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NATIONAL FORENSIC LEAGUE Policy Debate – 2013-2014 Novice Starter File Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela. ***TOPICALITY*** ................................................................................................................ 6 Notes – Gov 2 Gov ............................................................................................................................................... 7 1NC – T-Government to Government (1/2) .......................................................................................................8 1NC – T-Government to Government (2/2) ...................................................................................................... 9 2NC – Extension – EE = Gov to Gov (1/2) ...................................................................................................... 10 2NC – Extension – EE = Gov to Gov (2/2) .......................................................................................................11 2AC – AT: EE = Gov to Gov .............................................................................................................................. 12 Notes – Only Economic ..................................................................................................................................... 13 1NC – T-Only Economic (1/2) .......................................................................................................................... 14 1NC – T-Only Economic (2/2) .......................................................................................................................... 15 ***CUBA EMBARGO AFFIRMATIVE*** ...............................................................................16 Notes................................................................................................................................................................... 17 1AC – Relations Adv (1/8) ................................................................................................................................. 18 1AC – Relations Adv (2/8) ................................................................................................................................ 19 1AC – Relations Adv (3/8) ............................................................................................................................... 20 1AC – Relations Adv (4/8) ................................................................................................................................ 21 1AC – Relations Adv (5/8) ................................................................................................................................ 22 1AC – Relations Adv (6/8) ................................................................................................................................ 23 1AC – Relations Adv (7/8) ................................................................................................................................24 1AC – Relations Adv (8/8) ................................................................................................................................ 25 2AC – Extension – Solvency .............................................................................................................................26 2AC – Extension – Now is Key ......................................................................................................................... 27 2AC – Extension – Key to Democracy..............................................................................................................28 2AC – Extension – Global Spillover .................................................................................................................29 2AC – Extension – Terrorism Likely ............................................................................................................... 30 2AC – Add-On – Hegemony (1/2) .................................................................................................................... 31 2AC – Add-On – Hegemony (2/2) ................................................................................................................... 32 2AC – Add-On – LA Environment ................................................................................................................... 33 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (1/7) ............................................................................................................................... 34 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (2/7) .............................................................................................................................. 35 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (3/7) .............................................................................................................................. 36 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (4/7) .............................................................................................................................. 37 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (5/7) ..............................................................................................................................38 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (6/7) .............................................................................................................................. 39 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (7/7) ............................................................................................................................. 40 2AC – Extension – Solvency (1/2) .................................................................................................................... 41 2AC – Extension – Solvency (2/2) ...................................................................................................................42 2AC – Extension – Middle East Impact (1/3) .................................................................................................. 43 2AC – Extension – Middle East Impact (2/3) .................................................................................................44 2AC – Extension – Middle East Impact (3/3) ................................................................................................. 45 2AC – Extension – Kashmir Impact (1/2) .......................................................................................................46 2AC – Extension – Kashmir Impact (2/2) ....................................................................................................... 47 2AC – Extension – Soft Power Impact ............................................................................................................ 48 2AC – Add-On – Iran ........................................................................................................................................49 2AC – Add-On – North Korea ..........................................................................................................................50 ***CUBA EMBARGO NEGATIVE*** ..................................................................................... 51 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (1/4) ................................................................................................................ 52 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (2/4) ............................................................................................................... 53 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (3/4) ............................................................................................................... 54 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (4/4) ............................................................................................................... 55 2NC – Extension – Alt Causes .......................................................................................................................... 56 2NC – Extension – Relations Impossible ........................................................................................................ 57 2NC – Extension – US Won’t Change ..............................................................................................................58 2NC – Extension – Democracy Doesn’t Solve War ......................................................................................... 59 2NC – Extension – Terrorism Defense (1/2) .................................................................................................. 60 2NC – Extension – Terrorism Defense (2/2) .................................................................................................. 61 2NC – AT: Add-On – Hegemony (1/2) ............................................................................................................62 2NC – AT: Add-On – Hegemony (2/2) ............................................................................................................ 63 2NC – AT: Add-On – LA Environment ............................................................................................................64 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (1/5) .............................................................................................................. 65 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (2/5) .............................................................................................................66 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (3/5) ............................................................................................................. 67 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (4/5) ............................................................................................................ 68 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (5/5) .............................................................................................................69 2NC – Extension – Middle East Defense ......................................................................................................... 70 2NC – Extension – Kashmir Defense ............................................................................................................... 71 2NC – Extension – Soft Power Defense ........................................................................................................... 72 2NC – AT: Add-On – North Korea (1/2) .......................................................................................................... 73 2NC – AT: Add-On – North Korea (2/2) ......................................................................................................... 74 2NC – AT: Add-On – Iran (1/2) ....................................................................................................................... 75 2NC – AT: Add-On – Iran (2/2) ....................................................................................................................... 76 ***MEXICO BORDER AFFIRMATIVE*** ............................................................................. 77 Notes................................................................................................................................................................... 78 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (1/11) ...................................................................................................................... 79 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (2/11) ..................................................................................................................... 80 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (3/11) ...................................................................................................................... 81 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (4/11) ......................................................................................................................82 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (5/11) ......................................................................................................................83 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (6/11) ..................................................................................................................... 84 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (7/11) ......................................................................................................................85 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (8/11) ..................................................................................................................... 86 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (9/11) ...................................................................................................................... 87 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (10/11) ................................................................................................................... 88 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (11/11) .................................................................................................................... 89 2AC – Extension – Infrastructure Key ............................................................................................................ 90 2AC – Extension – Integration Key .................................................................................................................. 91 2AC – Extension – Innovation Internal Link ..................................................................................................92 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (1/6) .................................................................................................................... 93 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (2/6) ...................................................................................................................94 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (4/6) ................................................................................................................... 95 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (4/6) ...................................................................................................................96 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (5/6) ................................................................................................................... 97 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (6/6) .................................................................................................................. 98 2AC – Extension – AT: Relations Resilient .....................................................................................................99 2AC – Extension – AT: Cyber Resilient .........................................................................................................100 2 1AC – Solvency (1/2) ....................................................................................................................................... 101 1AC – Solvency (2/2) ....................................................................................................................................... 102 2AC – Extension – Coordination Key (1/3) ................................................................................................... 103 2AC – Extension – Coordination Key (2/3) ................................................................................................... 104 2AC – Extension – Coordination Key (3/3) ................................................................................................... 105 2AC – Extension – Federal Government Key ................................................................................................ 106 2AC – Terrorism Add-On (1/4) ...................................................................................................................... 107 2AC – Terrorism Add-On (2/4) ...................................................................................................................... 108 2AC – Terrorism Add-On (3/4) ...................................................................................................................... 109 2AC – Terrorism Add-On (4/4) ...................................................................................................................... 110 ***MEXICO BORDER NEGATIVE*** ..................................................................................111 1NC – Manufacturing Adv Frontline (1/4) ......................................................................................................112 1NC – Manufacturing Adv Frontline (2/4) .....................................................................................................113 1NC – Manufacturing Adv Frontline (3/4) .................................................................................................... 114 1NC – Manufacturing Adv Frontline (4/4) .....................................................................................................115 2NC – Extension – Manufacturing Resilient ................................................................................................. 116 2NC – Extension – No Impact To Offshoring (1/2) ....................................................................................... 117 2NC – Extension – No Impact To Offshoring (2/2) ...................................................................................... 118 1NC – Mexico Relations Adv Frontline (1/4) ................................................................................................. 119 1NC – Mexico Relations Adv Frontline (2/4) ................................................................................................ 120 1NC – Mexico Relations Adv Frontline (3/4) .................................................................................................121 1NC – Mexico Relations Adv Frontline (4/4) ................................................................................................ 122 2NC – Extension – Relations High ................................................................................................................ 123 1NC – Solvency Frontline (1/2) ...................................................................................................................... 124 1NC – Solvency Frontline (2/2) ...................................................................................................................... 125 2NC – Extension – Status Quo Solves (2/2) .................................................................................................. 126 2NC – Extension – Status Quo Solves (2/2) .................................................................................................. 127 2NC – AT: Add-On – Terrorism (1/2) ............................................................................................................ 128 2NC – AT: Add-On – Terrorism (2/2) ........................................................................................................... 129 ***VENEZUELA OIL AFFIRMATIVE*** ............................................................................ 130 Notes..................................................................................................................................................................131 1AC – Relations Adv (1/5) ............................................................................................................................... 132 1AC – Relations Adv (2/5) .............................................................................................................................. 133 1AC – Relations Adv (3/5) .............................................................................................................................. 134 1AC – Relations Adv (4/5) .............................................................................................................................. 135 1AC – Relations Adv (5/5)............................................................................................................................... 136 2AC – Extension – Solvency (1/2) .................................................................................................................. 137 2AC – Extension – Solvency (2/2) ................................................................................................................. 138 2AC – Extension – Amazon Impact ............................................................................................................... 139 2AC – Extension – Warming Real (1/2) ........................................................................................................ 140 2AC – Extension – Warming Real (2/2) ........................................................................................................ 141 2AC – Extension – Warming Reversible ........................................................................................................ 142 2AC – Add-On – Ocean Acidification............................................................................................................. 143 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (1/7) .................................................................................................................... 144 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (2/7) .................................................................................................................... 145 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (3/7) .................................................................................................................... 146 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (4/7) .................................................................................................................... 147 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (5/7) .................................................................................................................... 148 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (6/7) .................................................................................................................... 149 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (7/7) .................................................................................................................... 150 3 2AC – Extension – Solvency ............................................................................................................................151 2AC – Extension – Dependence Leads to China War (1/2) .......................................................................... 152 2AC – Extension – Dependence Leads to China War (2/2) ......................................................................... 153 2AC – Extension – Dependence Hurts China Relations ............................................................................... 154 2AC – Add-On – Economy.............................................................................................................................. 155 2AC – Add-On – Terrorism (1/2) ................................................................................................................... 156 2AC – Add-On – Terrorism (2/2)................................................................................................................... 157 ***VENEZUELA OIL NEGATIVE*** ...................................................................................158 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (1/4) .............................................................................................................. 159 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (2/4) ............................................................................................................. 160 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (3/4) ............................................................................................................. 161 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (4/4) ............................................................................................................. 162 2NC – Extension – Can’t Solve Relations (1/2) ............................................................................................. 163 2NC – Extension – Can’t Solve Relations (2/2) ............................................................................................ 164 2NC – Extension – Alt Cause to Amazon ....................................................................................................... 165 2NC – Extension – Warming Defense ........................................................................................................... 166 2NC – AT: Add-On – Ocean Acidification ..................................................................................................... 167 1NC – Oil Dependence Adv Frontline (1/4) ................................................................................................... 168 1NC – Oil Dependence Adv Frontline (2/4)................................................................................................... 169 1NC – Oil Dependence Adv Frontline (3/4)................................................................................................... 170 1NC – Oil Dependence Adv Frontline (4/4) ................................................................................................... 171 2NC – Extension – Venezuela Oil Now .......................................................................................................... 172 2NC – Extension – Long Timeframe .............................................................................................................. 173 2NC – Extension – China Relations Resilient ............................................................................................... 174 2NC – Extension – No China War .................................................................................................................. 175 2NC – Extension – Iran Won’t Close Strait ................................................................................................... 176 2NC – AT: Add-On – Economy (1/2) ............................................................................................................. 177 2NC – AT: Add-On – Economy (2/2) ............................................................................................................ 178 2NC – AT: Add-On – Terrorism (1/2) ............................................................................................................ 179 2NC – AT: Add-On – Terrorism (2/2) ........................................................................................................... 180 4 ***APPEASEMENT DISADVANTAGE*** ............................................................................ 181 Notes................................................................................................................................................................. 182 1NC – Appeasement DA (1/2) ......................................................................................................................... 183 1NC – Appeasement DA (2/2) ........................................................................................................................ 184 2NC – Uniqueness – Cuba .............................................................................................................................. 185 2NC – Uniqueness – Venezuela (1/2) ............................................................................................................ 186 2NC – Uniqueness – Venezuela (1/2) ............................................................................................................ 187 2NC – Uniqueness – Latin America ............................................................................................................... 188 2NC – Uniqueness – AT: Appeasement Now ................................................................................................ 189 1NC – Link – Cuba Embargo .......................................................................................................................... 190 2NC – Link – Cuba Embargo .......................................................................................................................... 191 1NC – Link – Mexico ....................................................................................................................................... 192 1NC – Link – Venezuela .................................................................................................................................. 193 2NC – Link – Venezuela ................................................................................................................................. 194 2NC – Impact – Turns LA Stability ................................................................................................................ 195 2NC – Impact – Iran Prolif ............................................................................................................................. 196 2NC – Impact – North Korea War ................................................................................................................. 198 2NC – Impact – Sino-Indo War ..................................................................................................................... 199 2NC – Impact – Taiwan War ......................................................................................................................... 200 ***AFF ANSWERS TO APPEASEMENT DA*** ................................................................... 201 2AC – Non-Unique ......................................................................................................................................... 202 1AR – Non-Unique ......................................................................................................................................... 203 2AC – Link Turn – Embargo ......................................................................................................................... 204 1AR – Link Turn – Embargo .......................................................................................................................... 205 2AC – No Impact – No Credibility Spillover ................................................................................................ 206 2AC – Impact Defense – Iran Prolif ...............................................................................................................207 1AR – Impact Defense – Iran Prolif .............................................................................................................. 208 2AC – Impact Defense – North Korea .......................................................................................................... 209 1AR – Impact Defense – North Korea ............................................................................................................ 210 2AC – Impact Defense – Sino-Indo War ........................................................................................................211 1AR – Impact Defense – Sino-Indo War ........................................................................................................ 212 2AC – Impact Defense – Taiwan War ............................................................................................................ 213 1AR – Impact Defense – Taiwan War ............................................................................................................ 214 5 ***TOPICALITY*** 6 Notes – Gov 2 Gov This topicality violation says that the plan must increase the economic relations specifically between the GOVERNMENTS of the involved countries. Any affirmative that would result in an increase of the economic ties between the private sectors of the topic countries would not be topical according to this violation. 7 1NC – T-Government to Government (1/2) A. Interpretation – economic engagement requires expanding bilateral economic relations Kahler, 6 - Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications) Economic engagement - a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations - is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized. This means the plan has to be government-to-government – not private economic engagement Daga, 13 - director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf) Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-togovernment economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others. ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005 (http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html) Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.] B. Violation – _____________________________________. 8 1NC – T-Government to Government (2/2) C. Standards – 1. limits – a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable – otherwise they could use any organization, lift barriers to private engagement, or target civil society – it makes topic preparation impossible for the negative 2. negative ground – formal governmental channels are key to predictable relations disadvantages and counterplans that test ‘engagement’ D. Topicality is a voting issue for fairness and education 9 2NC – Extension – EE = Gov to Gov (1/2) Economic engagement is the exclusive use of economic tools to improve bilateral relations Jakstaite, 10 - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLERANGE THEORIES” BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/v10076-010-0015-7) The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations .94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement. 10 2NC – Extension – EE = Gov to Gov (2/2) Economic engagement is designed to build bilateral relations Karakasis 08 – MA in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS at Instabul Bilgi University (VASILEIOS, “THE IMPACT OF EUROPEANIZATION ON GREECE’S ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY TOWARDS TURKEY”, http://www.academia.edu/667112/The_Impact_of_Europeanization_on_Greeces_Engagemen t_Strategy_towards_Turkey) This policy is accompanied by an economic pillar. By economic engagement what can be implied is a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with the adversary aiming to change its attitude and improve the bilateral relations. This pillar relies on increasing levels of trade and investments aiming to moderate the target’s interests’ conceptions by shifting incentives and building networks of interdependence.48 Economic interdependence is able to operate as transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the latter. It can generate and establish vested interests in the context of target society and government undermining old values of military status and territorial acquisition. The beneficiaries of this interdependence become addicted to it and protect their interests by putting pressure on the government to accommodate the source of independence.49 Internationalist elites committed to economic openness and international stability might marginalize nationalist elites which are wedded to the threat or use of force. Regardless whether the society of targeted society constitutes a pluralist democracy or not, interests tied to international economy become a critical part of the electorate to whom political elites must respond.50 11 2AC – AT: EE = Gov to Gov Counterinterp --- economic engagement includes trade, lifting sanctions, and entry into economic institutions Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k - *Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND **a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000s urvival.pdf Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs , which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement. Economic engagement can be towards the private sector Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k - *Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND **a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000s urvival.pdf The provision of economic incentives to the private sector of a target country can be an effective mode of ‘unconditional’ engagement, particularly when the economy is not state dominated. In these more open economic climates, those nourished by the exchanges made possible under economic engagement will often be agents for change and natural allies in some Western causes. To the extent that economic engagement builds the private sector and other non-state actors, it is likely to widen the base of support for engagement with America specifically and the promotion of international norms more generally. Certainly, US engagement with China has nurtured sympathetic pockets, if not to American ideals per se, then at least to trade and open economic markets and the maintenance of good relations to secure them. The only constraint on the scope and development of ‘unconditional’ engagement is the range of available collaborators in civil society or the private sector. Fortunately, globalisation and the explosion of economic entities that has accompanied it – while making economic isolation more difficult to achieve – presents a multitude of possible partners for unconditional engagement with non-state actors. Its means belonging to or associated with Dictionary.com, 9 (based on Collins English Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its?s=t) its (ɪts) — determiner a. of, belonging to, or associated in some way b. ( as pronoun ): each town claims its is the best with it: its left rear wheel 12 Notes – Only Economic This topicality violation says that the affirmative must only deal with directly with solely economic issues. This ensures that affirmatives that only do things “sort-of” related to economics can be excluded. This violation has a very strong argument about limits—or the size of the topic—because if affirmatives can address issues that aren’t only economic, a whole host of new things could be topical. 13 1NC – T-Only Economic (1/2) Interpretation – “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action to bolster economic development between countries Jakstaite, 10 - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLERANGE THEORIES” BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/v10076-010-0015-7) The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state’s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations .94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement. B. Violation – _____________________________________. 14 1NC – T-Only Economic (2/2) C. Standards – 1. limits – they explode the topic – blurring the lines between economic and other forms of engagement makes any positive interaction with another country topical. It’s impossible to predict or prepare 2. negative ground – the economic limit is vital to critiques of economics, trade disads, and non-economic counterplans 3. precision – it’s key to effective policy analysis Resnik, 1 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete) In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy. The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st century. D. Topicality is a voting issue for fairness and education 15 ***CUBA EMBARGO AFFIRMATIVE*** 16 Notes Affirmative Analysis This affirmative will defend that the US should end its economic embargo on Cuba. There exists an extremely large amount of literature on both sides of the debate for this particular affirmative and it is a crucial core part of the topic, particularly as one of the only Cuba aff. This version of the embargo affirmative includes two advantages. Because both are based off of the perception of lifting the embargo, this version of the affirmative helps hedge against arguments that Cuba will refuse economic engagement because the US can still regain its diplomatic credibility even if Cuba refuses to trade. Advantage One --- Latin American Relations The thesis of this advantage is that the continuation of the embargo remains an enormous impediment in US attempts to develop positive relations and cooperation with countries in the Latin America region. Many Latin American countries have indicated that they will not cooperate with the US if the US continues its embargo on Cuba. Advantage Two --- Diplomacy The thesis of this advantage is that the embargo also effects our global credibility in the eyes of the rest of the world. The evidence for the affirmative is incredibly strong that if we were to lift the embargo, it would send a signal to other global hotspots that the US is committed to conflict resolution and diplomacy rather than bullying other countries. This enables more effective foreign policy that would help generate diplomatic momentum to resolve several conflicts. New Advantage Ground While future updates will include several disadvantages based on the new commodities that can be traded between the US and Cuba and their economic effects on countries, this also provides tons of room for aff innovation and new advantages as affirmative teams can claim that new trade of specific products such as US rice, Cuban medicine, Cuban agricultural goods, etc., are positive changes from the status quo. Sample Plan Texts: The United States federal government should end the economic embargo on Cuba. The United States federal government should substantially ease economic restrictions on Cuba. The United States federal government should normalize trade relations with Cuba. 17 1AC – Relations Adv (1/8) Advantage ____ is Latin American Relations U.S.-Latin American relations are deteriorating in the status quo --- this trend undermines the development of regional cooperation Inter-American Dialogue, 12 – the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs (“Remaking the Relationship The United States and Latin America”, April 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) What is at stake is the future of inter-American relations , which today are generally cordial but lack vigor and purpose. Efforts at hemispheric integration have been disappointing. Effective cooperation in the Americas— even on widely shared problems like energy security, organized crime and the drug trade, and international economic volatility—remains limited and sporadic. It is the good news of Latin America’s progress that has most altered hemispheric relations . In the past decade, the region has posted its best economic performance in a generation and managed largely to sidestep the world financial crisis in 2008–2009. The ranks of the middle classes have swelled. The region’s political structures have also opened up, giving way to growing participation by women, indigenous and Afro-descendant populations, and other once-excluded groups. All Latin Americans across a broadening spectrum have greater access to education and health services, consumer goods, and foreign travel. They now have real and rapidly expanding stakes in their societies. These advances have also led to new social stirrings which, along with demands and expectations, are notably on the rise. There are more and more pressures for further change and improvements . Impressive economic, political, and social progress at home has, in turn, given Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and many other countries greater access to worldwide opportunities. Indeed, the region’s most salient transformation may be its increasingly global connections and widening international relationships. Brazil’s dramatic rise on the world stage most visibly exemplifies the shift. But other countries, too, are participating actively in global affairs and developing extensive networks of commercial and political ties. China is an increasingly prominent economic actor, but India and other Asian countries are intensifying their ties to the region as well . The United States has also changed markedly, in ways that many find worrisome. The 2008 financial crisis revealed serious misalignments in and poor management of the US economy—which, four years later, is still struggling to recover. Inequality has significantly widened in the United States, while much-needed improvements in education and infrastructure are ignored. The most ominous change in the United States has taken place in the political realm. Politics have become less collaborative. It is increasingly difficult to find common ground on which to build solutions to the critical problems on the policy agenda. Compromise, the hallmark of democratic governance, has become an ebbing art, replaced by gridlock and inaction on challenges that would advance US national interests and well-being. In part as a result of these shifts, US-Latin American relations have grown more distant. The quality and intensity of ties have diminished. Most countries of the region view the United States as less and less relevant to their needs—and with declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern them. In the main, hemispheric relations are amicable. Open conflict is rare and, happily, the sharp antagonisms that marred relations in the past have subsided. But the US-Latin America relationship would profit from more vitality and direction. Shared interests are not pursued as vigorously as they should be, and opportunities for more fruitful engagement are being missed. Well-developed ideas for reversing these disappointing trends are scarce. 18 1AC – Relations Adv (2/8) Now is the key time to act --- greater US engagement with Latin American countries must come now or they’ll transition to China or independence Valencia, 5/20/13 – political analyst and contributing writer for Global Voices Online (Robert, “U.S. and Latin America: Economic Cooperation without Militarization?”, http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/05/20/us-and-latin-america-economic-cooperationwithout-militarization] In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica and vowed to strengthen economic ties with these two countries and the rest of Latin America. He pledged to expand renewable energy development and education initiatives in recognition of the joined fates of the United States and Latin America. This approach to Latin America is refreshing, but its impact on the ongoing War on Drugs remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, the United States bears much of the responsibility for the failed campaign, but the Obama administration has seen that some Latin American countries are taking their own lead in tackling the drug trade and are increasingly relying less on Washington. The Obama administration, for its part, has realized that shifting the legendary treatment of Latin America as the U.S.’ “backyard” to an economic approach would draw Latin America closer to Washington, especially given the fact that Latin American leaders like Mexico’s Enrique Peña Nieto and Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff want to be considered trade partners and not U.S. subordinates. President Obama’s meeting with Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto centered on the historic economic relationship between the two countries, and furthered their conversation on economic and commercial initiatives as well as immigration issues. Additionally, Peña Nieto highlighted Mexico’s economic growth and the necessity for bolstering student exchange. Both leaders agreed to create an economic team led by Vice President Joe Biden and Mexican Secretary of the Treasury Luis Videgaray. They resolved to create projects to improve infrastructure and security along the 3,000 kilometer-long border, one of the world’s largest. The issue of security was only briefly discussed during the visit. Obama offered his support in fighting organized crime and curbing any illegal cash flow and gun trade, as well as measures to reduce drug consumption, but Peña Nieto quickly shifted the conversation back to economic initiatives to avoid thorny issues such as immigration overhaul and drug violence. Some experts claim Peña Nieto’s aversion to the issue is rooted in his desire to take on violence without U.S. help. Since 1997, the U.S. government has helped Mexican authorities perform a process of vetting officials by way of polygraphs, in order to identify any “rotten apples” that cooperate with drug kingpins. Many expect to Peña Nieto to change this policy. In addition, Peña Nieto has rejected any U.S. military help. Mexico’s take on the war on drugs is borne out of desperation for the lack of action by the U.S. to effectively tackle the effects of drug trade. And it very much resembles Latin America’s approach in the matter. Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, for example, has called for a sharp break with established policy on drug criminalization, and has stated that he would not oppose the legalization of narcotics if necessary. Santos’s comments drew support from chiefs of staff from Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala. Furthermore, the 43rd Assembly of the Organization of American States, which will take place on June 4-6 in Guatemala, is slated to address alternative goals for combating the drug trade, including prevention and drug treatment, violence reduction, crime-related activities that are connected to drug consumption, and money laundering. The lingering question is whether economic cooperation will be able to supplant entrenched security measures in the short term, especially considering how multi-million dollar aid packages have been earmarked for several Latin American nations for decades. Colombia, for example, has received $7 billion in U.S. military and police aid grants— the largest of any Latin American nation—followed by Mexico with $2 billion since 1996. President Obama’s meeting with seven leaders of Central American countries and the Dominican Republic in Costa Rica proved more successful in discussing immigration and the drug war than his trip to Mexico. Latin American countries with smaller economies, conversely, are seeking more cooperation from the United States. El Salvador’s Mauricio Funes said that the United States should provide more funding to Central America given its greater share of responsibility for combating illicit drug trade. The new emphasis on economic initiatives between the United States and Latin American countries represents a welcome break in stale policies. As President Obama pointed out, “the stronger the economies and the institutions for individuals seeking legitimate careers, the less powerful those narco-trafficking organizations are going to be.” Furthermore, economic initiatives need not eclipse security strategies, but rather work in tandem. The White House must take steps to implement economic cooperation as swiftly as possible, including the addition of including additional Latin American countries into the Trans-Pacific Partnership--a 2005 free trade agreement that includes more Asian countries--and encouraging more student exchange programs between the U.S. and Latin America. At present, only 40,000 Latin Americans are studying in the U.S., a far cry from the 100,000 slots Obama promised to open this year. Since the George W.Bush administration, the U.S. has seen its clout wane on the realms of diplomacy and Latin America’s decision-making as the leftist wave rose among several Latin American countries, while the region sought to integrate more and more by way of economic and diplomatic blocs like UNASUR and CELAC. If Obama’s words are not consequent with immediate actions in the next couple of months or years and does not take Latin America as a serious trade partner (which hasn’t been the case in previous administrations due to the Latin America-is-our-backyard mentality), the U.S. will continue to lose leverage on important issues that concern Latin America, and in turn Latin American countries will forge ahead with economic and security integration amongst themselves. 19 1AC – Relations Adv (3/8) Lifting the embargo is the most important internal link to fix relations --- it’s the litmus test for engaging the rest of Latin America Perez 10 – JD, Yale Law (David Perez, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis) Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking long-term as well as shortterm gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political capital was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of this, President Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement with Colombia encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard for international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American sentiment. The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American, meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite. Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that have consolidated the power of the executive, while extending or in Venezuela's case eliminating - presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales. Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin America is still searching for its identity. [*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors. The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage. A good reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. n4 In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between Many of the problems facing Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best the U.S. and Latin America. way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5 When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin America, having Washington's policy toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, America's reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own. n8 In disproportionately dominated short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect throughout Latin America , and would go a long way toward creating goodwill. 20 1AC – Relations Adv (4/8) Only the plan is sufficient to solve --- Cuba is the most important barrier to cooperation with Latin America Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis) Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years. Aside from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed state are slim, the threat is nevertheless real. If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge into civil war, face a humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a massive migration to Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new and comprehensive policy toward Cuba can help prevent these nightmare scenarios from materializing. There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it will face additional difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To address the issues confronting the United States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs, the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington must restore its heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader. Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new energy and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are suggestions that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's greatness is its ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace not only America's uncanny ability to reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so great to begin with. 21 1AC – Relations Adv (5/8) We’ll isolate two impact scenarios --Scenario one is democracy Improve relations and cooperation with Latin America is critical to regional democracy Inter-American Dialogue, 12 – the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs (“Remaking the Relationship The United States and Latin America”, April 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) The democratic outlook in the Americas is on balance positive, particularly when compared with previous periods and to the rest of the world . Free, competitive elections are regularly held and, happily, the massive human rights violations associated with earlier periods of authoritarian rule have passed . Nonetheless, there are fundamental challenges that, if unaddressed, could spread and become far more serious . These problems need to be dealt with collectively through established regional mechanisms. Among these is the defense of democracy, an important area for greater cooperation among the United States, Canada, and Latin America. Today, threats to democratic rule from the actions of the military, as occurred in the June 2009 coup in Honduras, are rare. More commonly, elected executives, once in office, centralize power and assume increasing control of critical institutions, public and private. Checks on presidential authority are, thereby, weakened or eliminated . Governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Ecuador have all followed this pattern, undermining press freedom and other basic rights . Although the Inter-American Democratic Charter calls for collective action to prevent and repair such transgressions, they have, in fact, been met with relative silence . Indeed, the charter has rarely been invoked . This inaction stems from the lack of consensus in the hemisphere about what constitutes violations of democratic principles and how best to respond to them . The charter should be reformed to establish mechanisms for redress when elected executives run roughshod over independent institutions. Although unlikely to be accomplished in the near future, the long-term goal of the United States and other hemispheric governments should be agreement on collective actions to hold nations to the standards of the charter. The United States and Canada cannot be effective if they are the only voices calling for action to defend democracy and enforce the charter. The United States should pursue a longer-term strategy of consulting and finding common ground with Latin American and Caribbean governments on the appropriate use of the charter, which should play an important role in hemispheric affairs. Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument . It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement. At the same time, Cuba’s authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas . At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press . Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba’s eventual transition to democratic rule. An end to the US policy Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step. of isolating 22 1AC – Relations Adv (6/8) Latin American democracy is key to global democracy Hillman 02 – Ph.D., Professor and Director, Institute for the Study of Democracy and Human Rights, St. John Fisher College (Richard S., Democracy and Human Rights in Latin Americai, Preface, p. vii) Latin American experiences, especially in the areas of democratization and human rights protection, are particularly relevant for developing countries that are attempting to build stable political and economic systems in order to provide a decent standard of living and incorporate previously excluded populations into the national mainstream. The past record, of course, is far from acceptable. The advent of the twenty-first century, however, appears to be a time of great potential progress for the institutionalization of democratic human rights regimes that would reduce human pain and suffering. The number of countries in Latin America and elsewhere that are experimenting with democracy has never been greater. Clearly, the path toward fulfilling the expectations raised by these experiments is not an easy one; it is fraught with difficult obstacles deriving from the historical legacy as well as contemporary challenges. Nevertheless, democracy and human rights have definitively entered the political lexicon and discourse throughout the world. Democracy prevents extinction Diamond, 95 – Hoover Institute Senior Fellow (Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm) This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability , popular sovereignty, and openness . LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build w eapons of m ass d estruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built. 23 1AC – Relations Adv (7/8) Scenario two is nuclear terrorism Stronger relations also spur effective global cooperation in preventing terrorist theft of nuclear weapons Inter-American Dialogue 12 (“Remaking the Relationship The United States and Latin America”, the Inter-American Dialogue is the leading US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in Western Hemisphere affairs, April 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and other Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues. Several for which US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important include: As the world’s lone nuclearweapons-free region, Latin America has the opportunity to participate more actively in nonprolif eration efforts. Although US and Latin American interests do not always converge on non-proliferation questions, they align on some related goals. For example, the main proliferation challenges today are found in developing and unstable parts of the world, as well as in the leakage—or transfer of nuclear materials—to terrorists. In that context, south-south connections are crucial. Brazil could play a pivotal role. Many countries in the region give priority to climate change challenges . This may position them as a voice in international debates on this topic . The importance of the Amazon basin to worldwide climate concerns gives Brazil and five other South American nations a special role to play. Mexico already has assumed a prominent position on climate change and is active in global policy debates. Brazil organized the first-ever global environmental meeting in 1992 and, this year, will host Rio+20 . Mexico hosted the second international meeting on climate change in Cancún in 2010 . The United States is handicapped by its inability to devise a climate change policy. Still, it should support coordination on the presumption of shared interests on a critical policy challenge. Latin Americans are taking more active leadership on drug policy in the hemisphere and could become increasingly influential in global discussions of drug strategies. Although the United States and Latin America are often at odds on drug policy, they have mutual interests and goals that should allow consultation and collaboration on a new, more effective approach to the problem. 24 1AC – Relations Adv (8/8) Nuclear terrorism results in global nuclear war and extinction Ayson 10 –Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33.7, InformaWorld) But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst ? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a high er stage of alert . In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. 25 2AC – Extension – Solvency Lifting the embargo boosts regional soft power and Latin American relations Rowen 13 (Dolores Rowen, Graduate student at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy at Seton Hall University, focusing in International Economics/Development and Latin America and the Caribbean, “What about Cuba?”, Maplewood, April 19 2013, http://thealternativepress.com/articles/what-about-cuba) In 2012, only 29 percent of Americans felt that the 52-year-old trade embargo on Cuba should remain a US policy. The majority of Americans believe that the economic embargo should be lifted. It is even more interesting to know that many Cubans look favorably on the US and want to see an end to this ineffective and archaic policy. The question therefore is if so many Americans and native Cubans support an end to the embargo, why does it still exist? The answer is not far-fetched. It exists mainly because the large Cuban lobbying constituency that desires an end to the Castro regime actively lobbies to keep such policies in place. Yet those that advocate for a continuation of this policy may not realize that this embargo is ultimately a lost economic opportunity for the United States. Cuba has resources such as sugar, cocoa, nickel, and fertile soil – all of which should appeal to US businesses. For the US, this ineffective embargo has only resulted in increased tensions and anti-American sentiment in Latin America and the Caribbean. It has failed at its primary purpose of disposing Fidel and Raul Castro and their Communist regime and of restoring democracy to Cuba. It has, however, had a profoundly negative effect on the Cuban economy. Given the current economic and political climate, the time for economic reform and the restoration of bilateral economic ties with Cuba is now, as it would be strategically beneficial for both countries to end the embargo. In the past, efforts to increase the effect of the embargo, such as the creation of the Cuban-Democracy Act (1992) and the Helms-Burton Act (1996) have neither resulted in regime change nor economic collapse. Somehow, Cuba has endured throughout the years. But, the reality for Cuba is that there is little to no economic growth or prosperity in the country. Cuban officials have been well aware of the fact that since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the introduction of the “special period” that there has been a need to reform Cuba’s economic policies. However, this process has been slow, subtle, and ineffective. In the 1990s, Cuba began to privatize small businesses. Its main focus was tourism, with the hope that this industry would revitalize its economy. In 2007, tourism accounted for about 16.7% of overall investment in Cuba. Due to the embargo, Americans are limited in their travel to Cuba. This is purely a lost economic opportunity for both Cuba and the US. Without tourists from the US, tourism untimely provides temporary economic stability, but does not provide long lasting economic growth. Cuba is a potential market for US exports and such opportunities should not be overlooked during in this present economic climate. Cuba is the largest country in the Caribbean with a large population of about11 million. Moreover, its unused agricultural land and limited technology should also be viewed as an opportunity for American businesses and entrepreneurs. Cuban society is highly educated and many of these individuals are currently working in positions that cater to the tourist industry rather than in their desired professional fields. The international community does not look favorably upon the perpetuation of this embargo. Our Latin American neighbors are adamantly opposed to it. Normalizing relations with Cuba would probably improve our overall relations with Latin American and Caribbean states, resulting in better relations within the Western Hemisphere, and prove to bolster the US’ “soft power” in the region. Lifting the embargo is the key first step --- it’s comparatively the largest issue Shifter 12 – President of Inter-American Dialogue (Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument. It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement. At the same time, Cuba’s authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas. At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press. Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba’s eventual transition to democratic rule. An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step. 26 2AC – Extension – Now is Key U.S. Latin American relations are at a crossroads --- US action now is key Shifter 12 – President of Inter-American Dialogue (Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) Simply addressing an unfinished agenda is not enough. Both the United States and Latin America need to do more to exploit the enormous untapped opportunities of their relationship in economics, trade, and energy. They need to work together to deal with global and regional problems. And they need to project common values, including peace, democracy, human rights, expansion of equal opportunity, and social mobility. They need to breathe new life and vigor into hemispheric relations. If the United States and Latin America do not make the effort now, the chance may slip away. The most likely scenario then would be marked by a continued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemispherewide institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity. The United States and Latin America would go their separate ways, manage their affairs independently of one another, and forego the opportunities that could be harvested by a more productive relationship. There are risks of simply maintaining the status quo. Urgent problems will inevitably arise that require trust and effective collaboration to resolve. And there is a chance that tensions between the United States and Latin America could become much worse, adversely affecting everyone’s interests and wellbeing. It is time to seize the moment and overhaul hemispheric relations. 27 2AC – Extension – Key to Democracy Expanding relations with Latin America provides a platform for global democratic support Goodman 13 – President of the Institute of International Education (Allan E. Goodman, “Cooperation is Key to Growth for Latin America”, May 24, 2013, http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/opinion/1464) In the United States, the Obama administration has made it a priority to expand academic exchanges between Latin America and the United States. The U. S. government is working with foreign governments, universities and colleges, and the private sector to reach the goal of “100,000 Strong in the Americas” to increase the flow of students between Latin American and the Caribbean and the United States to 100,000 in each direction. The most recent data in Open Doors report, published by IIE in partnership with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, shows that 64,021 students from the region studied in the United States and 39,871 students from the U.S. studied abroad in Latin America and the Caribbean. As described in a chapter on Western Hemisphere Academic Exchanges by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Meghann Curtis and “Strong partnerships in the region are critical to both U.S. domestic and global strategic interests.” The authors note that science and technology innovations have accelerated through cooperative partnerships and are key to shared sustainable growth, and that working collaboratively across borders in the region is necessary to attain energy security and to combat transnational crime and narcotrafficking, as well as to support the global effort to promote democracy, rule of law, social inclusion and human rights around the world. “At the center of these partnerships—and U.S. strategy in the region—are educational exchanges, which help us Policy Adviser Lisa Kraus at the U.S. Department of State, establish a strong foundation for empowering the best innovators, entrepreneurs, and leaders of today to meet all these challenges.” 28 2AC – Extension – Global Spillover Democratization in Latin America is key --- failure will derail democracy on a global scale Fauriol 95 (Georges Fauriol, Director – CSIS Americas Program, and Sidney Weintraub, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS, Professor at School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Summer 1995, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, “U.S. Policy, Brazil, and the Southern Cone,” p. 123) The democracy theme also carries much force in the hemisphere today. The State Department regularly parades the fact that all countries in the hemisphere, save one, now have democratically elected governments. True enough, as long as the definition of democracy is flexible, but these countries turned to democracy mostly of their own volition. It is hard to determine if the United States is using the democracy theme as a club in the hemisphere (hold elections or be excluded) or promoting it as a goal. If as a club, its efficacy is limited to this hemisphere, as the 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Indonesia demonstrated in its call for free trade in that region, replete with nondemocratic nations, by 2020. Following that meeting, Latin Americans are somewhat cynical as to whether the U nited S tates really cares deeply about promoting democracy if this conflicts with expanding exports. Yet this triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by the United States, but with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will compromise progress elsewhere in the world. 29 2AC – Extension – Terrorism Likely Terrorism is probable --- there’s nuclear theft now Dahl, 7/1/13 – Specialist Correspondent (Frederik, “Governments warn about nuclear terrorism threat,” 7/1/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/us-nuclear-securityidUSBRE96010E20130701) (Reuters) - More action is needed to prevent militants acquiring plutonium or highly-enriched uranium that could be used in bombs, governments agreed at a meeting on nuclear security in Vienna on Monday, without deciding on any concrete steps. A declaration adopted by more than 120 states at the meeting said "substantial progress" had been made in recent years to improve nuclear security globally, but it was not enough. Analysts say radical groups could theoretically build a crude but deadly nuclear bomb if they had the money, technical knowledge and materials needed. Ministers remained "concerned about the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism ... More needs to be done to further strengthen nuclear security worldwide", the statement said. The document "encouraged" states to take various measures such as minimizing the use of highlyenriched uranium, but some diplomats said they would have preferred firmer commitments. Many countries regard nuclear security as a sensitive political issue that should be handled primarily by national authorities. This was reflected in the statement's language. Still, Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which hosted the conference, said the agreement was "very robust" and represented a major step forward. RADICAL GROUPS' "NUCLEAR AMBITIONS" Amano earlier warned the IAEA-hosted conference against a "false sense of security" over the danger of nuclear terrorism. Holding up a small lead container that was used to try to traffic highly enriched uranium in Moldova two years ago, the U.N. nuclear chief said it showed a "worrying level of knowledge on the part of the smugglers". "This case ended well," he said, referring to the fact that the material was seized and arrests were made. But he added: "We cannot be sure if such cases are just the tip of the iceberg." Obtaining weapons-grade fissile material - highly enriched uranium or plutonium - poses the biggest challenge for militant groups, so it must be kept secure both at civilian and military facilities, experts say. An apple-sized amount of plutonium in a nuclear device and detonated in a highly populated area could instantly kill or wound hundreds of thousands of people , according to the Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG) lobby group. But experts say a so-called "dirty bomb" is a more likely threat than a nuclear bomb. In a dirty bomb, conventional explosives are used to disperse radiation from a radioactive source, which can be found in hospitals or other places that are generally not very well protected. More than a hundred incidents of thefts and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive material are reported to the IAEA every year, Amano said. "Some material goes missing and is never found ," he said. 30 2AC – Add-On – Hegemony (1/2) Stronger relations and cooperation is critical to US hegemony and the broader foreign policy agenda Sabatini and Berger 12 – editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director of policy at AS/COA, policy associate at the AS/COA (Christopher and Ryan, “Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America”, June 13th, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/whythe-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america) Speaking in Santiago, Chile, in March of last year, President Obama called Latin America “a region on the move,” one that is “more important to the prosperity and security of the United States than ever before.” Somebody forgot to tell the Washington brain trust. The Center for a New American Security, a respected national security think tank a half-mile from the White House, recently released a new series of policy recommendations for the next presidential administration. The 70-page “grand strategy” report only contained a short paragraph on Brazil and made only one passing reference to Latin America. Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea flaunting international norms and regional stability. But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the Rio Grande goes to the heart of the U.S.’ changing role in the world and its strategic interests within it. Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations: 1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies. Recently, countries with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions diametrically opposed to the U.S. when it comes to matters of global governance and human rights. Take, for example, Russia and China’s stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention. Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to refer to Brazil as “a rising spoiler.” At a time of (perceived) declining U.S. influence, it’s important that America deepens its ties with regional allies that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council and more representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decision-making rather than isolate them. If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy agenda. Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and human rights. 31 2AC – Add-On – Hegemony (2/2) That prevents global nuclear conflict and great power war Brooks et al. 13 [Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment”, Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 751,http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107] A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive wartemptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without theAmerican pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins toswing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimismregarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China . It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by astill-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on itsparticular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however,undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in tradeoffs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts thatthe withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). 32 2AC – Add-On – LA Environment Latin American democracy is key to regional environmental protection --- it will stop deforestation Callejas 10 (Danny Callejas, Professor of Economics at the Universidad de Antioquia, Colombia, “Democracy and Environmental Quality in Latin America: A Panel System of Equations Approach, 1995-2008,” November 2010) Democracy has a positive effect on environmental quality. The theory suggests that democracy sustains and encourages freedom of speech, freedom of press, political participation and social awareness. These elements provide a conduit for social demands. As urban population and income grow, citizens increase their demand for higher environmental standards and quality. The enactment of new policies and regulations that incentive individuals and firms may lead to a reduction in pollution, environmental degradation and deforestation; therefore, leading to a higher level of environmental quality. This study analyzed 19 Latin America countries for the period 1995-2008. A panel data system of equations estimates suggest that a 10% increase in democracy may reduce CO2 emissions per capita in 0.48% or 0.60% in Latin America. Similarly, a 10% increase in education may reduce emissions in 0.71% or 0.73%. These results suggest that democracy and education have a positive effect on environmental quality. Regional deforestation will risk extinction --- the Amazon is uniquely key Takacs 96 (David Takacs, “The Idea of Diversity: Philosophies of Paradise,” 1996, pg. 200-201) So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings per-ished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's wellstocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where cancer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper. 33 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (1/7) Advantage ____ is US diplomacy The embargo is ruining US international credibility and remains a critical barrier to effective global cooperation --- the plan’s commitment to diplomacy would facilitate conflict resolution in hotspots such as the Middle East and Kashmir Dickerson, 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M Dickerson, “United States Security Strategy Towards Cuba,” January 14, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf) At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo - a powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba. The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towards Cuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations. While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba. On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If negotiations break down and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, international support would be easier to garner. Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy. Policy and National Interest Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years. From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7 The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s 34 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (2/7) <<<CONTINUED --- NO TEXT REMOVED>>> economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15 By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments. The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba. A History of Anger and Distrust After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations. Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba. The embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20 Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26 Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries. unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead 35 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (3/7) <<<CONTINUED --- NO TEXT REMOVED>>>> It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evi l’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro. Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic engagement in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and s tability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba. To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open mar kets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth Na tional Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger CubanAmerican generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations. As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations. Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement. The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed. How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba. Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security. In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool. Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.? Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems. While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in th e region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere spe culation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations. Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow. The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let u s just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large th at we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate. Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these. We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set th e democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government. If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. multilateralism, should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections. The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions. While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected. Conclusion Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come. 36 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (4/7) Middle East war goes nuclear --- rationality doesn’t check --- reviving US credibility is key Beck 5/28/13 (Noah Beck, Middle East Analyst, “A nuclear Middle East is doomsday,” http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3633/a_nuclear_middle_east_is_doomsday) As the Obama administration tries to unbury itself from snowballing scandals, my apocalyptic thriller steadily crawls from fiction to fact. The Middle East is an insane place. And it's going nuclear. Yet, too many optimists, isolationists, and self-deluded analysts think that rationality will prevail and keep us all safe. Is it rational to take out the organs of a man you just killed and eat them on camera, as a Syrian rebel recently did? How about a senior Palestinian Authority official who recently declared on Lebanese television that the PA would nuke Israel if it had nuclear weapons? Jibril Rajoub, the deputy secretary of the Fatah Central Committee and the chairman of the PA Olympics Committee, apparently doesn’t mind that the nuclear mushroom he wants over Israel would also kill millions of Palestinians, just miles away – the main goal is that Israel be nuked. At best, one can say that there is a “twisted rationality” in the Middle East, as exemplified by Iran’s former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In a December 2001 speech, Rafsanjani said, “If one day the Islamic world [acquires nuclear weapons], then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality. Jews shall expect to be once again scattered and wandering around the globe the day when this appendix is extracted from the region and the Muslim world.” Despite the above, Rafsanjani is considered such a “moderate” that regime hardliners disqualified him from running in Iran’s presidential election next month. So if Rafsanjani thinks that nuking Israel would be worth a few million Iranians killed by an Israeli retributive nuclear strike, what does that say about the rationality of the current, less “moderate” regime (the one regularly threatening to destroy Israel)? Could the eschatology of Shia Islam further heighten the risk of Armageddon? If the regime under Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei genuinely believes that an apocalyptic war will hasten the advent of the Twelfth Imam (the Islamic messiah), doesn’t that make a nuclear first strike on Israel that much more tempting? Scholars may disagree about the potential impact of messianic ideology on nuclear decisions, but the mere possibility that geopolitical To spread its radical ideology, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard finances, trains, and arms some of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations: Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. These organizations are collectively responsible for thousands of deaths from decades of terrorist attacks and wars in Israel, Lebanon, Europe, and Latin America. Iran has also conflicts could be viewed through a theological lens hardly adds rationality to the Middle East. provided support to the Taliban, Iraqi insurgents, and al-Qaeda. And the Islamic Republic supplies Syria with arms, training, and fighters to help President Basher Assad stay in power by massacring his own people every day. If this is how the Iranian regime has behaved without the impunity conferred by a nuclear deterrent, what can be expected of the regime once it has nukes? Equally troubling, if Iran’s large-scale and dispersed nuclear program continues, the regime will be able to produce dozens of nuclear bombs every year. Such massive production only increases the odds of intentional (or unauthorized) nuclear transfers to state or non-state actors, and spurs regional rivals into acquiring or developing a matching nuclear deterrent. Three trends will make a nuclear Middle East even scarier: 1) technological improvements and miniaturization will make it easier to create and transfer small nuclear devices. 2) Climate change will aggravate water scarcity, which will only intensify generational conflicts in the Middle East. 3) Increasing technological interconnectedness will exacerbate sectarianism (as has been the case in Syria, where atrocities from the civil war are constantly recorded on video and shared, only further radicalizing the belligerents). Once Iran has nukes, the potential catastrophes are manifold: a Middle East decimated by a far-reaching Sunni versus Shia conflict (sparked in Syria) and/or by a nuclear war between Israel and Iran; a nuclear arms race among other Mideast countries; the end of the N uclear Non- P roliferation Treaty; and terrorists who can target major cities with small nuclear devices. However it plays out, oil prices will skyrocket and many will die. The Iranian nuclear threat is the most important global security issue of this generation. To focus public attention on it, I authored “The Last Israelis” in a breathless ten weeks, hoping to release the book in time to impact the May 2012 “P5+1” talks in Baghdad, when world powers tried yet again for a diplomatic solution. To continue raising awareness before Iran crosses the nuclear finish line, I just released a second edition, and added paperback and audiobook formats to reach more people with my book’s urgent message. But what happens when it’s too late to stop Iranian nukes? “The Last Israelis” depicts the doomsday scenario resulting from a nuclear-armed Iran, as experienced by 35 ideologically divided and ethnically diverse Israelis aboard the Dolphin submarine. To write the apocalyptic thriller, I dropped everything in my life and secured interviews with veterans of Imagining 35 submariners confronting the unthinkable as World War III unfolds in their claustrophobic reality was bad enough; watching the world gradually move in the same direction, knowing that it’s not my Israel’s elite and secretive submarine force. imagination this time, is far worse. 37 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (5/7) Current conflict resolution in Kashmir is ineffective --- new international action prevents nuclear conflict Zargar, 6/7/13 – Middle East reporter, Greater Kashmir News (Abdul Majid, “Kashmir Vs Global Community,” 6/7/13, http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Jun/8/kashmir-vsglobal-community-57.asp) Normal relations between India and Pakistan offer tremendous benefits & incentives to the global community. But normalization is itself subject to settlement of core issue of Kashmir between them. Indo-Pak tensions are especially dangerous because they bring two nuclear states face to face and any conflict between the two countries sparked by the dispute could escalate into a catastrophic nuclear war. They distract Islamabad from the urgent task of combating terrorists and militants on its own soil; and they contribute to Pakistani suspicions about India's activities in Afghanistan. Thus, the long-standing dispute over Kashmir is one part of a wider regional dynamic that has direct implications for global community’s ability to support a stable Afghan state and to address the threat posed by extremist groups in South Asia. For Kashmir, the conflict has been a great tragedy and a disaster in all respects: a large death toll, unabated human rights abuses which in normal course qualify as crimes against humanity or war crimes, displacement of populations, a devastated economy, serious environmental damage, massive military buildup, and severe psychological distress. Above all peoples lack of trust & confidence in the local political system put in place by the New Delhi. And for India Kashmir has been a patient with incurable disease from day one which it manages by shifting alternatively between Intensive care unit (ICU) and general ward depending upon the seriousness of the situation at particular point of time and where the job of the Local attending doctors (Politicians) is limited only to report the situation and take instructions of medicines & diet from New-Delhi. No serious attempt is made for a permanent cure of this patient except throwing billions of rupees in a bottomless pit. But the big question-Is global community doing enough to address the issue? While US and its surrogates are busy in creating new tensions & disorders in the world, existing long pending disputes like Kashmir & Palestine are hardly attended to. As far as Kashmir is concerned, though the US treats the territory as disputed but its State Department, reportedly treats the Indian repression there as “an internal Indian matter”. A former senior CIA officer, Robert Grenier, sometime back, called this posture by the Obama administration “craven”. When one contrasts this with the legitimate interest that the US showed in human rights in Arab states, and the consequent action it took, one loses all faith in protestations of moral concern underlying American policies and attitudes. And by the way what are the demands of the people of Kashmir for which they are brutalized day in & day out -a right to vote in a plebiscite promised long ago - The same right which the America claims to support in other parts of the world. But the recent discourse initiated by Norwegian parliament offers a new ray of hope. It has urged for an early solution to the Kashmir conflict. During discussions, Chairman of the Norwegian Parliamentary Kashmir Committee and Christian Democratic party leader Knut Arild Hareide referred to Kashmir as a regressive wound in the relationship between India & Pakistan and a continuing tragedy for the Kashmiri people. It surely is a comfort to know that the dispute has the attention of European nations. A mention, in this context, also needs to be made of recent conference held in Islamabad where Mr. V.P.Vaidik an eminent journalist & political thinker (also chairman of Council for Indian Foreign Policy), mooted the idea of total demilitarization of both sides of Kashmir. “Pughwash” is also holding a two day conference in Islamabad starting on 4th July 2013. The event would be drawing regional and international conflict resolution experts, diplomats, besides political elite from both parts of Kashmir, from Pakistan, India, USA, and Britain. In Srinagar, a meaningful lecture was delivered by Praful Bidwai, a noted columnist and political analyst (Also Founder member of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace)on the occasion of release of 10th Volume of Aina-Numa. In his assessment of the things, if India & Pakistan fail to find a solution to the Kashmir issue anytime soon and Indian repression & suppression continues in Kashmir , the whole of South Asia runs the risk of being turned into a nuclear dust because of a lurking danger of a nuclear war between two Countries. In his opinion the two Countries came very close to such a catastrophe twice during Kargil war. Recent reports also suggest that both the countries have increased their nuclear warheads in 2012 roughly by 10% over the previous year( see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report). So India, Pakistan & the Global Community need to take a fresh look at Kashmir. Like a festering wound that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light. Injustice must be exposed and options of a final settlement discussed & explored. The global community can ignore the problem at its own peril. If Kashmiris have been suffering for decades, it may take only minutes for the whole world to suffer & suffer irretrievably. 38 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (6/7) The embargo is also undercutting broader US legitimacy and is draining US soft power Iglesias 12 (Carlos Iglesias, Commander, US Navy, US Army War College, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba” http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408) Finally, U.S. international legitimacy and influence have a great deal to gain from a more inclusive and less unilateral approach. U.S. retort to U.N. anti-embargo resolutions that bilateral relations are exempt from General Assembly scrutiny have had longstanding blowback. This rhetoric has historically undercut American’s legitimacy and wasted political capital on this central world stage. Outside of New York City and across the globe, decades-long sanctions against the island have netted few if any national objectives, all the while depleting substantial national soft power. The cost benefit analysis to U.S. national foreign policy will remain exceedingly unfavorable, if not outright counterproductive. 33 Soft power solves all impacts Kurlantzick 06 – Joshua Kurlantzick visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program and a fellow at the USC School of Public Diplomacy and the Pacific Council on International Policy; previously foreign editor at The New Republic, (The Decline of American Soft Power, carnegieendowment.org, 2006, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick.pdf) A broad decline in soft power has many practical implications. These include the drain in foreign talent coming to the United States, the potential backlash against American companies, the growing attractiveness of China and Europe, and the possibility that anti-US sentiment will make it easier for terrorist groups to recruit. In addition, with a decline in soft power, Washington is simply less able to persuade others. In the run-up to the Iraq War, the Bush administration could not convince Turkey, a longtime US ally, to play a major staging role, in part because America's image in Turkey was so poor. During the war itself, the United States has failed to obtain significant participation from all but a handful of major nations, again in part because of America's negative image in countries ranging from India to Germany. In attempts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, Washington has had to allow China to play a central role, partly because few Asian states view the United States as a neutral, legitimate broker in the talks. Instead, Washington must increasingly resort to the other option Nye discusses-force, or the threat of force. With foreign governments and publics suspicious of American policy, the White House has been unable to lead a multinational effort to halt Iran's nuclear program, and instead has had to resort to threatening sanctions at the United Nations or even the possibility of strikes against Iran. With America's image declining in nations like Thailand and Pakistan, it is harder for leaders in these countries to openly embrace counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, so Washington resorts to quiet arm-twisting and blandishments to obtain counterterror concessions. Force is not a longterm solution. Newer, nontraditional security threats such as disease, human trafficking, and drug trafficking can only be managed through forms of multilateral cooperation that depend on America's ability to persuade other nations. Terrorism itself cannot be defeated by force alone, a fact that even the White House recognizes. The 2002 National security Strategy emphasizes that winning the war on terror requires the United States to lead a battle of ideas against the ideological roots of terrorism, in addition to rooting out and destroying individual militant cells. 39 1AC – Diplomacy Adv (7/7) Cuba will agree to economic engagement --- Raul is different from his predecessors Sweig 12 – Nelson and David Rockefeller senior fellow for Latin America studies and director for Latin America studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Julia E, “US Cuba Normalization,” 7/6/12, http://uscubanormalization.blogspot.com/2012/06/julia-sweigoverview-for-council-on.html) The second point is what's happening in Cuba. It's not realistic to expect the United States to undertake a series of unilateral moves toward normalization; it needs a willing partner. I believe we have one in Havana but have failed to read the signals. Raul Castro has now been in office since the beginning of 2008. Raul holds the reins on both foreign policy and domestic policy, and, domestically, the politics of implementing a fairly wide range of economic and political and social reforms are his priority. In a deal that was coordinated with the help of the Cuban Catholic Church and Spain, he released all of the political prisoners in Cuba. He also is taking a number of steps that imply a major rewriting of the social contract in Cuba to shrink the size of the state and give Cuban individuals more freedom--economically, especially, but also in terms of speech--than we've seen in the last fifty years. He has privatized the residential real estate and car market[s], expanded much-needed agrarian reform, lifted caps on salaries, and greatly expanded space for small businesses. He also is moving to deal with corruption and to prepare the groundwork for a great deal more foreign investment. He's moving in the direction of the kind of reforms that every administration over the last fifty years has called upon Cuba to make, albeit under the rubric of a one-party system. There's a broad range of cooperation--neighborhood security in the Gulf of Mexico, as Cuba has just started drilling for oil, counternarcotics, and natural disasters--between the two countries that is still not happening, and that gives me the impression that the United States has been unwilling to take "yes" for an answer and respond positively to steps taken by Cuba. The third geographic part of the story is south Florida. When they're polled, the majority of Cuban-Americans say that the embargo has failed, and support lifting the travel ban or loosening the embargo or some steps along that continuum of liberalization and normalization. The one most significant step that Obama did take when he took office was to eliminate the restriction on CubanAmerican travel and remittances to Cuba. Cuban-Americans are now voting with their feet. If you go to the Miami airport, you will see thirty, forty flights to Cuba a week just out of Miami. Cuban-Americans are now investing in their families' small businesses on the island. The politics of this are strange because we are told by the Obama administration that we can't rock the boat of the CubanAmerican vote, but those very voters are in fact demonstrating that they support a radically different set of policies than, in fact, the Obama administration has supported. 40 2AC – Extension – Solvency (1/2) Ending the embargo would be a powerful symbol of US commitment to cooperation Burgsdorff 09 – Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf) 6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism. 41 2AC – Extension – Solvency (2/2) The embargo undermines foreign policy credibility --- we’re perceived as strategically backwards and over-aggressive Hansing 11 — Katrin Hansing, Associate Professor of Black and Hispanic Studies at Baruch College (“10 Reasons to Oppose the Embargo”, Center for Democracy in the Americas, October 21 2011, http://www.democracyinamericas.org/blog-post/10-reasons-to-oppose-the-embargo/) In light of the UN Secretary-General’s report on the U.S. embargo of Cuba, and in advance of Tuesday’s vote against it, we offer a series of statements from a variety of sources–including a retired General, Ronald Reagan’s Agriculture Secretary, an environmentalist, a physician, an actor/human rights advocate, several scholars, and one of Washington’s leading voices on foreign policy–on why the U.S. should end the embargo. We hope you read them all. The embargo undermines U.S. foreign policy interests “Failure of the U.S. to finally snuff out the last vestiges of the Cold War in the U.S.Cuba embargo signals impotence in American strategic vision and capability. Those who support the embargo undermine the empowerment of Cuban citizens, harming them economically and robbing them of choices that could evolve through greater engagement – exactly what we have seen in transitioning Communist countries like Vietnam and China. The world is dismayed and rejects yet again America’s nonsensical embargo, which ultimately makes the U.S. look strategically muddled and petty rather than a leader committed to improving the global order.” Steve Clemons, Washington Editor-at-Large, The Atlantic Senior Fellow & Founder, American Strategy Program New America Foundation The embargo hurts U.S. national security interests “The U.S. embargo against Cuba is a Cold War relic that hurts America and Cuba by preventing normal trade and travel between our two countries. From the perspective of U.S. national security, not only does the embargo prevent our cooperation with Cuba on common security issues such as crime and terrorism, it hurts U.S. standing throughout the world by highlighting our aggression against a neighboring country that poses no threat. The United States demeans itself by this futile and hypocritical policy. It is long past time to repeal the U.S. embargo against Cuba.” John Adams, Brigadier General US Army (Retired) The embargo the embargo stains US reputation and undermines diplomacy Ayuso 12 (Silvia Ayuso, “ANALYSIS: Lifting Cuba's embargo, a domestic taboo for the US,” 2/5/12, http://news.monstersandcritics.com/americas/news/article_1689059.php/ANALYSISLifting-Cuba-s-embargo-a-domestic-taboo-for-the-US) ***Note --- Thale = director at the Washington Office on Latin America Still, even those timid steps reaped international applause, particularly from Latin America. According to Thale, the embargo is 'a stain on America's reputation abroad.' 'The US embargo on Cuba is this long-standing symbol of an unpleasant history of US attempts to dominate Latin America ... and it does complicate US diplomacy in the region, because it reminds people of the tradition of the ugly American,' he said. Each year, when the UN General Assembly votes on a resolution condemning the embargo - as it has done for 20 years - growing US isolation shows the extent to which the policy is unpopular far beyond the Americas. 42 2AC – Extension – Middle East Impact (1/3) Middle East war with escalate --- bioweapons will be used and all countries will join the fray absent effective conflict resolution Stirling, 11 — Governor & Lord Lieutenant of Canada, Lord High Admiral of Nova Scotia, & B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History; M.A. in European Studies (The Earl of Stirling, “General Middle East War Nears - Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan”, March 2011, http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html) Saddam Hussein's military had prepared what it called the "great equalizer", an arsenal of 25 Scud warheads carrying over 11,000lb of biological agents , including deadly botulism poison and anthrax germs (an additional 33,000lb of germ agents were placed in artillery shells and bombs). It was only after he was forced into denuding himself of his advanced weaponry that the neo-cons were able to begin the Second Gulf War commonly called the Iraq War. After Iraq, the Likud/neo-con war strategy calls for the neutralizing of Iran and Syria. The Iranians response, to this strategy, was to train and equip Hezbollah in Lebanon and to deepen their strategic alliance with Syria. During the 2006 Second Lebanon War, the Iranian trained and equipped Hezbollah forces repeated the efforts of Saddam during the First Gulf War. They delivered a very large number of rockets with “dumb” high explosive warheads on Israel. The Hezbollah Special Forces are in-effect a highly trained and well-equipped Iranian commando force of at least a Brigade in size. They man and protect a large number of mostly unguided and rather crude rockets, generally Katyusha 122mm artillery rockets with a 19 mile/30km range and capable of delivering approximately 66 pounds/30kg of warheads. Additionally, Hezbollah are known to possess a considerable number of more advanced and longer range guided missiles. During the 2006 war Hezbollah fired approximately 4,000 rockets (95% of which were Katyshas) all utilizing only "dumb" high explosive warheads. Some Iranian build and supplied Fajr-3 and Ra'ad 1 liquid-fueled missiles were also fired. At the time of the 2006 war Hezbollah was reported to have in the range of 13,000 rockets. There are creditable reports that this number has been rebuilt and expanded upon since the end of that war and that the number of rockets is now at least 50,000 and perhaps 60,000 or more. During the 2006 war the world watched as Israeli towns were hit time and time again by the Katyushas. What was not discussed by the main stream news media was the fact that the ordinance delivered by the Katyushas was mainly harassment fire with very limited effect. The Iranian/Syrian trained and supplied Hezhollah commandos were holding back their "heavy stuff" both in terms of their longer range guided missiles capable of hitting southern Israel and most importantly warheads of strategic military importance. That is NBC (nuclear [in this case radiological] chemical and biological) and advanced-conventional warheads. They were demonstrating their ability to deliver "ordinance on target" and their ability to survive a heavy Israeli ground and air combined arms attack. Hezbollah has the capability of loading truly strategic warheads on the large number of mostly crude older technology unguided rockets that it has. The use of advanced-conventional fuel-air explosive (FAE) warheads on the Katyushas would have had a much more profound effect in Israeli cities. The use of FAE submunitions on the larger missiles capable of hitting any target in Israel would have given Hezbollah the firepower of low-yield nuclear weapons without crossing the nuclear threshold. Coupled with the large number of missiles in Syria and those in Iran, the Hezbollah rockets posed, and continue to pose, a truly grave strategic threat to Israel if FAE warheads are used. This threat is dramatically increased if radiological ("dirty bombs"), chemical, and/or advanced biological warheads are used. The massive number of Hezbollah rockets could also be outfitted with chemical warheads . It is worth noting that the joint Syrian-Iranian chemical warfare R&D and production program is perhaps the largest and most complicated on earth. Generally the Israelis have shown themselves to be prepared for chemical warfare, however a chemical war attack following closely behind a FAE attack (to open up bunkers and apartment buildings) would have greater effect. While it is not necessary to utilize a rocket to deliver a biological war attack, it could be done and there is some benefit militarily to a rapid dispersal of biowar agents under the cover of conventional attacks. Radiological weapons deliver the long term (which can be hundreds of thousands of years) lethal effects of radiation without the blast effect of a nuclear bomb. The combined military strategic capability of NBC/Advanced Conventional warheads and very large numbers of rockets operated and protected by Hezbollah, coupled with the arsenal of Syria and Iran (and Hamas) acts as a MAD (mutually assured destruction) between Israel and Iran/Syria. Yes the Israelis can nuke the hell out of both Iran and Syria ; however, they possess a fatal return punch. Only a madman would consider starting a war in a MAD environment. The response from the Israeli and neo-con hardliners to the new MAD strategic environment has been frightening. Instead of recognizing the danger to Israel and to the entire world from the Iranian/Syrian “checkmate” on the aggressive Israeli/neo-con strategy, and making major changes to their strategy, they are attempting to “tough it out”. The issue of “danger from the Iranian nuclear program” is a smokescreen to facilitate the coming war on Iran and her allies (Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas) and to continue with the next stage of the neo-con strategy. The response from the hardliners is more war and damn their WMD (weapons of mass destruction). This is most unwise and most dangerous to the entire world. When the USSR was falling apart, and in the aftermath of the USSR breakup, Iran spend a lot of money to hire some of the best Soviet biological war experts. The advanced biowar weapons that Iran has developed gives Iran a Global Strategic Weapon of Mass Destruction that can unleash levels of death among the populations of the major neo-con nations (USA, UK, France, German, Italy, etc.) very similar to that from a global strategic nuclear strike. This means that Iran and her allies have a MAD with America, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, German, Italy, etc. Most people think of biological warfare as anthrax and smallpox; they do not understand that there has been a major shift in technology. The difference 43 2AC – Extension – Middle East Impact (2/3) <<<CONTINUED – NO TEXT REMOVED>>> between the old biowar (that most people think of) and advanced biowar (with its recombination DNA designer super killer viruses ) is like the difference between an old Model T Ford and a 2011 Rolls Royce Phantom. Both are cars, or biological weapons, but there is a difference of several orders of magnitude. Regardless of how a war against Iran breaks out, it is likely to very quickly escalate to the usage of WMD . There has been talk among USAF war planners of a 1,200 (some say 2,000 to 3,000 or more) target attack on Iran’s nuclear, industrial, military, political and religious infrastructure. If a foreign enemy were to bomb 1,200 or more targets in the United States what would be the response of the American government and it’s military? Actually the answer to this question is well known. The stated doctrine of the United States of America is to rain hundreds of hydrogen bombs (WMD) on the territory and people of such an aggressor; this has been our policy for approximately 60 years. Why do we presuppose that the Iranians would not do the same? If Iran is hit by either an Israeli and/or an American air attack, it is certain that Iran will respond. This response, even if is non-WMD at first, will certainly result in more escalation and counter-escalation. The chances of a regional Middle East war between Iran/Syria/Hezbollah/Hamas and Israel/USA not becoming a nuclear and advanced biological war nightmare are very low . In fact, since both sides know this, there is a strong military incentive to move to all out usage of WMD when the first bombs begin to fall (in order to utilize more of one’s weaponry before its destruction). This could include Iranian/Syrian fire-on-warning system using a fiber-optic CCC link between all the launch bunkers in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Palestine to coordinate fire a truly massive barrage of rockets and guided missiles, with WMD warheads, upon Israel within the first five-minutes of a launch warning. A similar fire-on-warning system for Israel, only involving nuclear-armed IRBMs, and submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and rapid launch of aircraft carried air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). could also launch within five minutes of warning. This is the " hair-triggering" of WMD in the single most dangerous place on the planet Earth . The end result will be a brief battle of unbelievable intensity that will leave half or more of all Israelis dead and large parts of the Israeli nation poisoned for hundreds of thousands of years by radiological warheads. Syria, Iran, and large parts of Lebanon and Palestine will cease to exists and will be little more than a green radioactive debris field poisonous to all forms of life higher than a cockroach for hundreds of thousands of years (longer than modern man has existed). The Iranian oilfields and most likely the oilfields of a large part of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other areas of the Middle East are also apt to be so poisoned by Iranian radiological warheads or Israeli/American nuclear fallout, that production will effectively cease. The destruction of the Middle Eastern oilfields and the blocking of the Gulf will cause the world to suffer its most complete economic collapse in history. All of this will take less than one week from the beginning of the General Middle East War. At about two weeks, after the beginning of the war on Iran, emergency rooms and doctors offices will begin to see a sudden spike in a number of new diseases with numerous very ill people being admitted to hospitals in North America, and Western Europe and what is left of Israel. By that time the Iranian and Syrian states will have effectively ceased to exist with insufficient manpower and organization to even bury their dead. The many new genetically engineered viruses causing the strange diseases showing up will have been spread by sleeper agents supplied with a number of new viruses and distributed in public places (movie theaters, shopping malls, churches, etc.) quietly without anyone knowing. Humans themselves will become the vectors of the diseases/biowar agents. Although the Bush/Obama Administrations have spent well over $40 billion on biowar defense in the last few years, there is little that can realistically be done against a global strategic advanced biowar attack. The tactic of necessity will be to lock down everyone, with only key persons being allowed to leave their homes, in order to let the multiple genetically engineered diseases burn themselves out (a nice way of saying letting everyone who has the illnesses die off). Expect to see sub dermal RFID chips implanted under the skin of the population left in the major neo-con states to “prove your disease free status” and necessary to buy, sell, or work. Expect to see military checkpoints everywhere and total control by the neo-con national governments over all aspects of life. Expect to see concentration camps for persons suspected of disloyalty to the state (this will include many viewers of sites like this one). Expect to see levels of death, fear, repression that are almost incomprehensible. Expect to see the various biological warfare diseases spread throughout the world, even with a total shutdown of international travel. Many many millions will die in Russia and China. Expect to see those national governments not controlled by the neo-con masters to go ape shit when their populations face the nightmare of advanced biowar. Expect the regional war in the Middle East to trigger an all out global battle utilizing all forms of weapons of mass destruction within a few weeks to a few months of the initial attacks on Iran. Before we allow hardliners in Israel take us into yet another war, we need to take a very hard and realistic look at just what a war involving MAD on all sides would mean to Israel, to Europe, to North America and the entire world. The strategy of using war to effect change in the Middle East is no longer realistic, as we are in a mutually assured destruction (MAD) environment. It is also imperative, that the United States and Israel stop insisting on maintaining the Mubarak regime (perhaps minus Mubarak himself). With each passing day, week and month that the people of Egypt are prevented from successful revolution, the forces of the Muslim Brotherhood will grow. While not all in the Muslim Brotherhood are extremist, the danger is that a radicalized Egyptian population and a future government will not continue to support regional peace with Israel and that itself will dramatically raise regional danger levels. It is imperative, given the highly lethal nature of 21st Century warfare, that we stop the drive to war against Iran and stop the neocon strategy of using military force to reshape the Middle East. We (the Human Race) simply cannot survive the global use of Advanced Biological Warfare. 44 2AC – Extension – Middle East Impact (3/3) Middle East is the most likely scenario for global spread --- it will escalate and go nuclear Primakov 09 (Yevgeny Primakov, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry – Russian Federation, Member – Russian Academy of Science, “The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations”, Russia in Global Affairs, 3, July/September, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13593) The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally . During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world . The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility. 45 2AC – Extension – Kashmir Impact (1/2) Kashmir conflict uniquely likely now because of water disputes --- it will go nuclear Overdorf 9 – Indian analyst for GlobalPost (Jason, “The coming war for water,” 9/21/9, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/india/090731/the-coming-war-water?page=0,1)//SJF These troop movements are indeed a constant part of daily life in Indian-controlled Kashmir, where the Indian army stations 600,000 to 800,000 soldiers — more than double the number deployed for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. A fragile cease-fire has held here since November 2003, but Kashmir remains one of the most dangerous places in the world. Anger over the bloody partition that divided India and Pakistan in 1947 and a bitter feud over the ownership of this majestic portion of the Himalayas have led the two subcontinental powers to three full-fledged wars and a perilous standoff in 2002, when many world powers feared the dispute would go nuclear. There are many reasons for the Kashmir conflict. But perhaps the most important of them is the water that spews into the sky at my feet. When the British drew the borders partitioning India and Pakistan, their cartographers failed to consider the run of the rivers that would feed the two countries. Kashmir's accession to India granted New Delhi control over the headwaters of the Indus — the lifeline of civilization in what is now Pakistan since 2600 B.C. And although a treaty for sharing the water was worked out in 1960, its foundation has begun to crack under the pressure of the two countries' rapidly growing populations and the specter of climate change. Shortly before he led Pakistan's troops into the Kargil War, a then-unknown Pakistani general named Pervez Musharraf wrote in his dissertation at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London that the issue of the distribution of the waters of Kashmir between India and Pakistan has “the germs of future conflict.” Because water is the one resource that neither India nor Pakistan can do without, many experts fear that one day the dispute over the Indus — already an incessant source of diplomatic skirmishes — will propel these two nuclear weapons states into an all-out war. Battles over water are already mounting in number around the world, according to Peter Gleick, an expert at the Pacific Institute. But Kashmir could be the most dangerous flash point. According to a recent United Nations report, Pakistan's water supply has dropped from about 5,000 cubic meters per person in the 1950s to 1,420 cubic meters today — perilously close to the threshold at which water shortage becomes an impediment to economic development and a serious hazard to human health. India, at 1,750 cubic meters per person, is not much better off. Both countries' huge populations are still growing, and because most of the available water comes from the disappearing glaciers of the Himalayas it is extremely vulnerable to climate change. “We already see evidence that the climate is changing water availability and water quality,” Gleick said. “Kashmir is a place where water may not be the worst of the problem, but like the Sudan, or like the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers or like the Nile, it's a growing factor in what is already a conflict situation.” Perhaps worse still, it appears that hawks on both sides are attempting to use water to create an insurmountable impasse in the dispute over Kashmir, rather than acknowledging that the sharing of rivers forms a framework for the two enemies to cooperate. This unease was underscored just last week, when India objected to a Pakistani proposal to build a new dam in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir with the help of the Chinese. 46 2AC – Extension – Kashmir Impact (2/2) Rationality and deterrence don’t check --- miscalculation and preemption incentives ensure the war will escalate The Economist 11 (The Economist, “A rivalry that threatens the world,” May 19, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18712274) Instead, say Indians, Pakistanis' own paranoia is the root of their instability. M.J. Akbar, an eloquent Indian journalist and author of a new book on Pakistan, sums up the place as dangerous and fragile, a “toxic jelly state”. He blames the army, mostly, for ever more desperate decisions to preserve its dominance. “Pakistan is slipping into a set of contradictions that increasingly make rational behaviour hostage to the need for institutions to survive,” he says. Others, including liberal Pakistanis, add that Pakistan cannot shake itself from military men obsessed with India. “We have become delusional, psychotic, fearing how to protect ourselves from the rest of the world,” says one. India's most senior security officials say that Pakistan is still, in essence, a state run by its army. That army, the world's seventh-largest, bleeds the state of about a sixth of all public funds with almost no civilian oversight. All that is grim enough. Then consider how Pakistan is rapidly expanding its arsenal of nuclear weapons. That programme was born out of the country's humiliating loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Six years earlier, around the time of a previous defeat by India, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan's foreign minister, had declared: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves for a thousand years, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.” Pakistan may now have between 70 and 120 usable nuclear devices—and may be unusually ready to use them. Some in the West believe Pakistan started preparing nuclear-tipped missiles in the midst of the 1999 Kargil war against India, after Pakistan invaded a remote corner of Kashmir. Nobody doubts that Pakistan, in the midst of its anxiety over India, is trying hard to get more. Its nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of about 15-20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The country produces about 100 kilograms of that a year, but is rapidly expanding its nuclear infrastructure with Chinese help. And with production longestablished, the price of adding weapons has fallen to almost nothing. A nuclear physicist in Pakistan, Pervez Hoodbhoy, now suggests that “you can have a working nuke for about $10m, or the cost of a nice big house in Islamabad.” The new push seems, as ever, to be a response to two developments next door. Pakistan was badly spooked by India's deal on civil nuclear power with America, completed in 2008. This not only binds America and India closely; it also lets India buy uranium on international markets, and probably means it will soon build many more reactors. By one panicky Pakistani estimate, India could eventually be making 280 nuclear weapons a year. The other change is over doctrine and delivery. India has long held a position of “no first use” of nukes. Pakistan, by contrast, with weaker conventional forces, refuses to rule out the option of starting a nuclear war against India, and is now taking steps that could make such first use more likely. Last month it test-fired a new missile, the Hatf IX, with a range of just 60km and specifically designed for war-fighting. Two missiles are carried in tubes on a transporter and can be fired, accurately, at short notice. The warheads are small, low-yielding devices for destroying large tank formations with relatively little explosive damage or radiation beyond the battlefield. Pakistan's generals say their new tactical weapons will meet a threat from India's Cold Start doctrine, adopted in 2004, that calls for rapid, punitive, though conventional thrusts against Pakistan. But by rolling out tactical nuclear weapons, Pakistan is stirring fears of instability. Previous efforts to reassure observers that terrorists or rogue army officers could not get hold of nukes rested on the fact that warheads and delivery systems were stored separately and were difficult to fire— and that final authority to launch a strike requires “consensus” within the National Command Authority, which includes various ministers and the heads of all three services, and is chaired by the prime minister. But tactical nuclear weapons deployed close to the battlefield pose new risks. Command-and-control protocols are likely to be looser and more delegated. If field officers retreating in the face of a conventional attack by India were forced to decide between using or losing their nuclear weapons, a border incursion could swiftly escalate into something very much bigger and more lethal. 