiplication of autonomy claims that,
once combined with the particular conditions of electoral competition, will eventually
set in motion self-government claims in initially less-empowered regions.
Moving from the theoretical dimension to the empirical focus of the paper, it is
worth mentioning that the territorial distribution of political power has been
unanimously considered one of the most contentious issues within the Spanish
democratic transition (Aja 2003; Blanco Valdés 2005; Caciagli 1984; Guibernau 1995).
If the Spanish Constitution was to emerge as the product of a “compromise” and
“consensus”6 among the main political forces, it would have to be achieved in spite of
the entrenched conflict between centralists advocating for the unity of the State and
those others political actors pressing for the recognition of minority nations and for
varying degrees of decentralisation. As a result, the constitutional writing will
noticeably show a lack of imprecision, allowing for different and sometimes
contradictory readings7.
Not surprisingly, the Fathers of the Constitution could only agree to defer the
final territorial structure of the State, and to set forth various alternative paths for the
elaboration of statutes of autonomy. Instead, the very decision to accede to devolution
was handed over to the very territorial entities that were to benefit from selfgovernment, in accordance with a “principle of voluntariness” (so-called principio
dispositivo). This is what P. Cruz Villalón has labelled “de-constitutionalisation of the
form of the State” (1981: 53).
Articles 151 and 143 of the Constitution establish two basic paths for selfgovernment, with an essential difference in terms of competencies: in the first case –socalled “fast-track autonomy”– the highest level of competencies could be achieved from
the very beginning, whereas autonomous communities to be formed according to the
second one –“slow-track autonomy”– would have to wait a five year period before they
could claim for the specific powers listed in the Article 149 of the Constitution. From a
procedural point of view, Article 151 required a formal initiative for self-government to
be adopted by three-fourths of municipalities, representing at least the majority of the
electoral census in each province. This initiative had also to be approved by absolute
majority in a referendum taking place within six months after the first agreement in
favour of the self-government initiative was upheld by a local authority within the
region. And a second referendum would be also necessary to ratify the drafted statute
M. Caciagli accurately reminds us that the Spanish Constitution has been characterised as a “reforma
pactada” or “consensus-based reform of the old system” rather than “ruptura” or “abrupt change” (1984:
85).
6
7
Article 2 clearly exemplifies the ambiguity and non-definition and the tension between opposed images
of the State, when it states: “The Constitution is founded upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish
nation, the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards, and recognises and guarantees the right to
autonomy of the nationalities and regions integrated in it and the solidarity among them” (Translation
from the original in (Guibernau 1995: 245).
4
afterwards. According to article 143, by contrast, the first referendum for the selfgovernment initiative was not required.
To complicate the scenario further, a special provision was made to allow “those
territories that had held in the past a referendum on a statue of autonomy with
affirmative result”8 to “opt in” to the widest range of powers without fulfilling any selfgovernment initiative procedure. In an intricate attempt to solve the long-lasting
national problem (Guibernau 1995: 239), this circumlocution used to refer to Catalonia,
the Basque Country and Galicia was expected to satisfy their demand of differentiated
treatment. As we have already seen, other regions were not absolutely excluded from
the same status, but their access to this higher degree of self-government was made
much more difficult (Solózabal 1996: 249). Extremely difficult, indeed, that it was
thought to be unviable in practice and to work only as a “formal alibi” for the extremely
favourable treatment the historical nationalities were to receive (Blanco Valdés
2005:56; Meilán Gil 1988).
Against this background, political forces in Andalusia almost unanimously
agreed that Andalusia did not want -and would not accept- to be treated as something
less than the historic nationalities; consequently, in the first meeting held by the
Andalusian pre-autonomous government on the 4th of December 1978, the so-called
“Antequera Accord” was approved. According to it, the pursuit for Andalusian selfgovernment would be undertaken on equal terms to those defined for Catalonia and the
Basque Country, that is to say, following the fast-track procedure. At the same time, the
“Antequera Accord” was used as an official appeal to all local and provincial councils
to adhere to the regional self-government initiative. In response to this request, and only
after two months, all eight county councils together with 95% of local councils had
formally endorsed the self-government initiative for Andalusia9.
These results are especially relevant, if several actions carried out by the UCD party in power at the central government- are taken into consideration: First,
instructions were sent by the National Secretariat of the Party to press UCD towncouncillors to vote against the self-government initiative. Second, the National
Executive Committee -met on the 15th January 1980- agreed on some “Conclusions and
Guidelines” concerning the Government’s decentralization policy, calling for the
“rationalization of the process of autonomy”10. This way, the Government formally
revealed its intention to close the path of Article 151 after the Statute of Galicia had
been approved; as a result, the process of devolution in the remaining of the country had
to be channelled through Article 143. Third, the National Executive Committee -met
8
See the Second Transitional Disposition of the Spanish Constitution.
There was even the case of two municipalities –Los Corrales y Puerto Real- that had agreed on the selfgovernment initiative, even before the official appeal was made by the regional pre-autonomous
government.
9
10
See the interview to Rodolfo Martin Villa, key figure within the UCD government at that time (in
Diario YA, November the 6th 1979).
5
again on the 16th January 1980- made a decision to recommend abstention to all party’s
voters, in case the Andalusian referendum would finally take place11.
These decisions came too late, because Andalusia had already complied with the
requirements to pursue the self-government initiative referendum and, even the
President of the Government -Adolfo Suárez- had decided the date for that popular
consultation. The Socialist Party -PSOE-, Communist Party and Party for Andalusia12,
strongly campaigned for participation and the “yes” vote, whereas UCD was divided
between those supporting the referendum and those others recommending abstention.
