Jurisdiction Outline Professor Richman Fall 2000 I. Introduction study of conflict of laws centers on transactions that have legal implications involving more than one sovereign conflicts divided into three parts: jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgments domicile: something close to, but not identical with, residence. It is a person’s “pre-eminent headquarters”. The relationship between a person and his domicile must be close enough to justify the reciprocal right/duty status denoted by the term. Each person has one and only one domicile at any one time for any one purpose. - To fix domicile: establish a physical presence in that jurisdiction with an intent to make that place home for the time - To acquire a new domicile: necessary actually to be present, at least for a while in that jurisdiction jurisdiction: power of courts to adjudicate with respect to a person or a thing. To exercise jurisdiction properly, a court must have enough connection with a problem to satisfy both constitutional and statutory requirements. There must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant or the res on the one hand and the state on the other to justify the exercise of power choice of law: a legal problem to involves incidents or problems concerning more than one state and a court must determine which state’s legal rules should control the resolution of the problem. The development of current approached to choice of law have been revolutionary II. Selecting the Proper court A. Overview Jurisdiction over person and property, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue come together to determine the permissible choice of forum for the P. a particular court is not the appropriate one in which to bring suit unless it satisfies all three requirements Ask: - does case belong in state or federal court? (SMJ) - which particular federal or state court? (juris over person or property and venue) Consider: the jury pool, the knowledge of law in that court, knowledge of juries, residence or domicile of parties, statute of limitations on damages, geography (easier and cheaper to sue at home), time (some courts have longer dockets than others and D’s like longer dockets) what are the choices? Which court do we want to sue in? legal/ technical problem of picking the right court? What obstacles are there (subject matter jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, venue)? 1 In the US, there are limits upon the jurisdiction of state and federal courts imposed by the DP clause of the 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment. A court that exercises jurisdiction over a D in the absence of a proper jurisdictional basis has violated her right not to be deprived of property without due process, and therefore, its judgement is invalid. The kind of relationship between D and the state that suffices to support an exercise of jurisdiction is a question of federal law and the Supreme Court is the final arbiter. The Full Faith and Credit Clause controls the states obligations to recognize and enforce the judgements of the courts of sister states. Subject only to a few controversial exceptions, the two constitutional clauses are co-extensive. Thus, if a state has a jurisdictional basis sufficient to satisfy the DP clause, the judgement of its courts will be entitled to FF&C in other states Notice: DP clause requires that adequate notice be given to the D of the action and an opportunity for him to be heard - no matter what sort of jurisdictional basis exists, and no matter whether jurisdiction is exercised in personam or in rem, the judgement will be invalid if the D has not been given adequate notice - Mullane test for in rem and in personam jurisdiction: (1) is the method of notice chosen reasonably likely to reach those affected?; and (2) if conditions do not permit such notice, is the method chosen about as good as any other? - Methods: personal service of process by an official of the court or a private process server; service by mail; substituted personal service (where the process server leaves the summons and complaint at the D’s house with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein); and notice by publication; B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 1. Generally Once it is clear that the state has power to hear a case, another question must be addressed: Which court within the state has been given competence to hear this type or class of case? States customarily divide up the judicial business among their several courts according to subject matter. - typical division: (1) court of general jurisdiction; (2) a group of inferior courts; (3) a group of specialized courts which have competence in such areas as probate, domestic relations, and appeals from regulatory agencies - state and litigants have an interest in their cases being heard by competent court: jurisdiction over subject matter cannot be conferred on a court by agreement of the parties, cannot be waived, and if not 2 - raised by the parties it must be noticed by the court on its own motion SMJ also used to describe the rules (constitutional and statutory) that control the jurisdiction of federal courts. The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; if jurisdiction over a case cannot be found in article III of the Constitution, it does not exist. The principle categories of federal jurisdiction are federal question jurisdiction (cases arising under the laws of the United States) and diversity jurisdiction (cases in which citizens of different states are adverse parties). 2. federal question jurisdiction Article III, section 2: “the judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, ARISIGN UNDER this Constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made...” Osborn v. Bank of U.S.: question as the what “ARISING UNDER” means in the Constitution. Court says that a suit arises under federal law if at some point, a federal question could come up 1845 Congress passed general federal question jurisdiction statute – 28 U.S.C. §1331. - Congress gave court federal question jurisdiction b/c : (1) likes to have uniform application and interpretation of federal law; (2) allows for expertise (have those who know federal law interpret it) - The words “ARISING UNDER” in the statute do not mean the same thing as the words “ARISIGN UNDER” mean in the Constitution (statute interpreted more narrowly) - Two tests the courts use to figure out original jurisdiction of the U.S. federal district courts: (1) Holmes test: suit arises under a law that creates the cause of action/ claim (property, tort and contract are state and admiralty and OSHA are federal); and (2) Smith test: federal question jurisdiction can be proper where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on some construction of federal law (where federal law is an element of a state claim, it suffices to support federal question jurisdiction only where it is important to the outcome of the case) well pleaded complaint rule: the P’s federal question must appear in the properly pleaded allegations of his complaint. Rule permits reliable early determinations of whether the federal court has jurisdiction. An allegation anticipating a defense based on federal law is not sufficient to raise a federal question 3. diversity jurisdiction Article II, section 2 is the source of diversity jurisdiction 3 Purpose is to protect out-of-state litigants from prejudice Even if all of the prerequisites of diversity jurisdiction are fulfilled, federal courts have traditionally refused to hear domestic relations cases and to get involved in probate proceedings. Their power to create such areas of abstention is not beyond doubt, but the reason normally given is that these areas have traditionally been the concern of the states 28 U.S.C. §1332 a1, a2, a3 : no diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in a suit between two aliens; not provided for , so it does not exist Strawbridge v. Curtiss: complete diversity is required to have diversity jurisdiction (each distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in federal courts. Mas v. Perry: for diversity purposes, citizenship means domicile; mere residence in the state is not sufficient. Complete diversity of parties is required in order that diversity jurisdiction obtain; that is, no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side DOMICILE for diversity jurisdiction: - To change domicile: take up residence in a new place (physical presence) and intend to remain there. Must have intent to remain there indefinitely (floating intent to leave new place at some time in the future is not good enough) - Corporations: 28 U.S.C. §1332(c) A corporation is a citizen of a place where incorporated and where it has its “principle place of business”. Test for “principle place of business” is : (1) bulk of corporate activities; or (2) where activities are spread out, rely on where home office is or where nerve of company is - Unincorporated Association: no separate legal existence b/c it is its members. No corporate status, so the test for citizenship is where the members are - Limited Partnership: general partners who have liability and control and limited partners with no control. Should be treated more like a corporation, but according to Supreme Court, citizenship of every partner matters Manipulating Diversity Jurisdiction: might want to get into federal court rather than states, so try to manipulate diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1359 restricts this (but controls only intent to CREATE diversity jurisdiction, not to DEFEAT it) - kinds of manipulation that will work: (1) move (all we require is intent, do not look at motive); (2) class actions (carefully choose named representatives of class b/c measure citizenship of named representatives only – Benhur) - kinds of manipulation that won’t work: (1) sell claims to lawyer who is diverse; (2) have administrator 4 or executor of estate sue on behalf (legal rep shall be deemed citizen of the same state as decedent under §1332(c)(2)) Interpleader: (if you have one thing and several claim it, bring them all into one action and let them all duke it out) these cases tell us something about complete diversity requirements - 28 U.S.C. §1335: interpleader permitted if two or more claimants of diverse citizenship and worth at least $500. As long as minimal diversity exists, the citizenship of plaintiff-stakeholder is immaterial - Article III section II permits complete and minimal diversity 4. Amount in controversy diversity statute limited federal jurisdiction to cases in which more than a certain minimum amount was in controversy. Currently, diversity jurisdiction is limited to cases involving more than $75,000. - monetary limit ensures that only substantial cases will be brought the amount is computed as of the date of the commencement of the action. Subsequent events (like part payment) do not defeat jurisdiction the jurisdictional amount requirement is satisfied unless the plaintiff’s complaint shows to a legal certainty that she could not recover more than the minimum amount. The claim for damages set forth in the complaint is determinative if made in good faith. The fact that the actual recovery does not exceed the jurisdictional amount dos not affect the jurisdiction of the court Aggregation: whether separate claims for less than the jurisdictional amount can be aggregated to satisfy the requirement depends on several factors: - Only claims for which all defendants are jointly liable to the plaintiff may be combined. Joint liability would arise in a few situations such as co-owners of property, but not joint tortfeasors - The claims of multiple plaintiffs can be aggregated only if they have a common undivided ownership in such claims - - All claims of the plaintiff against a single defendant, whether or not related, can be aggregated to meet the minimum Tag-along: when one claim already meets the minimum requirement on its own, other claims that do not can be tagged along (ride the coat tails) - Zahn v. International Paper Co.: for amount in controversy, amount must be met for each member 5. the diversity controversy: ( Federal Courts Study Committee article) Congress should limit federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship to complex, multi-state litigation, interpleader, and suits involving aliens. 