47 2AC – Extension – Soft Power Impact US credibility and legitimacy is critical to marshal coalitions to prevent every impact and nuclear escalation Reiss 08 (Mitchell B. Reiss, Vice Provost of International Affairs – College of William & Mary, “Restoring America's Image: What the Next President Can Do”, Survival, October, 50(5)) But first, there is another question to be answered: why should Americans care if the United States is liked or not? After all, foreign policy is not a popularity contest. Policies that are controversial today may look better in a few years. Perhaps America's unpopularity is just the price that must be paid for being the world's most powerful country. Yet Americans do care, and their desire to be respected by the world has been reflected in the campaign rhetoric of both McCain and Obama. This desire extends beyond the normal, near-universal human wish to be liked, or at least not misunderstood or hated. Americans still believe in John Winthrop's description of America as a 'shining city on the hill' and want others to view the United States that way as well. But there is another, larger reason for caring about the rise of anti-Americanism, one that is related to the United States' status as the world's only superpower. No one country can defeat today's transnational threats on its own. Terrorism, infectious disease, environmental pollution, w eapons of m ass d estruction, narcotics and human trafficking - all these can only be solved by states acting together. If others mistrust the United States or actively work against it, building effective coalitions and promoting a liberal international order that benefits both Americans and hundreds of millions of other people around the world will be far more challenging. Ultimately, if the United States has to go it alone or bear most of the costs while others are seen as free riders, the American people are unlikely to sustain engagement with the world with the same intensity, or even at all. The history of the last century demonstrates that when the United States retreats from the world, bad things happen. The United States rejected the League of Nations and turned inwards in the 1920s and 1930s, contributing to the Great Depression and the onset of the Second World War. After the Vietnam War, a weakened and inward-looking America prompted some Asian countries to start their own nuclear-weapons programmes, emboldened Islamic fundamentalists to attack American interests, and encouraged the Soviet Union to occupy Afghanistan. While there are some who say this couldn't happen today, that America couldn't pull up the drawbridge and retreat behind the parapets, recent opinion polls in the United States reveal a preference for isolationism not seen since the end of the Vietnam War. It is hard to imagine any scenario in which an isolated, disengaged United States would be a better friend and ally to other countries, better promote global prosperity, more forcefully endorse democracy, social justice and human dignity, or do more to enhance peace and security. 48 2AC – Add-On – Iran The plan’s commitment to conflict resolution enables diplomatic settlement with Iran --- that’s the 1AC Dickerson evidence --- this prevents extinction Beck 13 (Noah Beck, contributor at the American Thinker, “Apocalyptic Threats Cannot be Hoped Away: Iranian Nukes Must Be Stopped,” July 16, 2013, www.americanthinker.com/2013/07/apocalyptic_threats_cannot_be_hoped_away_iranian_n ukes_must_be_stopped.html) President Obama's Middle East policy has been an ever-worsening train wreck because it lacks credibility and strategy, as Egypt, Libya, and particularly Syria, have shown. And the region is about to get much worse, unless Obama exercises resolute leadership on the most important global security issue of this generation: Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. In a commerce-critical region where "might makes right" and only the strong survive, Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons could have catastrophic consequences for the Middle East and beyond. The resulting dangers potentially include: (i) nuclear proliferation, as other Mideast countries feel threatened into pursuing their own nuclear programs; (ii) the transfer of nuclear materials from Iran -- the world's chief sponsor of terrorism -- to terrorist organizations and/or rogue states; (iii) bolder attacks by Iranian terror proxies (Hamas, Hezb'allah, Islamic Jihad, etc.) protected by Iran's nuclear umbrella; and (iv) an even more belligerent Iran that flexes its nuclear arsenal to: export its radical Islamic ideology, acquire disputed territories and resources from neighboring countries, and/or undertake actions like blocking the Strait of Hormuz to increase the price of oil. As Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, recently told CBS News's Face the Nation, the Islamic Republic is now dangerously close to a nuclear capability. Because Iran has stockpiled about 190 pounds of 20% enriched uranium, Iran is just 60 kilograms -- potentially just weeks -- short of crossing the nuclear "red line" that Netanyahu set in his speech before the UN last September. Unfortunately, Obama has signaled no urgency over Iranian nukes. Perhaps he hopes for a negotiated settlement to the issue, now that Hassan Rouhani, a so-called "moderate," was elected to assume Iran's presidency next month. But hope is not a strategy with the Iranian regime. Rouhani has been linked to the 1994 terrorist bombing of an Argentine Jewish community center that killed 85 people, and has boasted about how he manipulated nuclear talks with the West about a decade ago to expand Iran's nuclear program. More importantly, Iran's foreign policy is set by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has banned concessions to the West. Indeed, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, the head of Iran's atomic energy agency, made it clear last Friday that Rouhani's election will have no impact on Iran's nuclear enrichment activities. Obama must also recognize that the sanctions against Iran have demonstrably failed. The Islamic Republic has skillfully outmaneuvered them, as shown in a leaked U.N. report detailing 11 instances of Iran violating sanctions, including attempts to acquire materials for its atomic program. Reuters published an expose outlining how Iran exploits sanctions loopholes to import ore from Germany and France that could be used for making armor and missiles. More importantly, the Iranian nuclear weapons program has never once stopped because of sanctions. The only time that Iran ever suspended its nuclear program was after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, when Iran briefly feared that a U.S. attack was imminent. Obama's Iran policy has thus far failed to produce any credible deterrent. It's time for Obama to build on the lead of Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird, who warned last month that Iran only has only a few months to demonstrate to the West that it is serious about a negotiated solution to the standoff. Israel doesn't have the luxury of treating its red lines the way Obama has treated the one he set for Syria's use of chemical weapons; that means that the volatile Middle East of today could become far more engulfed in war and instability. Netanyahu's latest message may be the canary in the coalmine giving its final warning, so Obama should provide bold leadership on this critical issue before it's too late. New Jersey-sized Israel survives only by the strength of the military force that it projects. Critical to that deterrent is making good on its threats, as Israel did with its destruction of the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear programs, in 1981 and 2007, respectively, and its ongoing surgical airstrikes to prevent Syria from transferring game-changing weapons to Hezbollah. Given such exploits, isolationists might wonder why the U.S. should bother; let Israel bear all of the costs and risks of eliminating the Iranian nuclear threat for us, goes the thinking. But the nuclear program in Iran is far more dispersed, hardened, and distant than what Israel neutralized in Iraq and Syria. Iranian nukes are truly vulnerable only to U.S. military capabilities. Expecting Israel to do the job is like a heavyweight-boxing champion asking his featherweight friend to defend him against the approaching middleweight champion. Such cowardly tactics needlessly endanger the featherweight ally, but -- more importantly -- there is a good chance that the middleweight won't be fully neutralized and will feel far more emboldened to attack the heavyweight after he concludes (alongside the rest of the world) that the heavyweight is just a paper tiger. Iran can already attack U.S. interests across the Middle East and Europe. And as early as 2015, Iran could develop and test ballistic missiles that could strike the continental U.S., according to a Pentagon report released last week ("2013 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Assessment"). Obama can wait for the U.S. to be drawn into war with a nuclear-armed Iran, or he can proactively address the threat before Iran acquires nukes. But he cannot hide from the threat or hope it away. Obama must lead -- before Iran's nuclear recalcitrance forces Israel's hand, with potentially apocalyptic consequences. 49 2AC – Add-On – North Korea The plan’s commitment to conflict resolution enables diplomatic settlement with North Korea --- that’s the 1AC Dickerson evidence --- that avoids nuclear war Maginnis 13 (Robert Maginnis, retired Army lieutenant colonel, national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television, “6 Ways North Korea is Aiming at Nuclear War,” Human Events, January 29, 2013, http://www.humanevents.com/2013/01/29/6-ways-north-korea-isaiming-at-nuclear-war/) Further, intelligence and monitoring agencies confirm North Korea is not bluffing about its weapons programs. The Hermit Kingdom has made considerable progress in its nuclear and missile programs despite five rounds of U.N. sanctions and Jan. 27 North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered officials to take “substantial and high-profile important state measures,” indicating imminent plans to explode another nuclear device in defiance of the U.N. What do these threats mean? First, it means Kim Jong-un decided that confrontation is a better strategy than economic reform — reform which that country desperately needs. Kim assumed power in December 2011 following the death of his father, Kim Jong-il and used the December rocket launch to consolidate his authority and to gain future diplomatic leverage especially vis-à-vis the U.S. and South Korea. Now, the anticipated third nuclear test will further consolidate the dictator’s authority at home in spite of chronic economic problems caused by frequent crop failures, a failed industrial base and large-scale military spending that draws off resources from the civilian sector. Second, it means Pyongyang is confident in its rudimentary ability to target the U.S. and given time it will field a credible intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat. The December launch showed North Korea has the capacity to deliver a rocket that could travel 6,200 miles, potentially putting San Francisco in range. Mark Fitzpatrick, director for nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, said the significance of the North’s December launch was the “successful separation between the three-stages of the rocket…this certainly furthers their ICBM ambitions.” Staging, however, is only part of the challenge that the North must overcome before it can deliver a weapon on American cities. “You need a warhead that is small enough to fit on top of the missile … and you need shielding to protect the warhead … during re-entry into the China is helping Pyongyang’s ICBM project overcome some of these technological challenges. A South Korean military official said that some of the parts used in North Korea’s December 2012 rocket launch earth’s atmosphere,” according to Fitzpatrick. appear to have been made in China and in “some European countries.” The South Korean military analyzed missile debris from the North Korean launch that fell into the Yellow Sea, according to a Japanese broadcaster. Third, it means North Korea will continue to test nuclear devices until it has a weapon suitable for an ICBM and the next test could happen soon. Satellite photos taken last week show that roads have been kept clear of snow and it appears the North sealed the tunnel into a mountainside at the Punggye-ri site where a nuclear device would be detonated. Further, Pyongyang followed missile launches in 2006 and 2009 with nuclear tests but the next test will be different, say the North Koreans. What does the North mean by the statement the next effort will be a “higher level” test? The North could mean a breakthrough regarding miniaturization for a missile warhead. But more likely it means this will be the first test of a uranium device, created from Pyongyang’s newly revealed uranium-enrichment program. Prior nuclear tests used plutonium fissile fuel, harvested from a now-closed nuclear reactor. Fourth, it means North Korea will share its weapons technologies with Iran, which makes them more dangerous than if they acted alone. The North Korea-Iran military weapons technology cooperation dates back to the 1980s and explains why Tehran’s missiles are based on North Korean designs. That cooperation took on a formal relationship last fall. Open Source Intelligence suggests as many as 100 Iranian nuclear weapons technicians and scientists are now in North Korea, following a September 2012 North Korea-Iran agreement. Iran’s leader Ayatollah Khamenei said that agreement helps the countries cooperate to reach their unstated goals despite the pressure and sanctions from others, namely the West. That relationship explains why North Korea’s next nuclear test may be based on uranium, an expertise heretofore associated with Iran. But there is reason to believe Iran and North Korea already jointly tested uranium-based devices, according to Fox News. Last year, the Swedish Military Research Agency argued that radio isotopes coming out of a suspected North Korean nuclear site in 2010 were evidence of nuclear tests based on enriched uranium. These incidents were not widely reported in part because underground explosions are difficult to detect. the latest threats are more specific than ever before. While the North is years away from having the ability to strike the U.S. with a nuclear warhead, it has a robust conventional capability which it will likely use soon. North Korea’s tough talk is an attempt, as before, to Fifth, North Korea’s nuclear war threats are overblown for now but it means there will be military action. Yes, bolster its bargaining position in diplomatic negotiations. Last Friday North Korea threatened to take “physical countermeasures” against South Korea if it helps enforce tightened U.N. sanctions against the North, calling the un-endorsed penalties a “declaration of war.” The South Koreans understand Pyongyang is not joking, but it will go ahead and enforce the U.N. sanctions. North Korea followed through on similar threats in 2010 by shelling a border island and sinking a South Korean warship. Those episodes brought the two Koreas closer than ever in recent times to full-scale war. Finally, We should the latest threats mean our past policies to eliminate North Korea’s missile and nuclear threats totally failed. expect Kim to continue the cycle of intrigue established by his father – provocations like rocket launches, U.N. condemnation, Pyongyang’s warnings of “physical countermeasures,” and Western efforts to draw the North back to talks. Unfortunately, President Obama appears set on his naïve status quo policy called “strategic patience,” North Korea will acquire nuclear-tipped missiles capable of targeting our homeland and then America will face a Cuban missile-like crisis with North hoping to lure North Korea back to talks that lead to denuclearization. Unless there is a radical change in our policy, Korea and/or Iran. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis brought the U.S. to the brink of nuclear war with the former Soviet Union and this time once again, America faces possible nuclear war with two less predictable, radical regimes. We avoided war with the Soviets because we had strong leadership and a clear-headed, tough policy, but this time all we have is President Obama and his status quo policy of “strategic patience.” “Patience” is nothing more than appeasement as understood by Iran and North Korea. It is the very policy of Europe and America toward Hitler that led directly to World War II. The coming provocation must be answered with force or we will suffer even greater in the near future and our policy must be announced now. 50 ***CUBA EMBARGO NEGATIVE*** 51 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (1/4) Cuba’s not key to relations --- it’s not the priority Suchlicki 2k (Jaime Suchlicki, University of Miami, s Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies at the University of Miami. June “The U.S. Embargo of Cuba” http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf) Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, and transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies. There are a multitude of alternative causes that the plan doesn’t address --- this means they don’t solve relations a) Drug policy Shifter 12 – President of Inter-American Dialogue (Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) Another chronic irritant is US drug policy, which most Latin Americans now believe makes their drug and crime problems worse. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while visiting Mexico, acknowledged that US anti-drug programs have not worked. Yet, despite growing calls and pressure from the region, the United States has shown little interest in exploring alternative approaches. b) Immigration policy Shifter 12 – President of Inter-American Dialogue (Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf) In the main, hemispheric relations are amicable. Open conflict is rare and, happily, the sharp antagonisms that marred relations in the past have subsided. But the US-Latin America relationship would profit from more vitality and direction. Shared interests are not pursued as vigorously as they should be, and opportunities for more fruitful engagement are being missed. Well-developed ideas for reversing these disappointing trends are scarce. Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation. The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas. Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue. Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations. 52 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (2/4) Relations are impossible --- domestic political interests Gvosdev 12 – former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College (Nikolas, “To Reset Latin America Policy, U.S. Must Think Big,” 4/20, World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11867/the-realist-prism-to-resetlatin-america-policy-u-s-must-think-big) Part of the problem is that important U.S. domestic lobbies are opposed to key pieces of what would be needed to promote greater regional integration -- from environmentalists concerned both about Canada’s oil sands and new pipeline projects that would transport more of Alberta’s hydrocarbons to U.S. refineries and markets to a formidable anti-immigration lobby that would be very hesitant to support a freer flow of labor between the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Add post-Sept. 11 security concerns and a prevailing view among many U.S. voters that free trade agreements usually come at the expense of the American worker, and it becomes more apparent why no U.S. politician has emerged as a strong advocate for a Community of the Americas. And while domestic politics are always going to be intertwined with foreign policy, U.S. messaging, particularly in Cartagena, seemed to convey just how much a domestic U.S. agenda is driving interaction with the rest of the region. Whether intended or not, Washington’s continued emphasis on framing foreign engagement as a way to boost U.S. job numbers does not provide much incentive for other states to embrace the U.S. agenda, as Obama similarly discovered during visits to India and other states in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the unwillingness to alter the U.S. position on Cuba set the tone in Cartagena, reinforcing the perception that U.S. strategy toward the region is seen through the prism of domestic politics -- in this case Florida’s electoral votes. Low relations is a decision by the U.S. --- the plan might make the U.S. palatable to Latin America but it doesn’t change the indifference in U.S. policy Cárdenas 11 – former assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development (José R., “The U.S. is MIA in Latin America,” December 29 2011, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/29/the_us_is_mia_in_latin_america) An end-of-the-year assessment of U.S. policy towards Latin America could possibly qualify for the world's shortest blog. For a President who has clearly established that foreign policy is not something that gets him up in the morning (or appears to keep him awake at night), Latin America must rank just above Antarctica in descending areas of interest. This uneven, sporadic focus on the region has led to only adverse consequences for U.S. interests. What effort the administration does expend seems only directed toward placating a smattering of hostile populist regimes, while ignoring the interests of our friends. Indeed, the predictable response is that we have only emboldened our enemies and despaired those in the hemisphere who share the U.S. vision of open political systems, free markets, and robust trade. Radical populists in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have run roughshod over democratic institutions and the best Washington can come up with is asking for the terms under which a U.S. ambassador would be allowed to return to their capitals. In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega is likely chuckling at the feeble U.S. response to his recently rigged re-election. It also appears that the administration has lulled itself into complacency over a cancerstricken Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, ground zero for regional instability, seemingly content to wait and see what happens after Chávez passes from the scene. But even as his circus antics continue, he is leaving behind what my colleague Roger Noriega calls a mountain of toxic waste that will take years to clean up. Chávez's days may indeed be numbered, but his friends in Iran, Russia, China, and Cuba are certainly taking the long-term view of things. All four have been great beneficiaries of Chávez's political solidarity and oil-fueled largesse and can be counted on to want to maintain that access with or without him in power. In other words, don't count on them to support a democratic transition away from Chavismo, only a succession. Every day, the United States stands idly on the sidelines, the chances they will succeed improve. 53 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (3/4) No impact to their democracy scenario --- countries don’t go to war because of institutional integration, and new democracies are likely to fight Shaw 2k (Martin Shaw, Professor of International Relations and Politics, University of Sussex, 2000, “Democracy and peace in the global revolution,” http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/hafa3/democracy.htm) In the global era, established liberal-democratic states do not fight each other. But once again, it obvious that this is not simply because they are democracies, but because they are embedded in the raft of common Western and global state institutions. Indeed it is not just liberal democracies which do not fight each other: the major non-Western states (Russia, China, India, Brazil, etc.), whether democratic or not, are not likely to fight with the dominant Western powers. Outside the Western core of global state power, however, national centres are more weakly integrated with its institutional structures, and regional institutions which might inhibit local conflicts are much weaker than they are in the core. In the Cold War era, interstate rivalries between major regional powers - such as between Russia and China, India and Pakistan and China, Indonesia and Malaysia, Iran and Iraq, Israel and the Arab states - led to wars and border incidents. While the integrative tendencies in the emerging global polity, including the democratisation trends, may increasingly inhibit wars, it clearly remains possible that such interstate rivalries will generate new wars. It is clear that democratisation in itself is not a guarantee of war-avoidance in such conficts. Israel, the only internally democratic state in the Middle East, has also been the most belligerent; Indian democracy has been quite compatible with bellicosity towards Pakistan. Democratic as well as military governments may see war, so long as it can be kept limited and relatively cost-free, as a means of boosting popularity. Thus Yeltsin’s Russia sought a military solution in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, despite the lessons of the late-Soviet failure in Afghanistan. Only in defeat did Russia’s weak democracy penalise the regime for the new disaster, and then not decisively. 54 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (4/4) No impact to terrorism --- no technical capacity to steal, transport or build the bomb Chapman 08 (Steven Chapman, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune, “Who’s Still Afraid of Osama?” Reason, February 8, 2008, http://reason.com/news/show/124874.html) Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have had to live with the knowledge that the next time the terrorists strike, it could be not with airplanes capable of killing thousands but atomic bombs capable of killing hundreds of thousands. The prospect has created a sense of profound vulnerability. It has shaped our view of government policies aimed at combating terrorism (filtered through Jack Bauer). It helped mobilize support for the Iraq war. Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable." But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet Al Qaeda and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple—say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb—it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small ." (http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/ APSACHGO.PDF) The events required to make that a multitude of herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal ." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally—for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment—plus people with specialized skills , lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if Al Qaeda could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time—but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab , back out or screw up . Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al Qaeda, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks happen include on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen. 55 2NC – Extension – Alt Causes Crime is a massive alt cause that the plan doesn’t address Barshefsky and Hill 08 (Charlene and James T., Chairs on The Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, PDF) In short, public insecurity could undermine progress on a variety of other fronts if not addressed urgently and adequately. As the vice president of Colombia, Francisco Santos, recently stated, ‘‘Crime is the biggest problem of the next decade. It will hinder tourism, investment, and threaten democracy.’’21 It is also a challenge that weighs heavily on the region’s relationship with the United States. Drug production and trafficking have long been among the defining issues of U.S.-Latin America relations. More recently, given economic ties and continuing migratory flows, the threat represented by transnational gangs has highlighted a deepening connection between the United States and Latin American security. 56 2NC – Extension – Relations Impossible Relations are structurally impossible --- the plan doesn’t change these underlying conditions Shifter, 8 – Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown (Micheal, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: Recommendations for the New Administration”, Inter-American Dialogue, October 27, 2008, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1625) As if any further proof were needed, the ongoing financial crisis highlights the already diminished capacity of the United States to shape developments in the rest of the world. With its own house in disorder, the United States will struggle to get back on track as a responsible member of the international community. Still, though the United States may be considerably chastened, it remains a superpower, whose decisions and actions have a huge global impact. When it falls to the next US administration to deal with the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, or even Africa, it will likely reassess US interests and frame strategic choices in light of new realities. But if the United States seriously undertakes such an effort for neighboring Latin America, it will mark the first time it has done so. For reasons of geography, history and power disparity, Latin America has typically been treated as a discrete compartment, separate from interest-based foreign relations. Regardless of how one comes down on the issues of Cuba, immigration, drugs, and trade, the paternalistic impulse on the part of the United States has been unmistakable. Latin Americans find this tutorial attitude extremely irritating, and their objections have prompted a more collegial tone from the United States in certain cases. Unfortunately, it is still manifest in a variety of ways, from the overall diplomatic style to specific policies like drug cooperation decertification or suspending military training for countries that do not sign agreements that exempt US soldiers from prosecution under the International Criminal Court. While domestic politics is never completely divorced from foreign policy, it has an inordinate and particularly distorting influence on Latin American policy. Hardliners and liberals alike rarely consider the effects policies and statements will have on US-Latin American relations or the ultimate impact for US interests. The decision to build a “wall” along the US-Mexico border, for example, may have been politically expedient but was deeply insulting, not only to Mexico, but to the entire region. This ingrained reflex to dismiss Latin America as the “backyard” of the United States may have been understandable in a distant era, but today the region is wildly varied and defies lazy, superficial generalizations (e.g. “inflation is out of control” or “democracy is starting to take root”). Whether or not the United States recognizes it, the fact is that different parts of Latin America are moving in markedly different directions simultaneously. 57 2NC – Extension – US Won’t Change The U.S. will stay self-absorbed --- improvement is impossible without uprooting domestic politics Farnsworth 11 – vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society (Eric, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: From Here to Where?”, April 12, 2011, http://www.ascoa.org/articles/us-latin-american-relations-here-where) Washington will continue to be self-consumed and self-absorbed, limiting the ability and the desire of the United States to project influence abroad or to take on additional priorities outside the immediate political environment. Domestic politics will prevail. This has profound implications for U.S. relations with Latin America, particularly a Latin America that is newly empowered through economic growth to determine a different future. Of course, Latin America is not homogeneous. It makes little sense to discuss the region en toto given the differences between Argentina and Guatemala or Haiti and Chile. The countries of the region are different, and therefore policies must be designed to take account of current realties on the ground. U.S. relations with Brazil are fundamentally different from U.S. relations with Venezuela or Colombia. What is similar is the way that U.S. policies that are essentially domestic in nature affect the individual and diverse countries of the region. For example, immigration reform is more directly related to U.S. relations with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean; nonetheless, a lack of immigration reform also affects growing migrant communities from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Trade relations, another sensitive political issue domestically, also affect the region as a whole. The inability to pass and implement pending agreements with Colombia and Panama or to abide by the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provisions on cross-border trucking, as well as Buy America provisions in the stimulus package, a lack of progress to conclude the Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization, and the moribund Free Area of the Americas, affect all Latin American countries by calling into question the ability of the United States to provide needed leadership on trade. Instead, regional trade agreements with other partners have proliferated, arguably making the conduct of trade relations in the hemisphere more complicated. Finally, security assistance is also at issue because of domestic priorities given spending constraints that affect the continued implementation of the Merida Initiative and assistance for the Caribbean Basin, Plan Colombia, and ongoing programs across the region. Where do these issues stand? Given the November election results, comprehensive immigration reform will not occur in the near term. Trade relations are uncertain, depending on whether the White House will seek to push the Colombia and Panama agreements over the objections of its important labor constituency. Spending will be cut, affecting foreign aid and the ability to promote the Administration’s social agenda in the hemisphere. At this point, the United States is not in a position to “bear any burden” in the hemisphere, as says John F. Kennedy’s famous phrase. As a result, Washington needs to take a step back and consider what its core interests are in the Americas and how best to promote them. The region has advanced considerably in the past decade at the same time that the tools available for use by the United States have diminished and interest in the region from nontraditional parties including China has increased exponentially. The game is changing. The question now is, how should Washington react? 58 2NC – Extension – Democracy Doesn’t Solve War No impact to democracy --- it doesn’t solve internal violence and has increased civil wars Ferguson 06 (Niall, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2006, The War of the World: History’s Age of Hatred, p. xxxviii) Did it matter how states were governed? It has become fashionable among political scientists to posit a correlation between democracy and peace, on the ground that democracies tend not to go to war with one another. On that basis, of course, the long-run rise of democracy during the twentieth century should have reduced the incidence of war. It may have reduced the incidence of war between states; there is, however, at least some evidence that waves of democratization in the 1920s, 1960s, and 1980s were followed by increases in the number of civil wars and wars of secession. This brings us to a central point. To consider twentieth-century conflict purely in terms of warfare between states is to overlook the importance of organized violence within states. The most notorious example is, of course, the war waged by the Nazis and their collaborators against the Jews, nearly six million of whom perished. The Nazis simultaneously sought to annihilate a variety of other social groups deemed to be ‘unworthy of life’, notably mentally ill and homosexual Germans, the social elite of occupied Poland and the Sinti and Roma peoples. In all, more than three million people from these other groups were murdered. Prior to these events, Stalin had perpetrated comparable acts of violence against national minorities within the Soviet Union as well as executing or incarcerating millions of Russians guilty or merely suspected of political dissidence. Of around four million non-Russians who were deported to Siberia and Central Asia, at least 1.6 million are estimated to have died as a result of the hardships inflicted on them. A minimum estimate for the total victims of all political violence in the Soviet Union between 1928 and 1953 is twenty-one million. Yet genocide predated totalitarianism. As we shall see, the policies of forced resettlement and deliberate murder directed against Christian minorities in the last years of the Ottoman Empire amounted to genocide according to the 1948 definition of the term. Their evidence is circumstantial at best --- it’s a correlation but not a causation Walt 99 (Steven M., Professor of Political Science, Master of the Social Science Collegiate Division, University of Chicago, January/February 1999, “ Never Say Never: Wishful Thinking on Democracy and War,” Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54641/stephen-m-walt/never-say-never-wishfulthinking-on-democracy-and-war) Critics of the democratic-peace hypothesis make two main counterarguments. Their first line of attack holds that the apparent pacifism between democracies may be a statistical artifact: because democracies have been relatively rare throughout history, the absence of wars between them may be due largely to chance. Evidence for a democratic peace also depends on the time periods one examines and on how one interprets borderline cases like the War of 1812 or the American Civil War. Critics also note that strong statistical support for the proposition is limited to the period after World War II, when both the U.S.-led alliance system and the Soviet threat to Western Europe's democracies discouraged conflict between republics. 59 2NC – Extension – Terrorism Defense (1/2) The impact is extremely small --- nuclear terrorism is highly improbable and would be impossible to pull off Mueller 08 (John Mueller, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” January 1, 2008, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF) A terrorist atomic bomb is commonly held to be the single most serious threat to the national security of the United States. Assessed in appropriate context, that could actually be seen to be a rather cheering conclusion because the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small. Moreover, the degree to which al-Qaeda--the chief demon group and one of the few terrorist groups to see value in striking the United States-has sought, or is capable of, obtaining such a weapon seems to have been substantially exaggerated. If there has been a "failure of imagination," perhaps it has been in the inability or unwillingness to consider the difficulties confronting the atomic terrorist. Terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration, they have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. Warnings about the possibility that small groups could fabricate nuclear weapons have been repeatedly uttered at least since 1946 when A-bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer agreed that "three or four men" could smuggle atomic bomb units into New York and "blow up the whole city" (Allison 2004, 104), a massive and absurd exaggeration of the capacity of atomic bombs of the time. Such assertions proliferated after the 1950s when the "suitcase bomb" appeared to become a practical possibility. And it has now been over three decades since terrorism specialist Brian Jenkins published his warnings about how the "widespread distribution of increasingly sophisticated and increasingly powerful man-portable weapons will greatly add to the terrorist's arsenal" and about how "the world's increasing dependence on nuclear power may provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction" (1975, 33). Or since John McPhee ominously reported that "to many people who have participated in the advancement of the nuclear age, it seem not just possible but more and more apparent that nuclear explosions will again take place in cities" (1974, 3). We continue to wait. It is essential to note, however, that making a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task. Thus, a set of counterterrorism "enormous technical and logistical obstacles confronting would-be nuclear terrorists, and to the fact that neither al-Qaeda nor any other group has come close to demonstrating the means to overcome them ." and nuclear experts interviewed in 2004 by Dafna Linzer for the Washington Post pointed to the Allison nonetheless opines that a dedicated terrorist group, al-Qaeda in particular, could get around all the problems in time and eventually steal, produce, or procure a "crude" bomb or device, one that he however acknowledges would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97; see also Bunn and Wier 2006, 139; Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 61). In his recent book, Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, William Langewiesche spends a great deal of time and effort assessing the process by means of which a terrorist group could come up with a bomb. Unlike Allison, he concludes that it "remains very, very unlikely. It's a possibility, but unlikely." Also: The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists. And so far there is no public case, at least known, of any appreciable amount of weapons-grade HEU [highly enriched uranium] disappearing. And that's the first step. If you don't have that, you don't have anything. It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state--even a close ally, much less a terrorist group--a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently. For example, during the Cold War, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused (Oberdorfer 2005; see also Pillar 2003, xxi). There could be some danger from private (or semi-private) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, its activities were rather easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down when it seemed to be the right time (Langewiesche 2007, 169-72). Since they are unlikely to be able to buy or steal a useable bomb and since they are further unlikely to have one handed off to them by an established nuclear state, terrorists would need to manufacture the device themselves. Because of the dangers and difficulties of transporting and working with plutonium, a dedicated terrorist group, it is generally agreed, would choose to try to use highly enriched uranium (Kamp 1996, 33; Keller 2002; Milhollin 2002, 46-47; Rees 2003, 44-45; Linzer 2004; Allison 2004, 96-97; Goldstein 2004, 131-32; Cameron 2004, 84; Wirz and Egger 2005, 500; Bunn and Wier 2006, 135; Langewiesche 2007, 21-23).8 The goal would be to get as much of this stuff as necessary (more than 100 pounds is required to reach critical mass) and then fashion it into an explosive.9 Most likely this would not be a bomb that can be dropped or hurled, but rather an "improvised nuclear device" (IND) that would be set off at the target by a suicidal detonation crew. 7 The process is a daunting one, and it requires that a whole cascade of events click perfectly and in sequence. This is a key issue. Those, like Allison, who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb, argue that a terrorist group could, if often with great difficulty, surmount each obstacle--that doing so in each case is "not impossible." But it is vital to point out that while it may be "not impossible" to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them rather quickly does approach impossibility. Let us assess the problem. Procuring fissile material. To begin with, stateless groups are simply incapable of manufacturing the required fissile material for a bomb since the process requires an enormous effort on an industrial scale (Milhollin 2002, 45-46; Allison 2004; Cameron 2004, 83; Bunn and Wier 2006, 136-37; Bunn and Wier 2006, 136-37; Langewiesche 2007, 20; Perry et al. 2007). Moreover, they are unlikely to be supplied with the material by a state for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb. Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase this crucial material. 60 2NC – Extension – Terrorism Defense (2/2) Terrorism won’t cause extinction --- people are more likely to die in a car crash Mueller 09 (John Mueller, Prof. Pol. Sci. – Ohio State U., in “American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear Threat inflation since 9/11”, Ed. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, p. 194) Although there are some who worry that al-Qaeda has been able to reconstitute itself and is now on the march (see Bergen 2007; Hoffman 2008; Mazzetti and Rohde 2008),2 estimates of the size of al-Qaeda central generally come in with numbers in the same order of magnitude as those suggested by Sageman. Egyptian intelligence, for example, puts the number at less than 200, while American intelligence estimates run from 300 to upwards of 500 (Wright 2008). One retired U.S. intelligence officer suggests it could be "as many as 2000" (Mazzetti and Rohde 2008), but that number should obviously be taken essentially to define the upper range of contemporary estimates. Another way to evaluate the threat is to focus on the actual amount of violence perpetrated around the world by Muslim extremists since 9/11 outside of war zones. Included in the count would be terrorism of the much-publicized and fearinducing sort that occurred in Bali in 2002, in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Turkey in 2003, in the Philippines, Madrid, and Egypt in 2004, and in London and Jordan in 2005. Three think-tank publications have independently provided lists of such incidents. Although these tallies make for grim reading, the total number of people killed comes to some 200 or 300 per year. That, of course, is 200 or 300 per year too many, but it hardly suggests that the perpetrators present a major threat, much less an existential one. For comparison: over the same period far more people have drowned in bathtubs in the United States alone. Another comparison comes from the consequences of policies instituted by the Transportation Security Administration. Increased delays and added costs at airports due to new security procedures provide incentive for many short-haul passengers to drive to their destination rather than flying. Since driving is far riskier than air travel, the extra automobile traffic generated by increased airport security screening measures has been estimated to result in 400 or more fatalities per year (Ellig et al. 2006: 35). Another assessment comes from astronomer Alan Harris. Using State Department figures, he estimates a worldwide death rate from international terrorism outside of war zones of 1,000 per year—that is, he assumes in his estimate that there would be another 9/11 somewhere in the world every several years. Over an 80 year period under those conditions some 80,000 deaths would occur which would mean that the probability that a resident of the globe will die at the hands of international terrorists is about one in 75,000 (6 billion divided by 80,000). In comparison, an American's chance of dying in an auto accident over the same time interval is about one in 80. If there are no repeats of 9/11, the probability of being killed by an international terrorist becomes more like one in 120,000. 61 2NC – AT: Add-On – Hegemony (1/2) Heg is resilient and decline is impossible Norrlof 10 – an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto (Carla, “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 1-2) We have seen erroneous predictions of American decline before. In the 1970s, the combination of high inflation, high interest rates, high unemployment, the Vietnam War, political and military challenges from China and the Soviet Union, and the economic rise of Japan led to eerily similar forecasts. Pessimists then, as today, underestimated the longevity of American power. The main reason the United States has continued to occupy a unique place in the international system is because a sufficient number of major and lesser powers have a strong interest in maintaining America at the top of the hierarchy. To bring America down would take a deliberate, coordinated strategy on the part of others and this is simply not plausible. As much as the United States benefits from the space it has carved out for itself in the current world order, its ability to reap unequal gains will remain unless and until allies start to incur heavy losses under American dominance. Even that, by itself, will not be sufficient to sink American hegemony. A strong alternative to American rule will have to come into view for things to fundamentally change. At present, no credible alternative is in sight. The United States is not invincible but its dominance is currently steady. Those who are inclined to think that American hegemony will persist – at least for a while – tend to dwell on the claim that the United States is providing a range of public goods to the benefit of all at its own expense. This is a chimera. The United States is self-interested, not altruistic. The illusion of benevolence has meant that very little attention has been given to uncovering the mechanism through which the United States gains disproportionately from supplying a large open market, the world’s reserve currency, and a military machine capable of stoking or foiling deadly disputes . This book exposes the mechanism through which the United States reaps unequal gains and shows that the current world system, and the distribution of power that supports it, has built-in stabilizers that strengthen American power following bouts of decline. Although all dominant powers must eventually decline, I will show that the downward progression need not be linear when mutually reinforcing tendencies across various power dimensions are at play. Specifically, I will demonstrate how the United States’ reserve currency status produces disproportionate commercial gains; how commercial power gives added flexibility in monetary affairs; and, finally, how military preponderance creates advantages in both monetary and trade affairs. 62 2NC – AT: Add-On – Hegemony (2/2) Latin America isn’t key --- US military strength is impossible to beat which means there wouldn’t be an impact anyways Bandow 10 (Doug Bandow, Senior fellow at the Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11143, January 19, 2010) The U.S. has no great power enemies. Relations with China and Russia are at times uneasy, but not confrontational, let alone warlike. Washington is allied with every other industrialized state. America possesses the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional force. Washington's reach exceeds that of Rome and Britain at their respective peaks. Other nations, most notably China, are stirring, but it will take years before they match, let alone overtake, the U.S. Even subtracting the costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars leaves American military outlay around five times that of China and 10 times that of Russia. Combine a gaggle of adversaries, enemies and rogues — Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria — and the U.S. spends perhaps 25 times as much. The United States is not alone. The European Union has 10 times the GDP and three times the population of Russia. Military outlay by the U.S. plus its NATO allies accounts for about 70 percent of world military spending. Add in America's other allies and friends, such as South Korea, and the total share of global military outlay hits 80 percent. 63 2NC – AT: Add-On – LA Environment No extinction Easterbrook 3 (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set=) If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed. Peer reviewed evidence indicates ecosystems are resilient McDermott 09 (“Good news: most ecosystems can recover in one lifetime from human induced or natural disturbance”, May 2009, http://www.treehugger.com/files/2009/05/mostecosystems-can-recover-from-disturbance-in-one-lifetime.php) There's a reason the phrase "let nature take its course" exists: New research done at the Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Science reinforces the idea that ecosystems are quiet resilient and can rebound from pollution and environmental degradation. Published in the journal PLoS ONE, the study shows that most damaged ecosystems worldwide can recover within a single lifetime , if the source of pollution is removed and restoration work done: Forests Take Longest of Ecosystems Studied The analysis found that on average forest ecosystems can recover in 42 years, while in takes only about 10 years for the ocean bottom to recover. If an area has seen multiple, interactive disturbances, it can take on average 56 years for recovery. In general, most ecosystems take longer to recover from human-induced disturbances than from natural events, such as hurricanes. To reach these recovery averages, the researchers looked at data from peer-reviewed studies over the past 100 years on the rate of ecosystem recovery once the source of pollution was removed. Interestingly, the researchers found that it appears that the rate at which an ecosystem recovers may be independent of its degraded condition: Aquatic systems may recover more quickly than, say, a forest, because the species and organisms that live in that ecosystem turn over more rapidly than in the forest. 64 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (1/5) The aff doesn’t solve --- massive alt causes undermine US diplomacy and credibility Greenwald 12 – Glenn Greenwald is an American political journalist, lawyer, columnist, blogger, and author (June 25, 2012, “Collapsing U.S. credibility,” http://www.salon.com/2012/06/25/collapsing_u_s_credibility/) Two Op-Eds in The New York Times this morning both warn of the precipitous decline of American credibility on matters of human rights and peace ushered in by the Obama presidency. Taken together, they explain much of why I’ve been writing what I’ve been writing over the last three years. The first is from Columbia Professor and cyber expert Misha Glenny, who explains the significance of the first ever deployment of cyberwarfare — by the U.S. (first under Bush and accelerated under Obama), along with Israel, against Iran: THE decision by the United States and Israel to develop and then deploy the Stuxnet computer worm against an Iranian nuclear facility late in George W. Bush’s presidency marked a significant and dangerous turning point in the gradual militarization of the Internet. Washington has begun to cross the Rubicon. If it continues, contemporary warfare will change fundamentally as we move into hazardous and uncharted territory. It is one thing to write viruses and lock them away safely for future use should circumstances dictate it. It is quite another to deploy them in peacetime. Stuxnet has effectively fired the starting gun in a new arms race that is very likely to lead to the spread of similar and still more powerful offensive cyberweaponry across the Internet. Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons, however, countries are developing cyberweapons outside any regulatory framework. . . . Stuxnet was originally deployed with the specific aim of infecting the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran. This required sneaking a memory stick into the plant to introduce the virus to its private and secure “offline” network. But despite Natanz’s isolation, Stuxnet somehow escaped into the cyberwild, eventually affecting hundreds of thousands of systems worldwide. This is one of the frightening dangers of an uncontrolled arms race in cyberspace; once released, virus developers generally lose control of their inventions, which will inevitably seek out and attack the networks of innocent parties. Moreover, all countries that possess an offensive cyber capability will be tempted to use it now that the first shot has been fired. . . . The United States has long been a commendable leader in combating the spread of malicious computer code, known as malware, that pranksters, criminals, intelligence services and terrorist organizations have been using to further their own ends. But by introducing such pernicious viruses as Stuxnet and Flame, America has severely undermined its moral and political credibility . He also explains that the Obama administration opposes any treaties to regulate all of this in part because it “might undermine its presumed superiority in the field of cyberweaponry and robotics,” and because it claims Russia and China (but not, of course, the U.S.) would attempt to exploit such treaties to control the Internet. In case anyone thinks he’s being melodramatic in his warnings, the original New York Times article by David Sanger that confirmed U.S. responsibility for the cyber attack included this passage: “Mr. Obama, according to participants in the many Situation Room meetings on Olympic Games, was acutely aware that with every attack he was pushing the United States into new territory, much as his predecessors had with the first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade.” It also explained that America’s maiden use of this new form of warfare “could enable other countries, terrorists or hackers to justify their own attacks.” The second is from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, an actually meritorious Nobel Peace Prize winner, who describes the record of his fellow Nobel laureate, the current President, in an Op-Ed entitled “A Cruel and Unusual Record“: Revelations that top officials are targeting people to be assassinated abroad, including American citizens, are only the most recent, disturbing proof of how far our nation’s violation of human rights has extended. This development began after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and has been sanctioned and escalated by bipartisan executive and legislative actions, without dissent from the general public. As a result, our country can no longer speak with moral authority on these critical issues. . . . . 65 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (2/5) No impact to diplomacy --- marshaling support is structurally impossible and ineffective --- particularly true for Kashmir and the Middle East Miller 10 (Aaron David Miller, public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Princeton University, Foreign Policy, “The End of Diplomacy?” February 3, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/03/the_end_of_diplomacy?page=full) Back in the day, there was a time when American diplomacy did big and important things. No more, it seems. The world's gotten complicated, America is a good deal weaker, and the U.S. administration is handicapping itself with a dysfunctional bureaucratic setup that makes it harder to focus and find its footing. Effective American diplomacy may well be going the way of the dodo, and the sad fact is there may be little Barack Obama can do about it. Lamenting the absence of great men years before his own shining moment, Winston Churchill wrote that in England, once upon a time, "there were wonderful giants of old." There's always a danger in idealizing what once was or seemed to be in order to make a point about the present. Still, looking back over the last 60 years, you really do have to wonder whether America's best diplomacy and foreign policy are behind it. America never ran the world (an illusion the left, right, and much of the third and fourth worlds believe; but there were moments (1945-1950, the early 1970s, 1988-1991) when the United States marshaled its military, political, and economic power toward impressive ends. There were, or course, disasters and plenty of dysfunction during these years, including the Vietnam War and out-of-control CIA operations. But there were also brilliant achievements: the Marshall Plan, NATO, effective Arab-Israeli diplomacy, détente with the Russians, opening to China, a competent American role in the acceleration and management of the end of the Cold War, and the first Gulf War. For most of the last 16 years, however -- under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush -- America has been in a diplomatic dry patch. In the face of terrorism, nuclear prolif eration, wars of choice, and nasty regional conflicts, conventional diplomacy has either not been tried or not been very successful. The image of the shuttling secretary of state pre-empting crises or exploiting them to broker agreements, doggedly pursuing Middle East peace, achieving dramatic breakthroughs with spectacular secret diplomacy seems a world away. The Obama administration wants to do this kind of stuff. And it has done pretty well in managing the big relationships with Russia and Europe, though it has had its share of problems with China. But frankly, these are the easy ones. It's not from the big that the president's problems come; it's from the small. In garden spots like Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the problems are four parts military, five parts nation-building, and maybe one part diplomacy. And America is unlikely to prevail in any meaningful sense of the word where corrupt, extractive regimes are unable to control their own territory and cut deals with anti-American elements and place their security and political concerns first. Even in areas where diplomacy might seem to work on paper -- Kashmir, Arab-Israeli peacemaking -- the United States is hampered by conflicts driven by deep ethnic and religious hostility and by internal politics in which it s own allies (Israel, Pakistan, and India) can't be of much help. And in one of the cruelest ironies of all, the U.S. president who has gone further to engage Iran than any of his predecessors is watching any hope for diplomacy being ground up by a regime under siege in Tehran. What's more, the power of the small is being matched by the weakening of the big. You don't have to be a declinist (I'm not) to see how far the image of American power has fallen. Forget the economic meltdown, which has much of the world wondering about what kind of great power the United States really is. America's currently fighting two wars where the standard for victory is not whether it can win but when it can leave. Whether it's an inability to get tough sanctions from the international community against Iran, bring Tehran to heel, make North Korea play ball, get the Arabs and the Israelis to cooperate, or push the Pakistanis to hit the Taliban and al Qaeda in a sustained way, the world has gotten used to saying no to America without cost or consequence. And that's very bad for a great power. Finally, there's the issue of how the country organizes itself. A new bureaucratic flowchart won't replace skill and luck, better marshal American power, or create genuine opportunities for success abroad. But if you don't have the right structure, it makes success all that much harder. And the United States has departed from the one model that has proven successful: the strong foreign-policy president empowering the strong secretary of state who rides herd over subcabinet-level envoys in real time and in close coordination with the president on strategy. Instead, the Obama administration has created an empire of envoys with power concentrated in the White House but without real purpose or strategy. The nation's top diplomat (the secretary of state) seems to be everywhere and nowhere in terms of owning issues and finding a way to take on some of the nastiest challenges, which is what secretaries of state are supposed to do. It's still early, and maybe the Obama administration will get lucky. Perhaps the Iranian regime will collapse or the Arabs and Israelis will do something good by themselves. But the next several years are more likely to be tough ones for American diplomacy. And the image that comes to mind isn't a terribly kind one: America as a kind of modern-day Gulliver tied up by tiny tribes abroad and hobbled by its inability to organize its own house at home. 66 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (3/5) No Middle East war --- it’s empirically denied, conflicts won’t escalate, and leaders won’t go to war Cook, et. al., 7 — Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, AND, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, AND, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution (Steven A., Ray Takeyh, and Suzanne Maloney, “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune, 6/28/07, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/why-iraqwar-wont-engulf-mideast/p13702) Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East. 67 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (4/5) No impact to the Kashmir scenario --- no nuclear use and no political will London 08 — South Asia Correspondent for the Australian (Bruce, “Doomsday Dread”, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/doomsday-dread/story-e6frg6t6-1111118216188) THE doomsayers' published assessments tell the grim story: upwards of 12 million people killed on the first day of a nuclear exchange, more than 150 million dead in a longer nuclear conflict. Devastation and destruction on a scale that is almost unimaginable. A catastrophe that would vastly transcend that seen at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. That is why, as India and Pakistan muscle up to each other after the Mumbai massacre and leaders from across the world hurry to counsel cool heads and caution in New Delhi and Islamabad, the unspoken fear everywhere is that the two South Asian neighbours could be pushed into the unthinkable: their fourth war, and one in which they would mobilise their nuclear arsenals. It is, it must be said, an unlikely prospect. No one in either capital -- even among the hotheads -- is thinking in those terms. Experienced strategic analysts rule it out. "Don't even think about it. It ain't going to happen," one says. But as the crisis over terrorism across South Asia deepens and jihadist groups linked to al-Qa'ida launch devastating attacks such as the one in Mumbai last week -- attacks designed to exacerbate tensions between India and Pakistan -- there is, in the view of most analysts, always the potential for events to tumble out of control and lead to a doomsday nuclear conflagration, with enormous loss of life. "South Asia's a nuclear tinderbox," a leading military analyst in New Delhi tells The Australian. "Yes, of course, I'd just about rule it out in the context of the face-off following the Mumbai attack. "But it's always there, always nagging at the edges of the constant tensions in the subcontinent. And there's no doubt that Osama (bin Laden) is doing his bit to stir the pot and do what he can to increase those tensions, since conflict between India and Pakistan serves the jihadist cause." Yesterday, US military officials in Washington, DC, closely monitoring the situation described the military temperature between the two neighbours as "pretty low right now", adding that although Pakistan has moved some aircraft and air defence units closer to the Indian border since the Mumbai attack, "on the nuclear side there is nothing". Which is hardly surprising, for the political will in both sides, despite the muscle-flexing, is overwhelmingly against resort to their nuclear arsenals. India, since it demonstrated its nuclear capability in 1998, has maintained a firm no-first-strike policy and a few days ago Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari turned longstanding Pakistani policy on its head (some believe to the annoyance of the country's powerful generals) by articulating a similar stance. On both sides there is a mood of extreme caution on the subject of any possible use of nuclear weapons, matched only by the intense secrecy that surrounds their arsenals. 