During the electoral campaign, advertising in national TV channels was forbidden,
some restrictions were also established for newspaper advertising13 and, the expenses
for the institutional campaign were reduced14. Due to some delays in the delivery of the
ballot papers, some soldiers in compulsory military service were unable to exercise their
voting right; and some problems happened in the vote counting, too.
Circumstances surrounding the referendum have been described as painful and
discriminatory for the Andalusian people (Clavero 1983) and, partly because of it
andalusian consciousness was strengthened. In this sense, the perception of being
discriminated found clear translation into the referendum results: The turnout was over
65% and, 86’93% of votes favoured the self-government initiative. Precisely because
Andalusia was able to carry out the whole path traced in Article 151, this “significantly
added democratic legitimacy to its autonomy quest over all other autonomous
communities – the so-called historical nationalities included” (Acosta 2002: 107)15.
How successful are the various hypotheses in explaining these political results?
In accordance with the “under-development hypothesis it can be argued that, at the
outset of the democratic transition Spain offered a broad gap between the most
prosperous and the poorest territories. Within this context, Andalusia was described as a
backward region, overtly dependent on agriculture and tourism and with a weak
industrial sector (Murillo 1981: 138). From the 1950s onwards, the region had
permanently been the origin of emigration movements; in 1979 the unemployment rate
was 5 points higher than the national average16 and, the average family income in the
region represented only 78% of the national one. Reinforcing these statistical data, the
widespread opinion in the region was that, it had suffered from the government’s
economic policy in previous decades that had favoured the development of other
regions at the expense of Andalusia (Clavero 1983; Jimenez et all 1977). The way was
Being the reason voiced by Manuel Clavero Arevalo –first Minister of the Regions and president of
UCD in Andalusia- to turn in his immediate resignation, the importance of such a decision seems out of
question.
11
12
Partido Socialista Andaluz (PSA), later called Partido Andalucista (PA).
Diario El País, “Recurso contra las normas sobre la campaña del referéndum en TVE”, 15th November
1978.
13
14
As a protest action, the then pre-autonomous president, Rafael Escudero, started a hunger strike.
Original quote in Spanish: “Andalucía obtuvo así un plus muy relevante de legitimidad democrática
sobre las restantes comunidades autónomas, incluidas las llamadas “nacionalidades históricas”.
15
16
13% in the Andalusian case against 8% as Spanish average.
6
paved, therefore, for regional politicians to exploit resentment and comparative
grievance arguments.
As for the cultural distinctiveness hypothesis, Andalusia does not have its own
regional language, but rather some phonetics and dialect features that differentiate the
way Andalusians talk the Castilian language from the standard Castilian pronunciation.
Accordingly, the linguistic element cannot rigorously be held as expression of the
Andalusian distinctiveness; yet, some other more subjective elements of cultural
specificity have been recognised in the case of Andalusia, in terms of its distinctive
lifestyle and folklore (Lecours 2001, 211). On the other hand, and in spite of an increase
in the sense of Andalusian distinctiveness, at the time when the referendum took place,
Andalusians mostly held the perception of being primarily Spanish and secondly
Andalusians (Jimenez et al 1977).
Regarding the political-institutional hypothesis, the mainstream literature on
Spanish decentralization agrees that the granting of special autonomy to the historical
nationalities –that is to say, establishing a process of asymmetrical devolution- had a
powerful demonstration effect on the rest of the country and, it resulted in a process of
inter-regional competition and territorial emulation (Blanco 2005; Lecours 2004;
Moreno 1997). Not out of irony, the process of decentralization has been described as
the “fable of the hare and the tortoise” (Corcuera 1994). But, why was Andalusia the
only among the “non-historic nationalities” that pursued autonomy through Article 151?
A first glance to political party interests and interactions reveals that the PSOE was the
main political force in Andalucia, whereas the central government was ruled by the
UCD. Whereas the PSOE read autonomy for Andalucia as opening the door to the
government of the region, UCD inevitably interpreted the same event as the lost in
territorial power.
When assessing both economic hypotheses together, the fact that economic
difference can work in both directions seems to minimise its conclusiveness and
explanatory power. Being one of the most economically developed parts of the country
could activate the claim for self-government in the case of Catalonia that found itself
“politically subjected to an anachronistic and backward state, Castile, that held
political power” (Guibernau 1995: 241). At the same time, being one of the most
economically under-developed parts of the country could also activate the claim for
self-government in Andalusia. Provided that most regions could easily find socioeconomic indicators –such as GDP per capita or unemployment rate- to argue that they
stand in a better or worse economic position that the average country, it seems that most
regions could rely on this argument as the rationale behind their claim for a higher level
of autonomy. That is to say, if economic difference could explain all cases, it would end
up explaining none of them.
Concerning the cultural explanation, it seems to me that it suffers from two
important weaknesses. First, to the extent that we accept that the identification of a
national or regional identity is the result of a process of social construction, it seems that
the question of cultural distinctiveness cannot we objectively answered in terms of
“who you are” but rather subjectively in terms of “who do you think you are?”. More
importantly, there is also a basic problem of logical tautology, in the sense that the
outcome to be explained is not independent from the explanation itself. In other words,
demands of regional autonomy are not simply a consequence of the existence of a
7
regional consciousness but rather we identify the existence of regional identity through
regionalist activity. Again, if some sense of cultural distinctiveness could be found in all
cases of regional assertiveness, cultural distinctiveness would end up explaining none of
them.
The evidence shown in the analysis of the case of Andalusia suggests, in my
opinion, that structural arguments do not stand as general and valid explanations for all
stances of self-government claims. Even more, whether or not political actors can make
use of those economic and cultural arguments for the sake of regional mobilisation, they
are unable to account for the form, timing and path of demands of autonomy. It is on
that matter where institutional analysis may offer some promising avenues for further
research.
8
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