Chapter 4
Grand Strategy
Armed with some basic concepts in international relations and the associated language, we are prepared to
move toward a discussion of national security strategy. National security strategy, grand strategy, is not about
winning a war in Iraq or about winning a global war on terrorism. Grand strategy is about assuring the
position of the United States in the world, its place in the international system of states, and it is a guide to
the exercise of power and influence to attain or maintain the desired position. Grand strategy guides the
use of national power—all instruments of national power.
Strategic theories ascribe cause and effect relationships between the uses of power and their
consequences. In the following two chapters, we review modern strategic thought, including the several
variants of Cold War containment, the strategic alternatives offered after the Cold War, and the
pronounced swings in the strategies of post-Cold War administrations. But first, some definitions are in
order.
What is a strategy?
A strategy links ends, ways, and means. That is, the ends of a strategy are the objectives or goals to be
achieved, the means include the multitude of resources devoted to achievement of those objectives, and the
ways are the methods of organizing and employing those resources to achieve national objectives. Ways are
the heart of strategy formulation. Aligning and balancing ends, ways, and means is the strategic calculation.
Not every formulation of ends, ways, and means qualifies as a strategy. Stating lofty objectives
inadequately supported by resources is not a strategy. It is little more than wishful thinking, a vision.
Vision statements are valuable, but they are not strategies. At the other extreme, providing resources for
all possible objectives—for example, maintaining large standing military forces capable of responding to
all conceivable contingencies—squanders resources. Tough choices must be made to concentrate
resources to minimize risks to the most vital interests while accepting some risks elsewhere. If not, the
resultant formulation fails to constitute a strategy, and the failure is a formula for exhaustion. It is all too
easy to fall victim to one of these two pathologies.
What constitutes a good strategy?
A good strategy guides the use of power as events emerge. Without a good strategy, one can only react to
events as they occur, yielding the initiative to the enemy by allowing the enemy to select the time, place,
and terms of the competition. Some presidents have possessed an overarching understanding of the
geostrategic environment, a view of America’s position in it, and a strategy to guide their behavior.
Eisenhower, Nixon, and George H.W. Bush responded to crises in the context of a persistent strategy.
Other presidents lacked a governing strategic view and allowed crises to dictate responses. Truman,
Carter, and George W. Bush reacted to crises outside the context of declared strategy. Presidents are also
differentiated by their ability to recognize and seize strategic opportunities. The Nixon and elder Bush
administrations offer notable successes in this area.
Presidents differed in their ability to limit themselves to pursuits they could afford. Large, expanding
means do not equate to infinite or even adequate means for all objectives. The condition of undifferentiated
threats, an inability to differentiate between vital and peripheral interests, and the threats to them, led to
exhaustive responses. Good strategies minimize risks to vital interests and accept some risks elsewhere.
Exhaustive responses are all too common, with Truman, Kennedy-Johnson, Reagan, and the younger
Bush offering clear examples.
A sustainable strategy is underwritten by public support. Only presidential leadership can build a
consensus to commitment. The American public grants the president wide latitude initiating action, but
withdraws support without a deliberate and sustained consensus-building effort. But even a concerted
effort at consensus building will fail if a strategy is not consistent with the nation’s philosophy. Truman,
Johnson, and Bush 43 are notable in their failure to build a consensus to commitment to their respective
wars. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, although beyond the scope of this work, is notable for his sustained
effort at building and maintaining a consensus to commitment.
All instruments of power are brought to bear in a good strategy. There are limits to what can be
achieved with any instrument of power, including the hard power provided by the military instrument.
Failure to recognize the limits of military power is a dangerous trap. The complementary use of all
instruments is more efficient and more effective. Moreover, not all power is in the hands of the United
States. There are other forces at work that can be leveraged, for example, rejection of the sense of
monolithic communism and recognition of the separate nationalistic impulses that allowed Nixon to drive
a wedge between China and the Soviet Union.
In short, a good strategy

pits strength against weakness,

denies the enemy the ability to determine the time, place, and terms of the competition,

distinguishes between vital and peripheral interests,

pursues clear objectives and judiciously applies scarce resources (subordinates means to
ends),

employs all instruments of power,

is consistent with national philosophy, and

is relevant to the time, e.g., consistent with contemporary international politics, military
developments, available technology, and domestic attitudes.
How is national security strategy expressed?
There are many ways to express grand strategy, but the four expressions of a nation’s grand strategy below
are used in this text:1

declaratory policy,

employment policy,

force development policy, and

force deployment policy.
The traditional four expressions are better suited to an era when national security was principally
assured by military force. The twenty-first century arguably requires a wider understanding of what
constitutes the force or power that can be brought to bear. The four expressions easily extend to include
all instruments of power rather than a narrow focus on the military instrument.
Declaratory policy is what we say we will do. The most obvious example of declaratory policy is the
president’s national security strategy document required by law since 1987. Other statements of public
officials also contribute to our declaratory policy. Declaratory policy is communicated to influence
enemies, friends, and neutral observers. Such statements deliberately exaggerate some things and
deemphasize others. Policy statements are full of constructive ambiguity—saying just enough to communicate
a position without precommitting to a response to an unpredicted stimulus.
Employment policy is what we actually do, specifically as our actions relate to the use of force to achieve
our strategic objectives. The overt use of military force is regularly described in the media. But there are
other uses of covert military or paramilitary force that go unannounced. Economic sanctions and foreign
aid are also examples of “action” policy.