68 1NC – Diplomacy Adv Frontline (5/5) Soft power is meaningless --- the notion that it solves anything is over-simplistic and unrealistic --- risks resentment, not resolution Fan 07 (Ying Fan, Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Brunel Business School, Brunel University in London, “Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?” November 14, 2007) Despite its popularity, the concept soft power remains a power of confusion. The definition is at best loose and vague. Because of such confusion it is not surprising that the concept has been misunderstood, misused and trivialised (Joffe, 2006a ). Criticisms of soft power centre mainly around three aspects: definition, sources and limitations. There may be little or no relationship between the ubiquity of American culture and its actual influence. Hundreds of millions of people around the world wear, listen, eat, drink, watch and dance American, but they do not identify these accoutrements of their daily lives with America ( Joffe, 2006b ). To Purdy (2001) soft power is not a new reality, but rather a new There are limits to what soft power could achieve. In a context dominated by hard power considerations, soft power is meaningless (Blechman, 2004 ). The word for the most efficient form of power. dark side of soft power is largely ignored by Nye. Excessive power, either hard or soft, may not be a good thing. In the affairs of nations, too much hard power ends up breeding not submission but resistance. Likewise, big soft power does not bend hearts; it twists minds in resentment and rage (Joffe, 2006b ). Nye’s version of soft power that rests on affection and desire is too simplistic and unrealistic. Human feelings are complicated and quite often ambivalent, that is, love and hate co-exist at the same time. Even within the same group, people may like some aspects of American values, but hate others. By the same token, soft power can also rest on fear (Cheow, 2002 ) or on both affection and fear, depending on the context. Much of China’s soft power in south-east Asia testifies to this. Another example is provided by the mixed perception of the United States in China: people generally admire American technological superiority and super brands but detest its policies on Taiwan. 69 2NC – Extension – Middle East Defense War won’t happen and it won’t escalate --- great powers won’t intervene and will contain already limited skirmishes Li, 1 — professor expert in the Middle East and a senior researcher in the Institute of Contemporary International Relations (Shaoxian, 8/17/2001, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Aug/17671.htm) Although the situation in the Middle East is alarming, it will not start a war. The main reasons are: First, both the international community and international environment will not allow another Middle East war to break out. Peace and development is still the theme of today’s world. No big power wants to see a new war between Arab and Israel in this area so crucial to oil production. Second, war is not in line with the interests of several countries in the Middle East. None of the Israelis (including Sharon himself) wants war, because war would again put the very existence of the country in danger; Yasser Afrafat, as well, does not want war, because war would turn his 10 years peace efforts into nothing; Egypt and Syria, the other two big powers in Middle East, do not want war either. The president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak firmly rejected the possibility of war in an interview with Israeli TV. Bashar al-Assad, the new president of Syria, has put most his attention on domestic affairs. Third, the countries and extremists who do want to see war have neither the capablities or means for war. 70 2NC – Extension – Kashmir Defense No war and no escalation --- deterrence checks and has worked for decades Economic Times 11 (“No chance of Indo-Pak nuclear war despite 'sabre rattling': Pak nuclear scientist A Q Khan,” May 17, 2011, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-0517/news/29552014_1_nuclear-blackmail-nuclear-secrets-india-and-pakistan) NEW YORK: Pakistan's disgraced nuclear scientist A Q Khan has said that despite "sabre rattling" between Islamabad and New Delhi, there is no chance of a nuclear war between the two neighbours. Khan, who has been accused of selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and Syria, wrote in Newsweek magazine that nuclear weapons in both countries had prevented war for the last 40 years. "India doesn't need more than five weapons to hurt us badly, and we wouldn't need more than 10 to return the favour," he said. "That is why there has been no war between us for the past 40 years." "India and Pakistan understand the old principle that ensured peace in the Cold War: mutually assured destruction," he said. "The two (India and Pakistan) can't afford a nuclear war, and despite our sabre rattling, there is no chance of a nuclear war that would send us both back to the Stone Age," he said. He claimed that Pakistan had to invest in a nuclear programme "to ward off nuclear blackmail from India". "I would like to make it clear that it was an Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974 that prompted our nuclear program, motivating me to return to Pakistan to help create a credible nuclear deterrent and save my country from Indian nuclear blackmail," he said. "We are forced to maintain this deterrence until our differences with India are resolved. That would lead to a new era of peace for both countries," Khan wrote. "I hope I live to see Pakistan and India living harmoniously in the same way as the once bitter enemies Germany and France live today," he said. Khan blasted various governments in Pakistan as well as "successive incompetent and ignorant rulers" for not engaging in basic development of the country, and raising the people's standard of living. "We are far worse off now than we were 20, or even 40, years ago when we were subjected to embargoes," he said. Strong economic constraints deter escalation Tellis 02 (Ashley Tellis, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Winter, p. 19) In any event, the saving grace that mutes the potential for exacerbated competition between both countries remains their relatively strong economic constraints. At the Pakistani end, these constraints are structural: Islamabad simply has no discretionary resources to fritter away on an open-ended arms race, and it could not acquire resources for this purpose without fundamentally transforming the nature of the Pakistani state itself— which transformation, if it occurs successfully, would actually mitigate many of the corrosive forces that currently drive Islamabad’s security competition with India. 21 At the Indian end, these constraints may be more self-imposed. New Delhi commands a large pool of national resources that could be siphoned off and reallocated to security instruments, but the current weaknesses of the central government’s public finances and its reform program, coupled with its desire to complete the technological modernization programs that have been underway for many decades, prevents it from enlarging the budgetary allocations for strategic acquisitions at will. 22 With these constraints on both sides, future nuclearization in India and Pakistan is more likely to resemble an "arms crawl" than a genuine Richardson-type "arms race." The strategic capabilities on both sides will increase incrementally but slowly—and in India will have further to go because of its inferior capabilities compared to China’s. This slowness may be the best outcome from the viewpoint both of the two South Asian competitors and the United States. 71 2NC – Extension – Soft Power Defense Soft power doesn’t solve wars --- different value systems and internal factors means it’s foolish to believe soft power is anything but distinctly limited Gray 11 (Colin S. Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England, “Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies Institute, April 2011) An inherent and unavoidable problem with a country’s soft power is that it is near certain to be misassessed by the politicians who attempt to govern soft power’s societal owners and carriers. Few thoroughly encultured Americans are likely to undervalue “the American way” in many of its aspects as a potent source of friendly self-co-option abroad. Often, this self-flattering appreciation will be well justified in reality. But as an already existing instrument of American policy, the soft power of ideas and practical example is fraught with the perils of self-delusion. If one adheres to an ideology that is a heady mixture of Christian ethics (“one nation, under God . . .”), democratic principles, and free market orthodoxy, and if one is an American, which is to say if one is a citizen of a somewhat hegemonic world power that undeniably has enjoyed a notably successful historical passage to date, then it is natural to confuse the national ideology with a universal creed. Such confusion is only partial, but nonetheless it is sufficiently damaging as to be a danger to national strategy. Since it is fallacious to assume that American values truly are universal, the domain of high relevance and scope for American soft power to be influential is distinctly limited. If one places major policy weight on the putative value for policy of American soft power, one needs to be acutely alert to the dangers of an under-recognized ethnocentrism born of cultural ignorance. This ignorance breeds an arrogant disdain for evidence of foreigners’ lack of interest in being coopted to join American civilization. The result of such arrogance predictably is political and even military strategic counterreaction. It is a case of good intentions gone bad when they are pursued with indifference toward the local cultural context. Some people have difficulty grasping the unpalatable fact that much of the world is not receptive to any American soft power that Not all rivalries are resolvable by ideas, formulas, or “deals” that seem fair and equitable to us. There are conflicts wherein the struggle is the message, to misquote Marshal MacLuhan, with value in the eyes of local belligerents. Not all local conflicts around the world are amenable to the calming effect of American soft power. True militarists of left and right, secular and religious, attempts to woo it to the side of American interests. find intrinsic value in struggle and warfare, as A. J. Coates has explained all too clearly. The self-fulfilment and self-satisfaction that war generates derive in part from the religious or ideological significance attributed to it and from the resultant sense of participating in some grand design. It may be, however, that the experience of war comes to be prized for its own sake and not just for the great ends that it serves or promotes. For many, the excitement unique to war makes pacific pursuits seem insipid by comparison. This understanding and experience of moral, psychological, and emotional self-fulfillment increase our tolerance for war and threaten its moral regulation. It transforms war from an instrumental into an expressive activity.49 It is foolish to believe that every conflict contains the seeds of its own resolution, merely awaiting suitable watering through co-option by soft power. To be fair, similarly unreasonable faith in the disciplinary value of (American) military force is also to be deplored. 72 2NC – AT: Add-On – North Korea (1/2) No impact --- North Korea isn’t a threat, will quickly lose the war, and multiple defensive measures prevent escalation Kelly 13 (Robert E. Kelly, associate professor of IR in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, a leading university in South Korea, writes for the Diplomat, April 10th, 2013 “North Korea Is the Boy Who Cried Wolf: There Will Be No War” http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/10/north-korea-is-the-boy-who-cried-wolf-there-will-be-nowar/) But if you listen to the analyst community, particularly those of us in Korea or with genuine local expertise, there is near unanimity that there will be no war. I have seen lots of my friends on BBC, CNN and other outlets in the last few weeks, and we are all saying the same thing: there will be no war. My own sense that this is pretty well-known, but it is worth repeating: Pyongyang will lose a war – completely and quickly. As lots of analysts have been noting recently, North Korea’s military is clapped out and short on everything – food, fuel, spare parts. Indeed, one obvious reason for Pyongyang to acquire nuclear weapons is to shortcut the widening military gap between it and Seoul, much less the U.S. While we hear that the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) is the fourth largest force in the world, that might not actually be the case. Further, there are big questions as to its combat effectiveness and willingness to fight once the war turns and command-and-control begins to break down. (Today’s U.S. military tends to target command & control in conflicts with airpower. It is likely to do so in a second Korean conflict.) The KPA, like other, erstwhile communist militaries, is postured around WWII and the Korean War. Huge amounts of infantry, tanks, and artillery would fight in massive battles like Kursk in 1943. But that is simply not how the hi-tech U.S. and South Korean militaries will fight. North Korea is almost completely lacking in the ‘C4ISR’ (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) technologies that structure today’s ‘networked battlefield.’ All those North Korean teens with their ‘summer of 1914’ spirit will find their divisions pummeled by American airpower in particular will be so dominant and intrusive, and Korea is geographically so narrow, that any North Korean concentrations will be easy targets. One could easily imagine Gulf War 1-style ‘roads of death’ all over again. (The one conventional ace-in-the-hole stand-off strikes they can neither defend against nor respond to. Pyongyang has is its special forces. Estimates go as high as 200,000, and it is widely thought they will land in South Korea on mini-subs and light planes, or pour through tunnels dug under the DMZ. [In fact DMZ tours will actually take you into a few of the tunnels the South has uncovered.] We assume these spec-ops forces will create behind the lines havoc, targeting bridges, power plants, etc. Given their Korean nationality, they will not have the ‘cultural fit’ problem of German soldiers who tried this on the Americans during the Battle of the Bulge.) While North Korean artillery could indeed devastate Kyeonggi, allied air power would target those firing tubes right from the start. Worse for North Korea, tens of thousands of dead South Korean civilians would be a humanitarian catastrophe but would not shake the constitutional and material foundations of the South. And it would immediately cost Pyongyang any remaining global sympathy. China in particular would have no choice after such a civilian holocaust but to abandon North Korea to its fate. If China did not, it would immediately confirm the fears of every neighboring state that it is a dangerous hegemonic aspirant, and it would face a very tight containment ring with Japan, India, and ASEAN working together. A similar logic applies to a Northern nuclear strike against the South. Estimates are that North Korea has between five and ten warheads with yields between five and ten kilotons each. (Those numbers come from U.S. and South Korean intelligence, but they are soft.) That yield – the energy released by the atomic chain reaction – is about half that of the Hiroshima bomb, which killed more than 100,000. A Northern strike would again create a humanitarian catastrophe, but almost certainly not knock the South out of war. With fifty million people, South Korea could ride out even a full North Korean first strike and still fight. Worse, large questions loom about whether the warheads could actually be delivered. North Korea’s air force is even more dated than its army, so we assume they would use a missile – hence all the tests. But this is still tricky. Nuclear warheads must be miniaturized to fit; the earliest U.S. bombs were enormous. Precise targeting is hard; North Korean rockets may simply fall in the water. (This may seem unlikely, because South Korea is not that far away. But those who remember the ‘throw-weight’ debate of the Cold War will recall that the USSR regularly built very large ICBMs, because their missile defense technologies are improving, and the U.S. has begun moving such assets to the region . And finally, as with a conventional devastation of Seoul, a nuclear strike would immediately cost Pyongyang all global guidance technology was so primitive. It is not hard to imagine this applies to North Korea as well.) Worse, sympathy. Indeed, China might reckon at that point that nuke-using North Korea is so dangerous that it should actually help the Americans and South Koreans invade the country. Lastly, a point rarely mentioned in the media coverage is that South Korea still has the death penalty. After a second Korean war, particularly if it involves enormous civilian casualties in the South, most think there would be war crimes trials. And given how awful North Korean human rights abuses are, there will likely be a truth and reconciliation process that will probably not offer much reconciliation. In a North Korea collapsing under U.S.-Southern airpower and a ground advance, one could easily see the Kim family running for their lives as did the Gaddifis or Ceaușescus. Angry North Koreans might simply lynch them as happened to Mussolini, while captured elites would almost certainly face the hangman like Saddam did. In short, most analysts think a war is extremely unlikely. Pyongyang will lose – quickly and completely. This will not be 1950 all over again. If there is a second war, Seoul will push for a final resolution to the long nightmare of North Korean orwellianism, and the U.S. will likely support that. China will be backed into a corner, because North Korea’s survival strategy depends on civilian counter-value strikes that will be intolerable to global opinion. And no one in the Kim family wants to wind up like Gaddifi or Milosevic. While Dennis Rodman’s new bff, Kim Jong-un, may be too young and naïve to know this stuff, I am all but positive, as are most in the analyst community, that the generals and Kim Jong Il loyalists who surround KJU on the National Defense Commission do know this well. 3. So What is the Point of They want no war, as they will lose it, badly and quickly, and then face the hangman . Hence I would say that this this Crisis? Which brings us to this current crisis, where the regime’s goals are once again very unclear. is simply more brinksmanship. I see four possible reasons, which are not mutually exclusive: 73 2NC – AT: Add-On – North Korea (2/2) South Korea won’t retaliate --- business interests Kim 10 (Jack Kim, June 16, 2010, Reuters, “Q+A - How serious is the Korean crisis and risk of war?” http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49340820100616) Many analysts doubt there will be war, as long as South Korea holds its fire. North Korea's obsolete conventional armed forces and military equipment mean quick and certain defeat if it wages full-scale war and Pyongyang is well aware of its limits. South Korea has made it clear it will not retaliate despite investigations that found a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine sank the corvette Cheonan in March. It knows the investment community will take fright if it does attack. President Lee Myung-bak's government has taken the case to the Security Council, rather than take the law into its own hands. 74 2NC – AT: Add-On – Iran (1/2) No Iran prolif or nuclear capability Risen and Mazzetti 12 (James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, “U.S. Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build a Bomb,” February 25, 2012, http://www.postgazette.com/pg/12056/1212697-82.stm) WASHINGTON -- Even as the United Nations' nuclear watchdog said in a new report Friday that Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment program, American intelligence analysts continue to believe that there is no hard evidence that Iran has decided to build a nuclear bomb. Recent assessments by American spy agencies are broadly consistent with a 2007 intelligence finding that concluded that Iran had abandoned its nuclear weapons program years earlier, according to current and former American officials. The officials said that assessment was largely reaffirmed in a 2010 National Intelligence Estimate, and that it remains the consensus view of America's 16 intelligence agencies. At the center of the debate is the murky question of the ultimate ambitions of the leaders in Tehran. There is no dispute among American, Israeli and European intelligence officials that Iran has been enriching nuclear fuel and developing some necessary infrastructure to become a nuclear power. But the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies believe that Iran has yet to decide whether to resume a parallel program to design a nuclear warhead -- a program they believe was essentially halted in 2003 and which would be necessary for Iran to build a nuclear bomb. Iranian officials maintain that their nuclear program is for civilian purposes . "I think the Iranians want the capability, but not a stockpile," said Kenneth C. Brill, a former United States ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency who also served as director of the intelligence community's National Counterproliferation Center from 2005 until 2009. Added a former intelligence official: "The Indians were a screwdriver turn away from having a bomb for many years. The Iranians are not that close." Iran's efforts to hide its nuclear facilities and to deceive the West about its activities have also intensified doubts. But some American analysts warn that such behavior is not necessarily proof of a weapons program. They say that one mistake the C.I.A. made before the war in Iraq was to assume that because Saddam Hussein resisted weapons inspections --acting as if he were hiding something -- it meant that he had a weapons program. 75 2NC – AT: Add-On – Iran (2/2) Even if Iran proliferates, it won’t spill-over or escalate to a nuclear arms race Theodoulou 12 (Michael Theodoulou, Foreign Correspondent at the National, “A nuclear Iran unlikely to trigger Middle East arms race: study,” December 25, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/a-nuclear-iran-unlikely-to-trigger-middleeast-arms-race-study#page2) Barack Obama in March voiced the same fear in almost identical terms. But the assumption that Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon would have a domino effect in the Middle East and on what the US president termed the "most dangerous part of the world" is being strongly challenged. In a study published last week, two experts from the Department of War Studies at King's College in London argue that key regional players - Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey - are unlikely to follow suit and develop their own nuclear arsenals. Indeed, Christopher Hobbs and Matthew Moran argue that the Middle East itself offers evidence that "nuclear proliferation is not inevitable". Israel remains the region's sole nuclear-armed power - albeit an undeclared one - more than four decades after it acquired nuclear weapons capability. The flaw in the logic that "proliferation begets proliferation" is also demonstrated in North East Asia where North Korea's nuclear weapons have not provoked Japan or South Korea, countries with advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict. The authors of Looking Beyond a Nuclear Iran make clear there are reasons to be to be wary of Iran's nuclear ambitions. While Tehran insists its atomic programme is solely peaceful, they point out that Iran's growing stockpile of medium-enriched uranium is already far in excess of its civilian needs. Even so, Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran argue that this will not necessarily ignite a regional rush for the bomb. This is not to say there is no history of regional powers harbouring nuclear ambitions. Iraq's Saddam Hussein was thought to have embarked on a plan to refine weapons-grade nuclear fuel in the late 1970s, as did Syria's Bashar Al Assad in the early 2000's. In both cases, Israel responded with devastating air strikes. Still, this year, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia recognise that nuclear restraint is in their best interests - not least because, according to Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran, "strong security alliances with the United States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role in dissuading these countries from going nuclear". All three, moreover, are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and have long pressed for a nuclear-free Middle East. Peter Jenkins, a former UK ambassador to the UN's atomic watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, is also sceptical that a nuclear-armed Iran would trigger a regional nuclear arms race. Saudi Arabia, he argues, while deeply suspicious of Iran, would be loath to alienate the US, its long-standing top supplier of conventional arms, and tacit guarantor of the kingdom's security, by seeking a nuclear deterrent. "It is hard to imagine that the US would stand by while its Saudi ally set about proliferating, or that Saudi rulers would risk that friendship by defying America's wishes," Mr Jenkins said. It has long been said that in the event of a successful Iranian nuclear test, Saudi Arabia would swiftly purchase nuclear warheads off the shelf, most likely from Pakistan. The Times (of London) in February quoted an unnamed senior Saudi source saying: "Politically, it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom." But it appears that Saudi views on the prospect of Iran going nuclear are not uniform. He recalls a discussion in July hosted by the Global Strategy Forum, a London think tank, where Jack Straw, a former British foreign secretary, recounted a Saudi official's reply when asked about the kingdom's nuclear intentions. "We say that we will have to keep step with Iran," the official said. "But in reality our people would never forgive us for tolerating Israeli nuclear weapons for so many years and developing nuclear weapons to balance their acquisition by Islamic Iran." Turkey is another Sunni-dominated state keeping watch on Shiite Iran's ambitions for regional influence, even though the countries have strong trade and energy links. But as a Nato member, Turkey "already has indirect access to nuclear deterrent forces", Mr Jenkins said. And "for more than 40 years, Turkey shared a border with a hostile, nuclear-armed Soviet Union, but never sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent". Ankara's generally positive relations with Tehran also mean Turkey would be unlikely to view a nuclear-armed Iran as an "immediate threat", Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran write. And Ankara knows any attempt to go nuclear would "spell the end of Turkey's EU aspirations". Like Saudi Arabia, Egypt sees itself as a leader of Sunni Arab states. But Cairo has chosen a diplomatic response to the much closer challenge of Israel's nuclear arsenal, using the NPT and other international platforms to put pressure on Israeli leaders over its atomic programme for the past four decades. "It would seem very unlikely that the threat presented by a nuclear-armed Iran would cause Cairo to abandon this approach," Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran write. Recent political divisions and economic difficulties also mean the Egyptian government that emerged after the fall of Hosni Mubarak's regime would be ill placed to acquire a weapon. "It would also invite a pre-emptive strike by Israel that would be free of the logistic obstacles that have militated against a strike on Iran," Mr Jenkins said. Moreover, Egypt's Islamist leadership is far less hostile to Tehran than was Mr Mubarak's regime. 76 ***MEXICO BORDER AFFIRMATIVE*** 77 Notes Affirmative Analysis This affirmative argues that the US should improve its border crossings with Mexico. It cuts to the core of the United States’ interests with Mexico, as border crossings deal with drugs, immigration, economics, and much more. Because of this broad range of issues the border interacts with, there is a lot of ground on both sides of this affirmative. Advantage One --- Manufacturing This advantage says that due to delays at border crossing, US businesses are at a competitive disadvantage with foreign businesses. This creates “offshoring”, or the loss of manufacturing business to other countries like China. Manufacturing is important to have in the US because it innovates new technologies that keep the US powerful. It also allows Chinese manufacturers to focus on creating goods for domestic consumption, instead of goods meant to be exported to the US that can’t be sold in China. This makes the Chinese economy more stable. Advantage Two --- US-Mexico Relations This advantage is very simple. It says that the plan would foster cooperation between the US and Mexico and that that cooperation is important for stability and preventing cyberattacks. Negative teams will try to say there are “alt causes”, or other issues that will affect relations more than the plan. However, since the border has such wide reaching consequences, the plan will solve all of those “alt causes”. There is a lot of area for expansion in this advantage, as there is a lot of literature on why US-Mexico relations are good. Sample Plan Texts: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement with Mexico to facilitate improved efficiency and reduced congestion along the U.S.-Mexico border. The United States federal government should facilitate improved efficiency and reduced congestion at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border. The United States federal government should substantially improve ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border. The United States federal government should substantially increase its United States-Mexico border infrastructure in the United States. The United States federal government should substantially invest in infrastructure and staffing at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border. 78 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (1/11) U.S.-Mexican trade is set to increase, but border infrastructure isn’t keeping up — the plan reduces congestion and saves the manufacturing sector Wilson and Lee 12 — Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. He is the author of Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico (Wilson Center, 2011), and an editor and author of the Institute’s forthcoming State of the Border Report, and Erik Lee, serves as Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University (Christopher E. Wilson, Erik Lee, Site Selection, July 2012, “Whole Nations Waiting”, http://www.siteselection.com/issues/2012/jul/us-mex-border.cfm) Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great — yet underappreciated — success stories of the global economy. In 2011 U.S.-Mexico goods and services trade reached the major milestone of one-half trillion dollars with virtually no recognition. The United States is Mexico's top trading partner, and Mexico — which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class over the last two decades — is the United States' second largest export market and third largest trading partner. Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border via trucks, meaning the border region is literally where "the rubber hits the road" for bilateral relations . This also means that not only California and Baja California, but also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and secure border management. The quantity of U.S.-Mexico trade is impressive, but its quality makes it unique. The United States and Mexico do not just sell goods to one another, they actually work together to manufacture them. Through production sharing, materials and parts often cross back and forth between factories on each side of the border as a final product is made and assembled. As a result, U.S. imports from Mexico contain, on average, 40 percent U.S. content, and Mexico's imports from the U.S. also have a high level of Mexican content. This system of joint production has two important consequences. First, it means that our economies are profoundly linked. We tend to experience growth and recession together, and productivity gains or losses on one side of the border generally cause a corresponding gain or loss in competitiveness on the other side as well. Second, the fact that goods often cross the border several times as they are being produced creates a multiplier effect for gains and losses in border efficiency. Whereas goods from China only go through customs and inspection once as they enter the U.S. or Mexico, products built by regional manufacturers bear the costs of long and unpredictable border wait times and significant customs requirements each time they cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Corridors in Crisis This trade relationship requires major infrastructure to function effectively . The largest trade corridor, often referred to as the NASCO corridor, links central and eastern Mexico to Texas, the American Midwest, Northeast, and Ontario, utilizing the key Laredo-Nuevo Laredo ports of entry (POEs). Other important trade arteries include the CANAMEX Corridor, which connects western Mexico to the intermountain United States and Canadian province of Alberta, as well as the shorter but high-volume I-5 corridor connecting California to Baja California. As the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico grow, it is likely that this network of freight transportation infrastructure — and the land POEs that serve as nodes in this network — will experience added stress. Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of bilateral trade 79 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (2/11) <<<CONTINUED --- NO TEXT REMOVED>>> or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time. The integrated nature of the North American manufacturing sector makes eliminating border congestion an important way to enhance regional competitiveness . The global economic crisis forced manufacturers to look for ways to cut costs. After taking into consideration factors such as rising fuel costs, increasing wages in China and the ability to automate an ever greater portion of the production process, many American companies decided to nearshore factories to Mexico or reshore them to the United States, taking advantage of strong human capital and shorter supply chains. Bilateral trade dropped significantly during the recession but has since rebounded strongly, growing significantly faster than trade with China. But the growth of trade continues to add pressure on the already strained POEs and transportation corridors . Several studies have attempted to quantify the costs of border area congestion to the economies of the United States and Mexico. In what is perhaps a testimony to the fragmented and geographically disperse nature of the border region, most of these studies have focused on particular North-South corridors of traffic and trade rather than taking a comprehensive, border-wide approach. The specific results of the studies (see table on p. 108) are quite varied. Nonetheless, one message comes through quite clearly — long and unpredictable wait times at the POEs are costing the United States and Mexican economies many billions of dollars each year. Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less, improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs (i.e. the Global Entry programs, which includes programs such as SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments expedited passage across the border. Common Voice Improving these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could increase throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing — all while strengthening security by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments. The development of the 21st Century Border initiative by the Obama and Calderón administrations has yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled . The 1990s were the decade of NAFTA and skyrocketing trade. The 2000s saw security concerns grow and recession struck. The new decade has only just begun, but the potential is there for a resurgence of competitiveness and regional integration . There are strong ideas — including trusted traveler and shipper programs, preclearance, customs harmonization, and public-private partnerships — that have enormous potential. The challenge is now for heterogeneous and geographically dispersed border communities to find a way to speak with a common voice, for policymakers in Washington and Mexico City to guide strategic planning for regional competitiveness, and for all stakeholders to engage vigorously in binational dialogue and cooperation. 80 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (3/11) Border delays threaten production shut-downs — the plan solves by reducing transportation costs and shipping times Wilson 13 — Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. He is the author of Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico, an editor and author of the Institute’s forthcoming State of the Border Report (Christopher E. Wilson, Wilson Center — Mexico Institute, January 2013, “New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_ideas_us_mexico_relations.pdf) At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the U nited States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context, or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term. Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be. The United States and Mexico have become profoundly integrated, and the two countries are now partners, rather than competitors, in the global economy. The North American Free Trade Agreement, geographic proximity, and the complementary nature of the two economies have fostered an integrated manufacturing platform . The United States and Mexico do not only trade finished products; they build them together. Indeed, roughly 40 percent of all content in Mexican exports to the United States originates in the United States, much more than the comparable figures with China, Brazil, and India, at four, three, and two percent respectively. Only improvements in productivity in either country, as well as advances that lower the costs of moving goods across the border (i.e.: long wait times, inefficient customs procedures), strengthen the competitiveness of manufacturers throughout the whole region. While manufacturing wages in China were four times less than Mexico in 2000, they are now nearly equal and are expected to be 25 percent Canada, at 25 percent, is similar. As a result, higher than Mexican labor costs by 2015.1 The simple math of wage differentials drove the past decade’s movement of factories from the U.S. and Mexico to China, but companies are taking an increasingly holistic approach in deciding where to locate factories, considering transportation costs and shipping times ; exchange rate and political risks; language, culture, and time zone differences; contract and intellectual property law enforcement; security; production flexibility; the supply and cost of materials and energy; and the availability of skilled and educated workers. In most of these categories, Mexico is gaining ground or maintains a distinct advantage over other regions of the world, particularly in terms of serving markets throughout the Americas. For example, between 2007 and December 2012, the value of the Mexican Peso fell by 17 percent compared to the U.S. Dollar and by a full 33 percent compared to the Chinese Yuan, improving the competitiveness of regional exports vis-à-vis Chinese goods.2 Crude oil prices rose 231 percent between 2002 and 2012, thus raising shipping costs and incentivizing the use of shorter, regional rather than longer, transcontinental supply chains.3 New drilling techniques, however, are changing the outlook for oil and especially natural gas, opening access to new reserves, increasing production, and therefore lowering some energy costs. While this may eventually lower long range shipping costs, the more immediate effect is proving to be a major decline in natural gas prices, which has already lowered electricity costs in some parts of the United States and has the potential to do so throughout both the region. Such a decline in prices provides a major boost to energy intensive industries, such as steel, and petrochemical producers. The United States is on the forefront of the technological advances in the energy industry and stands to gain the most from them, but Mexico could reap the benefits as well should it either reform its energy industry to take advantage of its significant shale gas reserves or develop the pipeline infrastructure to support increased gas imports from the United States. Technological advances and improvements in the manufacturing process and logistics are revolutionizing industrial production in ways that significantly change cost structures, further incentivizing those that had offshored to China to consider near-shoring in Mexico or re-shoring their production back to the United States. Robots and the high-tech sensors that allow them to function with precision are allowing many of the simple, repetitive jobs that 81 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (4/11) <<<CONTINUED --- NO TEXT REMOVED>>> traditionally made up factory work obsolete. The need for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers is on the decline, and the need for high skilled technicians who can program and maintain the complex machines and robots of today’s factories is on the rise. As a result, labor costs are a shrinking portion of total production costs, as evidenced by a recent study that found only 5.3% of the price of an iPhone goes to offshore manufacturing wages.4 This shift opens an opportunity for advanced economies like the U.S. to recoup some of their share of global manufacturing , especially if the complementary nature of high-tech design and production in the U.S. is complemented with lower cost manufacturing in Mexico for the portions of production that still require a higher degree of manual labor. The widespread implementation of lean manufacturing principl/es has improved the efficiency and agility of factories around the world. One important area in which fat has been cut from the manufacturing process is in warehousing. Just-in-time supply chain management has minimized the costly storage of parts and products, thus fueling the trend of regionalization in manufacturing by increasing the importance of a robust network of nearby suppliers. It is also greatly increasing the need for short and predictable wait times at the U.S. land borders since an unexpected delay has the potential to shut down production until the needed parts arrive at their destination. 82 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (5/11) Modernizing border infrastructure solves — safeguards competitiveness, bolsters manufacturing, and supports 6 million U.S. jobs NAFTA Works 13 — a monthly newsletter on NAFTA and related issues (NAFTA Works, Volume 18, Issue 4, April 2013, “Border Infrastructure's Key Role in Expanding U.S.-Mexico Trade”, http://www.naftamexico.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/apr13.pdf) Very few countries in the world have the potential to shape the United States’ manufacturing competitiveness as much as Mexico. It is difficult to overstate the critical importance of this strategic partnership, as trade between both countries reached roughly half a trillion dollars in 2012, maintaining Mexico’s status as the U.S.’ third largest trading partner and its second largest export market as it purchased nearly 1/8 of all U.S. exports. The increased usage of cross-border production lines has resulted in a very unique trading partnership, where working to establish a trade facilitating border infrastructure is now crucial to successfully competing in the global market . In order to understand the true strength of this partnership, a new approach that incorporates the relevance of foreign value-added in exports is required. Consequently, one of the most distinctive factors of U.S.-Mexico trade lies in its qualitative nature. Working together to co-manufacture products entails an intensive intra-industry trade of inputs rather than exclusively trading in finished products, helping to support the 6 million U.S. jobs that depend on trade with Mexico. As a result of this highly integrated production process, on average, 40% of all content in Mexican exports to the U.S. actually originates in the United States. As 82%, or $404 billion, of bilateral trade was carried across the border via surface transportation in 2012, improving the efficiency of trade flows at the U.S. southern Ports of Entry (POE) is imperative to safeguarding a regional competitive edge . Last year, over 44 million tons of food, inputs, components, and finished products crossed by land from Mexico into the U.S. to supply manufacturing plants and supermarkets alike. Far from exclusively benefiting the four Southern U.S. states bordering Mexico, a total of twenty-nine U.S. states had exports to Mexico in excess of $1 billion in 2012, making this one of the most economically significant borders in the world. Additionally, some twenty-three U.S. states depended on Mexico as their No. 1 and No. 2 largest export market in 2012, with states as far north as Michigan exporting over $10 billion. This illustrates that even states’ local economies that are far from the southern border are also major stakeholders when it comes to building a seamless, long haul border infrastructure that is capable of minimizing cross-border business costs. Of the 26 POEs along the southern border that collectively handled more than $1.3 billion in bilateral trade each day in 2012 - virtually all of it tariff free - the largest by far is the Port of Laredo in Texas. This critical POE facilitated more than 3.5 million cross-border commercial truck shipments, and over 500 thousand rail-boxes via railway in both directions, carrying more than $163 billion in goods in 2012 or 35% of all bilateral trade. Considering that forty U.S. states spread across the country use Laredo as their primary POE, this port could truly be considered the U.S.’ main artery for bilateral trade with Mexico. Last year alone, more than $76 billion in U.S. exports to Mexico and $86 billion in imported Mexican goods went through the Laredo POE. Another strategic POE is El Paso, which had 13% of all U.S.- Mexico trade pass through in 2012. With over $66 billion in goods being traded here, it is the second busiest port for bilateral trade. As an example of its relevance, El Paso is the second largest POE for U.S. electrical machinery exports to Mexico, as it was responsible for the timely crossing of 26% of this vital industry’s exports. Along the western side of the border, Otay Mesa is the U.S.’ third largest POE for bilateral trade with Mexico, which had more than $35 billion of goods move through this facility in 2012. An astonishing 99% of trade between California and Mexico is conducted by trucks, therefore ensuring that the state’s busiest commercial truck crossing operates at maximum efficiency is critically important. In order to enhance and also secure regional competitiveness, the strength of both countries’ industrial capabilities lies in the joint effort to minimize the logistical costs placed on regional manufactures. By expanding and modernizing the current border infrastructure, both countries promote a world-class logistical capability that improves border wait times, customs procedures, and trusted traveler or shipper programs. As a result, both countries are working together through the 21st Century Border Initiative to address shared challenges. Progress has been achieved over the past three years that has helped to facilitate the secure and efficient flow of goods and people along the border. Three new international bridges, one in Arizona and the other two in Texas, were constructed to support this growing demand. Becoming operational in 2009, the Anzalduas International Bridge in Texas was the first new bridge to be built in over a decade, during which bilateral trade grew by 76%. 83 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (6/11) Scenario One: Innovation Strengthening the domestic manufacturing maintains U.S. technological innovation and superiority Ettlinger and Gordon 11 (Michael Ettlinger, Vice President for Economic Policy at American Progress, Kate Gordon, Senior Fellow at American Progress, “The Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing,” April, http://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf) Beyond innovation and competitiveness, basing manufacturing in the United States also is important to our overall national and economic security. The most clear-cut example of this, of course, is the importance of being able to produce for the needs of our armed forces. The importance of domestic capabilities in defense manufacturing is obvious—one doesn’t want to be dependent on foreign suppliers in a time of conflict. Equally obvious is the importance of keeping innovations in military technology close to home. That underlies overall U.S. military and economic primacy Segal 04 (Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Is America Losing Its Edge,” Foreign Affairs, November 2004 - December 2004, Pg. 2 Vol. 83 No. 6, Technology Enterprises in China) The United States' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop new technologies and industries faster than anyone else. For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and technological entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity and military power. It was Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead.¶ Today, however, this technological edge-so long taken for granted-may be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (R&D), and preferential policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations. The percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the second-largest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around the world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing.¶ Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system . Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological innovation and a significant threat to it. The United States will never be able to prevent rivals from developing new technologies; it can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the United States must get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at home. 84 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (7/11) Absent effective US hegemony global wars will ensue Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7– 51) A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races , nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely toobtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which regional in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including 85 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (8/11) <<<CONTINUED --- NO TEXT REMOVED>>> regional great power war ). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states —all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however,such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclearpowers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence ofa hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties deterrence, and active management, the dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85 86 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (9/11) Scenario Two: Re-shoring Increasing border efficiency reduces production costs and facilitates re-shoring Wilson 13 — Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. He is the author of Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico (Wilson Center, 2011), and an editor and author of the Institute’s forthcoming State of the Border Report (Christopher E. Wilson, Wilson Center — Mexico Institute, January 2013, “New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_ideas_us_mexico_relations.pdf) Driven by a series of global developments and technological advances, a manufacturing renaissance is taking hold in the United States and Mexico that is increasing the competitiveness of regional industry and the volume of U.S.-Mexico trade. After many companies moved their factories to Asia in search of cheap wages over the past two decades, new trends are pulling production facilities back to North America . While manufacturing wages in China were four times less than Mexico in 2000, they are now nearly equal and are expected to be 25 percent higher than Mexican labor costs by 2015.1 The simple math of wage differentials drove the past decade’s movement of factories from the U.S. and Mexico to China, but companies are taking an increasingly holistic approach in deciding where to locate factories, considering transportation costs and shipping times ; exchange rate and political risks; language, culture, and time zone differences; contract and intellectual property law enforcement; security; production flexibility; the supply and cost of materials and energy; and the availability of skilled and educated workers. In most of these categories, Mexico is gaining ground or maintains a distinct advantage over other regions of the world, particularly in terms of serving markets throughout the Americas. For example, between 2007 and December 2012, the value of the Mexican Peso fell by 17 percent compared to the U.S. Dollar and by a full 33 percent compared to the Chinese Yuan, improving the competitiveness of regional exports vis-à-vis Chinese goods.2 Crude oil prices rose 231 percent between 2002 and 2012, thus raising shipping costs and incentivizing the use of shorter, regional rather than longer, transcontinental supply chains.3 New drilling techniques, however, are changing the outlook for oil and especially natural gas, opening access to new reserves, increasing production, and therefore lowering some energy costs. While this may eventually lower long-range shipping costs, the more immediate effect is proving to be a major decline in natural gas prices, which has already lowered electricity costs in some parts of the United States and has the potential to do so throughout both the region. Such a decline in prices provides a major boost to energy intensive industries, such as steel, and petrochemical producers. The United States is on the forefront of the technological advances in the energy industry and stands to gain the most from them, but Mexico could reap the benefits as well should it either reform its energy industry to take advantage of its significant shale gas reserves or develop the improvements in the manufacturing process and logistics are revolutionizing industrial production in ways that significantly change cost structures, further incentivizing those that had offshored to China to consider near-shoring in Mexico or re-shoring their production back to the United States . pipeline infrastructure to support increased gas imports from the United States. Technological advances and Robots and the high-tech sensors that allow them to function with precision are allowing many of the simple, repetitive jobs that traditionally made up factory work obsolete. The need for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers is on the decline, and the need for high skilled technicians who can program and maintain the complex machines and robots of today’s factories is on the rise. As a result, labor costs are a shrinking portion of total production costs, as evidenced by a recent study that found only 5.3% of the price of an iPhone goes to offshore manufacturing wages.4 This shift opens an opportunity for advanced economies like the U.S. to recoup some of their share of global manufacturing, especially if the complementary nature of high-tech design and production in the U.S. is complemented with lower cost manufacturing in Mexico for the portions of production that still require a higher degree of manual labor. The widespread implementation of lean manufacturing principles has improved the efficiency and agility of factories around the world. Just-in-time supply chain management has minimized the costly storage of parts and products, thus fueling the trend of regionalization in manufacturing by increasing the importance of a robust network of nearby suppliers . It is also greatly increasing the need for short and predictable wait times at the U.S. land borders since an unexpected delay has the potential to shut down production until the needed parts arrive at their destination. One important area in which fat has been cut from the manufacturing process is in warehousing. 87 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (10/11) North American near-shoring focuses Chinese manufacturing on the domestic market and growing Asian economies Sirkin et al. 11 — Harold L. Sirkin, senior partner and managing director in the Chicago office of The Boston Consulting Group and the author of GLOBALITY: Competing with Everyone from Everywhere for Everything, and Michael Zinser, partner and managing director in the firm’s Chicago office, and Douglas Hohner, partner and managing director in BCG’s Chicago office (Harold L. Sirkin, Michael Zinser, Douglas Hohner, The Boston Consulting Group, “Made in America, Again: Why Manufacturing Will Return to the U.S.”, August 2011, http://www.bcg.com/documents/file84471.pdf) The reallocation of production is still in its early stages , but we believe it will accelerate in the years ahead. The impact of the changing cost equation will vary from industry to industry. Products in which labor accounts for a small portion of total costs and in which volumes are modest, such as auto parts, construction equipment, and appliances, will be among those that companies reevaluate in terms of their options for supplying the North American market. But the manufacture of goods with relatively higher labor content that are produced in high volumes will likely remain in China. Finally, companies that make mass-produced, labor-intensive products, like apparel and shoes, may move production from China to other low-cost nations. (We will assess the implications of the new manufacturing math for specific industries in the second report in this series.) These trends do not suggest that Chinese manufacturing will decline or that multinational companies will shut their mainland plants. More Chinese production capacity will be devoted to supplying the country’s enormous domestic market, which is gaining millions of new middle-class households each year, as well as other growing economies in Asia . In addition, China will continue to remain a low-cost supplier to Western Europe. And China will remain competitive in industries that have developed strong “clusters of excellence” and that have an immense installed base of production capacity and component and material suppliers. This means that when it comes to building new production capacity, companies will likely choose to explore alternatives instead of automatically opting for China. Over the next five years, we believe that the U.S. will be the optimal choice for many manufacturing investments aimed at serving the North American market. 88 1AC – Manufacturing Adv (11/11) That causes great power war Auslin 09 (Michael, resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute, “Averting Disaster Preventing the worst case scenario in Asia,” February 5, 2009) AS THEY DEAL WITH a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saberrattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past. 89 2AC – Extension – Infrastructure Key Cross-border supply chains are at risk and collapse stalls the manufacturing sector – an integrated, coherent transportation infrastructure strategy is key Blank et al. 07 (Stephen, North American Center for transborder Studies, ASU, with Stephanie Golob, Department of Political Science, Baruch College, and Guy Stanley, Desautels Faculty of Management, McGills University, http://www.gatewaycorridor.com/roundconfpapers/documents/Blank_Golob_Stanley_Winnipeg.pdf, “A North American Transportation Infrastructure Strategy,”) The ability of North American firms to build complex, cross-border supply chains may be at risk Professor Mary Brooks, a transportation specialist at Dalhousie University, warns of danger that the deepening integration of the North American manufacturing sector will stall . Rising security concerns, increased border delay and a wide array of infrastructure problems have “damaged the credibility of the just-in-time system. The result has been to boost buffer stocks, and force just-intime supply chain managers to re-examine their sourcing options…”28 Inadequate transportation infrastructure also limits development in poorer North American regions and intensifies regional differences in standards of living. The problems of Mexico’s physical infrastructure, particularly in the south, and how this hinders economic progress are well known. A recent report issued by the American Chamber Mexico’s International Trade Committee notes that “Mexico stands at a crossroads. It can either take full advantage of its strategic geographic location to become an advanced manufacturing platform or it can continue down the road of a low wage, low value added assembly economy. An efficient and secure transportation system will act as a catalyst to help Mexico shift towards an advanced manufacturing platform. The result will be greater prosperity for Mexican citizens and an increased competitiveness for the entire NAFTA region.”29 Similar problems affect Canadian and US regions as well – in particular, Canada’s Atlantic Provinces which along with northern New England are in danger of being left as a “geographic backwater” in the new North American economic system.30 There is still time to head off this storm. There are some encouraging signs that governments are listening. In the past year, the leaders of the three NAFTA nations created significant new programs to enhance North American productivity and competitiveness – the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America and the few concrete steps have been taken to meet this goal. No vehicle exists to support an on-going dialogue with transportation stakeholders. There is no suggestion of the need to create an integrated and coherent North American transportation strategy or of how the intellectual resources found in transportation institutes, North American Competitiveness Council – that underline the need to improve transportation efficiency. Yet university transportation/supply chain management/ logistics departments, and other think tanks might be mobilized to participate in this process. Uncoordinated or stand-alone initiatives pursued by individual stakeholders can have limited effectiveness at best in this environment. We need to think now about a transportation strategy for North America. 