5 Federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is a major source of the federal courts’ caseload A substantial majority of the committee strongly recommends that Congress eliminate this basis of federal jurisdiction, subject to narrowly defined exceptions b/c no other class of cases has a weaker claim on federal resources and no other step will do anywhere nearly as much to reduce federal caseload. State courts are better able to handle caseload Courts should: prohibit plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their home states, deem corporations to be citizens of every state in which they are licensed to do business, specify that the jurisdictional floor does not include punitive damages, or non-economic damages Dissent: pp. 22 of supplement 6. supplemental jurisdiction: federal courts now have the power to hear disputes that do not fall squarely into the categories of federal question or diversity jurisdiction but that are so related to a federal question or diversity case that there is “supplemental jurisdiction” over them. Anchor claim: first case with federal jurisdiction; Supplemental claim: claim otherwise not jurisdictional United Mine Workers v. Gibbs: (§1367(a)) Had a federal claim and a state claim and the district court had the power to hear the state claim b/c there was common nucleus of operative fact/ the two claims arose out of the same controversy . The goal of supplemental jurisdiction is to promote judicial economy and consistency of decision by removing obstacles to having all related controversies decided in one proceeding. Aldinger v. Howard: trying to sue supervisor under §1983 claim and then sue the county under state law and get pendant jurisdiction. Court says there is power to hear both b./c there is a common nucleus of operative fact. But Congress has spoken (no §1983 against counties) - tests is: (1) is there a common nucleus of operative fact for constitutional power? And (2) has congress said that there CANNOT be jurisdiction? Finley v. U.S.: sues city of San Diego and San Diego Power Co., later realizes that FAA is responsible, not the city. Brings case in federal court (b/c of FAA) and wants to bring in cases against state. Court says there is a common nucleus of operative fact, but changes the test for jurisdiction: - NEW test is: (1) is there a common nucleus of operative fact for constitutional power? And (2) has congress said that there CAN be power? - With new test, there will rarely ever be jurisdiction b/c Congress usually expresses no intent about supplemental jurisdiction - Second sentence in §1367(a) overrules Finley and changes test back to - Has congress said there CANNOT be power? 6 Owen Equipment v. Kroger: Iowa P sues Nebraska D, Nebraska D impleads Iowa D, then iowa P adds claim against Iowa impleaded D. Supreme Court says there is no supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiff when it would be inconsistent with §1332 (requirement of complete diversity) Conditions and limits are statutorily defined in 28 U.S.C. 1367 (Gibbs, Aldridge, Finley, and Owen all codified here) Statute grants federal courts that have original jurisdiction over a claim supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that form part of the same case or controversy under Article III. The focus of the constitutional inquiry is whether the claims sought to be added to those within federal jurisdiction are part of one constitutional case or controversy 7. removal jurisdiction Allows a defendant to shift a case from state court to federal court when the plaintiff has chosen to sue in state court. Although there is no mention of removal jurisdiction in the Constitution, some form of removal jurisdiction has existed since the federal court system was first created. In general, an action that the plaintiff could have originally filed in federal court can be removed by the defendant. U.S.C. §1441(a) (pp. 35 of supplement) - if federal court has original jurisdiction, can be moved to federal court - if there is original jurisdiction, the case can be removed to federal court without regard to citizenship - court chooser (D) can’t use diversity to get into federal court if can be subject to its own courts (P sued D in D’s home state) - only D’s can remove C. Territorial Jurisdiction 1. Intro Judicial jurisdiction in the most inclusive sense refers to the power or ability of a court to hear a dispute and render a valid judgment in the sense that it will be recognized in other courts Buchanan v. Bucker: mailed complaint to courthouse door in the islands (case stands for the fact that the state must have some connection or relationship with the defendant or his property to exercise power over him types of territorial jurisdiction: connections that suffice for jurisdiction are referred to by courts and scholars as jurisdictional bases (or predicates) - in personam: permits a court to enter a judgement that is personally binding on D, either ordering her to do or refrain from doing a certain act or decreeing that the P may collect a certain amount of damages from D - in rem: permits a court to adjudicate rights of all claimants to a specific piece of property. - Quasi- in rem: formerly included two types of cases: (1) cases involving disputes about property under the 7 2. History court’s control and (2) cases involving personal disputes where court lacked personal jurisdiction over D, but had jurisdiction over D’s property. Property would be seized and used to satisfy claim if needed Mullane: as noted above, the DP clause, which requires the existence of acceptable jurisdictional basis, also requires the defendant to be given adequate notice of the proceeding and the opportunity to be heard. Two part test: (1) notice reasonably certain to inform; or (2) method chosen is as good as any other chosen Collateral Attack: error of jurisdiction asserted in a new proceeding Direct Attack: an appeal asserting error (motion to vacate) in the same proceeding that issued judgement theory of jurisdiction that governed until 1900 is the Territorial Power Theory or the International Law Model of Jurisdiction (power of U.S. in International Law Model is limited to territory of U.S.) a. early dogma Pennoyer v. Neff: Supreme court announced a theory of state court jurisdiction that was to stay in place for nearly 70 years. Territorial power theory relied on a conception of the states as nearly independent sovereigns. “Every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory” and “no state can exercise direct jurisdiction... over persons or property without its territory.” But the court was not able to develop a standard for determining when the forum involvement of the out-of-state D was sufficient to justify substituted service on a state officer. Invoked concepts of “implied consent” and “presence.” There are five acceptable jurisdiction bases under this theory: - service of process: on D while in territory establishes power over him - domicile: - consent to jurisdiction: by making an appearance - incorporation: as a corporation within the forum. state can disassemble/ rescind the corporation’s charter - in rem: state had in rem over an y property, real or personal, w/in the state b. stretching the dogma by fiction: territorial theory and the exceedingly narrow jurisdictional practice that it required proving to confining for the courts as modern methods of transportation, communication, and commerce made interstate litigation more common courts and legislatures faced a choice: scrap the outmoded theory or stretch it to reach more out-of-state Ds. Chose the second option with the doctrine of implied consent (D did not actually consent to the court’s jurisdiction, but rather the D conducted certain activities in the forum and consent was inferred from those activities) 8 Supreme court upheld these statutory fictions in cases about motor vehicles of residents or non-residents on highways, Ds involved in any sort of closely regulated activity within the state, and foreign corporations - “consent” and “presence” proved to be adequate theoretical justifications for the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations. But how much contact was required in order to find that the corporation consented t jurisdiction or that it was present in the forum? Court used the “doing business standard” – fairly substantial connection between the D and the forum. c. the revolution by the 1940’s,the theory had proved its inadequacy and that it was out-ofstep with recent advances in technology and communication defects of theory rendered it obsolete and the law of jurisdiction had to change International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington: Co was incorporated in Del. With its principle place of business in Missouri. Employed a Washington resident to solicit orders there, and send them back to Missouri. Washington sued Co. to collect unemployment tax on salaries. Supreme court affirmed lower court decision that personal jurisdiction existed over D, but divested corporate “presence” of the special significance it had in Pennoyer. Court dumped original Pennoyer tests and said that what matters is minimum contacts with the state so that it doesn’t offend notions of fair play and substantial justice - Shoe left it unclear whether we look at contacts or we simply look at fairness - Court identified two types of contacts a non-resident could have with the forum: (1) D’s activity within the forum state related to the controversy; and (2) D’s unrelated contacts McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.: Court says that if a foreign corporation’s contacts with the forum state were single or isolated, but the case arose out of those very contacts, the suit was based on a contact which had a substantial connection with that state. Established beyond question the forum’s authority to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident D’s in lawsuits resulting form their forum-directed activities. High-water mark for personal jurisdiction Hanson v. Denckla: complicated facts, but Court decided that a power theory was refined in International Shoe and under this theory, submission to suit is a fair exchange for the benefits and protection a non-resident D receives from a forum state. Without minimum contacts between nonresident D and the forum capable of supporting the power theory, no deal. Majority made clear that: (1) focus on the relationship between the forum and D was both central