Force development policy dictates what force structure we maintain and what we are developing. It
includes, for example, the number of Army divisions and Air Force fighter wings available. It also includes
their readiness level, e.g., do they require mobilization and training from the reserve forces, or are they
ready for immediate employment? The development of the next generation of weapon systems is also an
1 Paul H. Nitze, “Atoms, Strategy and Policy,” Foreign Affairs v (January 1956): 187-198. Nitze proposed the distinction
between declaratory and employment (“action”) policy. Donald Snow and others later inserted force development and
deployment policy between these two policy levels.
important expression of a nation’s strategy. Maintaining a nation building capability across the
departments and agencies is another example of force or capability development policy.
Force deployment policy dictates where we position the force in peacetime in anticipation. Having a small
Army force in South Korea, for example, serves as a trip wire and deterrent against North Korean
aggression far out of proportion to its size. And having a Navy carrier battle group persistently patrolling
within reach of the Persian Gulf is a powerful statement. Where intelligence collection efforts are focused
is another example of deployment policy.
There must be an internal consistency to these four expressions of strategy. Having a force incapable
or poorly positioned to support declaratory policy renders declaratory policy incredible. Failing to follow
through on declaratory policy renders it incredible as well. The actual use of force demonstrates both the
will and the ability that underwrites credibility. Achieving deterrent and other influence objectives through
credible declaratory policy is less expensive and more sustainable than force employment as a first resort.
Repeating a premise of this text, we must expand beyond a narrow focus on military force and consider
all instruments of power.
Declaratory policy generally, and the national security strategy document specifically, sets in motion
expensive and laborious processes. If, for example, there is a shift in emphasis from major war to small
war, or vice versa, major changes to force development policy will follow. The military departments are
required by law to organize, train, and equip the four services for the missions the president assigns to the
regional combatant commanders. An armored division, for example, had great value in major land war in
Europe but much less value to nation building in Iraq. Major shifts in declaratory policy require new
equipment with logistic support, new organizations, new doctrine, and new training programs. Each costs
money and each takes time. Employment policy not aligned with declaratory policy, or force development
and force deployment policy not keeping pace with employment policy, virtually assures unpreparedness
of the military instrument.
How is a grand strategy formulated?
How does one formulate a grand strategy? Three broad approaches are apparent. The well-established
majority approach is based on prioritized state interests. A recurring and recently resurgent approach is
based on addressing international issues expected to reduce the sources of conflict. And a third approach is
based on acting in accord with principles that reflect national values. These approaches are not mutually
exclusive. The interest-based approach dominates and the other two assert greater influence periodically.
Stephen Cambone describes the two dominant schools: the interests-based and issues-based schools.2
His analysis was conducted at csis between his service under Bush 41 and Bush 43 while the issues-based
approach enjoyed resurgence under Clinton. The principles-based or values-based approach surged under
Carter and Bush 43, although it has been apparent throughout American history.
The interests-based approach. The textbook answer to the question—how is a grand strategy
formulated—is that ends are determined by examining the interests of the state and identifying threats,
both actual and potential, to those interests. Interests are prioritized or simply differentiated as vital or
peripheral.3 The state is highly risk averse with respect to vital interests. Vital interests are non-negotiable
and therefore are pursued with all available means including military force. Honest people can and do
disagree on which interests are vital.
The interests school sees national security from the perspective of national interests with a
focus on the minimization of risks to the United States as a sovereign state in the
international system.4
2
Stephen A. Cambone, A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 1998), 8-31.
One prominent attempt categorized national interests as vital, extremely important, important, and less important. America’s
National Interests (Washington, D.C.: Commission on America’s National Interests, 1996), accessed 12 October 2008
http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/nationalinterests.pdf.
4 Cambone, New Structure, viii.
3
Defining vital interests too broadly is the first step to strategic exhaustion. The constraint on available
means requires that a strategy concentrate resources to counter threats and to minimize risks to vital
interests. Resources are shifted to vital interests and risks are shifted to the less vital. If a strategy—a
linkage of ends, ways, and means—cannot secure the state against threats to its vital interests, then ways
must be reconsidered, additional means must be allocated, what constitutes vital interests must be
redefined, or greater risks must be accepted. To defend everything is to defend nothing, Fredrick the
Great reminds us.
The interests-based approach to strategy formulation is consistent with realist thinking. Self interest
and the principles of territorial sovereignty, self determination, and non-intervention dominate.
The issues-based approach. A second prominent view is based on issues rather than on interests.
American national security is best assured by pursuing international security. And international security is
best assured by addressing the root causes of conflict.
The issues school focuses on global problems that impede the achievement of a fair
international system based on the improvement of the quality of life of the world’s
population. Resolving these issues, its advocates maintain, will address the most obvious
sources of human conflict and suffering.5
The issues school defines security threats far more broadly than the traditional interests school. For
example, the spread of HIV/AIDS and environmental degradation are readily included as threats to
security. Other issues include population growth, access to food and water, migration and displacement,
the rights of women and children, trafficking in drugs and people, the proliferation of WMD, and access to
commercial, financial, and capital markets. Many security threats are transnational in nature and require
international solutions.
The international community, perhaps represented by the UN, is a very loose confederation of
sovereign states. As such, it is difficult to sustain a consensus to action. Honest people can and do disagree
on the issues to address and on their respective importance. The international community establishes
norms of behavior between states. It also establishes norms to protect the rights of individuals against the
coercive powers of the state. Clearly the major powers have greater influence in establishing international
norms, but international norms may not align with American interests or values.
