SQUIRREL-KILLERS 2010
SECOND NEGATIVE BRIEFS
Dr. John F. Schunk, Editor
"Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its
military and/or police presence in one or more of the following:
South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey.”
N201. AFGHANISTAN: Solvency
N202. AFGHANISTAN: Short Time-Frame Disad
N203. AFGHANISTAN: Exit Deadline Disad
N204. AFGHANISTAN: Terrorism Disad
N205. AFGHANISTAN: U.S. Credibility Disad
N206. CHINA: Aggression Disad
N207. CHINA: Naval Adventurism Disad
N208. CHINA: New Silk Road Disad
N209. DRONES: Solvency/Disad
N210. IRAN: Solvency
N211. IRAN: Nuclear Threat Disad
N212. IRAQ: Loss of Democracy Disad
N213. IRAQ: Civil War Disad
N214. IRAQ: Terrorism Disad
N215. IRAQ: U.S. Credibility Disad
N216. ISOLATIONISM: Disad
N217. ISRAEL: Attack on Iran Disad
N218. JAPAN: Loss of Deterrence Disad
N219. JAPAN: Okinawa Bases Disad
N220. JAPAN: Nuclear Proliferation Disad
N221. KOREA REUNIFICATION: Solvency
N222. KUWAIT: Disads
N223. MILITARY AID: Solvency
N224. MILITARY BASES: Solvency
N225. MILITARY BASES: Withdrawal Disad
N226. MILITARY BASES: Latin America Disad
N227. NORTH KOREA: Solvency
N228. NORTH KOREA: Aggression Disad
N229. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: Solvency/Disad
N230. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Solvency
N231. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Disad
N232. OIL SHORTAGE: Disad
N233. PAKISAN: Terrorism Disad
N234. PREVENTIVE WAR: Disad
N235. PRIVATE CONTRACTORS: Ban Disad
N236. RUSSIA: Aggression Disad
N237. SOUTH KOREA: Loss of Deterrence Disad
N238. SOUTH KOREA: Loss of Bases Disads
N239. TAIWAN: Chinese Attack Disad
N240. TERRORISM: Impact
N241. TURKEY: Alienation Disad
N242. TURKEY: Nuclear Deterrence Disads
N243. TURKEY: Nuclear Proliferation Disad
N244. TURKEY: Cyprus Disad
N245. U.S. DOMESTIC FUNDING: Solvency
N246. UNEMPLOYMENT: Disad
N247. WAR POWERS ACT: Disad
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SK/N201. AFGHANISTAN: Solvency
1. AFGHANISTAN IS NOT READY TO STAND ON ITS OWN FEET
SK/N201.01) Andrew Potter, MACLEAN’S, March 8, 2010, p. 20, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The future of Afghanistan
depends ultimately on the Afghan people, and there is little indication that country
is remotely ready to stand on its own two feet.
SK/N201.02) Andrew Potter, MACLEAN’S, March 8, 2010, p. 20, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. To get a sense of the scale
of the challenge, here are some facts about Afghanistan. Life expectancy is 44
years. It has the second highest infant mortality rate in the world. Outbreaks of
diseases such as hepatitis and polio are common, and much of the population is
generally unhealthy, malnourished, has bad teeth, and--in Kabul anyway--suffers
from breathing air said to be full of dusty fecal matter. On the economic side, the
country is grindingly poor. Corruption is rampant; last year Afghans paid bribes
equivalent to one-quarter of the country's GDP. Municipal infrastructure is very
weak, with electricity supply unreliable even in the cities. The literacy rate is
generously estimated to be around 28 per cent (43 per cent of men, but only 13
per cent of women), although there hasn't been a proper census in over 30 years.
SK/N201.03) Andrew Potter, MACLEAN’S, March 8, 2010, p. 20, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The nub of the problem in
Afghanistan is what everyone calls "capacity," a shifty developmental term that
refers, more or less, to the ability of a society to shape and control its own
institutions. In the Afghan context, capacity refers primarily to the human
resources needed to run a state--people with the basic education and skills to do
anything more complicated than simple manual labour. And Afghanistan has
virtually no capacity. It isn't just that people are uneducated or illiterate. The more
fundamental difficulty, as one official put it, is that we're talking about people
who for the most part don't even know the difference between a hammer and a
screwdriver.
SK/N201.04) Andrew Potter, MACLEAN’S, March 8, 2010, p. 20, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Back-of-the-napkin
calculations suggest that Afghanistan stands in immediate need of something like
a million and a half educated and dedicated people, just to get the state back on its
feet. Where are they going to come from? There's the educated Afghan diaspora,
but it has been almost completely tapped. The only remaining source of human
capital is the school system, and this is one area that has seen some obvious
progress. When the Taliban were overthrown in 2001 there were only 700,000
children in School; now there are seven million. Educating people takes a long
time, though, and when they are at their most open, Canadian officials concede
that we are at least a decade away from being able to turn Afghanistan over to the
Afghans.
2. THE AFGHAN MILITARY IS WOEFULLY INADEQUATE
SK/N201.05) Editorial, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
December 11, 2009, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
After eight years and $19 billion spent on training, the Afghan Army is only some
95,000-strong and barely battle-hardened. A force of at least 250,000 is needed to
keep the Taliban in check in the largely rural, mountainous country. And the
Army remains rifted by desertions, graft, cowardice, illiteracy, low pay and, most
of all, an ethnic mix dominated by minority Tajiks rather than the majority
Pashtuns. Without greater recruitment of Pashtuns, the Army will have a hard
time pacifying the Pashtun regions, where the Taliban derives its strength.
SK/N201.06) Editorial, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
December 11, 2009, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. It
may be easy to quickly swell the ranks of Afghan soldiers and officers - especially
with the lure of higher salaries. But rushing them into battle and into rapidly
mastering the subtleties of counterinsurgency may only backfire.
SK/N201.07) Bobby Ghosh, TIME, March 8, 2010, p. 24, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Even if McChrystal's
officials are a huge success, two other crucial planks in Obama's plan to start
pulling U.S. forces from Afghanistan in mid-2011 already look worm-eaten. One
is the creation of a legitimate, reliable government in Kabul: since Karzai's
contentious election late last year, Afghanistan's President has shown little
inclination to ditch his corrupt cronies. Nor is there yet an Afghan security force
capable of taking over from the Americans. Although U.S. commanders carefully
talk up the contributions of the 4,500 Afghan National Army soldiers (two had
been killed) and police in the Marjah operation, it's no secret that the U.S.
Marines and British troops are doing the heavy lifting. McChrystal's target of a
134,000-man Afghan National Army by late fall--up from 104,000 now--seems
hopelessly optimistic.
3. THE AFGHAN POLICE ARE WOEFULLY ADEQUATE
SK/N201.08) T. Christian Miller et al., NEWSWEEK, March 29, 2010, p.
26, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The worst of it
is that the police are central to Washington's plans for getting out of Afghanistan .
The U.S.-backed government in Kabul will never have popular support if it can't
keep people safe in their own homes and streets. Yet in a United Nations poll last
fall, more than half the Afghan respondents said the police are corrupt. Police
commanders have been implicated in drug trafficking, and when U.S. Marines
moved into the town of Aynak last summer, villagers accused the local police
force of extortion, assault, and rape.
SK/N201.09) Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., NATIONAL JOURNAL, October
23, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. All
of the institutional problems hit the Afghan police force even harder than the
army. Dispersed in 365 districts across the country, the so-called Afghan national
police are in fact mostly a patchwork of locally based forces, recruited from the
communities they serve. Less well trained, paid, and equipped than the army, the
district police operate far from Kabul's support or oversight but dangerously close
to local potentates, criminals, and insurgents. From January 2007 to October 2008,
the Defense IG reported, while U.S. and NATO forces suffered 464 troops killed
in action and the Afghan army lost 505, the Afghan national police lost 1,215.
"The army is, I'd say, five to six years further along in development than the
police," Formica [outgoing chief of Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan] said. "Every army unit we have has been mentored [by U.S. or
NATO advisers]. With the police, we haven't had that luxury. We've got about 20
percent of the 365 police districts that have embedded mentor teams."
4. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE MUST BE MAINTAINED
SK/N201.10) John Nagl [President, Center for a New American Security],
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 33, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In most places afflicted by al-Qaeda,
the United States can implement counterinsurgency with a lighter footprint,
providing economic-development assistance and focusing on training and
equipping counterterrorism forces with local government partners. But in
Afghanistan, the government and its security forces are not yet strong enough to
stand on their own without significant help from us and our allies. That help is an
investment in building a more secure region from which we have been brutally
attacked and in which more attacks are now being planned.
SK/N201.11) Bing West [former Asst. Secretary of Defense],
NATIONAL REVIEW, May 3, 2010, p. 16, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. As we withdraw, the budget for the Afghan army
will plummet, and the army will not be able to stand on its own in 2011. It is clear
that we must continue to provide an air umbrella for the Afghan soldiers, and this
requires the presence of U.S. air controllers on the ground. Task forces like
Commando assist and reassure the Afghan forces while providing sufficient
combat power to protect our air controllers; they're advisory units and combat
units at the same time.
5. INCREASE IN U.S. FORCES IS REQUIRED FOR TRAINING
SK/N201.12) Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., NATIONAL JOURNAL, October
23, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In
the long run, it is true that "as the Afghans stand up, we will stand down," to adapt
the cliche that is, after many years, finally coming true in Iraq. But that equation
is true only over the long run. In the next few years, at least, getting more
Afghans ready to fight requires deploying more, not fewer, Americans to train
them in boot camp, to advise them in the field, and above all, to fight alongside
them. In the near term, training more Afghans is not an alternative to sending
more Americans: Achieving the goal requires more Americans.
SK/N201.13) Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., NATIONAL JOURNAL, October
23, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. We
know that training the Afghans to defend themselves will require more Americans,
not fewer, because we have tried it the other way. In 2003 and 2004, the United
States attempted to build Iraqi forces on the cheap and to hand over security to
them prematurely while drawing down American troops. When fighting in Falluja
triggered uprisings across the country, the undertrained and undersupported Iraqi
units mostly dissolved -- with some significant exceptions.
SK/N201.14) Thom Shanker, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
May 5, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
According to Pentagon statistics, allied nations have committed more than 1,500
trainers, viewed as essential for preparing Afghan forces to take over their
security mission so that U.S. and other foreign military personnel can go home, a
central tenet of the administration's strategy. But there is a shortage of 759
trainers. After President Barack Obama committed 30,000 more American
combat troops for Afghanistan, Mr. Gates led the effort to urge allies to send army
and police trainers even if they could not send more fighting forces, and he did
not want that program to slow down this summer.
6. THE SURGE IS FAILING TO MAKE ADEQUATE PROGRESS
SK/N201.15) Alissa J. Rubin, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
May 14, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. If the
timetable is not daunting enough, an April report by the Pentagon to Congress
found that by most measures, the country is, at best, only a little better off now
than it was a year ago. Progress so far appears well off pace to meet the American
goals. The insurgency has spread to some new places, notably the north and
northwest of the country, although it has diminished in a few areas. It is now
made up of more than a half-dozen groups with different agendas, making it that
much harder to defeat, or negotiate with, even if the Americans and Afghans
could agree on a strategy for doing that. In 120 districts that the Pentagon views
as critical to Afghanistan's future stability, only a quarter of residents view the
government positively. And the government has full control in fewer than a halfdozen of these districts.
SK/N201.16) Joe Klein, TIME, May 3, 2010, p. 23, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Marjah was taken, but most of the
Taliban slipped away and have now reconstituted themselves in the countryside; a
game of whack-a-mole seems likely to ensue. Meanwhile, the counterinsurgency
effort in Kandahar was crippled by the diversion of Afghan troops and police (and
also of U.S. civilian aid efforts) to Helmand: an entire Afghan regiment that was
supposed to partner with U.S. troops in the crucial Zhari district--where Senjaray
is located--was sent to Marjah. There are also 600 of Afghanistan's best-trained
police officers (ANCOPs) in Marjah, while the police presence in Zhari is
negligible. The fabled U.S. civilian surge is, well, a fable in the district. U.S.
forces will triple in Zhari during the next few months, but that won't make much
of a difference if the Afghan security and governmental presence remains as
pathetic as it now is.
SK/N201.17) Helene Cooper & Mark Landler, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, May 12, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. Mr. Katulis said that huge gaps remained between what the
United States would like from the Karzai government and what the Afghan
government had been able to do. For instance, U.S. officials coined the
"government in a box" idea for an Afghan government that would be ready to roll
into the former Taliban stronghold of Marja once American troops cleared out the
insurgents. But once the military operation in Marja was completed, Mr. Katulis
noted, "there wasn't much inside the box," referring to the slow pace of the
civilian effort in Afghanistan.
7. BUYING OFF LOCAL MILITIAS WON’T WORK
SK/N201.18) Editorial, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
December 11, 2009, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Obama’s backup plan is to buy off local militias to stand up against the Taliban.
But that plan may undercut Afghanistan’s fragile democracy if it simply
empowers corrupt warlords.
8. THE GOVERNMENT WILL CAVE IN TO THE TALIBAN
SK/N201.19) John Nagl [President, Center for a New American Security],
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 33, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Much of southern and eastern
Afghanistan is now ruled by a shadow Taliban government, in some places even
with established courts, a sign of near-total control. Withdrawing from
Afghanistan would lead to the rapid demise of the Karzai government, at least in
the areas already being wrested from its grasp. The Afghan army and police,
developed at enormous expense over the past five years, would crumble without
U.S. support.
SK/N201.20) MANILA BULLETIN, May 12, 2010, pNA, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. More than anything, US
President Barack Obama's deadline to start withdrawing troops by July 2011 after
a surge this year has reminded many Afghans of how Washington effectively
abandoned the country in 1989-90 after the Soviet army were forced to retreat.
That feeling has been exacerbated by a public spat between Obama and Karzai
this year, troubles in a stepped-up US-led offensive against the Taliban, as well as
mutterings from the US ambassador that the Afghan leader is not a reliable
partner. It is a sentiment that some say could further pressure Karzai to reach
early peace deals with the Taliban, something that worries the United States as its
prepares an offensive involving at least 23,000 NATO and Afghan troops in
Kandahar.
SK/N201.21) MANILA BULLETIN, May 12, 2010, pNA, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Washington has played down any
deadline, saying they would withdraw troops only if conditions were right. Some
Afghan experts see the deadline just as a way of Washington pressurising Karzai
to get his act together. But the perception among Afghans is different. "When you
start talking about exit strategies, these deadlines, these are interpreted by
Afghans in another way and encourage the other side. Enemies expect a repeat
performance. It makes Afghans remind themselves of '89, '90,” Wardak [Afghan
Defence Minister] added.
9. ONE YEAR IS NOT ENOUGH TIME FOR VICTORY
SK/N201.22) Max Boot [Sr. Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations], THE
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, December 8, 2009, p. A27, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The most problematic part of
Obama's policy is his pledge to begin a withdrawal in July 2011. Getting 30,000
troops into Afghanistan is a difficult logistical challenge. It will be a major
achievement if all of them are in place by July 2010. That will give them only a
year to reverse many years of Taliban gains before their own numbers start to
dwindle.
SK/N201.23) James Dobbins, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
May 12, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. U.S.
leaders have not necessarily been against negotiating with the Taliban leadership,
but most have argued that this should be done from a position of strength, and that
any effort at reconciliation should therefore await an improvement on the
battlefield. That makes sense if one is reasonably confident that the tide of battle
can be turned. Unfortunately, this is looking increasingly difficult to achieve, at
least within the narrow timeframe set by President Obama last November to begin
bringing American troops home by mid-2011.
SK/N201.24) Richard N. Haass [President, Council on Foreign Relations],
NEWSWEEK, December 14, 2009, p. 48, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. In his West Point speech, President Obama
committed to a "soft" exit from Afghanistan, pledging to begin reducing U.S.
forces there by the summer of 2011. Left unsaid is how quickly the number of
U.S. troops will come down, how many will remain, and for how long. Most
important, there is no mention of what will happen if "conditions on the ground"
remain poor or worsen--i.e., if it turns out that the Afghan Army and police aren't
ready to take over. There's every reason to believe that they won't be.
SK/N201.25) Alissa J. Rubin, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
May 14, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Despite the commitment of more troops by Mr. Obama and a new strategy that
has emphasized the protection of Afghan civilians, few in Afghanistan believe
that a functional government that holds the country together can be created on the
timetable outlined. "It was very unrealistic to think that in 18 months they would
be able, with the Afghan government, to secure a very large part of the country
which is insecure today," said Nader Nadery, a commissioner on the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission, who travels extensively around the
country. "Look at only Marja. It took such a long time just to secure that area."
The timeline also leaves many Afghans reluctant to back the Americans and the
Afghan government, because they fear that the members of the NATO coalition
may be leaving soon, Mr. Nadery said.
SK/N202. AFGHANISTAN: Short Time-Frame Disad
A. U.S. CAN WIN IN AFGHANISTAN IN 5-10 YEARS
1. IN FIVE YEARS, GOVERNMENT WILL STABILIZE
SK/N202.01) John Nagl [President, Center for a New American Security],
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 33, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. We waited until 2009 to give the
Afghan conflict the resources success will require. Over the next five years, it
should be possible to build an Afghan government that can outperform the
Taliban and an Afghan army that can outfight it, especially with the support of a
Pakistani government that continues its own efforts on its side of the Durand Line.
SK/N202.02) John Nagl [President, Center for a New American Security],
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 33, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The United States finally [in 2009]
began to provide the resources Afghanistan has long needed to build a stable state,
and Pakistan finally began to recognize the threat that the Taliban posed to its
government. More effective counterinsurgency operations on both sides of the
border have put increased pressure on the Taliban and al-Qaeda, a larger Afghan
army and a refocused Pakistani military are now learning to conduct
counterinsurgency. It will take years and significant resources to sufficiently
empower the governments and security services of both countries to stand on their
own, but the investment is worth the cost.
SK/N202.03) Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., NATIONAL JOURNAL, October
23, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. "If
we are going to depart Afghanistan," [retired Lt. Colonel] Nagl said, "the only
way to do so and be secure is to have a reliable Afghan security force
appropriately sized, working for a reasonably well-respected, well-supported
Afghan government. That's a work of three to five years and more resources than
we have yet put into Afghanistan."
SK/N202.04) Editorial, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
December 11, 2009, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai says it will take five years to ready the Army.
2. U.S. WILL NEED TO AID FOR TEN YEARS OR MORE
SK/N202.05) Henrik Bering, POLICY REVIEW, June-July 2009, p. 90,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Finally, patience is
needed. As David Kilcullen says in The Gamble, "there has never been a
successful counterinsurgency that took less than ten years." To prevail, a longterm commitment is essential. Only by demonstrating staying power will we be
able to convince the locals to throw in their lot with us. They are not suicidal. This
is why the constant talk of deadlines and exit strategies is so harmful.
SK/N202.06) Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Elisabeth Bumiller, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, December 9, 2009, p. A16, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. President Hamid Karzai said Tuesday that Afghanistan
would not be able to pay for its own security until at least 2024, underscoring his
government's long-term financial dependence on the United States and NATO
even as President Obama has pledged to begin withdrawing American troops in
2011. Mr. Karzai spoke at a news conference here with Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates, who did not put a timetable on the American and allied financial
commitment but acknowledged that there was a “realism on our part that it will be
some time before Afghanistan is able to sustain its security forces entirely on its
own.”
B. WITHDRAWAL SNATCHES DEFEAT FROM JAWS OF VICTORY
SK/N202.07) Analytic, NATIONAL REVIEW, September 21, 2009, p. 4,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Afghanistan is not
in nearly as dire a condition as Iraq circa 2006. Its capital is relatively safe-suffering a major attack only every several weeks--and the areas in the south
where the Taliban has had the most success are the ones that we have most
neglected. The surge in Iraq shows that classic counterinsurgency tactics work so
long as they are supported with enough force (Obama will have to send even more
troops) and given enough time (we will have to be patient). The war is far from
lost or unwinnable, and deliberately setting out to lose it by pulling out now
would be rank strategic folly.
SK/N203. AFGHANISTAN: Exit Deadline Disad
A. AN EXIT DEADLINE DISTORTS DECISION-MAKING
1. IT FOCUSES ON THE WRONG ISSUES
SK/N203.01) Gideon Rose [Council on Foreign Relations], CURRENT,
February 1998, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. In the past, policymakers often gave little thought to the specific
objectives and potential endings of their foreign adventures, with chaotic results.
But the idea of a formal exit strategy, with its anti-interventionist bias and stress
on rigid public planning, is misguided in theory and unhelpful in practice. Instead
of obsessing about the exit, planners should concentrate on the strategy. The key
question is not how we get out, but why we are getting in.
SK/N203.02) Gideon Rose [Council on Foreign Relations], CURRENT,
February 1998, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. The insistence that troops should never be deployed unless an
administration can tell Congress and the public in advance just how long the
mission will last, how much it will cost, and precisely how it will end represents a
Somalia corollary to the Vietnam syndrome in American foreign policy. This is
why the call for exit strategies fits so neatly into updated versions of the
Pentagon's restrictive post-Vietnam conditions for using force, articulated by
Caspar Weinberger in 1984 and supplemented by Colin Powell a few years later.
However, the concept has major drawbacks. By definition, the term biases
discussion in favor of foreign military commitments that can be terminated easily
and against those that appear more open-ended. By making an exit strategy a
prerequisite for the deployment of troops, neoisolationists preempt consideration
of some worthwhile operations, allowing a general rule rather than specific
arguments to do their work for them. Some of the missions that would have failed
to meet such a standard include American participation in NATO, the postarmistice defense of South Korea, the post-Camp David peacekeeping in the Sinai,
and the post-Gulf War containment of Iraq - not to mention the stated U.S.
intention to maintain 100,000 troops in Asia.
SK/N203.03) Gideon Rose [Council on Foreign Relations], CURRENT,
February 1998, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. Opposing exit strategies does not necessarily mean favoring the waste of
American blood and money in endless futile attempts to impose order or create
harmony in Bosnia or anywhere else. The main reason to jettison the concept is
because it lumps together several important issues that are best handled separately.
The first question is when open-ended military commitments might actually make
sense, and the answer is that it depends on the American interests at stake and the
policy options available. The second question is how interventions can be closed
out smoothly, and the answer is that they should leave some kind of stable order
behind. The third question is how overcommitment can be avoided, and the
answer is through selective intervention rather than the imposition of time limits.
Finally, the fourth question is how unexpected developments should be handled,
and the answer is according to well-developed contingency plans.
2. IT DESTROYS NEEDED FLEXIBILITY
SK/N203.04) Gideon Rose [Council on Foreign Relations], CURRENT,
February 1998, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. By emphasizing lockstep adherence to original plans and precise cost and
time estimates, the idea of an exit strategy contributes to a false notion that
military interventions are mechanical tasks like building a new kitchen, rather
than strategic contests marked by friction and uncertainty. The military
interventions under discussion these days may not resemble standard conventional
wars, but the more ambitious ones are nevertheless marked by potentially hostile
environments and the threat or use of force by all parties. In such situations it is
absurd to bind U.S. forces to a fixed timetable or demand guaranteed outcomes as
a precondition for action.
SK/N203.05) Gideon Rose [Council on Foreign Relations], CURRENT,
February 1998, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. By emphasizing the public aspects of intervention planning, exit strategies
elevate broad short-term popular approval above all else, including operational
effectiveness. For most military interventions, to publicize whatever exit strategy
one does have is to provide a how-to manual for any local actor seeking to play
the spoiler. Trumpeting advance plans for withdrawal may ensure that the
American public can control the actions of its government. But it does so at the
expense of hampering the government's ability to respond flexibly to the situation
that prompted the intervention in the first place.
B. AN EXIT DEADLINE INSURES U.S. DEFEAT
1. IT WILL EMBOLDEN THE TALIBAN
SK/N203.06) Max Boot [Sr. Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations], THE
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, December 8, 2009, p. A27, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The worrisome part of the
deadline is that it may signal a lack of resolve that emboldens our enemies.
SK/N203.07) Milan Vesely, THE MIDDLE EAST, January 2010, p. 16,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Obama's speech set
the stage for America's total withdrawal from Afghanistan, a fact that will not be
lost on the Taliban Shura in the Pakistani city of Quetta. Nor will it be lost on
Pakistan's military, or its more powerful ISI intelligence service, now bogged
down in the mountainous regions of South Waziristan and the Swat valley. By
defining a departure date some 18 months hence, President Obama unequivocally
announced he would accept a face-saving stalemate in Afghanistan rather than the
'victory' so often touted by George W. Bush.
2. TALIBAN WILL WAIT UNTIL DEADLINE TO TAKE OVER
SK/N203.08) Gideon Rose [Council on Foreign Relations], CURRENT,
February 1998, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. The problem with this approach is that overzealous attempts to devise,
publicize, and enforce limitations on American deployments can undermine an
intervention's effectiveness. Deadlines for withdrawal turn American troops into
lame ducks. They do not prod local thugs to settle their differences, but rather
encourage them to wait until the Americans go home.
SK/N203.09) J. Alexander Thier [US Institute of Peace], CURRENT
HISTORY, April 2010, p. 132. The harder question, though, is why the
insurgency would sue for peace if it believes it is winning and the Americans are
preparing to leave. Considering the Karzai government’s continued loss of moral
authority, the insurgency's still largely safe haven in Pakistan, and an ongoing
decline in public support for the war in NATO countries, the insurgents might
easily decide to wait out the next few years, meanwhile waging a very effective
guerrilla campaign.
SK/N203.10) Bobby Ghosh, TIME, March 8, 2010, p. 24, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Mullah Omar and his
colleagues, taking Obama on his word that he wants to begin a U.S. pullout by
July 2011, have said they intend to outlast the occupiers. If that means ceding
strongholds like Marjah only to pop up elsewhere, then that's what they will do.
SK/N203.11) Gwynne Dyer, WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE
EAST AFFAIRS, March 2010, p. S14, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. July 2011 is not a long time away: All the Taliban
leaders have to do is wait 18 months and then collect their winnings. If they are
intelligent and pragmatic men--which they are--they may even let the foreign
forces make some apparent progress in the meantime, so that the security situation
looks promising when the time comes to start pulling the U.S. troops out.
3. TALIBAN VICTORY IS DISASTER FOR AFGHAN WOMEN
SK/N203.12) J. Alexander Thier [US Institute of Peace], CURRENT
HISTORY, April 2010, p. 136. To be sure, an accommodation with the Taliban
might accelerate the steady erosion of rights that Afghan women have
experienced in recent years. Indeed, the democratically elected parliament passed
a family law last year-signed by President Karzai-that sanctioned, among other
things, marital rape under certain circumstances. And if, after the ink dried on an
agreement, the Taliban imposed an unofficial ban on female employment in
provinces that they controlled, no ISAF offensive would likely be triggered, even
if such a ban were in contravention of the constitution or the terms of the peace
agreement.
SK/N204. AFGHANISTAN: Terrorism Disad
A. U.S. WITHDRAWAL MEANS VICTORY FOR TALIBAN
SK/N204.01) THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, December 29, 2009, p. 13,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. "Failure in
Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most, of the country
and likely a renewed civil war," said Defense Secretary Robert Gates. He
described the military increase as "an extended surge of 18-24 months,"
suggesting that troop levels would drop to their current numbers, or fewer, after
two years.
SK/N204.02) Peter Bergen [Co-Director, Counterterrorism Strategy
Initiative, New America Foundation], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p.
1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Advocates of
doing less--the "cut and run" option that Bruce mentioned or doing it lighter in
various shapes or forms--have to answer two questions. One, we've done this
already. We've done the do-nothing option, which was closing our embassy in
1989, zeroing out aid to one of the poorest countries in the world and just washing
our hands of it. Into that vacuum stepped the Taliban and al-Qaeda. And we've
already done the "lite" option, which is basically Bush's ideological aversion to
nation-building. We got what we paid for, and the Taliban and al-Qaeda came
back, this time morphed together much more closely ideologically and tactically.
B. U.S. DEFEAT WILL INCREASE TERRORISM
1. RECRUITING TERRORISTS WILL BE EASIER
SK/N204.03) Henrik Bering, POLICY REVIEW, June-July 2009, p. 90,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. But a policy of
"masterly inactivity," leaving the Afghans to their benighted medieval practices,
though tempting to more cynical minds, is not a choice that is available to us.
Almost all terror attacks since 9/11 originate from the border region of
Afghanistan and Pakistan, making this the front in the war against fundamentalist
terror. An American defeat here would be an overwhelming propaganda victory
for the Islamists.
2. AL QAEDA WILL HAVE ITS TRAINING GROUND BACK
SK/N204.04) John Nagl [President, Center for a New American Security],
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 33, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Indeed, it is the Taliban--which rose to
power in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and provided the shelter from which bin
Laden's group planned and executed the September 11 attack--that is now
America's main adversary on the ground in Afghanistan. But were the Taliban to
regain control of the country, al-Qaeda would simply have more room in which to
entrench itself.
SK/N204.05) John Nagl [President, Center for a New American Security],
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 33, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the lessons of the past eight
years is that al-Qaeda will take advantage of safe havens wherever they arise;
were the Taliban to regain control of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda would once again
have an entire country potentially at its disposal from which to train, plan and
operate. And this would only give our enemy greater capability to threaten the
United States.
3. MANY MORE AMERICANS WILL DIE
SK/N204.06) John Nagl [President, Center for a New American Security],
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 33, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Afghanistan is one of the critical
battlefields in this war; while winning in Afghanistan would not by itself defeat
al-Qaeda, losing in Afghanistan would materially strengthen it and prolong the
fight, potentially at the cost of many more American lives. This fact may be
unpalatable, but it is also inescapable.
SK/N205. AFGHANISTAN: U.S. Credibility Disad
A. WITHDRAWAL WILL DESTROY U.S. CREDIBILITY
SK/N205.01) John Nagl [President, Center for a New American Security],
THE NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 33, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. This is not to mention the regional
consequences of an American withdrawal from Afghanistan, the costs of which
would be severe. The dominant regional narrative--that the United States will
abandon its friends without compunction--would be reinforced. NATO, having
made a more extensive commitment to Afghanistan than to any post-Cold War
conflict, would be severely weakened. Pakistan would be forced to recalculate its
recent decisions to fight against the Taliban inside its own borders because the
balance of power in the region would shift in favor of the Taliban upon our
departure.
SK/N205.02) Bruce Riedel [Sr. Fellow, Brookings Institution], MIDDLE
EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. The president's decision is, in my view, the best of some very
bad options. He only really had three. Option one was to cut and run. We can call
it all kinds of different things: downsize the mission, reorient the mission. But
nobody in Afghanistan and, just as important, nobody in Pakistan would see it as
anything other than the United States once more packing its bags and leaving the
locals to deal with the results of a failed intervention.
SK/N205.03) Hendrik Hertzberg, THE NEW YORKER, December 14,
2009, p. 29, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Withdrawal, beginning at once? The political and diplomatic damage to Obama
would be severe: a probable Pentagon revolt; the anger of NATO allies who have
risked their soldiers' lives (and their leaders' political standing) on our behalf; the
near-certainty that a large-scale terrorist attack, whether or not it had anything to
do with Afghanistan, would be met at home not with 9/11 solidarity but with
savage, politically lethal scapegoating.
B. LOSS OF CREDIBILTY INCREASES RISK OF TERRORISM
SK/N205.04) Richard N. Haass [President, Council on Foreign Relations],
NEWSWEEK, December 14, 2009, p. 48, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. If Afghans can't begin taking over from the U.S.
military by the summer of 2011, Obama would face a similarly uncomfortable set
of options. Two of them--extending the duration of the surge beyond 18 months
and increasing U.S. force levels even more--would be costly by every measure.
Opting for either would also cause a domestic political firestorm here. The
obvious alternative--scaling back dramatically despite the weakness of the Kabul
government and Afghan security forces--would also trigger furious criticism, in
this case for damaging American prestige and leaving the homeland more
vulnerable to terrorism launched from South Asia.
C. LOSS OF CREDIBILITY INCREASES RISK OF AGGRESSION
SK/N205.05) Steve Forbes, FORBES GLOBAL, October 5, 2009, p. 15,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As if military
conflict with Iran weren't enough, President Obama faces critical decisions
regarding Afghanistan. If he pursues the wrong course the repercussions will be
profoundly negative for the U.S. and the civilized world. Our defeat in Vietnam,
for example, encouraged the Soviet Union to pursue a highly aggressive foreign
and military policy, culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan and placing new
deadly missiles in its eastern European satellites to intimidate the West. At the
same time authoritarian and totalitarian forces around the world went on a
rampage. The deadliest of these actions was a revolutionary theocracy's seizing of
power in Iran. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, it appeared that proSoviet guerrilla armies were poised to take over El Salvador and much of Central
America. Our debacle in Lebanon in the early 1980s convinced Osama bin Laden
and others that the U.S. was a paper tiger.
SK/N206. CHINA: Aggression Disad
A. CHINA IS A MILITARY THREAT TO U.S.
1. CHINA IS ENGAGED IN MASSIVE MILITARY BUILDUP
SK/N206.01) Alex Kingsbury, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
ONLINE, February 12, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. China is upgrading and expanding its conventional military
forces as well as its antisatellite missiles and its nuclear forces, the new Director
of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told Congress. The hearing, before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, was an annual briefing about the current
and future threats to the nation. "We judge that China over the past several years
has begun a substantially new phase in its military development by beginning to
articulate roles and missions for the [the Chinese military] that go well beyond
China's immediate territorial interests," Blair said in a written statement. "China's
national security interests are broadening."