and indispensable to the minimum contacts inquiry; and (2) contacts would achieve the minimum only if they were sufficient to support the power theory 9 - reflects a reversal of usual pattern Hanson harks back to Territorial Power Theory After Hanson, McGee regarded as law and Hanson as a throwback Shaffer v. Heitner: most famous for its unification of in personam and in rem jurisdictional analysis under the International Shoe standard. In the one hand, it rejects the territorial power theory in Pennoyer; on the other hand, other parts of the opinion are not as supportive of a theory of jurisdiction based on fairness. Clearly committed to contacts rather than fairness analysis d. Constitutional limits on state court jurisdiction – modern doctrine After 1977, the court ended its 22 years of silence – and issued 12 major decisions General Jurisdiction: D relationship with the forum justifies jurisdiction over him based on any claim, even one unrelated to the forum Specific Jurisdiction: Connection between the forum and the acts of nonresident D generate the controversy. Claim arises in the state, so D amenable to jurisdiction. Much less contacts with the forum World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Robinson’s take car to new home in Arizona, but on their way get into an accident in Oklahoma. Sue NY auto dealer and NY/NJ distributor in Oklahoma. Court hold s there is no jurisdiction. Announces a two part tests for exercise of jurisdiction: (1) minimum contacts; and (2) id overall jurisdiction fair or reasonable? (combines the tests in International Shoe). Courts says that foreseeability that the car might have reached Oklahoma is possible, but foreseeability alone has never been a benchmark for personal jurisdiction. DP analysis requires not the mere likelihood that the product would end up in forum state, but hat the D’s conduct and connection with the forum are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there - stream of commerce theory: if D loses a product in a stream of commerce, D is amendable to personal jurisdiction wherever the product ends up through this stream (chain of distribution). Everyone in the stream is amenable where stream ends - may be no amenability where consumer happens to take product - case makes clear that nonresident D is not subject to personal jurisdiction unless he has directed acts towards the forum Keeton v. Hustler: P sued Hustler for libel. Connection with NH is that 10,000 copies of the magazine sold there. Court decides that NH has an interest in the case (but seems to dig up ridiculous reasons why) and seems stuck on contacts being more important than fairness. Fairness seems to point away from jurisdiction this case, though there are some contacts. Court seems to be saying that even if exercise of jurisdiction might result in unfairness, if D has established contacts with the forum, there will be jurisdiction. 10 - Some scholars seem to think this case represents courts way of aggregating contacts related to claim and those unrelated to claim in order to reach minimum contact standard (indication that neither related nor unrelated contacts would have been alone sufficient - Single publication rule: in defamation suit, must get damage done in all states paid in just one state – do it all at once – can’t bring another suit. P is free to pick court anywhere Helicopteros v. Hall: Texas state wrongful death action as a result of Peruvian crash of helicopter operated by Helicopteros. Supreme Court decided that Texas did not have personal jurisdiction over Helicopteros. Court said no general jurisdiction b/c contacts between Helicopteros and TX when seen as unrelated to controversy were insufficient. Court said no specific jurisdiction b/c not raised in briefs (but this is a lie) and injury did not arise in TX (yet, but for negotiations in TX injury never would have happened). Court said injury did not “arise out of or relate to activities in TX” and court seemed to want no part in figuring out when claim arises out of forum. - as the number or importance of contacts increases, there can be jurisdiction with a weaker connection between the claim and the forum - as the number or importance of contacts decreases, jurisdiction requires a stronger connection between the claim and the forum - purchases by foreign entities in the US are something we want to encourage - perhaps we need a doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity? Burger King v. Rudzewicz: ordinary kind of franchise dispute where BK sues D in Florida. Brennan subtly reformulates the contacts and fairness test into : “commercial actors’ efforts are purposefully directed towards residents of another state.” Used to be that test was activities actually IN the forum state, not just directed TOWRDS it. Brennan says that fairness factors sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of contacts than would otherwise be required. This statement reduces the rights of Ds in jurisdiction cases and changes the burden in fairness issue (once P meets burden on contacts, D has burden on fairness). - mail order specter: courts reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over foreign consumer who used mail order... more willing to exercise over foreign sellers Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court: products liability case where P sued in California b/c of serious accident there killing his wife. D manufactured tire in Taiwan and attempted to bring in Asahi, the manufacturer of the tire’s valve assembly. Court said that whether or not minimum contacts exist between the forum and Asahi, California’s attempt 11 to assert personal jurisdiction exceeded the reasonableness standard of due process. - First case where Supreme Court rested holding on fairness component - Modification of stream of commerce test: World Wide Test is too P friendly, so should require additional evidence that D was purposefully availing himself of forum - Opinion described as s primer for foreign manufacturers to read to figure out how to avoid being amendable in U.S. e. bases for jurisdiction (1) traditional bases reconsidered: U.S. constitution, discussed above, is not the only source of law governing the jurisdiction of state courts. The mere fact that an exercise of jurisdiction does not violate the DP clause, does not mean that it is permissible. A state can exercise jurisdiction only if state law gives it the authority to do so. Traditionally, state law has authorized jurisdiction when: (1) the D is a domiciliary of the state; (2) the D is served with process while present in the state’s territory; or (3) the D consents to the state’s exercise of jurisdiction. Personal Service of Process: gives notice no matter where accomplished, but serves jurisdictional basis only if accomplished within the state. Basis for general jurisdiction. Traditionally, the state could always exercise personal jurisdiction over anyone who could be served within its borders, and it could exercise jurisdiction ONLY over people who could be so served. International Shoe, requiring non-present D to have minimum contacts in order for jurisdiction to exist, flew in face of this traditional thinking (though service like this would disappear b/c no minimum contacts). Shaffer said that ALL exercises of jurisdiction must satisfy minimum contacts and fairness standards of International Shoe. - Burnham v. Superior Court: couple living in NJ separates and wife moves to CA. Wife files suit against husband in CA and when he enters the state to see his kids, he is served with process. All justices say there is jurisdiction, but Brennan and Scalia debate about why. Brennan justifies jurisdiction based on Shoe and Shaffer (used highways, used cops protection while there, traveled to CA, so can expect to be amenable there). Scalia justifies based on tradition (define DP by tradition and history. Shoe was directed only towards non-present defendants) Domicile: provides adequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction. Reciprocal rights and duties of the citizen and the state and has a justification based on necessity: there should always be some place where the D is continuously amenable to suit in any cause of action. Maximal contacts and expected, so easy to justify under Shoe and Shaffer test. 12 Appearance and consent: D with no contact with state in which she is used has three options: default, appear specially to object to the court’s jurisdiction, or appear generally and litigate on the merits. - If she takes the last course she has consented to jurisdiction without any contact with the state and this is an acceptable basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction. Does not matter whether D is appears personally or attorney appears for her (she need not set foot in the state to appear, and therefore, to consent). Courts divide on whether D’s appearance to defend original action is an adequate basis for jurisdiction over claims added by subsequent amendment. Forum does have jurisdiction, though, over the original claim AS WELL AS counterclaims. - General appearance is essentially a consent after the fact (may take the form of a document nominating a particular state official or private person as agent to accept service of process or it may take the form of contract to consent to court’s jurisdiction (Szukhent: jurisdiction consent clauses are valid even in adhesion contracts) (Bremen: forum-selection clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless the clause is unreasonable or unjust, it was procured by fraud or is overreaching, it violates the forum’s public policy, or it would be inconvenient. - Special appearance: device that permits a D to appear for the purpose of litigating the court’s jurisdiction over her without making a general appearance and thereby consenting tot he court’s exercise of jurisdiction. If D loses her jurisdictional challenge, some courts make her appeal right away (if she doesn't she is held to have appeared generally and cannot later attack jurisdiction on appeal). Most courts, though, say that D can plead on the merits without losing the right to assert objection on appeal. Bauxite’s: D can waive jurisdictional objection by refusing to participate in discovery. - Class Action Plaintiffs ( Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts): Court says that if no minimum contacts, we can justify jurisdiction over absent class members based on consent. Class Ps are different from typical Ps b/c courts protect them and they don’t have to hire lawyers. Court wants to promote these nationwide state court class actions to free up federal docket. (2) long arm statutes: traditional bases for jurisdiction were adequate until Court broadened theory in International Shoe. Gap between traditional bases and the 13 constitutional limit on jurisdiction. Filled with long arm statutes (necessary b/c w/o them court can only exercise jurisdiction up to traditional bases) Two kinds: - California: (most effective way to do it using the least amount of words). “Exercise personal jurisdiction without violating DP.” Yet these statutes don’t give D very good notice as to what kinds of behavior puts him at risk - Enumerated Act: (list those acts that make you amenable to personal jurisdiction). Greta notice to Ds, but may run the risk of leaving something out. Statute intended to take jurisdiction to constitutional limits, so why not just enact a California type (about half of the states read them as if they were anyway)? Some courts say enumerated acts matter, but should be interpreted broadly. TRANSACTING BUSINESS IN THE STATE (much broader than “doing business” could be one deal), CONTRACTING TO SUPPLY IN THE STATE (contact can be executed anywhere), TORTIOUS INJURY IN THE STATE (does not require local injury, but only local act – reaches resident manufacturer), FOREIGN ACT WITH LOCAL TORTIOUS INJURY (injury in this state by act or omission outside state), INTEREST OR USE OR POSSESSION OF PROPERTY IN THE STATE (generates personal jurisdiction, not in rem – simply used property as a connector), CONTRACTING TO INSURE IN THE STATE (contract can be executed anywhere – all we care about is where risk insured is) ________________________________________________________________________ PERSONAL JURISDICTION ATTACK STRATEGY: Does a traditional bases generate jurisdiction? PEOPLE: served with process, domiciliary, consent CORPORATION: incorporated, doing business, consent Does a long arm statute generate jurisdiction? CALIFORNIA: go directly to Constitutional issue ENUMERATED ACT: does one of the sections apply in this case? If yes to either of first two questions, is it constitutional? (certain minimum contacts so that maintenance of suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice) CONTACTS: 1. measured for general jurisdiction – enough contacts that any claim can be litigated there 14 2. measured for specific jurisdiction – does claim arise out of controversy> number? Claim relatedness? Did D initiate contacts? Stream of commerce? FAIRNESS: 1. burden on D severe? 