90 2AC – Extension – Integration Key Effective production sharing is key --- solves competitiveness, manufacturing, trade, and employment Manzella, 03 (John, world-recognized author and speaker on global trends, international business, China, and today's economic realities, is editor-in-chief of The Manzella Report and president of Manzella Trade Communications, a strategic communications and public affairs firm, 6/1, http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/manufacturing/197-production-sharingoffers-benefits-opportunities-and-challenges, “Production Sharing Offers Benefits, Opportunities and Challenges,”) In today's dynamic global environment, companies often need to implement new strategies to remain competitive. For many manufacturers, production sharing is part of the answer . Also referred to as co-production, cross-border manufacturing and outward processing, production sharing occurs when producers in different countries share in the manufacturing of a product. For example, a Detroit auto parts manufacturer may team up with a Mexican company to produce high quality and competitively priced products. Production Sharing Benefits Are Vast Crossborder manufacturing allows companies to: Complement each others’ strengths in order to create greater value; Gain access to unique technology , raw materials, and specialized intermediate inputs; Reduce overall costs ; Provide an important market for a company's component exports ; Retain higher wage jobs , product development and design, capital-intensive manufacturing, and marketing-related activities in the United States; and sometimes Provide the only means to keep companies in business. Cross-Border Manufacturing Is Growing Worldwide Production sharing is not unique to the United States. For example, companies in Japan, Korea and Taiwan primarily co-produce in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines with a focus on computer hardware, telecommunications equipment, electronic components and appliances. In the European Union (EU), most co-production involves apparel, auto parts and electronic products and occurs mainly in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia — countries with inexpensive but well-educated labor forces. A growing share of EU co-production also is taking place in Northern Africa. How big is production sharing? According to The World Bank, production sharing involves more than $800 billion or 30% of total manufacturing trade annually. U.S. Tariff Code 9802 U.S. exports of components are co-produced abroad and often re-imported by the U.S. as finished goods. In most cases, these imports are entered into the United States under section 9802 of the U.S. tariff code. Under 9802, U.S. materials assembled, processed or improved abroad can be shipped back to the United States, incurring duty only on the foreign labor and non-U.S.-made materials. As a result, these imports — which often contain substantial U.S. content — can be more price competitive than other imports with no U.S. content. Outward Processing Advanced in the Auto Industry Revolutionary technologies combined with production sharing have transformed the U.S. manufacturing industry. As such, levels of productivity and competitiveness during the 1990s increased significantly. The U.S. auto industry is no exception . As global competition continues to increase, production sharing is one strategy employed by U.S. and foreign auto producers to stay ahead of the curve. This may involve, for example, the capital, technology and engineering skill of a U.S. producers with precision assembly provided by a Chinese partner. The result: an attractive top quality product. In 2002, U.S. imports under 9802 of automobiles, trucks, buses, bodies, and chassis from Japan reached $18.6 billion. Germany followed with $9.3 billion; the U.K., $1.8 billion; Sweden, $1.8 billion; and South Korea with $1.5 billion. North American Auto Industry Is Highly Integrated Since vehicles assembled in Canada and Mexico are eligible for U.S. duty-free treatment under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), only a small percent enters the U.S. imports of automobiles, trucks, buses, bodies, and chassis from Mexico and Canada under 9802 were $618 million and under the 9802 tariff code. For example, according to the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), in 2002, U.S. $36 million, respectively. However, in 2002, co-produced U.S. imports of motor vehicles from Mexico not entered under 9802 are estimated at $19.5 billion. Co-production data from Canada outside 9802 is not available. How Important Is Production Sharing? In the late 1980s, the ITC conducted a survey of 900 U.S. firms that co-produced utilizing Chapter 98. When asked what they would do if this Customs provision was eliminated, the firms said they would: Turn to foreign suppliers of components; Drop labor-intensive products and import them from East Asia; Move all manufacturing to Asia; Cut back U.S. production and target a market niche not threatened by imports; or Go out of business. Since then, production sharing has become vastly more important to U.S. companies and workers. According to the ITC, it has been responsible for generating new jobs and retaining those that would have been lost due to intense foreign competition. 91 2AC – Extension – Innovation Internal Link A strong manufacturing base spills over to advanced R&D and innovation Lind and Freedman 12 — Michael Lind, policy director of New America’s Economic Growth Program and a co-founder of the New America Foundation, and Joshua Freedman, program associate in New America’s Economic Growth Program (Michael Lind, Joshua Freedman, New America Foundation, April 2012, “Value Added: America’s Manufacturing Future”, http://growth.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Lind,%20Michael%20an d%20Freedman,%20Joshua%20-%20NAF%20%20Value%20Added%20America%27s%20Manufacturing%20Future.pdf, Accessed 07-192013) Perhaps the greatest contribution of manufacturing to the U.S. economy as a whole involves the disproportionate role of the manufacturing sector in R&D. The expansion in the global market for high-value-added services has allowed the U.S. to play to its strengths by expanding its trade surplus in services, many of them linked to manufacturing, including R&D, engineering, software production and finance. Of these services, by far the most important is R&D. The United States has long led the world in R&D. In 1981, U.S. gross domestic expenditure on R&D was more than three times as large as that of any other country in the world. And the U.S. still leads: in 2009, the most recent year for which there is available data, the United States spent more than 400 billion dollars. European countries spent just under 300 billion dollars combined, while China spent about 150 billion dollars.14 In the United States, private sector manufacturing is the largest source of R&D. The private sector itself the manufacturing sector accounts for 70 percent of all R&D spending by the private sector in the U.S.15 And R&D and innovation are inextricably connected : a National Science Foundation survey found that 22 accounts for 71 percent of total R&D in the United States, and although U.S. manufacturing accounts for only 11.7 percent of GDP in 2012, percent of manufacturers had introduced product innovations and the same percentage introduced process innovations in the period 2006-2008, while only 8 percent of non-manufacturers reported innovations of either kind.16 Even as the manufacturing industry in the United States underwent major A disproportionate share of workers involved in R&D are employed directly or indirectly by manufacturing companies; for example, the US manufacturing sector employs more than a third of U.S. engineers.17 This means that manufacturing provides much of the demand for the U.S. innovation ecosystem, supporting large numbers of scientists and engineers who might not find employment if R&D were offshored along with production. Why America Needs the Industrial Commons Manufacturing creates an industrial commons, which spurs growth in multiple sectors of the economy through linked industries. An “industrial commons” is a base of shared physical facilities and intangible changes and suffered severe job losses during the last decade, R&D spending continued to follow a general upward growth path. knowledge shared by a number of firms. The term “commons” comes from communally-shared pastures or fields in premodern Britain. The industrial commons in particular in the manufacturing sector includes not only large companies but also small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 41 percent of the American manufacturing workforce and account for 86 percent of all manufacturing establishments in the U.S. Suppliers of materials, component parts, tools, and more are all interconnected; most of the time, Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih point out, these linkages are geographic because of the ease of interaction and knowledge transfer between firms.18 Examples of industrial commons surrounding manufacturing are evident in the United States, including the I-85 corridor from Alabama to Virginia and upstate New York.19 Modern economic scholarship emphasizes the importance of geographic agglomeration effects and co-location synergies.20 Manufacturers and researchers alike have long noted the symbiotic relationship that occurs when manufacturing and R&D are located near each other: the manufacturer benefits from the innovation, and the researchers are better positioned to understand where innovation can be found and to test new ideas. While some forms of knowledge can be easily recorded and transferred, much “know-how” in industry is tacit knowledge. This valuable tacit knowledge base can be damaged or destroyed by the erosion of geographic linkages, which in turn shrinks the pool of scientists and engineers in the national innovation ecosystem. If an advanced manufacturing core is not retained, then the economy stands to lose not only the manufacturing industry itself but also the geographic synergies of the industrial commons, including R&D. Some have warned that this is already the case: a growing share of R&D by U.S. multinational corporations is taking place outside of the United States.21 In particular, a number of large U.S. manufacturers have opened up or expanded R&D facilities in China over the last few years.22 92 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (1/6) Bilateral border investments are crucial to U.S.-Mexico relations. Baker Institute 9 — The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University—a nonpartisan public policy think tank, 2009 (“Developing the U.S.-Mexico Border Region for a Prosperous and Secure Relationship,” Baker Institute Policy Report, Number 38, April, Available Online at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/LAI-pub-BorderSecPREnglish041509.pdf) The relationship between the United States and Mexico has historically been a strong one, but internal politics in both countries today are preventing a potentially closer and more productive alliance. Problems at the border loom large in the political calculation of decision makers both in Washington, D.C., and Mexico City. Daily news reports seem to imply that problems developing at the border stand to derail common goals. However, it is our contention that the exact opposite is true. Creative localized solutions to the challenging set of issues that surround the U.S.–Mexico border could hold the key to building a stronger overall bilateral partnership and constructive joint future, rather than serve as the flashpoint for tensions between the two neighbors. Both Mexican President Felipe Calderón and U.S. President Barack Obama have a unique opportunity in the next four years to advance common goals such as economic prosperity and security. This report on the U.S.–Mexico border aims to aid policymakers in forging stronger and sustainable U.S.–Mexico bilateral relations with the use of more coordinated approaches to border issues . Sponsored by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston, Texas, this study investigates the important role of border institutions, civil society, cross-border transnational populations, and localized, small-scale problem-solving as a first defense against the deteriorating conditions at the border—be they humanitarian, economic, or security-related. By better understanding life along each side of the U.S.–Mexico border, we hope to demonstrate the great potential of this vibrant region to play a positive role in both the U.S. and Mexican economies and intertwined transnational communities. Rather than represent a zero-sum unilateral dilemma, the border can be a stepping stone toward a lasting friendship between the United States and Mexico, and positively influence citizens on both sides of the boundary. The border should be where one can best see the benefits for the two countries of collaborating and cooperating on issues of major concern. Instead, the border is increasingly becoming an area of tension, conflict, and unilateral policies and actions that are more likely to hinder, rather than promote, common goals. 93 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (2/6) Infrastructure investment rebalances the relationship — overcomes alternate causalities Selee and Wilson 12 — Andrew Selee, Vice President for Programs and Senior Adviser for the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Adjunct Professor of Government at Johns Hopkins University and of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Visiting Professor at El Colegio de Mexico, holds a Ph.D. in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland, an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California-San Diego, and a B.A. in Latin American Studies from Washington University in St. Louis, and Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, previously served as a Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and as a researcher at American University’s Center for North American Studies, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University, 2012 (“Getting ready for a new era in U.S.Mexico ties,” Global Public Square—Fareed Zakaria’s CNN blog, December 3rd, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/03/Getting-Ready-for-a-New-Era-in-U-SMexico-Ties/) U.S.-Mexico relations have been dominated for the past six years by efforts to address drug trafficking and organized crime-related violence. This was the right thing to do while violence spiked in Mexico, but with a new administration in office after the swearing in of President Enrique Peña Nieto over the weekend, the time has come to rebalance the bilateral relationship . Ties tend to have the same top three items on the agenda year after year and administration after administration: immigration; drugs and violence; and trade and economic relations. Drugs and violence have dominated in recent years, and cooperation in addressing the transnational flows of drugs, arms and illicit money, as well as support for Mexico’s efforts to strengthen public security, must continue. Although the gains are still tenuous and the situation fluid, violence in Mexico does appear to have begun to decline at a national level and major advances have been made in key border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez. Immigration dominated the early 2000's as presidents Bush and Fox sought a bilateral deal on the topic, but it has since become clear that immigration reform is first and foremost a domestic political issue in the United States. The rate of unauthorized immigration from Mexico has now dropped to historically low levels – there are at least as many leaving as arriving – which should allow for a more rational and reasoned debate on this issue in the United States. However, not since the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA in the 1990s have economic relations topped the bilateral agenda. Trade and jobs should once again top the U.S. agenda with Mexico for three main reasons. First, the economy most likely will be the top issue in both the United States and Mexico for the next several years. Economic issues were clearly the top issue for voters in the recent U.S. presidential elections, and in Mexico they matched public security as the top set of concerns. Second, by focusing on the creation of jobs and improving the competitiveness of manufacturers on both sides of the border, we can improve the tone of the relationship. We may even find that the stickier issues of security and migration become a little less intractable. Finally, the economic agenda between the two countries has the potential to yield tangible results, creating jobs and improving the competitive position of North America vis-a-vis Asia. For years, Mexico has oriented its economy toward the U.S. in hopes of harnessing the growth of the world’s most dynamic economy. Now, at a time when Mexico is growing around four percent a year – faster than the United States – Mexico can return the favor and provide a boost to the U.S. economy. Meanwhile, Mexico’s large and growing middle class has become an increasingly important market for U.S. products. As it turns out, U.S. and Mexican companies do not simply sell products to one another, they build products together, with parts zigzagging back and forth across the border as goods are manufactured. As a result, a product imported from Mexico is, on average, made of 40 percent U.S. parts and materials, meaning forty cents of every dollar spent of Mexican imports stays right here in the United States. Chinese products, in contrast, contain just four percent U.S. content. 94 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (4/6) <<<CONTINUED --- NO TEXT REMOVED>>> This also means the competitiveness of our two countries is closely linked, and improvements in productivity in one nation make a co-manufactured product cheaper and more competitive on the global market. That is to say, growth in Mexico or the United States will boost exports from both countries: when it comes to manufacturing, we are in it together. To produce results, the U.S.-Mexico economic agenda needs substance, and there is plenty to do . To start out, we must make the southwest border more efficient without sacrificing security. Today, long and unpredictable wait times act as a type of border tax, cutting away at manufacturers’ competitiveness a bit more each time they send goods across the border. Since we manufacture and export together, the United States should also join forces with Mexico and Canada in designing and implementing a global trade strategy. The first step is robust cooperation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, but the end goal must be to expand the agreement until countries like China and India feel they will lose out if they do not join in. The countries could also tackle ways of making customs procedures more efficient, ensuring regulatory frameworks are compatible, and integrating our transportation and logistics networks to keep up with regional manufacturers, who have already integrated production. In the end, it is a matter of perspective. If Mexico is seen more as a business partner than a source of intractable problems, a whole range of policy options that were previously considered too risky to be tried will be within reach. If such a change in perception occurs, the results will speak for themselves. 95 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (4/6) Scenario one is Central American instability – Relations are key to Central American stability Selee and Wilson 12 [Andrew, Vice President for Programs and Senior Advisor to the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center, Christopher, associate with the Mexico Institute, “A New Agenda with Mexico,” Wilson Center, November 2012, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/a_new_agenda_with_mexico.pdf] As Mexico’s security crisis begins to recede, the two 3 A New Agenda with Mexico countries will also have to do far more to strengthen the governments of Central America, which now face a rising tide of violence as organized crime groups move southward. Mexico is also a U.S. ally in deterring terrorist threats and promoting robust democracy in the Western Hemisphere, and there will be numerous opportunities to strengthen the already active collaboration as growing economic opportunities reshape the region’s political and social landscape. Instability causes global war Rochlin 94 [James Francis, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College. “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America,” p. 130-131, 1994] While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 96 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (5/6) Scenario two is cyber-security – US-Mexico relations are key to solve cyber-security threats – engagement is key Downie 11 – Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University (Dr. Richard, deputy director and fellow with the CSIS Africa Program, master’s degree in international public policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Critical Strategic Decisions in Mexico: the Future of US/Mexican Defense Relations,” July 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/chds/docuploaded/Dr_Downie_OCP_2011.pdf) 2). Impact on US/Mexico Defense Relationship. The “stay the course” option would potentially offer an additional “sexenio” during which the US and Mexican militaries could expand and mature in the conduct of shared missions. If so, the growing relationship could potentially lead to a network or infrastructure of activities and agreements. Military forces from both countries would continue to exchange intelligence and sensitive information and share operational experiences while working toward a common purpose and objectives. Perhaps eventually, the United States and Mexico could engage in exercises as well as combined operations that would permit the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures that align their efforts not only in the fight against the TCOs, but also in other functional areas such as disaster or humanitarian relief operations, cooperative responses to terrorism, or proliferation of WMDs. Beyond mere confidencebuilding measures, this process could ideally lead to the establishment of protocols or standard operating procedures through which the forces of the two countries could operate in a common framework and ultimately achieve a level of functional interoperability. Although the US/Mexican defense relationship has advanced significantly in the past few years— certainly more quickly than any analyst would have predicted—the relationship is still not mature, stable, or consolidated. The strong US/Canada defense relationship offers a useful example of how military-to-military relations can mitigate the long-term impact of political decisions made on the basis of short-term disagreements between nations. The defense relationship with Canada, for example, involves a rich tradition of agreements and joint commissions, including a bi-national command, such as the US/Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense, established in 1948; the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), since 1945; and the North America Aerospace Defense Command, based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, which is literally a two-nation command. While cooperative US/Mexican military-to-military initiatives seem to increase almost monthly, there is a long way to go before the United States and Mexico can achieve the kind of mature defense partnership that characterizes the US/Canada relationship. The US/Mexico defense relationship is not yet at a point in which institutional factors can help mitigate political tensions between the two countries. Time is the key element in advancing toward a more institutionalized structure of bilateral or even trilateral cooperation. At a minimum, a sustained process is needed for the US and Mexican militaries to continually enhance their relationship in a manner that benefits both countries. Continuing on the present course would probably entail more and more intrusive U.S. cooperation, both for equipment and training of Mexican law enforcement personnel, as well as for intelligence and other tactical support. The lofty, ultimate goal of such a process from a US viewpoint could be the establishment of a bi-national or even tri-national command in Mexico, addressing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as protection of critical infrastructure intelligence sharing, cyber security, counterterrorism, and perhaps support for counter-TCO efforts. Ideally, this multinational security organization could be under the leadership of a Mexican military or civilian official.36 While international military organizations such as NATO or even NORAD could serve as models, even in the most optimistic of scenarios that level of US/Mexican, and potentially Canadian, cooperation would require many years—even decades—of sustained effort and interaction. As increasing numbers of Mexican military personnel work closely with their US counterparts for longer periods of time, there could be a corresponding reduction in the stigma and barriers to a closer US/Mexico defense relationship arising from our past history. 97 1AC – Mexico Relations Adv (6/6) Retaliation to cyber-attack escalates to global nuclear war Lawson 9 (Sean - assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Utah, Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict, , 5/13/2009, http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477 ) At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, “The Problem with Cyber War,” that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States. He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalation–i.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call “cross-domain responses” to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that “The best thing that you could possibly do if you want to start World War III is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about cyber war like it’s a practical thing, what they’re really doing is messing with the OK button for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k up.” [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversary’s ability to make rational decisions could backfire. [3] For example, Gregory Witol cautions that “attacking the decision maker’s ability to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolve… Removing the capacity for rational action may result in completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been.” [4] Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern. It’s not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary. What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that “kinetic attacks” (i.e. physical use of force) are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks. Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a nuclear response is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a “domain of warfare” equivalent to air, land, sea, and space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary. But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define “cyber attacks” (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war. But what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains? It retaliates. But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked. Rather, responses are typically “cross-domain responses”–i.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military “way of warfare” that emphasizes multidimensional, “joint” operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of “kinetic action” in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]: (U) Kinetic Actions. DOD will conduct kinetic missions to preserve freedom of action and strategic advantage in cyberspace. Kinetic actions can be either offensive or defensive and used in conjunction with other mission areas to achieve optimal military effects. Of course, the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in “cross-domain response.” And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. defense policy documents. From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): “The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical ‘weapons’. They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.” [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, “Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible. It also sets a relevant scale–a cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness.” [7] 98 2AC – Extension – AT: Relations Resilient Relations are complicated and depend on a multitude of issues Brzezinski 12 (Zbignew, former NSA advisor – 1977-81, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, CSIS scholar). Strategic Vision. http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/22143767/259139901/name/Strategic+Vision_+America+and+ the+Crisis+-+Zbigniew+Brzezinski.pdf In recent decades, America and Mexico have succeeded in constructing a predominantly positive relationship. However, their economic interdependence, their demographic interconnection due to years of high Mexican migration to the United States, and their shared security threat emanating from the cross-border narcotics trade makes relations between the two countries both more complex and also more vulnerable to the impact of international changes. Americans tend to take Mexico’s relative stability for granted, assuming it poses little direct threat to America’s strategic position and to the security of the entire Western Hemisphere. A significant deterioration in the US- Mexico relationship and its resulting consequences would thus come as a painful shock to the American public, generally not aware that the Mexican and American versions of their countries’ past relations tend to vary. 99 2AC – Extension – AT: Cyber Resilient A successful attack will destroy any resiliency Billo and Chang 04 (Charles and Welton, Senior Research Associate at ISTS and Research Intern at ISTS, “CYBER WARFARE AN ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS AND MOTIVATIONS OF SELECTED NATION STATES,” Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College, November) The conventional wisdom holds that the Internet backbone is resilient because of back-ups and redundancies. The track record so far suggests that engineering “work-arounds” in response to router problems are achievable using alternative nodes; however, the Internet today may not be as resilient as some experts believe because of the free market progression toward central network hubs that present a potentially lucrative target for hackers. One of the corollaries of this trend is increasing convergence in industrial countries such as the United States of IT, telecommunications, and links to embedded computer systems employed to control physical infrastructure. The degree of convergence has accelerated markedly in the past five to ten years. IT security experts at local and national levels are often unsure of the interconnections. On top of this, our adversaries no doubt are becoming more and more proficient in harnessing and improving hacking skills intended to identify flaws and loopholes in network and software security. IT dependence in the United States is evolving into a strategic center of gravity. This represents an inviting target to a potential adversary. While intrusions and hacks are not the exclusive province of large, hierarchical organizations, military and intelligence services possess an advantage over terrorist units for example in terms of resources, depth of personnel, and longer time-horizon reconnaissance and probes. 100 1AC – Solvency (1/2) Engagement with Mexico is needed to improve efficiency and reduce congestion at the border — the plan facilitates trade while boosting security Lee and Wilson 12 — Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University, former assistant director at the Center for U.S.Mexican Studies at the University of California-San Diego, holds an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California-San Diego, and Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, previously served as a Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and as a researcher at American University’s Center for North American Studies, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University, 2012 (“The State of Trade, Competitiveness and Economic Wellbeing in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” Working Paper of the Border Research Partnership—comprised of Arizona State University’s North American Center for Transborder Studies, the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, and the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, June, Available Online at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State_of_Border_Trade_Economy_0.pdf) Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great—yet underappreciated— success stories of the global economy. In fact, in 2011 U.S.-Mexico goods and services trade probably reached the major milestone of one-half trillion dollars with virtually no recognition.1 The United States is Mexico’s top trading partner, and Mexico—which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class over the last two decades—is the United States’ second largest export market and third largest trading partner. Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border via trucks, meaning the border region is literally where “the rubber hits the road” for bilateral relations. This also means that not only California and Baja California, but also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and secure border management. Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time. The development of the 21st Century Border initiative by the Obama and Calderón administrations has yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled. [end page 2] Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less, improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs (i.e. the Global Entry programs, which includes programs such as SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments expedited passage across the border. Improving these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could increase throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing—all while strengthening security by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments. 101 1AC – Solvency (2/2) A strong federal role is vital — ensures coordination, transportation planning, and cross-border management Wilson and Lee 13 — Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He develops the Institute’s research and programming on regional economic integration and U.S.-Mexico border affairs. He is the author of Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico (Wilson Center, 2011) Chris previously served as a Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and as a researcher for Dr. Robert Pastor at American University’s Center for North American Studies. In Mexico, he worked with the international trade consultancy IQOM, Inteligencia Comercial, and with American students studying regional political and social issues. Before joining the Wilson Center as Associate, Chris worked as a consultant with the Mexico Institute on U.S.-Mexico economic relations. He completed his M.A. in International Affairs at American University, focusing on U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-Mexico relations, and Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University. He is responsible for legislative research, policy analysis and coordination with numerous partners in the United States, Mexico and Canada on various collaborative initiatives related to trade, security and sustainability. He serves on the international advisory board for the journal Latin American Policy and on the advisory board for the Morrison Institute’s Latino Public Policy Center. He is also a member of the international steering committee of the International Metropolis Project based at Carleton University. (Christopher E. Wilson, Erik Lee, The State of The Border Report: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border, “CHAPTER 2: THE STATE OF TRADE, COMPETITIVENESS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING INTHE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER REGION”, May 2013, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/mexico_state_of_border.pdf) Managing the U.S.-Mexico border is made particularly difficult by the large number of federal, state, and local government entities that manage and protect the border and surrounding transportation infrastructure. While the State Department and Mexico’s Foreign Ministry manage most bilateral issues, in the case of the border they must work alongside a number of federal stakeholders, such as Commerce/Economía, DHS/Gobernación, DOT/SCT, and EPA/SEMARNAT, to name but a few. In light of border region complaints over the slowdown in crossborder commerce due to increased concerns regarding terrorism and drug-trafficking related violence, in 2010 the U.S. and Mexican governments reconfigured their interagency processes and created the bilateral Executive Steering Committee on 21st Century Border Management (ESC) in an effort to improve both interagency and binational coordination. Officials on both sides of the border cite the ESC as a major advance in federal-level coordination of border management . For the United States, the National Security Staff Interagency Policy Committee sits at the nexus of the new Executive Steering Committee and three major components, Infrastructure Planning, Port Operations, and Corridor Security. The increased involvement of the White House in border affairs reflects an understanding that only top-level leadership can manage the many departments and agencies with interests in the border. A key component of how the U.S.-Mexico border functions to facilitate trade has to do with transportation planning . In the absence of strong and coordinated planning, infrastructure investments on one side of the border or in one region can simply feed traffic into a bottleneck in another area . This process is largely managed by the Joint Working Committee on Transportation Planning (JWC), a binational entity chaired by the two countries’ transportation agencies but including representatives from many federal agencies and state departments of transportation. As border communities felt themselves increasingly affected by decisions made in Washington and Mexico City, their insistence on being included in these discussions led to the regional border master plan process, in which state DOTs lead stakeholder discussions on border infrastructure priorities. While this process makes sense from a U.S. perspective (in the absence of a national transportation plan, state DOTs essentially manage and spend federal transportation dollars), this process is somewhat of a mismatch for Mexico’s more centralized political system. The system seems to work better in certain cross- border communities than others, as is seen with California and Baja California’s award-winning master plan. There is no simple answer to the complex challenge of coordinating border planning and management, but a few key ingredients for success can be identified. First, border stakeholders need to be at the table—border experts in Washington and Mexico City are no a strong federal role is important . Border communities often work together, but they also compete to attract federal resources and trade flows. The federal agencies are well placed to analyze and balance competing needs, especially in dialogue with border communities. Finally, and hopefully obviously, cross-border collaboration is vital. To strengthen substitute for those living the implications of policy on a daily basis. Nonetheless, regional competitiveness and security, we need regional coordination. 102 2AC – Extension – Coordination Key (1/3) A coordinated approach is vital — infrastructure investments solve growth and manufacturing O’Neil 13 — Senior Fellow for Latin American Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Shannon K. O’Neil, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2013, “Mexico Makes It”, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-makes/p30098) BORDER BUDDIES Since NAFTA was passed, U.S.-Mexican trade has more than tripled . Well over $1 billion worth of goods crosses the U.S.-Mexican border every day, as do 3,000 people, 12,000 trucks, and 1,200 railcars. Mexico is second only to Canada as a destination for U.S. goods, and sales to Mexico support an estimated six million American jobs, according to a report published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center's Mexico Institute. The composition of that bilateral trade has also changed in recent decades. Approximately 40 percent of the products made in Mexico today have parts that come from the United States. Many consumer goods, including cars, televisions, and computers, cross the border more than once during their production. Admittedly, this process has sent some U.S. jobs south, but overall, crossborder production is good for U.S. employment. There is evidence that U.S. companies with overseas operations are more likely to create domestic jobs than those based solely in the United States. Using data collected confidentially from thousands of large U.S. manufacturing firms, the scholars Mihir Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James Hines upended the conventional wisdom in a 2008 study, which found that when companies ramp up their investment and employment internationally, they invest more and hire more people at home, too. Overseas operations make companies more productive and competitive, and with improved products, lower prices, and higher sales, they are able to create new jobs everywhere. Washington should welcome the expansion of U.S. companies in Mexico because increasing cross-border production and trade between the two countries would boost U.S. employment and growth. Mexico is a ready, willing, and able economic partner, with which the United States has closer ties than it does with any other emerging-market country. Familial and communal ties also unite the United States and Mexico. The number of Mexican immigrants in the United States doubled in the 1980s and then doubled again in the 1990s. Fleeing poor economic and employment conditions in Mexico and attracted by labor demand and family and community members already in the United States, an estimated ten million Mexicans have come north over the past three decades. This flow has recently slowed, thanks to changing demographics and economic improvements in Mexico and a weakening U.S. economy. Still, some 12 million Mexicans and over 30 million Mexican Americans call the United States home. For all these reasons, the United States should strengthen its relationship with its neighbor, starting with immigration laws that support the binational individuals and communities that already exist in the United States and encourage the legal immigration of Mexican workers and their families. U.S. President Barack Obama has promised to send such legislation to Congress, but a strong anti-immigrant wing within the Republican Party and the slow U.S. economic recovery pose significant barriers to a comprehensive and far-reaching deal. Nevertheless, the U nited S tates and Mexico urgently need to invest in border infrastructure, standardize their customs forms, and work to better facilitate legal trade between them. Furthermore, getting Americans to recognize the benefits of cross-border production will be an uphill battle, but it is one worth fighting in order to boost the United States' exports, jobs, and overall economic growth. 103 2AC – Extension – Coordination Key (2/3) A certain and coordinated investment is necessary — that solves growth, trade, and manufacturing Figueroa et al. 12 — Alejandro Figueroa, Research and Policy Analyst at the North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University, and Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University, and Rick Van Schoik, Director of the North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University (Alejandro Figueroa, Erik Lee, Rick Van Schoik, North American Center for Transborder Studies — Arizona State University, 01-04-12, “Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico”, http://21stcenturyborder.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/realizing-the-value-of-crossbordertrade-with-mexico2.pdf) The U.S. and Mexico will be successful at enhancing a prosperous bilateral relationship to the extent that both federal governments and stakeholders are capable of coordinating the development of their border management and infrastructure . The massive and highly complex U.S. and Mexican economies interact and even create value at our shared border. According to a study conducted by Accenture for the U.S. Department of Commerce, today’s level of demand exceeds the physical infrastructure and operating capacity of our ports of entry. Wait times are projected to increase across the five busiest U.S.-Mexico border crossings if volumes continue to grow as expected and if infrastructure and operations remain the same. By 2017, it is estimated that the average wait time will be nearly 100 minutes —an increase of 60%. Sharing a 2,000-mile long border needs to be recognized as both a challenge and an opportunity. While land ports of entry between the two nations were first envisioned to process the legitimate crossing of people, goods and services across the border, security has taking a dominant role in recent years, hampering the ability of federal agencies to efficiently manage border traffic. Advances in border infrastructure simply did not happen during the last decade, which is astounding given the greatly expanded post-NAFTA binational commercial relationship. Our border’s infrastructure and capacity today reflects the needs of a bygone era . This became evident as never before when on September 14, 2011, the San Ysidro, California port of entry —the busiest land port of entry in the world—had to shut down its 24 northbound lanes due to the collapse of part of its roof, injuring several people and damaging vehicles trying to cross into the U.S. from Tijuana, Mexico. According to a report by the San Diego Association of Governments, inadequate infrastructure capacity just at the border crossings between San Diego County and the state of Baja California creates traffic congestion and delays that cost both the U.S. and Mexican economies on average an estimated $7.2 billion in forgone gross output and more than 62,000 jobs on an annual basis. These border delays could cause $86 billion in output losses over the next ten years. These delays are significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that American firms are constantly attempting to reduce their inventory costs in an attempt to remain competitive. While importing from China to the U.S. may require a company to hold more than 100 days of inventory, if efficiently managed, our proximity to Mexico can provide American firms with a constant and predictable flow of goods that may reduce inventory costs and provide firms the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to sudden market changes. With this fundamental fact in mind, in May of 2010 the U.S. and Mexico signed the 21st Century Border Management Joint Declaration. Recognizing the importance of fostering the commercial relationship, both countries have agreed to coordinate efforts to enhance the economic competitiveness by expediting lawful trade. The idea is that development of modern and secure border infrastructure will give an added boost to our region’s competitiveness in the world and at the same time increase our access to a wider, more affordable and ever improving quality set of goods. Today more than 75,000 trucks (carrying close to 80 % of our two-way trade) cross our border on a daily basis. That this much traffic is able to cross our congested borders is due in part to important advances in border infrastructure in the last couple of years as new ports of entry have been opened. One important 104 2AC – Extension – Coordination Key (3/3) <<<CONTINUED – NO TEXT REMOVED>>> policy development is master planning processes for regional border infrastructure, which have been initiated in conjunction with local border communities and state governments. It is hoped that these regional processes will eventually make the overall binational infrastructure-building process more transparent, more robust and ultimately a better fit for two such powerful economies and next door neighbors. Much Opportunity, but the Real Work Has Only Just Begun Total trade between the United States and Mexico has expanded by more than 600% since 1990. Yet we need further commitment and investment in the infrastructure needed to sustain such growth, which is critical for both economies. The question now is whether our current border management system will be able to sustain that growth, and if so, for how much longer. A strong trade/joint production relationship with Mexico can help create high-quality jobs within our borders. For reasons of geography and history, Mexico’s fate is intertwined with that of the United States. And despite the current global economic environment, and transnational organized crime affecting Mexico and the United States, the two countries need to implement a 21st Century border that not only re-invigorates crossborder trade and economic integration but which will also lead to increased safety and quality of life for the residents of both countries. Both countries need to remain committed to promoting the global competitiveness of our region and to ensuring that the benefits of expanding trade flows keep reaching businesses, workers and consumers on both sides of our shared border. We will be able to accomplish this if leaders can explain the critical nature of our commercial relationships in ways that are more concrete and easier for citizens to understand. It is past time for our shared border to begin to meet tomorrow’s demands, acting as a facilitator and conductor of the lawful flows of goods, services and people between our nations, so that we may capitalize on the full potential of our partnership. If a billion dollars’ worth of trade crosses the U.S.-Mexico border on a daily basis and sustains six million jobs in the U.S., imagine what could be accomplished with a truly 21st century border. 105 2AC – Extension – Federal Government Key Federal funding is key --- unpredictable wait times hamstring U.S. manufacturing competitiveness Uribe 12 — Mónica Ortiz Uribe, reporter for Fronteras, a public radio collaboration in the southwest focusing on the border and changing demographics (Mónica Ortiz Uribe, Marketplace — World, 10-30-12, “NAFTA's promise slowed by lack of border infrastructure”, http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/naftas-promise-slowed-lack-border-infrastructure) Every day, more than a billion dollars worth of goods moves across the border between Mexico and the United States. Trade between the two countries quintupled in the last two decades. The World Trade bridge in Laredo, Texas is the most important commercial crossing along the southern border. About one third of all goods traded between the U.S. and Mexico travel through this port of entry. That equals about 5,000 trucks per day moving everything from cornflakes, to weed eaters, to Volkswagen bugs. "World Trade Bridge was actually opened in April 2000," says Gene Garza, who is in charge field operations in south Texas for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "prior to that there was no bridge here, there was nothing out here this was just farm land." The bridge is a testament to the post-NAFTA boom when most tariffs between the United States and Mexico were eliminated. Since NAFTA the number of trucks crossing through Laredo has tripled. But even before this bridge celebrated its 10th birthday, traffic had already outgrown capacity. Last year border authorities nearly doubled the number of lanes to 15. Still wait times can be inconsistent, which is a problem for manufacturers. Carlo Jose, a Mexican truck driver who's been crossing trucks through this border for seven years, says "sometimes it's difficult sometimes you spend five to six hours to cross the border." A five-hour-plus wait time is worst case scenario. On good days drivers may wait just one hour. If they are accredited under a Customs and Border Protection trusted traveler program their wait could be less than an hour. The main hold up at the border is security. After the terrorist attacks of September 11 , 2001 the inspection process at the border intensified. Every vehicle that crosses through U.S. borders is subject to a thorough screening. That could be an X-ray of both the truck and trailer or a manual inspection where the entire contents of a trailer is unloaded and checked. "We have to facilitate the commercial traffic coming in but we also have to make sure that our borders are secure," Garza says. Infrastructure at the border also affects wait times. The biggest obstacle to updating the current ports of entry and building new ones is insufficient federal funding . It’s especially tough now when the country is recovering from an economic recession and Congress has failed to approve the a new budget. Chris Wilson, who researches binational trade for the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C., says “Customs and Border Protection has identified a $6 billion deficit between where we are now and where we need to be to keep up with all the people and goods that are flowing across the border everyday." There has been some progress. There’s a new commercial port of entry in Arizona and another under construction in west Texas. Other ports have added additional lanes and trusted traveler programs have helped speed up inspection times. But it’s not enough . In the past two years binational trade has grown by a record 23 percent. Without the infrastructure to support that amount of trade both countries lose out. “ It cuts into the competitiveness of manufacturing in North America ," Wilson says. "It means that we have less jobs, less trade, less exports and those are things that are really important right now to our economy.” 106 2AC – Terrorism Add-On (1/4) Perception of strong border security is key to deterring terrorists Willis et al. 10 — Henry H. Willis, the Director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, and professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School, Ph.D. in engineering and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University, M.A. in environmental engineering and science at University of Cincinnati, B.A. in chemistry and environmental sciences at University of Pennsylvania; Joel B. Predd, engineer at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in electrical engineering at Princeton University, B.S. in electrical engineering at Purdue University; Paul K. Davis, senior principal researcher at the RAND Corporation and a professor of policy analysis in the Pardee RAND Graduate School, Ph.D. in chemical physics at MIT, B.S. at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Wayne P. Brown, 2010 (“Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry”, Sponsored by the DHS, Technical Report, RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, Available Online at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR837.pdf) 4.2.2 Contributions of Border Interdiction, Deterrence, and Networked Intelligence The principal contributions that border security makes to counterterrorism relate to preventing certain kinds of terrorist attacks dependent on flows into the country of people or materials. These contributions can be illustrated by considering what opportunities exist to disrupt terrorist attacks while they are being planned and orchestrated. Through a number of planning efforts, DHS and its components have developed detailed planning scenarios of terrorist events (DHS, 2006). Each of these scenarios has been deconstructed into attack trees that are useful for considering how DHS border-security programs contribute to terrorism security efforts. In their most generic form, these attack trees specify dimensions of attack scenarios with respect to building the terrorist team, identifying a target, and acquiring a weapon (see Figure 4.1). This decomposition of attack planning provides a structure around which to consider how interdiction, deterrence, and networked intelligence contribute to preventing terrorist attacks and, thus, why it is relevant to measure these functions. DHS border-security efforts focus on interdiction of terrorist team members and weapons or weapon components when they cross U.S. borders. Examples of initiatives that are intended to enhance these capabilities include the Secure Border Initiative, the acquisition of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals for nuclear detection, the Secure Communities Initiative, and US-VISIT. In addition, it is often pointed out that, when border-security measures are perceived to be effective, terrorists groups may be deterred from attacking in particular ways, or possibly from attacking at all. This could result from awareness of what type of surveillance is occurring or the capability of interdiction systems. In either case, deterrence refers to the judgment of terrorists that they will not be successful, leading them to choose another course of action. Finally, many border-security initiatives also contribute information to the national networked-intelligence picture. For example, the Secure Communities Initiative has implemented new capabilities to allow a single submission of fi ngerprints as part of the normal criminal arrest and booking process to be queried against both the FBI and DHS immigration and terrorism databases. This effort makes it easier for federal and local law enforcement to share actionable intelligence and makes it more difficult for terrorists to evade border-security efforts. 4.2.3 Non-DHS Factors on Which Border-Security Outcomes Depend The terrorist threat that border-security efforts must counter will be significantly influenced by the effectiveness of security, economic policy, military, diplomatic, and intelligence efforts targeting other aspects of terrorism. If terrorists overseas are able to acquire significant quantities of weapon material or establish advanced counterintelligence capabilities, attack plans may easily overwhelm border-security efforts. If terrorists are successful at recruiting and building networks within the United States, the perceptions that terrorists have about the difficulty of entering the country could influence decisions of how to organize and plan attacks. If borders are viewed as porous and open, terrorist groups can be expected to take advantage of this vulnerability. To the extent that border security is seen as presenting barriers to terrorist planning (especially barriers that include substantial operational uncertainty), efforts will create a deterrent effect that could lead terrorists to shift to attacking interests outside the United States or attacking in different ways. The extent to which border security will be effective at both interdicting and deterring terrorists will itself depend on a number of contextual factors, including the following: • material being smuggled: Is it possible to detect the border-security efforts may never get the chance to interdict attacks. Similarly, material using noninvasive means (e.g., with nuclear detectors)? • mode of travel: Will crossings be via air, land, or sea? • environment and terrain: Will crossings occur during times when and at places where border security benefits from good visibility or poor visibility? • U.S. intelligence capabilities: Do expenditures on intelligence collection and analysis afford border security the ability to anticipate terrorist incursion attempts? • terrorist counterintelligence capabilities: Do terrorists have enough understanding of bordersecurity tactics and techniques to be able to avoid them and to do so with considerable confidence? The answer to this, of course, will depend on the visibility and predictability of border-security systems and procedures. The measures used for evaluation of border-security eff orts must be able to reflect some of these dependencies and factors that moderate the effectiveness of border security. 107 2AC – Terrorism Add-On (2/4) Nuclear terrorism is very likely --- no acquisition barriers, no lack of motive, high risks, enormous consequences --- empirics/studies prove Goodspeed 12 — Peter Goodspeed, Senior Reporter of International Affairs at the National Post, 2012 (“Nuclear terror threat; A 'dirty bomb' could make cities uninhabitable, destroy global economy”, March 24 2012, National Post, Full Comment, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/03/24/preventing-devastating-nuclear-terroristattack-aim-of-world-leaders-meeting/) Six months after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorists attacks on New York, Henry Kelly, then president of the Federation of American Scientists, warned U.S. leaders there may be worse to come. "Recent events make it necessary to take almost inconceivably evil acts seriously," he told members of the U.S. Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. In a calm, determined voice he described the threat posed by nuclear terrorism - a risk so grave it looms over a today summit of 53 world leaders that opens in Seoul, South Korea, Monday. Terrorists or a rogue state may some day acquire a nuclear weapon and threaten to kill millions of people in a single devastating blow, he said. But the greater risk comes from a malicious radiological attack or "dirty bomb" that uses common industrial or commercial nuclear material to create panic, threaten the health of thousands over a prolonged period, make entire cities uninhabitable, cause billions of dollars in damage and destroy the global economy. Mr. Kelly outlined what would happen if terrorists exploded a bomb, containing a single, 12 inch-long, piece of radioactive cobalt taken from a food irradiation plant, at the lower tip of Manhattan, near the former World Trade Center. "An area of approximately onethousand square kilometres, extending over three states, would be contaminated," he said. "Over an area of about three hundred typical city blocks, there would be a one-in-ten risk of death from cancer for residents living in the contaminated area for forty years." "The entire borough of Manhattan would be so contaminated that anyone living there would have a one-in-a hundred chance of dying from cancer caused by the residual radiation. It would be decades before the city was inhabitable again, and demolition might be necessary." On Monday, the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, the largest gathering of world leaders since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, aims to create a global system that will deny terrorists access to nuclear materials through improved security, decreased use of potent materials, enhanced regulatory and export controls, increased intelligence sharing, expanded use of radiation detectors and improved disposal and recycling of nuclear material. A follow-up meeting to a nuclear summit, convened by U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington in 2010, the Seoul meeting is tightly focused on keeping nuclear weapons and radiological materials out of the hands of terrorists. It will deal only tangentially, in sideline discussions, with nuclear proliferation threats posed by countries such as Iran and North Korea. But the threat of devastating death and destruction will still dominate the talks. "We believe the potential for nuclear terrorism remains high ," said Page Stoutland, vice-president for nuclear security at are currently thousands of tons of nuclear materials in the world and those materials today are stored at hundreds of sites in over 30 countries." he said. "Some of those sites are well secured. Many are not, leaving weapons-usable nuclear materials vulnerable to theft or sale on the black market to terrorist organizations. "The elements of a perfect storm are in place: an ample supply of weapons-usable nuclear materials, an expansion of the knowledge and technical know-how to build a crude nuclear bomb accessible by the Internet or through rogue scientists and the determination of terrorists organizations to do it." The single greatest nuclear threat remains terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons. Scientists have estimated that, if detonated at New York's Grand Central Station, a ten-kiloton bomb (two-thirds the yield of the world's first nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima) would kill over 500,000 people immediately, injure hundreds of thousands more, permanently destroy most of Lower Manhattan and force the evacuation of all of New York City. Damage would be in the trillions of dollars. "A nuclear attack would be among the most difficult types of attacks for terrorists to accomplish," concludes a report the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington-based think-tank. "There 108 2AC – Terrorism Add-On (3/4) <<<CONTINUED – NO TEXT REMOVED>>> prepared by Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom. But, with the necessary fissile materials, "a capable and well organized terrorist group plausibly could make, deliver and detonate at least a crude nuclear bomb capable of incinerating the heart of any major city in the world." The amounts needed to build a crude nuclear bomb are small. With an efficient implosion design, a baseball-sized lump of plutonium weighing as little as four kilograms or a softball-sized lump of highly enriched uranium weighing 12 kilograms would be enough. To build a less efficient, but still devastating, gun-type bomb, terrorists would need 48 to 60 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. "There is an immense difference between the difficulty of making safe, reliable weapons for use in a missile or combat aircraft and making crude, unsafe, unreliable weapons for delivery by truck," said Matthew Bunn, a professor at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. "With highly enriched uranium, a gun-type bomb - like the one that obliterated Hiroshima - is very plausibly within the capabilities of a sophisticated terrorist group," he said. With weapons-usable nuclear material stored in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries, under security situations that range from very stringent to virtually nonexistent, the risk of terrorists acquiring bomb-making materials remains great. " Theft of only 0.01% of the world stockpile could cause a global catastrophe ," Mr. Bunn said. And terrorists have shown a definite interest in obtaining the materials needed to make both nuclear fusion and radioactive dirty bombs. Before he was killed last May, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda had spent a decade trying to obtain nuclear weapons and may already have experimented with limited quantities of nuclear material. In 1998, as Russia reeled from an economic crisis, officials uncovered a conspiracy in which insiders at one of Russia's largest nuclear weapons facilities tried to steal 18.