SK/N206.02) Aaron L. Friedberg, THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
September-October 2009, p. 19, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. It is past time for Americans to take seriously the
challenge ,posed by the continuing growth of China’s military power. Triggered
by the geopolitical shifts that accompanied the end of the cold war, fueled by the
nation's rapid economic growth, and driven by a mix of insecurity and ambition,
today's buildup has been under way for the better part of two decades.
SK/N206.03) Aaron L. Friedberg, THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
September-October 2009, p. 19, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. Over the course of the past twenty years, this shift in priorities
has been reflected in a substantial, sustained military buildup, especially in Chinas
aerospace and naval capabilities. With the nation's economy expanding at near
double-digit rates, Beijing was able to increase defense budgets even faster
without imposing noticeable burdens on society. According to the Defense
Department's latest figures, between 1996 and 2008 Chinas officially disclosed
(and likely understated) defense budget grew by an average of 12.9 percent per
year, while GDP grew at around 9.6 percent.
SK/N206.04) Paul J. Smith [Naval War College], ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN
AMERICAN REVIEW, Winter 2009, p. 230, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Perhaps the most destabilizing element in SinoJapanese relations is the rapid modernization and build-up of China's military
capabilities. Within the past decade, China has increased its defense spending by
an average of 14.2 percent annually. In March 2008, China announced that its
military expenditures would increase by 17.6 percent in 2007.
2. CHINESE MILITARY WILL SOON RIVAL U.S.
SK/N206.05) Robert Madsen & Richard J. Samuels [Director, Center for
International Studies, MIT], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, May-June 2010, p.
48, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Washington
and Tokyo both realize that China is on the verge of surpassing Japan
economically and that Beijing has every intention of transforming its considerable
economic clout into military might. Assuming domestic stability, China will
eventually emerge as a peer competitor of the United States.
SK/N206.06) Drew Thompson [Director of China Studies, The Nixon
Center], FOREIGN POLICY, March-April 2010, p. 86, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. China's military today is, if not a near
rival to that of the United States, at least a "fast-learning organization," in the
view of many close foreign observers. It is deploying weapons that neutralize key
U.S. advantages, such as ballistic missiles and supersonic sea-skimming missiles
that can target U.S. aircraft carriers in the region; an enlarged submarine fleet;
homegrown satellite reconnaissance and communications capabilities; and
recently, the demonstrated capability to eliminate satellites and intercept ballistic
missiles.
SK/N206.07) Otto Kreisher, CONGRESS DAILY AM, May 19, 2010,
pNA. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. U.S. armed
services need to develop potentially expensive new capabilities to offset China's
rapidly growing capacity to counter America's military advantage in the Western
Pacific, but face a "constrained fiscal environment" that will require difficult
choices in the future. Those were the conflicting views presented by two key
senators and a panel of defense experts at a Capitol Hill forum Tuesday.
3. CHINESE WEAPONS BUILDUP THREATENS U.S.
SK/N206.08) Robert D. Kaplan [Sr. Fellow, Center for a New American
Security], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As part of its effort to control its
offshore waters in the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea, China is also
improving its mine-warfare capability, buying fourth-generation jet fighters from
Russia, and deploying some 1,500 Russian surface-to-air missiles along its coast.
Furthermore, even as they are putting fiber-optic systems underground and
moving their defense capabilities deep into western China, out of potential
enemies' naval missile range, the Chinese are developing an offensive strategy to
strike that icon of U.S. power, the aircraft carrier.
SK/N206.09) Otto Kreisher, CONGRESS DAILY AM, May 19, 2010,
pNA. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Air-Land
Subcommittee ranking member John Thune, R-S.D., shared those concerns,
noting that while the military has been focusing on relatively low-tech battles in
Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a significant high-tech battle emerging to counter
China's capabilities. A key weapon to do that, he said, is the new long-range strike
capability that the Air Force is seeking.
SK/N206.10) Otto Kreisher, CONGRESS DAILY AM, May 19, 2010,
pNA. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A detailed
study on the AirSea Battle concept released by CSBA on Tuesday also cited as a
priority better long-range strike capabilities, which could include conventionally
armed intercontinental ballistic missiles. Another priority would be to counter
China's vast missile arsenal by "blinding" its ability to target U.S. carriers at long
range. That could require destroying China's spy satellites.
4. CHINA IS INCREASING ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
SK/N206.11) Alex Kingsbury, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
ONLINE, February 12, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. On the other hand, the annual threat assessment, which
represents the consensus views of U.S. intelligence agencies, warns that China
would increase its nuclear capabilities in the next 10 years. "Beijing seeks to
modernize China's strategic forces in order to address concerns about the
survivability of those systems in the face of foreign, particularly U.S., advances in
strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and missile defenses," Blair [Director of
National Intelligence] said in his statement.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ASIA RISKS CHINESE AGGRESSION
1. WITHDRAWAL INSURES CHINESE SUPREMACY
SK/N206.12) Aaron L. Friedberg, THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
September-October 2009, p. 19, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. America's influence in and access to Asia will be drastically
reduced, with harmful long-term consequences for its security, prosperity and
ability to promote the spread of liberal democracy, if it is seen to be in long-term
decline relative to China or, even worse, if it appears irresolute, incompetent,
unwilling or simply unable to fulfill its commitments. Other governments will
then have no choice but to reconsider their national strategies either by developing
their own nuclear capabilities or--worse--by bandwagoning with Beijing.
2. CHINESE MILITARY THREATENS NEIGHBORS
SK/N206.13) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Japan is anxious,
too. Its defense minister, Toshimi Kitazawa, said in mid-April that two Chinese
submarines and eight destroyers were spotted on April 10 heading between two
Japanese islands en route to the Pacific, the first time such a large Chinese flotilla
had been seen so close to Japan. When two Japanese destroyers began following
the Chinese ships, a Chinese helicopter flew within 300 feet of one of the
destroyers, the Japanese Defense Ministry said.
SK/N206.14) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The Chinese
Navy's most impressive growth has been in its submarine fleet, said Mr. Huang,
the scholar in Singapore. It recently built at least two Jin-class submarines, the
first regularly active ones in the fleet with ballistic missile capabilities, and two
more are under construction. Two Shang-class nuclear-powered attack
submarines recently entered service. Countries in the region have responded with
their own acquisitions, said Carlyle A. Thayer, a professor at the Australian
Defense Force Academy. In December, Vietnam signed an arms deal with Russia
that included six Kilo-class submarines, which would give Vietnam the most
formidable submarine fleet in Southeast Asia. Last year, Malaysia took delivery
of its first submarine, one of two ordered from France, and Singapore began
operating one of two Archer-class submarines bought from Sweden.
SK/N206.15) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Last fall, during a
speech in Washington, Lee Kuan Yew, the former Singaporean leader, reflected
widespread anxieties when he noted China's naval rise and urged the United
States to maintain its regional presence. “U.S. core interest requires that it remains
the superior power on the Pacific,” he said. “To give up this position would
diminish America's role throughout the world.”
3. CHINA AIMS TO CURTAIL U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION
SK/N206.16) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In late March, Adm.
Robert F. Willard, the leader of the United States Pacific Command, said in
Congressional testimony that recent Chinese military developments were “pretty
dramatic.” China has tested long-range ballistic missiles that could be used
against aircraft carriers, he said. After years of denials, Chinese officials have
confirmed that they intend to deploy an aircraft carrier group within a few years.
China is also developing a sophisticated submarine fleet that could try to prevent
foreign naval vessels from entering its strategic waters if a conflict erupted in the
region, said Admiral Willard and military analysts. “Of particular concern is that
elements of China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our
freedom of action in the region,” the admiral said.
4. CHINESE WEAPONS COULD CRIPPLE U.S. MILITARY
SK/N206.17) Otto Kreisher, CONGRESS DAILY AM, May 19, 2010,
pNA. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Senate
Armed Services Air-Land Subcommittee Chairman Joe Lieberman, D-Conn., said
the new concept was important because China wants to be capable of not just
overcoming U.S. air and naval superiorities, "but making them irrelevant." He
cited Beijing's arsenal of hundreds of missiles able to hit U.S. bases and carriers
far away and its weapons to disable the communications and spy satellites the
United States depends on. To prevent tensions from escalating into conflict,
America must make it clear to its allies and to China "that we are committed to
maintaining our capabilities in the Western Pacific," Lieberman said.
5. U.S. WITHDRAWAL INCREASES RISK OF WAR
SK/N206.18) Aaron L. Friedberg, THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
September-October 2009, p. 19, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. This combination of rapidly advancing offensive and defensive
capabilities is beginning to raise doubts in the region about America's ability to
defend its allies and project its power. What is worse, over the next several years
there will be an increasing danger that, in an extreme crisis, Chinas leaders might
believe that they have a chance of starting a war by effectively knocking the
United States out of the western Pacific and blunting its initial, retaliatory
response, all without striking the American homeland and without the need to fire
a single nuclear weapon.
6. CONFLICT WITH INDIA COULD GO NUCLEAR
SK/N206.19) Jeremy Kahn, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL, October
19, 2009, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
implications for India's security--and the world's--are ominous. It turns what was
once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks
hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two
nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an
issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States
and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice--a conflict involving
India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in-either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or
as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.
7. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD STRIKE U.S. HOMELAND
SK/N206.20) Aaron L. Friedberg, THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
September-October 2009, p. 19, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. As risky as an American attack on Chinese nuclear forces, ports,
airfields and communications centers would be today, it will be considerably
more so a few years from now. Beijing is in the process of deploying
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMS) that will be far less vulnerable
than their predecessors. In addition to its small force of fixed, single-warhead
ICBMS, over the next few years China will place in service several dozen hardto-locate road-mobile and submarine-launched missiles, each capable of striking
the United States with multiple warheads.
SK/N207. CHINA: Naval Adventurism Disad
A. CHINESE NAVAL BUILDUP THREATENS U.S. SUPREMACY
1. CHINA IS ENGAGED IN SIGNIFICANT NAVAL BUILDUP
SK/N207.01) Robert D. Kaplan [Sr. Fellow, Center for a New American
Security], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. According to Seth Cropsey, a former
deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Navy, and Ronald O'Rourke of the
Congressional Research Service, China could field a submarine force larger than
the U.S. Navy's, which has 75 submarines in commission, within 15 years.
Moreover, the Chinese navy, says Cropsey, plans to use over-the-horizon radars,
satellites, seabed sonar networks, and cyberwarfare in the service of antiship
ballistic missiles. This, along with China's burgeoning submarine fleet, is
designed to eventually deny the U.S. Navy easy access to significant portions of
the western Pacific.
2. CHINA INTENDS TO SEND ITS FLEET FAR AND WIDE
SK/N207.02) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The Chinese
military is seeking to project naval power well beyond the Chinese coast, from the
oil ports of the Middle East to the shipping lanes of the Pacific, where the United
States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force, military officials and analysts
say. China calls the new strategy “far sea defense,” and the speed with which it is
building long-range capabilities has surprised foreign military officials.
SK/N207.03) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Another element of
the Chinese Navy's new strategy is to extend its operational reach beyond the
South China Sea and the Philippines to what is known as the “second island
chain” -- rocks and atolls out in the Pacific, the official said. That zone
significantly overlaps the United States Navy's area of supremacy.
SK/N207.04) Drew Thompson [Director of China Studies, The Nixon
Center], FOREIGN POLICY, March-April 2010, p. 86, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. But there is little doubt that China is
steadily building its ability to project power beyond its shores. Milestones such as
the PLA Navy's around-the-world cruise in 2002 and its anti-piracy mission off
the African coast indicate that China is looking to operate more globally.
Although Beijing has not yet sought to deploy combat-capable military units to
the sites of international natural disasters, in the not-too-distant future Chinese
military aircraft might be delivering Chinese-made disaster-relief supplies.
Having recently commissioned a hospital ship, Chinese naval strategists have
already identified disaster relief as a key mission for a future Chinese aircraft
carrier, while military writers discuss how to conduct regional missions to protect
China's interests outside its territorial waters.
B. WITHDRAWAL FROM PACIFIC RISKS CHINESE ADVENTURISM
1. CHINA WILL KEEP U.S. OUT OF SOUTH CHINA SEA
SK/N207.05) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. China's naval
ambitions are being felt, too, in recent muscle flexing with the United States: in
March, Chinese officials told senior American officials privately that China
would brook no foreign interference in its territorial issues in the South China Sea,
said a senior American official involved in China policy.
SK/N207.06) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In March, Chinese
officials told two visiting senior Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader
and James B. Steinberg, that China would not tolerate any interference in the
South China Sea, now part of China's “core interest” of sovereignty, said an
American official involved in China policy. It was the first time the Chinese
labeled the South China Sea a core interest, on par with Taiwan and Tibet, the
official said.
SK/N207.07) Aaron L. Friedberg, THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
September-October 2009, p. 19, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. America's ability to project power into the western Pacific,
once unchallenged, is now threatened by the maturation of what Pentagon
planners refer to as China's "anti-access/area-denial" strategy. The goal here is not
to match the Americans ship-for-ship and plane-for-plane but rather to develop
certain specialized capabilities designed to make it difficult, if not impossible, for
U.S. forces to operate freely anywhere close to Chinas coasts. In the past decade,
Beijing has made considerable progress toward achieving this goal. Every one of
the relative handful of bases on which the United States relies to sustain its
presence in East Asia will soon be within range of bombardment by repeated
salvos of precisely targeted Chinese conventional ballistic and cruise missiles.
2. U.S. SURVEILLANCE WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY HAMPERED
SK/N207.08) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. American vessels
now frequently survey the submarine base at Hainan island, and that activity leads
to occasional friction with Chinese ships. A survey mission last year by an
American naval ship, the Impeccable, resulted in what Pentagon officials said was
harassment by Chinese fishing vessels; the Chinese government said it had the
right to block surveillance in those waters because they are an “exclusive
economic zone” of China. The United States and China have clashing definitions
of such zones, defined by a United Nations convention as waters within 200
nautical miles of a coast. The United States says international law allows a coastal
country to retain only special commercial rights in the zones, while China
contends the country can control virtually any activity within them.
SK/N207.09) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The Pentagon does
not classify China as an enemy force. But partly in reaction to China's growth, the
United States has recently transferred submarines from the Atlantic to the Pacific
so that most of its nuclear-powered attack submarines are now in the Pacific, said
Bernard D. Cole, a former American naval officer and a professor at the National
War College in Washington. The United States has also begun rotating three to
four submarines on deployments out of Guam, reviving a practice that had ended
with the cold war, Mr. Cole said.
3. CHINA’S NEIGHBORS WILL LOSE OUT ON RESOURCES
SK/N207.10) Edward Wong, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 2010,
p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Yalong Bay, on the
southern coast of Hainan island in the South China Sea, is the site of five-star
beach resorts just west of a new underground submarine base. The base allows
submarines to reach deep water within 20 minutes and roam the South China Sea,
which has some of the world's busiest shipping lanes and areas rich in oil and
natural gas that are the focus of territorial disputes between China and other Asian
nations. That has caused concern not only among American commanders, but also
among officials in Southeast Asian nations, which have been quietly acquiring
more submarines, missiles and other weapons. “Regional officials have been
surprised,” said Huang Jing, a scholar of the Chinese military at the National
University of Singapore. “We were in a blinded situation. We thought the Chinese
military was 20 years behind us, but we suddenly realized China is catching up.”
SK/N208. CHINA: New Silk Road Disad
A. THE NEW SILK ROAD IS TIEING CHINA TO MIDDLE EAST
SK/N208.01) Andrew England, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, April 27,
2010, p. 11, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Last month,
China's ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and some 400 of his compatriots
living in the Gulf state gathered to witness a bit of history. For the first time, two
Chinese naval ships, the frigate Maanshan and the supply ship Qiandaohu, visited
the UAE, with a brief port call in Abu Dhabi. The event, which captured little
attention, was another example of the growing ties between the Gulf and the
Asian giant. With the level of trade between the Middle East and Asia soaring, the
talk is of a new silk road. It is easy to see why. In 2008, China overtook the US as
the largest exporter to the Middle East, with Chinese goods coming into the
region valued at about $60bn at the end of last year - up from $4.6bn at the turn of
the century, according to the Royal Bank of Scotland. In the other direction, oil
and petrochemicals are flowing at an increasing rate. About 35 per cent of China's
crude imports now originate in the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
SK/N208.02) Leo Lewis, THE TIMES (London, England), February 15,
2010, p. 44, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The three
towers rise grimly into the skyline, the world-famous logo just visible through a
freezing fog that has grounded flights and made Seoul even grumpier than usual.
It is a drab starting-point for the romantic-sounding "New Silk Road" - the reemerging network of trade links between Asia and the Middle East that, some say,
stands to connect the regions in one giant band of growth and to redraw the global
economic map.
SK/N208.03) Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), January 2, 2010, p. 31, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. With hindsight we can see that two events occurring within days of
each other in late 2001 brought about an epochal change in the world's strategic
system, drawing China and the Mid-East oil powers into each other's arms again
after five centuries of estrangement. The old Silk Road came back to life.
SK/N208.04) Andrew England, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, December 15,
2009, p. 13, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The
government school is an illustration of the attention Gulf states are giving to their
burgeoning relationship with China. In theory, the children could represent the
next generation leading trade between the oil-rich Middle East and resourcehungry Asia, with the communist republic at the forefront. Analysts point to
rapidly increasing trade between the two fast-growing regions as they speak of the
emergence of a new " Silk Road". Trade between the Middle East and Asia grew
more than five times between 2001 and 2008, rising from $110bn to $600bn,
according to HSBC, and China has taken over from the US as the largest exporter
to the Middle East. The global economic crisis is expected to accelerate the trend,
particularly in terms of capital flows as Gulf investors look to tap into Asia's
speedier recovery.
B. CHINA IS ON COLLISION COURSE WITH U.S. OVER OIL
SK/N208.05) Babak Dehghanpisheh, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL,
May 17, 2010, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
China is racing to secure Middle East oil deals, putting it on a possible collision
course with U.S. interests in the world's most volatile region. China is now the
biggest importer of Saudi oil, the second-biggest of Iranian oil, and the largest
player in the Iraqi oil game. China is "being very aggressive," says Jon Alterman,
director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies. "They're putting a lot of money on the bet that having ownership of oil
fields is a better guarantee of supply than buying oil on the open market."
SK/N208.06) Babak Dehghanpisheh, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL,
May 17, 2010, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Beijing is betting big in Iraq, which many Western companies are avoiding. In
November, the Chinese National Petroleum Co. (CNPC) won a large stake in a
$15-billion deal to develop the Rumaila oil field in southern Iraq, thought to be
the second largest in the world. That followed a $3-billion deal to develop the
Ahdab oil field in 2008. And two other Chinese firms just closed a deal on a large
oil field in eastern Iraq. Chinese companies have also shown much greater
willingness to take on risk by placing their own nationals in war zones: CNPC has
an office in Baghdad partly led by Chinese nationals.
SK/N208.07) Andrew England, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, April 27,
2010, p. 11, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. There is
greater debate, however, about how trade ties may evolve into a political
relationship and what this may mean for western interests in an oil-rich region
that has historically looked to the US as partner and guarantor of security. The
point was recently brought into focus when US officials suggested that Saudi
Arabia could use its influence with China to help persuade Beijing not to obstruct
tougher sanctions against Iran. The idea was that Riyadh could reassure China
that the kingdom would meet any shortfall in oil imports the communist state
might face if sanctions are tightened.
C. U.S. WITHDRAWAL ALLOWS CHINA’S FIREPOWER TO PREVAIL
SK/N208.08) Babak Dehghanpisheh, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL,
May 17, 2010, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
China is moving to protect its new oil ties in the Middle East, presenting a
challenge to the West. China is reluctant to follow the U.S. line on Iran sanctions
because of its oil interests. The two Chinese warships that docked in Abu Dhabi
in March also sent a blunt message: China is willing to back up its interests with
firepower.
SK/N209. DRONES: Solvency/Disad
Solvency: DRONES CAN’T TAKE THE PLACE OF TROOPS
SK/N209.01) Steve Forbes, FORBES GLOBAL, October 5, 2009, p. 15,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The President is
coming under increasing pressure to pull U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. The
seductive reasoning is that we can achieve all we need to by relying on satellites
and intelligence sources and using offshore surgical missile strikes or drones to
make sure the Taliban doesn't take over Afghanistan. This is delusional. If we pull
out, the Taliban will soon rule most of Afghanistan, which will embolden
extremist forces in neighboring Pakistan. The U.S. will once again be seen as an
unreliable ally.
SK/N209.02) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, p. 216.
Internationalists also cite the continuing inaccuracy of even the most advanced
precision weapons and intelligence. Technology, they argue, is simply not mature
enough to replace all foreign bases, considering the difficulties that computer
systems inevitably have in taking over the countless decisions that pilots need to
make, and the inevitable danger of frequent breakdowns in communication links.
Disad: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
SK/N209.03) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, p. 216. Critics of
Fortress America also cite the political backlash that long-range military strikes
inevitably engender in the developing world. For example, the Predator strike in
Pakistan during January 2006 directed against al-Zawahri, the number 2 leader of
al-Qaeda, failed, due to incorrect intelligence, to hit its target. Instead, it killed
seventeen innocent civilians, prompting condemnation even from the conservative
local Pakistani government.
SK/N209.04) Charlie Savage, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 3, 2010, p.
A10, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In a 29-page report
to the United Nations Human Rights Council, the official, Philip Alston, the U.N.
special representative on extrajudicial executions, calls on the United States to
exercise greater restraint in its use of drones in places like Pakistan and Yemen,
outside the war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq.
SK/N210. IRAN: Solvency
1. IRAN WILL NEGOTIATE ONLY AS A STALLING TACTIC
SK/N210.01) Mortimer B. Zuckerman, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
ONLINE, March 23, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. It is not that the Iranians don't want to talk--they do. That's how
they play for time. Quite simply, they seek the technical know-how that will
enable them to produce nuclear weapons in a short period.
SK/N210.02) David Ibsen [coalitions director, United Against Nuclear
Iran], inFOCUS, Winter 2009, p. 28, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. This is not to say that negotiating with Iran is not worthwhile.
But considering Iran's nuclear progress (it is already spinning 8,300 centrifuges,
enough to potentially produce fuel for one bomb per year), and the discovery this
year of the secret enrichment facility at Qom, it is important to ensure that the
international community is not drawn into a North Korean--type scenario in
which negotiations serve as cover for the final stages of Iran's nuclear weapons
program.
2. HISTORICALLY NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED
SK/N210.03) Mortimer B. Zuckerman, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
ONLINE, March 23, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. Every U.S. administration since 1979--yes, including the past
one--has reached out to the Iranians. To adopt President Obama's inaugural
metaphor, every open hand has met a clenched fist. Jimmy Carter could not obtain
the release of American hostages illegally seized in Tehran. Ronald Reagan's
national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, failed in a secret mission to release
the American hostages held by Iran's Hezbollah agents in Beirut. Brent Scowcroft,
George H. W. Bush's national security adviser, made no progress. The Clinton
administration's dozen gestures in 1999 were spurned. Clinton even lifted some
sanctions in the interest of a "grand bargain," to be made public through an
"accidental" meeting between Clinton and the Iranian president in the corridors of
the United Nations, only to have it canceled at the last minute. It is the same
dismal story with five years of efforts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. "We
haven't really moved one inch toward addressing the issues," said Mohamed
ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
3. NUCLEAR VERIFICATION IS IMPOSSIBLE
SK/N210.04) David Kay [former head CIA’s Iraq Survey Group], THE
NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 18, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. But as a former weapons inspector, I
have very bad news for you: a weapons-inspection regime in Iran will not work.
Inspections themselves are most effective when both the state being inspected and
the inspecting countries are fully on board and even then there are limits. An
inspection regime can never ensure full disarmament. We can only hope it would
detect major violations. Tehran has shielded its nuclear program from outside
examination, and, moreover, the Iranian government has made clear that it will
not fully divulge--even when caught--all of the details of its nuclear activities and
their support networks, both domestic and foreign.
SK/N210.05) David Kay [former head CIA’s Iraq Survey Group], THE
NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 18, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. And Iran is unlikely to ever be an
honest broker. For more than twenty years now, Tehran has engaged in systematic
efforts to protect a clandestine nuclear program from discovery by IAEA
inspections. Abetted by a broad effort of deception and denial--they seek foreign
assistance in the design and production of centrifuges, they import undeclared
natural uranium, they acquire data on nuclear weapons and missile warheads, and
they build secret nuclear facilities, some hidden in tunnels and others in military
bases --the Iranian government has shown every sign that it plans to covertly
continue arming itself.
SK/N210.06) David Kay [former head CIA’s Iraq Survey Group], THE
NATIONAL INTEREST, March-April 2010, p. 18, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A successful inspection regime would
require a level of transparency by Iran that is beyond the pale of anything such an
aggressively authoritarian state would allow. And inspectors would need to be
there on a permanent basis.
4. U.S. CANNOT STOP IRAN FROM DEVELOPING NUKES
SK/N210.07) John Mueller, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, January 10, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. The uncomfortable truth is this: If Iran's leaders want
to develop a nuclear weapon, there is no way to stop them, at least in the long
term, except by invading the country, which would make America's costly war in
Iraq look like child's play. The casualties would be substantial. An airstrike on a
nuclear facility would cause extensive collateral damage (particularly because air
defenses would have to be suppressed) and might cause radiation to seep out into
the atmosphere, triggering alarm, some of it desperate, in neighboring countries.
In response to an attack, moreover, Iran would likely seek to make life markedly
more difficult for U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
SK/N211. IRAN: Nuclear Threat Disad
A. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE KEEPS IRAN IN CHECK
SK/N211.01) Nazila Fathi & David E. Sanger, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, April 22, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. Iranian state television reported Thursday that the country
had begun a large military exercise in the Gulf, where the United States and Israel
have both increased their presence in recent months. The report came a day after
Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared that President
Barack Obama's new nuclear strategy amounted to "atomic threats against Iranian
people." The Iranian military has defined the exercise as a three-day naval,
ground and air war game in the Gulf, including the sensitive Strait of Hormuz, a
narrow transit way through which passes a large amount of the world's oil.
SK/N211.02) Richard L. Russell [Professor of National Security Affairs,
National Defense U.], JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, October 2009, p. 35,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Despite the huge
military expenditures and sophisticated Western armaments in their inventories,
the Arab Gulf states are ill prepared to defend themselves in low-end (insurgency
and militia sponsorship) and high-end (ballistic missile, perhaps with nuclear
warheads) scenarios against Iran. These inventories, moreover, are not likely to
overcome Gulf Arab shortcomings for defending against asymmetric Iranian
attacks.
SK/N211.03) Richard L. Russell [Professor of National Security Affairs,
National Defense U.], JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY, October 2009, p. 35,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. If the Arab Gulf
states grow uncertain of the U.S. commitment to their security, they could
bandwagon and appease Iran--and in so doing distance themselves from the
United States and give Tehran freer rein in the Gulf. If they are more confident of
American security backing, they would balance against Iran and increasingly turn
to the United States for security protection because their militaries are inadequate
to the task of countering Iran along the full spectrum of warfare.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL WILL LEAD TO NUCLEAR NIGHTMARE
1. U.S. WITHDRAWAL WILL MEAN A NUCLEAR IRAN
SK/N211.04) Elliott Abrams, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT ONLINE,
April 21, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. But it should be obvious that the military option must be left on the table
if negotiations are to succeed. Having a real military option will keep the
negotiations serious by making it clear what may happen should Iran approach the
nuclear weapons threshold. The incentive for Iran to compromise is far stronger if
the ayatollahs believe their own interests are at greater risk should negotiations
fail.
2. A NUCLEAR IRAN IS A MORTAL THREAT TO U.S.
SK/N211.05) John R. Bolton [Sr. Fellow, American Enterprise Institute],
NATIONAL REVIEW, October 19, 2009, p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Iran’s nuclear-weapons program has cast a shadow
over its region and the world for years. That kind of regime, with those kinds of
weapons, is a continuing mortal threat to America's friends and allies, and to
international peace and security.
SK/N211.06) John R. Bolton [Sr. Fellow, American Enterprise Institute],
NATIONAL REVIEW, October 19, 2009, p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Many believe that a nuclear Iran will not constitute a
significant threat, and that it can be contained and deterred, as the Soviet Union
was during the Cold War. This analogy is fundamentally flawed. First, who in his
right mind would willingly return to the days of mutual assured destruction,
especially when the Tehran end of the equation is staffed by religious fanatics
who prize the hereafter more than life on earth? It may not have been a virtue, but
at least the Communists believed they went around only once.
3. IT WILL TRIGGER MIDDLE EAST PROLIFERATION
SK/N211.07) John R. Bolton [Sr. Fellow, American Enterprise Institute],
NATIONAL REVIEW, October 19, 2009, p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Even more devastating to the "contain and deter"
theory is the inevitability that Iran will not be the only state in the region to
acquire nuclear weapons. Other Middle Eastern states will conclude (if they
haven't already) that they must acquire them too, in response to Iran's efforts.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey are all likely candidates, and Libya's Moammar
Qaddafi may well decide that his 2003 decision to give up his program was illadvised and get back in the game. Others in the region could follow.
4. THE RISK OF NUCLEAR ATTACK WILL SKYROCKET
SK/N211.08) John R. Bolton [Sr. Fellow, American Enterprise Institute],
NATIONAL REVIEW, October 19, 2009, p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Thus, in the not-too-distant future, the Middle East
could have half a dozen or more states with small nuclear arsenals, each
calculating the advantages of striking first against its potential adversaries to
prevent them from doing the same. If deterrence during the Cold War's bipolar
standoff was problematic, imagine the multiplayer chess required to avoid nuclear
exchanges in such Middle East, along with the likelihood that nuclear technology
will pass into the hands of global terrorists.
SK/N212. IRAQ: Loss of Democracy Disad
A. DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ IS HIGHLY FRAGILE
SK/N212.01) Missy Ryan, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Spring 2010, p.
65, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Even after
parliamentary polls in March, when voters defied insurent attacks to cast ballots,
the dangers are many. Iraq has not yet settled major questions about the balance
of power between central and regional authorities, how a newly empowered
majority will treat minorities, and how to achieve national reconciliation.
SK/N212.02) Missy Ryan, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Spring 2010, p.
65, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Today, after a
period of relative calm, there are worrying signs Iraqis are moving further apart.
In the wake of the sectarian purges of 2006-07, Baghdad is a far more segregated
city than it once was. In the largely autonomous Kurdistan region to the north,
many young people speak only broken Arabic. In the historically diverse city of
Kirkuk, a post-2003 initiative to allow minorities to study in their native tongue
has meant that many Kurdish children study in schools funded and staffed by the
Kurdistan government. Their official Kurdish textbooks teach that Kirkuk is by
right a Kurdish city, home "mainly to Kurds, but where Arabs and Turkmens also
live."
SK/N212.03) Missy Ryan, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Spring 2010, p.
65, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Iraq "is already
more democratic than all its neighbors, except for Turkey," says a U.S. official,
on condition of anonymity. That's not saying much, though, given Iraq's rough
and tumble neighborhood: the controlling Assad dynasty in Syria, King
Abdullah's virtually unchecked power in Jordan, and Hosni Mubarak's enduring
rule in Egypt--plus the monolithic Saudi monarchy on one flank, Iran's troubled
Islamic Republic on the other.
SK/N212.04) Richard N. Haass [President, Council on Foreign Relations],
NEWSWEEK, March 8, 2010, p. 36, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. A principal rationale for the Iraq War was to create a model
democracy that other Arab countries would be forced to emulate. Iraq has become
a model, certainly, but of a different sort: it is the epitome of a weak state, one
that cannot defend itself, maintain internal peace, or address many of its most
pressing challenges without outside help. As such, it is a harbinger of the kind of
national-security challenge the United States will confront this century.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL IS DEATH KNELL FOR DEMOCRACY
1. U.S. TROOPS ARE NECESSARY TO PROTECT DEMOCRACY
SK/N212.05) Andrew Lee Butters, TIME, March 15, 2010, p. 26, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Democracy in Iraq can't
go too far off the rails while U.S. soldiers are still in the country. "No one will
attempt a coup d'etat while the U.S. is in Iraq," says an al-Maliki aide. "Unless the
U.S. is behind it." But with a date set for the end of the American occupation, U.S.
influence in Iraq is already waning.
SK/N212.06) Kenneth M. Pollack [Director, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, Brookings Institution], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
The militia parties who ruled Iraq from 2003 to 2007 are very much alive and
well. They remain the major political parties today, albeit mostly without their
militias. They too scheme, plot and maneuver constantly. They still bribe and
extort. They still assassinate and kidnap. They still steal and vandalize. They can't
do it as openly or as much as they once did, and they often have to be much more
subtle, but they find ways. Many pine for the "good old days" when their militias
ruled the streets, the Iraqi security forces were their Wal-Mart, Iraq's oil fields
were their ATMS and the Americans were off on wildgoose chases hunting
"terrorists" around the wastelands of Anbar while they held sway over the Iraqi
people. And they especially do whatever they can to prevent the emergence of
new political parties--parties that are more secular, more democratic, more
representative, less corrupt and less violent. If this modus operandi prevails and
America is forced out, the glimmers of democracy will fade and Iraq will be lost
again.