An issues-based strategy formulation process is consistent with idealist, internationalist,
institutionalist, and Wilsonian thinking. Such a process rests more on universalism and interventionism
and less on self determination; it endorses limited territorial sovereignty.
The principles-based approach. A minority view holds that foreign policy should be constructed by
adhering to specific principles rather than calculating outcomes based on interests. The animating
principles might be derived from political, economic, or religious ideology. Spreading free market
capitalism, spreading democracy, supporting Israel, intervention against genocide, intervention for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and nonintervention are examples of principles to be followed.
The principles school promotes behavior on the international scene in accordance with
specific principles. The goodness of policy action is determined by how it adheres to or
diverges from the chosen guiding principles rather than on the consequences obtained.
A specific subset of principles-based thinking periodically gains prominence. Its principles are based
in religion. Some use values-based to describe this approach, although the same label is used with other
meaning. According to this school, American international behavior should be guided not by calculation
of worldly consequences but by following certain principles independent of those worldly consequences.
The guiding values are determined by reference to a biblical interpretation that is believed to be universally
applicable. The threat to national security includes multiculturalism, both domestically and abroad. The
relative growth of populations that do not share American values all constitute threats to the American
way of life.
5
Cambone, New Structure, viii.
The values school seeks to project national values by applying to national security decision
making principles derived from biblical interpretation believed by its advocates to be
universally applicable.
The political faction encouraging the values-based approach is absolutist. It believes in imposing its
version of American values onto the international community rather than yielding to the norms of the
international community. American values are universal values. Consistent with vindicationism, this school
is willing to export values by aggressive foreign policy including the use of military force. It represents the
crusading rather than the pacifist Christian tradition. It is Jacksonian, projecting a way of life, not just
continentally, but globally.
Reconciling the Approaches. Adherents to the issues-based and principles-based approaches tend to
pursue domestic policies based on issues or principles, respectively, and then project those same issues and
principles onto formulation of foreign policy. The interests-based approach, in contrast, does not attempt to
project American ways on others, relying instead on exemplarism and self-determination. Where we start
with strategy formulation has a lot to do with where we end up.
Interests-based and issues-based approaches hope to achieve consequences (ends) in the secular,
temporal, material world. The values-based approach seeks consequences in the hereafter by following
religious principles or doctrine based on the biblical interpretation of religious elites. The empirical
analysis of cause and effect that underwrites interest- and issues-based strategy formulation does not serve
the values-based camp.
A cautionary note is in order. Although the orientations to strategy formulation are widely accepted,
the labels are not. Sometimes the term values-based is used to describe both issues- and principles-based
formulation as defined above. Sometimes the values referred to are individual liberty and the rule of law
rather than religious in origin. Americans can certainly disagree on what constitutes national values. What
Cambone calls interest-based, the Princeton Project6 calls threat-based, and what Cambone calls issuesbased, Princeton calls interest-based. Rather than assuming clear meaning from a label built from words
like interests, issues, principles, and values, the cautious thinker must ask which interests, which issues,
which principles, and whose values.
The diverse American public is galvanized when it comes to vital interests narrowly defined—i.e.,
national survival and defense of American life, liberty, and property. Presidents will not be forgiven for
failing to secure these vital interests. The same diversity provides fickle support for actions to secure the
liberties of others or for promoting values not shared abroad or even domestically. Presidents can build
domestic coalitions in opposition to their own actions when the connection to American security is
tenuous and the costs are high.
All three approaches must secure vital interests. Therefore, the issues-based and principles-based
approaches impose costs over and above the interests-based approach. This explains, perhaps, why the
interests-based approach remains dominant and persistent while the others exhibit transient prominence.
Another plausible explanation is the distinction between national security policy and foreign policy.
Not all foreign policy objectives are matters of national security. Foreign policy objectives might include
advancing human rights in China, but China’s failure to guarantee human rights to its citizens does not
constitute a threat to American national security. The interests-based approach to national security strategy
formulation maintains a tighter focus on threats and makes a clearer distinction between foreign policy
and national security policy. The issues-based approach requires a much broader definition of national
security issues and blurs the distinction between foreign policy and national security policy.
Regardless of the approach taken, a variety of instruments must be resourced to achieve national
ends. Instruments include, for example, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments.
The mix of instruments must be sufficient to achieve the stated ends, and the resources devoted must be
affordable. Alternating approaches every four or eight years creates lurching and contradictory demands
on the departments and agencies that house the instruments of power virtually guaranteeing inadequacy
in ways and means.
6 G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, co-directors, “Forging a World of Liberty under Law: US National Security in
the 21st Century” (Princeton: The Princeton Project on National Security, 2006).
Presidential Doctrine
Presidents do not publish an official doctrine under their names. Outside observers—sometimes
journalists and sometimes political opponents—identify and name presidential doctrine. Doctrines can
sometimes be traced to a specific piece of declaratory policy, e.g., a prominent speech. At other times,
doctrines emerge from an observed pattern of declaratory and employment policy. Because they represent
the judgment of observers, they are open to interpretation and rebuttal. These doctrines often contain the
elements of strategy in crystallized form. Prominent presidential doctrines are presented in the following
chapters on grand strategy.
Cold War and Post-Cold War strategies
To construct a new strategy, we need not and should not begin with a blank slate. Some of the best minds
available participated in the national security strategy debate during the Cold War and in the decade that
followed. There were eight containment strategies and four proposed post-Cold War strategies.