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Just last June, officials in Moldavia arrested six people for smuggling 4.4 grams of weapons-grade uranium as part of a plot to sell up to nine kilograms of highly enriched uranium on the black market for $31-million. The Russian ringleader of the group is still at large and, according to news reports, may still have as much as a kilogram of uranium. In 2007, a group of attackers came within a breath of stealing the ingredients for a nuclear bomb, when they launched a midnight raid on South Africa's Pelindaba nuclear research centre, just west of Pretoria. South Africa developed nuclear weapons in 1979 and became the only state in the world to voluntarily abandon their nuclear arsenal in 1991. But the country still stores enough weapons-grade material for 25 nuclear bombs at the Pelindaba site. On November 8, 2007, two teams of armed, well-trained men attacked Pelindaba from two different directions. They deactivated several layers of security, including a 10,000 volt electrical fence, and entered the facility's control centre, where they shot a security guard, who still managed to trip an alarm. The attackers fled before they were able to take any nuclear material. But they spent 45 minutes alone inside the nuclear centre and have never been caught. Existing nuclear weapons stocks in countries like Pakistan, which is threatened by terrorism, corruption and jihadist radicals, or Russia, which still boasts the world's largest stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, are always under threat. But it is radioactive material, the heart of any "dirty bomb," stored in thousands of nuclear power plants, research reactors, hospitals, laboratories, blood banks, factories and food processing plants around the world that may be most vulnerable to terrorists. "In the United States, a radioactive source is lost, stolen or missing about once a day," said Charles Ferguson, current president of the Federation of American Scientists. Khammar Mrabit, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Office of Nuclear Security, said he investigates roughly 200 incidents of improperly secured nuclear material each year. "The threat of malicious radiological attack is quite real, quite serious and deserves a vigorous response," Mr. Kelly warned 10 years ago in the aftermath of Sept. 11. "We must face the brutal reality that no technological remedies can provide complete confidence that we are safe ," he said. "Determined malicious groups might still find a way to use radiological weapons when their only goal is killing innocent people. 109 2AC – Terrorism Add-On (4/4) Nuclear terrorism results in global nuclear war and extinction Ayson 10 –Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33.7, InformaWorld) But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst ? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a high er stage of alert . In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. 110 ***MEXICO BORDER NEGATIVE*** 111 1NC – Manufacturing Adv Frontline (1/4) Manufacturing industry empirically resilient WSJ 11 (Wall Street Journal. 2/25/11. "The Truth About U.S. Manufacturing."online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703652104576122353274221570.ht ml.html#articleTabs%3Darticle) Is American manufacturing dead? You might think so reading most of the nation's editorial pages or watching the endless laments in the news that "nothing is made in America anymore," and that our manufacturing jobs have vanished to China, Mexico and South Korea. Yet the empirical evidence tells a different story—of a thriving and growing U.S. manufacturing sector, and a country that remains by far the world's largest manufacturer. This is a particularly sensitive topic in my hometown of Flint, Mich., where auto-plant closings have meant lost jobs and difficult transitions for the displaced. But while it's true that the U.S. has lost more than seven million manufacturing jobs since the late 1970s, our manufacturing output has continued to expand. International data compiled by the United Nations on global output from 1970-2009 show this success story. Excluding recession-related decreases in 2001 and 2008-09, America's manufacturing output has continued to increase since 1970. In every year since 2004, manufacturing output has exceeded $2 trillion (in constant 2005 dollars), twice the output produced in America's factories in the early 1970s. Taken on its own, U.S. manufacturing would rank today as the sixth largest economy in the world, just behind France and ahead of the United Kingdom, Italy and Brazil. In 2009, the most recent full year for which international data are available, our manufacturing output was $2.155 trillion (including mining and utilities). That's more than 45% higher than China's, the country we're supposedly losing ground to. Despite recent gains in China and elsewhere, the U.S. still produced more than 20% of global manufacturing output in 2009. The truth is that America still makes a lot of stuff, and we're making more of it than ever before. We're merely able to do it with a fraction of the workers needed in the past. Consider the incredible, increasing productivity of America's manufacturing workers: The average U.S. factory worker is responsible today for more than $180,000 of annual manufacturing output, triple the $60,000 in 1972. Increases in productivity are a direct result of capital investments in productivity-enhancing technology, such as GM's next generation Ecotec engine. These increases are a direct result of capital investments in productivity-enhancing technology, which last year helped boost output to record levels in industries like computers and semiconductors, medical equipment and supplies, pharmaceuticals and medicine, and oil and natural-gas equipment. 112 1NC – Manufacturing Adv Frontline (2/4) No impact to off-shoring: 1) Wage increases and selective re-shoring Heineman 13 (Ben Heineman, The Atlantic, 3/26/13, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/why-we-can-all-stop-worrying-aboutoffshoring-and-outsourcing/274388/, "Why We Can All Stop Worrying About Offshoring and Outsourcing”) Labor markets have for the past quarter century been at the center of the globalization disputes under the "off-shoring and out-sourcing" rubric. How many jobs were lost at home to cheap labor abroad? What were conditions for those overseas workers? But the rapidly changing nature of the global economy has changed much, though not all, of that "off-shoring/out-sourcing" debate. Today, cheap labor is only one of many factors leading global companies to choose where to do business in diverse nations across the world. Major economic changes like the internal growth of emerging markets have scrambled debates about the global economy, posed challenges for international business, stimulated contradictory public policies and confused the general public. It was often cheap labor in emerging markets that, more than two decades ago, led companies in developed markets to move company jobs away from the home country either to company owned facilities (offshoring) or to third parties (out-sourcing) in developing markets. The broad idea was that less expensive manufacturing or inexpensive white collar workers would create goods and services in developing nations that would serve world markets. China, especially, would be the global product- manufacturing center; India, via the web, would be the global service provider. The well known debate ensued between free-trade (more competition, cheaper goods in U.S., growth in developing markets) and fair trade (only wealthy benefit, hollowing out of U.S. middle class, exploitive labor standards overseas). The debate heated up in political years (including 2012), when "outsourcing" became an especially a dirty word. But, in addition to dramatic economic growth in emerging markets, four recent trends have significantly modified this old off-shoring and out-sourcing schematic. First, labor costs for many businesses may no longer be the critical or even primary factor in global location decisions. Wages are rising in many emerging markets due, in part, to increased demand, new labor laws, and greater worker voice. Wages are declining in developed markets like the U.S. where depressed economic conditions for workers have led to lower wage and benefit packages, especially for lower entry level workers, and often through negotiations with organized labor. New technology, such as robotics, and higher productivity have also lowered the price of labor as a percentage of total product or service costs. When labor cost differences are not as dramatic or important, other costs like materials, energy, transportation, currency, capital, government imposed costs (tariffs, regulation) -- which were always important - may have as great (or greater) impact on the location as cheap workers. Second, companies are retaining but modifying their global supply chains by selectively reversing the long-term trend of outsourcing. They are "making" important parts of the products or services rather than "buying" from third parties , as described recently by U.S. business people and journalists, Companies are recognizing that closely interrelating, even co-locating, research and development, design and marketing, manufacturing and assembly close to the markets served can lead to much faster response to market shifts and to much faster innovation. The old practice of designing at home and then manufacturing abroad can slow the pace of innovation and product change to a crawl. So companies are making complex trade-offs between "making" and "buying" -- and between the need to develop technology at connected global R&D centers and the need to apply it in a variety of local settings in a variety of ways. Similarly, companies which were enamored of outsourcing key service functions like information technology to nations like India are discovering that these, too, are key to fast-paced innovation and should be "made" not "bought" -- bringing them back in-house, with corporate units integrated across the world under global/local management. The "de-verticalizing" outsourcing process - when a company sent many of its functions between raw materials and the finished product to third parties - is now being partially reversed with "re-verticalization." But, even with changes, global supply chains, even if owned more by the company and less by third parties, will remain critical. 113 1NC – Manufacturing Adv Frontline (3/4) 2) Proximity – reshoring is inevitable – unionization and regulation are alt causes Fluser 13 (Fluser, SEO Business Directory, no date, last updated 2013, “Re-Shoring, OffShoring, or Right-Shoring - Global Trade and Wages in the Balance,” http://fluser.com/articles/re-shoring-off-shoring-or-right-shoring--global-trade-and-wages-inthe-balance-429.php) There sure is a lot of talk about China taking jobs away from the United States, and yet for some reason it doesn't concern me as much as others, because I realize that eventually a rebalancing of global trade will occur. The issues of up-and-coming India and China have taken their toll, and currently are a concern, but as wage inflation continues, jobs will migrate to other places. Indeed, our next-door neighbor Mexico will also be on the list along with a revitalized and new North Africa with so many people making only a dollar and change per day. When I hear people badmouthing China for their currency manipulation I laugh because China is in a little bit of economic hot water, and they painted themselves into a corner. They could easily have a complete reset of their economy due to pushing the year-over-year growth at 10%, without regards to the realities at hand. They have some bad loans from municipal vehicles that are outstanding, and now those municipal vehicles are selling bonds to pay off those bad loans and get themselves into a better financial situation. In reality, such tactics are nothing more than a switcheroo on the balance sheet, and hardly take care of the problem. When that house of cards comes crashing down, it will affect the currency, valuation, and therefore, all the problems will take care of themselves on our side of the stick. Not long ago, there was some talk in some of the financial magazines including the Economist, that the United States could expect 3 million jobs to come back to our shores as China's middle class gets going, and as their wage inflation continues to rise at an annual 15 to 20% per year. Surely, some jobs may come back to the United States, or companies here may decide that it is more prudent to build factories in the states, but I just bet that Mexico, certain parts of Latin America, and other countries will be the net gain in all of this and not necessarily the US. Rather than being concerned about what China is doing, perhaps we need to look at our own mirrors and consider some of our own policies. We've over regulated our companies here the United States, and we've given too much power to the unions, the lawyers, and we've just done a terrible job in keeping civility between the rich and poor, and the corporations and the workers - this infighting is commonly referred to as class warfare. Rather than yelling at Wall Street, not that they don't deserve a little critique, we ought to consider what we are best at in the United States, and that is free-market capitalism. 114 1NC – Manufacturing Adv Frontline (4/4) 3) Reshoring doesn’t solve competitiveness – low skill and job redistribution Speakman 12 (Colin, Director of China Programs at CAPA International Education, president of the Council on China Exchange, former Senior Vice President/Global Director of Partnership Programs at the American Institute for Foreign Study, master’s degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science, contributing writer for China Daily, China Daily, August 15, 2012, “Outsourcing is not that bad for US,” http://www.chinadailyapac.com/article/outsourcing-not-bad-us) Put more generally, where in a typical American multinational company's mission statement do the words "we strive to protect US jobs at all costs" appear? It is more likely for us to find "we aim to consistently provide a high return to our shareholders" and if that means switching employment between countries to increase profits, so be it. A clue is in the words "American multinational"; such companies have responsibilities toward their global workforce and, let's face it, the world needs jobs. Travel back a couple of decades and you will see a graph of the supply source that resembles an hour glass fallen on its side when it comes to US industries like footwear and toys. The left axis would start showing sourced from China as low down and sourced from elsewhere outside then US (South Korea for example) high up, but as the years pass, China rises and the other sources fall. It is not so much outsourcing itself that has suddenly been discovered, but that so much of it has been aggregated in China in the last decade. Is that change so bad? Are 5 million jobs outsourced a million each to five countries any less of a job loss than the whole 5 million outsourced to one? The primary advantage of one foreign country growing a higher income domestic market is that it provides opportunities for overseas domestic sales on a bigger scale than if dispersed across many countries, and thus an opportunity for American companies beyond the importing of goods to the US. Do Americans want those low-wage basic jobs back now? Probably not, despite the idea that rising labor costs in China may make re-shoring possible. It is more likely that those jobs would be resourced to western China where labor costs are lower, or to Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos or Vietnam. If we look far enough ahead, China and its neighbors will face the outsourcing pressure as their labor costs rise, and the Middle East and Africa could become the new home of low-cost historic manufacturing. All this means that the low-cost seeking job outsourcing is not the battle that US politicians should be looking to win. The important battlefield will be the next generation of higher skilled, higher added-value jobs in the innovative and increasingly green industries. Solar power, wind turbines, alternative fuel vehicles, healthcare technological advances and other cutting edge areas are seen as the preserve of the advanced Western economies, especially the US with its high quality universities, support for r esearch and d evelopment and tradition of thinking outside the box. They are the great hope of innovation driven industrial development. But guess what? China wants those jobs too. We know China wants to move from the "made in China" to "created in China" stage and to raise the living standards of its people by getting them into higher skilled jobs. China already has taken a lead in solar and wind power and is the US' major competitor in new industries. If Americans are to have confidence in a future with plentiful well-paid jobs, their politicians need to start outlining how the US can compete for those jobs rather than how it can reclaim the old outsourced jobs. 115 2NC – Extension – Manufacturing Resilient Manufacturing industry resilient – technological innovation Engler 09 (John, the former three-term governor of Michigan, is president of the National Association of Manufacturers, the nation’s largest industrial trade association. “Forging A Second American Century,” Forbes, May 28th, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/27/john-engler-manufacturing-business-america.html) The 20th Century is often called the American Century, marking the U.S. rise to global pre-eminence. Manufacturing powered our ascendance, factories created our prosperity.But the American Century is nearly a decade gone, manufacturing jobs are dwindling, and the future promises fierce competition from the new industrial giants of China and India (and the old giants of Europe). The recession drags painfully on, and dozens of other competitor countries target what they sense is a new U.S. vulnerability. It is time to finally resign ourselves to becoming a second-rate manufacturing nation? Not if manufacturers have anything to say about it. Manufacturers in the United States have adapted before to survive, and they will again . First, the good news. The United States remains the world’s largest manufacturing nation, accounting for more than 19.5% of global manufacturing output. In 2007, the U.S. produced more volume of products than ever before, and manufacturing represented $1.6 trillion of our economy, or about 11.6% of gross domestic product. Manufacturing in the United States accounts for more than 12 million jobs and supports millions more in other sectors. And manufacturing jobs are among the most highly compensated in the nation, paying on average about 20% more than those in other sectors. Yes, we are shedding manufacturing jobs. In the U.S., manufacturing has lost some 1.5 million jobs since the current downturn started, continuing a long-term trend that dates back at least until the early 1980s. But to concentrate on aggregate job losses masks a more profound trend–vastly improved productivity. Americans are making a lot more stuff with a lot fewer people. This increased productivity is largely due to continuous innovation in the manufacturing sector and high investment levels in new technology. Examples abound. In the northwestern Pennsylvania town of Meadville, a group of businesses evolved over a century into a tool-and-die sector of more than 130 companies. The companies had grown with the American auto industry, and their fates were tied to Detroit. Ten years ago Meadville’s Starn Tool & Manufacturing, with 54 employees, did the overwhelming majority of its business with auto suppliers. Today, the auto industry represents only 5% of its business. Like other companies in the area, Starn adapted to changing markets and is now producing tools and parts for everything from satellites to Segway scooters. Down in Pittsboro, N.C., a former hosiery mill where 400 laborers once worked on looms is now home to a biotechnology company, Biolex Therapeutics, where 90 workers use advanced laboratory equipment to develop a drug for a serious liver ailment. Even the lowest paid of the lab technicians earns far more than the seamstresses in the old hosiery mill. In Haleyville, Ala., Exxel Outdoors recently revved up to produce up to 2 million of its top-end line of sleeping bags. Exxel was manufacturing in China, but as costs of production and shipping rose, it made economic sense to move production back to the United States. In general as manufacturing becomes more automated, both in the U.S. and abroad, lower labor costs in places like China and India are increasingly less important to the competitive picture. But the bad news is that regardless of labor costs, U.S. manufacturers face disadvantages that are largely beyond the control of individual firms. A 2008 study by National Association of Manufacturers affiliate organization The Manufacturing Institute and the Manufacturer’s Alliance/MAPI compared the cost of manufacturing in the U.S. to a group of nine industrial nations including Germany, Japan, China and Mexico. Because of higher taxes, energy and regulatory costs, U.S. manufacturers face a 17.6% structural cost disadvantage when competing against firms from these nine countries. But progress is being made. The same group estimated that just two years earlier, in 2006, American firms faced a 31.7% structural cost History provides some reassurance regarding recovery. American manufacturing has always come back after past downturns, and most economists forecast recovery by the second quarter of next year 2010. For U.S. manufacturers, the American Century lives on, and there is no reason to accept–or expect–a second-rate status . disadvantage. 116 2NC – Extension – No Impact To Offshoring (1/2) No tradeoff between the manufacturing that goes on in Mexico and what we offshore – structurally different economies Peters, Hearn, and Shaiken 13 (Enrique Dussel, Adrian H., Harley, member of the economic faculty at la Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, division of postgraduate studies, AND ARC future fellow, convenor if IR at the University of Sydney China Studies Center, PhD, AND professor of education and geography at Berkeley, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Miami, May 1, 2013, “China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations,” http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=clas_publicat ions) Many in the U.S. Congress and media accuse China of being a leading cause of the downturn in U.S. manufacturing during the recessions of 2002 and 2009, and have proposed legislation designed to mitigate the influences of China’s “unfair” policies on U.S. industry 7. In the first of the decade’s two recessions, U.S. manufacturers’ shipments declined by 7.5 percent during 2000-02 (table 2a) and the economy lost $2.5 million. 4. How does Mexico Compete with China? The following are key factors enabling Mexico to maintain its share of the U.S. market, despite intense competition from China: 1. Lower transportation costs. 2. Less time from manufacture to market. 3. Easier communication and supervision of production. 4. Greater flexibility for changes in production. 5. More transparent government regulations. 6. Better protection of intellectual property. Table 3 and figures 9 and 10 compare the leading U.S. imports from Mexico and China in 2011. Motor vehicles and auto parts accounted for nearly one quarter of U.S. imports from Mexico, but only 4 percent of imports from China. Computer and telecom equipment accounted for over one quarter of U.S. imports from China. Mexico is most competitive relative to China in products with the following characteristics: a. High ratio of weight to value: (1) Motor vehicles (2) Large screen televisions (3) Major household appliances b. Quality (rather than price) intensive: (1) Medical goods (2) Process control instruments (3) Precision metal working c. Are inputs for industries that require just-in-time delivery, customized production, or require frequent design changes—such as auto parts d. Protection in intellectual property is important Felipe Canales of BAS-Tech Group contrasted the competitive advantages of Mexico and China succinctly in a recent interview. Mexico has the advantage for midvolume customized products such as the “3As”: automotive, appliances, and aerospace. China’s strength is in high volume products, such as the “3Cs”: communications, computers, and consumer goods (Canales, Myers, and Rozental 2012). Several factors are increasing the costs of importing from China: 1. Rising value of the yuan (Schneider 2012). 2. Rising labor costs in the industrialized coastal regions of China. 3. Rising costs of imported inputs used in assembly plants in China. 4. Growth of demand by China’s middle class. 5. Increasing costs to ship finished goods to North America. Some goods are very labor-intensive to manufacture and, as costs increase in China, their production may shift to lower labor-cost countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia.12 For some other products, while production may not shift from China to Mexico, goods made in Mexico are becoming more competitive in the U.S. market as costs in China rise and sourcing may shift to Mexico (Lahart and Orlik 2012). Table 4 identifies 25 product categories for which China supplied over one-half of U.S. imports in 2011. Collectively, in those 25 categories, China accounted for 65 percent of total U.S. imports in 2011 (figure 11). By contrast, imports from Mexico accounted for just 9 percent. When people exclaim, “Everything is made in 117 2NC – Extension – No Impact To Offshoring (2/2) <<<CONTINUED – NO TEXT REMOVED>>> China!” they are thinking about products in those 25 categories. But what about the other 225 product categories used by industry analysts at the U.S. International Trade Commission? Those 225 categories accounted for 88 percent of total U.S. imports in 2011. Imports from Mexico in those collective categories exceeded imports from China, with imports from Mexico accounting for 12.4 percent of U.S. imports in those categories and imports from China accounting for 12.0 percent (table 5 and figure 12). Contrary to popular perceptions, the bulk of North American manufacturing did not go to China. Although many U.S. manufacturers established production facilities in China to supply the existing and hoped-for market there, and other U.S. companies contracted out manufacturing of labor-intensive articles to low-cost producers in China in order to maintain or expand their market shares in the United States, much of the growth in U.S. imports from China in the last two decades came from a shift of production from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan to China rather than from the United States to China. As demonstrated in tables 2a and 2b and figure 7, U.S. producers’ shipments of manufactured goods grew by 27 percent during 2000-2012. For many U.S. companies, partnerships with assembly plants in Mexico for the supply of intermediate and final goods has helped these companies remain competitive with non-North American suppliers to the U.S. market. NAFTA has played an important role in facilitating these partnerships. The ability of the North American manufacturing industry to remain competitive depends on commitments from all three NAFTA partners to invest in infrastructure, education, and research, facilitate access to markets and credit for small- and medium-sized business, implement reforms that will make it easier to do business while protecting the rights of stakeholders, and enforce i ntellectual p roperty r ights.13 118 1NC – Mexico Relations Adv Frontline (1/4) Relations high – our evidence is predictive and discusses the segregation of issues Selee and Diaz-Cayeros 13 (Andrew and Alberto) “The Dynamics of US Mexico Relations” Mexico and the United States: the politics of partnership. 2013. Book Yet positive factors favor prospects for more effective partnership and are likely to drive cooperation over time. First among these is the genuine interdependence of interests that underlies integration between the two countries. Everyday issues that need to be resolved – from the GM bailout to drug traffickinging to natural disasters and water shortages at the border – create a dynamic of constant engagement around highly concrete topics that policymakers on the two sides of the broder need to address. Moreover, the growing complexity of the relationship means that even when disputes arise among the two countries’ political leaders, progress continues along a number of other areas, driven by federal agencies, state, and local covernments, and nongovernmental actors. Increasingly, interactions between the two countries take place simultaneously along a wide number of different points of engagement, which are largely independent of each other and have their own particular dynamics. Progress on one does not necessarily augur progress on another; nor does failure in one area lead to failure in another . Nonetheless, progress in deepending engagement between the two countries will constantly be challenged by the persistent asymmetries that condition the relationship. The different in geopolitical realities of the two countries, the continuing intequality in average income between them and the dissimilar capacities of the two states are likely to continue to limit some efforts at greater cooperation. Recent tendencies have softened the impact of some of these asymmetries. Democraticization in Mexico has made the political systems of the two countries more similar. Increased economic and social exchanges have built ties that mitigate some of the most visible asymmetries and forced the two countries to seek solutions to shared problems. Public opinion studies show how far the two countries have gone in recognizing their mutual interest in working together despite their differences, with ordinary citizens generally far ahead of political elites. Over the long term, interdependence will force the two countries closer and complexity will allow the relationship to lay down even deeper roots along multiple points of engagement. However, asymmetry will continue to create frictions and provide a brake on progress in cooperation. The relationship between the United States and Mexico will continuiously deepen, but wil be a process fraught with tension. The countries have ceased to be distant neighbors but as yet they remain far away from being strategic partners whose relationship is guided by a common vision of mutually beneficial shared outcomes. 119 1NC – Mexico Relations Adv Frontline (2/4) Alternate causalities to an effective border policy — immigration and law enforcement O’Neil 13 — Shannon K. O’Neil, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is the author of the forthcoming book Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead (Oxford University Press, 2013), from which this essay is adapted (Shannon K. O’Neil, Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2013, “Mexico Makes It”, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-makes/p30098) For all these reasons, the United States should strengthen its relationship with its neighbor, starting with immigration laws that support the binational individuals and communities that already exist in the United States and encourage the legal immigration of Mexican workers and their families. U.S. President Barack Obama has promised to send such legislation to Congress, but a strong anti-immigrant wing within the Republican Party and the slow U.S. economic recovery pose significant barriers to a comprehensive and far-reaching deal. Nevertheless, the United States and Mexico urgently need to invest in border infrastructure, standardize their customs forms, and work to better facilitate legal trade between them. Furthermore, getting Americans to recognize the benefits of cross-border production will be an uphill battle, but it is one worth fighting in order to boost the United States' exports, jobs, and overall economic growth. On the security front, U.S. efforts must move beyond cracking down on drug trafficking to helping Mexico combat crime more generally. Security links have expanded since 2007, when Washington and Mexico City began taking on drug traffickers together. Today, Obama should support Peña Nieto's strategy of cracking down on violence rather than try to eliminate the drug trade. Washington should also expand its law enforcement training programs , currently conducted primarily at the federal level, to Mexico's state and local police forces and justice systems. Washington and Mexico City should also invest together in border community projects and programs that support social and economic development in often neglected and crime-ridden areas. Alt cause to instability – war on drugs The Global and Mail 12 [“The drug war spreads instability,” The Globe and Mail, September 6, 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/the-drug-war-spreadsinstability/article4104311/] The war on drugs doesn’t just cause human misery. It contributes to the political instability of many parts of the world, including Mexico, Central America and now West Africa. The transnational criminal groups in control of the drug trade have successfully destabilized transit countries that stand between production and the market in Europe and North America. This underscores the unintended consequences of prohibition: the growth of a huge criminal black market financed by the profits of supplying demand for illegal drugs, and the “balloon” effect, whereby drug production and transit corridors shift location to avoid law enforcement. The war on drugs is inherently unwinnable, as the recent report from the Global Commission on Drug Policy concludes. 120 1NC – Mexico Relations Adv Frontline (3/4) No Latin American escalation Cárdenas 11 [Mauricio, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution, 3-17, “Think Again Latin America,” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=full] "Latin America is violent and dangerous." Yes, but not unstable. Latin American countries have among the world's highest rates of crime, murder, and kidnapping. Pockets of abnormal levels of violence have emerged in countries such as Colombia - and more recently, in Mexico, Central America, and some large cities such as Caracas. With 140,000 homicides in 2010, it is understandable how Latin America got this reputation. Each of the countries in Central America's "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) had more murders in 2010 than the entire European Union combined. Violence in Latin America is strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable international appetite for the illegal drugs produced in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional leaders -- including Brazil's former president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based on demand reduction, rather than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars. Despite the recent tensions on the VenezuelaColombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support. 121 1NC – Mexico Relations Adv Frontline (4/4) Multiple protections prevent any chance of cyber war and negative consequences from an attack Bailey 11 [Ronald is Reason's science correspondent. “Cyberwar Is Harder Than It Looks: Internet vulnerability to attacks exaggerated, says new report.” 1/18/2011, http://reason.com/archives/2011/01/18/cyberwar-is-harder-than-it] Brown and Sommer conclude, “It is unlikely that there will ever be a true cyberwar.” By cyberwar, they mean one fought solely over and with information technologies. Why? Because it takes a lot of effort to figure out new vulnerabilities in already protected critical systems and the effects of an attack are difficult to predict, including blowback on the perpetrators. More importantly, they note, “There is no strategic reason why an aggressor would limit themselves to only one class of weaponry.” In a real war, cyberattacks would be an adjunct to conventional efforts to blow up critical infrastructure. Because attacks can be launched from any set of computers, attackers can remain hidden. Consequently, a strategy of deterrence will not work in cyberwarfare because the target for retaliation is unknown. This means that resilience is the main defense against cyberweapons, a combination of preventive measures and contingency plans for a quick post-attack recovery. If cyberwarfare against infrastructure was easy, terrorists like Al Qaeda would have already tried the tactic against us and our NATO allies. Brown and Sommer observe that the Internet and the physical telecommunications infrastructure were designed to be robust and self-healing, so that failures in one part are routed around. “You have to be cautious when hearing from people engaging in fear-mongering about huge blackouts and collapses of critical infrastructures via the Internet,” says University of Toronto cyberwarfare expert Ronald Deibert in the January/February 2011 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “There is a lot of redundancy in the networks; it’s not a simple thing to turn off the power grid.” In addition, our experience with current forms of malware is somewhat reassuring. Responses to new malware have generally been found and made available within days and few denial of service attacks have lasted more than a day. In addition, many critical networks such as those carrying financial transactions are not connected to the Internet requiring insider information to make them vulnerable. While not everyone uses up-to-date malware detection, most government agencies, major businesses, and many individuals do, which means that would-be attackers must take the time and effort to find new flaws and develop new techniques. For example, the success of the Stuxnet worm that attacked and disabled Iranian nuclear centrifuges required very extensive intelligence gathering and knowledge of specific software flaws as well as someone able to walk into the facilities with an infected USB drive. Brown and Sommers urge governments to ratify the CyberCrime Convention. The chief treaty holdouts are Russia and China, countries from which many recent cyberattacks appear to have originated. “We should not forget that many of the countries that are havens for cybercrime have invested billions in domestic communications monitoring to supplement an already extensive set of police tools for political control,” notes James Lewis. “The notion that a cybercriminal in one of these countries operates without the knowledge and thus tacit consent of the government is difficult to accept. A hacker who turned his sights from Tallinn to the Kremlin would have only hours before his service were cut off, his door was smashed down and his computer confiscated.” Another fruitful way to address emerging cyber threats suggested by the authors is to strengthen connections between national Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs). CERT experts operate as a kind of early warning system who also devise software fixes to stop the spread of new malware. And they think that public policy, including procurement, can be used to encourage the development of properly tested hardware and software. While blowing up the Internet probably won't happen, espionage, hacking, and malware will be with us always. Whatever we do to defend against them, will also defend against the threat of cyberwarfare 122 2NC – Extension – Relations High US Mexico relations improving – our evidence speaks to trends O'Neil 13 – Shannon K. O'Neil is a senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization. ( http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138818/shannon-k-oneil/mexico-makes-it "Mexico makes it" March/April 2013.) Hidden behind the troubling headlines, however, is another, more hopeful Mexico -- one undergoing rapid and widespread social, political, and economic transformation. Yes, Mexico continues to struggle with grave security threats, but it is also fostering a globally competitive marketplace, a growing middle class, and an increasingly influential pro-democracy voter base. In addition, Mexico's ties with the United States are changing. Common interests in energy, manufacturing, and security, as well as an overlapping community formed by millions of binational families, have made Mexico's path forward increasingly important to its northern neighbor.¶ For most of the past century, U.S.-Mexican relations were conducted at arm's length. That began to change, however, in the 1980s and, even more, after the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spurred greater bilateral economic engagement and cooperation. Mexico's democratic transition has further eased the wariness of some skeptics in Washington. Still, the U.S.-Mexican relationship is far from perfect. New bilateral policies are required, especially to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexican border. More important, the United States needs to start seeing Mexico as a partner instead of a problem. New administration promises continued high relations Seelke 13 (Clare Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Mexico’s New Administration: Priorities and Key Issues in US-Mexican Relations,” Congressional Research Service, January 16, 2013 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdf) U.S.-Mexican relations grew closer during the Felipe Calderón Administration (2006-2012) as a ¶ result of the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral security effort for which Congress has provided $1.9 ¶ billion. Some Members of Congress may be concerned about whether bilateral relations, ¶ particularly security cooperation, may suffer now that the party controlling the presidency has ¶ changed. Although the transition from PAN to PRI rule is unlikely to result in seismic shifts in ¶ bilateral relations, a PRI government may emphasize economic issues more than security matters. ¶ President Peña Nieto has vowed to continue U.S.Mexican security cooperation, albeit with a ¶ stronger emphasis on reducing violent crime in Mexico than on combating drug trafficking; what ¶ that cooperation will look like remains to be seen. He has also expressed support for increased ¶ bilateral and trilateral (with Canada) economic and energy cooperation. 123 1NC – Solvency Frontline (1/2) The government fails at implementing border infrastructure — coordination failures turn the case Regan 11 — Sean Regan, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (Sean Regan, Naval War College, 1028-2011, “U.S. – MEXICO POLICY COORDINATION AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY BORDER POLICY COORDINATION EFFORT”, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555536.pdf) Bureaucracies on both sides of the border struggle to coordinate policies across and within various levels of government including federal, state, and local structures. However, the complexity and interdependence of bi-national issues means there is rarely a clear, single lead department or agency on any given issue on either side of the border. Complicating coordination efforts are the various and often duplicative authorities held by many U.S. and GoM institutions. In addition, the various bi-national interactions at the federal, state, and local levels are often not apparent to the other levels of government. The different government stakeholders often address issues directly and indirectly through bi-lateral institutions, commissions, and agreements.7 The failure to coordinate efforts results in disjointed border policies and activities leading to increased levels of congestion, delay, higher border-crossing costs, and insufficient infrastructure planning . One example of a disjointed effort can be found at coordination related to the establishment and management of land ports of entry (POEs).8 The United States and Mexico have over seven federal departments within each national-level structure with POE related responsibilities.9 Each department and agency has distinct purposes and authorities that span issues ranging from law enforcement to commerce management. Sporadic and disjointed efforts result in departments working toward common end-states (i.e. improved POE development) but doing so in an uncoordinated and non-supporting manner. National efforts to synchronize a whole-of-government approach have been haphazard . Across the border, the GoM has its own bureaucratic structure but suffers from the same challenges. These federal-level challenges are both independent of and repeated within, the numerous state and local agencies that have their own policies and processes. Enhancing coordination among the stakeholders involved in the crossing process provides an opportunity to achieve many benefits including increased security, and reduced system costs through a predictable and coordinated policy structure.10 Prior to attempting bi-national coordination, obtaining consensus on priority efforts at the federal inter- agency level must occur. The United States’ inter-agency policy and coordination processes focus on the development of whole-of-government approaches to issues. However, security-focused agencies, customs-focused agencies, and transportation-focused agencies each have different mandates and nomenclature . This can lead to confusion on which priority topic the federal agencies should be focused on: security, infrastructure, or throughput. Confused, disjointed, and unclear priorities interfere with efforts to get Congressional funding that promotes focused crossborder progress. The structure of the GoM’s departments and agencies is similarly complex with border and national security responsibilities split between the president and eight cabinet departments. Efforts are often duplicated across agencies because roles, responsibilities, and authority are not clearly defined .11 Ambiguous, shifting, and overlapping responsibilities have also led to uncoordinated efforts (and often animosity) between Mexican federal agencies. While overlapping roles in the GoM federal structure may provide some checks and balances across agencies, more often it leads to confusion in both the United States and GoM with regard to authority, roles, responsibilities, and which department should coordinate with what department. 124 1NC – Solvency Frontline (2/2) Current investments in the border solve the aff — the 21st Century Border Initiative is sufficient Regan 11 — Sean Regan, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (Sean Regan, Naval War College, 1028-2011, “U.S. – MEXICO POLICY COORDINATION AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY BORDER POLICY COORDINATION EFFORT”, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555536.pdf) It is important to examine if the coordination mechanisms established by Presidents Obama and Calderón in the Twenty-First Century Border Executive Steering Committee (ESC) and the tasks they have chosen to address, have the potential to increase and improve the governance ability of the Government of Mexico. Again, governance has three components: (1) the ability to develop appropriate and collaborative policy; (2) the ability to coordinate the implementation of the policy; and (3) the ability to do so transparently and informatively to the public. The Twenty-First Century Border effort has successfully met the first two components and part of the third and should result, eventually, in improved governance in Mexico. The first component, developing appropriate and collaborative policies, is ongoing and efforts to date appear to have had some success . The 2010 Joint Declaration of Presidents Obama and Calderón established the Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral Executive Steering Committee (ESC). The ESC is composed of high-level representatives from federal government departments and agencies with authorities and responsibilities related to the border. For the United States, this includes representatives from the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, Transportation, Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Defense, and the Office of the United State Trade Representative. For Mexico representatives are from the Secretariats of Foreign Relations, Interior, Finance and Public Credit, Economy, Public Security, Communications and Transportation, Agriculture, and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic. This group was charged by the Presidents to make “progress in upgrading border infrastructure; implement innovations in port of entry operations that advance both citizen safety and global competitiveness; and increase our capacity to prevent and address violence and criminality in the border region.”19 The ESC recognized that it must address policy issues that were of mutual benefit to each nation and would demonstrably improve cross-border trade facilitation without decreasing security. In May 2010, the Executive Steering Committee (ESC) identified binational issues for collaborative and coordinated action. These include programs focused on reducing congestion and delays in cross-border traffic; the creation, expansion, or mutual recognition of “trusted shipper” programs (programs allowing enforcement authorities to concentrate their efforts where they are most needed to stop illicit border flows); programs that permit pre-screening, pre-clearance, and preinspection of people, goods, and products prior to them arriving at POEs; and, improved binational coordination in planning, financing, permitting, designing, building, and operating POEs. National Security Staff representatives indicate there were nearly 21 priority projects identified with topic areas addressing infrastructure to information sharing. ESC members from both nations agreed to the list of priority projects and work is underway to address them. Overall, the bureaucratic structure formed by the Presidents appears to have enhanced the development of coordinated border policies , the first component of governance. 125 2NC – Extension – Status Quo Solves (2/2) And, 21st Century Border Initiative is ensures coordination — the status quo solves Regan 11 — Sean Regan, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (Sean Regan, Naval War College, 1028-2011, “U.S. – MEXICO POLICY COORDINATION AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY BORDER POLICY COORDINATION EFFORT”, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a555536.pdf) Similarly, the GoM has made progress in adjusting its coordination structures for greater effectiveness. The GoM established a five-group structure that aligns with the United States’ structure. The five groups include an infrastructure planning subcommittee that aligns with the U.S. Infrastructure Planning group and a law enforcement and security subcommittee that parallels the U.S. Corridor Security effort. Further, it established three subcommittees that align very closely with the U.S. Secure Flows effort. These subcommittees address commerce facilitation, bi-national risk management, and preclearance and preinspection. State Department representatives have remarked this is a remarkable step forward in the GoM’s inter-agency coordination and participation in cooperative policy-making.21 It is also a strong indication of the GoM’s commitment to ensuring bi-national approaches to important topics. An ESC working group met in December 2010 and agreed upon progressive crossborder efficiency and effectiveness goals that would be accomplished within a 12-month period. To manage the implementation of these goals a bi-national, co-chaired structure was established. These groups should improve coordination and efficiency . The bi-national groups seek to address: 126 2NC – Extension – Status Quo Solves (2/2) Status quo solves trade and border infrastructure Houghton 13 (Richard Houghton, writter for Mexico Real Estate News and Blog. 7/23/13. "Mexico Announces $316 Billion Infrastructure Investment Plan". www.investmentpropertiesmexico.com/mexico-real-estate-news-blog/2013/07/mexicoannounces-316-billion-infrastructure-investment-plan) President Enrique Peña Nieto expects at least one third of the investment total to be invested in transportation and communications projects that will be funded by both public and private investors. This will reportedly include new highways, ports and railroads to connect all areas of the country, thereby improving travel and logistics for businesses operating in Mexico.¶ “Communications and Transport Minister Gerardo Ruiz Esparza said major works include construction or modernization of 5,410 kilometers of highways, the upgrading of six regional airports and a number of sea ports, as well as the construction of three intercity passenger railways, a new line for the Monterrey subway system, and a light passenger train system,” writes the Wall Street Journal.¶ In 2013 alone, the Mexican government reportedly plans to spend nearly $3 billion to modernize roads, according to the nation’s General Director of Highways, Hector Arvizu. The money will be used to ensure the economy, efficiency, safety and quality of airports, highways, ports, railroads and official buildings.¶ “Mexican trains now haul about 14 percent of the nearly $500 billion worth of goods that cross the Mexico-U.S. border each year, up from 10 percent in 2009,” writes Reuters. “With some saying bilateral trade could double in the next five years, having already jumped 62 percent between 2009 and 2012, it’s a trend that looks set to continue.”¶ Over the next five years, at least $100 billion has been allocated to improve these key parts of Mexico’s infrastructure, including funds that have been earmarked to build the nation’s first high-speed rail links. This move is expected to revive passenger rail in Mexico City and the Riviera Maya, connecting Cancun real estate with the colonial city of Merida, which is just a short ride inland on Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula. ¶ In addition, Mexico’s transport and communications authority has vowed to invest at least an additional $450 million in its Gulf ports, including will make the port more accessible and efficient for new access roads, dredging and a new railway line that various exporters . This year the government already completed a new entrance into Mahahual’s Costa Maya Cruise Port, which is a popular destination for international travelers in the state of Quintana Roo south of Cancun on Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula. 127 2NC – AT: Add-On – Terrorism (1/2) Newest data proves – no risk of WMD terrorism Mueller 2011—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truthabout-al-qaeda?page=show) As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance . Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included. 128 2NC – AT: Add-On – Terrorism (2/2) No terrorism – no capabilities Basit 11 (12/23/11 – writer for Islamabad Pulse (Abdul, “A threat assessment of Al-Qaeda’s strength and weaknesses-IV.” http://www.weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=1641&storylist=2) A threat assessment of Al-Qaeda’s current status looking into its capabilities, intentions and opportunities would reveal that currently it clearly lacks capabilities and has fewer opportunities at its disposal; however, it still has the intentions to carry forward its agenda of transnational jihad. Effective and efficient responses to Al-Qaeda’s threat at political and ideological level have isolated the terror network. As mentioned in previous pieces Al-Qaeda’s staunchest ally, the Afghan Taliban, have distanced themselves from its ideology of global jihad and portray themselves as nationalist resistant movements. Currently, AlQaeda’s closest ally in Pakistan, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is also suffering desertions and dissentions. Internal divisions are quite visible within the TTP ranks and it is finding it difficult to keep its act together. In such a scenario, it will be doubly difficult for the TTP to protect and shelter Al-Qaeda in Pak-Afghan tribal region. Starting with capabilities, Al-Qaeda does not possess both manpower and firepower to carry out large-scale terror attacks against its target. It is weak at the center but strong at the fringes. Out of the network’s 10 main leaders listed after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, only two are still alive: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s one-time deputy who took over after his boss was killed in May; and Abu Yahya Al-Libi. However, due to continuous threat of CIA-led predator drone strikes and fear of being spotted they remain underground. Most of the time their focus is on how to survive and keep themselves alive and, every now and then, to appear in a video message to address their followers and operatives. This in turn weakens their ability to manage operational matters of Al-Qaeda and actively coordinate with its world-wide cells. Even before his death former Al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden was also leading life of a recluse and he was hardly in touch with the leadership of his group. After 9/11 Al-Qaeda has failed to target any major attacks beyond Gulf. Most of its terror plots were foiled or averted by the security agencies. According to a research carried out by the Heritage Foundation since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 at least 39 terror plots against the United States have been foiled. Moreover, few lone-wolf style terror acts by Al-Qaeda operatives were also unsuccessful. The abortive attempts of Richard Reid and Faisal Shahzad are two cases in point. Richard Reid abortively tried to light a fuse protruding from his shoe on a Paris bound American Airlines Flight No. 63. Reid was overpowered by fight crew and passengers and the flight was diverted to Boston. While Faisal Shahzad, who tried to blow up a car bomb in New York’ Time Square, failed to detonate the explosive material and was arrested by security authorities. Looking at intentions the group still harbors its espoused vision of global jihad and target its enemies around the globe. However, it has not been able to recover from various setbacks it has suffered in the last decade. Various attempts, abortive or otherwise, establish this fact beyond any doubt that against all odds and difficulties Al-Qaeda has not given up on its stated goals and objectives. The like-minded terror networks which Al-Qaeda has built, highlights its aims. A worrying factor in this regard is the breakdown of state institutions in different Muslim countries of Africa and Middle East as well as spread of radicalization in Muslim Diaspora communities of the West and US. AlQaeda has thrived in failed or failing Muslim states. The erosion of incompetent and corrupt Muslim leaders and poor governance created huge vacuums which Al-Qaeda masterly exploited and furthered its own interests. Currently, the abysmal state of affairs in several Muslim countries provides an ideal opportunity to Al-Qaeda and its like-minded groups to re-cultivate their influence. A heartening thing to notice in Arab Spring was ‘minimal’ to ‘no’ Al-Qaeda influence in these movements. Though these protests varied from country to country in their agendas and motivations, one thing common in these mass movements was that they sprouted from their own set of problems in local contexts. The major demands in these movements were better job opportunities, right to elect their representatives and end to decades of dictatorial rules and monarchies. None of these moments attributed the ills to external forces (read America) and demanded solutions which do not provide Al-Qaeda any groundswell. However, a concerning thing in this situation is the transition phase. If the public mandate is not respected and peaceful transfer of power to elected publicrepresentatives is not facilitated by interim set-ups then prolonged transition phases can provide Al-Qaeda with an opportunity to inject its influence to manipulate the process of power transition from old to new setups. Another lesson learnt from Arab Spring is the rise of Islamist forces in elections. Any attempt to sideline these Islamist forces would pave way for Al-Qaeda to manipulate the circumstances to its benefit. A case in point is suppression of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria by Algerian military which over the years brought Algeria’s Islamists closer to Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) grew out of a conflict in Algeria between the government and Islamist militants. 129 ***VENEZUELA OIL AFFIRMATIVE*** 130 Notes Affirmative Analysis This affirmative defends that the US should increase its investment in and engagement with Venezuela’s oil sector. This type of affirmative is strong in that it focuses in on one aspect of the topic country to engage with – in this case, the oil sector in Venezuela. This particular Venezuela affirmative is a major component of the discussion on whether or not to increase economic engagement with Venezuela as their oil reserves offer huge national benefits to the US should we choose to enact the plan. This affirmative gets into really strong, literature-rich, debates about US oil dependence on the Middle East which enables the affirmative team to access really large and true impact claims to hedge against negative positions. Advantage One --- US-Venezuela Relations The thesis of this advantage is that US investment and engagement in the oil sector would send an olive branch to Venezuela which would provide substantive commitment to repairing the relationship with recently elected Maduro. Repairing bilateral ties would enable more effective regional cooperation as Venezuela and the US could cooperate on issues such as green energy and deforestation. Advantage Two --- Oil Dependence The thesis of this advantage is that US investment in the oil sector would enable Venezuela to ramp up production and scale up their exports of oil to the US. Because of this, the US could be independent of Middle Eastern oil because large quantities of Venezuelan oil could replace our current dependence on OPEC oil exports. New Advantage Ground One interesting way to read this Venezuela aff as supported by the literature is to defend a conditional offer of engagement on Venezuela taking a particular action. These “quid pro quo” affirmatives are definitely arguably topical on this topic and are strategic in that they can claim advantages off of the reciprocal action that Venezuela might take. A specific condition that a substantial amount of literature exists on is to condition oil sector investment on Venezuela cutting off ties with and financial support for Iran which may access an entirely distinct advantage ground based off of Iranian proliferation. Sample Plan Texts: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic investment in oil infrastructure in Venezuela. The United States federal government should substantially increase energy sector reform engagement with Venezuela. 