2. Forum have an interest? 3. P have convenient alternative? 4. look at interstate judicial system’s interest 5. advance shared interests of several states? ________________________________________________________________________ (3) jurisdiction for federal courts: as a Constitutional matter, can exercise jurisdiction over anyone with minimum contacts with U.S. (might be unreasonable, but passes contacts test). Usually the jurisdiction is the same as state courts across the street b/c of statutory restrictions - FRCP Rule 4(k): can establish jurisdiction over person of D (1)(A): jurisdiction over those by corresponding jurisdiction of state court (minimum contacts) (1)(B): jurisdiction over D joined by Rule 14 impleader or Rule 19 (minimum contacts with forum state or bulge area) (1)(C): jurisdiction over those subject to federal interpleader under 28 U.S.C. §1335 (Minimum contact with US) (1)(D): jurisdiction when authorized by statute of US – national long arm statute (minimum contacts with US) (2) A federal long arm statute and gap filing exercise that says that if there is a federal question and D has minimum contacts with US, there is jurisdiction 3. Jurisdiction Over Things (more precisely the jurisdiction over the interest of persons in things) a. the traditional taxonomy distinction between personal and in rem jurisdiction is that a court with personal jurisdiction can do pretty much anything – any form of remedy the court gives. In rem jurisdiction or any form of property based jurisdiction gives the court a vastly more limited power (all court can do is create and destroy interests in the thing, or “res”). Types: - in rem: least controversial; forum court adjudicates interests of everyone in the thing. The power to do so rests on the power over the thing – don’t care bout contacts. P asserts and court adjudicates title to the thing as against all of the world. Justification is 15 necessity. Exists in relatively few cases (admiralty, forfeiture, probate, condemnation) - quasi in rem: about claims of ownership asserted by the P in the property. Different from in rem b/c there is a particular D named and the suit is not against the whole world. Common to have suits that remove cloud on title. All the court can do is change interests in the property. - Attachment: based on a claim that has nothing to do with the thing (it can, but usually does not). Usually is just b/c P can’t get personal jurisdiction over D (P concedes that D owns property and says “I can’t get personal jurisdiction over you, but I can hold your property hostage”). If P wins, the property is sold and P gets the proceeds up to the value of the claim. If P loses, can go somewhere else D has property. b. the development of attachment jurisdiction Pennoyer v. Neff was also the first to set out the theoretical basis for attachment jurisdiction. The narrow holding of Pennoyer was that the presence of D’s property within the forum and its attachment at the commencement of the action are absolute prerequisites to a proper exercise of attachment jurisdiction. The principle permitted a court, if it attached real property of the D at the commencement of the action, to adjudicate a personal claim against the D even though there was no personal jurisdiction over him and even though the claim had nothing to do with the attached property. The main limitation was that a court with attachment jurisdiction could not issue a personal judgment against the D; its power was limited to the authority to award the property to the P or to order the property to be sold and the proceeds to satisfy the claim. Seems to fly in the face of International Shoe’s standards of minimum contacts and fairness, yet it is very difficult to have property in a state without having minimum contacts. Argument for tangible property is weaker b/c the property is not permanently located anywhere and it is much easier to have it without having minimum contacts with the state. Harris v. Balk: Court held that the obligations of a debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes. That obligation represents intangible personal property of the creditor, which can be attached to provide a basis for attachment jurisdiction, even though the creditor has no connection with the forum state. Very potent instrument of unfairness Seider v. Roth: Took the rule of Balk to its logical extent. As long as D had an insurer who did business in all fifty states, he was amenable to suit in any of those states, no matter where the injury occurred. c. the in rem revolution Shaffer v. Heitner (again): Court says that a huge hunk of traditional in rem jurisdiction is not ok. All exercises of jurisdiction must comply with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Court also says, 16 though, that quasi in rem and in rem actions are usually in state where property is located (this seemed to save in rem and quasi in rem) As for attachment jurisdiction, seems to suggest that attachment actions where tort or contract is related to the property meets the tests of fairness. ATTACHMENT CLEARLY EXISTS IF D HAS MINIMUM CONTACT WITH THE STATE. (amount of contacts required might be less than required for personal jurisdiction). Necessity says that must have attachment jurisdiction when used to enforce an in-personam judgment (P using attachment jurisdiction in F2 to enforce a personal judgement of F1 where D has plenty of property.) - Justice Powell in dissent says that perhaps in case of land, attachment jurisdiction without contacts is ok (controversial b/c implies larger doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity 4. Limits Upon The Exercise of Jurisdiction a. force , fraud, and privilege: a court will not exercise jurisdiction over a D or his property if jurisdiction has been obtained by force or fraud for policy reasons, courts typically have held some D’s immune from service and refused to exercise jurisdiction over them (a person who enters a state to serve as a witness in a proceeding in the state’s courts will typically be immune from service and a person who enters a state to appear as a defendant in a criminal or civil proceeding has immunity) b/c of long arm statutes, force and fraud are not big deals today b. forum non-conveniens common law: permits a court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient forum for the action and if another more convenient forum is available to the P. Does not give the D a right to avoid suit in an inconvenient forum, rather, its application depends heavily on the exercise of sound discretion of the trial judge - interests to be considered are the proximity and accessibility of tangible evidence, the availability of compulsory process for unwilling witnesses, the travel costs for willing witnesses, the possibility of viewing the relevant property, etc. - Supreme Court has stated that the balance must tilt heavily in favor of the D in order to upset the P’s choice of forum options: if judge decides that D is inconvenienced seriously, she cannot simply transfer the case to the courts of another state. The simplest option is to dismiss the case outright and assume that the P will bring the suit in another more convenient forum. Another option is to condition dismissal upon the D’s waiver of any objection he may have to a suit in another more convenient forum (person, venue, statute of limitations, etc.). Finally, the court may stay the action pending P’s demonstrated ability to bring suit against the D in a more convenient forum. 17 Federal transfer: within the federal court system, the doctrine of forum non-conveniens has been supplanted largely by statute: 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) provides that for convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. The remedy is not dismissal; the federal court simply transfers the case to a more appropriate forum. Statute permits transfer on a lesser showing of inconvenience than does the common law. Serious choice of law problems can occur with the federal transfer statute. The new forum may have choice of law principles or substantive law rule that are less favorable to the P’s claims that the law of the original forum. §1406 allows a court in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong divisions or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the best interests of justice, transfer it to the district or divisions where it could have been brought. - Van Dusen v. Barrack: Court held that nay transfer of jurisdiction under §1404(a) carries to the new forum the law of the state where the suit was filed originally. Indicates that when the Supreme court has control over the transferee court, it will ensure that a change of courts does not result in a change of law - Piper Aircraft v. Reyno: Supreme court said that a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non-convenien inquiry. Can’t require Scotland to apply American law. - Ferens: P inured by lawnmower and waited five years to sue. Couldn’t bring action in PA b/c statute of limitations had run, but could bring it in Mississippi and move for a transfer. Court allows this b/c P already had right to Mississippi law and locked in Mississippi statute of limitations. Plus, better to have one rule than two (same rule for both Ps and Ds) c. limits imposed by contract – jurisdiction ouster clauses many contracts today routinely include forum selection clauses and courts routinely enforce them valid forum selection clause can be seen as yet another limitation the exercise of jurisdiction d. other limitations our law has long distinguished between local and transitory actions. Local actions are usually those involving land and can be heard only by the court in the situs state. No good policy supports the refusal of a court with personal jurisdiction over the parties to hear their action another set of limitations on jurisdiction involves claims that the forum will not entertain based on policy reasons - penal laws: courts will not enforce the criminal laws of other states 18 - taxes: state will not entertain an action brought by a sister state to enforce the sister state’s tax laws. No good policy supports the tax limitation rule, so in the past couple of years many state courts have heard these actions - public policy: notion that the law upon which the cause of action is based offends the public policy of the forum. Convenient escape device e. multi-district and complex litigation Congress passed the Multidistrict Litigation Act: permits a special panel to transfer civil cases which involve common question of fact to one judge for all pre-trial proceedings. The cases are then transferred for trial to the districts in which they were filed. complex litigation is becoming overwhelming for courts, so proposals include: mass consolidation, transferring all cases to one court for trial, and a uniform choice of law rule. D. Venue 1. In general Venue: the way states divide up the judicial business geographically by rules that indicate which county or judicial district within the state is the appropriate place to bring the action. Rules of venue give the D a privilege not to be sued in an inconvenient forum; they do not affect the power or competence of the court. 