SK/N212.07) Kenneth M. Pollack [Director, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, Brookings Institution], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
This is why the role of the United States remains critical. American troops are still
needed as peacekeepers to prevent the old militia parties--including those that
control the government and its security forces--from employing violence to
advance their political agendas.
2. IRAQ WILL RETURN TO POLICE STATE STATUS
SK/N212.08) THE ECONOMIST (US), September 5, 2009, p. 46EU,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The Shia-led
government has overseen a ballooning of the country's security apparatus.
Human-rights violations are becoming more common. In private many Iraqis,
especially educated ones, are asking if their country may go back to being a police
state.
SK/N212.09) THE ECONOMIST (US), September 5, 2009, p. 46EU,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Old habits from
Saddam Hussein's era are becoming familiar again. Torture is routine in
government detention centres. "Things are bad and getting worse, even by
regional standards," says Samer Muscati, who works for Human Rights Watch, a
New York-based lobby. His outfit reports that, with American oversight gone
(albeit that the Americans committed their own shameful abuses in such places as
Abu Ghraib prison), Iraqi police and security people are again pulling out
fingernails and beating detainees, even those who have already made confessions.
A limping former prison inmate tells how he realised, after a bout of torture in a
government ministry that lasted for five days, that he had been relatively lucky.
When he was reunited with fellow prisoners, he said he saw that many had lost
limbs and organs.
SK/N212.10) THE ECONOMIST (US), September 5, 2009, p. 46EU,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The Americansponsored judicial system was supposed to protect Iraqis' civil rights. But it is
sorely overstretched, with some 1,500 people being brought into prisons every
month as the Americans empty their own Iraqi jails. The number of Iraqis in
American-run prisons has dropped to less than 9,000 from more than 21,000 a
year ago, whereas the number in Iraq's own jails has risen from 35,000 in
February probably to more than 40,000 today.
SK/N213. IRAQ: Civil War Disad
A. IRAQ IS A POWDER KEG READY TO EXPLODE
1. VIOLENCE HAS INCREASED AS U.S. TROOPS LEAVE
SK/N213.01) Samira Shackle, NEW STATESMAN, November 2, 2009, p.
12, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The western
media have largely ignored Iraq since the US handed control of cities to local
forces three months ago, allowing the impression that the country is on the road to
recovery and self-determination. But 1,891 civilians were killed in the first six
months of 2009; 1.6 million people are internally displaced--a lack of clean water,
fuel or electricity preventing their return home. Unemployment is at 50 per cent,
and just 19 per cent of people have proper sewerage.
SK/N213.02) Hugh Tomlinson, MEED: MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC
DIGEST, August 21, 2009, p. 24, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. The withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi towns and cities at the
end of June was widely expected to spark an increase in violence across the
country. In the weeks leading up to the move, there had been a significant spike in
the number of attacks attributed to terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Since the June
handover of responsibility for security in Iraqi towns to government forces, the
scale of the attacks has intensified, culminating in a series of truck bomb and
mortar attacks that killed at least 95 people on 19 August. Four co-ordinated
bombings in Baghdad and Mosul on 10 August left scores of people dead.
SK/N213.03) THE ECONOMIST (US), August 15, 2009, p. 28EU, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Chairman Mao laid down
the rules for modern guerrilla warfare during the Chinese civil war. "When the
enemy advances, withdraw; when he stops, harass; when he tires, strike; when he
retreats, pursue," he instructed. Iraqi insurgents seem to be following his advice
all too closely. During the American "surge" two years ago they melted away.
After the surge peaked they renewed their attacks. And barely a month after Iraqi
troops took control of the main towns from the slowly departing Americans,
blood is once again gushing down the boulevards. More than 100 civilians were
killed in a four-day period this week and hundreds wounded. Two lorries packed
with several thousand pounds of high-grade explosives levelled most of a
settlement on the edge of Mosul in northern Iraq. Residents were sleeping on their
roofs to escape the summer heat when their houses collapsed beneath them.
Meanwhile, bombs in Baghdad targeted day-labourers and pilgrims. Altogether
this has been the worst spasm of violence in recent memory.
SK/N213.04) THE ECONOMIST (US), October 31, 2009, p. 52EU,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. At the same time,
the American army is continuing with plans to pull out. It hopes to withdraw
70,000 soldiers by August 2010, leaving a force of only 50,000 for another year.
But doubts about the wisdom of this timetable are rising. Why not make sure
peace works first? After all, America's presence, now mostly hidden on bases
outside the urban areas, is no longer antagonising Iraqis as it once did. This
week's attacks were not against "infidel occupiers"; violence is increasingly a
local affair.
SK/N213.05) Lara Jakes [The Associate Press], THE VIRGINIA PILOT,
May 12, 2010, p. A10, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
More than two months after parliamentary elections, the Iraqis have still not
formed a new government, and militants aiming to exploit the void have carried
out attacks like Monday's bombings and shootings that killed at least 119 people the country's bloodiest day of 2010. The threat has prompted military officials to
look at keeping as many troops on the ground, for as long as possible, without
missing the Aug. 31 deadline. A security agreement between the two nations
requires U.S. troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.
SK/N213.06) Sahar Issa, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May
10, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Nearly
100 people died and at least 300 others were injured Monday in a series of attacks
that crisscrossed Iraq , targeting security forces, factory workers, and shoppers on
what authorities called the deadliest day of the year. The violence - a combination
of explosions and drive-by shootings at checkpoints - occurred against a backdrop
of political stagnation since the March parliamentary elections, which pitted
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki against secular rival Ayad Allawi in a race so
close that the outcome is still disputed. The political stalemate has given rise to
fears of renewed sectarian violence, a potential hindrance to the full withdrawal of
US forces as scheduled for the end of next year.
2. SHIITE MILITIAS ARE A THREAT TO PEACE
SK/N213.07) Jane Arraf, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May
12, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. A senior
US general said forces loyal to Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr are rising again in
Iraq's south, engaging in intimidation, extortion, and political violence as
politicians in Baghdad continue to negotiate over forming a government two
months after national elections. Maj. Gen. Vincent Brooks, in charge of US forces
in nine southern provinces, said he has not ruled out involvement by Sadrist
paramilitaries or splinter groups in a string of deadly attacks Monday across the
south. "There's evidence in the past that they're not at all reticent to intimidate and
to murder their fellow Shiite citizens, so I do not exclude them," said Brooks,
commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division, in a telephone interview from
Basra.
SK/N213.08) Henrik Bering, POLICY REVIEW, June-July 2009, p. 90,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One scare scenario,
outlined in the Book [THE GAMBLE: GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS AND
THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ, 2006-2008, by Thomas
E. Ricks] by an anonymous colonel, is that Muqtada al-Sadr will just bide his time
and go on amassing weapons and infiltrating the Iraqi army and the police. And
then, when American troops are down to sufficiently low levels, he will make his
move, trusting that the U.S. is too exhausted to undertake a new buildup.
3. KURDS ARE A THREAT TO PEACE
SK/N213.09) Kenneth M. Pollack [Director, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, Brookings Institution], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
The Kurds are threatening to promulgate a constitution for the Kurdish region
which diverges from the national constitution on key issues like oil and security,
which could trigger nationalist outbursts on both sides. Kurdish elements also
continue to stir up trouble in places like Mosul and Diyala, and both sides treat the
status of the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk like a political football, rather than
the kind of powder keg that could bring them all to ruin.
SK/N213.10) James Kitfield, NATIONAL JOURNAL, April 9, 2010,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Against the
backdrop of political uncertainty, some experts question the U.S. military's
ambitious plans to cut its force levels by half in a matter of months. The
aggressive schedule seems certain to distract commanders, for instance, and to
steadily decrease American leverage and influence at a moment of significant
Iraqi vulnerability. Despite the successful election, many of the thorniest issues
that have bedeviled the young democracy remain unresolved, including
mechanisms for sharing oil revenue; the future of oil-rich Kirkuk, a city contested
by Arabs and Kurds; continued Iranian meddling and influence; and powersharing arrangements between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.
4. IRAQ SECURITY FORCES ARE A THREAT TO PEACE
SK/N213.11) Editorial, THE NATION, March 23, 2009, p. 4, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. United States president
Barack Obama's plan to withdraw soldiers from Iraq would leave 50,000 soldiers
until the end of 2011. The transitional force's mission includes training Iraqi
security forces and protecting American civilian and military forces. Such a force
is seen to increase the risk of attacks from Iraqi factions.
SK/N213.12) James F. Dobbins [Director, International Security &
Defense Policy, RAND Corporation], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Fall 2009, p. 1,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As we train and
equip the Iraqi security forces, we also need to be conscious that they are another
risk factor. The Iraqi security forces must not become so powerful and so
autonomous that they begin to abuse that power and usurp constitutional functions
or allow somebody--the prime minister, for instance--to usurp constitutional
functions. The Iraqi security forces themselves are at the moment a force for
stability, and one of the main objectives of American policy is to improve those
forces. But that has to be done in the context of continued support for
constitutional rule, for a balance among all of the ethnic and sectarian groups in
the country, and for the development of the professional military that understands
its limits and constraints. So the Iraqi security forces themselves are both a part of
the solution, but they are also potentially a part of the problem and one has to be
conscious of that.
5. IRAN IS A THREAT TO PEACE IN IRAQ
SK/N213.13) James F. Dobbins [Director, International Security &
Defense Policy, RAND Corporation], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Fall 2009, p. 1,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Iran is the country
that probably has the greatest capacity to destabilize Iraq as the United States
withdraws, to embarrass the United States and to deny America what should be its
objective, which is to leave behind an Iraq that is at peace with itself and its
neighbors.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL INCREASES RISK OF CIVIL WAR
1. IRAQ IS ON BRINK OF CIVIL WAR
SK/N213.14) James F. Dobbins [Director, International Security &
Defense Policy, RAND Corporation], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Fall 2009, p. 1,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. So the major threat
is that, in the context of the American withdrawal, the major Iraqi groups
themselves will, for one reason or another, resume the civil war, which largely,
but not entirely, ended in 2007. The major groups concerned are the Sunnis, in
particular those associated with the Sons of Iraq, the former insurgents who were
put on the U.S. payroll and whom we are now trying to transfer to the Iraqi
government payroll; the Kurds; then the Shia, of which there are several major
groupings.
SK/N213.15) Fareed Zakaria, NEWSWEEK, January 4, 2010, p. 12,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. But the purpose of
the surge was, in President Bush's formulation, to give Iraq's leaders a chance to
resolve their major political differences. It was these differences--particularly
between Sunnis and Shias--that were fueling the civil war in the first place. If they
were not resolved, the war might well begin anew or take some other form that
would doom Iraq to a breakup or breakdown. Iraq's political differences have not
been resolved. The most fraught remains the tussle between the Shias, the
country's majority sect, and the Sunnis, a minority that has traditionally been the
country's elite. The simplest indication that issues between these two communities
are still unsettled is the fact that only a few of the 2 million Iraqis who fled the
country between 2003 and 2007--the vast majority of whom were Sunnis--have
returned.
SK/N213.16) Andrew Lee Butters, TIME, March 15, 2010, p. 26, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Devolving power to
Kurdistan or to the Shi'ite south--the two safest, richest parts of Iraq--could
reignite the civil war between Shi'ites and Sunnis or start an additional one
between Arabs and Kurds.
SK/N213.17) Andrew Lee Butters, TIME, March 15, 2010, p. 26, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. With so many foreign
powers playing politics in Iraq, the future of the nation will depend on the skill,
maturity and willingness of its leaders to compromise. Plenty don't think they are
up to the task. "They are going to push us back to civil war," says Daha Arwai,
the head of a charity that looks after the children and widows of men murdered by
militias.
SK/N213.18) Kenneth M. Pollack [Director, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, Brookings Institution], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
The old Iraqi politics of corruption and violence constantly risk subverting or coopting the new politics of democratization. Left to their own devices, Iraq's
militia-politicians would doubtless drive the country back to civil war.
SK/N213.19) James Kitfield, NATIONAL JOURNAL, April 9, 2010,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. "It is no
small accomplishment that Iraq just had an election whose results actually matter,
but given that it remains something of a shell democracy with very weak
institutions and no formal government in place, I would argue this is a very risky
period to withdraw 50,000 U.S. troops," said Noah Feldman, a law professor at
Harvard University who helped to write the Iraqi constitution as the senior
constitutional adviser to the former Coalition Provisional Authority. The Iraqi
insurgency is clearly engaged in a new wave of violence and bombing in hopes of
provoking conflict, he said, and pushing Iraq back toward civil war.
2. U.S. WITHDRAWAL WILL PUSH IRAQ OVER THE BRINK
SK/N213.20) Kenneth M. Pollack [Director, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, Brookings Institution], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Iraq has made a great deal of progress since 2006 and the evidence indicates it
could make a great deal more. But it is not going to make progress if left to its
own devices. If the United States walks away from Iraq or if we are evicted too
soon, the old patterns of Iraqi politics will subvert the new patterns of
democratization and the country could easily become yet another data point on the
academic graphs that demonstrate how pitifully few countries can escape the
civil-war trap.
SK/N213.21) Kenneth M. Pollack [Director, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, Brookings Institution], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
In May 2009 I was back in DC and attended the annual U.S. government
conference on Iraq. Perhaps the most powerful panel of the whole two days was
the one most of the participants expected the least from. The first panel of the
conference consisted of three of the leading academic experts on civil war. These
were not specialists on Iraq or even the Middle East, but scholars who had spent
decades looking at major internal conflicts--what causes them, what propels them
and how they end. Their central message was a chilling one: countries that
experience major civil wars like the one Iraq went through in 2004-06 have a
terrifyingly high rate of recidivism, and the one factor that provides any hope of
preventing such a recurrence is the willingness of an external great power
(typically the former colonial power) to make a long-term commitment to serve as
a peacekeeper and mediator.
SK/N213.22) Kenneth M. Pollack [Director, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, Brookings Institution], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
In August 2008, an Iraqi army operation in the ethnically mixed city of Khanaqin
in northeast Iraq nearly resulted in a firefight. Only the timely intervention of the
American soldiers accompanying the Iraqi units prevented bloodshed. Since then,
Iraqi army and pesh merga formations have continued to maneuver against one
another constantly, and again it is only the presence of American soldiers that
averts violence.
SK/N213.23) Kenneth M. Pollack [Director, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, Brookings Institution], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 8, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
For the United States, the reemergence of Iraqi nationalism has created two
challenges. It produces new incentives to violence that American forces need to
prevent. But it has also led many Iraqi politicians, including the prime minister, to
take public positions unsupportive of the American presence, even though most
know that America's role as peacekeeper, mediator, adviser and capacity-builder
remain critical to Iraq's stability and progress.
3. CIVIL WAR WILL SPREAD THROUGHOUT MIDDLE EAST
SK/N213.24) Martin Chulov, THE GUARDIAN (London, England), May
11, 2010, p. 22, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Iraq's
former prime minister Iyad Allawi, who scored a surprise win in the recent
general election, warned yesterday that the country risks descending into a new
sectarian war, with feuding politicians attempting to sideline his supporters and
the international community standing idly by. In an interview with the Guardian
Allawi said that since the bitterly contested 7 March election, in which his Iraqiya
party list won 91 seats, political groups had abandoned efforts to build a united
government and were regressing into sectarianism, encouraged by Iran. Allawi,
who led the country for nine turbulent months from early 2004 as a US-appointed
transitional prime minister, also warned that unless America and its allies
safeguarded Iraq's nascent democracy, renewed conflict could spread around the
region. "This conflict will not remain within the borders of Iraq ," he said. "It will
spill over and it has the potential to reach the world at large, not just neighbouring
countries.”
4. CIVIL WAR IS A DEVASTATING BLOW TO U.S. INTERESTS
SK/N213.25) Henrik Bering, POLICY REVIEW, June-July 2009, p. 90,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Similarly, failure
in Iraq would mean civil war, chaos, and a bigger regional war. We cannot just
pull out of a region that is central to our economies. The stability of the Western
democracy rests on access to oil.
SK/N213.26) Lara Jakes [The Associate Press], THE VIRGINIA PILOT,
May 12, 2010, p. A10, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In
Baghdad and Washington, U.S. officials say they remain committed to the
deadline, which Obama has said he would extend only if Iraq's security
deteriorates. Getting out of Iraq quickly and responsibly was among Obama's top
campaign promises in 2008. Extending the deadline could be politically risky
back home - but so could anarchy and a bloodbath after a hasty retreat.
SK/N214. IRAQ: Terrorism Disad
A. AL QAEDA REMAINS A DEADLY THREAT IN IRAQ
SK/N214.01) Eric Schmitt, THE NEW YORK TIMES, December 21,
2009, p. A6, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Even in its
weakened state, the Iraqi insurgent group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia remains a
dangerous foe that has shown resiliency in carrying out major terrorist attacks
intended to destabilize Iraq as the country prepares for pivotal elections early next
year, according to several top American commanders. With its access to financing
and fighters dwindling, the Qaeda affiliate in Iraq has shifted its tactics and
strategy, husbanding resources to conduct less frequent but increasingly
catastrophic attacks aimed at undermining public support for Prime Minister Nuri
Kamal al-Maliki's government in the months leading up to national elections in
March, the officers said.
SK/N214.02) James Kitfield, NATIONAL JOURNAL, April 9, 2010,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Everyone
understands that by braving terrorist attacks and intimidation to vote in the
election to determine the transfer of political power, the Iraqi people
accomplished something historic. But several consecutive days of terrorist attacks,
which included coordinated bombings aimed at embassies and apartment
buildings in Baghdad on April 4 and 5, plus rockets launched into the Green Zone,
and the brutal execution of 24 people in a village south of the capital, confirm that
Al Qaeda in Iraq is attempting to exploit the political vacuum and once again sow
the seeds of civil war.
SK/N214.03) THE ECONOMIST (US), March 6, 2010, p. 14EU, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Several hundred Iraqis are
still dying violently for political reasons every month--more, by the way, than in
Afghanistan. Iraq's nationalist insurgency has faded, but al-Qaeda is still wreaking
carnage every month or so. Flashpoints, particularly along a "trigger line"
between Iraq's Arabs and Kurds, threaten the peace. Baghdad is not open for
normal business, except for firms that can afford their own bomb-proof security
systems.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL WILL INCREASE TERRORISM
SK/N214.04) Nicolas Lemann, THE NEW YORKER, April 26, 2010, p.
73, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan all have pro-American governments that are weak.
They don't have firm control over the area within their borders, and they lack the
sort of legitimacy that would make terrorism untempting. Now that General
Petraeus is the head of the Central Command and has authority over American
troops in the region, our forces could practice all that he has preached, achieve
positive results, and still be unable to leave, because there is no national authority
that can be effective against terrorism.
SK/N215. IRAQ: U.S. Credibility Disad
A. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE NEEDED BEYOND EXIT DEADLINE
SK/N215.01) Jane Arraf, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
December 15, 2009, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
But despite a US-Iraqi agreement for all US forces to withdraw by the end of
2011, neither Iraqi nor US officials envision that Iraq will be ready to protect its
skies by then - a worrying prospect for a country with five neighbors, including
Iran. "They are increasingly coming to understand that on Jan. 1, 2012, they will
need American help on their airspace," says John Nagl, president of the Center for
a New American Security in Washington, who expects any security agreement
past 2011 to allow a significant US Air Force presence in Iraq.
SK/N215.02) Missy Ryan, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Spring 2010, p.
65, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In reality,
American troops are likely to be stationed in Iraq far beyond 2011. A small,
unobtrusive U.S. presence could benefit both countries. Indeed, after all this
bloodletting, Washington's interests lie with stability in Iraq, at least a superficial
one, and the American presence has so far pressured feuding Iraqi elements to
work together. Moreover, the Iraqi leadership seems to understand that a U.S.
footprint provides the state with a degree of international credibility.
SK/N215.03) THE ECONOMIST (US), March 6, 2010, p. 14EU, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. So it is still too soon for
the outsiders who wrought much of the misery to rush for the exit. If the Iraqis
ask for some or all of them to stay on, Mr Obama should say yes. American
troops in crucial spots still hold the ring between rival groups. The American
president has some semantic wiggle-room: he previously talked of leaving a
"residual force" of up to 50,000 advisory troops after August. The "status of
forces agreement" signed by the Iraqi government and President Bush before he
left office stipulates that all American troops, whether "combat" or not, must be
out by the end of next year. That too can be twiddled and extended. Only if the
Iraqis' own elected government asks all foreign troops to leave forthwith should
they leave. Iraq, after all, is a sovereign country.
SK/N215.04) THE ECONOMIST (US), August 8, 2009, p. 33EU, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. For a start, Iraq will still
need military aid, no matter how much its government throws its weight around.
Only the Americans can provide drones and helicopters as well as logistics and
electronic devices.
SK/N215.05) James F. Dobbins [Director, International Security &
Defense Policy, RAND Corporation], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Fall 2009, p. 1,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. While the Iraqi
security forces will probably be adequate to handle threats from Jaish al-Mahdi
and the special groups, al-Qaeda and those kinds of groups, they are still going to
be pretty evenly matched with the Kurdish security forces. So the possibility of a
conflict is there, and so the United States will have to think about how to continue
to remain engaged, perhaps by having observers or other engagement with both
sides along that divide so that even after the U.S. forces leave, there is still
somebody who is mediating disputes and ensuring that misunderstandings don't
give rise to something more serious.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ DESTROYS U.S. CREDIBILITY
1. IT MEANS WITHDRAWAL FROM ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST
SK/N215.06) James F. Dobbins [Director, International Security &
Defense Policy, RAND Corporation], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Fall 2009, p. 1,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. We will continue
to maintain a major offshore presence, and perhaps some headquarters and
refueling and other capabilities in the region. But this is a withdrawal not just
from Iraq. It is a withdrawal from the Middle East in terms of large-scale groundcombat forces, so we do need to think about what that means for the geopolitics of
the region as a whole.
2. IT DESTROYS CREDIBILITY OF U.S. STAYING POWER
SK/N215.07) Missy Ryan, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Spring 2010, p.
65, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Zinsmeister
[author of DAWN OVER BAGHDAD: HOW THE U.S. MILITARY IS USING
BULLETS AND BALLOTS TO REMAKE IRAQ] furnishes with a powerful
assessment of how the United States needs to continue its fight in Iraq and uses
the conflict as grounds to reassess who America's true allies are. He points out
that the world's perception is that the US population is not willing to endure a
long-term overseas conflict and that by continuing the war in Iraq, America is
proving that belief wrong.
SK/N216. ISOLATIONISM: Disad
A. U.S. FACES MANY CRISIS FLASH POINTS
SK/N216.01) Jung Sung-ki, THE KOREA TIMES, September 9, 2009,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The CSIS [Center
for Strategic and International Studies] draft analysis also cited other
contingencies for which the U.S. is preparing. They include a "loss of control over
nuclear weapons in Pakistan" and a clash between China and Taiwan. It added the
U.S. faces possible "coordinated attacks on offshore energy production facilities,
container ships and underwater communication lines that collectively are
designed to upend the domestic and global economies."
B. U.S. CAN’T SHIRK RESPONSIBILITY AS WORLD LEADER
SK/N216.02) Editorial, THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, December 5,
2009, p. 14A, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The World
Wide Web is an apt metaphor for the world we all live in now. The entire globe is
connected by the instantaneous flow of information and capital. So even if it
wanted to, the United States, as the mightiest military, political and cultural power
on Earth, could not shrink from the world stage and shirk its duty to lead. The
Chinese and American economies are closely intertwined, with a huge amount of
U.S. debt held abroad. Like it or not, the United States is fully engaged with the
world. The best way to improve the situation at home is to be a player in the
world to influence events for the good of the country.
SK/N216.03) Editorial, THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, December 5,
2009, p. 14A, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. While the
focus on issues close to home is understandable, disengaging from the world
would not improve the U.S. economy or the lives of its citizens. The global
economy knows no boundaries, nor does pollution, the changing climate, the
threats of terrorism - and for that matter, the information economy in which we all
now function.
SK/N216.04) Brian C. Rathbun [Asst. Professor of Political Science, U. of
Southern California], POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Summer 2008, p.
271, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. For a
significant portion of the history of the United States, there was little distinction
between a realist and an isolationist policy. America's strategic interests were
largely dictated by its geography, which until the twentieth century allowed the
United States to pursue a foreign policy relatively free from the affairs of other
great powers. Only when the nature of technology began to make the world a
smaller place did true tensions among the rights emerge. The British could
interfere in Latin America; German submarines could sink American commercial
vessels; the Soviet Union could strike the United States with intercontinental
missiles.
C. ISOLATIONISM LEAVES U.S. UNPREPARED FOR NEXT CRISIS
SK/N216.05) Editorial, THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, December 5,
2009, p. 14A, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. History
shows that when Americans try to isolate themselves, the world comes crashing in.
Americans looked inward during the Great Depression. Then came Pearl Harbor 68 years ago Monday - to show what can happen when the United States tries to
"mind its own business" for too long when a world is already at war.
SK/N216.06) Victor Davis Hanson [recipient of the 2007 National
Humanities Medal], THE AMERICAN, March-April 2008, p. 86, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Still, the new isolationists
and protectionists do not answer how the Westernized world would deal with
China without American leadership and power. Who would contain lunatic
regimes rising in South America, or Islamic terrorism, or petro-rich Middle
Eastern autocracies seeking the bomb? What would be the global consequences of
curtailing the lucrative, wide-open American market for India, China, and other
emerging powers? But then isolationism and protectionism never do evoke such
long-term worries. They have always followed short-term outbursts of emotion
that may feel good in the here and now but are sorely regretted later.
SK/N216.07) THE ECONOMIST (US), March 29, 2008, p. 14US, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the biggest dangers
facing the next president is that the bungled assertiveness of the Bush years may
be replaced not by mushy multilateralism but by grumpy isolationism. In the past
America has often followed periods of intense involvement with periods of
withdrawal--think of the aftermath of the first world war or the Vietnam war--and
isolationist sentiment is clearly on the rise.
SK/N217. ISRAEL: Attack on Iran Disad
A. FAILURE TO DETER IRAN WILL CAUSE ISRAELI ATTACK
1. ISRAEL WILL NOT ALLOW IRAN TO GO NUCLEAR
SK/N217.01) Steve Forbes, FORBES GLOBAL, October 5, 2009, p. 15,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Israel is not going
to let Iran get the bomb. Virtually the entire Israeli political spectrum views the
nuclear program of the fascistic mullahs in Tehran as an existential threat. Israeli
intelligence apparently believes Iran will be able to put together a bomb before
the end of next year.
SK/N217.02) Alon Ben-Meir [Sr. Fellow, School of Global Affairs, New
York U.], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Spring 2010, p. 12, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Israel's defense doctrine is
based on the premise that no enemy should be able to muster the capability to
threaten Israel's existence with impunity, and all measures must be taken to avert
and neutralize such threats. With this doctrine in mind, Israel lends no credence to
the idea floated by several US scholars--including former national security
advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft--that Israel's nuclear arsenals
constitute an effective deterrence.
2. ISRAEL BELIEVES PREEMPTIVE ATTACK CAN SUCCEED
SK/N217.03) THE MIRROR (London, England), May 11, 2010, p. 19,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Israel's air force can
successfully strike Iran after modernising its weapons, the country's deputy
premier said yesterday. Moshe Yaalon, a former armed forces chief, added:
"Technology has improved range and aerial refuelling capabilities and has
brought about a massive improvement in accuracy of ordnance and intelligence.
"This capability can be used for a war on terror in Gaza, war in the face of rockets
from Lebanon, war on the conventional Syrian army, and also for war on a
peripheral state like Iran." Israel, which is assumed to have the Middle East's only
nuclear weapons, bombed Iraq's atomic reactor in 1981. It launched a similar
strike against Syria in 2007.
SK/N217.04) Alon Ben-Meir [Sr. Fellow, School of Global Affairs, New
York U.], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Spring 2010, p. 12, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Israel is also fully aware
that unlike its attacks against Iraq and Syria, which completely destroyed their
nuclear facilities, an attack on Iran's nuclear plants will not obliterate its entire
program. These facilities are widely dispersed in remote areas, and many are built
deep underground and fully fortified to withstand heavy bombardments. Israeli
officials will be content if an Israeli attack only delays Iran's nuclear buildup, with
the hope of creating a new political environment that might force Iran to forgo its
nuclear ambitions.
SK/N217.05) John R. Bolton [Sr. Fellow, American Enterprise Institute],
NATIONAL REVIEW, October 19, 2009, p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. That leads, by process of elimination if nothing else,
to the preemptive use of military force against Iran's nuclear infrastructure. No
one argues that a successful strike would end the Iran problem, but that is not the
point. Destroying key aspects of Iran's program (such as the Esfahan uraniumconversion plant, the Natanz uranium-enrichment facility, the Arak heavy-water
complex, and the Bushehr reactor) would buy time. Between two and five years is
a reasonable estimate, and that is close to eternity, because during that period time
would be on our side rather than on the proliferator's.
SK/N217.06) John R. Bolton [Sr. Fellow, American Enterprise Institute],
NATIONAL REVIEW, October 19, 2009, p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. While much has been speculated, pro and con, about
the feasibility of an Israeli strike, one thing is certain: The Israelis have believed,
at least until now, that they can succeed, and they will make the ultimate decision,
one way or the other--not armchair pundits with incomplete information.
3. ISRAEL WILL MAKE PREEMPTIVE ATTACK
SK/N217.07) Bronwen Maddox, THE TIMES (London, England),
September 16, 2009, p. 5, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
If Iran gets nuclear weapons, Israel will make a military attack on it. That was the
most dramatic pronouncement from the launch of the strategic survey from the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), its annual stocktaking of the
world's problems. Israel will not tolerate Iran having a nuclear weapon," said
Mark Fitzpatrick, its proliferation specialist and a well-known analyst of Iran.
SK/N217.08) Alon Ben-Meir [Sr. Fellow, School of Global Affairs, New
York U.], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Spring 2010, p. 12, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. There have been three
attempts by Arab states to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1981, after Israel had
concluded that Saddam Hussein was on the verge of completing nuclear facilities
with the Oziraq reactor in Iraq, the site was promptly bombed by the Israeli Air
Force. In September 2007, Israel bombed a suspected Syrian nuclear site built by
North Korea. Under US coercive diplomacy, Libya's strong man Qaddafi gave up
his nuclear weapons program in 2003, which Israel was prepared to destroy had
Qaddafi not heeded to US and British pressure. This background gives some
perspective to Israel's determination to prevent a nuclear Iran, and to what length
Israeli leaders will go to see that Ahmadinejad never realizes his nuclear agenda.
SK/N217.09) Alon Ben-Meir [Sr. Fellow, School of Global Affairs, New
York U.], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Spring 2010, p. 12, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Finally, while many
Israelis weigh the Iranian threat against the risks of attacking or not attacking,
Israel will ultimately determine how to address Iran's nuclear ambitions once it
reaches breakout capacity. That is, if Iran reaches the technological breakthrough
necessary to create a nuclear device, then Israel will attack Iran regardless of the
consequences that such an attack would cause.
SK/N217.10) Sheera Frankel & Giles Whittell, THE TIMES (London,
England, October 23, 2009, p. 1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. The deal to export much of Iran's uranium to Russia and process it
for civilian use should push back Iran's acquisition of its first nuclear bomb by at
least a year, analysts believe. Iran has until today to approve the plan, which was
provisionally agreed earlier this month. Until that point Israel was "on a glide
path" to ordering a pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, one expert has
said, echoing the privately-held views of some in the Obama Administration.
SK/N217.11) Steve Forbes, FORBES GLOBAL, October 5, 2009, p. 15,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The government of
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (as well as that of his predecessor) hasn't
been coy about how it sizes up the situation. Israel has conducted open military
exercises clearly aimed at preparing for a hit on Iran's nuclear facilities.
SK/N217.12) John R. Bolton [Sr. Fellow, American Enterprise Institute],
NATIONAL REVIEW, October 19, 2009, p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. With so many risks of failure and retaliation, the use
of military force is hardly attractive to Israel or anyone else. Even so, the
consequences of a nuclear Iran could be far more devastating. Israel has not
hesitated to strike preemptively before, starting with the Six-Day War of 1967,
and including the destruction of the Osirak reactor outside Baghdad in 1981 and
the North Korean reactor in Syria in September 2007. Don't bet on passivity now.
4. CONSEQUENCES OF ATTACK WILL NOT DETER ISRAEL
SK/N217.13) John R. Bolton [Sr. Fellow, American Enterprise Institute],
NATIONAL REVIEW, October 19, 2009, p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Many contend that the potential consequences of a
preemptive strike are too horrible to contemplate, but such concerns are unlikely
to deter Israel, since the result of not striking could well be a second Holocaust.
The choice is not between the world as it stands today and the world after an
Israeli attack; the choice is between the world after the attack and a world where
Iran has nuclear weapons. That puts the oft-expressed fear of a spike in oil prices
in context, at least for Israelis. Nor are Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's
promises of a "defense umbrella" reassuring. At its time of maximum peril, the
Jewish state is not going to rely on the goodwill of anyone, friend or foe.