Throughout the Cold War, two other strategies were applied consistently—the offset strategy and a costimposing strategy—but they were subordinate to grand strategy. All are covered in the coming chapters.
The various grand strategies examined in the next two chapters are characterized in terms of interests
and objectives, major underlying premises, preferred political and military instruments, and policies. Both
declaratory policy (as publicly stated for psychological effect) and employment policy (as implemented
through plans and action) are examined.
Postwar Conditions
The US national security system was established in 1947, but history did not begin there. Before embarking
on an examination of Cold War and post-Cold War strategies, it is useful to review the geostrategic
conditions existing at the end of WWII as the Cold War was taking shape.
United Nations
The Declaration of the United Nations established the alliance of status quo nations (Allies) who opposed
those states that would use force to acquire territory and establish dominion over others (Axis). It also
serves as the initial declaration of the formal United Nations that would be established later. A state had to
be a signatory of the Declaration before war’s end to become a member of the UN. After the war, the
major powers of the victorious Allies took responsibility for the occupation of the defeated Axis powers
and for governance of the areas not capable of governing themselves, including those devastated by the
war and those freed from colonial rule but without the institutions of state. But the victorious wartime
alliance was soon dissolved and two poles emerged in the East and West. The UN was not as united as
hoped.
Europe
The United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union divided Europe. The United States, Great
Britain, and France soon consolidated their areas, but the Soviet Union would not join in unification.
Europe was divided into East and West by what would later be called the Iron Curtain. Germany was
divided into East and West. Berlin was similarly divided. The Soviet Union consolidated its grip on
Eastern Europe. A divided Europe would be the main theater throughout the Cold War competition.
Things were not so clear in other parts of Europe. Greece and Turkey remained unstable and a
competition for the right to govern ensued. Both were host to violent insurgencies waged by domestic
communist antagonists. Elsewhere, the competition was political, as in Italy, where communists actively
competed in electoral processes. Political warfare would be the norm.
Latin America
Having overturned centuries of Islamic occupation in the Christian Reconquest, the Catholic Spaniards
and Portuguese proceeded to bring Christianity to the Western Hemisphere. Resource exploitation under
powerful landholders, patrons, brought the golden age of Spain. After European dominance weakened,
Latin American countries slowly and painfully moved forward driven by nationalistic aspirations.
Strongman governments and powerful oligarchies replaced European colonial powers in repressing
populist ambitions. Socialism was appealing as a counter to oligarchy.
American foreign policy objectives in the Caribbean included controlling sea lanes for transit of the
Panamanian Isthmus and denying a presence to foreign powers. The Panama Canal opened (1914) within
weeks of declarations of war in Europe. In addition to preventing meddling by European powers, a
priority was placed on protecting American business interests, including Cornelius Vanderbilt’s transisthmus railroad and American fruit company plantations. To accomplish these ends, policy sought to
establish local political stability and stimulate economic development.
Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine were guiding principles for US actions. President James
Monroe’s (1817-1825) original statement of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) was benign and in solidarity with
new world peoples in the Western Hemisphere seeking self determination from European powers.
President James Polk (1845-1849), an expansionist Southern Democrat in the Jacksonian tradition,
exploited a contrived incident to initiate the Mexican-American War (1846-1848). The war was waged
under Manifest Destiny, as “allotted by Providence.” The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) and the
follow-on reduced Mexican claim to territory by 55 percent. President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909)
interpreted the Monroe Doctrine to include unilateral intervention to stabilize states unable to repay
European lenders rather than risk European intervention (1904).
American Imperialism in Latin America
Insurgencies and other political instabilities in Latin America often threatened American strategic or commercial
interests resulting in economic or military intervention. The Marine Corps was often deployed to re-establish
order. Today we would describe the conditions as failed states and refer to the operations as peace operations,
humanitarian assistance, and nation building. Marines separated the factions, established a constabulary, restored
the judicial system, and provided public works, including the provision of education and medical care. It was not
uncommon to use forced labor. In general, these operations were conducted within an environment containing
some mix of bandits and rebel insurgents. Marines conducted tactical operations, typically in remote jungle
environments and against guerrilla forces. The experiences of this period were codified in the Small Wars Manual
of 1940.
Marines conducted three major and three lesser interventions in Central America and the Caribbean in the
decades surrounding WWI. The first of the minor interventions contributed to the seizure of territory for the
Panama Canal (1902). The United States encouraged a rebellion that separated the Panamanian Isthmus from
Colombia and won a favorable treaty from the newly independent Panama. To protect American interests,
marines entered Nicaragua (1912-1913) as its brutal dictator brought the country close to bankruptcy. In another
minor intervention, marines helped overthrow what President Wilson called a government of butchers in
Mexico (1914). The Mexican revolution against a government dominated by business and the Catholic Church
eventually produced an election and a constitution. In one of the longer interventions, marines occupied Haiti
(1915-1934) in response to a bloody revolution. Another major intervention into the Dominican Republic
(1916-1924) resulted in marines establishing a military government. Marines returned to Nicaragua again (19261933) picking up where they left off from the earlier half of the intervention to provide for free elections with an
insurgency in the background.
As foreign policy, American interventions and nation building attempts have a bleak history, particularly
with respect to the tendency for the marine-built native constabularies to later support the rise of a dictator. It
was common for marines to provide the officers of a constabulary, the Guardia, and have the enlisted ranks
filled from the indigenous population. After marines left the Dominican Republic with a stable government
from 1922 to 1924, General Rafael Trujillo later used the same constabulary to establish himself as dictator.