2. forum non-conveniens, transfer, limits on the exercise of jurisdiction a. forum non-conveniens under common law, as stated above, court has discretion to dismiss, stay, or dismiss in condition is inconvenience to D is great enough federal transfer statute allows judge to transfer b. transfer 28 U.S.C. §1404 allows federal judges to transfer to other federal courts where the action may have been originally brought. Does not apply to state courts. c. jurisdiction ouster clauses courts routinely uphold jurisdiction selecting clauses III. Choice of Law A. Introduction Started with Justice Story – right of a state to control what went on in its courts First Restatement and Beale: idea that the moment a cause of action arises, rights vest according tot he law of the place where the crucial event occurred Second Restatement: law was and should be functional, and legal rules should be tailored to serve societal goals. Hard and fast rules in favor of a general principle that the law of the state with the most significant relationship to a transaction should control. Currie: choice of law process should focus on the policies behind the state substantive law rules; whether a rules should be applied should depend upon whether the policy underlying the rule would be advanced by its application. Known as Interest analysis 19 B. The Traditional Approach – The first Restatement (Hard and fast rules with escape devices) 1. Introduction a. Theory: vested rights vested rights theory provided an alternative view of the choice of law process (old view was applying foreign law based on notions of comity). This new view was more acceptable to the territorialist and formalist jurisprudence of the early 20th century. Since foreign law could never operate outside the territory of the foreign sovereign, vested rights theory proposed that the forum’s use of foreign law could be explained in terms if the creation and enforcement of vested rights. When an event occurred in a foreign territory, a right was created. B/c the only law that could operate in a foreign territory was the law of the foreign sovereign, the existence and content of any such right was determined by the foreign law. The forum court simply enforced the right which had vested in the foreign territory according to foreign law. Important, under the theory, to know when and where a particular right vested, b/c the law of the place where the right vested would control the content of the right System of a few, broad, relatively rigid choice of law rules that each governed a major area of the law by a identifying a particular contact as the trigger for the vesting of the right. b. Practice law consists of a few. Broad single-contact jurisdiction selecting rules coupled with an array of escape devices jurisdiction-selecting rules: they pick between competing states, not between competing rules. The court does not consider the scope, content, or policy of the substantive rule of law until after the state is chosen. Not concerned with which substantive rule is better or which validates the parties’ intentions, or which is motivated by a policy that can be advanced by its application. Concerned only with identifying a particular event and the jurisdiction in which the event occurred. Rely on only one salient connection between the dispute and the state. 2. The Rules a. Torts First Restatement specifies the LAW OF THE PLACE OF THE WRONG for nearly all issue in torts Law of the place of the wrong is the state where the last event necessary to make the actor liable for the alleged tort takes place (in almost all circumstances , this is the injury to the P, so the place of the wrong rally means the place of injury or the place where the harmful force first takes effect on the body) A few limited exceptions: - section 387 provides that vicarious liability of the D for the acts of another is determined by the place of the 20 wrong only if the D authorized the person to act for him in that state - section 382 shields from liability a person who acts in state X pursuant to a legal duty or privilege and causes an injury actionable in state Y - argument for exceptions is that the actor in each case justifiably relies on the law of the state where he acts; his reasonable expectation should not be frustrated bc/ of the fortuity of an out of state injury. some torts involve non-physical injuries, and locating such injuries is not always easy b. contracts LAW OF THE PLACE OF MAKING is the choice of law rule that governs the validity of contracts b/c it is certain in application, easier for parties to ascertain and follow law of place of making governs such issues in contract validity as capacity, formalities, consideration, and defenses. Place of making is where the principle event necessary to make the contract occurs. For formal contract, the principal event is delivery; for an informal unilateral contract, the offeree’s performance; for a bilateral contract, the offeree’s promise. Section 326 adopts the mailbox rule and provides that the state where the acceptance was transmitted is the place of contracting. One major exception to the place of making rule: section 358 provides that questions concerning issues of performance are to be governed by the law of the place of performance (matter of performance, time and place of performance, the persons by and for whom the performance shall be rendered, the sufficiency of performance, etc.) this exception is so large that it threatens to swallow the rule c. Property (1) immovables, the situs rule First Restatement requires application of he law of the situs (the location of the land) to nearly all questions concerning interests in the land (rule applies to conveyances, adverse possession, mortgages and liens, marital property, trusts, and succession by will) Modern courts continue to apply the situs rule b/c: (1) only the situs has absolute power over land, so all courts should apply the law the situs would apply – then situs will enforce orders; (2) tittle searching should be made as easily as possible and the searcher should be able to apply the law he knows best rather than some other forum’s law; and (3) situs is the state with the greatest interest in the land (2) movables, inter-vivos transfers, succession on death for nearly all inter-vivos transactions of movables, the First Restatement prescribes the law of the place where the moveable was located at the time of the transaction. Thus, the situs rule applies to conveyances, adverse possession, etc. 21 - It is immaterial that the parties to the transaction live elsewhere, or that the agreement to make the transaction occurs elsewhere or that the movable arrived at the situs only by chance. succession on death: the First Restatement refers questions concerning testamentary disposition of movables and intestate succession of movables to the law of the decedent’s domicile at the time of death. Rationale is that it is desirable to have an entire estate pass according to a single plan 3. Escape Devices: judges felt illegitimate giving reasons that were not cold logic for breaking with the cold formalism of the vested rights theory, so they used formalist tricks to obtain the right results. Devices can be and often are manipulated to “escape” the otherwise inflexible regime imposed by traditional choice of law rules a. Characterization the jurisdiction selecting rules of the First Restatement required each case to be labeled in order to determine which choice of law rule applied. Obviously, the result could turn on which label the court chose for the problem and often it was not clear why the court picked one name tag rather than another. Can come in many forms: - tort > contract - substance > procedure - property > contract - equitable conversion - tort > domestic relations case manipulation by judge and lawyer was very possible b/c what label was chosen was never really explained. Undermines uniformity and predictability in decision-making by permitting a judge to avoid explaining real reasons for his choice Creates a disconnect between the why and the how of the case – the reasons for the decision are not those stated Arkansas Telegraph Cases: to obtain favorable results, in case #1 the court called the case a tort, and in case #2 called the case a contract action. Hard to read this precedent. Equitable conversion: really specialized characterization device which permits a court to re-characterize real property as personal property - Duckwall v. Lease: decedent dies and leaves instructions in will for land to be sold and the proceeds to go to her legatees. Courts characterizes problem as one not of land, but of movable property (the money they get for it) Domestic relations: court may want to re-characterize a tort as a domestic relations case, b/c in these cases the forum applies the law of the marital domicile b. Renvoi 22 in American conflicts law, a reference to the law of another jurisdiction is almost always a reference to the law that the foreign state would apply to a purely domestic problem. The focus, in conflicts parlance, is not the “whole law” of the other state (its substantive plus its choice of law rules), but rather it is internal law (rules the other state would use in a purely domestic problem) Occasionally, though, as an escape device, courts would apply the whole law of a state instead of just its tort law or contract law. Renvoi is applying another state’s choice of law rules (read the word “law’ to mean “whole law”) Why? It is important sometimes to get a certain case to have the same result in one forum as it would have in another forum b/c : - power: if case involves real property and we do what the situs would have done, the situs will enforce the judgement - uniformity: decedent has personal property in MI and France. MI says law of domicile and FR says law of decedent nationality. France applies own choice of law rules and distributes according to law of N. In MI, read our choice of law rule to refer to French choice of law rules, the red French to refer to N. - Erie: a fed court sitting in diversity will apply law of the state where it sits (to avoid forum shopping) say to federal court, apply tort law and choice of law of the state in order to avoid forum shopping First Restatement courts also applied renvoi when they felt like it as an escape device. University of Chicago v. Dater: court gave no reason for the use of renvoi. Horrible b/c no rule as to when a court can use and when not. Seems choice of law is up for grabs in every case. Every choice of law precedent is unreliable c. Public policy Court confined by the rules of the First Restatement had an ultimate escape device available to avoid an unpalatable results... by invoking the “public policy” device, a court could sweep away the results called for by the traditional rules and usually, without much explanation, apply its own law to achieve the desired results. Court gave no standard for determining when public policy escape device should be invoked Judges tried to make the formula objective, but really couldn’t. “Inherently vicious, wicked, and immoral” was the language used. ________________________________________________________________________ What is good about the first Restatement? 