5. U.S. CANNOT PREVENT ATTACK
SK/N217.14) Brian Knowlton, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
July 6, 2009, p. 5, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Plunging into one of the most sensitive issues in the Middle East, Vice President
Joseph R. Biden Jr. suggested over the weekend that the United States would not
stand in the way of Israeli military action aimed at Iran's nuclear program.The
United States "cannot dictate to another sovereign nation what they can and
cannot do," Mr. Biden said in an interview broadcast Sunday on the ABC
television talk show "This Week." "Israel can determine for itself - it's a sovereign
nation - what's in their interest and what they decide to do relative to Iran and
anyone else," he said in an interview taped in Baghdad at the end of a visit there.
B. ISRAELI ATTACK WILL HAVE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES
1. IRAN RETALIATION WILL BE DEADLY
SK/N217.15) Whitney Raas & Austin Long, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY, Spring 2007, p. 7, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. The capability of Israel to launch a military attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities, similar to its successful 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor, is
assessed. It is concluded that the upgraded weapons of the Israeli Air Force can
effectively strike Iran's nuclear sites, but would lead to an undesirable Iranian
counterattack and military counter growth.
2. U.S. WILL BE DRAWN INTO MIDDLE EAST WAR
SK/N217.16) Steve Forbes, FORBES GLOBAL, October 5, 2009, p. 15,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Moreover, what
the Obama Administration may not fully grasp is that if the Israelis do attack, the
U.S. will be involved in the conflict almost immediately. Tehran's fanatics will
use missiles to try to close the critical Persian Gulf, through which flows much of
the world's oil supply. Our Navy will then likely take out Iran's missile sites and
obliterate its navy if it interferes with our efforts to get the oil flowing again.
SK/N217.17) Bronwen Maddox, THE TIMES (London, England), July 3,
2009, p. 11, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Even if Israel
overcame these barriers and tried to strike without US permission, the world
would assume it had been given a tacit go-ahead, which could take the US into a
regional war.
SK/N218. JAPAN: Loss of Deterrence Disad
A. JAPAN FACES MANY REGIONAL THREATS
SK/N218.01) Masaru Tamamoto [Sr. Fellow, World Policy Institute],
WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall 2009, p. 63, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Japan lives in a dangerous and troubled
neighborhood. China's huge military buildup is worrisome for both its size and
lack of transparency. Moreover, Japan has territorial disputes with all its
neighbors--including Russia, South Korea, China, and Taiwan. North Korea is the
sole exception; but long standing animosities between the two nations remain.
Recent North Korean missile and nuclear tests that have seen rockets fly over the
Japanese mainland have the region on edge. Japan is squarely in North Korean
missile range, while Japan does not possess the ability to counter on its own with
either nuclear warheads or conventional arms.
B. REDUCING U.S. TROOPS IMPAIRS REGIONAL SECURITY
1. U.S. TROOPS IN JAPAN DETER AGGRESSION
SK/N218.02) Masami Ito, JAPAN TIMES, January 30, 2010, pNA,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The United States must
maintain forces in Japan to react swiftly to urgent threats in the region, including
the biggest concern -- North Korea -- with its missiles and ongoing succession
issue, U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos said Friday. In a speech at Waseda
University in Tokyo, Roos expressed concern over Pyongyang's development of
ballistic missiles and the possibility of regime collapse.
SK/N218.03) Masami Ito, JAPAN TIMES, January 30, 2010, pNA,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Roos [U.S. Ambassador to
Japan] asserted that the U.S. military presence in Japan was important to deal with
such risks as North Korea and China, with its "well-funded military
modernization." "The fundamental role of U.S. forces in Japan is to make those
who would consider the use of force in this region understand that that option is
off this table," Roos said. "The forward deployment of U.S. forces puts us in a
position to react immediately to emerging threats and serves as a tangible symbol
of our commitment."
SK/N218.04) Katie Engelhart, MACLEAN’S, March 22, 2010, p. 29,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A number of
environmental warriors have also been stepping in: not exactly on behalf of
Okinawa, but on behalf of its coral reef, which they claim would be damaged by
the construction of a new airstrip. But others see the standoff in a different light.
They point out that much of the U.S.'s geopolitical strength in the region is rooted
in Japan. Indeed, base supporters insist that the U.S. troops in Japan have deterred
threats from China and North Korea.
SK/N218.05) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., INTERNATIONAL HERALD
TRIBUNE, January 8, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. The best guarantee of security in a region where China remains a
long-term challenge and a nuclear North Korea poses a clear threat remains the
presence of American troops, which Japan helps to maintain with generous
support.
2. U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA DETERS AGGRESSION
SK/N218.06) Editorial, JAPAN TIMES, April 16, 2010, pNA, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. While Japan has made nuclear
disarmament a pillar of its diplomacy, in fact the existence of U.S. nuclear
weapons has been critical to Japan's postwar peace and prosperity. The U.S.
nuclear arsenal provided an extended deterrent -- a nuclear umbrella -- that
sheltered this country and protected it from external threats.
SK/N218.07) Masaru Tamamoto [Sr. Fellow, World Policy Institute],
WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall 2009, p. 63, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Japanese security policy distilled to its essence is the
American nuclear umbrella. Simply put, Tokyo expects the United States to
employ nuclear weapons to counter any attack on Japan, whether it is nuclear or
conventional. Such clarity has long been Japan's understanding of what it means
to be under American military protection. But now, Japanese officials in both
politics and the military, if not yet the broader public, are confused as to how
America's avowed pursuit of a nuclear-free world could proceed without
compromising Japan's security.
3. U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE DETERS AGGRESSION
SK/N218.08) Leszek Buszynski [Professor of International Relations,
International U. of Japan], CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, April 2009,
p. 143, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Japan has
regarded its alliance with the United States as critical for its security.
Collaboration with the US has been important for the development of an antiballistic missile system which would protect the Japanese mainland against
missile strikes from North Korea. This system, described as the most complex yet
devised, includes Aegis equipped destroyers with the SD-3 and PAC-3 Patriot
missiles which were first deployed in Japan in March 2007.
SK/N218.09) Ilan Berman [Vice-President, American Foreign Policy
Council], THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 2, 2010, p. B1, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Western strategy, then, would be much better
served by assuming that the North's nukes cannot simply be negotiated away.
Instead, they need to be contained and deterred. This means greater investments in
steps that could help blunt North Korea's nuclear menace to its neighbors,
including the provision of additional missile defenses to regional allies like South
Korea and Japan.
SK/N219. JAPAN: Okinawa Bases Disad
A. A DECADE OF STUDY PRODUCED BEST PLAN FOR OKINAWA
SK/N219.01) Masami Ito, JAPAN TIMES, January 30, 2010, pNA,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In 2006, the U.S. and
Japan, then led by the Liberal Democratic Party, agreed to move Futenma to
Camp Schwab. "The arrangement is certainly not perfect, no compromise ever is,"
Roos [U.S. Ambassador to Japan] said. "But what makes this issue especially
difficult is that our two nations studied and debated virtually every conceivable
alternative for more than a decade before deciding that the current plan is the best
option to enable us to close Futenma as quickly as possible without degrading our
ability to fulfill our treaty commitments."
SK/N219.02) Robert Madsen & Richard J. Samuels [Director, Center for
International Studies, MIT], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, May-June 2010, p.
48, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In fulfillment
of a campaign pledge, and contrary to Washington's express wishes, Hatoyama
and his partisans reopened debate about a 2006 bilateral agreement on bases that
had taken Washington and successive LDP cabinets more than a decade to
negotiate. According to the agreement, the U.S. administration would move the
U.S. Futenma Marine Corps air station to a less populated part of Okinawa. The
Hatoyama government, however, is now reconsidering that deal--a decision which
has deeply disturbed the Obama administration. At roughly the same time, the
DPJ government terminated Japan's contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom
in the Indian Ocean. There were even whispers in Tokyo that the new government
would reevaluate both the level of Host-Nation Support provided to the United
States--from covering the costs of U.S. forces' electricity to paying workers'
wages--and the Status of Forces Agreement that governs the legal rights and
responsibilities of U.S. forces in Japan.
B. REMOVING ALL U.S. BASES DESTROYS REGIONAL SECURITY
SK/N219.03) Justin McCurry, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
May 14, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. He
[Japanese Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama] must decide whether to honor a 2006
agreement with the US that would see Futenma moved to an offshore location in a
less populated part of the island, and 8,000 marines and their dependents moved,
by 2014, to Guam. The White House has given Hatoyama time to weigh options,
while making it clear it wants to stick to the original deal. Recent events have
offered little hope of a breakthrough, with Hatoyama conceding that moving
Futenma's functions off the island will be "impossible," given its key role in
deterrence.
SK/N219.04) Katie Engelhart, MACLEAN’S, March 22, 2010, p. 29,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. All this
underscores the fact that Okinawa remains critical to U.S. security, as tensions
between the U.S. and China grow, and as nuclear threats from Iran and North
Korea become more troubling.
SK/N220. JAPAN: Nuclear Proliferation Disad
A. JAPAN WILL DEVELOP NUKES IF U.S. MILITARY REDUCED
SK/N220.01) John R. Bolton [former U.S. Ambassador to U.N.], THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, April 28, 2010, p. B4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. In the Pacific, concerns are equally acute, especially in
Japan. Faced with the unambiguous reality of China expanding and modernizing
its nuclear and conventional military capabilities, and with North Korea as a
nuclear weapons state, Japan inevitably faces the question of whether it needs its
own nuclear deterrent. U.S. ambivalence on missile defense only heightens
Tokyo's concerns, given its proximity to ballistic missile threats from the East
Asian mainland. South Korea, Taiwan and Australia, among others, also share
Japan's concern, each according to its own circumstances.
SK/N220.02) Masaru Tamamoto [Sr. Fellow, World Policy Institute],
WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall 2009, p. 63, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. It is a curious logic that sees a denuclearized North
Korea retaining the capacity to attack Japan with biological, chemical, and
conventional weapons, while the United States, tied to a total pledge of nonaggression, becomes unable to honor its guarantee of security for Japan. Under
this scenario, Japan, the world's second largest economy, would find its
geopolitical influence dramatically reduced and, in the context of the U.S.-Japan
alliance, would be relegated to the role of a perpetual supplicant. Indeed, such
logic has led to a more dangerous, almost unspeakable, strain of thought in
Tokyo: if the United States were to water down its commitment to defend Japan
with nuclear weapons in response to any sort of attack, perhaps Japan should
acquire nuclear weapons of its own.
SK/N220.03) Robert Madsen & Richard J. Samuels [Director, Center for
International Studies, MIT], THE NATIONAL INTEREST, May-June 2010, p.
48, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. At the very
least, steps must be taken to prevent the Japanese from losing so much confidence
in the American security guarantee that their government decides either to provide
more for its own defense by developing an independent nuclear force--an event
that could precipitate a regional arms race--or to seek a separate, and subordinate,
accommodation with Chinese power in the region and beyond.
SK/N220.04) Leszek Buszynski [Professor of International Relations,
International U. of Japan], CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, April 2009,
p. 143, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Japan has
relied upon the US navy for its security, but if the US is effectively deterred by a
Chinese strategic missile force from acting it would be compelled to develop its
own naval capability.
B. A NUCLEAR JAPAN WILL SET OFF A DISASTROUS ARMS RACE
SK/N220.05) Masaru Tamamoto [Sr. Fellow, World Policy Institute],
WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall 2009, p. 63, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. On the whole, Japanese military strategists have long
understood that the nation's acquisition of nuclear weapons will effectively
diminish the level of its national security. Confidence and trust in northeast Asia
is sufficiently low that any decision by Japan to develop a nuclear arsenal would
surely raise the level of regional tension and result in a potentially catastrophic
arms race.
SK/N221. KOREA REUNIFICATION: Solvency
1. NORTH KOREA DOES NOT WANT REUNIFICATION
SK/N221.01) William J. Taylor [senior advisor for international security
affairs, Center for Strategic & International Studies], WORLD AND I, June 2000,
p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The No. 1
priority of the DPRK leadership is to preserve itself in power. The regime
understands that near-term North-South unification could come only through a
war it would lose, or by anarchy, coup d'etat, or revolution among its starving and
repressed millions. For the foreseeable future, Pyongyang wants controlled
foreign assistance over the long haul to get through its times of trouble.
2. SOUTH KOREA DOES NOT WANT REUNIFICATION
SK/N221.02) William J. Taylor [senior advisor for international security
affairs, Center for Strategic & International Studies], WORLD AND I, June 2000,
p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Despite the
near-miraculous recovery, given its recent economic malaise, Seoul cannot afford
the staggering costs of near-term reunification, which have been estimated to be
several hundred billion dollars. Nor is Seoul prepared for massive North Korean
refugee flows to the south, which would occur under most near-term unification
scenarios.
SK/N221.03) Arnaud de Borchgrave [Editor-at-Large], THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, June 3, 2010, p. B4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. A powerful argument against retaliation is the fear of an
internal collapse of the last Stalinist regime on Earth. At 69, Kim Jong-il looks
frail and dazed as he recovers from last year's stroke. He also is rumored to be
fighting cancer. South Korea could then find itself faced with a humongous bill
for reunification of the two Koreas and the reconstruction of an entire country
from the ground up. German reunification cost West Germany $100 billion over
10 years - but East Germany was not without resources. Everything worked in the
German Democratic Republic, albeit with inferior quality, much like in the Soviet
Union. North Korea is devoid of all modern amenities, from ground to grid.
3. JAPAN DOES NOT WANT A REUNIFIED KOREA
SK/N221.04) William J. Taylor [senior advisor for international security
affairs, Center for Strategic & International Studies], WORLD AND I, June 2000,
p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. North and
South Koreans share one thing: memories of the brutal Japanese colonial rule of
Korea (1910--1945). Tokyo knows this and is reluctant to see a unified Korea
capable of posing a serious security
SK/N221.05) William J. Taylor [senior advisor for international security
affairs, Center for Strategic & International Studies], WORLD AND I, June 2000,
p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Furthermore,
unification could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula
and, ultimately, the Japanese archipelago, creating a security vacuum in East Asia
and necessitating very large increases in Japanese defense spending.
4. GERMAN REUNIFICATION NOT ANALOGOUS TO KOREA
SK/N221.06) William J. Taylor [senior advisor for international security
affairs, Center for Strategic & International Studies], WORLD AND I, June 2000,
p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. South
Korea's President Kim Dae Jung stated in March 2000 at the Free University in
Berlin that achieving Korean unification would be very difficult. He noted that the
two Germanys had never fought a war and that their unification was preceded by
years of cooperative exchanges. He concluded that "it seems out of the question
that we should hasten territorial unification."
SK/N221.07) William J. Taylor [senior advisor for international security
affairs, Center for Strategic & International Studies], WORLD AND I, June 2000,
p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. There may
be some worthwhile comparisons of the German and Korean cases, but they are
few. Hans Giessmann makes a very persuasive case in the summer 1999 issue of
Korea and World Affairs. His article, entitled "Korea and the Myth of 'Cloning
the German Unification Model,'” illustrates that the many years of East-West
detente in Europe, which gave East German leaders hope that they could trade on
openings to the West for increased legitimacy of power, have no prolonged
comparison under the juche system of North Korea (DPRK).
SK/N222. KUWAIT: Disads
1. U.S. WITHDRAWAL CRIPPLES U.S. COMBAT TROOPS
A. BASES IN KUWAIT VITAL TO SUPPORT TROOPS IN IRAQ
SK/N222.01) Brian Murphy, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 1,
2009, p. 15, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The
Americans have shifted about 1,000 soldiers to replace the departing British
troops to ensure a smooth transition and protect U.S. military supply lines from
Kuwait to American bases throughout Iraq.
SK/N222.02) Lawrence J. Korb [Senior Fellow, Center for American
Progress], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Fall 2009, p. 1, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The United States is not leaving the
region. Jim Dobbins said we're not going to have 150,000 ground troops in Iraq,
but we are still going to have forces and bases in Kuwait. In the Cold War, we
were sensitive about putting American forces in the Middle East, so the Saudis
built bases to conform to our specifications. In the First Gulf War, when we went
in, it was just like going to an American base. We had forces in Kuwait; we will
also remain in the Persian Gulf with the carrier battle group and the Marine Corps
expeditionary force there. Whatever happens in Iraq, if they should be invaded by
a foreign country, we would be able to apply power. If conflict were to spill over
into the region, we will be there to play a role.
SK/N222.03) Demetria S. Walker [Major, U.S. Army Reserves], ARMY
LOGISTICIAN, January-February 2009, p. 2, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Khabari Crossing had been under construction for
several years. Its concept was developed with the intent of replacing Navistar
Coalition Crossing while retaining the basic task of controlling all civilian,
military, and coalition traffic going into or coming back from Iraq. The 513th
MCT had the responsibility and the satisfaction of bringing the vision to fruition.
The border crossing between Iraq and Kuwait is now more efficient and more
effective.
SK/N222.04) Joseph Gerson [American Friends Service Committee], in
THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S.
MILITARY POSTS, edited by Catherine Lutz, 2009, p. 55. Bases in Okinawa and
elsewhere in Japan were essential to the U.S. wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the
Persian Gulf. This is also a function of the U.S. bases in Kuwait, Bahrain,
Ecuador, and Honduras.
B. BASES IN KUWAIT VITAL FOR TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN
SK/N222.05) Stephen Farrell & Elisabeth Bumiller, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, April 1, 2010, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. All lethal supplies -- weapons, armored trucks, eight-wheeled
Stryker troop carriers -- come in by air to avoid attacks, but everything else goes
by sea and land. The standard route from Iraq to Afghanistan is south from
Baghdad and down through Kuwait, by ship through the Persian Gulf and the
Strait of Hormuz to Karachi, Pakistan, then overland once again.
SK/N222.06) Stephen Farrell & Elisabeth Bumiller, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, April 1, 2010, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. In trying to speed 30,000 reinforcements into Afghanistan while
reducing American forces in Iraq by 50,000, American commanders are
orchestrating one of the largest movements of troops and materiel since World
War II. Military officials say that transporting so many people and billions of
dollars' worth of equipment, weapons, housing, fuel and food in and out of both
countries between now and an August deadline is as critical and difficult as what
is occurring on the battlefield. Military officials, who called the start of the fivemonth logistics operation “March Madness,” say it is like trying to squeeze a
basketball through a narrow pipe, particularly the supply route through the
Khyber Pass linking Pakistan and Afghanistan.
SK/N222.07) Stephen Farrell & Elisabeth Bumiller, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, April 1, 2010, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. “Hannibal trying to move over the Alps had a tremendous logistics
burden, but it was nothing like the complexity we are dealing with now,” said Lt.
Gen. William G. Webster, the commander of the United States Third Army, using
one of the extravagant historical parallels that commanders have deployed for the
occasion. He spoke at a military base in the Kuwaiti desert before a vast
sandscape upon which were armored trucks that had been driven out of Iraq and
were waiting to be junked, sent home or taken on to Kabul, Afghanistan. The
general is not moving elephants, but the scale and intricacy of the operation are
staggering. The military says there are 3.1 million pieces of equipment in Iraq,
from tanks to coffee makers, two-thirds of which are to leave the country. Of that,
about half will go on to Afghanistan, where there are already severe strains on the
system.
SK/N222.08) Stephen Farrell & Elisabeth Bumiller, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, April 1, 2010, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. Overcrowding at Bagram Air Base, the military's main flight hub in
Afghanistan, is so severe that beds are at a premium and troops are jammed into
tents alongside runways. Cargo planes, bombers, jet fighters, helicopters and
drones are stacked up in the skies, waiting to land.
2. U.S. WITHDRAWAL WILL INCREASE TERRORISM
SK/N222.09) Sara Carter & Eli Lake, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
August 12, 2009, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
U.S. officials credited close cooperation between American and Kuwaiti
intelligence services for the capture Tuesday of six al Qaeda operatives who were
planning attacks on a U.S. military base and other targets in the country. The
plotters had made martyrdom videos claiming responsibility for the attacks, which
were disrupted by a joint investigation, the officials told The Washington Times.
SK/N222.10) Sara Carter & Eli Lake, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
August 12, 2009, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
The American and Kuwaiti intelligence services determined that the group was
planning to attack Camp Arifjan, the largest U.S. base in the country, located
about 38 miles from the capital, Kuwait City. Another military official with
knowledge of the operation told The Times that the plot was taken seriously and
that information gathered revealed that the men intended to attack not only the
base but other facilities in Kuwait, in what was to be a grand al Qaeda attack.
SK/N222.11) Sara Carter & Eli Lake, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
August 12, 2009, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Defense Department spokesman Lt. Col. Pat Ryder said the arrests by Kuwaiti
security forces illustrated the benefits of working jointly with partners and
demonstrate the importance of our partner and the positive relationship we've
developed with Kuwait.
SK/N223. MILITARY AID: Solvency
1. MILITARY AID WILL BE SUBSTITUTED FOR U.S. TROOPS
SK/N223.01) James F. Dobbins [Director, International Security &
Defense Policy, RAND Corporation], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Fall 2009, p. 1,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. We have securityassistance relationships with lots of countries in the Middle East in which we
don't have any troops stationed, and we need to look at some of those other
models and decide what kind of relationship we want with Iraq.
2. U.S. AID IS INEFFECTIVE AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
SK/N223.02) Jim Poyser, THE QUILL, June-July 2008, p. 59, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. After more than a year of
reporting and research, combing through thousands of foreign lobbying records
and haggling with government officials of FOIA requests, the Center for Public
Integrity's International Consortium of Investigative Journalists published a
comprehensive resource on U. S. military aid and assistance in a post-9/11 era.
The project combined the reporting of 10 investigative journalists on four
continents with a powerful database, resulting in a single, easily accessible toolkit.
The overall findings included: * Lobbying by foreign governments and concerns
over terrorism have dramatically shifted U . S . military assistance programs. *
The change in priorities often came at the cost of human rights and fiscal
accountability. * Controversial U.S. allies recruited into the global war on terror,
such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Djibouti, received billions in additional, new
military aid, oftentimes with little oversight by Congress. * Several former
members of Congress have been hired by governments with dubious human rights
records to lobby Washington to ensure continued funding of controversial U.S.
military aid.
SK/N223.03) Editorial, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 2009, p. 8, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The Obama
Administration is asking Congress for $3 billion in aid to the Pakistani military
over the next five years. The money is supposed to be used for counterinsurgency
purposes. That is bad news for Pakistan and for the region. In the past, Pakistan's
military has pocketed much of U.S. aid or bought weapons systems for use
against India, instead of utilizing it to fight the Taliban. And the money will
further strengthen an already overly powerful military in a country that has
suffered from repeated military coups.
SK/N223.04) Joseph Ingram [former World Bank Special Representative
to the UN] & Clare Lockhart [Director, Institute for State Effectiveness], THE
WORLD TODAY, February 2010, p. 13. An Afghan Ministry of Finance
evaluation of donor performance in 2008, endorsed by the World Bank,
concluded that only a derisory share of foreign assistance is spent on government
developmental budget priorities. Most goes to foreign contractors - subcontracted
many times - or into the pockets of businessmen under the guise of security.
SK/N224. MILITARY BASES: Solvency
1. TROOPS WILL MERELY BE SHIFTED TO ANOTHER COUNTRY
SK/N224.01) Kozue Akibayashi [Institute for Gender Studies,
Ochanomizu U.] & Suzuyo Takazato, in THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE
GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. MILITARY POSTS, edited by Catherine
Lutz, 2009, p. 265. As the discussions of the movement's international networking
reveal, closing or decreasing the capacity of one Asian base has often led to the
reinforcement of other military bases in the region as a means of minimizing the
negative effects of the closure on the U.S. military's global strategies. For instance,
when the bases in the Philippines were closed in 1992, those troops previously
assigned there were transferred to bases in Okinawa and Korea. More recently,
“lessening the burden of people in Okinawa," a phrase in the Security
Consultative Committee (2006) document, will be achieved by build-up on Guam.
2. SHIFT COULD BE TO BASES IN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES
SK/N224.02) THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, April 6, 2010, p. 7, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As William Pfaff has
pointed out, the U.S. has over 700 military bases around the world. The U.S.
military has divided the world into six regions, with bases and forward operating
sites in each one.
SK/N224.03) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As indicated in recent
Defense Department publications, basing access has come to be viewed along a
spectrum embracing the "main operating base," "forward operating site," and
"cooperative security location." Main operating bases involve "permanently
stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure" and "will be characterized by
command and control structures, family support facilities, and strengthened force
protection measures." Examples mentioned are Ramstein Air Force Base
(Germany), Kadena Air Base (Japan), and Camp Humphreys (Korea). Others that
might fit that category are the air bases at Thumrait, Seeb, and Masirah in Oman,
and Al Udeid in Qatar. Yet others might be the naval base at Yokosuka, the
complex of bases on Guam, the naval facilities on Diego Garcia, maybe the air
and army bases in Kuwait, and perhaps the main army bases in Germany at
Baumholder, Wurzburg, Wiesbaden, Friedberg, Schweinfurt, and Vilseck.
SK/N225. MILITARY BASES: Withdrawal Disad
A. U.S. MILITARY BASES IN ASIA ARE VITAL TO SECURITY
1. ASIA IS RIFE WITH POTENTIAL SECURITY THREATS
SK/N225.01) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A few points stand out
from the myriad of possible complex scenarios. Most reflect focuses on WMD,
terrorism, hegemonic rivalry with China, and competition over scarce resources-particularly oil, but possibly also such minerals as iron ore and manganese--and
the possible nexus between the latter two. The possession, existing or possibly
pending, of nuclear weapons by Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea,
perhaps later Egypt, Syria, or Taiwan, among others, is at the heart of numerous
scenarios. Islamist terror raises the possibility of conflict and, hence, access
requirements in numerous areas spanning the West, North and East Africa, the
Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Central Asia, etc. Hegemonic China
looms large in such scenarios.
SK/N225.02) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Recent U.S. experiences-1990-91 in the Persian Gulf, in Bosnia, Kosovo, and then in Afghanistan (2001)
and Iraq (2003)--have highlighted the complexities and uncertainties of basing
access in the post-Cold War period. They have involved questions of access to,
and overhead transit rights for, a variety of nations: all over Europe, Egypt,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Tadzhikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Djibouti, and many
others. They have also highlighted the crucial importance of the future of
American basing access at a time of shifting alliances, friendships, and enmities
amid wholesale changes in the structure of the international system, and of the
movement to the forefront of the issues of terrorism, radical Islam, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and a looming hegemonic challenge by China.
SK/N225.03) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Out of all these complex
and contingent sets of scenarios and possible policies in connection with the
future of the U.S. global defense posture, a number of general points deserve
emphasis. The first is that the diverse, uncertain, and global nature of the
emerging threat environment requires an elaborate global basing and posture
strategy. Threats include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, traditional
warfare possibilities in Iran, Taiwan, and Korea, perhaps hegemonic rivalry with
China and, maybe, the European Union. But looming quietly behind them may be
a struggle for oil, gas, and nonfuel minerals, perhaps to be linked to terrorism,
WMD, and great-power hegemonic rivalry.
2. U.S. MILITARY BASES PRESERVE SECURITY IN ASIA
SK/N225.04) Aaron L. Friedberg, THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
September-October 2009, p. 19, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. The system of alliances and diplomatic relationships that make
up the U.S. strategic position in Asia is built on a foundation of military power.
The credibility of America's security guarantees--and the willingness of others to
accept them--is a direct result of its perceived strength and its reputation for
resolve. If these erode, the superstructure of alliances and overseas bases on
which the United States currently depends may persist for a time, but will not do
so indefinitely. Whether the end comes gradually or in a sudden, catastrophic
collapse will depend on chance and circumstance.
SK/N225.05) William J. Taylor [senior advisor for international security
affairs, Center for Strategic & International Studies], WORLD AND I, June 2000,
p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Major U.S.
interests in Northeast Asia are served by the peace and stability maintained in
large part by the presence of about 100,000 American troops deployed in the
Asia-Pacific region.
SK/N225.06) Gideon Rose [Council on Foreign Relations], CURRENT,
February 1998, p. 21, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. Indeed, an exit strategy in Asia would contradict the very purpose of the
American presence there.
B. WITHDRAWING FROM BASES WILL IMPAIR WORLD SECURITY
1. U.S. WILL LOSE POWER PROJECTION ABROAD
SK/N225.07) Thomas Donnelly, NEW STATESMAN, August 3, 2009, p.
30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The argument
against US overseas military bases is almost always a surrogate argument against
the exercise of US power. But you can't have one without the other. And the
annoying thing about American hyperpuissance is that, compared to other
probable outcomes, it produces what appears to be the least bad international
system. And so, various allies continue to tolerate, and even encourage, the
presence of US military installations in their countries.
SK/N225.08) Alexander Cooley, BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE AND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, p. 5. U.S. overseas
bases and access rights are the linchpin of American global power and its military
supremacy of the global commons. Overseas bases in countries such as Spain and
Uzbekistan act as "force multipliers" and enable U.S. planners to rapidly project
power both within and across regions.
SK/N225.09) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Coercive diplomacy,
known as "gunboat diplomacy" in an earlier time, may also require access.
Numerous cases have been detailed in which this issue came into play during the
Cold War, many cases involving access to bases and overhead air space.
SK/N225.10) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. "Presence," or "showing
the flag," mostly through port visits, is a longtime maritime tradition, an important
aspect of the politics of prestige and alignments. In the nineteenth century, for
instance, all the major naval powers sent flotillas (one of them the American
"Great White Fleet") around the globe to show the flag, display might, perhaps
intimidate a bit. Such visits are made to allied nations but also to neutral and even
somewhat unfriendly ones. As was recently the case with U.S. ship visits to
Vietnam, "showing the flag" (or the acceptance by hosts of such visits) can be a
way of indicating new political relationships. The bombing of the USS Cole
(DDG 67) took place in that context--in Aden (Yemen), which had been not much
earlier a major Soviet naval base.
SK/N225.11) Hal M. Friedman [Henry Ford Community College], THE
JOURNAL OF MILITARY HISTORY, January 2010, p. 325. Moreover, the
authors' [[of THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST
U.S. MILITARY BASES, edited by Catherine Lutz] continued call for US
demilitarization and a "new world" of peace and justice reveals their own naive
notions of international relations. I, too, have often felt that US foreign policy has
become much too militarized and that the US has gotten itself into a situation of
imperial overstretch. Yet, I've also wondered what might happen if the US did
demilitarize or otherwise withdraw from its current position. What other nation or
nations would fill that power vacuum? The fact that the authors never discuss
power vacuums and real alternatives demonstrates even more how unrealistic
their ideas are about refashioning international relations by tearing one system
down without any concrete thought about the replacement.
2. IT WILL BE A BLOW FOR DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM
SK/N225.12) Thomas Donnelly, NEW STATESMAN, August 3, 2009, p.
30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. What is
historically distinct about US power is that it correlates quite remarkably with the
spread of human liberty and representative government, through time and across
cultures. What has been true abroad has also been true at home: the cold war
period, so far from producing the feared "garrison state", also brought a dramatic
expansion of political rights for African Americans, women and even
homosexuals. And so two cheers for the global exercise of American power and
the overseas military bases that are a necessary consequence thereof.
SK/N225.13) Jim Talent [Heritage Foundation], NATIONAL REVIEW,
March 5, 2007, p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. America is the defender of freedom in the world and therefore always a
prime target for those who hate freedom. The progress of the international order
toward peace and democracy depends on American power; and while the basket
of Western foreign policy contains many tools, what underpins them all is a U.S.
military that the world knows is capable of defeating threats swiftly and
effectively.
3. INTERNATIONAL STABILITY WILL BE WEAKENED
SK/N225.14) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, p. 254. It seems
unlikely that America itself can avoid an expansive global political role as long as
it remains a world superpower. Effectively it will need to be a global stabilizer. It
will need to help insulate the "functioning core" of the global system from the
persistent volatility at its less-integrated periphery-across the developing yet often
thinly governed nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Such an international
reassurance function will no doubt require some enduring form of forward
military presence.
4. DETERRENCE OF AGGRESSION WILL BE WEAKENED
SK/N225.15) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, p. 219. A final
rationale for a foreign base presence is strategic: the value of a “tripwire" that
links a nation's formal security commitments tangibly to its intercontinental
geostrategic capabilities, and thus enhances deterrence. In the case of the United
States, this logic can be formidable: with by far the most substantial, diverse, and
accurate military arsenal on earth, including nuclear weapons and state-of-the art
delivery systems, the United States is in a position to retaliate at any conceivable
level to attacks where its forces are engaged. Deterrence is strongest when a
potential aggressor realizes that U.S. forces would suffer casualties in any attack
that it might attempt, so could credibly be expected to retaliate.
SK/N225.16) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, p. 218. Beyond its
narrow political-military functions, the American global footprint has also
leveraged U.S. foreign policy in a broader sense. It has literally become "a
bellwether of U.S. attitudes and approaches to foreign policy." As such, stable
troop presence has both signaled broad support for allies and deterrence of
potential antagonists, even where troops have not been optimally deployed, from
the perspective of military operations.
5. U.S. WAR AGAINST TERRORISM WILL BE IMPAIRED
SK/N225.17) Alexander Cooley, BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE AND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, p. 4. But securing
overseas basing access remains a critical aspect of current U.S. defense policy and
the global war on terrorism, especially as U.S. planners reconfigure the force
structure and basing posture to cope with more regionally based threats.
SK/N225.18) Alexander Cooley, BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE AND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, p. 5. Securing
overseas bases and access agreements with a number of countries was critical for
the recent U.S.-led military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, the
K2 base in Uzbekistan was staging facility for the OIF mission, whereas facilities
in Spain were used for both the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns.