Anastosia Somoza, backed by the Guardia, made himself president of Nicaragua in 1936. Marines returned to
the Dominican Republic (1958-1963) to help strengthen the army of dictator François “Pappa Doc” Duvalier.
Whether the US Government was deposing or installing tyrants, the marines were there. A lasting legacy was
established.
Republican President William Howard Taft (1909-1913) preferred dollars over bullets—dollar
diplomacy. Taft’s administration encouraged US businesses to offer loans to repay debts to European
powers. Insolvent states accepted loans in exchange for accommodations to US businesses and for
governmental and economic reforms. US government takeover of custom houses ensured repayment.
President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) reserved the right to decide which Latin American governments
to recognize as legitimate (1915).
The era of American imperialism in Latin America nominally came to an end prior to WWII when in
1933 President Franklin Roosevelt’s inaugural address introduced the good neighbor policy toward Latin
America. But the United States would continue its unwelcome interventions. Rightwing dictators opposed
to communism would be supported by the United States while indigenous, populist, and nationalist
leftwing movements would be encouraged by the Soviet Union as part of the Cold War great-power
competition.
Africa
African countries were freed from their colonial pasts. Few African states had the institutions of
government or the skilled bureaucrats necessary for government. In general, those states that had been
subjected to British rule fared better than others. State borders delineated convenient administrative
districts and bore no resemblance to nations. Many former European colonies in Africa were made
trustees of the UN rather than be granted immediate independence. For example, the UN placed Namibia
under South African trusteeship; the UN rescinded South Africa’s trusteeship 30 January 1970, but South
Africa remained, and a war of independence ensued.
More violent than some, Angola’s post-WWII history followed a common pattern. The Portugese had
been involved in the region since 1482. The Portugese brought guns and Christianity, and an African king
provided slaves and raw materials for export. The Dutch occupied Angola briefly (1641-1648) but Angola
became a Portugese colony in 1655.
Militant anti-colonial parties began to form in the late 1940s. Two merged into the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in December 1956 under Agostinho Neto. Another two merged into
the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) in March 1962 under Holden Roberto. Jonas Savimbi
split from the FNLA to form the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ( UNITA) in 1964.
Revolts against colonial rule erupted in the early 1960s and were brutally repressed in a long
counterinsurgency effort waged by Portugese Armed Forces. The Angolan War of Independence (19611975) was not won in Angola. The Portugese government was engaged in multiple colonial wars and grew
increasingly authoritarian at home. Leftist forces overthrew the Lisbon government in the Carnation
Revolution of 24 April 1974. Angola achieved formal independence 11 November 1975.
The Angolan Civil War (1975-2002) began even before the independence agreement was signed as the
competing factions turned on each other. Whites fled leaving the country without experienced civil
servants and professionals. The factions—all nationalistic, populist, and left leaning—presented the
appropriate face to appeal to a chosen Cold War sponsor and became part of the East-West competition.
South Africa, seeking regional hegemony and apartheid capitalism, invaded 23 October 1975 on the side
of the FNLA and UNITA. Cuban forces united with the MPLA to oppose the South African coalition. All of
southern Africa was engaged in one way or another.
Eastern Asia
The countries of Eastern Asia were part of a secondary, and in some cases tertiary, theater for the United
States in WWII. But the war had been devastating for the locals, and there was a history of colonialism,
civil war, and regional competitions. Nationalism would have powerful effects.
Japan. Getting an early start on WWII, Japan established dominion over large parts of Eastern Asia.
Atrocities had been committed, and memories would be long. The Japanese would leave China, Korea,
Indochina, and Oceania and return to Japan under American military occupation.
China. The modern day Chinese narrative includes arrival of Christian missionaries in the 16th Century
and the humiliating presence of European powers during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). By the end of
the 19th century, including two Opium Wars, China had been divided into spheres of influence by the
European powers. The United States, without its own sphere and fearing lack of access to its commercial
interests, convinced the Europeans of the Open Door Policy. The collapse of Western empires and
unequal treaties imposed on China at the end of WWI initiated a new era. Strong nationalist sentiments
and rebellion was accompanied by the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
The long civil war in China (1927-1937), pitting Western-supported nationalists against Sovietsupported communists, was disrupted. The two factions continued fighting each other and simultaneously
posed a unified front against Japanese invaders. The civil war resumed (1946-1950) with renewed vigor
after Japanese defeat in WWII. Nationalist forces led by Chiang Kai-shek retreated to the island of Taiwan
(Formosa) and formed the Republic of China (ROC). Communists led by Mao Zedong established the
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. The West and the UN recognized the ROC as the
legitimate government while the East recognized the PRC.
Korea. The Korean Peninsula had long been an area contested by China, Japan, and Russia. At the end
of WWII, Japanese occupation was replaced by a partitioned Korea with a Soviet-backed communist
government in the industrialized North and a US-backed dictatorial government in the underdeveloped
South. The divided Korea would be the site of the first major Cold War conflict.
Indochina. After the Japanese withdrew, the French returned to Indochina to reestablish colonial
prerogatives. As in Korea, Vietnam was divided north and south, with communist support for the
government in the North and French support to the government in the South. The East and West major
powers would conduct proxy wars throughout the Cold War. The First Indochina War (1946-1954) quickly
ensued with civil wars in Vietnam (1946-1975), Laos (1953-1975), and Cambodia (1967-1975). Later
American involvement would initiate the Second Indochina War (1962-1975) centered in Vietnam but
involving Laos and Cambodia as well. Cambodia—Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge—engaged in a
period of self-mutilation (1975-1979). After unification of Vietnam under communism, Vietnam invaded
Cambodia (1975-1989), and China’s brief punitive invasion of Vietnam was repulsed (1979).