1. easy to apply and simple if you apply it right out of the box (until we add escape devices) 23 2. fairly uniform and predictable (but with escape devices uniformity goes away) 3. often lauded as forum neutral 4. decreases incentive for forum shopping escape devices were sign that something was wrong - reasons in the opinions did not accurately reflect reasons of decisions - can’t accurately predict results ________________________________________________________________________ C. New Approaches to Choice of Law judges made tentative moves away from First Restatement in the 1950s courts started to experiment with other choice of law rules 1. Center of Gravity (A first step) Auten: Judge Fuld noted that recent cases had adopted the “center of gravity” or “grouping of contacts” theory, which looks not tot he place of making f the contract, but emphasizes the law of the place which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute. Although the approach affords less certainty and predictability, he adopted it b/c it the focus on specific legal issues permitted application of the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately connected with the case. Permitted the court to consider both party and governmental interests in its quest for justice - an important change in law - influenced the drafting of the Second Restatement - primary effect was transitional Haag v. Burns: court measures number of contacts, not quality of contacts 2. Interest Analysis (Choice based on Policy Behind the Competing State Law Rules) method of analyzing choice of law problems developed by the late Professor Brainerd Currie. a. description of the method Currie based his system upon the observation that law is purposive in nature – that those who made the law sought to serve various social goals. Anonmechanical approach to choice of law must be sought b/s rote application of domestic law to choice of law problems may not optimally advance various social goals implicated in a multi-state problem. Currie argues that, in a choice of law decision making process, the government interests of each jurisdiction in having its own law applied should be considered. This helped ensure that law will not be applied unless applying that law would achieve a policy goal sought by the sovereign which promulgated the law. Forum law should supply the rule of decisions; so the burden is on the party seeking to displace forum law to show that it would be proper to do so. Court must examine the policies that different laws seek to implement, using the ordinary processes of the construction and interpretation. The aim of that construction is to ascertain the policy of the law as it might be applied in a purely domestic case. Compare reason for rule with the contacts case has with a state 24 False conflict: the policy of only one state would be furthered by applying it in the case at bar ... APPLY THE LAW OF ONLY INTERESTED STATE True conflict: the policies of each state would be furthered by the application of its law to the case. FORUM SHOULD APPLY OWN LAW Unprovided for case: the policy of no state would be advanced by applying its law in the case at bar. FORUM SHOULD APPLY OWN LAW b/c there is no important policy reason to displace the normal presumption in favor of the forum law. b. the false conflict only one state interest advanced... apply the law of the only interested state Babcock v. Jackson: guest statute case (two NYers involved in an accident in Ontario. NY is clearly the only state interested even though accident happened in Ontario) c. the true conflict each state has a policy that would be advanced by the application of its law. The policy of each state points to a contact in that state. Most of the time the forum will apply it own law in these situations Currie originally took the position that courts should not weigh or balance the competing state interests bc/ assessment of the respective values f competing interests of two legitimate sovereigns is a political function. Forum law, therefore, should apply, in the absence of a governing statute, to resolve a true conflict. If the interests do conflict, no reason exists to ignore the normal rule that the forum law should not be displaced unless good reason for doing so Many cases were embarrassing to Currie and his initial view... applying forum law in all cases simply did not make sense all of the time - People v. One Ford Victoria: Currie was embarrassed by this result. Applying forum law in this kind of case is a stretch. Currie responded by qualifying his rule that the forum law should always apply it won law: when a court recognizes a true conflict, it should reexamine its own law to see if a more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy behind the law will show that its purpose does not require application in a particular case. That may turn a true conflict into a false conflict. Comparative Impairment: Baxter proposed that state laws generally have, in addition to domestic policy objectives, external objectives which are based on the state’s need to have its own policies respected by other states. The external objective of theses state whose internal objective will be least impaired shall be subordinated to its competitor. (apply law of state whose policy will be least impaired) Relative commitment: asks who cares more about its policy? Not every policy is held as dear as every other policy d. the un-provided-for case 25 neither state’s policy refers to an in-state contact; hence neither policy would be advanced by applying its own law to the problem at bar. Currie argued that forum law should be applied b/c no good reason exists for doing otherwise. He rejected the approach of applying the “better law” b/c it might place the court in the position of condemning the law of its own state. e. manipulating the system judicial manipulation is possible under the system case that is a false conflict can re-characterized as a true conflict. Choice of law would then shift from law of interested state to forum law. No system can completely escape the curse of characterization and manipulation 3. Leflar in a series of articles, Leflar identified five “choice influencing considerations” that he perceived as providing a working basis for judicial decision-making. Argued that his considerations embody the factors which actually motivate courts and the public discussion of the considerations by judges in their opinions was an essential condition for proper decision making. - Predictability of Result: knowledge of likely result encourages planning and reliance by parties to a consensual transaction and also discourages wasteful litigation - Maintenance of interstate and international order - Simplification of the judicial task: ease of judicial administration is important. Need to expedite litigation and conserve scare judicial resources - Advancement of the forum’s governmental interests - The better rule of law: more progressive, more recovery generating, more validating Leflar has helped pinpoint the factors that influence judicial decision-making. The concern with this approach, however, if that it does not really discipline judicial thinking; rather it may tend to encourage ad hoc decision making and unprincipled selection. Its great merit is forcing judges to consider openly the comparative merits of the underlying substantive laws. If they explain their choices honestly and carefully, the considerations Leflar has identified certainly can improve the quality of the judicial product. 4. The New Territorialists (Counter Revolutionaries) interest analysis shifted the focus in choice of law cases away from the vested rights theory and it was not long before a counter-revolution set in and attempts were made to restore primacy in some form to the territorialism choice of law system. Cipolla: Court relied on Professor Cavers work as authority. Cavers argued that choice of law decisions should be influenced substantially by territorial considerations, both b/c governments are organized along territorial lines and 26 b/c party expectations have a strong territorial cast. Expectations, in other words, derive largely from the territory in which the activity takes place Cavers derived a set of seven Principles of Preference from his analysis of common choice of law problems. These principles which specifically address only a limited number of problems in tort and contract law emphasize fairness to the parties and deference to their territorially defined expectations. Combination of policy, party expectations, and territorialism. Combo helps the court achieve predictable results, and at the same time the narrow focus of the principles means that they are more likely to advance relevant substantive policies than the broad rules of the First Restatement. 