LOW WORKER PROTECTION CAN REDUCE ON-THE-JOB TRAINING Making it easier to hire and fire workers reduces firms’ incentives to invest in training their employees. This challenges the conventional view that the ease with which workers can lose their jobs but also gain jobs is the sign of a more efficient economy. The study by Matteo Picchio and Jan van Ours, presented at the Royal Economic Society’s 2011 annual conference, analyses data on workers and firms in the Netherlands to show that: Increasing ‘labour market flexibility’ – by lowering compulsory redundancy compensation, legal rights to appeal, etc. – will lower a firm’s incentives to train its employees as the chance that workers take their skills elsewhere also increases. This effect is relatively small. If the economy removed all worker protection completely – an unlikely scenario – investments in on-the-job training would decrease by 36% or €95 per full-time worker. The fraction of firms investing in training would decrease by 13%. Increased competition among firms – brought about in part by globalisation – does not influence on-the-job training. More competition may reduce training because profits fall, but it may also increase training if a better-skilled workforce makes the firm more able to compete. Firm-provided training is a key factor for competitiveness of firms as it stimulates workers’ productivity. Improving human capital through on-the-job training may help shift the economy to higher-skilled industries and stimulate growth nationwide. More... An increase in labour market flexibility can reduce the incentives of firms to invest in the training of their employees. The report also suggests that product market competition does not affect firm-sponsored training. Firm-provided training is a key factor for competitiveness of firms as it stimulates workers’ productivity. The extent to which training of workers is important differs between firms and is related to a series of technological, strategic and organisational firm-specific determinants. For example, some firms may choose to hire less-skilled workers and invest in training of these workers, while other firms may prefer to hire more-skilled workers and provide less training. Nevertheless, the importance of workers’ training goes beyond individual firms: accumulation of human capital through employer-provided training may facilitate sectoral adjustment and stimulate growth nationwide. Recent human capital theories provide ambiguous predictions about the effect of labour market flexibility and product market competition on training. More competition in the product market may reduce training because profits and investment funds go down, but it may also increase training if a better skilled workforce makes the firm more able to compete with other firms. Similarly, the effect of labour market competition can go either way. Higher labour mobility may increase the need for training but at the same time reduce the willingness of firms to make the investment in training because with a shorter job tenure the payback period is reduced. As theoretical predictions are unclear, empirical research is needed. This is what the report provides, using matched worker-firm data from Statistics Netherlands to show that: Product market competition does not affect firm-sponsored training. Labour market frictions have an impact on firm-sponsored training. The effect of labour market frictions on firm-sponsored training, even if significantly different from zero, is small in size. If there were an economy-wide movement towards the most flexible labour market, firms’ investments in the training of their employees would decrease by 36%, corresponding to €95 per full-time equivalent worker. The fraction of firms investing in training would instead decrease by 13%. The policy implications from this study are straightforward. There are two dominant trends in product markets and labour markets: an increase in product market competition due to international integration and an increase in labour market flexibility due to a reduction in employment protection. The results imply that increasing competition through international integration and globalisation does not pose a threat to investments in on-the-job training. To the extent that the differences in labour market flexibility are related to employment protection legislation, a reduction in employment protection can reduce incentives of firms to invest in training of workers. But the magnitude of this effect is small. ENDS ‘Market Imperfections and Firm-Sponsored Training’ by Matteo Picchio and Jan van Ours of Tilburg University Contact: Matteo Picchio Telephone: +31.13.4662534 Email: m.picchio@uvt.nl Jan van Ours Telephone: +31.13.4662880 Email: vanours@uvt.nl