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Was there observance of the substantive and procedural
requirements in Sigaw’s Pirma petition?
(By Felicito C. Payumo, former Representative, Ist District of
Bataan, Former Chairman/Administrator, Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority)
The Supreme Court has been known to be very strict in the
observance of the substantive and procedural requirements of due
process. It was unbending on this rule in Garcia vs. COMELEC,
the case involving the first exercise in recalling an elective official.
On the eve of July 1, 1993, the majority of the members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly of Bataan constituted themselves for
the purpose of the recall of the incumbent Provincial Governor,
Enrique T. Garcia. The PRAC of Bataan, composed of all the
mayors, vice mayors and councilors of the 12 municipalities of
Bataan, had a membership of 144, and its majority was 73. While
74 signatures were found genuine in their Resolution– barely but
still satisfying the 50% plus 1 requirement, the Supreme Court
nullified the resolution. What was the reason? For failing to give
notice to all members of the assembly, especially the political
allies of Governor Garcia. Never mind if the Local Government
Code provided that 50% plus 1 was sufficient to initiate the recall,
and that it did not specifically require sending of notice to all
members. The majority members argued that they had the number,
so why bother with the rest? But the Supreme Court was not
impressed. It ruled that “the due process clause of the constitution
requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should
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always be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its
silence. To the extent that the other members were not notified of
the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is the sovereign voice of
the people they represent nullified.”
The convenors had to comply and sent notices to all members of
the PRAC (via registered mail, telegrams, and other means
showing proof of delivery) to once again “convene in session on
September 26, 1993 at the town plaza of Balanga, Bataan at 8:30
o”clock in the morning.” The PRAC convened and 87 of its
members once more passed a resolution calling for the recall of
Governor Garcia. Thirteen (13) more signatures were added to the
original 74! But that’s another story.
Governor Garcia, then filed a Supplemental Petition and
Reiteration of Extremely Urgent Motion pressing for their
contention that the PRA mode of recall provided in section 70 of
RA 7160 was unconstitutional. It was here that the Supreme Court
reiterated that “every law enjoys the presumption of validity… To
strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the
statute permits.” A recall election was set in which the official
being recalled was, automatically, a candidate.
The rest was history. Governor Garcia lost to Governor Ding
Roman in the recall election. But Garcia had since won in a
subsequent Gubernatorial election, after Roman has completed his
3 terms.
My purpose in bringing up this case is not to reopen old political
wounds but to draw lessons from the experience. Looking back, I
now see the merit for the Supreme Court’s assiduous insistence in
the observance of due process. Governor Garcia was going to be
subjected to a recall election. At the very minimum, he had that
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right to due process which the pro-recall group, to which I then
belonged, ignored.
Fatal Flaw
Given this strict ruling of the Supreme Court, we see a fatal flaw in
the process done by the Sigaw ng Bayan petitioners in securing the
alleged 6.3 million signatures . The petition was peddled around
for signatures in the barangays, not in signing booths or stations
where an election registrar or his representative could be present to
witness the signing. How, then, can the more than 1500 Municipal
Election Registrars verify those signatures? By comparing them to
the voters’ specimen signatures in the Registry of Voters, I
suppose. But are they all handwriting experts? Had there been
signing stations or booths, (as in election booths) where teachers
could check the voters’ ID with their names in the register, perhaps
one can argue for presumption of validity of the process. We do
not even have to go into the question of whether the people were
coerced or duped. The question is: are the 6.3 million signatures
genuine and verifiable? That is what then Justice Artemio
Panganiban asked, even as he dissented in the Santiago vs.
COMELEC case.
Now, what is the significance of the Garcia Case to Sigaw’s Pirma
petition? The Supreme Court protected the right of Garcia. He was
one individual, and a local executive. In contrast,
Sigaw’s Pirma seeks the wholesale abolition of the Senate, an
institution composed of twenty four (24) individuals who are
national officials. Are they not deserving of the same protection?
Can the Supreme Court be so cavalier in its treatment of the right
of 24 Senators? What is the due process that the Senators are
entitled to? Section 13 (f) of RA 6735, An Act Providing for a
System of Initiative and Referendum requires that “the petition
shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated
representative, in the presence of the representative of the
proponent… Signature stations may be established in as many
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places as may be warranted.” While this section refers to initiative
on national laws and local legislation and petitions, then all the
more should it apply to petitions of national import. Was this
procedure punctiliously, meticulously and strictly followed? Aside
from the right of the Senators, the exercise of People’s Initiative is
laden with greater and far significant implications. It involves not
just the removal of an elected official or officials, but the overhaul
of our Constitution.
Should this exercise not be subjected to an even higher bar of
observance of the substantive and procedural requirements of due
process? To my mind, this is what the anti-Pirma group should
attack. Not the difference between revision and mere amendment
where lawyers have ample room to argue. Not the inadequacy of
the enabling law which the Supreme Court can reconsider. After
all, it has many times decided that “every law enjoys the
presumption of validity,…and the presumption rests on the respect
due to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the Legislative,
by which the law is passed, and by the Chief Executive by whom
the law is approved.” (Alba vs. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 [1957] )
But this lack of observance of the substantive and procedural
requisites is what perhaps, as Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J. pointed
out in his column, Chief Justice Panganiban meant when he stated,
“This to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test of a people’s
initiative…if as claimed by many, these 6 million signatures are
fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all history in
a signature verification process under our open system of legal
advocacy.”
(Reactions to this paper can be addressed to:
fcpayumo@hotmail.com)
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