5. The Second Restatement a. in general: presumptive references and the most significant relationship a court must follow a statutory choice of law, if one is available. If there is no statutorily directed choice, the Restatement provides specific jurisdiction selecting presumptions to resolve some issues. For most issue, however, the Restatement prescribes the law of he state with the most significant relationship to the issue. Significance is determined by evaluating the consideration listed in §6. - §6: factors relevant to the applicable rule of law include: (1) the needs of the interstate and international systems;(2) the relevant policies of the forum; (3) the relevant policies of the other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue; (4) the protection of justified expectations; (5) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and (7) ease in determination and application of the law to be applied - varying weight will be given to a particular factor or to a group of factors in differing areas of choice of law specific choice of law presumptions are organized by subject matter (torts, contracts, property, trusts, status, corporations, and administration of estates). Restaters sought to provide specific guidance to specific problems while permitting the selection of a more appropriate law through flexible general provisions. Presumptive choice of law can usually be trumped if some other state has a more significant relationship with the problem b. Torts most significant relationship test forms the centerpiece of the Second Restatement’s approach to tort matters. The state with the most significant relationship with an issue is determined by considering, in addition to the factors listed in §6, a list of contacts found in §145(2): - the place where the injury occurred - the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred - the domicile , residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and 27 - the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issues combination of §6 and §145 gives the court a great deal of maneuvering room when the laws of all states having contacts with the problem are identical, the Restatement provides that there is no conflict and the case should be treated, for choice of law purposes, as if the conflicts were all grouped in one state. If the laws of at least two states do conflict, then the procedure is to apply the Restatement section addressing the specific problem (if there is one). c. Contracts Second Restatement departed significantly for its predecessor in the provisions dealing with the choice of law in contract matters. Here, as elsewhere, the most significant relationship tests plays and important role; its general use frees contract choice of law rules from the iron grip of the law of the place of making, which dominated the First Restatement. At least as important in both practice and theory, however, is the authority granted the parties to designate the law that will govern their contract. The Second Restatement also provides a number of discrete residual presumptive references to handle common problems not dealt with expressly by the parties. §187: provides that the parties can choose the law to govern rights and duties arising under the contract. - §187(1) provides that the law chosen by the parties will be applied if the issue is one that could have been resolved by express provision in the contract. Does not specify a rule of law at all; rather provides a means by which parties may incorporate by reference certain provisions from foreign law into agreements - §187(2) permits the parties to choose foreign law in circumstances that extend beyond its incorporation by reference for the purposes of interpretation and construction. Even if the issue is not one which under forum law could not have been controlled by an express provision in the contract, the parties may still be able to choose it. Two limits: (1) must be a substantial relationship between state law chosen and the issue or some other reasonable basis; and (2) can’t be contrary to fundamental public policy of the MSR state. Restatement provides two general techniques for handling contracts cases in the absence of a valid choice of law clause. The first is a series of presumptive references in the several specific categories of cases. The second is the old standby – most significant relationship doctrine. 28 - several of the specific sections do not select a jurisdiction at all but merely refer the court back to the Restatement’s general contact choice of law sections, §187 (party autonomy) and §188 (most significant relationship) - where a party sets forth a presumption concerning a specific problem, it usually maintains the MSR tests in reserve §188: lists a number of factors a court should consider, in combination with those mentioned in §6, in determining the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship. These include: - the place of contracting - the place of negotiation of the contract - the place of performance - the location of the subject matter of the contract; and - the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties §193: for contracts of insurance, don’t look at the place of making, but place where the parties thought the risk would be (huge departure form First Restatement and almost uniformly adopted) §203: validation principle – pick law of state with MSR to validate contract ________________________________________________________________________ Does Contract have choice of law clause? YES NO §187 §6 and §188 is the issue one that parties or specific sections could have resolved by explicit terms? YES Validate/ enforce Choice of law Clause NO enforce unless: §187(2)(a) contrary to No substantial public policy relation and of MSR state no reasonable basis ________________________________________________________________________ d. property closely resembles the First Restatement with a few differences: - willingness to provide rationales for the choices it made - adoption of a general principle that says that the interests of the parties in a thing are determined, 29 depending on the circumstances, either by the law or by the local law of the state, which with respect to the particular issue, has the MSR to the thing and the parties under the principles stated in §6. - Revoi used more than in First Restatement when uniformity of result is the primary objective the situs rule usually controls all questions concerning land. Dos its best to eliminate those escape devices getting around situs rule by dealing specifically with the problems. Provides in each instance a specific reference to the situs law in an effort to remove the temptation to indulge in ad hoc decision making universal adoption of the UCC has eliminated many of the choice of law problems involving movables by codifying law of sales and secured transactions. D. Impact of the Constitution 1. Introduction a state is not free to apply any law it wished to solve a particular problem; that choice is limited by several provisions of the US Constitution Legislative jurisdiction: whether the US Constitution permits the state to apply its law to the legal problem (jurisdiction to legislate) Judicial jurisdiction: the authority of a state to apply its law, statutory or judge made. Early Lochner Era: Rules of First Restatement were nearly constitutionalized New Deal Era: forum’s interest balanced against lex loci interest in the case Modern Era: as long as forum has an interest in the case, its law can be applied (roughly coincident with rational basis scrutiny) DP clause protected people from wrong choice of law and FF&C clause protects another state from wrong choice of law 2. Restrictions on Choice of Law – Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Allstate: Court says that for state’s law to be chosen, there must be significant contacts so that application is neither arbitrary nor unfair. We now know from Allstate that: (1) standard is significant contacts; (2) standard has no teeth (little restriction on state’s ability to apply own law to dispute); and (3) DP clause and FF&C clause standard are the same Shutts: Supreme court says must go through Allstate calculation of contacts for each state involved in class action suit. Now know that Allstate does have some teeth: teeth are that court MUST go through the analysis Wortman: per se rule that forum’s use of own statute of limitation is per se constitutional b/c it is traditional. E. Choice of Law in Federal Courts Federal courts underwent a profound change in 1938. Before that date they applied state rules of procedure and federal general common la on questions of substantive law not covered by state statute. After 1938, Federal courts applied the newly enacted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the substantive law of the state where they sat 30 1. The Erie Question Put an end to the possibility of forum shopping by an out-of-state litigant by requiring a federal court sitting in diversity to apply the substantive law of the state where it sits Scope of Erie clearly depends on how much of the state law the federal courts must apply. A crucial problem after Erie was how to distinguish between procedural and substantive law Guaranty Trust Co. v. York: expanded scope of Erie. It held that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the state statute of limitation to an action in equity. Far more important than the holding, though was the test the court announced for distinguishing matters of substance from matters of procedure for Erie purposes: the tests is the Outcome Determinative Test (instructs the district court to apply state law to any issue that could affect the result of the action) Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative: court began to chisel away at the Outcome Determinative Test. Indicated what while strong, the Erie/ York principle might have to yield in cases to other important principles Hanna v Plumer: Court effectively insulated the various federal rules dealing with procedure from any Erie- based attack. Outcome Determinative Test = state law to be applied to any issue that affects outcome. Reformulated, the test might best be renamed the Forum Choice Determinative Test: it counsels the use of state law when a difference between state and federal law would prompt a litigant to choose one forum rather than another. Stewart Organization v. Ricoh: makes clear what analysis should be followed in Erie cases where a federal statute is involved: when a federal statute arguably conflicts with state law, there is no need for fancy footwork. Rather the focus is on ordinary Supremacy Clause analysis: If straight forward exercise in statutory interpretation show that the statute covers the point, the federal law prevails. - court said question should be “is issue governed by FRCP, FR criminal procedure, FR admin. Procedure, FRE, FR appellate procedure, or a federal procedural statute?” If answer is yes.... apply federal rule - this above expanded question governs all courts Erie triggered whenever there is a claim by one litigant that federal law controls and a claim by another litigant that state law governs Existence of Erie problem has nothing to do with whether there is subject matter jurisdiction. In state court, no Erie question, could not come up. Federal courts are no longer bound to follow mechanically the decisions of lower state courts, nor even the decisions of the state’s highest courts if these decisions are old and eroded. Rather, a district judge, under Erie, must consider all relevant expression of the state law in order to predict how the state’s highest court would rule on a particular issue. 