6. ABILITY TO SUPPORT U.S. COMBAT WILL BE CRIPPLED
a. IN THE AIR
SK/N225.19) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, pp. 218-219. First,
the need to maintain air superiority requires offshore bases. Even in a world
where long-range U.S. bombers such as the B-2 can strike targets far distant from
America's homeland, as they did in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, aircraft with
shorter ranges are needed to patrol the skies around them, as well as to refuel
them. Those aircraft need foreign bases.
b. ON THE GROUND
SK/N225.20) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, p. 219. A second
reason for foreign bases relates to the need for ground forces abroad. These forces
would be crucial in the event that friendly countries might be attacked and
defeated before U.S. forces could respond, making it necessary to evict an
aggressor. They could also be necessary for various kinds of reconnaissance
and/or counterterrorist activities. Ground units may well get lighter and more
mobile over time, but they will inevitably continue to be large, heavy, and quite
unwieldy to deploy. This reality will necessitate an offshore supply presence-either bases or prepositioned equipment-to allow such forces to respond to
contingencies in a timely manner.
c. ON THE SEA
SK/N225.21) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, p. 219. A third reason
for at least some offshore bases-even if scaled down and isolated to minimize
expense and conflict with local societies-is the for need for safe ports and friendly
harbors, it is argued. These could, for example, be important to assuring secure
passage in the energy sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to consumers in the United
States, Europe, and East Asia. The only way to move heavy ground forces and
their equipment is, and prospectively will remain, by sea. If ports are required, it
ismuch better to control them in advance. Thus the need is crucial for naval bases,
or at least access agreements in potentially strategic areas.
SK/N225.22) Joseph Gerson [American Friends Service Committee], in
THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S.
MILITARY POSTS, edited by Catherine Lutz, 2009, p. 55. U.S. bases serve
interventionist aircraft carriers, destroyers, nuclear armed submarines, and other
U.S. warships. This includes bases in Spain, Italy, Israel, Bahrain, Qatar, and
Japan, and "access" agreements in Israel, the Philippines, Singapore, and other
countries.
7. U.S. WILL LOSE VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING
SK/N225.23) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, p. 216. Despite the
steady progress of precision technology, military success continues to depend
heavily on accurate intelligence as well. To secure such intelligence, the United
States needs listening posts in parts of the world where it has difficulty gathering
accurate information. Inside the Sensitive Compartmentalized Information
Facility (SCIF), at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, for example, civilian and military
intelligence analysts collect diverse kinds of information, including the
personalized local knowledge that comes only from establishing a concrete
physical presence in forward locations. "You can't hear unless you're here," as
Major Mike Poehlitz, head of the army civil-affairs unit based in Djibouti, noted
ruefully.
SK/N225.24) Alexander Cooley, BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE AND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, p. 5. Beyond their
military roles and strategic functions, bases also provide service and repair
facilities, storage, training facilities, and logistical staging posts. Bases can also be
used to conduct surveillance, coordinate tasks, collect intelligence, and facilitate
command, control, and communications (C3).
8. ACCESS TO RESOURCES WILL BE IMPAIRED
SK/N225.25) Alexander Cooley, BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE AND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, p. 5. Even when not
used for combat purposes, bases are significant when they guarantee U.S. access
to neighboring assets, territories, or resources that are of critical importance.
9. DEVELOPMENT WILL DECLINE IN HOST COUNTRY
SK/N225.26) Alexander Cooley, BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE AND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, pp. 11-12. Basing
agreements provide a range of benefits and resources to host regimes. Of these,
the most obvious benefit to the host nation is security. The presence of foreign
troops can deter aggressors and permits a host to spend less on its national
security than it otherwise would. In his study of hierarchy in international politics,
David Lake finds that base hosts and subordinate states in security arrangements
tend to spend less on their security than do states with no such foreign troop
deployments.
SK/N225.27) Alexander Cooley, BASE POLITICS: DEMOCRATIC
CHANGE AND THE U.S. MILITARY OVERSEAS, 2008, p. 12. In turn,
spending less on security allows regimes to spend more on goods that will
enhance their political survival. For example, the bilateral security guarantees and
military bases offered by the United States to East Asia in the postwar periods
allowed Japan and Korea to minimize security spending and instead pursue stateled neomercantilist policies under the U.S. security umbrella.
10. SEA AND CONUS BASES NOT RELIABLE ALTERNATIVES
SK/N225.28) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Fourth, and while sea
basing and Conus basing are serious alternatives to land basing by virtue of
technological changes in ships, aircraft, etc., there are serious questions of cost
and of feasibility in relation to important categories of scenarios.
SK/N225.29) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The CBO report briefly
discusses four arguments against sea basing, whether on a modest or major scale.
Those arguments are the possible inability of even maximal sea-basing schemes
to deal with large-scale military operations, such as in Iraq in 1990-91 and 2003;
the vulnerability of sea bases to attack from ballistic and cruise missiles, maybe
even greater than that of less concentrated land bases; the seeming unlikelihood
that the United States would attempt large-scale amphibious operations when it
has not done so since the Korean War; and the expense of all the new ships and
connectors needed.
11. OVERSEAS BASES ARE COST-EFFECTIVE
SK/N225.30) Kent E. Calder [Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins U.], EMBATTLED GARRISONS: COMPARATIVE
BASE POLITICS AND AMERICAN GLOBALISM, 2007, p. 214. The costs of
forward deployment must be balanced, of course, against the very real costs of
long-range precision-strike capabilities. B-2 (stealth) bombers, for example, have
effective global strike capabilities well demonstrated in America's recent wars,
but they cost $730 million each. And each JDAM, which the United States used at
a peak rate of 3,000 a month in Afghanistan, costs $14,000.
SK/N226. MILITARY BASES: Latin America Disad
A. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IS DECLINING IN LATIN AMERICA
SK/N226.01) THE ECONOMIST (US), December 5, 2009, p. 44EU,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The American
military presence in Colombia has recently declined, partly because the
Democrats in Congress have cut annual military aid by $70m, to around $320m.
The number of American troops is now around 250, down from a peak of 570 in
early 2007.
SK/N226.02) Martin Arostegui, THE WASHINGTON POST, August 27,
2009, p. B1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. A U.S. State
Department fact sheet states that there are no plans to increase U.S. military
personnel in Colombia, where U.S. deployments have been in gradual decline
from a peak of 600 to 800 in 2004. About 300 to 400 remain, according to the
State Department.
SK/N226.03) Martin Arostegui, THE WASHINGTON POST, August 27,
2009, p. B1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Ecuadorean
President Rafael Correa, who assumed the rotating presidency of UNASUR, has
shut down a U.S. naval facility in the port of Manta. He also has been locked in a
dispute with Mr. Uribe since Colombian forces raided a Colombian rebel camp in
Ecuador last year, killing a top rebel commander. Meanwhile, Bolivian President
Evo Morales declared that any Latin American president allowing U.S. bases is
committing treason.
B. U.S. TROOPS WILL BE SHIFTED FROM ASIA TO LATIN AMERICA
SK/N226.04) Greg Grandin, THE NATION, February 8, 2010, p. 9,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The US is taking
an increasingly threatening stance toward the Latin American region by adopting
a strategy of militarization. The administration of US President Barack Obama,
continuing the policies of his predecessors, is establishing military bases in the
region and supporting right-wing movements that are more accommodating to US
interests.
SK/N226.05) Gregory Wilpert [author of CHANGING VENEZUELA BY
TAKING POWER], NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 3, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
In August, a deal was announced in which the U.S. military will be granted the
use of five military bases in Colombia, in addition to the two it already uses, to
fight drug trafficking and guerrillas. This is the latest move in which the U.S.
military has raised its profile in Latin America, coming a year after the Bush
administration reactivated the U.S. Navy's Fourth Fleet, which continues to patrol
Latin American waters under President Obama.
C. U.S. TROOPS IN LATIN AMERICA INCREASE RISK OF WAR
1. THEY WILL ACCELERATE REGIONAL ARMS RACE
SK/N226.06) Martin Arostegui, THE WASHINGTON POST, August 27,
2009, p. B1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Colombia's
decision to grant U .S. troops the use of more military bases is fueling an arms
race in Latin America and deepening a rift between anti-U.S. populists, such as
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, and more moderate, though still left-leaning, leaders in
nations such as Brazil. The strains are becoming increasingly pronounced as
Venezuela and Bolivia buy more Russian arms and Mr. Chavez pushes other
regional leaders to condemn Colombia for renewed agreements with the U.S.
military.
SK/N226.07) THE ECONOMIST (US), December 5, 2009, p. 44EU,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Politicians, from
Cuba's Fidel Castro to some Colombian opponents of Mr Uribe, have revived
atavistic fears of American intervention, claiming that an American defence
department document shows that the yanquis will now use Colombia for
surveillance missions in South America and as a staging post to send troops to
Africa via Ascension Island.
SK/N226.08) THE ECONOMIST (US), December 5, 2009, p. 44EU,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Five months after
news surfaced that Colombia would grant the United States access to seven
military bases for joint operations against drug-trafficking and guerrillas, the
agreement continues to poison diplomacy in the region. Mr Chavez claims that
the deal, which was signed in October, is intended as a launch-pad for military
action aimed at toppling his leftist regime. In response, he has ordered a "freeze"
on imports from Colombia.
2. RISK OF COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA WAR IS MAGNIFIED
SK/N226.09) Gregory Wilpert [author of CHANGING VENEZUELA BY
TAKING POWER], NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 3, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Rather, the threat is that the U.S. military presence will exacerbate tensions
between Colombia and the rest of the region. While almost all presidents of South
America questioned Colombia's acceptance of greater U.S. military presence in its
country, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez went much further. After Colombia attempted
to justify its decision by repeating its claim that Venezuela supports Colombia's
largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
Chavez temporarily withdrew his ambassador, threatening to cut off trade with
Colombia and to nationalize Colombian companies operating in Venezuela. Thus
in no time did the announcement of an increased U.S. military presence in the
region contribute to the latest and potentially most damaging crisis in relations
between Venezuela and Colombia.
SK/N226.10) Gregory Wilpert [author of CHANGING VENEZUELA BY
TAKING POWER], NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 3, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Chavez knows that Venezuela has nothing to gain but trouble from the
continuation of Colombia's civil war. Yet this is what having more U.S. troops in
Colombia is sure to accomplish: heating up the country's civil war, which has
spilled over into neighboring countries for years. Venezuela is already home to
one of the world's largest refugee populations, with an estimated 4 million
Colombians living there who fled their country's violence. Moreover, the conflict
regularly causes border clashes between the Venezuelan and Ecuadoran armed
forces and Colombian armed groups (military, paramilitary, and guerrillas). It also
contributes to lawlessness and crime throughout the Colombian border region.
SK/N226.11) Gregory Wilpert [author of CHANGING VENEZUELA BY
TAKING POWER], NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, SeptemberOctober 2009, p. 3, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
If mounting tensions lead to a cut-off in trade between Colombia and Venezuela,
both economies will suffer--Colombia's probably more so, since it sells about six
times as much to Venezuela than vice versa, and since it is generally more
difficult to find new markets than it is to find new suppliers. Furthermore, trade is
one of the best guarantors of good relations. Without it, the possibility is much
greater of a conflict erupting between the two countries, a conflict far more
serious than has yet taken place.
SK/N227. NORTH KOREA: Solvency
1. NORTH KOREA WILL USE TALKS AS A STALLING TACTIC
SK/N227.01) David Ibsen [coalitions director, United Against Nuclear
Iran], inFOCUS, Winter 2009, p. 28, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. Once the North Koreans are at the negotiating table, however,
they draw out or suspend talks until better terms are reached. For example, in
December 2005, North Korea suspended the six-party talks and later conducted its
first nuclear test in October 2006. Although this nuclear test was roundly
condemned initially, the international community and North Korea eventually reentered negotiations, and North Korea used its increased leverage as a nuclear
power to elicit significant concessions from the international community in
exchange for shutting down its nuclear facilities.
SK/N227.02) Lee Tae-hoon, THE KOREA TIMES, October 22, 2009,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. With regard to the
North's recent reconciliatory gestures, Defense Minister Kim said it was
premature to conclude that the secretive state was ready to engage seriously in
nuclear diplomacy. "Although, on the surface, there are signs of some change
from North Korea, including its recent willingness to talk, in reality the unstable
situation such as the nuclear program and the military-first policy remains
unchanged," Kim said.
2. NORTH KOREA WILL MAKE UNREASONABLE DEMANDS
SK/N227.03) Peter Crail, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, March 2010, p. 53,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The outreach by
China and the United Nations follows North Korean claims that it would be
willing to return to talks and pursue denuclearization only after a peace treaty
formally concluding the Korean War was agreed and international sanctions were
lifted. In a Jan. 11 Foreign Ministry statement, Pyongyang proposed talks
beginning this year on a peace treaty to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement,
which continues to serve as a ceasefire but not a permanent end to the Korean
War. "The conclusion of the peace treaty will help terminate the hostile relations
between [North Korea and the United States] and positively promote the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at a rapid tempo," read the statement.
The statement also said that the removal of sanctions was necessary to pave the
way for the resumption of talks. Sin Son Ho, North Korea's permanent
representative to the UN, repeated this position Jan. 12, telling reporters, "We will
return to the talks if the sanctions are lifted."
SK/N227.04) Armstrong Williams, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, August
19, 2009, p. A4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In the
hardest case, that of North Korea, the alternatives are shockingly constant:
confrontation or capitulation. They may be dressed up in six-power talks or in
humanitarian gestures (everyone who thinks that former President Clinton's
actions - noble though it may be - were not drenched in symbolism (we don't
negotiate with terrorists) and thereby political, raise your hand), but there is an
unerring constant: Either we will stand up to an aggressive, repressive and brutal
regime or we will negotiate and capitulate, at least partly, to its demands.
3. NORTH KOREA’S CONCESSIONS DON’T LAST LONG
SK/N227.05) David Ibsen [coalitions director, United Against Nuclear
Iran], inFOCUS, Winter 2009, p. 28, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. In 2007 and 2008, the strategy worked again. North Korea
received 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, millions of dollars in unfrozen funds from
illicit bank accounts, removal from the U.S. government's state sponsors of
terrorism list, and increased food aid. In exchange, the North Koreans shut down
their nuclear program and dismantled their nuclear facilities. North Korean
concessions don't last long, however. The North Koreans subsequently resumed
their nuclear program and conducted another nuclear test in 2009. When new
sanctions were imposed as a result of the North Korean nuclear test, the North
Koreans announced they were weaponizing plutonium from fuel rods at the
nuclear weapons reactor in Yongbyon--the same nuclear reactor that was to be
dismantled as part of the six-party talks. North Korea then announced it was
enriching uranium for another source of fuel for a nuclear weapon.
4. ALLIES OPPOSE U.S.-NORTH KOREA BILATERAL AGREEMENT
SK/N227.06) Masaru Tamamoto [Sr. Fellow, World Policy Institute],
WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Fall 2009, p. 63, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. North Korea is clearly suspicious of the United
States and wants assurances it will never be attacked. To guarantee this, the
government in Pyongyang wants to conclude with the United States a binding
non-aggression pact in exchange for abandoning its nuclear weapons program.
Tokyo strongly and publicly objects to Washington cutting such a deal. Following
North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in
2003, Japan officially asked the George W. Bush administration never to rule out
the use of nuclear weapons, while endorsing the American policy of
denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. But with no sign that Kim Jong Il intends to
give up his nuclear weapons, and with officials in Tokyo in fear of being
abandoned by the United States, there are worries that a bilateral U.S.-North
Korea non-aggression pact will leave Japan dangerously exposed.
SK/N227.07) Armstrong Williams, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, August
19, 2009, p. A4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. No one
wants war on the Korean Peninsula, but neither can the U.S. stand for an outright
and obvious defeat. What is a minor threat to us is an existential one for our
Japanese and South Korean allies. We must stand with them in defusing the
situation. That precludes the bilateral U.S.-North Korean negotiations the hermit
kingdom craves. It also calls for an ever tighter relationship with our allies in
confronting North Korea.
5. SANCTIONS ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE
SK/N227.08) David Ibsen [coalitions director, United Against Nuclear
Iran], inFOCUS, Winter 2009, p. 28, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. The self-imposed economic and political isolation of the North
Korean regime makes it difficult to develop and deploy effective measures to
increase the diplomatic and economic isolation of North Korea. In other words,
how much more isolated can North Korea get? Notwithstanding effective
measures that target the financial interests of the North Korean elite, such as
freezing North Korean controlled accounts in Banco Delta Asia in 2007, sanctions
have had little impact on the regime.
6. NORTH KOREA WILL NOT DENUCLEARIZE
SK/N227.09) Ilan Berman [Vice-President, American Foreign Policy
Council], THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 2, 2010, p. B1, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Truth be told, that negotiating track launched in 2003 and encompassing the U.S., Russia, China, South Korea, Japan
and the DPRK - never stood much chance of success. The official goal of the offagain, on-again process, after all, was and remains the complete denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula. But there's no real evidence that the DPRK's nuclear
effort is negotiable. To the contrary, the Kim dynasty's persistent pursuit of the
bomb in the face of tremendous domestic hardship and international isolation
suggests that the powers that be in Pyongyang see nuclearization as the key to
regime stability - and to international credibility.
7. PAST EXPECTATIONS WERE MERELY WISHFUL THINKING
SK/N227.10) ARMS CONTROL TODAY, November 2006, p. 4, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. North Korea negotiated
the standard test of an [nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]-type safeguards
agreement with the [International Atomic Energy Agency]. Following the U.S
decision to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and many other
places, there might be some hope for talks with North Korea, and full certification
of the country's nuclear installations. --Then-International Atomic Energy Agency
Director-General Hans Blix, November/December 1991
SK/N228. NORTH KOREA: Aggression Disad
A. NORTH KOREA IS A HUGE THREAT TO SOUTH KOREA
1. NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY DWARFS SOUTH KOREA’S
SK/N228.01) Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 1, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. The South Korean military has maintained its armed forces
at a consistent number between 600,000 and 700,000 and has steadily modernized
based on its economic dynamism. The North has an active-duty military estimated
at 1.2 million, with between five million and seven million in the reserves.
2. THREAT OF AGGRESSION IS ACCELERATING
SK/N228.02) Lee Tae-hoon, THE KOREA TIMES, October 22, 2009,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. North Korea pulled
out of the multilateral talks in April after the international community condemned
its failed rocket launch, which was allegedly capable of carrying nuclear warheads
and striking parts of the U.S. On Wednesday, Gates also said the threat posed by
the reclusive North had reached a higher level and become even more "lethal and
destabilizing."
SK/N228.03) Choe San-Hung, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 11,
2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. North and
South Korean naval vessels exchanged fire in disputed waters off the western
coast of the Korean Peninsula on Tuesday, leaving one North Korean vessel
engulfed in flames, South Korean officials said. One North Korean sailor was
killed and three others injured, according to MBC, a South Korean television
station. The South Korean defense minister, Kim Tae-young, told Parliament that
he could not confirm the report. The two Koreas accused each other of violating
territorial waters, provoking the fierce two-minute skirmish. It was the first border
fighting in seven years between the countries, which technically remain at war
after fighting in the 1950-3 Korean War ended in a truce rather than a permanent
peace treaty.
SK/N228.04) Choe Sang-Hun, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 1, 2010, p.
A6, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Tensions on the
divided Korean Peninsula have deteriorated to their worst point in years after a
South Korean warship sank on March 26. South Korea blamed a North Korean
torpedo attack for the blast.
SK/N228.05) Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 1, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. "We believe that this is the beginning of North Korea's
asymmetrical military provocations employing conventional weapons," said the
South Korean official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the
military's internal analysis. "They will use such provocations to ratchet up
pressure on the U.S. and South Korea. The Cheonan sinking is an underwater
terrorist attack, and this is the beginning of such attacks."
SK/N228.06) Choe Sang-Hun, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 1, 2010, p.
A6, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. After it formally
accused the North on May 20 of having responsibility for the sinking, South
Korea cut off nearly all trade with the North and began a diplomatic campaign to
bring it before the United Nations Security Council for punishment. The South
also vowed to resume psychological warfare against the North, after a six-year
hiatus, by rebuilding loudspeakers along the border for propaganda broadcasts
and by dropping leaflets over the North using balloons. If the psychological war
resumes, the North has warned that it would shut down a joint industrial complex
at the North Korean border town of Kaesong -- the last remaining symbol of interKorean ties. The North also warned that it would shoot artillery shells across the
border to blast the loudspeakers. The South would certainly have to respond in
kind, officials said, raising the possibility of a major skirmish along a border
guarded by nearly two million troops on both sides.
SK/N228.07) Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 1, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. According to a recent strategic assessment by the U.S.
military based on the Korean Peninsula, the North has spent its dwindling treasury
to build an arsenal able to start armed provocations "with little or no warning."
These attacks would be specifically designed for "affecting economic and
political stability in the region" - exactly what happened in the attack on the
Cheonan, which the South Korean military and experts from five other countries
determined was carried out by a North Korean midget submarine firing a
powerful torpedo.
3. RISK OF PREEMPTIVE ATTACK BY SOUTH INCREASING
SK/N228.08) Choe San-Hung, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 21,
2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. South Korea
would launch a pre-emptive conventional strike against the North if there were
clear indications of an impending nuclear attack, the South Korean defense
minister said Wednesday in Seoul, even as both countries were holding talks
about improvements at their jointly operated industrial park. The comment by the
defense minister, Kim Tae-young, reconfirmed the South Korean military's stance
on the possibility of a nuclear strike by the North, ministry officials said.
SK/N228.09) Choe San-Hung, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 21,
2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Last Friday,
North Korea's National Defense Commission threatened a “holy war to blow
away” the South, denouncing Seoul over unconfirmed news reports that the South
has recently drawn up contingency plans for a potential collapse of the
government in Pyongyang. “A nuclear attack from the North would cause too
much damage for us to react,” Mr. Kim said, speaking at a security seminar on
Wednesday. “We must detect signs, and if there is a clear sign of attack, we must
immediately strike. Unless it's a case where we would sustain an attack but still
could counterattack, we must strike first.”
4. SOUTH KOREA WOULD BE DEVASTATED
SK/N228.10) Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 1, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. Even so, 70 percent of North Korea's ground forces - part of
the fourth-largest armed force in the world - remain staged within about 60 miles,
or 95 kilometers, of the demilitarized zone with the South. In that arsenal are 250
long-range artillery systems able to strike the Seoul metropolitan area. "While
qualitatively inferior, resource-constrained and incapable of sustained maneuver,
North Korea's military forces retain the capability to inflict lethal, catastrophic
destruction," said the assessment, approved by Gen. Walter L. Sharp, commander
of U.S. and U.N. forces in South Korea.
SK/N228.11) Arnaud de Borchgrave [Editor-at-Large], THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, June 3, 2010, p. B4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. North Korea can target, attack and sink a South Korean
warship, killing 46 of the South Korean crew, but South Korea cannot retaliate
without triggering a barrage of shells from North Korea's 11,000 artillery tubes,
which can lay waste to Seoul, a capital city of 11 million. North Korea is also a
rogue nuclear power, and a single nuclear-tipped missile probably could achieve
the same result.
SK/N228.12) Bill Powell, TIME INTERNATIONAL (Asia Edition), June
7, 2010, p. 15. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
simple fact is that while the North's ground forces are no match for those of South
Korea or the U.S., Pyongyang has an armory of long-range missiles and artillery
that could easily target the South's largest population centers to cataclysmic effect.
5. THOUSANDS WOULD DIE IN SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN
SK/N228.13) William J. Taylor [senior advisor for international security
affairs, Center for Strategic & International Studies], WORLD AND I, June 2000,
p. 30, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A second
fundamental on the Korean peninsula is that, although North Korea would quickly
lose a conventional air-ground-sea war against the U.S.-South Korean Combined
Forces Command, such a war would quickly escalate with the DPRK use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The North's well-documented, vast arsenal
of around 5,000 tons of chemical and at least 10 kinds of biological weapons (plus,
perhaps, a few nuclear devices) would be delivered against South Korea (ROK)
by long- range artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and short-to-mid-range tactical
missiles. WMD would be delivered against Japan by much longer-range Nodong
and Taepodong missiles. The stark fact of life is that there is no effective missile
defense against North Korean weapons in either South Korea or Japan. Hundreds
of thousands among our allies would die, and there are 83,000 U.S. military
personnel, businesspeople, and dependents in South Korea and over 100,000 in
Japan.
B. REDUCING U.S. PRESENCE INCREASES RISK OF AGGRESSION
SK/N228.14) Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 1, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. Surprised at how easily a South Korean warship was sunk
by what an international investigation concluded was a North Korean torpedo
fired from a midget submarine, senior U.S. officials say they are planning a longterm program to plug major gaps in the South's naval defenses. They said the
sinking revealed that years of spending and training had still left the country
vulnerable to surprise attack.
SK/N228.15) Jung Sung-ki, THE KOREA TIMES, September 9, 2009,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The United States is
bracing for a possible nuclear war with North Korea, as well as the regime's
possible sudden collapse, according to a Washington-based think tank. In the
analysis of an upcoming Defense Department review, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) said a government team is examining various
scenarios, including "regime collapse in North Korea." The report, dated Aug. 27,
also suggested that Washington may consider plans to deal with a potential
confrontation with the North that involves a nuclear strike.
SK/N229. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: Solvency/Disad
Solvency: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ELMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SK/N229.01) Richard J. Harknett [Professor, U. of Cincinnati], THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, April 9, 2009, p. 9, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. We must remember that the knowledge and
the physics of nuclear weapons are established; we cannot eliminate that.
SK/N229.02) John Mueller [Professor of Political Science, Ohio State U.],
FOREIGN POLICY, January-February 2010, p. 38, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. But all nukes are not likely to vanish
entirely, no matter the method. Humanity invented these weapons, and there will
still be nuclear metaphysicians around, spinning dark, improbable, and spooky
theoretical scenarios to justify their existence.
Disad: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT INCREASES RISK OF WAR
A. U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETER AGGRESSION
SK/N229.03) John R. Bolton [former U.S. Ambassador to U.N.], THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, April 28, 2010, p. B4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. There was never any doubt that a Soviet attack through the
Fulda Gap into Western Europe would have swept through NATO forces,
possibly all the way to the English Channel. Thus, the threat of U.S. nuclear
retaliation against such an attack - an unambiguous case of a U.S. first use of
nuclear weapons - was precisely what was needed to keep Soviet forces on their
side of the Iron Curtain.
B. A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD WOULD BE TOO DANGEROUS
SK/N229.04) Richard J. Harknett [Professor, U. of Cincinnati], THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, April 9, 2009, p. 9, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. However, Mr. Obama also announced that the
US must "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." This
is a goal that will undermine global nuclear security. It may seem counterintuitive, but a successful policy on international nuclear weapons security must
strive to support stable possession and effective stewardship of nuclear
technology. Only by stabilizing nuclear capabilities, not by eliminating them, will
the world be safe from the threat of nuclear weapon use.
SK/N229.05) Richard J. Harknett [Professor, U. of Cincinnati], THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, April 9, 2009, p. 9, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The only time in history atomic weapons were
used in warfare was when only one country possessed them in very small
numbers. Stability since then through deterrence has rested on assured mutual
destruction. A world with no nuclear weapons creates an unstable environment in
which the first country to redeploy even one gains an extraordinary advantage.
SK/N229.06) Richard J. Harknett [Professor, U. of Cincinnati], THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, April 9, 2009, p. 9, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In a future crisis, even if no country has
secretly maintained an arsenal, the rush to redevelop a weapon would be intense
and the war that would break out to preempt that capacity from happening could
escalate rapidly. In 2003, in Iraq, we saw the mistakes that can be made in
engaging in preventive war.
SK/N230. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Solvency
1. U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS ARE A DISMAL FAILURE
SK/N230.01) Julian Borger [Diplomatic editor], THE GUARDIAN
(London, England), May 3, 2010, p. 18, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. Israel, India and Pakistan, which all have nuclear arsenals, remain
outside the treaty. North Korea withdrew seven years ago and has since been
building its own bombs. Iran is widely suspected of cheating, and the five nuclear
powers recognised under the pact - the US, Russia, UK, France and China - are
under fire for what non-weapons states see as hypocrisy and the slow pace of
disarmament.
SK/N230.02) Eli Lake, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 3, 2010, p.
A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. As an undeclared
nuclear power, the Israeli government does not confirm that it has nuclear
weapons. It is illegal in Israel for newspapers to print that the country has nuclear
arms. For 40 years, the United States has been a partner in Israel's nuclear opacity
as well. In a deal fashioned in 1969 between President Nixon and Israeli Prime
Minister Golda Meir, the United States does not pressure Israel to join the treaty,
which would require the Jewish state to give up its nuclear weapons. Israel, in
turn, does not acknowledge it has the weapons.
2. NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS MORE DEADLY THAN NUKES
SK/N230.03) John Mueller, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, January 10, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. But our track record with aggressive
counterproliferation policies should give pause to anyone advocating such an
approach. The sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s, and the continuing war
there, are responsible for more deaths than were inflicted by the bombs dropped
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
SK/N230.04) John Mueller [Professor of Political Science, Ohio State U.],
FOREIGN POLICY, January-February 2010, p. 38, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The anti-proliferation sanctions
imposed on Iraq in the 1990s probably led to more deaths than the bombs dropped
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the same can be said for the ongoing war in Iraq,
sold as an effort to root out Saddam Hussein's nukes. There is nothing inherently
wrong with making nonproliferation a high priority, so long as it is topped with a
somewhat higher one: avoiding policies that can lead to the deaths of tens or
hundreds of thousands of people under the obsessive sway of worst-case-scenario
fantasies.
SK/N231. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Disad
A. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE VITAL TO NONPROLIFERATION
1. U.S. ALLIES IN ASIA DEPEND ON U.S. DETERRENCE
SK/N231.01) Michael Ruhle [Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit, NATO],
THE WORLD TODAY, March 2010, p. 8. Today, more than thirty nations rely
on extended US deterrence, including the members of NATO, South Korea and
Japan.
2. U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA DETERS PROLIFERATION
SK/N231.02) Michael Ruhle [Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit, NATO],
THE WORLD TODAY, March 2010, p. 8. While Japan never actively sought
nuclear weapons, most experts agree that Taiwan and South Korea once tried.
Taipei and Seoul had both been laying the groundwork for a national nuclear
option to hedge against a worsening regional security situation. It was only after
the US intervened politically that the programmes were terminated. For the tirne
being, at least, the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region bridles nuclear
ambitions and spares Southeast Asia a nuclear arms race.
SK/N231.03) David J. Trachtenberg [National Security Research Inc.],
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2005, p. 155, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. John Deutch correctly notes the potential utility of
nuclear weapons as a deterrent to a more militant China or a revanchist Russia.
He is also correct to point out that the U.S. nuclear umbrella has aided
nonproliferation by limiting the "nuclear ambitions of other countries." Moreover,
he accurately states that "the possession of [nuclear] weapons by current nuclear
powers does not directly influence the ambitions of states or terrorist groups that
already want their own.”
SK/N231.04) Michael Ruhle [Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit, NATO],
THE WORLD TODAY, March 2010, p. 8. In addition, several other states
without formal defence agreements, like Australia and Taiwan, are also believed
to be beneficiaries of the umbrella. These extended commitments have become a
major nonproliferation tool. American protection satisfies the security interests of
allies and thus dampens any temptation to develop nuclear weapons of their own.
Current developments in Asia and the Middle East demonstrate that the
significance of extended deterrence has not changed. With Iran and North Korea
challenging the political and military status quo in their respective regions, US
security guarantees are crucial to nuclear nonproliferation.
SK/N231.05) Michael Ruhle [Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit, NATO],
THE WORLD TODAY, March 2010, p. 8. All these developments bring home
what many disarmament enthusiasts dare not admit: the nonproliferation
successes of the past forty years were not just a result of the nonproliferation
Treaty or arms control, but also of extended US deterrence.
3. U.S. COMMITMENTS VITAL TO NONPROLIFERATION
SK/N231.06) Editorial, JAPAN TIMES, April 16, 2010, pNA, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The credibility of the U.S.
commitment to its allies' defense is essential if those nations' nuclear ambitions
are to be capped. It would be tragic if U.S. attempts to reduce its nuclear arsenal
spurred other nations to develop or acquire their own.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL PRODUCES PROLIFERATION NIGHTMARE
1. U.S. WITHDRAWAL PRECIPITATES ARMS RACES
SK/N231.07) Gerard Alexander [U. of Virginia], POLITICAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY, Spring 2010, p. 146. Consider two major assumptions on which
Preble relies. The first is that unipolarity is making war more likely and hence
involvement in wars more likely for America. Preble says that U.S. military
preponderance leads many other states to rely on the U.S. to provide, implicitly or
explicitly, important portions of their defense. He proposes that limiting U.S.
capabilities and commitments will inspire these states to increase their own
defense spending, leading to (as he hopes) a multi- rather than unipolar world (p.
137) But are we sure this would be beneficial, as opposed to reignited rivalries,
arms races, and security dilemmas instead making wars more likely? Advocating
multipolarity requires confronting theorizing by William Wohlforth and others on
the benefits of unipolarity (and for that matter the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance associated with Paul Wolfowitz) and systematic evidence concerning
historical patterns of inter-state rivalry and conflict.
2. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WILL SKYROCKET
SK/N231.08) Michael Ruhle [Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit, NATO],
THE WORLD TODAY, March 2010, p. 8. While some arms controllers are quick
to dismiss extended deterrence as a relic of the past and an obstacle to deep
reductions of the US nuclear posture, a closer look reveals that the nuclear
umbrella is still a cornerstone of a predictable international order. Without it,
emergence of new nuclear nations would be a foregone conclusion.
SK/N231.09) Michael Ruhle [Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit, NATO],
THE WORLD TODAY, March 2010, p. 8. If the US were to reduce or even end
its role as a nuclear protector, this could result in the largest wave of proliferation
since the dawn of the nuclear era.
SK/N231.10) John R. Bolton [former U.S. Ambassador to U.N.], THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, April 28, 2010, p. B4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. U.S. decline leaves the allies feeling increasingly on their
own, uncertain about Washington's commitment and steadfastness and facing
difficult decisions about how to guarantee their own security. Ironically, therefore,
it is America's friends that might increase nuclear proliferation, not just their
mortal foes.
SK/N231.11) John R. Bolton [former U.S. Ambassador to U.N.], THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, April 28, 2010, p. B4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. Bad as Obama policies are for America, they are equally
dangerous for friends who have relied for decades on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as
a foundation of their own national security strategies. As Washington's
capabilities decline and as it narrows the circumstances when it will use nuclear
weapons, allies are asking hard questions about whether the U.S. nuclear umbrella
will continue to provide the protection it has previously.
SK/N231.12) THE ECONOMIST (US), April 10, 2010, p. 41(US), GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. He [President Obama] did
not, as some inside and outside his administration wanted, declare that America
would never be the first to use its nuclear weapons. That would have unsettled
allies in exposed places who still rely for their safety on America's nuclear
umbrella.
3. PROLIFERATION IS #1 THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY
SK/N231.13) Jon Meacham, NEWSWEEK, October 12, 2009, p. 5,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The drama now
playing out with Iran is a chapter in a long story. That story--of the gradually
rising number of members of the nuclear club--is arguably the single most
important national-security question of our time. Nothing else really comes close.
If you doubt this, think about how significant proliferation will appear the day
after a nuclear conflict of any scale, involving either terrorists or nation-states.
SK/N231.14) Jon Meacham, NEWSWEEK, October 12, 2009, p. 5,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The success of
deterrence is dependent on rationality, and the more people with access to nuclear
weapons increases the risk that irrationality will enter the equation. Which is a
polite way of saying that human forces--pride, ambition, fanaticism--will always
confound the most elegant of geopolitical calculations.
SK/N232. OIL SHORTAGE: Disad
A. U.S. ECONOMY DEPENDS ON MIDDLE EAST OIL
1. U.S. ECONOMY IS DEPENDENT ON OIL
SK/N232.01) Bryan Walsh, TIME, May 17, 2010, p. 28, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The U.S. needs energy-lots and lots of energy--and 37.1% of it is currently supplied by oil. As the
population expands and the policy decisions and technological innovations
needed to make the switch to green, renewable energy sources lag, thirst for the
stuff is only going to grow.
SK/N232.02) Bryan Walsh, TIME, May 17, 2010, p. 28, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The 37.1% share of
American energy that is supplied by petroleum dwarfs the 7.3% generated by
renewable sources--and most of that is hydroelectric and biomass, including
ethanol, not wind or solar. (Coal, natural gas and nuclear make up the rest.) It will
take years--perhaps decades--until renewables represent more than a tiny share of
the energy mix, and in the meantime America needs to keep the lights on and the
factories humming. Even if the analysts are underestimating the growth of green
energy by orders of magnitude--not impossible, given their shaky track record--it
doesn't change the essential supremacy of oil.
2. MIDDLE EAST OIL IS VITAL
SK/N232.03) Neha Khanna [Associate Professor of Economis &
Environmental Studies, Binghamton U.] & Duane Chapman [Professor Emeritus
of Applied Economics & Management, Cornell U.], ECONOMIC INQUIRY,
April 2010, p. 434, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Persian Gulf countries together account for 55% of the world's remaining
resources of crude oil (Saudi Arabia alone has 23% of remaining resources) and
they have the lowest extraction costs as well, with an average cost of about $5 per
barrel. The extraordinary value of the oil in the Persian Gulf has historically been
an attraction to western oil companies and governments, including Russia. Three
major wars have occurred in the Gulf region in the past three decades and all
involved the seizure of oil fields.
3. U.S. CAN’T RELY ON GULF OF MEXICO
SK/N232.04) Bryan Walsh, TIME, May 17, 2010, p. 28, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The slick--a morphing
mass of at least 2,000 sq. mi. (5,200 sq km) as of May 3 and changing every day-threatens to kill wildlife and wreck the fishing industry along nearly 1,300 miles
(2,100 km) of coastline. Scientists worry that ocean currents could carry the oil
around the tip of Florida to the beaches of the East Coast. President Obama, not
given to overstatement, called the scene unfolding in the Gulf a "massive and
potentially unprecedented environmental disaster."
B. REDUCED MILITARY PRESENCE THREATENS U.S. ACCESS
1. OIL COMPANIES ARE RETURNING TO IRAQ
SK/N232.05) Stanley Reed, BUSINESS WEEK, November 16, 2009, p.
32, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. This past
summer, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Eni, and others walked away from
bidding on rich Iraqi fields, balking at the tough terms Baghdad was proposing.
Now they're back--getting roughly the same deal that was on the table in June. On
Nov. 2, Eni initialed a contract to boost production in the Zubair field near Basra,
which Eni estimates has 6 billion barrels of reserves. Shell, Exxon, and
ConocoPhillips are also in talks that could help boost Iraq's production to more
than 6 million barrels per day--behind only Saudi Arabia in OPEC.
SK/N232.06) Stanley Reed, BUSINESS WEEK, November 16, 2009, p.
32, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The big oil
companies are reconsidering Iraq because they fear this may be their last
opportunity to get big volumes of crude. And after BP and China National
Petroleum Corp. agreed to Iraq's terms in the wake of the June auctions, the others
realized they were unlikely to get a better deal. Under the BP/CNPC contract,
signed Nov. 3 at a ceremony in Baghdad, the companies are to nearly triple output
at Rumaila, about 30 miles west of Basra.
2. U.S. MILITARY BASES VITAL FOR ACCESS TO OIL
SK/N232.07) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In the late 1980s, with the
"reflagging" operation on behalf of Kuwait, the United States established new
points of access in the Persian Gulf. Today, as is heavily reflected in Defense
Department and Congressional Budget Office publications, overseas bases are
seen in connection with potential struggles over oil resources, not only in and
around the Persian Gulf but in Azerbaijan, Libya, Algeria, Gabon, Angola,
Equatorial Guinea, etc. Economics, then, in the form of access to oil, has crept
back into basing access and global presence.
3. COMPETITION FOR OIL RISKS SQUEEZING OUT U.S.
SK/N232.08) Robert E. Harkavy [Professor of Political Science, Penn
State U.], NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Summer 2005, p. 13, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Most importantly, maybe,
the supply-demand equation for oil also looms large, what with enormously
increased demand by China, India (with a projected population of 1.6 billion), and
other Asian countries. China is now getting oil in large quantities from Saudi
Arabia, Oman, Angola, Iran, Russia, Sudan, Yemen, Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
and Indonesia. It is looking for additional sources in Chad, Canada and Peru,
among other places.
SK/N233. PAKISTAN: Terrorism Disad
A. INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN EMANATES FROM PAKISTAN
SK/N233.01) William L. Hauser [Inter-University Seminar on Armed
Forces & Society] & Jerome Slater [Professor Emeritus of Political Science, State
U. of NY at Buffalo], WORLD AFFAIRS, January-February 2010, p. 75, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Now the Taliban and alQaeda have substantially reconstituted their insurgent capabilities, particularly in
southern and eastern Afghanistan and the borderlands of Pakistan, and are
attacking NATO forces from across the Afghan-Pakistani border with increasing
intensity. It would take considerably larger ground plus air forces, along with
naval transport (and, given the exhaustion of our ground arms, a more-thanproportionally larger "rotation base" for sustained operations), to subdue these
enemies, if, in fact, they can be subdued at all. The Obama administration's
reinforcement of more than 30,000 combat troops and advisers, along with any
near-term expansion of the still unreliable Afghan army, will not begin to achieve
the troop-to-population ratio generally acknowledged to be necessary for success
in such a counterinsurgency.
SK/N233.02) Bruce Riedel [Sr. Fellow, Brookings Institution], MIDDLE
EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. The first thing I would stress is that we cannot de-link
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In fact, we cannot de-link Afghanistan from its larger
regional environment. If we are to succeed in Afghanistan--whatever success
means--it must be done within a larger regional environment. We will need to find
ways to encourage all of Afghanistan's neighbors to help in trying to stabilize this
country, and we will need to get other countries to help us to stabilize and solidify
civilian control in Pakistan.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL IS VICTORY FOR TERRORISM
1. WITHDRAWAL WILL DELIVER PAKISTAN TO TERRORISTS
SK/N233.03) John Barry, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL, April 26,
2010, p0, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As the
U.S. army retreated last week from its final outpost in Afghanistan's Korengal
Valley--the short way up to Kabul for insurgents coming over the remote
Pakistani border--American officials tried to frame the move as part of the
administration's new strategy to shift focus away from the frontier and toward
protecting large population centers and main roads. But Pakistan fears the pullout
confirms the U.S. is walking away from a key military agreement. Under the
"hammer and anvil" deal, the two sides agreed to coordinate efforts to prevent
insurgents escaping an offensive on one side of the border from taking sanctuary
on the other. The Pakistani military has spent two years exerting control over its
side of the Korengal border, just to see an estimated 700 Taliban take refuge in
Afghanistan, unchallenged by withdrawing U.S. forces.
SK/N233.04) Analytic, NATIONAL REVIEW, September 21, 2009, p. 4,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. It is important to
keep Afghanistan from again becoming a haven for dangerous extremists, and the
course of the war there will influence the fate of a nuclear-armed Pakistan (if
Pakistan thinks we are going to leave Afghanistan, it will have even more
incentive to cooperate with terrorists who will ultimately threaten it too).
2. U.S.MILITARY AID IS INADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE
SK/N233.05) Steven Metz [Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College], WORLD AFFAIRS, March-April 2010, p. 49, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The U.S. response has
been to expand the capacity of the Pakistani government and military through
assistance, encourage them to end the deliberate or tacit sanctuary for terrorists,
and prod them toward deep economic and political reform (which, theoretically,
could undercut the anger and frustration that give rise to violent extremism-something that decades of aid have failed to do). Such urgings, despite their being
coupled with an open pipeline of cash, have only bought hysterical antiAmericanism, fueled by bizarre conspiracy theories that remain pervasive even
among the educated Pakistani elite.
SK/N233.06) Steven Metz [Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College], WORLD AFFAIRS, March-April 2010, p. 49, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Because it now hosts the
core leadership of al-Qaeda and possesses nuclear weapons, Pakistan has an even
greater say in U.S. strategy than Afghanistan. Yet it is even more dysfunctional, a
country that has been deeply involved in transnational terrorism. But Islamabad
makes little effort to quash violent extremists who do not attack it directly. With
economic expansion lagging behind population growth, a failed educational
system, rising religious parties, a tumultuous and corrupt political system, and a
military with a track record of political intervention fixated on India rather than
on domestic extremism, the Pakistani government plays a game of chicken with
revolution. It exercises little or no control over large swaths of the country, both
the inaccessible hinterlands and parts of its own cities. The security forces have
longstanding ties to the Afghan Taliban, which maintains its headquarters and
support infrastructure in Pakistan.
C. PAKISTANI TERRORISM IS HUGE THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY
1. PAKISTANI TERRORISM THREATENS U.S. HOMELAND
SK/N233.07) Bobby Ghosh, TIME, May 17, 2010, p. 24, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Over the past couple of
years, more plots against U.S. targets have emanated from or had a strong
connection to Pakistan than any other country. Says the counterterrorism official,
who was briefed on the hunt for the Times Square bomber but is not authorized to
speak with the media: "It was totally predictable that the smoking Pathfinder
would lead to someone with Pakistan in his past."
SK/N233.08) Bobby Ghosh, TIME, May 17, 2010, p. 24, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Nor would it come as a
surprise if it were revealed that Faisal Shahzad, who has claimed to investigators
that he was working alone, was in fact linked to an ever lengthening list of
extremist groups operating in Pakistan's northern wilds. These groups, whose
attacks had long been confined to the Indian subcontinent, are now emerging as a
deadly threat to the U.S. and its allies. As the core of al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin
Laden, wilts under the constant pounding from the CIA's Predator drone
campaign, Pakistani groups are mounting operations deep into the West.
SK/N233.09) Bobby Ghosh, TIME, May 17, 2010, p. 24, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Now, security officials
fear, Pakistani jihadis are spreading their operations across the Atlantic, recruiting
U.S. citizens to their cause just as Britons were recruited a decade ago. If that
assessment proves accurate, the Times Square bomb plot could be the first of
more to come.
2. RISK OF NUCLEAR ATTACK IS CHILLING
SK/N233.10) Reuel Marc Gerecht [former CIA specialist on the Middle
East] NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, Winter 2010, p. 64, WILSON
WEB. Arab al-Qaeda never enlisted first-rate--or even second-rate--scientific
talent. Pakistan and India, with vastly better educational establishments than the
Arab world, might just provide what modern holy warriors have so far lacked: the
requisite skill to deploy weapons of mass destruction against the US.
SK/N234. PREVENTIVE WAR: Disad
A. PREVENTIVE WAR IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
1. HISTORICALLY PREVENTIVE WAR IS A FAILURE
SK/N234.01) Andrew J. Bacevich [Professor of History & International
Relations, Boston U.], COMMONWEAL, March 28, 2008, p. 10, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Put simply, preventive
war is wrong and it doesn't work. Never again should the United States wage a
war of aggression. Instead, we should treat force as a last resort, to be used only
after exhausting all other options. We should wage war exclusively for defensive
purposes.
SK/N234.02) Kevin Green [Washington U. School of Law],
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY, Spring 2009,
p. 509, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. For
example, a series of attacks was launched against the nuclear program of Nazi
Germany, though scientific and other error likely would have prevented Germany
from building a nuclear device in the time available. The 1998 missile attacks
against chemical weapons facilities in Sudan also made little difference and the
evidence associating the installation with chemical weapons was quite weak. The
1993 and 1998 cruise missile strikes against Iraqi targets were also aimed at a
dormant weapons of mass destruction program.
SK/N234.03) Kevin Green [Washington U. School of Law],
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY, Spring 2009,
p. 509, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Mitchell's
arguments, while not supporting a constitutional challenge to preventive war,
reveal the implications and policy weaknesses of preventive war. Besides the
potential harm to America and the world that Mitchell describes, others argue that
preventive attacks are also "ineffective, costly, unnecessary, and potentially even
counterproductive." Historically, attacks have been made against targets that were
not likely to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Underlying these episodes is
poor intelligence about a target's weapons program.
2. IRAQ INVASION IS FLAGRANT EXAMPLE OF FAILURE
SK/N234.04) Christopher Preble [Cato Institute], THE CATO JOURNAL,
Fall 2009, p. 594, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
The difficulties that the United States has encountered in Iraq (and to a lesser
extent Afghanistan), however, reveal the problems inherent in presuming a priori
that preventive war will achieve its intended aims and that the gains will not be
dwarfed by unintended consequences.
SK/N234.05) William Pfaff [author of 8 books on U.S. foreign policy],
WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, January-February
2010, p. OV-4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
Americans have started to leave Iraq, having gained nothing except to make Iran
the regional great power, and to create hostility for American oil companies who
wanted but are not getting oilfield development contracts.
3. PREVENTIVE WAR INCREASES TERRORISM
SK/N234.06) Kevin Green [Washington U. School of Law],
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY, Spring 2009,
p. 509, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. This can
happen in four ways: (1) use of force can increase global anti-Americanism,
which may increase the motivation of some individuals to join terrorist groups;
(2) U.S. troops abroad may create targets of opportunity for terrorists; (3)
preventive attacks open the door for insurgency wars, effectively generating
training opportunities for terrorist organizations; and (4) even if regime change
does occur, the state may be overrun by chaos and disorder, allowing terrorists
and rogue elements to seize material useful for producing weapons.
4. DEFENSIVE MEASURES PROTECT NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SK/N234.07) Kevin Green [Washington U. School of Law],
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY, Spring 2009,
p. 509, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Ever since
the Israeli attack against the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981, states with
weapons programs "have been much more aware of the possibility of being the
target of a preventive attack" and have "taken steps to reduce the vulnerability of
their [weapons] programs by hardening facilities, building duplicate facilities, and
keeping the existence and location of facilities secret."
B. PREEMPTIVE ATTACK ON IRAN WOULD BE A DISASTER
SK/N234.08) Mir H. Sadat [School of Intelligence Studies, National
Defense Intelligence College] & James P. Hughes [U.S. Air Force], MIDDLE
EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 31, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. Hard-line options include a range of military actions that are
inadvisable for various geostrategic reasons. Although airstrikes or other limited
attacks against Iranian targets are possible, such attacks may weaken international
support for U.S. pressure on Iran, galvanize the hard-line elements in Iran's
government and society, and destroy the opportunity for any constructive
dialogue with the Iranian government. Karim Sadjadpour points out that bombing
Iran's nuclear facilities is not a "one-off." Even if airstrikes destroy part of Iran's
nuclear production capacity, he explains that this would be only a temporary
setback, providing Iran with greater incentive to harden its facilities and continue
its nuclear pursuits.
SK/N234.09) Mir H. Sadat [School of Intelligence Studies, National
Defense Intelligence College] & James P. Hughes [U.S. Air Force], MIDDLE
EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 31, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. An invasion and occupation of Iran for the purposes of regime
change or other objectives pose a military challenge even greater than the
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran is approximately four times the size of
Iraq with over three times as many inhabitants--half of the Middle East's
population. While Iran's military would be no match for invading U.S forces, it
consists of over 500,000 active-duty troops and possesses a variety of land, sea
and air capabilities. These forces, along with the mountainous terrain in northern
and western Iran, would pose operational challenges. Furthermore, U.S. forces
and the public are not prepared to wage or sustain a war with Iran, much less deal
with the challenges of post-combat stabilization.
C. COSTS OF PREVENTIVE WAR OUTWEIGH BENEFITS
SK/N234.10) Kevin Green [Washington U. School of Law],
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY, Spring 2009,
p. 509, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Furthermore, while there may be long-term benefits to preventive wars in which
regime change is the goal, these engagements come at a large cost. First,
American casualties are unavoidable and military assets are drawn away from
other priorities. Second, preventive wars can reduce the number of people that
volunteer for military service. Third, regime-change operations are expensive and
current estimates state that the Iraq war has cost over $1 trillion. Finally,
preventive wars have the potential to stimulate terrorism, the very thing they are
designed to prevent. Accordingly, because it is unlikely that any potential benefits
would outweigh these risks, engaging in preventive war is not in the best interest
of the United States.
SK/N234.11) Kevin Green [Washington U. School of Law],
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY, Spring 2009,
p. 509, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Preventive
war is not a sound policy because of its short-term and long-term costs combined
with the uncertainty of success.
SK/N235. PRIVATE CONTRACTORS: Ban Disad
A. PRIVATE CONTRACTORS ARE VITAL TO U.S. MILITARY
SK/N235.01) Max Boot [Sr. Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations], THE
VIRGINIAN PILOT, October 10, 2007, p. B11, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. Because so many contractors are pulling guard duty
(estimates range from 20,000 to 50,000), more soldiers and Marines are free for
pacification operations.
SK/N235.02) Max Boot [Sr. Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations], THE
VIRGINIAN PILOT, October 10, 2007, p. B11, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. The answer isn't to demonize the entire private military
industry, at least not unless we want to recruit so many more soldiers that we no
longer have to rely on contractors. It would take about 200,000 more soldiers to
return the Army to its early 1990s size, when there was much less reliance on
contractors.
B. CONTRACTOR BAN WOULD PERPETUATE DEATHS IN SUDAN
1. MILLIONS HAVE DIED IN SUDAN
SK/N235.03) Alex Perry, TIME INTERNATIONAL, April 19, 2010, p.
18, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Sudan is
already one of the least stable countries on earth. This is where Osama bin Laden
lived for five years in the 1990s; where the government has waged, in Darfur,
what the Bush Administration called genocide; where the President, Omar alBashir, is the first head of state to be indicted by the International Criminal Court;
and where 2 million people died in two civil wars between the south and the
northern government in 1955-72 and between 1983 and 2005, conflicts that left
the entire country awash with guns.
SK/N235.04) THE ECONOMIST (US), April 10, 2010, p. 14EU, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The Muslim Arabs in the
north, who have run Sudan since it broke free from Britain in 1956, have little in
common with their blacker-skinned Christian and animist compatriots in the south,
whom they have periodically enslaved over the centuries. During more than four
decades of strife since the British left, at least 2 million southerners have been
killed. More recently the government in Khartoum, under President Omar alBashir, has bludgeoned the disaffected inhabitants of the western region of Darfur
since the start of a rebellion in 2003, killing some 300,000 of them and displacing
another 3 million.
SK/N235.05) Scott Baldauf, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
April 26, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In
1983, a southern group called the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, led by
John Garang, took up arms to replace the northern Arabic-speaking elite with a
more broadly representative and secular government. The war, which claimed 1.5
million lives and displaced millions more, ended only in 2005 with a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Khartoum government and the
SPLM in Juba.
SK/N235.06) Scott Baldauf, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
April 26, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Human rights activists, the US administration of George W. Bush, and the
International Criminal Court chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo have all
called Darfur a "genocide"; but despite the higher death toll in South Sudan, that
conflict is seen as a mere civil war.
2. SOUTH SUDAN INDEPENDENCE THREATENS NEW WAR
SK/N235.07) Nicholas D. Kristof, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 22,
2010, p. A29, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The real
game isn't, in fact, Darfur or the elections but the maneuvering for a possible new
civil war. The last north-south civil war in Sudan ended with a fragile peace in
2005, after some two million deaths. The peace agreement provided for a
referendum, scheduled to take place in January, in which southern Sudanese will
decide whether to secede. They are expected to vote overwhelmingly to form a
separate country. Then the question becomes: will the north allow South Sudan to
separate? The south holds the great majority of the country's oil, and it's difficult
to see President Bashir allowing oil fields to walk away. “If the result of the
referendum is independence, there is going to be war -- complete war,” predicts
Mudawi Ibrahim Adam, one of Sudan's most outspoken human rights advocates.
SK/N235.08) Alex Perry, TIME INTERNATIONAL, April 19, 2010, p.
18, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A new country
born into that environment, which, say, did not have clearly defined borders, or
had weak institutions, or was split internally, could spell disaster. "It could
recreate the conditions for civil war," says Gressly [U.N.'s regional coordinator
for southern Sudan]. Major General Scott Gration, U.S. special envoy to Sudan,
describes his task as ensuring "civil divorce, not civil war," and warns, "This
place could go down in flames tomorrow. The probability of failure is great." And
that's just the south. Secession there is likely to encourage other Sudanese
independence fighters, like those in Darfur, or in the east of the country, or in the
central-southern states of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile.
SK/N235.09) Reuters, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 26, 2010, p. A7,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Clashes between soldiers
in southern Sudan and Arab tribes in Darfur killed 58 people, raising tensions
along the border with the north of the country, officials said Sunday. Muhammad
Eissa Aliu, a leader of the Arab Rizeigat tribe in South Darfur, said his tribe
fought with the south's Sudan People's Liberation Army.
3. POLICING NORTH-SOUTH BORDER WILL BE HUGE TASK
SK/N235.10) THE ECONOMIST (US), April 10, 2010, p. 14EU, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. It is hard to find many
good things to say about Mr Bashir; but he has to be commended, so far, for
seeming to accept his country's likely break-up, albeit that he will keep the best
oil-bearing bits on his side of the proposed border between north and south. The
UN and other outsiders have managed against the odds to get both sides to agree,
more or less, to a new line. Policing it after independence will be a huge task.
4. PRIVATE CONTRACTORS COULD PREVENT THE KILLING
SK/N235.11) Steve Forbes, FORBES GLOBAL, December 10, 2007, p.
15, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. There's a
simple way to bring about a quick end to the Sudanese government's genocide
campaign: Contract a security firm such as Blackwater to send in several hundred
of its people to get the job done. The folks who work with Blackwater are welltrained and well-screened, and many are military veterans, often from elite units
such as the U.S. Army Special Forces and the Navy Seals. They could provide
working communications equipment to Darfur's villages so that in the event of an
attack word could get to peacekeepers quickly. A Blackwater-like operation
would have a number of attack helicopters in the area that could respond
immediately. In addition, these operatives could give the African peacekeepers
some quick training, as well as bring in proper equipment for them. Then a
relative handful of these peacekeepers could make short shrift of the militias. And
if they failed to, the Blackwater-like operatives could.
SK/N235.12) Christopher Spearin [Associate Professor of Defence Studies,
Royal Military College of Canada], INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Autumn
2009, p. 1095, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In
light of the inability or undesirability of further using state militaries, one
proposal has been to seek a nonstate solution to the crisis by relying upon the
international private security industry. The logic is that higher calibre, better
organized, and more effective forces can be taken from the private sector. In
particular, proponents such as Max Boot of the influential Council on Foreign
Relations and Steve Forbes, the editor of Forbes and a past seeker of the US
presidency, look back to the 1990S and cite the activities of Executive Outcomes,
a now defunct South African-based firm, as conclusive proof that private security
companies could play a catalytic role in bringing peace and stability to Darfur.
SK/N235.13) Christopher Spearin [Associate Professor of Defence Studies,
Royal Military College of Canada], INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Autumn
2009, p. 1095, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
seeming attraction of the Executive Outcomes example is that in its operations in
Sierra Leone from 1995 to 1997, it brought to heel the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF), an organization with murderous intentions similar to those of the
Janjaweed, given its penchant for terrorizing civilians with amputations and
summary executions. As well, from 1993 to 1995, Executive Outcomes, through
its contract with the Angolan government, was instrumental in bringing the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to the negotiating
table, which resulted in the subsequent creation of the Lusaka protocol. What is
more, in both cases Executive Outcomes was willing to do what the United
Nations could not--"take sides, take casualties, deploy overwhelming force and
fire pre-emptively."
SK/N236. RUSSIA: Aggression Disad
A. RUSSIA IS A MILITARY THEAT TO WORLD SECURITY
1. RUSSIA IS PURSUING AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN POLICY
SK/N236.01) Ilan Berman [President, American Foreign Policy Council],
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, February 1, 2010, p. B1, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. None of this means that the United States no
longer has to worry about Russia. Quite the contrary. The Kremlin's neo-imperial
foreign policy, its persistent designs over Eurasian energy and its ongoing efforts
to oust Western influence from the post-Soviet space are all guaranteed to
preoccupy policymakers in Washington in the years ahead.
SK/N236.02) Editorial, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 16, 2008 p.
A18, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. After criticizing Mr.
Clinton for placing too much faith in Boris Yeltsin, Mr. Bush has placed far too
much faith in Vladimir Putin. Mr. Bush and the Europeans have willfully looked
the other way as Mr. Putin, the president-turned-prime minister, throttled a free
press, jailed political rivals and used Russia's oil and gas riches to blackmail
neighbors.
2. RUSSIA THREATENS MISSILES ON EUROPEAN BORDER
SK/N236.03) Stephen Castle, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 14,
2008, p. A8, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Russia's
threat to station missiles along its border with Europe drew strong criticism from
senior United States and European officials Thursday, as they prepared to
confront President Dmitri A. Medvedev on the matter before heading together to
Washington to discuss reforming the world financial system. In an interview, the
president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, strongly criticized
Moscow's threat to put missiles in the enclave of Kaliningrad, which shares a
border with Poland and Lithuania, and he warned that “cold war rhetoric” over the
issue was “stupid.”
3. INVASION OF GEORGIA TYPIFIES RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
SK/N236.04) THE BOSTON HERALD, August 31, 2008, p. 20, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Russian troops rolled over
Georgian troops because they knew they could. Georgia has no modern weapons
and a very small military establishment.
SK/N236.05) James Blitz, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, September 23,
2008, p. 5, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The Russian
military's recent incursion into Georgia means that many more west Europeans
now regard Russia as a greater threat to global stability than states such as Iran,
Iraq and North Korea, according to a survey for the Financial Times.
SK/N236.06) Editorial, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 16, 2008 p.
A18, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Russia's brazen
invasion of Georgia has raised a host of chilling questions that Americans and
many others around the world had hoped were long settled. Is Russia a threat -- to
its neighbors, to Europe, to the United States? What are the United States and its
NATO allies prepared to do if Russia blackmails or attacks another sovereign
democratic nation that is not a member of the alliance? Should the West continue
to engage Russia or focus more on containing its ambitions?
SK/N236.07) Bill Powell, FORTUNE, September 15, 2008, p. 80, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. No wonder European
lawmakers were frantic to ink a cease-fire between Russia and Georgia: Russia's
bombers came within yards--purposefully, or was their aim bad?--of blowing up a
critical oil pipeline that brings Central Asian crude across Georgia and eventually
to Europe.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ASIA INCREASES RUSSIAN THREAT
1. RUSSIA WANTS HEGEMONY OVER CENTRAL ASIA
SK/N236.08) Scott G. Frickenstein [Jt. Staff, U.S. Air Force], AIR &
SPACE POWER JOURNAL, Spring 2010, p. 67, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Under Putin, Russia demonstrated its
"ultimate intention" for the Central Asian nations--namely, to "limit [their]
sovereignty ... and expand control over their foreign policies." Medvedev's FPC
and recent actions in Central Asia confirm both Russia's hegemonic aspirations
and its intense focus on security and energy interests.
SK/N236.09) Clifford J. Levy, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
July 28, 2009, p. 3, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Central Asia is Moscow's former territory and current backyard, and the Kremlin
evinces a sense of entitlement here, not to mention a desire to dominate natural
resources. Russia's role in the former Soviet republics has been a constant source
of friction between the two sides. Just last week, Vice President Joseph R. Biden
Jr. visited Ukraine and Georgia and rebuked Russia for its "19th-century notion of
spheres of influence."
SK/N236.10) Scott G. Frickenstein [Jt. Staff, U.S. Air Force], AIR &
SPACE POWER JOURNAL, Spring 2010, p. 67, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Recent developments indeed confirm
Russia's reassertion of a "zone of influence" in this portion of the former Soviet
Union [Central Asia]. Andrei Serenko, cofounder of a Russian think tank focused
on Afghanistan, confirms that "Russia wants to be the only master of the Central
Asian domain" and "to the maximum extent possible [will] ... mak[e] things
difficult for the U.S.--in making the transfer of American forces into Afghanistan
be dependent on the will of the Kremlin."
2. RUSSIA WANTS U.S. MIILTARY OUT OF KYRGYZSTAN
SK/N236.11) Scott G. Frickenstein [Jt. Staff, U.S. Air Force], AIR &
SPACE POWER JOURNAL, Spring 2010, p. 67, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In light of Russia's statements in
support of the Afghanistan mission (such as those found in the FPC and
elsewhere) and the realization that Russia is a primary beneficiary, US policy
makers are frustrated by Russian efforts to impede US- and NATO-led efforts.
Following Russia's undisguised involvement in convincing the Kyrgyz to evict
the United States from Manas Air Base, parliamentarian and Putin loyalist Igor
Barinov acknowledged that the Kremlin "shares many goals with Washington"
but expressed both bitterness over "the attitude that NATO takes" and regret that
little "attention had been paid toward Russia's opinion."
SK/N236.12) Clifford J. Levy, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
July 28, 2009, p. 3, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The
U.S. installation on the outskirts of the Kyrgyz capital is crowded with C-17 cargo
planes and KC-135 tanker planes that readily reach the Afghan skies for midair
refueling of fighters. As many as 30,000 military personnel cycle through the base
monthly. Those troops and planes have stirred deep unease in the Kremlin, which
tried to persuade Mr. Bakiyev to oust the Americans, in the end unsuccessfully.
SK/N236.13) Clifford J. Levy, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
July 28, 2009, p. 3, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In
recent months, Kyrgyz military bases have been the point of contention,
especially the American one on the outskirts of the capital, which was established
in December 2001 after the U.S. incursion into Afghanistan. The Russians have
regularly insinuated nefarious doings at the base, which is at Manas International
Airport; the state-controlled news media in Russia have broadcast rumors that the
base is a hub for smuggling heroin, prostitutes, babies and even body parts. "The
main thing is to instill fear in occupied territory," said the narrator in a recent
documentary on Russian television that insisted that the base was a massive
espionage complex.
3. KYRGYZSTAN IS ON BRINK OF CIVIL WAR
SK/N236.14) Andrew E. Kramer, THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 20,
2010, p. A10, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. A deadly
ethnic riot broke out Wednesday in a major southern city in Kyrgyzstan, where
the country's interim government has only tenuous control and where the police
have largely stopped working rather than take sides in a political conflict. Since
the overthrow last month of the former president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, people in
the turbulent and ethnically divided south have been arming themselves with
everything from sharpened sticks to military rifles. Late last week, two people
died and scores were wounded in street fighting.