Palestine
Nationalism was an extremely powerful force at work in the postwar era. Two major nationalist
movements had been gaining strength during and between the world wars. It had become clear that the
promise of self determination could only be realized if nations had states with defensible borders and
institutions that enforced the norms of the people. Arab nationalism would ultimately be frustrated, but
Jewish nationalism solidified.
Arab Nationalism. The Arab world had not adopted modern forms of government and lacked the
attendant organizational capacities. They were easy prey for European colonizers. The First World War
offered Arabs the opportunity, the promise, of statehood after the fall of the Turkish dominated Ottoman
Empire. It was not to be as European powers filled the vacuum left by the Ottomans. Arab nationalism
would be frustrated throughout the interwar period as Europeans denied Arab self determination. States
emerged inside colonial boundaries and national identities began to develop within these states thus
diffusing the drive toward a unified Arab state and Pan-Arabism. Sophisticated and charismatic leaders
emerged in Egypt and in non-Arab Turkey and Iran. The region would be caught up in the Cold War
competition between the major powers of East and West.
Arab Nationalism and the Great Betrayal
Arab nationalism was rekindled in WWI. Very important components of today’s Arab-Islamic narrative are the events
associated with the end of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. Three bodies of documents serve to
describe this component: the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration. The
collective is sometimes referred to as the Great Betrayal.
Sherif Hussein, a Hashemite, was perhaps the single individual that could be considered the Arab spokesman
during the First World War. Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner of Egypt, was the principal British
spokesman in the Arab world. As early as 1914, the Hussein-McMahon correspondence began encouraging an Arab
uprising against the Ottoman Turks and the promise of Arab independence after the war. An Arab Caliphate under
Hussein was a possibility. Separately, in May 1915, two small movements, al-Fatat and al-Ahd, produced the
Damascus Protocol describing their conditions for cooperation to support the British against the Turks. The Arab
uprising began in June 1916, was led by Hussein’s son Feisal, and was aided by T.E. Lawrence. The Hussein-
McMahon correspondence (not a formal agreement) is often cited as the basis of Arab understanding of the way
things were supposed to be after the war.
At the same time, member of British Parliament Sir Mark Sykes and French diplomat Charles François GeorgePicot were quietly discussing the postwar partition of the Ottoman Empire. It would be divided between the British
and the French with Russia having the dominant role in the north. The British and French would have direct control
in some areas and indirect control in others. Semi-autonomous Arab states would be possible where indirect
European control existed. The resulting secret document is the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
The Balfour Declaration—a letter from British diplomat Arthur J. Balfour to the head of the British Zionist
Organization Lord Rothschild in November 1917—indicated the British government’s positive view toward a Jewish
homeland in Palestine. Palestine was at the time an undefined area. A condition of the new homeland would be that
the rights of the non-Jewish community would not be prejudiced.
The entirety is often evoked as “Sykes-Picot,” and has the connotation of “white man speaks with forked
tongue.” It represents past betrayal and predicts future betrayal associated with the Western alliance, which includes
present-day Israel. Self determination had been thwarted for the Arab nation, and direction of Arab history has been
determined by the West. In the future, everything the US would say and do would be interpreted through this lens.
Jewish Nationalism. Ancient empires exiled Jews from their homeland; many migrated across Europe.
Persecution in Western Europe during the Crusades pushed Jews to Eastern Europe. After Centuries of
prosperity in Muslim Spain, Jews were driven out during the Inquisition. The Enlightenment improved the
lot of Jews in Western Europe and simultaneously increased violent persecution in Russia. But the
persecution soon returned to Western Europe culminating in the Holocaust. The true depth and breadth
of the atrocities weren’t fully apparent until war’s end.
Jewish Nationalism—Zionism
After domination by the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, and Greeks, most Jews were already living in exile when
the Romans banned those remaining following revolts in the 1st and 2nd centuries. The Roman province of Judea was
renamed Palestine. Forced conversions took place in the Christian Byzantine Empire and in Christian France during
the second half of the first millennium.
Jews prospered in Muslim Spain, centered in Cordoba, for four centuries, but following the defeat of the Moors
in the 13th century the Spanish Inquisition targeted Jews and Muslims, driving out non-Christian influences
completing the Christian Reconquest. Jews converted to Christianity in large numbers and were later put to death as
the Spanish Inquisition strengthened in pursuit of Christian purity (1391). Later the Catholic Monarchs (Isabella and
Ferdinand) signed an edict for Jews (1492) and Muslims (1501) to convert, leave, or be put to death. In northern
Europe, Jews and Muslims were massacred during the Crusades (1095-1291). Jews were expelled from England in
the late 13th century and from France in the 14th century.
The French Revolution (1789-1799) abruptly ended the ancien régime—political domination by the monarchy,
aristocracy, and the established church. Emancipation of the Jews began in France (1791) and spread across Europe
throughout the 19th century. Assimilation into local societies became an increasingly popular solution for many Jews.
But scapegoating Jews increased after the financial crises that followed the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) and the
failure of the Panama Canal Investment Company in the middle 1880s.