31 _____________________________________________________________________________ Is the Issue Governed by a FR? YES NO Apply the Federal Rule (Hanna) Hanna alteration Outcome Determinative Test: Is the issue forum choice determinative (pick one court over other?) YES Balance b/c of Byrd NO inconsequential (apply federal law) Erie v. Federal Judicial Admin. Policy that stands behind federal rule in conflict with state rule _____________________________________________________________________________ 2. Klaxon On question of what rules of choice of law a US District court is supposed to follow, Court said that federal court in diversity must apply the choice of law rules of the state where it sits - can get from chart above: FRCP not applicable, and issue is forum choice determinative. Can’t balance Erie with federal choice of law b/c there is no federal choice of law, so obviously Erie wins cost of Klaxon: we get intrastate choice of law uniformity, but we lose interstate uniformity (could only get uniformity of all if there was a federal choice of law system that applied to the state courts through the Supremacy Clause and Allstate makes it clear that this will never happen b/c state have plenary power) federal court’s obligation under Erie and Klaxon: must use all data available to predict what state court might do 3. Forum Non-conveniens and Transfer Ferens: any transfer of jurisdiction under §1404(a) carries to the new forum the law of the state where the suit was originally filed. IV. Foreign Judgments – Full Faith and Credit A. Introduction 1. Basic Principles – Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion the effect of a judgment in F1 is controlled by the law of res judicata or former adjudication law of res judicata is composed of two major branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Claim preclusion prohibits a second suit on a claim or cause of action which was asserted in a prior suit, which proceeded to a final judgement on the merits. The judgment in the first action precludes not only all questions which were actually litigated, but also all issues which might have been litigated. Issue preclusion, more limited in scope, prohibits re-litigation of factual issues actually decided in a prior 32 proceeding, regardless of whether the second proceeding is based upon the same claim or cause of action primary right theory holds that a singles cause of action consists of the violation of a single primary right the transactional theory defines a cause of action as a single transaction or occurrence, or an interlocked series of transactions or occurrences. Who is bound by a judgement and who may benefit from a judgment? The answer is typically the parties to the action and those in privity with them. Principles of res judicata are constitutional only is they bind only those who have had a day in court 2. Interstate Finality Full faith and Credit shall be given in each state tot he public Acts, Records, and judicial proceedings of every other state 28 U.S.C. §1738 exceeds the constitutional mandate by requiring FF&C for the judgements of territories and possession and by requiring that federal courts give FFC to state court judgements. Supreme Court has constitutionally required that state courts grant FFC to federal court judgments governing law of FFC might be described as the interstate application of the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. (congress has made only minimal efforts to implement the FFC Clause so courts have had the primary responsibility) 3. Enforcement of the F1 Judgement in F2 In order to get an F1 judgement enforced in F2, P must bring an action in F2 based on the F1 judgement. The result of the action in F2 is an F1 judgement which may be then enforced by a writ of execution in F2 by the appropriate F2 officials. In federal courts, Congress enacted a statute in 1948 which provides that a judgement of one district can be registered in any other district. A registered F1 judgement becomes essentially and F2 judgment, which can be enforced directly like any other F2 judgment Law of claim preclusion and issue preclusion is not the same from state to state, so, the Supreme court requires that state court judgements be given the same faith and credit as have in courts of such state from which they are taken Mutuality: stranger can never use results from suit #2. Modern non-mutuality: stranger can use results F2 must apply F1’s law of judgments when F1 is more preclusive than F2. When F1 is less preclusive than F2, F2 should give the F1 judgement at least as much preclusive effect as F2 judgement and no more. B. Full Faith and Credit for In Rem Judgments an F1 in rem, quasi in rem, or attachment judgment is entitled to FFC in F2. (A court that has only property based jurisdiction cannot order D to perform an act, nor can it decree that D is a judgement debtor of P. all that it can do is adjudicate the rights of person in the thing over which it has jurisdiction. Its 33 judgement can do no more than create or destroy interests in the res. F2’s obligation under the FFC clause, then , is to simply recognize as valid the interests created by the F1 judgement). If F1 court with only property based jurisdiction exceeds its limited powers and purports to issue a personal judgement against D, that judgement is not entitled to FFC in F2. If, in an in rem, quasi in rem, or attachment action in F1 the D makes a limited appearance and the parities litigate on the merits, the F1 court’s on the findings actually litigated will preclude subsequent relitigation of those issues in F2 even though the F1 court lacked personal jurisdiction over the D. C. The Reach and Limits of Full Faith and Credit 1. The Iron Law If the F1 court has jurisdiction over both the person and the subject matter, this judgment is entitled to FFC in F2, even though that judgment is based upon a mistake of fact or law (or if F2 just smiley hates the law!!) . If the losing litigant wishes to correct such a mistake, she must do so in F1’s courts. Once the F1 judgment is final according tot he law of F1, however, the FFC clause prohibits collateral attack in F2. This might be called the Iron Law of FFC. FFC applies to judgments, not laws. One state can reuse to apply the law of another (on policy grounds), but one cannot refuse to apply the judgement of another state. In your face disgrace case: must have interstate recognition of a judgment to have a country. If F2 screws up and refuses to give FFC to F2 when it should, F3 cannot refuse FFC to F2. Must fix error in F2 by appeal, not by F3 refusing FFC. When two inconsistent judgments, later judgement in time is entitled to FFC) 2. Exceptions I: Defects in the F1 Judgment a. not on the merits a judgment not given preclusive effect in F1 need not be given preclusive effect in F2. Judgements not on the merits make up one large class of judgements without claim-preclusive effect. (typically said to be on the merits when it rests on a determination of the validity of the parties’ claim and defenses under the applicable substantive law) F1’s definition of “on the merits” and F1’s law about “on the merits” applies in F2 b. finality a judgment not final under the law of the state which rendered it is not entitled to FFC. In many jurisdictions this rule embraces judgments on appeal. Some courts say vacated judgment until affirmed on appeal. Other courts say vacated upon reversal upon appeal A judgment subject to modification (such as custody or alimony) is also not considered final. Finality must be defined according to F1’s law c. Fraud 34 F2 need not grant FFC to an F1 judgement that was procured by fraud. Define fraud according to F1 Extrinsic fraud: fraud that prohibited fact finder from even seeing question (F1’s usually say that in this case judgment can be attacked) Intrinsic fraud: F1 fact finder had fraud before it (perjured testimony, forged documents) (F1’s historically would not support attack in F1 based on this, so no attack in F2) BUT law has changed: Restatement 2d adopted a less preclusive stance. Judgment can now be attacked for extrinsic fraud and intrinsic fraud if litigant could not have , by reasonable means, learned the truth of the matter d. lack of jurisdiction when a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or jurisdiction over the person its judgement is void and therefore, not entitled to FFC in F2 That rule, perhaps as basic as the Iron Law of FFC, is subject to an important qualification: A court’s finding on jurisdiction, like its finding on any other relevant issue, may preclude re-litigation of that issue. Litigated > Precluded (if litigated in F1, precluded in F2) and Not Litigated > Not Precluded YET EACH OF THESE PRINCIPLES HAS A COUNTER EXAMPLE: - Kalb v. Foyerstein: Fed Bankruptcy Court refused to give F! judgment FFC even though it had heard and decided SMJ issue - Chicot Co.: jurisdiction was not contested, litigated, and determined in F1, yet court said it was precluded in F2) e. the land taboo An F1 judgement that purports to affect directly title to land in F2 need not be respected by F2. Fall v. Eastin: majority in Fall stands for the principle that one state cannot directly affect the title to land located in another state. This is a little rule: b/c forum can have in personam jurisdiction over Ds, forum can have a massive effect on land in F2 (just can’t do it directly). Key is that an F1 court with personal jurisdiction can order a person over which it exercises control to do ANYTHING ANYWHERE (if he doesn’t do it, hold him in contempt) 3. Exceptions II: Ignoring a Valid F1 Judgment a. no competent court in F2 the law is well settled that a state may not refuse to enforce a sister state judgement o the ground that the original action could not have been brought in the state in which the enforcement is sought. A claim that has been reduced to judgment must be enforced by another state even though the claim is one that could have not been brought there originally. There are only two limits: (1) a state need not permit a suit to enforce a judgement by one who lacks capacity to sue under forum law and 35 (2) the judgement creditor is seeking must be available in the forum (ordinarily no problem b/c most ask for money and all courts can do this) b. penal judgments the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another. So, valid F1 judgments based on purely penal claims are not entitled to FFC in F2. What is penal defined not according to the law of F1, but according to constitutional definitions Huntington: case that instructs what penal means: F2 need not grant FFC to judgment that is penal only if it is penal in the international sense: (1) recovery in favor of the state; (2) purpose is to punish NOT to compensate c. public policy Restatement §103: a judgment rendered in one state of the United States need not be recognized or enforced in a sister state if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the national policy of FFC b/c it would involve an improper interference with the important interests of the sister state sounds like the in-your-face-disgrace-case, but it should really say “recognition is not required by FFC b/c it would be an interference with important domestic and governmental affairs.” Means that courts cannot interfere with important governmental affairs. Good example are anti-suit injunctions: A sues B in F1, B sues A in F2 to enjoin A from continuing to prosecute in F1. F2 can’t do this – can’t interfere with he governmental machinery in F1. Supreme court approached the issue in two other contexts: domestic relations and workers compensation - domestic relations: permitted NC to refuse FFC to what would have been a valid divorce in NV - worker compensation: three cases all summarized in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light. Supreme Court generates the limited choice of law argument...USUALLY an OH court hearing a suit on MI P can make a decision about whose law it will apply. It will consider the interests of MI and will incorporate it into its judgment. B/c of this, MI is not free to disregard judgement and reconsider its own interest. In Workers Comp cases, always use only one state’s charts for figuring out compensation and never give any though to the other laws. B/c of this, I can refuse the judgement and consider its own interest. DANGEROUS b/c now any time there is a limit on choice of law capabilities, there can be re-adjudication §103 is probably the law if stated correctly in narrow holding about anti-suit injunctions. 36