SK/N236.15) Isabel Gorst, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, May 15, 2010, p. 2,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Security forces in
Kyrgyzstan moved to restore order in the volatile south yesterday after clashes
between supporters and opponents of the new interim government. Supporters of
Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the deposed president, seized local government buildings
and airports in three cities in south Kyrgyzstan on Thursday, raising fears that
civil war would erupt.
4. KYRGYZSTAN IS VULNERABLE TO RUSSIAN TAKEOVER
SK/N236.16) Kathleen Collins [Associate Professor of Political Science,
U. of Minnesota], THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 3, 2010, pNA,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Russia, meanwhile, has
long wanted the US evicted and is now offering economic incentives and
peacekeeping forces to encourage the fragile provisional government to end the
US contract. Given Kyrgyzstan's political instability and dire economic conditions,
and the absence of substantial American political or economic assistance,
Otunbayeva may be forced into Russia's arms. Consequences for US strategic
interests would be grim.
5. LOSS OF MILITARY BASES CRIPPLES AFGHAN MISSION
SK/N236.17) Clifford J. Levy, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
July 28, 2009, p. 3, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the world that hosts separate military bases for
the United States and Russia, and both major powers are bent on sustaining or
deepening their presence. That in part explains why neither has publicly
condemned the heavy-handed tactics of the Kyrgyz president, Kurmanbek
Bakiyev, who easily won another term last week in an election that his opponents
said was rigged. The United States believes that it must have a sizable military
base in Central Asia to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan, especially now
that supply routes through Pakistan are perilous.
SK/N236.18) Kathleen Collins [Associate Professor of Political Science,
U. of Minnesota], THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 3, 2010, pNA,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Protesters toppled the
corrupt, clannish, and repressive government of Kyrgyzstan's President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev on April 7. And now he's been charged with mass murder.
The new provisional government, headed by Roza Otunbayeva, promises a
democratic constitution this June and free elections in October, but is tenuously in
control. The revolution presents the US with a unique opportunity to promote
democracy, stability, and economic reform in a predominantly Muslim country,
while also preserving a US base critical to the Afghan war.
SK/N237. SOUTH KOREA: Loss of Deterrence Disad
A. U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IS VITAL TO SOUTH KOREA
1. U.S. TROOPS PRESERVE STABILITY IN EAST ASIA
SK/N237.01) Andrew Bacevich [Professor of International Relations &
History, Boston U.], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Winter 2010, p.
70, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. For example,
the US presence in the Asia-Pacific area probably contributes to the stability of
that region, so I would not be in favor of suddenly pulling US troops out of Japan
and Korea. In contrast, I would argue that the US troops that are present in
Western Europe are completely redundant. Western Europe faces a minimal
external security threat, Europeans are rich and solidly democratic, and we should
call upon them to provide for their own security. We should bring US forces
home from Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, and so on.
SK/N237.02) Leslie Sorley, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, March
2006, p. 32, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
American forces remained in Europe and Korea for decades after the conclusion
of those wars. Our people accepted that it was beyond the capability of our allies
in the region to defend themselves against threats from the Soviet Union without
our help, and they were willing to make sacrifices to maintain U.S. security and
international peace. The verdict of history is that it remains very much in our
interest to commit forces to preserve freedom and stability in parts of the world
where we have expended blood and treasure to quell aggression.
2. U.S. TROOPS DETER NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION
SK/N237.03) Jung Sung-ki, THE KOREA TIMES, April 29, 2009, pNA,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. About 28,500 U.S. troops
are stationed here as a deterrent against Stalinist North Korea, which is seeking to
become a nuclear power.
SK/N237.04) Eli Lake, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 29, 2009, p.
A13, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. U.S. military bases
in South Korea have been put on high alert for the second time in three years as a
precaution after North Korea announced Wednesday that it was withdrawing from
the 1953 armistice that ended the fighting in the Korean War. U.S. forces have
served in some ways as a tripwire between the North and the South since the end
of that conflict.
3. U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA PROTECTS SOUTH KOREA
SK/N237.05) Lee Tae-hoon, THE KOREA TIMES, October 22, 2009,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. U.S. Defense
Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday that Washington will continue to provide
its nuclear deterrent to South Korea. "The United States will continue to provide
extended deterrence using the full range of military capabilities including the
nuclear umbrella to ensure the security of the Republic of Korea (ROK)," Gates
said during annual security talks between the two allies in Yongsan, Seoul.
SK/N237.06) Jung Sung-ki, THE KOREA TIMES, June 17, 2009, pNA,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. U.S. President Barack
Obama reaffirmed Tuesday that Washington would provide an extended nuclear
umbrella to South Korea in response to increasing nuclear threats from North
Korea. In a summit at the White House, President Lee Myung-bak and Obama
adopted "the joint vision for the ROK-US alliance," which calls for building a
broader, "21st century strategic" partnership in the realms of politics, the
economy, culture and other areas beyond the security arena.
SK/N237.07) Jung Sung-ki, THE KOREA TIMES, June 17, 2009, pNA,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Under the extended
nuclear deterrence pledge, the U.S. military would use some of its tactical nuclear
weapons, such as B-61 nuclear bombs carried by B-2/52 bombers and F-15E, F16 and F/A-18 fighters, as well as Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from
nuclear-powered submarines, to strike North Korea's nuclear facilities in
retaliation for any such attack on the South, military sources here said.
B. U.S. WITHDRAWAL LEAVES SOUTH KOREA VULNERABLE
1. DETERRENCE IS DESTROYED WITHOUT U.S. TROOPS
SK/N237.08) Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, June 1, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. In an interview last week, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the joint training exercise with South Korea
planned just off the country's coast in the next few weeks represented only the
"near-term piece" of a larger strategy to prevent a recurrence of the kind of shock
the South experienced as it watched one of its ships sunk without warning.
2. SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY COULD NOT GO IT ALONE
SK/N237.09) David A. Fulghum & Bradley Perrett, AVIATION WEEK
& SPACE TECHNOLOGY, August 10, 2009, p. 60. "It would be hard to find
anyone who thinks the [South Korean air force] could go it alone in an all-out
war," says a U.S. intelligence official based in Washington. "They simply don't
have the aircraft systems--particularly precision-guided munitions and
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance--that allow you to operate close to
ground forces without high risk of fratricide. And they haven't accepted the notion
that the linear battlefield is obsolete.”
3. SOUTH KOREA NEEDS GREATER MISSILE DEFENSE
SK/N237.10) Ilan Berman [Vice-President, American Foreign Policy
Council], THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 2, 2010, p. B1, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Western strategy, then, would be much better
served by assuming that the North's nukes cannot simply be negotiated away.
Instead, they need to be contained and deterred. This means greater investments in
steps that could help blunt North Korea's nuclear menace to its neighbors,
including the provision of additional missile defenses to regional allies like South
Korea and Japan.
SK/N238. SOUTH KOREA: Loss of Bases Disads
1. WITHDRAWAL DESTROYS U.S. LEVERAGE IN EAST ASIA
SK/N238.01) Joseph Gerson [American Friends Service Committee], in
THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S.
MILITARY POSTS, edited by Catherine Lutz, 2009, p. 63. While the primary
role of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea will continue to be to help ensure that
North Korea is not tempted to take reckless military actions, their presence and
the ability to threaten their complete withdrawal will be used to influence South
Korean foreign and domestic policies. Despite objections raised by former
president Roh Moo Hyun, U.S. troops deployed in South Korea can be used
during confrontations and possible conflicts with China and elsewhere in East
Asia.
2. WITHDRAWAL WOULD IMPAIR CONTAINMENT OF CHINA
SK/N238.02) Joseph Gerson [American Friends Service Committee], in
THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S.
MILITARY POSTS, edited by Catherine Lutz, 2009, p. 55. U.S. bases in Korea,
Japan, Guam, Australia, and in Central Asia, augmented by access agreements
with the Philippines and Singapore, and the emerging U.S. alliance with India, are
all designed to contain China.
3. WITHDRAWAL WOULD IMPAIR U.S. COMBAT IN MIDDLE EAST
SK/N238.03) Catherine Lutz [Professor of Anthropology, Brown U.],
THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S.
MILITARY POSTS, 2009, pp. 18-19. Where bases in Korea, for example, were
once meant to defend South Korea from attack from the north, they are now, like
bases everywhere, meant to project power in any number of directions and serve
as stepping stones to battles far from themselves.
SK/N237.0264) Joseph Gerson [American Friends Service Committee], in
THE BASES OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S.
MILITARY POSTS, edited by Catherine Lutz, 2009, p. 63. And, as in the case of
their being dispatched to invade and occupy Iraq, U.S. South Korean-based forces
are to be available for interventions as far afield as the Persian Gulf.
SK/N239. TAIWAN: Chinese Attack Disad
A. CHINESE ATTACK ON TAIWAN IS A SERIOUS RISK
1. CHINA SEES TAIWAN AS A MILITARY THREAT
SK/N239.01) Bruce Gilley [Asst. Professor of Political Science, Portland
State U.], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January-February 2010, p. 44, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Taiwan, however, by
virtue of its geographic location, represents a potential strategic threat to China. It
could serve as a base for foreign military operations against China and even in
peacetime could constrain Beijing's ability to develop and project naval power
and ensure maritime security in East Asia.
SK/N239.02) Bruce Gilley [Asst. Professor of Political Science, Portland
State U.], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January-February 2010, p. 44, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Beijing's core goal from
this perspective is the preservation of its dominance in its immediate offshore
region, as became clear in 2009 when five Chinese vessels trailed a U.S. Navy
ship sailing near a Chinese submarine base. Taiwan represents an obstacle to this
goal if it remains a U.S. strategic ally armed with advanced U.S. weaponry, but
not if it becomes a self-defending and neutral state with close economic and
political ties to China.
2. MISCALCULATION COULD LEAD TO WAR
SK/N239.03) Harlan W. Jencks [U. of California, Berkeley], PACIFIC
AFFAIRS, Winter 2006, p. 679, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. Maochun Yu writes that Chinese leaders are increasingly
concerned with global issues beyond Taiwan. Yet no leader dares appear less
hard-nosed than the others about Taiwan--even though they all recognize that war
would be horribly costly. Yu and others, notably Steve Tsang in his introductory
essay, recognize that emotion, internal politics and misjudgment could lead to the
war nobody wants. Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian has pushed the political
envelope dangerously, while the KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan has refused to
allocate funds for the unprecedented arms package offered by the US in 2001.
B. WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST ASIA ENDANGERS U.S. SECURITY
1. U.S. MILITARY SALES ARE VITAL TO TAIWAN
SK/N239.04) Robert D. Kaplan [Sr. Fellow, Center for a New American
Security], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The Obama administration's
announcement, in early 2010, that it would sell $6.4 billion worth of weapons to
Taiwan is thus vital to the United States' position vis-a-vis China, and in Eurasia
overall.
2. WITHDRAWAL DESTROYS ABILITY TO DEFEND TAIWAN
SK/N239.05) Robert D. Kaplan [Sr. Fellow, Center for a New American
Security], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. China is just 100 miles away from
Taiwan, whereas the United States must project military power from half a world
away and with more limited access to foreign bases than it had during the Cold
War. China's strategy to deny the U.S. Navy entry into certain waters is designed
not only to keep U.S. forces away generally but also, specifically, to foster its
dominance over Taiwan.
SK/N239.06) Robert D. Kaplan [Sr. Fellow, Center for a New American
Security], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. According to a 2009 RAND study, by
the year 2020, the United States will no longer be able to defend Taiwan from a
Chinese attack. The Chinese, argues the report, will by that time be able to defeat
the United States in a war in the Taiwan Strait even if the United States has F-22s,
two carrier strike groups, and continued access to the Kadena Air Base, in
Okinawa, Japan. The report emphasizes the air battle. The Chinese would still
have to land tens of thousands of troops by sea and would be susceptible to U.S.
submarines. Yet the report, with all its caveats, does highlight a disturbing trend.
3. LOSS OF TAIWAN WOULD ENDANGER U.S. SECURITY
SK/N239.07) Bruce Gilley [Asst. Professor of Political Science, Portland
State U.], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January-February 2010, p. 44, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Taiwan has played a
strategic role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s--first it served as a buffer
against communist expansion out of North Korea, and more recently it has been a
bulwark against a rising China. It is strategically located along East Asian
shipping lanes and could provide another naval resupply site if China continues to
limit U.S. naval visits to Hong Kong.
SK/N239.08) Robert D. Kaplan [Sr. Fellow, Center for a New American
Security], FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As U.S. General Douglas MacArthur
put it, Taiwan is an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" midway up China's seaboard.
From there, say the naval strategists Holmes and Yoshihara, an outside power
such as the United States can "radiate" power along China's coastal periphery. If
Taiwan returned to the bosom of mainland China, the Chinese navy not only
would suddenly be in an advantageous strategic position vis-a-vis the first island
chain but also would be freed up to project power beyond it to an unprecedented
degree. The adjective "multipolar" is thrown around liberally to describe the next
world order; only the fusing of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland would mark
the real emergence of a multipolar military order in East Asia.
SK/N240. TERRORISM: Impact
1. TERRORISM IS AN INCREASING THREAT WORLDWIDE
SK/N240.01) Robert Stevens [CEO, Lockheed Martin], NATIONAL
JOURNAL, November 13, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. Last year, 11,700 acts of terrorism were recorded.
They don't seem to be diminishing -- they seem to be growing, and it seems like
non-state actors are getting full-throated voices.
2. TERRORISM IS AN INCREASING THREAT TO U.S. HOMELAND
SK/N240.02) Sara Carter & Eli Lake, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
August 12, 2009, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. In
June, The Times reported that U.S. counterterrorism officials authenticated a
video of a Kuwaiti dissident, Abdullah al-Nafisi, telling a roomful of supporters in
Bahrain that al Qaeda was monitoring the U.S. border with Mexico to determine
how to send terrorists and weapons into the U.S. The recruiter told the group that
al Qaeda was capable of smuggling a biological weapon into the United States via
tunnels under the Mexico border, the latest sign of the group's determination to
stage another mass-casualty attack on the U.S. homeland.
3. NUCLEAR TERRORISM IS #1 THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY
SK/N240.03) Scott Shane, THE NEW YORK TIMES, April 16, 2010, p.
A12, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. It has become
conventional wisdom, repeated by President Obama at the nuclear summit
meeting this week, that the cold war danger of huge strikes by thousands of
nuclear missiles has given way to a new threat: terrorists killing tens of thousands
of Americans with a stolen or homemade nuclear device. A broad range of
security experts agree that nuclear terrorism may well be the most serious danger
the United States faces today.
SK/N240.04) Robert Burns & Anne Flaherty [Associated Press], DAILY
HERALD (Arlington Heights, IL), April 7, 2010, p. 12, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. "The greatest threat to U.S. and global
security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by
violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of states," he
[President Obama] said, spelling out the core theme of the new strategy.
SK/N240.05) Micah Zenko & Michael Levi [both Council on Foreign
Relations], THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, January 25, 2010, p0,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. First, the threat from
terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon (or the material to make one) is greater than
that of a nuclear strike against the US. As a National Intelligence Estimate warned
in December 2001: "The Intelligence Community judge[s] that US territory is
more likely to be attacked with WMD [weapons of mass destruction] using
nonmissile means - most likely from terrorists - than by missiles."
4. NUCLEAR ATTACK WOULD KILL MILLIONS
SK/N240.06) Chuck Hagel [former US Senator] et al., THE TIMES
(London, England), April 1, 2009, p. 26, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. A nuclear conflict - or accident - could cause millions to die
in a flash and create an environmental catastrophe that would last for generations.
SK/N241. TURKEY: Alienation Disad
A. TURKEY IS ON THE BRINK OF ALIENATION FROM THE WEST
1. TURKEY IS FLEXING ITS MILITARY MUSCLES
SK/N241.01) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The military modernization programs
Ankara has undertaken in recent decades make the Turkish armed forces a strong
deterrent in the Middle East and other regions that the Turkish security elite
traditionally considered dangerous. For instance, Turkey no longer perceives
Russia as a conventional threat and shows more confidence in its diplomatic
maneuvers in the Caucasus. Similarly, a major factor that forced Syria to abandon
its strategic hostility toward Turkey and end its support for the PKK was Turkey's
effective use of coercive diplomacy backed by military power.
SK/N241.02) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. It is no coincidence that
"revolutionary" foreign-policy initiatives in the Middle East stem from U.S. plans
to withdraw from Iraq. This, along with the EU's inability to play an effective
strategic role in the region, sets the structural background for active Turkish
involvement. A familiar combination of factors has facilitated Turkey's move: a
perceived security vacuum and the possibility that Turkey could serve as a
conduit between Middle Eastern countries and the international system.
2. TURKEY SEEKS A NEW OTTOMAN EMPIRE
SK/N241.03) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Defining accurately the substance and
boundaries of Turkey's new foreign-policy activism is a task still to be
accomplished. Irrespective of the label, Turkey aspires to play a role beyond its
nation-state borders. Some current discussions concern whether Turkey is
pursuing "neo-imperial" policies in order to reclaim the Ottoman legacy. The
JDP's growing involvement in the former Ottoman realm leads many observers to
dub its foreign-policy doctrine "neo-Ottomanism." Some understand this term as a
metaphor for creating a sphere of influence, while others believe it connotes an
Islamist agenda. Davutoglu and other Turkish leaders supply ammunition to those
who accept the neo-Ottoman interpretation.
SK/N241.04) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. If Turkey were to pursue such overly
ambitious objectives, it would create major security dilemmas for many actors in
the region, including Egypt and the Gulf monarchies. These countries would not
welcome a curbing of Western leverage. They believe their partnership with the
United States ensures their security and don't want Turkey to challenge their
command over the Arab street.
3. TURKEY IS SLIPPING AWAY FROM THE WEST
SK/N241.05) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The changing dynamics of Turkey's
relations with the West, arguably its most precious connection--economically,
politically and strategically--is said to be triggering new foreign-policy activism
in the Middle East and the Greater Black Sea area. On the one hand, Turkish-EU
relations, which have anchored Turkey in the Western political community and
served as the prime engine of Turkey's domestic transformation, have been going
through difficult times. While the Turkish government is criticized by certain EU
leaders for failing to maintain the pace of democratization reforms, Turks
increasingly blame the EU for applying double standards and stalling Turkey's
membership process because of intra-European problems.
SK/N241.06) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As a follow up to this argument, critics
of the JDP's growing involvement in regional affairs argue that Turkey has shifted
its axis in foreign policy away from its traditional Western orientation. They
maintain that, driven by concerns over domestic political survival or identitybased policies, the foreign-policy elite in Ankara have come to prioritize the
Turkish and Arab streets over the transatlantic agenda.
SK/N241.07) Michael Petrou, MACLEAN’S, April 19, 2010, p. 31,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. What most
threatens the Israel-Turkey alliance, as least in the minds of some Israelis, is the
concern that the current chill is not the result of the Gaza invasion or of antiSemitic television shows in Turkey. Instead, they fear that a more fundamental
shift has taken place, and that Turkey is sliding away, not only from Israel, but
from the Western democratic world.
SK/N241.08) Arnaud de Borchgrave [Editor-at-Large], THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, June 3, 2010, p. B4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. As China, the U.S. and South Korea were still discussing
how best to persuade North Korea to step away from the precipice of conflict, yet
another upheaval changed the geopolitical map of the Middle East. Israel lost its
only ally in the region, Turkey. Any prospects of resuming proximity talks with
Israel for a Palestinian state went down the proverbial toilet. From London to
Lebanon to Lahore, thousands turned out to protest Israel's botched operation to
stop a Turkish-flagged convoy of six vessels transporting 10,000 tons of urgently
needed supplies for Gaza's 1.5 million Palestinians.
B. WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT IS LAST STRAW
1. INTERFERING IN TURKISH POLITICS IS A MISTAKE
SK/N241.09) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. As mentioned above, some analysts
would invite the United States and also the EU to get involved in Turkish politics
in order to help manage its domestic transformations. Such arguments exaggerate
the threat at hand and, in any case, are doomed to failure. Turkey's domestic
challenges are daunting, but the Western community should let its domestic
transformation evolve on its own. After all, Turkey's democratization struggle is a
domestic one, to be won at home, rather than in Brussels or Washington.
Moreover, since domestic political rivals have incentives to manipulate American
or European support to their advantage, any interference might turn out to be selfdefeating. Mismanaged American involvement might further undermine the
image of the United States in the eyes of the Turkish public.
SK/N241.10) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A defining pillar of Turkey's agenda in
the 1990s was its Western orientation. At the time, Turkey was considered a
"pivotal" country that facilitated Western access to the region. Now it increasingly
defines its regional interests as autonomous. The new elite no longer want to be
thought of as extending Western interests.
2. MILITARY SUPPORT IS TURKEY’S ONLY NEED FOR WEST
SK/N241.11) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Declining threat perceptions have
diminished an important rationale for Turkey's Western orientation: the defense
partnership. Turkey joined the Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War because this
defense cooperation provided shelter against the Soviet threat. In the post-Cold
War era, Turkey acted jointly with the transatlantic community in the Balkans,
because this partnership was seen as an effective instrument for containing the
threat of ethnic nationalism and instability in Southeastern Europe.
3. AN ALIENATED TURKEY DERAILS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
SK/N241.12) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The growing divergence between
Ankara and Washington on regional issues became apparent once again during
the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, when Turkey limited the passage of American
warships into the Black Sea in order to avoid a confrontation with Russia. Despite
the improvement of relations under the Obama administration, serious differences
of opinion remain on the Iranian nuclear issue, the reconstruction of Afghanistan,
and how to deal with a resurgent Russia. At any rate, "Western orientation" no
longer occupies the central place in Turkey's international relations, as Ankara has
deepened its ties with its Middle Eastern neighbors and realigned its geopolitical
agenda with Moscow.
SK/N241.13) Saban Kardas [Dept. of International Relations, Sakarya U.,
Turkey], MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Spring 2010, p. 115, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Furthermore, Turkey can not only
shape local political dynamics; it also possesses another property of a regional
power: the capacity to challenge global leaders and deny access to extra-regional
actors. This was the case in the Iraq War and the Russia-Georgia war, and now is
also the case in the context of the Iranian nuclear standoff. Turkey reacted against
the harsh American response to the Iranian nuclear program, not out of
complacency, but out of concern over the negative implications of such a policy
for the Middle East.
SK/N241.14) Michael Petrou, MACLEAN’S, April 19, 2010, p. 31,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Inbar [professor,
Bar-Ilan University], and others who fear Turkey is turning its back on the West,
point to Turkey's improved relations with Iran and Syria, and its hosting of
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the Inter national
Criminal Court on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Turkey is
also frustrating American efforts to gather support for tougher international
sanctions against Iran. "We have specifically stated that the questions can be
resolved through diplomacy and diplomacy only," Erdogan said at a press
conference after discussing the issue with President Barack Obama in December.
SK/N242. TURKEY: Nuclear Deterrence Disads
1. REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS RISKS IRAN AGGRESSION
SK/N242.01) Alexandra Bell [Project Manager, Ploughshares Fund] &
Benjamin Loehrke [U. of Maryland School of Public Policy], BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS Web Edition, November 23, 2009, pNA. Critically,
any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with
efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a
military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a
NATO ally and key regional partner.
SK/N242.02) Mustafa Kibaroglu [Dept. of International Relations, Bilkent
U., Turkey] & Baris Caglar, MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Winter 2008, p. 59,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The presence of
U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey may be considered by outside observers and by
experts inside Turkey to be an insurance policy that would be sufficient to deter
possible intentions of Iran in the future.
SK/N242.03) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January-February 2008, p. SS4,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Finally, U.S.
policymakers need to pay more attention to Turkey's other security concerns,
including the strategic implications of Iran's nuclear ambitions. The prospect that
Iran may obtain nuclear weapons is likely to heighten Turkey's interest in missile
defense. Yet, current plans for deploying elements of a U.S. missile defense
system in Poland and the Czech Republic are designed to provide protection
against only long-range missile threats from Iran and North Korea, and they
exclude southern Europe and Turkey, effectively dividing Europe into two
unequal zones of security. This is bound to reinforce Turkey's sense of insecurity
and its disenchantment with its Western allies since it already faces a threat from
Iran's short- and medium-range systems, some of which can reach parts of eastern
Turkey. The United States needs to develop a short- and medium-range missile
defense system--perhaps through the deployment of Patriot systems--that can
protect Turkey and the rest of southern Europe. Otherwise, current plans could
exacerbate Turkey's security concerns and create new strains in Washington's
relations with Ankara.
2. REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS RISKS RUSSIA AGGRESSION
SK/N242.04) John R. Bolton [former U.S. Ambassador to U.N.], THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, April 28, 2010, p. B4, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Custom Newspapers. Because the New START treaty does not limit tactical
nuclear weapons, Europe, simply because of geographic proximity, is most
vulnerable to Russia's advantage in that category. It is thus highly ironic that some
NATO countries have recently called for removing the last U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons from Europe, which will simply enhance Russia's existing lead.
SK/N242.05) John R. Bolton [former U.S. Representative to the U.N.],
NATIONAL REVIEW, May 3, 2010, p. 32, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. The Obama-Medvedev treaty does not limit tactical
nuclear weapons, which Russia possesses in substantially greater numbers than
the U.S. While we do not necessarily want a treaty encompassing both strategic
and tactical warheads, lowering our strategic capabilities to levels not seen in half
a century dangerously enhances the threat of Russia's lead in tactical nuclear
weapons to nations around its periphery.
SK/N242.06) Keith B. Payne [Head, Dept. of Defense & Strategic Studies,
Missouri State U.], NATIONAL REVIEW, April 19, 2010, p. 30, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Russia understandably
clings tightly to its nuclear weapons as the great equalizer. This undoubtedly is
why it continues to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons and adamantly refused
to include them in the recent START negotiations--despite the fact that it has a
ten-to-one advantage over the United States in these weapons.
SK/N243. TURKEY: Nuclear Proliferation Disad
A. TURKEY DOES NOT WANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMOVED
SK/N243.01) Catherine M. Kelleher [Professor of Public Policy, U. of
Maryland] & Scott L. Warren, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, October 2009, p. 6,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Some European
countries, especially elites in the newer central and eastern European member
states, attach a high symbolic importance to the deployment of tactical nuclear
weapons on European soil as evidence of U.S. security guarantees. Turkey also is
thought to be particularly concerned about any withdrawal because it faces a more
direct threat from Iranian missiles, although it is now included in the new U.S.
plans for a European missile defense system.
SK/N243.02) Mark Landler, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
April 23, 2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Some officials worry that the debate over tactical nuclear weapons, if not properly
handled, could splinter the alliance - pitting longtime NATO members against
newer members like Turkey and the former Soviet satellites, which are more
reluctant to push for the removal of these weapons.
SK/N243.03) Michael Ruhle [Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit, NATO],
THE WORLD TODAY, March 2010, p. 8. However, the interest in a tangible
American security commitment remains unchanged. The war between Russia and
Georgia in mid 2008 made this abundantly clear. It led some of NATO's
easternmost members to ask publicly for changes in its military planning and
deployments. Moreover, the desire of these countries to host American military
installations on their national soil, and the nervousness they display about a
prospective withdrawal of the remaining US nuclear weapons from Europe,
demonstrate that what Josef Joffe has called 'Europe’s American Pacifier’ is still
in demand.
B. TURKEY WILL DEVELOP ITS OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SK/N243.04) Alexandra Bell [Project Manager, Ploughshares Fund] &
Benjamin Loehrke [U. of Maryland School of Public Policy], BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS Web Edition, November 23, 2009, pNA. Then there
is the issue of Tehran's nuclear program, which seriously complicates any
discussion of the United States removing its tactical nuclear weapons from
Turkey. An Iranian nuclear capability could spark an arms race in the Middle East
and bring about a "proliferation cascade," which could cause Turkey to reconsider
its nuclear options--especially if the United States pulls its nuclear weapons from
Incirlik. When asked directly about its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon, a
high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said that Turkey would immediately arm
itself with a bomb.
SK/N243.05) Mustafa Kibaroglu [Dept. of International Relations, Bilkent
U., Turkey] & Baris Caglar, MIDDLE EAST POLICY, Winter 2008, p. 59,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Turkey has acted
as a responsible member of the nuclear-non-proliferation community and will
remain so for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is not easy to argue with great
confidence that the next generations of Turkish decisionmakers will display
similar unequivocal loyalty to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, if Iran, under
the NPT provisions, cannot be prevented from manufacturing nuclear weapons or
from developing breakout capabilities that may enable it to assemble weapons in a
short period of time.
SK/N243.06) Michael Ruhle [Deputy Head, Policy Planning Unit, NATO],
THE WORLD TODAY, March 2010, p. 8. Some analysts have warned that
Turkey might flirt with a nuclear option should Iran go nuclear, but few believe
Europe as a whole is facing serious prolifieration pressures.
SK/N244. TURKEY: Cyprus Disad
A. REDUCED U.S. PRESENCE WILL PRECIPITATE CYPRUS CRISIS
1. NORTH CYPRUS IS DEPENDENT ON TURKISH MILITARY
SK/N244.01) THE ECONOMIST (US), April 24, 2010, p. 50, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Cyprus has been divided
since July 1974, when Turkey invaded after a Greek-backed coup that led to an
abortive attempt at enosis (union with Greece). Since 1983 the self-proclaimed
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has run the north. It is recognised only by
Turkey and relies on the protection of the Turkish army and on fat annual
subsidies from Ankara.
SK/N244.02) Sebnem Arsu, THE NEW YORK TIMES, September 4,
2008, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. Cyprus has
been divided since 1964, when fighting between the two sides prompted the
United Nations to create a buffer zone. In 1974, the military dictatorship in power
in Athens engineered a coup to try to unite the island with Greece. Turkey
deployed troops to the island's northern third, and has since maintained a heavy
presence.
SK/N244.03) THE ECONOMIST (US), December 12, 2009, p. 32EU,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Most GreekCypriots date their island's "problem" to July 1974, when Turkish troops invaded
the north.
2. NORTH CYPRUS SEEKS INDEPENDENCE
SK/N244.04) THE ECONOMIST (US), April 24, 2010, p. 50, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The prospects of Cyprus's
reunification and of Turkey joining the European Union both took a blow this
week. The cause was the election of Dervish Eroglu as president of Turkishcontrolled north Cyprus on April 18th. Mr Eroglu, a nationalist hardliner who
opposes the framework of the Cyprus settlement talks, took 50.4% of the vote.
The incumbent, Mehmet Ali Talat, trailed with 42.8%.
SK/N244.05) THE ECONOMIST (US), April 24, 2010, p. 50, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Mr Eroglu's hope is to
maintain the status quo with the ultimate goal of independence, says Cengiz Aktar,
a Turkish commentator. That would doom Turkey's hopes of EU membership.
3. TURKEY CANNOT AFFORD TO LET CYPRUS GO
SK/N244.06) Demetrios A. Theophylactou, HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Winter 2010, p. 16, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One reason is that, to the extent that
Turkey is seeking a leadership role in the region and in any of the groupings of
Islamic states, it cannot afford (a) to compromise its unity by granting excessive
rights and/or autonomy to the Kurds; (b) to accept a Kurdish state along its border
with Iraq, as this may have a spill-over effect internally; and (c) to give up on
Cyprus, not least because of the island's significant geo-strategic position in the
Eastern corner of the Mediterranean, only 40 miles from the Turkish coast.
4. TURKEY AND GREECE ARE ON BRINK OF WAR
SK/N244.07) THE ECONOMIST (US), April 24, 2010, p. 50, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. With a parliamentary
election due in Turkey next year, the government is unlikely to risk nationalist ire
by deserting Mr Eroglu. But Mr Erdogan may call for Greek intervention in
Cyprus when he visits Athens on May 12th. He may float the idea of an
international conference to bring to the table both Cypriot sides, the UN, Greece
and Turkey. But a dispute between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean Sea will
make this harder. Dogfights have broken out between Turkish and Greek pilots.
B. CYPRUS CONFLICT IMPAIRS U.S. INTERESTS
1. BRITISH MILITARY BASES ON CYPRUS ARE VULNERABLE
SK/N244.08) Damien McElroy, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), November 11, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. Britain has offered to give up half the land occupied by its sovereign
military bases in Cyprus if the divided island's leaders can seal a reunification
deal. Gordon Brown is expected to unveil the initiative to kick-start the Cyprus
peace process at a meeting with President Demetris Christofias at Downing Street
today. A letter already lodged with the United Nations pledges to transfer 45sq
miles if an all-encompassing agreement with local leaders can be reached.
Progress in overcoming the divisions that underpin the fortified frontier have
eluded a succession of mediators since a Turkish invading force divided the island
in 1974.
SK/N244.09) Damien McElroy, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), November 11, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. London has offered to give up half the area under previous peace
talks. The offer is designed to placate local resentment. The Annan plan, the last
UN-backed settlement agreement, was put to separate votes in 2004. That would
have established a Swiss-style state, the United Cyprus Republic, in which
separate zones would largely govern their own affairs. The pact, named after Kofi
Annan, the former UN secretary general, contained an identical British offer that
lapsed when the peace process fell apart after Turkish voters accepted the
arrangement but Greeks overwhelmingly rejected the proposals.
2. BRITISH BASES ARE VITAL FOR SUPPORT OF TROOPS
SK/N244.10) Damien McElroy, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), November 11, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. Some 3,500 British personnel are based in Cyprus, which remains a
prized operational asset. The bases contain a listening post for the Middle East
and are vital to the training and transfer of British troops moving between Iraq
and Afghanistan.