The assassination of the Russian tsar (1881) punctuated the growing divide between Eastern and Western
Europe. Jews were scapegoated for a variety of economic and social ills, many associated with liberalization and
capitalism in Western Europe. By the end of the 19th century, state-led or state-allowed persecution of Russian Jews
fueled a growing desire to return to their biblical home.
The First Aliya (1882-1903) doubled the Jewish population in Palestine. A British proposal to establish a Jewish
homeland in Uganda was rejected (1903). Another wave of emigration accompanied the failed Russian revolution
(1904-1905). Those who could afford it dispersed to the Western Hemisphere or into the British Empire. Others
migrated to Western Europe. Some went to Palestine in the Second Aliya (1904-1914).
In accordance with the Balfour Declaration (1917), the League of Nations established the Palestinian Mandate
under British auspices after their defeat of the Ottomans. The Mandate included establishment of the institutions of
state and of a Jewish homeland with civil rights protections regardless of religion or race. The Third Aliya (19191923) and Fourth Aliya (1924-1929) were also out of Eastern Europe. As Jewish immigration increased under British
authority, riots by indigenous Arabs erupted in the 1920s causing the British to place restrictions on further Jewish
immigration. The Fifth Aliya (1929-1939) was driven by the increasing anti-Semitism associated with Nazism and the
pursuit of ethnic purity. The British White Paper (1939) further restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine.
Jews benefited from the 18th century Enlightenment and liberalization in Western Europe, but the
Dreyfus Affair dashed the hopes even of the most assimilated Jew, like Theodor Herzl. French Army
Captain Alfred Dreyfus, falsely accused in 1894 of spying for Germany, was convicted and later
vindicated. Herzl, having covered the Dreyfus Affair as a journalist, became convinced that assimilation
was impossible and that anti-Semitism would not die. He wrote Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) in 1896.
Herzl became the tireless promoter of a Jewish state and the father of modern Zionism.
Before WWI, the great majority of the world’s Jews lived in Europe, about 50 percent in Poland, and
only .2 percent lived in Palestine. About 2 percent of the population in Palestine was Jewish and about 10
percent Christian; the majority Arab population was Sunni Muslim. Arabs and Jews, both Semitic peoples,
co-occupied Palestine in peace. European colonial exploitation of Arab lands and European treatment of
Jews led Jewish and Arab nationalists to consider alliance and common cause in their pursuit of self
determination. By the end of WWII, the Palestinian population was about 58 percent Muslim, 33 percent
Jew, and 8 percent Christian.
As Jews were pushed from one part of Europe to another, the longing grew for a state of their own.
The problem was centered in Europe, often the product of an anti-Jewish (and anti-Muslim)
interpretation of Christianity and sometimes the product of the related phenomenon of nationalism. It
resulted in the sustained migration of Jews bringing a modern, 20th century European culture into a land
occupied by a society with a traditional culture. The solution to a problem created by Europeans would be
establishment of a Jewish state that displaced innocent Palestinian Arabs. The Palestinian issue would be
one of the first and most complex faced by the new United Nations. By 2010, the United Nations would
minister to 4.7 million registered Palestinian refugees.
Western, Central, and Southern Asia
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire left a vacuum in Western, Central, and Southern Asia. The
importance of oil in industrial-age warfare increased the significance of the region to the great powers.
Nationalism would be prominent in the region as it struggled for independence and experimented with
new methods of social organization.
Oil in the World Wars. The two world wars epitomize industrial-age warfare. The United States was the
world’s leading oil producer and was the principal supplier of oil to the Allied armies. But US resources
were finite and it was abundantly clear that Middle Eastern oil would play a critical role in economic
recovery of the industrial powers devastated by war, and oil would be a strategic resource should another
war erupt.
Oil in the World Wars
With WWI developing, in 1903, British Foreign Secretary Lord Landsdowne warned Russia and Germany that Britain
would “regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a
very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal.”
Petroleum was critical to the industrial-age armies of WWII. Great Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran in
1941 to prevent Iran’s railroads and oil from falling to Axis Powers. As the world’s leading oil producer, the United
States supplied most of the oil for Allied armies. But US resources were not infinite, and positive relations with Saudi
Arabia became a strategic necessity. On 16 February 1943, FDR said, “the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the
defense of the United States.”
These, in a small way, establish the initial conditions for competition for oil in the Middle East throughout the
Cold War. Western business interests continued to dominate the oil industries, including profits, in the Middle East.
Western powers would support pro-Western Middle Eastern governments. Oil would flow freely and cheaply to the
industrialized West. Threats to the status quo were seen as threats to national and international security. Threats
would come from Soviet expansion and from the local forces of nationalism and a desire for self determination after
a long period of European colonialism.
Iranian Revolutions. Persia is an ancient and sophisticated civilization dating back two and a half
millennia. Arabs successfully brought Islam to Persia between the 7th and 9th centuries but never made it
Arab. Persia became an independent state in 1501. The Enlightenment and the industrial revolution
rapidly transformed European political and economic systems by the end of the 19th century. Persian
political factions forced the shah to adopt a European-like constitution with monarch and elected
parliament in 1906.
The competition between progressive constitutionalists and conservative monarchists continued.
Russia and Great Britain continued their great power interventions throughout the First World War. After
WWI a charismatic leader ascended to the throne and pursued the progressive agenda with a heavy hand.
(The shah asked foreign diplomats to use the name Iran rather than Persia.) American and German
neutrality won favor. Growing trade between Iran and Germany gave Great Britain and the Soviet Union a
reason to intervene to prevent Iranian oil from supplying Germany. The United States later operated in
Iran to supply the Soviet Union during the war. Great Britain and the United States withdrew at war’s end
as promised, but the Soviet Union required encouragement.
The Iranian Revolutions
Persia’s Constitutional Revolution took place between 1906 and 1911. Mozafar al-Din Shah Qajar, who had
ascended to the throne in June 1896, was forced by revolutionaries to adopt a constitution and elect a
parliament on 5 August 1906. It replaced a weak, centralized, and corrupt government with a constitutional
monarchy, both preserving the shah and establishing an elected parliament, the Majlis (the People’s House). The
constitution, modeled on the Belgian constitution, provided for the rule of law, equality, individual rights,
universal public education, and freedom of the press. After the shah’s death, his son, Mohammad Ali, ascended
21 June 1907. He secured large loans from Great Britain and Russia, ceding considerable influence. Iranian
politics was divided internally by progressive constitutionalists and conservative monarchists.
The British and Russians announced a pact on 7 September 1907. They backed the shah and geographically
divided the country between them. By dividing the country, they unified the Iranian factions. Great Britain and
Russia intervened. Russian Cossaks stormed the parliament 23 June 1908 initiating a civil war. Christian
missionaries pressured US politicians to respond with tough action, but Presidents Teddy Roosevelt and William
Taft maintained a policy of neutrality. The revolution ended in 1911 and Iranian constitutionalists turned to the
noninterventionist United States for assistance and Germany for trade. Relations between Iran and the United
States would continue on favorable terms for 35 years.
After WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey successfully transitioned to a secular
government committed to modernization. Iran attempted a similar transition but with less success. Reza Khan
overthrew the last shah of the Qajar Dynasty and ascended to the throne in 1925 and began the Pahlavi
Dynasty. His rule was sectarian and authoritarian. He was a strong nationalist, particularly opposed to Russian
and British influence. He initiated industrial expansion, railroad building, and an educational system. Western
dress was required, the veil was prohibited, and Jews were emancipated from the ghettos.
To prevent Iran’s railroads and oil from falling to the WWII Axis Powers, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union invaded Iran in 1941 with a promise to leave at war’s end. But the Soviets remained until Iran
successfully out maneuvered them politically. President Truman provided strong support for Soviet withdrawal.
And US neutrality paid dividends again.
Reza Shah Pahlavi was ousted in 1941 and replaced with his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who was
expected to be more malleable. The shah’s White Revolution (1963) was heavy-handed modernization that
enflamed nationalist sentiments and fear in traditionalists. The stage was set for the Islamic Revolution (1979).
Afghanistan. The present-day borders of the Afghan state reflect historic great-power decisions and do
not honor nations. It is bordered by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in the north; Pakistan on
the east and south; Iran on the west, and even a short border with China at the far east of the Hindu
Kush. The suffix “stan” means “land of.” Baluchistan, not a state, spans Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Pashtunistan, also not a state, lies equally in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The border between Afghanistan
and Pakistan, the Durand Line, was drawn down the middle of Pashtunland (1893) as part of the Great
Game between Great Britain and Russia.
The region was long a crossroads for traders, migrants, and armies with diverse ethnic and religious
groups. It was home to Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, and Zoroastrians before Arabs brought Islam to the
region (642-870) soon after the religion’s establishment. Islam brought the first unity to the various ethnic
groups of the region. The great majority of Afghans are Sunni.
The Great Game
The Great Game (1813-1907) was a strategic competition between Czarist Russia and Great Britain over Central
Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. It was apparently more of a preoccupation of the British in defense of India, the
Empire’s crown jewel. The contest was centered in Afghanistan but involved the larger region.
The Durand Line was drawn to demarcate British and Russian spheres of influence in 1893. Convenient to the
great powers, the line—like many drawn by outside powers—was not drawn with respect to nations (peoples). Here,
Pashtuns had their land divided between Afghanistan and what later became Pakistan.
After WWII, as the British relinquished colonial authorities, the British Indian Empire was hastily divided into a
Muslim state and a Hindu-majority secular state by the Radcliffe Line. The 1947 Partition created India and the divided
state of East and West Pakistan separated by several hundred miles. East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh
in 1971. Border disputes continue to plague Paki-Hindi relations.
Pashtuns, an Iranic people, comprise over 40 percent of the Afghan population. Ahmad Shah Durrani
first unified the Pashtun tribes (early 18th century). At its peak, the Durrani, or Afghan, Empire (17471826) included all of today’s Afghanistan and Pakistan and extended into neighboring Persia and India.
Pashtuns, the majority in Afghanistan, constitute a major ethnic group in Pakistan and a minor presence in
Iran. Unified Afghanistan was ethnically Pashtun and religiously Sunni Muslim.
Properly speaking, Pashtuns are the true ethnic Afghans. Other groups retain their ethnic identities,
but they identify first as Afghans. Tajiks are Persian speaking and comprise over 25 percent of the Afghan
population, and they are dominant in Tajikistan to the north. Uzbeks and Turkmen, Turkic peoples, are
dominant in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the north but constitute less than 10 percent of the Afghan
population. Many fled in the 1920s from Russian religious suppression. Hazaras are a Persian-speaking
minority of less than 10 percent living mostly in central Afghanistan, but there is a sizable presence in
Pakistan. Hazaras are Shia Muslims and have been brutally repressed by Pashtuns (18th, 19th, and 20th
centuries) earlier for ethnic and later for religious differences. Baluchs, also an Iranic people, constitute a
small minority.