3. CYPRUS CONFLICT IMPAIRS U.S.-NATO ALLIANCE
SK/N244.11) Christos Kassimeris, JOURNAL OF MODERN GREEK
STUDIES, May 2008, p. 91, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded
Academic ASAP. When Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974, both NATO and United
States interests were impacted. The United States adopted measures to preserve its
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and maintain the cohesion of NATO's
southern flank. But the U.S. Congress imposed an embargo on arms sales to
Turkey. This had serious implications for American foreign policy and brought
out the sharp divisions between the legislature and the executive branches over
issues of enforcing regulations governing arms sales and the need to preserve
national interests.
SK/N244.12) THE ECONOMIST (US), April 24, 2010, p. 50, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Turkey cannot seriously
hope to join the EU without a Cyprus deal. The (Greek-Cypriot) Republic, an EU
member since 2004, has a veto. Eight of Turkey's 35 negotiating chapters have
been frozen since 2006 because of the government's refusal to open its ports and
airports to the Greek-Cypriots.
SK/N245. U.S. DOMESTIC FUNDING: Solvency
1. MILITARY SAVINGS WILL GO TO FEDERAL DEBT REDUCTION
A. FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT IS HUMONGOUS & GROWING
SK/N245.01) Anthony Randazzo [Director of Economic Research, The
Reason Foundation], REASON, April 2010, p. 26, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The Congressional Budget Office has
projected that by the end of 2019 the U.S. will have nearly doubled its debt to
more than $17 trillion, or 82 percent of GDP. And that's before dealing with the
peak of baby boomers draining Social Security and Medicare funds.
SK/N245.02) Peter Cohn, CONGRESS DAILY PM, March 26, 2010,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. "Ignoring
our budget constraints could produce an economic calamity of unprecedented
proportions, a wrecked economy, confiscatory taxes and an eviscerated
government -- a nightmare scenario whatever your political preferences are," said
Syracuse University professor Len Burman. Deficits would average roughly $1
trillion annually for the next 10 years under President Obama's budget projections.
Beyond a decade, the picture gets far worse as the ratio of workers to retirees
declines. Under projections by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities' Robert
Greenstein, U.S. debt will rise to 300 percent of gross domestic product by 2050.
B. DEBT REDUCTION IS U.S. LEADERS’ TOP PRIORITY
SK/N245.03) Humberto Sanchez, CONGRESS DAILY AM, June 9, 2010,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Partisan
jockeying over the federal debt and deficit intensified Tuesday as Republicans
blamed Democrats for a roughly $600 billion expected increase over the current
$13 trillion in total public debt by the end of FY10, which Republicans argued is
holding back the economic recovery. "The president's economic experts say a 1
percent increase in [gross domestic product] can create almost 1 million jobs, and
that 1 percent is what experts think we are losing because of the debt's massive
drag on our economy," House Ways and Means ranking member Dave Camp said
in a release. As the midterm elections near, both Republicans and Democrats are
trying to position themselves as representing the party that will be make the tough
decisions and bring down the historically high debt and deficit.
SK/N245.04) Humberto Sanchez, CONGRESS DAILY AM, June 9, 2010,
pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Meanwhile,
the White House was highlighting its proposals to bring down the deficit by
looking to cut redundant and ineffective programs. In a speech, OMB Director
Orszag said the White House is asking non-security federal agencies to submit
lists of ineffective or redundant programs for possible elimination. The White
House is also seeking proposals from non-security agencies on how they would
cut their budgets by 5 percent.
SK/N245.05) David E. Sanger & Sewell Chan, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
June 9, 2010, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The
mood in both parties of Congress has turned decidedly anti-deficit, meaning that
the job-creation programs once favored by the White House and Democratic
leaders in Congress have been cut back, then cut again. It is a measure of the
mood that Mr. Obama on Tuesday hailed an initiative by his administration to cut
the budgets of most major government agencies by 5 percent, at a time when
conventional theory would call for more government spending to lift the economy.
SK/N245.06) Harriet Barovick et al., TIME, February 15, 2010, p. 14,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. President Obama's
$3.8 trillion budget for 2011 drew fire from lawmakers who say the plan does not
seek to make a deep-enough dent in the soaring U.S. deficit, expected to hit a
record $1.56 trillion this year.
C. CONGRESS WON’T CUT MILITARY SPENDING
SK/N245.07) Jim Wallis [Editor-in-Chief], SOJOURNERS MAGAZINE,
April 2010, p. 7, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Member of Congress Barney Frank recently told me he will propose a 25 percent
cut in the military budget and that he will need help from the faith community. He
proposed a similar cut last year, and wrote, "Both parties have for too long
indulged the implicit notion that military spending is somehow irrelevant to
reducing the deficit and have resisted applying to military spending the standards
of efficiency that are applied to other programs.”
2. MILITARY SAVINGS WON’T GO TO DOMESTIC FUNDING
A. DOMESTIC FUNDING LEVELS ARE BEING FROZEN
SK/N245.08) THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, April 6, 2010, p. 7, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. President Obama is to be
commended for calling for a three-year freeze in spending on many domestic
programs, and for increases no greater than inflation after that, in an effort to
shrink the deficit.
B. ALLEGED GUNS-BUTTER TRADEOFF IS BOGUS
SK/N245.09) Brian Gifford [RAND Corporation], AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, September 2006, p. 474. Unfortunately, the
multitude of studies investigating the relationship between "guns and butter" has
failed to yield clear and consistent results, with studies alternately finding
negative, positive, and nonexistent relationships.
SK/N245.10) Brian Gifford [RAND Corporation], AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, September 2006, p. 476. Some scholars approach
military and social spending as representative of distinct bureaucratic, economic,
and social interests around which political battles for state resources are fought.
They argue that gains made in one budgetary category come at the expense of
other categories, and the trade-off between them indicates the relative success of
particular polity members (both outside and within the state). However, evidence
of such trade-offs between defense and welfare has been inconsistent. While some
find evidence of direct budgetary tradeoffs (e.g., Kamlet and Mowery 1987;
Parapet and Williamson 1988), others find little evidence for a
contemporaneously negative relationship (Hicks and Misra 1993; Huber and
Stephens 2001), or a negative relationship only under extraordinary circumstances
such as war and reconstruction (Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher 1983).
C. MILITARY SPENDING ACTUALLY BOOSTS DOMESTIC
SK/N245.11) Brian Gifford [RAND Corporation], AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, September 2006, p. 476. Huber et al. (1993) nicely
encapsulate the complexity of the "guns and butter" relationship in one paper:
they find a positive relationship between military and social spending within
countries over time, which suggests that budgets expand to accommodate both
military and social welfare needs (Russett 1982).
SK/N245.12) Brian Gifford [RAND Corporation], AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, September 2006, pp. 476-477. Some scholars
counter that states' military efforts directly and indirectly contribute to overall
prosperity. They argue that military spending stimulates economic growth by
enhancing aggregate demand, financing heavy industry and infrastructural
development, raising nations' technological and human capital stock, and creating
the stable security conditions necessary for investor confidence (see, e.g., McNair
et al. 1995; Heo 1999).
SK/N246. UNEMPLOYMENT: Disad
A. MILITARY DRAWDOWN WILL INCREASE UNEMPLOYMENT
1. MILLIONS ARE ALREADY UNABLE TO FIND JOBS
SK/N246.01) Opinion, THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston, SC),
April 9, 2010, p. A12, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Monday's Washington Post, citing figures from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, reported: "In March, about 44.1 percent of the 15 million unemployed
people across the country were out of work 27 weeks or more, up from 40.9
percent in February. The previous peak of 26 percent was reached in June 1983.
About 20 percent of the people on the unemployment rolls have been out of work
a year or longer."
SK/N246.02) Opinion, THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston, SC),
April 9, 2010, p. A12, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Keep in mind, too, the Labor Department's announcement Thursday that first-time
unemployment claims jumped by 18,000 last week to a seasonally adjusted
460,000 - significantly above previous estimates.
SK/N246.03) Graham Brink & Robert Trigaux, THE ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, March 28, 2010, p. 1D, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. 8,400,000 -- That's about how many jobs the Great Recession has
stripped from the U.S. economy since December 2007, helping drive the
unemployment rate from a manageable 4.9 percent up close to 10 percent.
SK/N246.04) Jackie Clews, CONGRESS DAILY PM, May 7, 2010, pNA,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. "The majority
promised that, under their 'stimulus,' unemployment would not exceed 8 percent
and job creation would begin 'almost immediately,'" House Minority Leader
Boehner said in a press release. "But since President Obama signed it into law,
more than three million Americans have lost their jobs, unemployment is near 10
percent, and the deficit is set to hit a record $1.6 trillion."
SK/N246.05) Shawn Tully, FORTUNE, May 3, 2010, p. 140, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Twenty-seven months
after the recession began, unemployment is stuck at 9.7%. Housing starts are
dragging near half-century lows. Consumers are finally spending again, but
they're still too fearful about their jobs and homes to crowd malls and auto lots
with the buoyant abandon that heralds a full-rigged revival, the kind Americans
are used to.
SK/N246.06) Harry Maurer & Cristina Linblad, BUSINESS WEEK, April
5, 2010, p. 10, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
average estimated unemployment rate for 2010 is now 9.6%, down from 9.8% in
late February, according to a Bloomberg survey of economists. Developed by
Bloomberg BusinessWeek using data from pollster YouGov, the Meter is a
proprietary measure of sentiment and expectations, economic statistics, and
market forecasts.
SK/N246.07) Marvin J. Cetron [President, Forecasting International Ltd.]
& Owen Davies [former senior editor of OMNI magazine], THE FUTURIST,
May-June 2010, p. 35, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. The limiting factor is unemployment, which reached 10.2% in the United
States in October 2009. OECD expects jobless numbers to peak in the first half of
2010. It will take at least five years to bring employment back to its pre-recession
level. Until that is accomplished, unemployment will be a drag on consumer
spending and GDP growth.
SK/N246.08) Anthony Randazzo [Director of Economic Research, The
Reason Foundation], REASON, April 2010, p. 26, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In 2009 alone the economy shed a
staggering 3-9 million jobs. And though the headline unemployment rate
stabilized at 10 percent during the final months of the year--17.3 percent if you
include part-time workers--initial jobless claims for January 2010 jumped at a rate
not seen since the previous August. It's not at all clear the worst is behind us.
SK/N246.09) Richard W. Johnson & Corina Mommaerts [both, The Urban
Institute], POLICY & PRACTICE, April 2010, p. 43, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Unemployment rates for older workers
soared in 2009, although they were even higher for younger workers.
SK/N246.10) Kevin A. Hassett, NATIONAL REVIEW, March 22, 2010,
p. 6, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. However bad
the unemployment rate is for the general population, it is always worse for black
Americans. On average, the black unemployment rate has been 6.6 percentage
points higher than the white unemployment rate since 1972. According to the
most recent data, the unemployment rate for blacks is 7.8 percentage points higher
than the rate for whites. The climb during the latest downturn is par for the course.
In times of recession, when the probability of being unemployed increases 1
percent for whites, it increases 1.5 percent for blacks.
2. THE JOB OUTLOOK WILL CONTINUE TO BE BLEAK
SK/N246.11) Marvin J. Cetron [President, Forecasting International Ltd.]
& Owen Davies [former senior editor of OMNI magazine], THE FUTURIST,
May-June 2010, p. 35, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic
ASAP. According to official estimates, it takes 100,000 jobs per month to absorb
young people and others just entering the labor force. Between January 1999 and
October 2009, the U.S. economy generated an average of only 26,000 jobs per
month. Most economists believe it will take five years--that is, to 2015--just to
replace the 8.4 million jobs lost to date in the post-2007 recession.
SK/N246.12) James A. Barnes, NATIONAL JOURNAL, February 18,
2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Economists on the left and the right concur that the joblessness problem is more
severe today than it was 28 years ago, even though it has topped out at 10.1
percent -- not the 10.4 percent of October 1982. (The 1982 rate rose still higher in
November and December -- to 10.8 percent.) For the first time since the
government started keeping track, the portion of the unemployed who have been
out of work for at least six months has risen to 40 percent. Because companies
have become more sophisticated about managing inventories and production, they
are much less likely to weather the ups and downs of the business cycle by laying
off employees and recalling them a few months later. A pink slip now tends to be
a permanent goodbye.
SK/N246.13) James A. Barnes, NATIONAL JOURNAL, February 18,
2010, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. "This
recession is shattering all records," said Heidi Shierholz, a labor market economist
at the liberal Economic Policy Institute. "In the '80s, employers were much more
likely to use temporary layoffs. In this recession, there's a very small percent of
total job losers who are on temporary layoff." According to economist Desmond
Lachman, a resident fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, "By
most metrics, today's unemployment situation is worse than in 1982." Citing an
analysis by the Atlanta Federal Reserve, he noted, "The increase in involuntary
part-time workers in this [recessionary] cycle is very much worse than 1982."
SK/N246.14) David E. Sanger & Sewell Chan, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
June 9, 2010, p. A1, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. “My
best guess is that we'll have a continued recovery, but it won't feel terrific,” Ben S.
Bernanke, the Fed chairman, said at a dinner at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars on Monday night. “And the reason it won't feel
terrific is that it's not going to be fast enough to put back eight million people who
lost their jobs within a few years.”
SK/N246.15) THE FINANCIAL TIMES, June 5, 2010, p. 16, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. If the labour force stops shrinking
due to people abandoning the search for work, returning to growth of 1 per cent
annually, then the unemployment rate of 10 per cent would only return to a
"normal" 6 per cent in four years' time. Growth in the labour force flatters the
calculation, however. In absolute terms it will take five years to hit 2007's peak of
146 million employed. Furthermore, the return of discouraged job seekers, and
those forced to take part-time work will slow declines in the unemployment rate.
3. MILITARY SERVICE & EMPLOYMENT ARE A TRADEOFF
SK/N246.16) THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, November 30, 2008, p. 6,
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The economic downturn
and rising unemployment are making the military a more attractive option,
Pentagon officials say. In some cases, the peace of mind that comes with good
benefits and a regular paycheck is overcoming concerns about the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. "We offer a stability of income that a lot of employers can't
guarantee right now," said Lt. Col. Michael Bennett, who commands the
Maryland Army National Guard's recruiting battalion. Recruiters have generally
struggled in times of private-sector job growth and done well during recessions.
SK/N246.17) Brian Gifford [RAND Corporation], AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, September 2006, pp. 477-478. First, the induction
of large numbers of service members (historically, young men) removes them
from availability as labor for producing surpluses. Large standing armed forces
thus diminish reserve labor armies, which should have the effect of buoying
wages and reducing unemployment.
SK/N246.18) Tom A. Peter, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
November 1, 2009, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
For the US military, high unemployment rates have always meant a good thing for
recruiting, says Lindsay Cohn, a political science professor who specializes in
military personnel issues at the University of Northern Iowa. As far back as the
Civil War, people have been turning to the military when the job market goes
south.
4. MILITARY DISCHARGES WON’T HAVE JOBS WAITING
SK/N246.19) U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT ONLINE, November 18,
2008, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
number of military veterans claiming unemployment benefits has increased
sharply in recent years--researchers marked a 75 percent increase between 2002
and 2004. To examine the causes of this phenomenon, a Rand study examined
why these service members face delays in returning to the civilian workforce after
deployment. The results show a connection with the ongoing global war on
terrorism--a "significant proportion" of the veterans affected are reservists who
were called to active service only in recent years. Also, many find themselves
unemployed after coming home from long deployments, whether by choice
(needing a break) or by change of circumstance (former employer no longer
exists).
SK/N246.20) Edward Colimore, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
April 10, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers.
Employers are required by law to hold the jobs of active-duty soldiers, but they
can still cut them if they show the positions would have been lost as part of
company-wide force reductions, said retired Army Col. Carmen Venticinque,
chairman of the New Jersey Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and
Reserve, a Defense Department-funded advocacy organization with branches
across the country. "When that happens, we can't do anything about that," he said.
SK/N246.21) Michele A. Forte [Air Force Legal Operations Agency], AIR
FORCE LAW REVIEW, Spring 2007, p. 287, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. While the Guard and Reserve supply critical
manpower to the U.S. military, the absence of these individuals from their civilian
employment can cause serious hardship to the employer and to the members'
ability to maintain their civilian jobs. Despite the enactment of the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) of 1994, guard
and reserve members continue to report instances of discrimination and adverse
action as a result of their military service.
SK/N246.22) Michele A. Forte [Air Force Legal Operations Agency], AIR
FORCE LAW REVIEW, Spring 2007, p. 287, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING,
Expanded Academic ASAP. While becoming familiar with the protections and
consequences of USERRA [Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act], businesses will likely notice the absence of any real incentive, other
than patriotism, for employers to hire or reemploy reserve or guard members.
Similar to other discrimination statutes, USERRA speaks in mandates. But
USERRA has such an economic impact on employers that it should also address
the economic burden to employers. In an age when the bottom line means
everything, employers may not see a business reason to offer and maintain jobs
for guard and reserve members. The inefficiency and inconvenience of complying
with the letter of USERRA may drive businesses away from complying with the
spirit of the Act. For some small businesses, there may come a time when it may
not be economically possible to comply with the act.
B. UNEMPLOYMENT CAUSES DEATH & SUFFERING
1. UNEMPLOYMENT DEVASTATES HEALTH
SK/N246.23) Albert J. Huebner [Dept. of Physics, California State U.],
AMERICA, January 28, 1984, p. 48. In a path-breaking study prepared for the
Joint Economic Committee of Congress during the recession of 1975-76, Dr. M.
Harvey Brenner of Johns Hopkins University analyzed the statistical relationship
between unemployment and health over a period of more than 30 years. He found
an appalling rise in sickness, death and aggressive behavior as unemployment
goes up. The most significant increases were in admissions to mental hospitals,
homicides, suicides, admissions to prisons and, above all, deaths from stressrelated disorders such as heart disease. The overall mortality increase came to
more than 36,000 deaths for each 1 percent rise in joblessness.
SK/N246.24) Noshua Watson, FORTUNE, March 4, 2002, p. 30, GALE
CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Until recently a 19-yearold study by Johns Hopkins professor M. Harvey Brenner was the authoritative
word. Based on the ugly downturns of 1973-74 and 1981-82, Brenner found that
as unemployment rose, it led to stress, drinking, smoking, and less medical care.
Overall, health suffered. In some circles the correlation is gospel: "All types of
social dysfunction increase during recessions," says Carl Steidmann, chief
economist of Deloitte Research. When he noted that drugstore sales spiked in the
1990-91 recession, he quizzed drugstore executives. "They pray for recessions,"
he says.
SK/N246.25) Victoria Lambert, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), January 26, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. A succession of international studies links unemployment and
financial stress to cardiovascular disease: a report from the Central Michigan
University last year found that socio-economic environment plays a significant
role in deaths from heart disease. It reinforces a highly influential 1997 study by
Prof Harvey Brenner, of the University of North Texas Health Science Centre,
which studied the relationship between heart disease mortality and economic
changes, including unemployment, in West Germany from 1951-1989.
SK/N246.26) Victoria Lambert, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), January 26, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. Prof Brenner examined the theory that the impact of national
economic changes on cardiovascular mortality reflected emotional stresses, losses,
frustrations and deprivations. Even allowing for the additional effects of smoking,
a fatty diet and alcohol - all means by which those under pressure comfort
themselves - Prof Brenner concluded that increased unemployment and business
failure rates are related to increases in the number of deaths from heart disease
over more than a decade: "Three to five years after the height of unemployment,
we will begin to see an increase in illness and the number of deaths,'' he said.
Specifically, he estimates that a 10 per cent annual increase in business failures
leads to a 0.3 per cent increase in cardiovascular illness years later, with the time
lag perhaps due to the gradual effect of increasingly unhealthy lifestyles.
SK/N246.27) Victoria Lambert, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), January 26, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. A 2004 study from the Karolina Institute in Sweden demonstrated
that unemployment is associated with an increased risk of early death, even after
adjustment for several potential confounding factors, including socioeconomic
status, lifestyle factors, genetic and early childhood factors. In particular,
unemployment was associated with increased mortality from suicide and external
undetermined causes; for men, deaths from cancer also increased.
SK/N246.28) Victoria Lambert, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), January 26, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. Another Swedish study, at Umea University in 2001, confirmed that
health among young people, particularly women, deteriorates during a recession.
The authors speculated that women are affected because they feel more keenly a
lack of control over the work situation.
SK/N246.29) Victoria Lambert, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), January 26, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. Richard Wilkinson, Emeritus Professor of Social Epidemiology,
University of Nottingham, confirms that "health worsens as soon as there is the
threat of redundancies''. He says fear of unemployment rather than the actual loss
of a job is often more damaging. He also points to the higher number of
prescriptions issued in areas with high unemployment. This is not because the
unemployed take more pills, but anxiety tends to be widespread in a community
where there have been job losses.
SK/N246.30) Victoria Lambert, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London,
England), January 26, 2009, pNA, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom
Newspapers. Dr William Shanahan, medical director of Capio Nightingale
Hospital in London, is seeing a vast increase in the number of people with anxiety
and depression - what is being termed "Square Mile syndrome”. "Referrals and
calls to our helpline have doubled,” says Dr Shanahan. "We saw a similar effect
after 9/11; but then people perceived it as a one-off. Now there is no sense that
anything will change soon so there is a lot of panic. Young people have had the
rug removed from under them; all the old certainty has gone. Some are getting
very depressed and near suicidal.”
SK/N246.31) Albert J. Huebner [Dept. of Physics, California State U.],
AMERICA, January 28, 1984, p. 48. Dr. Brenner [Johns Hopkins U.] has applied
his statistical analysis to other industrial societies with similar results. Meanwhile,
other investigators have been extending our understanding of the connection
between unemployment and health. Ray Catalano and David Dooley, social
ecologists at the University of California, found that job setbacks doubled the
likelihood of physical illness or accidental injury. During a modest economic
downturn, moderate-income groups are most affected. If the recession deepens,
this greater risk spreads to a much larger segment of the population.
SK/N246.32) Albert J. Huebner [Dept. of Physics, California State U.],
AMERICA, January 28, 1984, p. 48. A research group at Yale University
discovered a subtler aspect of the link between joblessness and serious disease.
Members found that an employee's blood pressure frequently rose when job loss
was still only anticipated. Cholesterol level--like blood pressure a major risk
factor in the nation's leading causes of death--did not increase until after layoff.
Then it followed the same pattern, remaining elevated and not returning to a lower
value until the worker found a stable new job.
SK/N246.33) Albert J. Huebner [Dept. of Physics, California State U.],
AMERICA, January 28, 1984, pp. 48-49. Equally ominous, high unemployment
is forcing more and more people to put off early treatment and preventive care. A
survey last year by Medical World News indicated that all across the country
patients were paying significantly fewer visits to their doctors. In particularly
hard~hit areas like Detroit, physicians report up to a 50 percent decline in office
visits. Dr. Louis Ferman of the University of Michigan has done a formal study of
employees laid off during the 1975 recession that confirms this informal evidence.
He found that dental checkups were the first casualty followed by annual
physicals and then elective surgery. The consequerices of this deferred care are
that disease develops that could have been prevented, and that minor disease is
not treated until it becomes major.
2. UNEMPLOYMENT INCREASES PARTNER VIOLENCE
SK/N246.34) Sheetal Ranjan [Asst. Professor of Sociology, William
Paterson U.] & Chitra Raghavan [Asst. Professor of Psychology, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice], THE JOURNAL OF EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, April
2010, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
economic recession is affecting families in many ways. For example, recent job
loss data indicate that men are losing jobs at a faster pace than women. According
to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 10.3 percent of males were
unemployed in 2009, compared to 8.1 percent of females (BLS 2010). In addition
to stressors directly related to job loss, the disproportionate ratio of male to female
unemployment has created an imbalance in families that may challenge traditional
gender roles. Traditionally, men are expected to provide for the family
economically, while women are supposed to play other roles. Taken together,
these stressors and the unemployment imbalance can amplify an already tense
relationship, potentially leading to partner violence.
SK/N246.35) Sheetal Ranjan [Asst. Professor of Sociology, William
Paterson U.] & Chitra Raghavan [Asst. Professor of Psychology, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice], THE JOURNAL OF EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, April
2010, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In
addition, studies have observed a strong relationship between low income, high
debts, job instability, perceived economic distress and IPV [intimate partner
violence] (Benson, Wooldredge, Thistlethwaite, and Fox 2004; Firestone,
Lambert, and Vega 2000). A low income increases not only the likelihood of
victimization but also the seriousness of the IPV (Van Wyk, Benson and Fox
2003).
SK/N246.36) Sheetal Ranjan [Asst. Professor of Sociology, William
Paterson U.] & Chitra Raghavan [Asst. Professor of Psychology, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice], THE JOURNAL OF EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, April
2010, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In a
study on employment, men were found to use more coercive control tactics when
they were unemployed and their wives were employed. The same study found that
being employed triples a woman's risk of being systematically abused when her
husband is unemployed (Gartner and Macmillan 1999).
SK/N246.37) Sheetal Ranjan [Asst. Professor of Sociology, William
Paterson U.] & Chitra Raghavan [Asst. Professor of Psychology, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice], THE JOURNAL OF EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, April
2010, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. A
study by Macmillan and Garmer (1999) found that women's labor force
participation lowers the risk of spousal abuse when their male partners are also
employed but substantially increases it when their male partners are not employed.
This finding has been found to be most relevant for traditional households
(Atkinson, Greenstein, and Lang 2005). Also, when a man is out of work, he is
likely to spend more time at home, thereby increasing the risk of violence.
SK/N246.38) Sheetal Ranjan [Asst. Professor of Sociology, William
Paterson U.] & Chitra Raghavan [Asst. Professor of Psychology, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice], THE JOURNAL OF EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, April
2010, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
CDC reports that victims of severe IPV [intimate partner violence] lose nearly 8
million days of paid work--the equivalent of more than 32,000 full-time jobs--and
almost 5.6 million days of household productivity each year (CDC 2003).
SK/N246.39) Sheetal Ranjan [Asst. Professor of Sociology, William
Paterson U.] & Chitra Raghavan [Asst. Professor of Psychology, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice], THE JOURNAL OF EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, April
2010, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
Bureau of Justice Statistics (2007) reports that in 2005, 329 males and 1,181
females were murdered by an intimate partner.
SK/N246.40) Sheetal Ranjan [Asst. Professor of Sociology, William
Paterson U.] & Chitra Raghavan [Asst. Professor of Psychology, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice], THE JOURNAL OF EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, April
2010, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. While
homicide is the most severe outcome of IPV [intimate partner violence], partner
violence takes its toll on victims in a variety of other ways. Besides physical
injuries such as bruises and scratches (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000), the constant
stress associated with IPV can have an impact on the immune system and
endocrine functions of the victim (Crofford 2007; Leserman and Drossman 2007;
Pichta 2004; Wuest et al. 2008). The CDC mentions the following as some of the
disorders associated with IPV: * Fibromyalgia; * Irritable bowel syndrome; *
Gynecological disorders; * Pregnancy difficulties like low birth weight babies and
perinatal deaths; * Sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS; * Central
nervous system disorders; * Gastrointestinal disorders; and * Heart or circulatory
conditions.
SK/N246.41) Sheetal Ranjan [Asst. Professor of Sociology, William
Paterson U.] & Chitra Raghavan [Asst. Professor of Psychology, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice], THE JOURNAL OF EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, April
2010, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. The
psychological outcomes of IPV [intimate partner violence], like the physical
outcomes, are primarily related to stress. Different studies report that
psychopathological factors are both predicted by and predictive of IPV. The CDC
mentions several psychological outcomes related to IPV (Mercy, Krug, Dahlberg,
and Zwi 2003), including the following: * Depression; * Antisocial behavior; *
Suicidal behavior in females; * Anxiety; * Low self-esteem; * Inability to trust
men; * Fear of intimacy; * Emotional detachment; * Sleep disturbances; and *
Flashbacks to and mental replays of the assault.
SK/N246.42) Sheetal Ranjan [Asst. Professor of Sociology, William
Paterson U.] & Chitra Raghavan [Asst. Professor of Psychology, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice], THE JOURNAL OF EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, April
2010, p. 17, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In
addition to physical and psychological outcomes, IPV [intimate partner violence]
affects the overall quality of the victim's life. Economically, women may find it
harder to keep jobs or be successful at work. Additionally, they may become a
victim of stalking at the workplace by their intimate partners. IPV victims may
find that the victimization results in strained relationships with their health care
providers (Pichta 2004) and isolation from their social networks (Raghavan et al.
2009). Moreover, IPV victims are more likely to engage in behaviors that have
negative health outcomes, such as risky sexual behaviors, substance abuse or
unhealthy diet behaviors (Coker et al. 2000: Roberts, Klein, and Fisher 2003).
3. UNEMPLOYMENT INCREASES CRIME
SK/N246.43) Kelly Frailing [U. of Cambridge, United Kingdom] & Dee
Wood Harper Jr. [Professor of Sociology & Criminal Justice, Loyola U., New
Orleans], THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY,
April 2010, p. 717, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP.
Other researchers have investigated the relationship between crime and economic
variables and have found that in general, unemployment and low wages are
associated with increased crime rates (e.g., Freeman 1983, 1996; Juhn 1992; Katz
and Murphy 1992; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001; Gould, Weinberg, and
Mustard 2002).
SK/N246.44) Edward S. Shihadeh & Raymond E. Barranco [both,
Louisiana State U.], SOCIAL FORCES, March 2010, p. 1393, GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Indeed, an expanding literature links a
variety of structural factors to black crime. Some of the causes, such as inequality
(Blau and Blau: 1982; Harer and Steffesnmeier 1992), joblessness and family
structure (Sampson 1987; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994), have an established
history in sociological thought.
SK/N246.45) Albert J. Huebner [Dept. of Physics, California State U.],
AMERICA, January 28, 1984, p. 49. There is an even greater long-term
consequence. The stress, frustration and loss of self-esteem that accompany
extended periods without a job are well-known causes of explosive violence.
Regions as different from each other as industrial cities of the Midwest, coppermining areas of Arizona and lumber towns of Oregon have reported increases in
child-abuse by unemployed parents. Caseworkers report that in some abuse-prone
families it has become more severe, but it is also occurring in many families for
the first time. Therapists agree that once abusive behavior sets in, it is bard to get
rid of. Worse yet, it tends to be passed on from generation to generation; abused
children frequently go on to become child-abusing parents. This cycle of domestic
violence spills over into the community: Studies consistently find that violent
criminals are likely to have come from violent homes.
SK/N247. WAR POWERS ACT: Disad
A. PRESIDENT MUST BE ABLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO CRISIS
SK/N247.01) Paul E. Vallely [Host of radio show “Stand Up America”],
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 13, 2008, p. M13. GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. I am not sure even that the War Powers Act or
this new War Powers Consultation Act is constitutional. We might ask if either is
necessary. Congress is not going to waiver any of its power over the executive
branch and vice versa. As we may remember, the War Powers Act was not well
thought out and was a hasty legislative response to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
in 1964. I admit that consultation is good for politics and policy-makers but not as
a process of having to rapidly go to war. Those responsible for the intricate
planning of offensive or defensive military action must take into account the
threat to our immediate and future security and not be impeded by unnecessary
consultative and additional staff processes and slow, cumbersome bureaucracy.
B. NEW WAR POWERS ACT WOULD HAMSTRING THE PRESIDENT
SK/N247.02) Paul E. Vallely [Host of radio show “Stand Up America”],
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 13, 2008, p. M13. GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The Miller Center's National War Powers
Commission, co-chaired by former Secretaries of State James A. Baker and
Warren Christopher, this past Tuesday recommended that Congress repeal the
War Power's Act of 1973 (Joint Resolution) and substitute a new statute that
would provide for more meaningful consultation between the president and
Congress on matters of war. This means to me that they agree not to disagree and
clearly avoids giving the necessary power to the executive branch and the
president, who is the commander in chief. There is clear merit in opposing the
recommendations of the commission. The president needs and requires the
latitude to protect America and its people on a timely basis. We certainly know
how effective a consultative process works between the executive and legislative
branches. Not very well nor timely. We can do better than this to safeguard the
United States and I oppose the commission report.
SK/N247.03) Paul E. Vallely [Host of radio show “Stand Up America”],
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 13, 2008, p. M13. GALE CENGAGE
LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. The commission reports that the War Powers
Act of 1973 is "ineffective and impractical." This new alternative is unwilling to
state that either Congress or the president has a pre-eminent role and subsequent
power to commit U.S. forces into combat. Consultation is the process prescribed
(Mr. Baker and Mr. Christopher love this process as lawyers), so it is
recommended that this is the way to decide when we go to war. Can you imagine
how effective this would be with the neutered politicians we have today? We all
know how effective hearings and consultative government are as a substitute for
good effective leadership.
C. NEW WAR POWERS ACT WOULD BE WORSE THAN OLD ONE
SK/N247.04) Editorial, THE NEW YORK SUN, July 10, 2008, p. 6.
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Custom Newspapers. For those of us who lived
through the great debate over war powers in the wake of the Vietnam conflict, the
gambit by Secretaries of State Baker and Christopher - a proposed law called the
War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 - looks like the worst of both worlds. The
law these two worthies seek would establish yet another joint committee in
Congress with yet another permanent staff. And a president would have not only
to notify but consult with such committee in case of significant military action.