131 1AC – Relations Adv (1/5) Advantage ____ is US-Venezuela Relations Status quo relations with Venezuela are chilled because of the absence of US commitment to normalizing relations --- Venezuela’s recent attempts at better ties means now is the key time for normalizing relations AFP 13 (Agence France Presse, “Venezuela’s new government ‘open’ to resuming U.S. diplomatic relations,” May 19, 2013, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/05/19/venezuelas-newgovernment-open-to-resuming-u-s-diplomatic-relations/) Venezuela on Sunday made a rare diplomatic overture to the United States, suggesting it could be time for better ties. “We are going to remain open to normalizing relations with the United States,” Foreign Minister Elias Jaua said on Televen television Sunday. “The first thing would be to resume diplomatic representation at the highest level,” he said. The country’s late socialist president Hugo Chavez was a staunch critic of the United States, and his successor Nicolas Maduro is still feeling out its footing with Washington. Chavez for more than 14 years unleashed verbal broadsides on US leaders before his death in March. The United States and Venezuela since 2010 have not even had ambassadors in their embassies in their respective capitals. Maduro, who earlier said his government would like to increase dialogue with the United States, has selected lawmaker Calixto Ortega as its potential US envoy. US President Barack Obama however has not congratulated Maduro for his controversial, razor-thin April 14 election, as Maduro’s opposition rival Henrique Capriles presses claims that the Venezuelan presidential election was marred by irregularities. Maduro meanwhile slammed Obama “the top leader of devils” after he commented on post-election unrest in Venezuela. The plan signals a commitment to commercial relations with Venezuela which spills over and enables successful regional energy policy cooperation Delahunt 12 (William Delahunt, chairman of the Venezuela-US Friendship Group and former U.S. Representative, “A New Role for the US an Venezuela,” October 30, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/10/30/podiumvenezuela/EJ6Jd2yRKfaJ76HYrXb4WJ/story.html) The recent election in Venezuela offers an opportunity to improve the US-Venezuela bilateral relationship. On Oc. 7th, President Hugo Chavez was reelected to a new six-year term by a nine point margin. I — along with hundreds of other international witnesses — was duly impressed with the transparency of the electoral process and the enthusiasm of Venezuelans for democracy. Eighty-one percent percent of registered voters went to the polls! This turnout was remarkable when compared to the United States and other “mature” democracies. Whether or not one agrees with Chávez’s policies, there can be no doubt that he won these elections fairly. There are so many checks and balances in the electoral system in Venezuela that there is virtually no room for fraud. The voter registry, the voting machines, the electronic ballot and the data transmission system are all fully audited by representatives of all the different political parties and independent observers. Former President Jimmy Carter recently called the Venezuelan voting system “the best in the world.” He noted that the voting machines print out a paper receipt that voters can look at to verify that their selection was recorded correctly, and poll workers check those receipts against the electronic tally. I was particularly struck by the atmosphere of peacefulness and mutual respect in the voting centers, where monitors from both pro-government and opposition groups were present. In contrast with elections past, the two main candidates manifested a similar attitude. Once the election authorities announced the results, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles rapidly conceded defeat, and he quickly scolded “radical” opposition supporters who insisted on alleging that fraud had taken place, despite no evidence to support their claims. Chávez also behaved gracefully, calling Capriles the following day to express his willingness to work together to mitigate the polarization that divided Venezuelans. Most of Venezuela’s political leadership — following a tumultuous power struggle, during which a coup d’Etat and violent protests occurred — appear to have accepted to follow the democratic rulebook and be more tolerant of one another. This is an important step forward, and the United States should encourage Venezuelans to continue seeking common ground, rather than support one group over another, as has at times been the case in recent years. Most importantly, over 55 percent of Venezuelan voters cast their vote in favor of Chávez. The United States should respect this outcome and seek to improve Commercial relations between our two countries have generally been excellent, despite political differences, and both countries would greatly benefit from their expansion. Venezuela will no doubt continue to play a central role in the region’s new multilateral cooperation and consultation mechanisms, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Central American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The United States, which has increasingly found itself isolated in regional forums, would do well to find ways to work with these new groups on important issues such as drug trafficking and energy cooperation. Improved relations with Venezuela would greatly facilitate this task. Our government will certainly have important differences with Venezuela, particularly in the area of relations in areas where we can agree. international relations. But we can agree to disagree, as we do with many other partners throughout the world. I am convinced that the Venezuelan government is prepared to respond favorably to such an initiative. 132 1AC – Relations Adv (2/5) Regional energy cooperation is key to overcome energy nationalism and expand clean technology and green research --- that’s key to stop Amazon deforestation and combat climate change Zedillo et al. 08 (Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, “Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World,” Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america %20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF) To expand the hemisphere’s energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil production (especially deep offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the region’s potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will cost $70–240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexico’s. Mexico also plans to connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America. Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports. However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in South America have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines, remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners. In addition to developing carbon-neutral sources of energy, the centralized and disseminated. Western Hemisphere has other roles to play in combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the LAC region’s future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also, deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin contains one of the world’s three most important rainforests, whose protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is pioneering the use of information technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon. 133 1AC – Relations Adv (3/5) Amazon destruction will lead to extinction Takacs 96 (David Takacs, “The Idea of Diversity: Philosophies of Paradise,” 1996, pg. 200-201) So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious which a billion human beings per-ished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's wellstocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where cancer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper. Integrating Venezuela is key to solve climate change --- the plan’s increase in dialogue helps ensure a broader regional investment in low carbon and green technologies Edwards 11 (Guy Edwards, Brown University Research Fellow & co-founder of Intercambio Climatico, “Climate, Energy to Dominate US-Latin American Relations,” July 18, 2011, http://www.trust.org/item/?map=climate-energy-to-dominate-us-latin-american-relations) The threats of climate change and growing resource scarcity, combined with the opportunities presented by green growth, provide the impetus for increasing trade and investment in low carbon and high- tech industries. Although the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative leads U.S. trade policy in the Western hemisphere, the State Department’s diplomats complement this work and Valenzuela ’s successor can make a valuable contribution in this area with the relevant expertise. As climate, clean energy, resource scarcity and green growth begin to define U.S.-Latin American relations, the U.S.’s top diplomat in the region should have the appropriate experience to ensure greater policy coherence among U.S. agencies and effective dialogue with Latin American governments, many of which are trailblazing in these areas. 134 1AC – Relations Adv (4/5) Warming is real and reaching a tipping point --- action now is critical to prevent irreversible positive feedbacks Chen et al. 10 – Chen, Qian, Peridas, Qiu, Ho: Natural Resources Defense Council, Friedmann: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Li, Wei: Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sung, Fowler: Clean Air Task Force, Seligsohn, Liu, Forbes: World Resources Institute, Zhang: China Tsinghua University, Zhao: Institute of Engineering Thermophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Jason Chen, Jingjing Qian, George Peridas, Yueming Qiu, Bruce Ho, Julio Friedmann, Xiaochun Li, Ning Wei, S. Ming Sung, Mike Fowler, Deborah Seligsohn, Yue Liu, Sarah Forbes, Dongjie Zhang, Lifeng Zhao, December 2010, “Identifying Near-Term Opportunities For Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in China,” http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10121001a.pdf) Scientific evidence has established that warming of the Earth’s climate system is unequivocal.2 The average atmospheric temperature near the surface has risen much faster over the past 150 years than during the thousands of years before, and over the last 50 years this warming trend has accelerated. During the last decade, the world experienced some of the highest average global temperatures in recorded history (see Table 1.1).3 [table omitted] Without a clean energy transformation away from coal and other fossil fuels, the detrimental effects of global warming will only intensify over the coming decades. These negative trends will include rising sea levels, more extreme weather patterns, rapidly-melting glaciers, damage to ecosystems, and the resurgence and spread of diseases. Scientific models warn that a 2°C to 4°C increase in global average temperatures would likely trigger sudden and irreversible effects, including the submersion of large areas of coastline due to significant sea level rises, abrupt shifts in global ocean circulation patterns causing large-scale climate change, and the potential extinction of 40 to 70 percent of species worldwide.4 Without significant global action, we may soon reach a tipping point upon which global warming begins to reinforce itself in hard-to-stop positive feedback cycles. For example, melting permafrost could unlock previously frozen greenhouse gases, which would accelerate and fuel the warming trend.5 To avoid the worst effects of this warming, the world must reduce emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases by drastically reducing its reliance on fossil fuels. To this end, governments around the world are moving toward a consensus that we must not allow global average temperatures to rise by more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. This limit implies that the world as a whole must cut CO2 emissions in half by 2050 compared to 1990 levels.6 135 1AC – Relations Adv (5/5) Climate change outweighs nuclear war and causes extinction Doebbler 11 (Curtis Doebbler, International Human Rights Lawyer, “Two Threats to Our Existence,” Ahram Weekly, July 2011, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1055/envrnmnt.htm) Climate change is widely acknowledged to be the greatest threat facing humanity. It will lead to small island states disappearing from the face of the earth, serious global threats to our food and water supplies, and ultimately the death of hundreds of millions of the poorest people in the world over the course of this century. No other threat -- including war, nuclear disasters, rogue regimes, terrorism, or the fiscal irresponsibility of governments -- is reliably predicted to cause so much harm to so many people on earth, and indeed to the earth itself. The International Panel on Climate Change, which won the Nobel Prize for its evaluation of thousands of research studies to provide us accurate information on climate change, has predicted that under the current scenario of "business-as-usual", temperatures could rise by as much as 10 degrees Celsius in some parts of the world. This would have horrendous consequences for the most vulnerable people in the world. Consequences that the past spokesman of 136 developing countries, Lumumba Diaping, described as the equivalent of sending hundreds of millions of Africans to the furnace. Yet for more than two decades, states have failed to take adequate action to either prevent climate change or to deal with its consequences. A major reason for this is that many wealthy industrialised countries view climate change as at worst an inconvenience, or at best even a potential market condition from which they can profit at the expense of developing countries. Indeed, history has shown them that because of their significantly higher levels of population they have grown rich and been able to enslave, exploit and marginalise their neighbours in developing countries. They continue in this vein. 136 2AC – Extension – Solvency (1/2) Oil investment is different --- catalyzes broader relations and Venezuela is willing to accept Metzker 13 (Jared Metzker, “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/06/analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-u-s-venezuela-relations/) WASHINGTON, Jun 17 2013 (IPS) - A shift in U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela may be pending as a bilateral rapprochement suddenly appears more possible than it has in years. On the sidelines of talks held earlier this month in Guatemala by the Organisation of American States (OAS), U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua, with Kerry’s subsequent statements indicating that relations could be heading in a friendlier direction. “We agreed today – both of us, Venezuela and the United States – that we would like to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive relationship and find the ways to do that,” Kerry said following the meeting with Jaua, which was reportedly requested by the Venezuelans. The meeting happened on the heels of the release of Timothy Tracy, a U.S. filmmaker whom Venezuela had been holding on accusations of espionage. His release was interpreted by many as an “olive branch” being offered by the new Venezuelan government of Nicholas Maduro, whose presidency Washington still has not formally recognised. Only months ago, before the death of Venezuela’s long-time socialist leader Hugo Chavez, any normalisation of relations between Venezuela and the United States seemed highly unlikely. In 2002, Chavez was briefly removed from power by a military coup d’état that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had known was imminent. Chavez immediately accused the United States of having played a part in the event. After his suspicions were confirmed partly valid, his rhetoric grew more scathing. In 2006, he famously told the United Nations General Assembly that then-U.S. President George W. Bush was “the devil himself”. Following Chavez’s death from cancer in March, however, his hand-picked successor, Maduro, the former vice-president, has not been as vitriolic in his posturing vis-à-vis the United States. According to Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, Maduro has offered “conflicting signals”. “Maduro has so far shifted in his position toward the U.S. between a moderate approach and a more hard-line one,” Shifter told IPS. The new president’s waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent support from the lower classes. In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won election, Maduro has had to deal with a split within Chavez’s own former political base. Shifter pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is given to Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuela’s parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the presidency. Maduro’s legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to “emulate” his predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable. Still, ideological concerns may not ultimately decide the issue. Venezuela has inherited from Chavez an economy in difficult straits, which continues to suffer from notorious shortages and high inflation. Oil economy Over half of Venezuela’s federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the country’s exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world. Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela. Venezuela’s oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His government took a greater chunk of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies. While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company. The same critics also point to increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure. In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites. “The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating,” explained Shifter. “They know they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out.” If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the world. Kerry’s recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open arms. “Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time,” Diana Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, “and we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests.” Indeed, Negroponte said she was “optimistic” about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a “troika” of issues on which the United States is looking for Venezuelan cooperation: counterterrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels. 137 2AC – Extension – Solvency (2/2) Oil is distinct --- it offers a unique opportunity to revive relations Clarke 13 (Kevin Clarke, Associate Editor of America The National Catholic Review and MA in International Studies from DePaul University, March 25, 2013, “Chavez Death Brings New Chance For U.S.-Venezuela Engagement,” http://americamagazine.org/issue/chavez-deathbrings-new-chance-us-venezuela-engagement) The passing of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela unleashed an epic outpouring of grief among his supporters in Venezuela, the likes of which may only be eventually paralleled with the passing of another larger-than-life figure in Latin American socialism, Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Matthew Carnes, S.J., assistant professor of government at Georgetown University, said Chávez will be remembered as a leader who had an “outsized impact in Venezuelan politics.” Father Carnes said Chávez’s passing offers an opportunity for the United States, politically and economically, to revive its relationship with Venezuela. Occasionally “capricious and doctrinaire,” Chávez was “someone the United States had a hard time negotiating with,” according to Father Carnes. Whether his designated political heir, Vice President Nicholas Maduro, or an opposition candidate, most likely Henrique Capriles Radonski, governor of the Venezuelan state of Miranda, is elected to replace Chávez, Father Carnes expects a more pragmatic and less confrontational leadership to emerge. That could mean improved ties not just with Venezuela but throughout the region, he said, and a possible opening for renewed U.S. investment and partnership with the Venezuelan state oil industry. Despite Chávez’s notorious distaste for U.S. political leaders, under his leadership Venezuela remained one of the largest suppliers of oil to the United States. This is likely to continue. 138 2AC – Extension – Amazon Impact Amazon destruction will result in extinction --- it’s the lungs of the planet O’Neal 97 (Martin O’Neal, “Rain Forest Depletion,” May 5, 1997, http://www.northern.wvnet.edu/~tdanford/bio1/RAINFO.htm) There are some really amazing facts about the Amazon rain forest. The Amazon alone covers 54% of all the world’s rain forests, thus making it literally the lungs of the Earth. We can say this because trees produce oxygen while they use carbon dioxide to maintain their respiration. Rain forests cover about 7% of the Earth’s surface, but host about 5090% of the plant and animal population of the entire world. The Amazon River has more species of fish than the entire Atlantic Ocean does. In less than 25 acres of rain forest there are more species of trees than the entire continent of North America. A tree found in Peru was found to be the host to 43 different species of ants. There are more species of birds on a Peru reserve than the entire United States has. A fact that is very highly regarded about the Amazon rain forest is that of the 3000 species of plants that have been discovered there, 70% of these plants have anti-cancerous properties. Also, 25% of these plants are now used to combat cancer. So as humankind continues to harvest the Amazon rain forest which covers 1.2 million acres and 9 countries, they should also try to consider the devastating effects that it is having on our race along with all the biological effects that it also carries. Although 1.2 million acres seems like a very large number, in the past four decades that number was reduced in half to the current figure, so we see that this can not keep happening with out some type of governing on what is occurring. If it does we may become an endangered species. 139 2AC – Extension – Warming Real (1/2) The consensus of scientists and the strongest data supports that warming is real and anthropogenic Anderegg et al. 10 (PhD Candidate at Stanford in Biology, William Anderegg, “Expert Credibility in Climate Change,” National Academy of Sciences, p. 12107-12109) Preliminary reviews of scientific literature and surveys of cli- mate scientists indicate striking agreement with the primary anthropogenic greenhouse gases have been responsible for “most” of the “unequivocal” warming of the Earth’s average global temperature over the second half of the 20th century (1–3). Nonetheless, substantial and growing public doubt remains about the anthropogenic cause and scientific agreement about the role of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in climate change (4, 5). A vocal minority of researchers and other critics contest the conclusions of the mainstream scientific assessment, frequently citing large numbers of scientists whom they believe support their claims (6–8). This group, often termed climate change skeptics, contrarians, or deniers, has received large amounts of media attention and wields significant influence in the societal debate about climate change impacts and policy (7, conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): 9–14). An extensive literature examines what constitutes expertise or credibility in technical and policy-relevant scientific research (15). Though our aim is not to expand upon that literature here, we wish to draw upon several important observations from this literature in examining expert credibility in climate change. First, though the degree of contextual, political, epistemological, and scholars acknowledge the need to identify credible experts and account for expert opinion in tech- nical (e.g., science-based) decision-making (15–19). Furthermore, delineating expertise and the relative credibility of claims is critical, especially in areas where it may be difficult for the majority of decision-makers and the lay public to evaluate the full complexities of a technical issue cultural in- fluences in determining who counts as an expert and who is credible remains debated, many (12, 15). Ultimately, however, societal decisions regarding response to ACC must necessarily include input from many diverse and nonexpert stakeholders. Because the timeline of decision-making is often more rapid than scientific consensus, examining the landscape of expert opinion can greatly inform such decision-making (15, 19). Here, we examine a metric of climate-specific expertise and a metric of overall sci- entific prominence as two dimensions of expert credibility in two groups of researchers. We provide a broad assessment of the rel- ative credibility of researchers convinced by the evidence (CE) of ACC and those unconvinced by the evidence (UE) of ACC. Our consideration of UE researchers differs from previous work on climate change skeptics and contrarians in that we primarily focus on researchers that have published extensively in the climate field, although we consider all skeptics/contrarians that have signed pro- minent statements concerning ACC (6–8). Such expert analysis can illuminate public and policy discussions about ACC and the extent of consensus in the expert scientific community. We compiled a database of 1,372 climate researchers based on authorship of scientific assessment reports and membership on multisignatory statements about ACC (SI Materials and Methods). We tallied the number of climaterelevant publications authored or coauthored by each researcher (defined here as expertise) and counted the number of citations for each of the researcher’s four highest-cited papers (defined here as prominence) using Google Scholar. We then imposed an a priori criterion that a researcher must have authored a minimum of 20 climate publications to be considered a climate researcher, thus reducing the database to 908 researchers. Varying this minimum publication cutoff did not ma- terially alter results (Materials and Methods). We ranked researchers based on the total number of climate publications authored. Though our compiled researcher list is not comprehensive nor designed to be representative of the entire cli- mate science community, we have drawn researchers from the most high-profile reports and public statements about ACC. Therefore, we have likely compiled the strongest and most credentialed researchers in CE and UE groups. Citation and publication analyses must be treated with caution in inferring scientific credibility, but we suggest that our methods and our expertise and prominence criteria provide conservative, robust, and relevant indicators of relative credibility of CE and UE groups of climate researchers (Materials and Methods). Results and Discussion The UE [unconvinced by evidence] group comprises only 2% of the top 50 climate researchers as ranked by expertise (number of climate publications), 3% of researchers of the top 100, and 2.5% of the top 200, excluding researchers present in both groups (Materials and Methods). This result closely agrees with expert surveys, indicating that ≈97% of self-identified actively publishing climate scientists agree with the tenets of ACC (2). Furthermore, this finding complements direct polling of the climate researcher community, which yields quali- tative and self-reported researcher expertise (2). Our findings capture the added dimension of the distribution of researcher expertise, quantify agreement among the highest expertise climate researchers, and provide an independent assessment of level of scientific consensus concerning ACC. In addition to the striking difference in number of expert researchers between CE and UE groups, the distribution of expertise of the UE group is far below that of the CE group (Fig. 1). Mean expertise of the UE group was around half (60 publications) that of the CE group (119 pub- lications; Mann–Whitney U test: W = 57,020; P < 140 2AC – Extension – Warming Real (2/2) <<<CONTINUED – NO TEXT REMOVED>>> 10−14), as was median expertise (UE = 34 publications; CE = 84 publications). Furthermore, researchers with fewer than 20 climate publications comprise ≈80% the UE group, as opposed to less than 10% of the CE group. This indicates that the bulk of UE researchers on the most prominent multisignatory statements about climate change have not published extensively in the peer-reviewed climate literature. We examined a subsample of the 50 most-published (highestexpertise) researchers from each group. Such subsampling facili- tates comparison of relative expertise between groups (normalizing differences between absolute numbers). This method reveals large differences in relative expertise between CE and UE groups (Fig. 2). Though the top-published researchers in the CE group have an average of 408 climate publications (median = 344), the top UE re- searchers average only 89 publications (median = 68; Mann– Whitney U test: W = 2,455; P < 10−15). Thus, this suggests that not all experts are equal, and top CE researchers have much stronger expertise in climate science than those in the top UE group. Finally, our prominence criterion provides an independent and approximate estimate of the relative scientific significance of CE and UE publications. Citation analysis complements publication analysis because it can, in general terms, capture the quality and impact of a researcher’s contribution—a critical component to overall scientific credibility—as opposed to measuring a research- er’s involvement in a field, or expertise (Materials and Methods). The citation analysis conducted here further complements the publication analysis because it does not examine solely climate- relevant publications and thus captures highly prominent re- searchers who may not be directly involved with the climate field. We examined the top four most-cited papers for each CE and UE researcher with 20 or more climate publications and found immense disparity in scientific prominence between CE and UE communities (Mann–Whitney U test: W = 50,710; P < 10−6; Fig. 3). CE researchers’ top papers were cited an average of 172 times, compared with 105 times for UE researchers. Because a single, highly cited paper does not establish a highly credible reputation but might instead reflect the controversial nature of that paper (often called the single-paper effect), we also considered the av- erage the citation count of the second through fourth most-highly cited papers of each researcher. Results were robust when only these papers were considered (CE mean: 133; UE mean: 84; Mann–Whitney U test: W = 50,492; P < 10−6). Results were ro- bust when all 1,372 researchers, including those with fewer than 20 climate publications, were considered (CE mean: 126; UE mean: 59; Mann–Whitney U test: W = 3.5 × 105; P < 10−15). Number of citations is an imperfect but useful benchmark for a group’s scientific prominence (Materials and Methods), and we show here that even considering all (e.g., climate and nonclimate) publications, the UE researcher group has substantially lower prominence than the CE group. We provide a large-scale quantitative assessment of the relative level of agreement, expertise, and prominence in the climate researcher community. We show that the expertise and prominence, two integral components of overall expert credibility, of climate researchers convinced by the evidence of ACC vastly overshadows that of the climate change skeptics and contrarians. This divide is even starker when considering the top researchers in each group. Despite media tendencies to present both sides in ACC debates (9), which can contribute to continued public misunderstanding re- garding ACC (7, 11, 12, 14), not all climate researchers are equal in scientific credibility and expertise in the climate system. This extensive analysis of the mainstream versus skeptical/contrarian researchers suggests a strong role for considering expert credibility in the relative weight of and attention to these groups of researchers in future discussions in media, policy, and public forums regarding anthropogenic climate change. 141 2AC – Extension – Warming Reversible Emissions are reversible but the window is closing --- action now is key Harvey 11 (Fiona Harvey, environmental correspondent for Guardian, “World headed for irreversible climate change in five years, IEA warns,” 11/9/2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climatechange) The world is likely to build so many fossil-fuelled power stations, energy-guzzling factories and inefficient buildings in the next five years that it will become impossible to hold global warming to safe levels, and the last chance of combating dangerous climate change will be "lost for ever", according to the most thorough analysis yet of world energy infrastructure. Anything built from now on that produces carbon will do so for decades, and this "lock-in" effect will be the single factor most likely to produce irreversible climate change, the world's foremost authority on energy economics has found. If this is not rapidly changed within the next five years, the results are likely to be disastrous. "The door is closing," Fatih Birol, chief economist at the International Energy Agency, said. "I am very worried – if we don't change direction now on how we use energy, we will end up beyond what scientists tell us is the minimum [for safety]. The door will be closed forever." If the world is to stay below 2C of warming, which scientists regard as the limit of safety, then emissions must be held to no more than 450 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; the level is currently around 390ppm. But the world's existing infrastructure is already producing 80% of that "carbon budget", according to the IEA's analysis, published on Wednesday. This gives an ever-narrowing gap in which to reform the global economy on to a low-carbon footing. If current trends continue, and we go on building high-carbon energy generation, then by 2015 at least 90% of the available "carbon budget" will be swallowed up by our energy and industrial infrastructure. By 2017, there will be no room for manoeuvre at all – the whole of the carbon budget will be spoken for, according to the IEA's calculations. Birol's warning comes at a crucial moment in international negotiations on climate change, as governments gear up for the next fortnight of talks in Durban, South Africa, from late November. "If we do not have an international agreement, whose effect is put in place by 2017, then the door to [holding temperatures to 2C of warming] will be closed forever," said Birol. 142 2AC – Add-On – Ocean Acidification Regional cooperation enables massive emissions reductions --- that’s Zedillo --reducing emissions alone prevents extinction from ocean acidification Romm 12 (Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, “Science: Ocean Acidifying So Fast It Threatens Humanity’s Ability to Feed Itself,” 3/2/2012, http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/03/02/436193/science-ocean-acidifying-so-fast-itthreatens-humanity-ability-to-feeditself/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+climateprogr e) The world’s oceans may be turning acidic faster today from human carbon emissions than they did during four major extinctions in the last 300 million years, when natural pulses of carbon sent global temperatures soaring, says a new study in Science. The study is the first of its kind to survey the geologic record for evidence of ocean acidification over this vast time period. “What we’re doing today really stands out,” said lead author Bärbel Hönisch, a paleoceanographer at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. “We know that life during past ocean acidification events was not wiped out—new species evolved to replace those that died off. But if industrial carbon emissions continue at the current pace, we may lose organisms we care about—coral reefs, oysters, salmon.” That’s the news release from a major 21-author Science paper, “The Geological Record of Ocean Acidification” (subs. req’d). We knew from a 2010 Nature Geoscience study that the oceans are now acidifying 10 times faster today than 55 million years ago when a mass extinction of marine species occurred. But this study looked back over 300 million and found that “the unprecedented rapidity of CO2 release currently taking place” has put marine life at risk in a frighteningly unique way: … the current rate of (mainly fossil fuel) CO2 release stands out as capable of driving a combination and magnitude of ocean geochemical changes potentially unparalleled in at least the last ~300 My of Earth history, raising the possibility that we are entering an unknown territory of marine ecosystem change. That is to say, it’s not just that acidifying oceans spell marine biological meltdown “by end of century” as a 2010 Geological Society study put it. We are also warming the ocean and decreasing dissolved oxygen concentration. That is a recipe for mass extinction. 143 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (1/7) Advantage ____ is Oil Dependence The Chavez model has led to a decline of Venezuela’s oil sector decreasing oil supply and retrenching dependence on OPEC supplies --- increased US investment can reverse this Goldwyn 13 (David Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, “The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities for Cooperation,” House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Energy Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean,” April 11, 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07Wstate-GoldwynD-20130411.pdf) The Western Hemisphere has seen the rise of two trends in energy governance in recent years. One trend is towards rising state control of energy resources – in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador in particular. The concern here is that this trend will limit the growth of global supplies of oil and gas by undermining the value of existing investments, discouraging future investment and leading to political instability resulting from declining living standards. The economic consequence of this trend is that the hemisphere will contribute less to the diversification of oil supply, thereby engendering a tighter international oil market more vulnerable to the negative effects of supply shocks, increasing the importance of OPEC supply and, over time, undermining economic development in the region. The political consequences of these trends include the decline of U.S. influence in the region relative to competing ideologies and the erosion of democratic structures. A second, much more positive, trend is towards creative fiscal regimes that welcome foreign investment and require state owned companies to compete with international companies, with independent regulators that promote fair and efficient regulation. Countries observing this model are increasing production or stalling the decline of existing reserves. Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Peru are key examples of this creative model. When I last testified on Latin American energy trends before Congress, Mexico was generally considered to be a part of the first group, making the net trend negative. Today, however, Mexico’s government is actively seeking reforms that include, but are certainly not limited to, the energy sector. A new question mark hangs over Brazil, however. While Petrobras had been viewed as an exemplar national oil company in recent years, it has recently seen its production estimates curtailed, and its market value tumble. The company is no longer second in value only to Exxon Mobil. Perhaps as a sign of changing regional dynamics, Petrobras is now reported to be worth less than Colombia’s national oil company, a development that would have been thought to be nearly unthinkable just a few years ago. 14 While natural gas production is rising, oil production is falling, as Petrobras has faced major challenges fulfill both its newfound responsibilities in the deep and ultradeepwater subsalt resources, companies face challenges meeting aggressive local content requirements and Petrobras struggles to meet the political expectations of the government. Venezuela and Mexico are the most important oil exporters in the hemisphere. While Brazil, Colombia and Argentina are important destinations for foreign investment, and helpfully produce enough oil to meet their own domestic needs and make some contribution to the global export market, they are not strategic suppliers to the global market at this time. Only Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela produce more than a million barrels per day, although Colombian crude oil production rose as high as 944,310 barrels per day in 2012,15 and Federico Renjifo, the Colombian Energy and Mining Minister, has stated that the country expects to produce 1.01 mbd in 2013.16 Bolivia has enormous gas reserves, but exports mostly to Brazil and modestly to Argentina. Only Trinidad and Tobago is a key supplier to the world gas market. A. The Rise in State Control From those countries now committed to increasing state control, the U.S. faces two key challenges: the loss of production growth and diversity of supply from the region if new economic frameworks are unattractive to foreign investors and, most critically, the loss of U.S. influence vis-à-vis competing political visions. The Economic Impact of Rising State Control The recent wave of changes in contractual terms and dramatic changes in tax regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and, in recent years, Argentina, threatens to slow new investment and eventually deepen instability and poverty in these nations, as well as destroy shareholder value for the companies invested there. The deterioration in the investment climate for energy in these countries is primarily an economic threat, as it foments an environment where supply is constrained and prices are high. We are seeing the revision of economic terms at a time when producers rather than companies hold more market power. Venezuela In 2007, President Hugo Chavez led the nationalization of oil exploration and production in Venezuela, mandating renegotiation of contracts with a minimum 60 percent PdVSA share. While sixteen companies, including Shell and Chevron, complied with the new agreements, ExxonMobil and ENI refused to cooperate and were forcibly taken over. Both companies have pending complaints before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) at the World Bank that are expected to be decided in late 2013. As a result of those claims, particularly the ExxonMobil claim, Venezuela withdrew from the ICSID in The impact of the nationalizations, according to expert analysts like Deutsche Bank and Wood Mackenzie, was a massive flight of investment capital from Venezuela’s heavy oil sector to Canada’s oil sands, effectively freezing development of the hemisphere’s largest oil reserves during one of the greatest oil booms in history. The net impact on Venezuela’s credit and credibility are quite negative, again with serious negative long-term consequences for the global oil market and Venezuela’s own economy. In 2008, ENI and Total came reached an agreement with PdVSA regarding a 2005 joint venture requirement that they 2012.17 had not previously signed an MOU for. Terms for involvement in natural gas development in Venezuela are slightly more beneficial, although in 2012, the year before his death, President Chavez expressed some interest in altering those terms. It is generally expected that Venezuela’s oil production will continue to fluctuate or stagnate without considerable outside investment. According to the EIA, some analysts estimate that PdVSA must spend at least $3 billion annually in order to keep production at its current levels.18 Venezuela plays a significant role in the Western Hemisphere, acting as a proxy for Cuba and providing oil at favorable cost and financing terms to Caribbean nations through Petrocaribe and the Southern Cone through Petrosur, ventures which add stress to the country’s fiscal situation. While change is unlikely to happen quickly, pressure stemming from the recent failed currency devaluation, rising inflation, and vast external subsidies will take a toll on the economy and are ultimately unsustainable. 144 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (2/7) The plan is key --- only US engagement can catalyze a broader revival the Venezuelan oil sector Farnsworth 13 (Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, “Energy Security Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Hearing Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, April 11, 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-WstateFarnsworthE-20130411.pdf) More broadly, the United States has a strategic interest in working with willing nations in the hemisphere to develop their own energy resources effectively, while promoting models that reduce the negative if unintended consequences of regional energy development, including a lack of transparency and official corruption, the distorting impact of consumption subsidies, an over-reliance on a single commodity or sector, environmental concerns, and a concentration of wealth and political power around the sector. In order to develop their respective industries, nations need U.S. technology, management expertise, and investment dollars. They need our education system to develop their engineers and seismologists, they need help to understand regulatory, tax, and policy models that work, they need to be exposed to best practices in environmental mitigation, and they need our technical assistance to improve the investment climate and the rule of law. 145 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (3/7) US transition away from oil dependence will take too long --- the plan’s investment in Venezuelan oil will enable massive supply growth which allows the US to be completely independent of Middle Eastern oil Weafer 13 (Chris Weafer, chief strategist at Sberbank Investment Research, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political, “No business as usual for Russia in Venezuela – paper,” March 12, 2013) Despite assurances from government officials in Caracas that it will be business as usual after the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez last week, his passing will almost certainly lead to the start of political and social changes in that country. The only question is the time frame. Chavez's death and the emergence of a new presidential administration will surely have a significant impact on the global oil industry and price of oil, although perhaps on an even longer timeline. According to the BP Energy Review, Venezuela sits on the world's largest exploitable reserves of oil. Chavez's policies have led not only to no significant exploitation of those reserves but have actually directly led to a cut in the country's average daily oil output by one-third in the 14 years he served as president. In 1999, the country produced an average of 3.5 million barrels per day, while With the right investments, the country may easily support average daily oil output of 5 million barrels and probably higher, according to industry estimates. There can be little doubt that as of last week, Venezuela has become the most important target location for foreign oil majors, especially US companies. Russian oil majors still have a small advantage, and senior executives from state-owned Rosneft and Gazprom will the current average output has dropped to 2.5 million barrels. be eager to ensure good relations with the next administration. But they must know that there is now a limited window to convert promised cooperation with the Venezuelan state-owned oil company, PDVSA, into actual projects. Oil executives from Houston will soon be descending on Venezuela with lucrative alternatives, and PDVSA, in dire need of capital investment, will surely be listening to their offers. For Russia, that means three risks. First, Gazprom and Rosneft will have more competition for joint-venture deals in that country. Second, Venezuela is an easier alternative to the hostile and unpredictable Russian Arctic for US oil companies, which may make it harder for Moscow to attract joint-venture deals. Finally, the prospect of more oil coming out of Venezuela adds to the growth projections for shale oil as a significant longer-term threat to the price of oil, and therefore, to the Russian economy. None of this will be lost on the Kremlin. It means that there will have to be greater urgency to convert promised deals into real projects in Venezuela. At the same time, the Kremlin will want to conclude more joint ventures to exploit the Arctic. It also means that the clock counting down to lower oil revenues is now ticking, increasing the need for more urgent progress in economic reforms. The Venezuelan constitution mandates that a new election must take place within 30 days. As it Maduro said he intends to stick with the economic and political policies and ideologies of his former boss, but since Maduro is no Chavez, this will be stands today, the current vice president, Nicolas Maduro, is expected to be elected to replace Chavez. virtually impossible to achieve. Chavez was a hugely charismatic, larger-than-life leader who managed to maintain unity of purpose among the many vested interests in the country. At the same time, he stayed popular with the people even as the economy slid further into trouble. With oil averaging over 110 dollars per barrel last year, the Venezuelan state budget ran a deficit of close to 20 per cent of gross domestic product. Now that Chavez is gone, the soon-to-be-elected president Maduro will come under increasing pressure to take actions to start improving the economy. No different from President Vladimir Putin's situation when he took over an ailing economy in Russia in 2000, the only place that the new Venezuelan president can get revenue is from the oil sector. But after Chavez practically destroyed PDVSA when he fired 20,000 skilled engineers and other workers in 2002, PDVSA will need a huge boost to capital spending and joint-venture partnerships. Although politically risky, Maduro may have no other choice than to ask ExxonMobil and Chevron, two of the US majors that had their local projects nationalized by Chavez, to come back. Venezuela is certainly an attractive option for the world's big oil majors. Recoverable reserves are now put at just under 300 billion barrels, compared to about 265 billion in Saudi Arabia and less than 100 billion in Russia. Most of Venezuelan oil is heavy and more expensive to refine, but it lies only a few hundred meters below the Orinoco Belt. That makes it a lot more attractive than, for example, speculatively drilling in the hostile Russian Arctic while dodging icebergs. The Orinoco Belt is an extremely important natural environment, and the inevitable objections from domestic, regional and international environmentalists will slow any development. But as has happened in similar situations elsewhere, the quest for the prize will almost certainly prevail. Venezuela needs the money. Venezuela has also very likely moved to near the top of the US government's list of geopolitical priorities. The US is set on a course to become energy independent, and the International Energy Agency calculates this may take two to three decades based on current trends and with optimistic assumptions for US shale oil production. Such assumptions have always been speculative when it comes to the oil industry. But a more achievable target for the US is to become regionally oil independent -that is, to only source its oil requirements domestically and from Canada, Mexico and now perhaps from Venezuela. That would allow the US to become completely independent of Middle East oil within 10 years or so. A change in Venezuela's political and economic priorities would also weaken the Cuban economy since Chavez supplied Cuba with almost free oil. That would hasten the inevitable regime change there as well, an extra bonus for Washington. But while such an outcome would be very favourable for the US economy, it would accelerate the game change already started in the global oil industry with the rapid growth in shale oil volumes. No matter how you work the assumptions, the world is heading for a lot more oil supply over the balance of this decade. New major oil production will come from North America, Iraq and the Caspian Sea, where Kazakhstan's giant Kashagan field starts to produce from this year, almost certainly from Venezuela if a new administration takes concrete steps to increase foreign investment and production in the oil sector. This may be the real reason Russian officials shed a few tears at Chavez's funeral on Friday. 146 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (4/7) US dependence on Middle Eastern oil is in direct competition with China --- this risks military conflict and damages US-China relations Leverett 06 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, and Jeffrey Bader, director of the Brookings China Initiative, Washington Quarterly, 2006 http://www.cfr.org/china/washington-quarterly-managing-china-us-energycompetition-middle-east/p9569) Chinese engagement in the Middle East has expanded economically, politically, and strategically over the last several years. Since the late 1990s, Beijing's policies toward the region have been closely linked to the objectives of the three major, state-owned Chinese energy companies -- the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and CNOOC -- to seek access to Middle Eastern oil and gas, frequently on an exclusive basis. Since 2002, the Middle East has become the leading arena for Beijing's efforts to secure effective ownership of critical hydrocarbon resources, rather than relying solely on international markets to meet China's energy import needs. There is every reason to anticipate that China will continue and even intensify its emphasis on the Middle East as part of its energy security strategy. China will likely keep working to expand its ties to the region's energy exporters over the next several years to ensure that it is not disadvantaged relative to other foreign customers and to maximize its access to hydrocarbon resources under any foreseeable circumstances, including possible military conflict with the United States. It seems doubtful that Chinese energy companies' fledgling efforts to lock up petroleum resources will succeed in keeping a critical mass of oil reserves off an increasingly integrated and fluid global oil market. Nevertheless, China's search for oil is making it a new competitor to the United States for influence in the Middle East. If not managed prudently, this competition will generate multiple points of bilateral friction and damage U.S. strategic interests in the region. 147 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (5/7) US China military conflict escalates quickly and leads to nuclear war White 12 (Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at ANU and a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute, “The China Choice: A Bold Vision for U.S.-China Relations,” August 17, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/17/the-china-choice-a-bold-vision-for-u-s-china-relations/) Even if China may not become strong enough to dominate Asia itself, it is already strong enough to prevent the U.S. maintaining primacy. If America tries to perpetuate the status quo, there is a very real risk of an escalating contest which neither side could win, and which could very easily flare into a major, and perhaps catastrophic, war . The main reason for America to seek an accommodation with China is to reduce the risk of such a catastrophe. Many people will disagree. Some of them think that the relationship with China is working fine, and that accommodation – or further accommodation – is unnecessary. They think that Washington is committed to a good relationship with Beijing, and that China will be satisfied with the kind of relationship America is offering now. I think this is too optimistic. The relationship today can manage day-to-day stresses, but is not robust enough to withstand real problems. Some people cite the Chen case earlier this year as proof that the relationship is strong, but the fact that such a minor issue can cause such anxieties about the future of the world’s most important bilateral relationship surely points the other way. The U.S.-China relationship is probably going to have to face much greater stresses in future, and it is not at all clear that it is strong enough to withstand them. Furthermore, the relationship seems to be getting weaker rather than stronger over time, so the risk of a rupture grows. The present fabric of the relationship is weak and getting weaker because China’s and America’s ambitions in Asia over coming decades are inherently incompatible. It is important to my argument to explain why this should be so. Those who think that America is already accommodating China have perhaps not really registered what is at stake here. For the past 40 years the Asian strategic order, and the U.S.-China relationship, have been based on a conception of American leadership which places all other countries in Asia in a clearly subordinate position. American policy today precludes any substantial change in this status quo over the coming decades. This was made clear by Barack Obama in his speech in Canberra in November of last year. American optimism about the future of the relationship therefore depends on the hope that China will find this acceptable. It is often said that America’s policy towards China today is not containment. But Washington clearly does resist any substantial expansion of China’s influence at the expense of U.S. primacy. So if it’s not containment, that can only be because China is not seeking such an expansion. That seems to be wishful thinking. China accepted American primacy when America was many times richer and stronger than China. Now that the balance of relative power has changed, China’s ambitions have expanded. It would be very surprising if they hadn’t. Moreover those ambitions go very deep, fuelled by nationalism. There is no reason to assume that China is not just as committed to changing the status quo to increase its influence as America is to preserving the status quo to maintain its influence. So there is no reason to assume that China will just back down, and more than America will. This means that, unless America is willing to withdraw from Asia, it does face a choice between accommodating China or competing with it. Some people – like Professor Aaron Friedberg of Princeton – see the probability of rivalry but argue against seeking an accommodation with China because they think the costs of accommodation would be higher than those of rivalry. This may turn out to be true, because it partly depends on how much we would have to concede to China to reach an accommodation. But those who argue that we should not even seek an accommodation must assume that the costs of any possible deal with Beijing would outweigh the costs of rivalry. That view seems to me to imply a very serious underestimation of the kind of rivalry we might be talking about and where it might lead. As a rival, China is already the most formidable country America has every faced, because it is economically stronger relative to America than any country has been in over a century. A war with China would be hard to contain, and could swiftly become bigger than anything since the Second World War, dwarfing Vietnam and Korea. There would be a real chance of escalation to nuclear exchanges from which U.S. cities might not be spared. These risks must weigh very seriously in any policy debate. It is hard to argue that they do not justify at least exploring the possibility of accommodation with China. 148 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (6/7) Oil is the key internal link --- it will spill-over into all aspects of US China relations Yetiv 07 (Steve A. Yetiv, Professor of Political Science at Old Dominion University, The Middle East Journal, Spring 2007, pg lexis) Sino-American relations will likely shape important contours of the 21s1 century, and energy issues which fundamentally criss-cross the Middle East are likely to be increasingly important in affecting relations between the two.6* The United States and China must do more to achieve an understanding on how to protect their energy security and, in turn, that of the world. Failure to reach such an understanding will increase the potential for tensions in bilateral relations, tensions that may spill over into other areas of Sino-American relations and generate instability not only in the Middle East, but also around the world. Strong US-China relations solve multiple scenarios for nuclear war Conable and Lampton 93 (Barber B. Conable, President Emeritus – World Bank, David Lampton, President – National Committee, “China: The Coming Power,” Foreign Affairs, December / January 1993, Lexis) Regionally American interests are both numerous and important. The two most protracted, economically distracting and politically explosive American military commitments in the post-World War II era were Korea and Vietnam. In both cases China figured prominently. The lesson is that regional stability requires workable U.S.-China relations. Competition between Beijing and Washington takes the form of exploiting indigenous regional conflicts by both powers, resulting in local problems that expand to suck both countries into a self-defeating vortex. The most serious threats to American security and economic interests in Asia include armed conflict with nuclear potential between the two Koreas and between India and Pakistan; a deterioration of relations between Beijing and Taipei that could lead to economic or military conflict; a re-ignition of the Cambodian conflict; and a botched transition to Beijing's sovereignty in Hong Kong in 1997. None of these problems can be handled effectively without substantial Sino-American cooperation. Constructive relations with Beijing will not assure P.R.C. cooperation in all cases; needlessly bad relations will nearly ensure conflict. The Republic of Korea's formal diplomatic recognition of Beijing last August, at the expense of Taipei, is just one indication of the increasing importance the region attaches to building positive ties to the P.R.C. 149 1AC – Oil Dependence Adv (7/7) Dependence on Middle Eastern oil also makes nuclear war with Iran inevitable over the Strait of Hormuz Glaser 11 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “ Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser_-_EnergySecurity-AUGUST2011.docx ***note – added [of] for grammar) Energy dependence could draw the U nited S tates into a conflict in which a regional power was interrupting, or threatening to interrupt, the flow of oil. The economic costs of a disruption would determine whether the costs of fighting were justified. Similarly, the potential economic costs of a disruption would determine whether U.S. foreign and military policy should be devoted to deterring states from interrupting the flow of oil; more precisely, these economic costs would determine how much the United States should invest in the policies required for deterrence. Given the geographical distribution of oil, such a conflict would likely occur in the Persian Gulf. The greatest danger is probably posed by Iran—the Iraq War has greatly increased Iran’s power relative to Iraq, and Iran is acquiring improved missile capabilities and making progress toward having the capability to build nuclear weapons. The most disruptive Iranian action would be closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which the vast majority of Persian Gulf oil must pass. Having identified the danger posed by dependence on oil that transits this strait (as well as the Strait of Malacca), a recent Council on Foreign Relations study concluded that the “United States should take the lead in building an infrastructure protection program that would be based on practical steps by relevant countries and address critical infrastructures and transit routes. Initial efforts should focus on joint planning, technical assistance, and military exercises, especially involving naval units operating near ports or along critical sealanes.” Although difficult to estimate the probability that Iran would attempt to close the strait, analysts have offered reasons for expecting the probability to be quite low: Iran would lose the oil revenue from its own exports; and Iran would likely be deterred by the probable costs of U.S. Because so much oil flows through the strait, the United States would almost certainly respond to keep it open. Nevertheless, there are plausible scenarios in which Iran blocks the strait, for example, as retaliation for an attack against is nuclear weapons program or as a coercive measure if losing a conventional war. Careful analysis suggests that the intervention, which could include the destruction of key military bases and occupation of some of its territory. United States would prevail, but that a successful campaign could take many weeks or more, and that oil prices would increase significantly during this period. Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would increase the risk of this scenario in two basic ways. First, Iran might believe that the possibility of escalation to nuclear weapons would deter the United States from responding, making Iran more willing to interrupt tanker traffic. Although basic deterrence logic says this calculation points in the correct direction, the United States might nevertheless intervene. The United States would question Iran’s willingness to escalate to nuclear use because America’s far larger and more capable nuclear forces would pose a formidable retaliatory threat. In addition, the United States would have incentives to make clear that possession of a small number of nuclear weapons by a much weaker state would not deter the United States from using conventional weapons in a limited war. Being deterred by the Iranian nuclear force would suggest that small nuclear arsenals provide tremendous potential for launching conventional aggression. As Barry Posen argued in a related context (the counterfactual case in which Iraq possessed nuclear weapons before deciding to invade Kuwait), “If the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait is permitted to stand, nuclear weapons will come to be viewed as a shield that Consequently, the United States would have incentives to respond to Iranian aggression both to preserve its ability to deter conventional aggression by small nuclear states and to support its nonproliferation policy. Second, once a conventional conflict occurred, there would be the danger that U.S. conventional operations could increase the probability [of] nuclear war. A number of paths are possible. The U.S. mine clearing operation required to open the strait would likely be accompanied by attacks against land-based Iranian targets. The United States would want to destroy the landbased anti-ship cruise missiles that Iran could use to threaten U.S. mine clearing ships; in addition, the United States protects conventional conquests from any challenger, including a great power heavily armed with its own nuclear weapons.” would want to destroy Iranian air defenses that could be used to protect these missiles. These U.S. strikes would require large numbers of carrier-based aircraft flying sorties over a period of a few weeks or more. If Iran lacked confidence that U.S. aims were limited, it could feel compelled to put its nuclear forces on alert to increase their survivability, which would increase the probability of accidental or unauthorized nuclear attack. The United States could then have incentives to attack Iran’s nuclear force, either preemptively because it believed Iran was preparing to launch an attack or preventively because it faced a closing window of opportunity after which Iran’s nuclear forces would be survivable. A more subtle danger is the possibility of inadvertent nuclear escalation resulting from a situation in which Iranian leaders decide to escalate because they believe, incorrectly, that the United States has decided to destroy their nuclear force (or ability to launch it). U.S. conventional operations could create this danger by destroying Iranian radars, and command and control systems, leaving Iranian leaders unable to assess the U.S. conventional campaign and fearing that the United States was preparing to launch a full-scale invasion or a conventional attack against their nuclear forces. 150 2AC – Extension – Solvency Venezuelan oil industry is lacking foreign investment --- US engagement solves Fillingham 13 (Zachary Fillingham, March 10, 2013, Director of Publications @ Geopolitical Monitor, BA in International Relations @ NYU, MA in Chinese Studies @ University of London (SOAS), the recipient of a Taiwan Ministry of Education Huayu Scholarship, writer, editor and translator, and has consulted for some of the world’s largest finance firms, “Post-Chavez USVenezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?” http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavezus-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790) And by all indications, Venezuela’s finances aren’t going to hold out for very long. The country is currently running a deficit of over 20 percent, and its national inflation rate fluctuates between 20 and 30 percent. Though it presides over one of the world’s largest oil reserves and is a card-carrying member of OPEC, Venezuela’s oil yields have been dropping throughout the Chavez era due to a lack of foreign investment. The same is true of Venezuela’s food industry. A lack of foreign investment, inefficiency, and costly subsidies have stunted overall output, resulting in food shortages that are now showing themselves in the huge lineups spilling out of government food depots nationwide. A reoccurring theme of Chavez’s economic policy was a willful ignorance regarding the creation of infrastructure and social capital that could drive economic growth beyond the era of direct government handouts. Given the structural challenges that the Venezuelan economy now faces, challenges that will preclude the government’s ability to continue Chavez-era patronage ad infinitum, a Maduro government will inevitably be faced with an economic reckoning of sorts. In the aftermath of this economic reckoning, there will be an opportunity for both domestic opposition forces within Venezuela, and American foreign policy to make inroads. Just to recap: what we are likely to see is a Maduro win, followed by a politicoeconomic crisis that ushers in either a return to credible multi-party democracy or a descent into conspicuous authoritarianism. But how will this impact US-Venezuelan relations? Given its precarious economic situation, Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near future. And while some would say that China is best suited to step up and bail out Caracas, there are a few reasons to question whether this will actually come to pass. First of all, The Chinese Development Bank has already provided a huge amount of money to the Chavez government, about $40 billion between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, if Venezuela were to be faced with a default, it would be Chinese investors with their money on the line. Any debt renegotiations would surely include provisions that didn’t sit well with the Venezuelan public. After all, there have already been agreements reached between Venezuela and the Chinese state-owned company Citic Group that have raised populist alarm bells regarding the signing of mineral rights over to foreign companies. In this context, a limited rapprochement makes sense from a Venezuelan point of view, as it would balance against a preponderance of Chinese economic influence. Now that the “Bolivarian Revolution” is all but discredited, and countries like Brazil have proven that it’s possible to alleviate poverty through trade and keep US influence at arm’s length, a US-Venezuelan thaw is theoretically possible. However, authorities in Washington will likely have to endure another round of vitriol and wait until the dust settles in Venezuelan domestic politics before their window of opportunity presents itself. 151 2AC – Extension – Dependence Leads to China War (1/2) Oil dependence makes US China war inevitable Klare 10 (Michael Klare, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, “Tomgram: Michael Klare, China Shakes the World,” September 19, 2010, http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175297/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_china_shakes_t he_world) Already, China’s efforts to bolster its ties with its foreign-oil providers have produced geopolitical friction with the United States. There is a risk of far more serious Sino-American conflict as we enter the “tough oil” era and the world supply of easily accessible petroleum rapidly shrinks. According to the DoE, the global supply of oil and other petroleum liquids in 2035 will be 110.6 million barrels per day – precisely enough to meet anticipated world demand at that time. Many oil geologists believe, however, that global oil output will reach a peak level of output well below 100 million barrels per day by 2015, and begin declining after that. In addition, the oil that remains will increasingly be found in difficult places to reach or in highly unstable regions. If these predictions prove accurate, the United States and China -- the world’s two leading oil importers -- could become trapped in a zero-sum great-power contest for access to diminishing supplies of exportable petroleum. What will happen under these circumstances is, of course, impossible to predict, especially since the potential for conflict abounds. If both countries continue on their current path -- arming favored suppliers in a desperate bid to secure long-term advantage -- the heavily armed petrostates may also become ever more fearful of, or covetous of, their (equally well-equipped) neighbors. With both the U.S. and China deploying growing numbers of military advisers and instructors to such countries, the stage could be set for mutual involvement in local wars and border conflicts. Neither Beijing nor Washington may seek such involvement, but the logic of arms-for-oil diplomacy makes this an unavoidable risk. Conflict over planetary oil reserves is not, however, the only path that China’s new energy status could open. It is possible to imagine a future in which China and the United States cooperate in pursuing oil alternatives that would obviate the need to funnel massive sums into naval and military arms races. President Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, seemed to glimpse such a possibility when they agreed last November, during an economic summit in Beijing, to collaborate in the development of alternative fuels and transportation systems. At this point, only one thing is clear: the greater China’s reliance on imported petroleum, the greater the risk of friction and conflict with the United States, which relies on the same increasingly problematic suppliers of energy. The greater its reliance on coal, the less comfortable our planet will become. The greater its emphasis on alternative fuels, the more likely it may make the twenty-first century China’s domain. At this point, how China will apportion its energy needs among the various candidate fuels remains unknown. Whatever its choices, however, China’s energy decisions will shake the world. 152 2AC – Extension – Dependence Leads to China War (2/2) Sino-American energy war inevitable --- only a shift away from the status quo solves Reynolds 10 (Lewis Reynolds, energy industry financial advisor and consultant, author of “America the Prisoner: The Implications of Foreign Oil Addiction and a Realistic Plan to End It,” “Seven Dangerous (and Surprising) Side Effects of the U.S. Dependency on Foreign Oil,” The American Surveyor, August 4, 2010, http://www.amerisurv.com/content/view/7708/, Sawyer) It creates strained foreign relations and sets the stage for an unstable future. The entire U.S.-Middle East foreign policy has been structured around the obvious importance of the region for the world’s oil supply. Policy makers don’t like to discuss it openly, but oil is always the elephant in the room when it comes to U.S. foreign relations—even with nations outside the Middle East. One of the great questions in the context of geopolitical struggle for oil is whether the great oil consuming nations— which will soon include the U.S., China, Russia—will view one another as allies, competitors, or some combination of both. The U.S. has love-hate relationships with both countries. There is historic rivalry between the U.S. and Russia leading back generations. The relationship with China is murky at best. Events are already in motion that could set the stage for a U.S.Chinese confrontation. Oil consumption continues to grow modestly in the U.S., but in China it is exploding. On a global scale, oil consumption will certainly continue to grow into the foreseeable future, yet there are considerable questions as to whether global production can be increased much beyond current levels if at all. With both the U.S. and China needing oil, competition is inevitable. Responsibility lies with both sides to take actions to avoid the long progression toward a conflict. A Sino-American energy war is far too likely if both countries continue on their present courses without developing substantial alternative energy sources. 153 2AC – Extension – Dependence Hurts China Relations Dependence on the Middle East exacerbates US China tensions --- it’s the key issue for relations Collina 05 (Tom Z. Collina, Executive Director, 20/20 Vision, “Oil Dependence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Real Dangers, Realistic Solutions,” Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs United States Senate, October 19, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2005_hr/051020collina.pdf) China currently imports half of its oil, and like the United States, China will become increasingly dependent on oil from the Middle East. As a result, access to Middle East oil will over time become a key issue in relations between the two nations. The more U.S. actions in the Middle East are perceived as an effort to dominate oil resources there, the more China will consider the United States a threat to its interests, and visa-versa. In the current context of stagnating supply, this kind of demand competition is very destabilizing. Defusing a potential U.S.-Chinese rivalry over global oil supplies is a key driver for reducing U.S. oil dependency. Oil dependence feeds escalatory antagonism in the relationship Leverett and Bader 06 (Flynt Leverett, senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution, Jeffrey Bader, director of the Brookings China Initiative, “Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 187-201, Winter 2005-2006, http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/20051216_leverett_bader.pdf) Without drawing Beijing into such a posture, the Chinese drive for energy is likely to fuel a gradually escalating clash of interests between the United States and China in the Middle East. This clash of interests could threaten the attainment of U.S. goals in the region. It could also feed a more general and unwelcome antagonism between the world’s only superpower and the world’s fastest-growing power. An escalatory cycle of this nature is not inevitable. If it is to be avoided, however, policymakers in Washington need to start thinking now about the elements of a strategy for managing the Chinese challenge in the Middle East. 154 2AC – Add-On – Economy Dependence on Middle Eastern oil causes a host of economic ills --- it will collapse the US economy Luft 07 (Gal Luft, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “Dependence on Middle East Energy and its Impact on Global Security,” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, most recent cited date – 2007, http://www.iags.org/luft_dependence_on_middle_east_energy.pdf) For energy importers the rise in oil prices means slower growth rate, inflation, loss of jobs and burgeoning trade deficits. The biggest casualties are the developing nations some of whom still carry debts which go all the way back to the oil crises of the 1970s. The recent change of the trade patterns of the Arab oil producers could potentially bring about the decline of the U.S. dollar as the main reserve currency, a process that may already be on its way. Arab countries have grown more dependent on imported goods from Europe and Asia rather than the U.S. Since it is now Euros and Yens that need to pay for the Arabs’ imports, Arab governments think more and more in terms of nondollar currencies. At a time when the U.S. dollar is weak and U.S. national debt is at a historical high the specter of OPEC countries oil dropping the dollar in favor of other currencies while being a boon to Europeans, is a great threat to the U.S. economy. US economic decline leads to global nuclear war O’Hanlon, 12 (Kenneth Lieberthal, Director of the China Center, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Michael O’Hanlon, Director of Research, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, “The Real National Security Threat: America’s Debt,” Los Angeles Times, July 3, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/03/opinion/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703) Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. 155 2AC – Add-On – Terrorism (1/2) Oil dependence on the Middle East makes nuclear terrorism inevitable Sandalow 07 (David Sandalow, “Ending Oil Dependence: Protecting National Security, the Environment and the Economy,” Opportunity 08, http://a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/PB_Energy_Sandalow.pdf) Problems with Oil Dependence National Security Threats The United States is in a long war. Islamic fundamentalists struck our shores and are determined to do so again. Oil dependence is an important cause of this threat. For example, according to Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser at the time of the first Gulf War, “…what gave enormous urgency to [Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait] was the issue of oil.” After removing Saddam from Kuwait in 1991, U.S. troops remained in Saudi Arabia where their presence bred great resentment. Osama bin Laden’s first fatwa, in 1996, was titled “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” Today, deep resentment of the U.S. role in the Persian Gulf is a powerful jihadist recruitment tool. Resentment grows not just from our relationship with the House of Saud, the presence of our forces throughout the region, and more. Yet the United States cannot easily extricate itself from this contentious region. The the war in Iraq, but also from Persian Gulf has half the world’s proven oil reserves, the world’s cheapest oil, and its only spare production capacity. So long as modern vehicles run only on oil, the Persian Gulf will remain an indispensable region for the global economy Furthermore, the huge flow of oil money into the region helps finance terrorist networks. Saudi money provides critical support for madrassas promulgating virulent anti-American views. Still worse, diplomatic efforts to enlist Saudi government help in choking off such funding, or even to investigate terrorist attacks, are hampered by the priority we attach to preserving Saudi cooperation in managing world oil markets. This points to a broader problem—oil dependence reduces the world community’s leverage in responding to threats from oil-exporting nations. Today, the most prominent threat comes from Iran, whose nuclear ambitions could further destabilize the Persian Gulf and put powerful new weapons into the hands of terrorists. Yet efforts to respond to this threat with multilateral sanctions have foundered on fears that Iran would retaliate by withholding oil from world markets. In short, three decades after the first oil shocks— and a quarter-century after the humiliating capture of U.S. diplomats in Tehran—we remain hostage to our continuing dependence on oil. 156 2AC – Add-On – Terrorism (2/2) Nuclear terrorism results in global nuclear war and extinction Ayson 10 –Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33.7, InformaWorld) But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst ? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a high er stage of alert . In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. 157 ***VENEZUELA OIL NEGATIVE*** 158 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (1/4) The plan won’t repair relations --- hardline right will win out within Venezuela Meacham 13 (Carl Meacham, CSIS Americas Program director, “The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-Venezuela Relations?” CSIS, June 21, 2013, csis.org/publication/kerry-jauameeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations) Conclusion: In short, relations between the United States and Venezuela have a rocky track record that recent headlines cannot obscure. And while there are undoubtedly members of the Venezuelan government who want to improve relations, it’s difficult to see their argument winning over the more hardline Chavistas in the government, who would likely see any steps to building ties as betraying the cause. This is a bigger internal link --- marginal short-term gains in relations will be cutoff in the near future --- Maduro will want to shore up support within his own party Meacham 13 (Carl Meacham, CSIS Americas Program director, “The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-Venezuela Relations?” CSIS, June 21, 2013, csis.org/publication/kerry-jauameeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations) Q2: Does the Venezuelan government want good relations? A2: Despite recent discussions with the United States, it doesn’t seem to be the case. Earlier this year, the Venezuelan government suspended talks between the U.S. State Department and Venezuelan Foreign Ministry that had begun in late 2012, citing alleged U.S. meddling in Venezuela’s April election. The Maduro government has also largely followed the Chávez playbook, constantly accusing the United States of assassination plots, spying, and economic and political sabotage. While the Kerry-Jaua meeting may have made for nice headlines, it’s difficult to imagine that the Venezuelan government will not play the anti-U.S. card again, if needed. This week, Calixto Ortega— appointed to handle matters with the United States—will meet with Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs These good-faith gestures made by the Venezuelan government are neither new nor unheard of. Despite recent efforts, U.S. policymakers should temper any positive expectations, as a core basis of Chavismo is its anti-U.S. ideology. It’s of course difficult to improve relations with a government that consistently defines itself as vehemently against your foreign policy agenda. This suggests that Venezuela may be looking to reestablish a purely economic relationship—one that will eliminate U.S. sanctions. Still, even if certain positive steps are taken, history suggests that the Venezuela n government could quickly scuttle progress made, likely with the goal of Maduro shoring up support within his own ranks. Roberta Jacobson to continue discussions and establish a new set of concrete goals to guide the relationship forward. 159 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (2/4) Clean technology doesn’t solve the Amazon --- Brazilian transportation projects will continue to destroy the Amazon Butler 12 – May, Rhett A., Monga Bay, “Deforestation in the Amazon,” http://www.mongabay.com/brazil.html Infrastructure Improvements Road construction in the Amazon leads to deforestation. Roads provide access to logging and mining sites while opening forest frontier land to exploitation by poor landless farmers. Brazil's Trans-Amazonian Highway was one of the most ambitious economic development programs ever devised, and one of the most spectacular failures. In the 1970s, Brazil planned a 2,000-mile highway that would bisect the massive Amazon forest, opening rainforest lands to (1) settlement by poor farmers from the crowded, drought-plagued north and (2) development of timber and mineral resources. Colonists would be granted a 250-acre lot, six-months' salary, and easy access to agricultural loans in exchange for settling along the highway and converting the surrounding rainforest into agricultural land. The plan would grow to cost Brazil US$65,000 (1980 dollars) to settle each family, a staggering amount for Brazil, a developing country at the time. The project was plagued from the start. The sediments of the Amazon Basin rendered the highway unstable and subject to inundation during heavy rains, blocking traffic and leaving crops to rot. Harvest yields for peasants were dismal since the forest soils were quickly exhausted, and new forest had to be cleared annually. Logging was difficult due to the widespread distribution of commercially valuable trees. Rampant erosion, up to 40 tons of soil per acre (100 tons/ha) occurred after clearing. Many colonists, unfamiliar with banking and lured by easy credit, went deep into debt. Adding to the economic and social failures of the project, are the long-term environmental costs. After the construction of the Trans-Amazonian Highway, Brazilian deforestation accelerated to levels never before seen and vast swaths of forest were cleared for subsistence farmers and cattle-ranching schemes. The Trans-Amazonian Highway is a prime example of the environmental havoc that is caused by road construction in the rainforest. Road construction and improvement continues in the Amazon today: Paving of roads brings change in the Amazon rainforest and the Chinese economy drives road-building and deforestation in the Amazon The Amazon is not threatened --- deforestation is a myth Morano and Washburn 2k (Marc and Kent, Producers of American Investigator's "Amazon Rainforest: Clear-Cutting the Myths" “Shaky Science Behind Save-Rainforest Effort,” June 26, 2000, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=17543) Today the environmental scientist and leader of a group called Greenspirit has a new cause -- alerting the public to what he calls the "myth" that the Amazon rainforest is endangered by development and deforestation. "The Amazon is actually the least endangered forest in the world," states Moore in American Investigator's television newsmagazine documentary, "Clear-cutting the myths," hosted by former CBS and CNN newsman Reid Collins. Moore explains that, in the 20 years of warnings about deforestation, "only 10 percent of the Amazon has been converted to date from what was original forest to agriculture and settlement." The finding that the Amazon rainforest threat is a myth based on bad science and political agendas -- especially by unlikely critics such as Moore, other scientists and inhabitants of the region -- is not expected to sit well with a movement that has enlisted schoolchildren throughout the United States and celebrities ranging from Sting to Alec Baldwin to Chevy Chase to Tom Jones and Tony Bennett. And which has also raised tens of millions of dollars for environmental activist groups. "This is where I really have a problem with modern-day environmentalism," says Moore. "It confuses opinion with what we know to be true, and disguises what are really political agendas with environmental rhetoric. The fact of the matter is: There forest intact is a larger percentage of the Amazon rain than there are most other forests in this world." 160 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (3/4) They can’t solve climate change --- even with agreements, countries will cheat, localities will shirk mandates, and India and China are huge alt causes Mead 10 (Walter Russell Mead, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Death of Global Warming, February 1, http://blogs.the-americaninterest.com/wrm/2010/02/01/the-death-of-global-warming/) But even if somehow, miraculously, the United States and all the other countries involved not only accepted the agreements but ratified them and wrote domestic legislation to incorporate them into law, it is extremely unlikely that all this activity would achieve the desired result. Countries would cheat, either because they chose to do so or because their domestic systems are so weak, so corrupt or so both that they simply wouldn’t be able to comply. Governments in countries like China and India aren’t going to stop pushing for all the economic growth they can get by any means that will work — and even if central governments decided to move on global warming, state and local authorities have agendas of their own. The examples of blatant cheating would inevitably affect compliance in other countries; it would also very likely erode what would in any case be an extremely fragile consensus in rich countries to keep forking over hundreds of billions of dollars to poor countries — many of whom would not be in anything like full compliance with their commitments. For better or worse, the global political system isn’t capable of producing the kind of result the global warming activists want. It’s like asking a jellyfish to climb a flight of stairs; you can poke and prod all you want, you can cajole and you can threaten. But you are asking for something that you just can’t get — and at the end of the day, you won’t get it. The grieving friends and relatives aren’t ready to pull the plug; in a typical, whistling-past-the-graveyard comment, the BBC first acknowledges that even if the current promises are kept, temperatures will rise above the target level of two degrees Celsius — but let’s not despair! The BBC quotes one of its own reporters: “BBC environment reporter Matt McGrath says the accord lacks teeth and does not include any clear targets on cutting emissions. But if most countries at least signal what they intend to do to cut their emissions, it will mark the first time that the UN has a comprehensive written collection of promised actions, he says.” 161 1NC – Relations Adv Frontline (4/4) No impact to climate change --- humans can adapt and aff authors are biased Goklany 11 (Indur M. Goklany, science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior, “Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming” December 2011, http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf) A third approach would be to fix the root cause of why developing countries are deemed to be most at-risk, namely, poverty. Sustained economic growth would, as is evident from the experience of developed countries, address virtually all problems of poverty, not just that portion exacerbated by global warming. It is far more certain that sustainable economic growth will provide greater benefits than emission reductions: while there is no doubt that poverty leads to disease and death, there is substantial doubt regarding the reality and magnitude of the negative impact of global warming. This is especially true as assessments often ignore improvements in adaptive capacity. Of these three approaches, human well-being in poorer countries is likely to be advanced most effectively by sustained economic development and least by emission reductions. In addition, because of the inertia of the climate system, economic development is likely to bear fruit faster than any emission reductions.These figures also indicate that the compound effect of economic development and technological change can result in quite dramatic improvements even over the relatively short period for which these figures were developed. Figure 5, for instance, covered 26 years. By contrast, climate change impacts analyses frequently look 50 to 100 years into the future. Over such long periods, the compounded effect could well be spectacular. Longer term analyses of climate-sensitive indicators of human well-being show that the combination of economic growth and technological change can, over decades, reduce negative impacts on human beings by an order of magnitude, that is, a factor of ten, or more. In some instances, this combination has virtually eliminated such negative impacts. But, since impact assessments generally fail to fully account for increases in economic development and technological change, they substantially overestimate future net damages from global warming . It may be argued that the high levels of economic development depicted in Figure 6 are unlikely. But if that’s the case, then economic growth used to drive the IPCC’s scenarios are equally unlikely, which necessarily means that the estimates of emissions, temperature increases, and impacts and damages of GW projected by the IPCC are also overestimates.B. Secular Technological Change The second major reason why future adaptive capacity has been underestimated (and the impacts of global warming systematically overestimated) is that few impact studies consider secular technological change. 25 Most assume that no new technologies will come on line, although some do assume greater adoption of existing technologies with higher GDP per capita and, much less frequently, a modest generic improvement in productivity. 26 Such an assumption may have been appropriate during the Medieval Warm Period, when the pace of technological change was slow, but nowadays technological change is fast (as indicated in Figures 1 through 5) and, arguably, accelerating. 27 It is unlikely that we will see a halt to technological change unless so-called precautionary policies are instituted that count the costs of technology but ignore its benefits, as some governments have already done for genetically modified crops and various pesticides. So how much of a difference in impact would consideration of both economic development and technological change have made? If impacts were to be estimated for five or so years into the future, ignoring changes in adaptive capacity between now and then probably would not be fatal because neither economic development nor technological change would likely advance substantially during that period. However, the time horizon of climate change impact assessments is often on the order of 35–100 years or more. The Fast Track Assessments use a base year of 1990 to estimate impacts for 2025, 2055 and 2085. Over such periods one ought to expect substantial advances in adaptive capacity due to increases in economic development, technological change and human capital. As already noted, retrospective assessments indicate that over the span of a few decades, changes in economic development and technologies can substantially reduce, if not eliminate, adverse environmental impacts and improve human wellbeing, as measured by a variety of objective indicators. 41 Thus, not fully accounting for changes in the level of economic development and secular technological change would understate future adaptive capacity, which then could overstate impacts by one or more orders of magnitude if the time horizon is several decades into the future. The assumption that there would be little or no improved or new technologies that would become available between 1990 and 2100 (or 2200), as assumed in most climate change impact assessments, is clearly naïve. In fact, a comparison of today’s world against the world of 1990 (the base year used in most impacts studies to date) shows that even during this brief 20-year span, this assumption is invalid for many, if not most, human enterprises. Since 1990, for example, the portion of the developing world’s population living in absolute poverty declined from 42% to 25%, and in sub-Saharan Africa Internet users increased from 0 to 50 million, while cellular phone users went from 0 per 100 to 33 per 100. 162 2NC – Extension – Can’t Solve Relations (1/2) Ambassador Powers’ comment tanks relations --- they’re no longer willing to cooperate Neuman 13 (William Neuman, Andes Region correspondent, “Venezuela Stops Efforts to Improve U.S. Relations,” New York Times, July 20, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/americas/venezuela-stops-efforts-to-improve-usrelations.html?_r=2&) Venezuela announced late Friday that it was stopping the latest round of off-again-on-again efforts to improve relations with the United States in reaction to comments by the Obama administration’s nominee for United Nations ambassador. The nominee, Samantha Power, speaking before a Senate committee on Wednesday, said part of her role as ambassador would be to challenge a “crackdown on civil society” in several countries, including Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro had already lashed out on Thursday at Ms. Power for her remarks, and late on Friday the Foreign Ministry said it was terminating efforts to improve relations with the United States. No potential for engagement --- Maduro is even more anti-American Labott 13( Elise Labott, CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter, March 6, 2013, "U.S.-Venezuela relations likely to remain tense after Chavez", http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/06/u-svenezuela-relations-likely-to-remain-tense-after-chavez/) But in the words of one senior official, the outreach to Caracas has been a "rocky road." Talks have been short on substance and never left U.S. officials with the feeling Venezuela was interested in mending fences. Maduro's first news conference, a good portion of which was devoted to railing against the United States, was not very encouraging. As he prepares to stand in upcoming elections to replace Chavez, Maduro's anti-American rhetoric is dismissed in the United States as political jockeying to shore up his political base. This tried-and-true method of using America as straw man worked for Chavez, which is why U.S. officials acknowledge that the campaign season not be the best time to break new ground or expect tangible progress. Officials say they will continue to speak out in favor of a more productive relationship between the two countries, but the ball, officials say, is firmly in Venezuela's court. "The opportunities are not there yet for the U.S. to engage" says Carl Meacham of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "For the next month or so, Maduro has to show he is even more Chavez than Chavez was. That means he is going to be more antiAmerican, more anti-capitalist, more anti-systemic. As far as a rapprochement, I don't see it coming anytime soon." 163 2NC – Extension – Can’t Solve Relations (2/2) There are a litany of other policy barriers --- US officials won’t buy in to better relations Sullivan 13 (Mark Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, January 10, 2013, “Venezuela: Issues for Congress”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40938.pdf) The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, a major supplier of foreign oil to the United States, but there has been significant friction with the Chávez government. For several years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela’s military arms purchases (largely from Russia), its relations with Cuba and Iran, its efforts to export its brand of populism to other Latin American countries, and the use of Venezuelan territory by Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces. Declining Venezuelan cooperation on antidrug and antiterrorism efforts also has been a U.S. concern. Since 2005, Venezuela has been designated annually (by President Bush and President Obama) as a country that has failed to adhere to its international anti-drug obligations. Since 2006, the Department of State has prohibited the sale of defense articles and services to Venezuela because of lack of cooperation on antiterrorism efforts. 164 2NC – Extension – Alt Cause to Amazon Can’t solve --- cattle ranching is the leading cause of destruction Butler 12 – May, Rhett A., Monga Bay, “Deforestation in the Amazon,” http://www.mongabay.com/brazil.html Cattle ranching is the leading cause of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. This has been the case since at least the 1970s: government figures attributed 38 percent of deforestation from 1966-1975 to large-scale cattle ranching. Today the figure is closer to 60 percent, according to research by Brazil's National Institute for Space Research (INPE) and its Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa). Most of the beef is destined for urban markets, whereas leather and other cattle products are primarily for export markets. Brazil is today the world's largest exporter and producer of beef. Much of its expansion has taken place in the Amazon, which currently has more than 80 million head of cattle, up from 26.6 million in 1990 and equivalent to more than 85 percent of the total U.S. herd. The Brazilian Amazon has more than 214,000 square miles of pasture, an open space larger than France. 165 2NC – Extension – Warming Defense Warming isn’t real --- previous models are wrong --- new and objective satellite data should be preferred IBT 11 (International Business Times, citing report from NASA’s Terra Satellite, “Global Warming a Hoax? NASA Reveals Earth Releasing Heat into Space”, 7/30/2011, http://sanfrancisco.ibtimes.com/articles/189649/20110730/global-warming-hoax-nasa-earthreleasing-heat-space.htm) With new data collected from a NASA's Terra satellite, the previous model may be proven as a hoax . Hypothesis based on the satellite's findings show that planet Earth actually releases heat into space, more than it retains it. The higher efficiency of releasing energy outside of Earth contradicts former forecasts of climate change . Dr. Roy Spencer, a team leader for NASA's Aqua satellite, studied a decade worth of satellite data regarding cloud surface temperatures. "The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show...There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans," said Dr. Spencer. By cross examining data with other Climate Change models, he concluded that carbon dioxide is just a minor part in global warming. His studies have garnered media attention and that the data are going against the beliefs of global warming alarmists by disproving their theory. Even if it’s real, it won’t lead to extinction --- massive biologic resilience NIPCC 11 (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change. Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC. 8 March 2011. http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html) In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate." 166 2NC – AT: Add-On – Ocean Acidification There’s zero basis for their impact --- adaptation checks CSCDGC 09 (Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, “Ocean Acidification Database,” CO2 Science, 2009, http://www.co2science.org/data/acidification/results.php) The results we have depicted in the figures above suggest something very different from the doomsday predictions of the climate alarmists who claim we are in "the last decades of coral reefs on this planet for at least the next ... million plus years, unless we do something very soon to reduce CO2 emissions," or who declare that "reefs are starting to crumble and disappear," that "we may lose those ecosystems within 20 or 30 years," and that "we've got the last decade in which we can do something about this problem." Clearly, the promoting of such scenarios is not supported by the vast bulk of pertinent experimental data. Two other important phenomena that give us reason to believe the predicted decline in oceanic pH will have little to no lasting negative effects on marine life are the abilities of essentially all forms of life to adapt and evolve. Of those experiments in our database that report the length of time the organisms were subjected to reduced pH levels, for example, the median value was only four days. And many of the experiments were conducted over periods of only a few hours, which is much too short a time for organisms to adapt (or evolve) to successfully cope with new environmental conditions (see, for example, the many pertinent Journal Reviews we have archived under the general heading of Evolution in our Subject Index). And when one allows for such phenomena, the possibility of marine life experiencing a negative response to ocean acidification becomes even less likely. In conclusion, claims of impending marine species extinctions driven by increases in the atmosphere's CO2 concentration do experimental findings we have analyzed above. not appear to be founded in empirical reality, based on the Marine creatures can survive up to 1000 ppm Watts 09 (Anthony Watts, meteorologist, AMS Seal Holder, owner, weather graphics company, founder, cites Anne L. Cohen, a research specialist at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, “Oh Snap! CO2 Causes Some Ocean Critters to Build More Shells,” December 1, 2009, http://wattsupwiththat.com/2009/12/01/oh-snap-co2-causes-ocean-critters-to-build-moreshells/) “We were surprised that some organisms didn’t behave in the way we expected under elevated CO2,” said Anne L. Cohen, a research specialist at WHOI and one of the study’s co-authors. “What was really interesting was that some of the creatures, the coral, the hard clam and the lobster, for example, didn’t seem to care about CO2 until it was higher than about 1,000 p arts p er m illion [ppm].” Current atmospheric CO2 levels are about 380 ppm, she said. Above this level, calcification was reduced in the coral and the hard clam, but elevated in the lobster The “take-home message,” says Cohen, is that “we can’t assume that elevated CO2 causes a proportionate decline in calcification of all calcifying organisms.” WHOI and the National Science Foundation funded the work. 167 1NC – Oil Dependence Adv Frontline (1/4) Venezuela is already drilling for more oil --- plan’s unnecessary Harvest Natural Resources, 11 (HNR Inc is a petroleum exploration and production company that explores geological basins with proved petroleum reserves, “Venezuela: Petrodelta”, no date, but cites up until 2011, http://www.harvestnr.com/operations/venezuela.html) The nature of the high quality assets in Venezuela supports rapid conversion of unproved resource into proved reserves. At yearend 2010, combined proved and probable (2P) reserves net to Harvest from Petrodelta were 103.6 MMBOE, a 24% increase over year-end 2009. That increase could not have occurred without a prolific asset in which to drill. Petrodelta’s self-funded 2011 capital budget of $224 million will be allocated to drilling and infrastructure development. Petrodelta’s current operations plan calls for running a two-rig drilling program to drill 28 new oil wells, two water injector wells, one gas injector well and to build pipelines and related facilities. So far in 2011, the company has drilled four development wells, one each in Uracoa, Temblador and El Salto field, plus the first well in Isle?o field drilled since 1957. The Isle?o ISM-8 well is currently producing 1,800 BOPD of 15.5 API crude. With 220.6 MMBOE of proved, probable and possible reserves, Petrodelta has a well-defined and visible long-term growth path in sight. Status quo solves US oil dependence and there’s no impact Forbes 13 (Forbes Magazine, “Peak Oil Will Be Fully Discredited When Peak Government Is Realized,” February 19, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbradley/2013/02/19/peakoil-will-be-fully-discredited-when-peak-government-is-realized/) From offshore oil to previously inaccessible gas deep in the earth, the federal domain is poised for an energy renaissance. The United States could become the world’s largest producer of oil by 2017, surpassing Saudi Arabia and Russia, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). By 2035, the United States will be nearly energy self-sufficient. The prospect of U.S. self-sufficiency overturns a half-century of conventional wisdom. Oil and gas critics have long warned of “peak” supply – the point at which extraction is at its highest possible rate. At this “peak,” the wells will start running dry for good. But this theory is being revealed as nothing more than a myth—and scare tactic by those favoring politically correct, market incorrect energies such as ethanol, wind, and solar. The idea of peak hydrocarbons seemingly found a scientific basis in the 1950s when M. King Hubbard, associate director of the Exploration and Production Research Division at Shell Oil Company, quantitatively mapped the future of oil production. Hubbard’s predictions gained steam when the nation confronted the energy shortages of the 1970s — exactly the time he had projected that domestic oil and natural gas output would peak. Over the next decades, new voices warning of “peak oil” and “peak gas” emerged. Few thought to reject the Hubbard paradigm, even though it relied heavily on neo-Malthusian notions of a world of technological advances in the way we find and tap oil and natural gas have propelled estimates of available reserves far beyond anything Hubbard could have imagined. static technology and a known, fixed supply. But 168 1NC – Oil Dependence Adv Frontline (2/4) Plan doesn’t solve --- oil infrastructure deficiencies means it takes a long time before production can increase Flannelly 13 (Michael Flannelly, Dividend.com, March 6, "”Venezuelan Oil Production in the Post-Chavez World (CVX, XOM, COP, more)", http://www.dividend.com/news/2013/venezuelan-oil-production-in-the-post-chavez-worldcvx-xom-cop-more/) Throughout Hugo Chavez’s 14 year reign as President of Venezuela, he was committed to nationalizing oil production in order to aid in funding a variety of social programs aimed at helping the poor. In doing so, he eventually limited the amount of oil supplied to the rest of the world (and left a substantial amount of money on the table for Venezuelan coffers). Conversely, the amount of oil expertise flowing in his own country was limited due to his protectionist policies. Supermajor oil companies like ExxonMobil (XOM) exited the country, furthering reducing the country’s exposure to oil and gas technology. Venezuela’s current oil production infrastructure is pretty dilapidated due to Chavez’s inability (or indifference) to reinvest in the nationalized oil industry, especially with limited technological innovations and expertise. Even if future leaders in the Latin American country were to open up their borders to a variety of multinational oil corporations, it may take awhile for the foreign direct investment to lead to a substantial oil production. Venezuela won’t accept US investment in oil Fletcher 13 (Sam Fletcher, Senior Writer for Oil and Gas Journal, April 29, 2013, " MARKET WATCH: Energy prices undermined by economic worries", http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/04/market-watch--energy-prices-undermined-byeconomic-worries.html) In other news, Raymond James analysts said it is “abundantly clear” the election of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's handpicked successor ensures that country’s “hardline, aggressively nationalistic energy policy will continue long after Chavez's death.”They said, “This, of course, will keep a lid on Venezuelan oil production by keeping away foreign investment from companies that are understandably fearful of further violations of property rights. But the effect of ‘chavismo’ is even more widespread than that. Venezuela plays a famously hawkish role within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in close alliance with Iran.” 169 1NC – Oil Dependence Adv Frontline (3/4) Strategic interdependence means US-China relations are resilient and no risk of US-China war Zhang 10 (Qian Zhang, staff writer, People’s Daily Online, News Source, “Books: Sino-US Relations Remain Complicated Either,” People’s Daily Online, 12/28/10, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7244583.html) First, the interdependent relationship between China and the United States has been continually deepened, and the financial crisis has further linked the mutual interests of the two countries. The United States exports to China increased 39 percent in the first five months of 2010, which surpassed the growth in foreign trade with other countries. The facts show that Sino-U.S. economic interaction is crucially important for the U.S. economy. In addition to the economic interdependence of the two countries, the United States and China have formed a relationship of correlative dependence and cooperation in a series of global issues, such as climate change, nuclear nonproliferation, anti-terrorism and other. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and a nuclear power, China plays a decisive role in geopolitics. These factors mean the United States must cooperate with China in these most pressing international issues. This interdependence also forms the structural basis of Sino-U.S. relations. Meanwhile, the increase of Chinese national strength has also led to political tensions between the United States and China. As China has increased its military power in recent years, it has increasingly demonstrated the determination to defend its own interests — especially maritime interests — which has inevitably led to conflict with the United States. Facing the new military strategy of China, the U.S. Navy has adopted a policy of containment. The deepened distrust with regard to security between the United States and China in 2010 and the antagonistic interaction in the form of military exercises were products of the development of this structural contradiction. As the corresponding development of this contradiction, the diplomatic game on the South China Sea between the United States and China is also becoming more heated. China hopes to resolve the territorial disputes on the South China Sea through bilateral means with the relevant countries. However, after sitting on the sidelines over the years, the United States has tried to complicate and internationalize the issue. The yellow book speculated that the United States intends to deal with the growing anxiety and fears of China's neighbors over its rising power by intervening in the affairs on the South China Sea. According to the analysis of the yellow book, the power struggle between China and the United States is undoubtedly a key element of bilateral relations. However, the interdependence between the two sides in economic and other global issues is also a factor that would lead to cooperation. Taking this interdependence as an anchor, the conflict of the two sides can be contained in an overall situation full of struggle. Finally, the yellow book noted that the SinoU.S. interaction is like a pendulum always swinging between cooperation and conflict. Sometimes there are just a small number of swings and sometimes surprising ups and downs. Judging from the policy evolution on China of the Obama administration this year, the two sides will not be a serious confrontation despite the obvious hardening, deterrence and containment moving frequently. The increase in extent and intensity of swing of the bilateral interaction indicates that the growth and decline in power marks a new phase. The rising China needs to further adapt to its roles while the United States also needs to further adapt to the new role of China. 170 1NC – Oil Dependence Adv Frontline (4/4) Iran won’t close the Strait --- even if they did, no impact on the US so we wouldn’t intervene Singh 12 (Michael Singh, managing director of The Washington Institute, “The Real Iranian Threat in the Gulf,” January 3, 2012, The Washington Institute, www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1789) Iran's bellicose rhetoric and Gulf wargames in recent days have given rise to the question of whether Tehran could close the Strait of Hormuz. As many analysts have observed, the answer is no -- not for a meaningful period of time. Less frequently addressed, however, is whether Iran would even try. The answer to that question is also "no" -- even the attempt would have devastating strategic consequences for Iran. The presumable target of an Iranian effort to close the Strait would be the United States. However, while we would of course be affected by any resulting rise in global oil prices, the U.S. gets little of our petroleum from the Gulf. The U.S. imports only about 49 percent of the petroleum we consume, and over half of those imports come from the Western Hemisphere. Less than 25 percent of U.S. imports came from all the Gulf countries combined in October 2011 -- far less than is available in the U.S. S trategic P etroleum R eserve, were Gulf supplies to be interrupted. China, on the other hand, would find its oil supplies significantly threatened by an Iranian move against the Strait. China's most significant oil supplier is Saudi Arabia. China also happens, however, to be Iran's primary oil customer and perhaps its most important ally: Beijing provides Iran with its most sophisticated weaponry and with diplomatic cover at the United Nations. Thus a move to close the Strait would backfire strategically by harming the interests of -- and likely alienating -- Iran's most important patron and cutting off Iran's own economic lifeline, while doing little to imperil U.S. supplies of crude. 171 2NC – Extension – Venezuela Oil Now Venezuela is already increasing oil production --- foreign companies are already investing AVN 6/14/13 (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, “Venezuela to Increase Oil Production to 3.25m BPD in 2013,” Press-Venezuelan Embassy to the US, http://venezuelaus.org/2013/06/14/venezuela-to-increase-oil-production-to-3-25m-bpd-in-2013/) Venezuelan Oil and Mining Minister Rafael Ramirez said Thursday that according to projections, the production capacity of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) will reach 3.25 million barrels per day by late 2013. In statements to the media, he said that this is an increase of 250,000 barrels over the previous year, and is thanks to new developments in the Orinoco Oil Belt, the site of the world’s largest certified oil reserves. Ramirez referred to efforts that are under way to increase oil output levels. “1,000 wells are being drilled annually, with 200 drills, hundreds of miles of pipeline are being installed to build in this period of government [20132019] a capability that will double the current one,” he said, to reach 6 million barrels per day in 2019. “We are focused on meeting our goals because it is a stage of volumetric expansion of the production capacity, which is in compliance with the timelines stipulated for the [Orinoco Oil] Belt,” he said. Ramirez said that the government has implemented efforts in recent weeks to meet the projected goals for oil extraction and has signed cooperation agreements with strategic partners and secured financing. Last month, PDVSA and Chevron signed a $2 billion line of credit to increase production at Petroboscan from 107,000 barrels to 127,000 barrels per day. Also, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) initialed an agreement with PDVSA for $4 billion to increase production at Petrosinovensa from 140,000 to 160,000 barrels per day by the end of this year. “The disbursement of this funding will be paid by the end of the year, the resources will come in this year,” Ramirez said. The French and American company Schlumberger also signed a cooperation agreement with PDVSA that involves increasing service provision related to oil exploration and production. Meanwhile, Russia’s Rosnieft and PDVSA created a new joint venture called PetroVictoria and agreed to a loan of $1.5 billion. They’re already producing three million barrels a day and it will increase --- plan’s not necessary Nelson 13 (George Nelson, Argentina Independent Staff, May 3, 2013, "Venezuela: Oil and Natural Gas Production Set To Increase", http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/newsfromlatinamerica/venezuela-oiland-natural-gas-production-set-to-increase/) Venezuela is set to increase oil production capacity by 2014, according to the government. The world’s largest crude oil reserves are found in the country, estimated at around 297,700million barrels.The Venezuelan minister of petroleum and mining, Rafael Ramírez, said that US$25 billion is to be invested in the oil sector in a bid to increase mining and production capacity.“Our goal is to produce four million barrels per day,” said Ramirez during a meeting with the National Oil Chamber, in the Sucre State, in the northeast of the country. The country is currently producing three million barrels a day, although present capacity stands at a potential 3.7 million barrels per day.“In the early 1980’s Venezuela was producing 1,600,000 barrels of oil a day, this is nothing compared to what we can do today,” said the minister while also stating the government’s plan to increase natural gas production.Increasing production to six million barrels per day for 2019 is an objective that “requires a comprehensive investment plan”, according to Ramirez. “We will do in seven years what has been done in the last 60 with regards to oil production in Venezuela.” 172 2NC – Extension – Long Timeframe Oil production won’t matter for years because of production deficiencies Money Morning 13 (March 19, 2013, “Oil Companies Hope for New Opportunity in EnergyRich Venezuela,” http://moneymorning.com/2013/03/19/oil-companies-hope-for-newopportunity-in-energy-rich-venezuela/) Due to years of not properly investing in its oil industry resources, production steadily declined by about 25% in the 14 years Chavez was in power, and oil exports fell by nearly 50%. In fact, there were various points during the Chavez years that Venezuela was actually a net importer of crude."Venezuela's clout on OPEC and on world oil prices has been greatly diminished because of its inability to exploit its enormous resources," Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, a consultancy, told The New York Times. "In the 1990s, their production was booming and they could thumb their nose at Saudi Arabia and get away with it, but now they have become OPEC's poor cousin."That is to say even with a regime change, which does not appear imminent, it will take years for output there to jump to the point where Venezuela makes a significant contribution to reserves and profits for major oil companies. 173 2NC – Extension – China Relations Resilient Relations are resilient and have survived far larger issues in the past Stokes 05 (Bruce, PhD, Snr Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, National Journal, 7-16, Lexis) The Chinese resent growing pressure from Washington to revalue their currency, the yuan. They worry about mounting anti-Chinese sentiment in Congress. They anticipate potential bilateral friction over North Korea and over China's lengthening economic and diplomatic shadow in East Asia. And, said Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies Nonetheless, members of China's small community of experts on Sino-American relations are upbeat . They welcome April's agreement between Beijing at Beijing University, "there are deep-rooted suspicions of U.S. intentions." and Washington to hold regular senior-level talks, with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick leading the dialogue, on the full array of issues facing the two nations. They think that the Taiwan issue is manageable. And they have faith that the U.S.-China relationship can be put on a stable course once Beijing convinces Washington that China's military buildup in recent years poses no threat to the United States, and that China does not want to exclude America from Asia. [CONTINUES] As Yuan suggests, as dynamic as China appears from the outside, insiders here fret about their country's domestic vulnerabilities. Tens of millions of Chinese are jobless and drifting around the country with no permanent home. The possibility of an economic slowdown that might increase this number sends shivers through the leadership. Moreover, millions more work unproductively on the land. At some point, these people need to find jobs in industry and services if Chinese agriculture is ever to become more efficient. In addition, the strength of the financial system, burdened as it is by bad loans, is a constant worry. Opinions differ on how serious the problem is. Green, from Standard Chartered Bank, says there is "good reason to believe that China can get through this." But the banking system is likely to be vulnerable for years to come. All of this uncertainty exists amid an environment of mounting civil unrest. The number of demonstrations and other citizen protests has increased dramatically in the past few years, and many are aimed at the tax system and at environmental abuses. This internal political insecurity is compounded, analysts here say, by a growing wariness of U.S. meddling. Well aware of the role that Washington played in funding successful opposition groups in Ukraine and elsewhere, the already insecure Chinese leadership views Bush administration talk of democracy promotion with grave concern. For these reasons, Chinese experts on Sino-American relations welcome the new high-level dialogue between China and the U.S. that is slated to commence this summer. The talks aren't intended to solve specific problems -- such as Taiwan -- but will focus on building trust about each other's long-term geopolitical and security intentions. The Chinese would like to see the dialogue take up the expanding U.S. role in Central Asia, how Americans see their future relationship with Japan, and how to peacefully manage mutual energy needs. Although Chinese praise the dialogue as a good beginning, they do not have high expectations for the first meetings. They realize that the process will be slow. For that reason, some Chinese experts believe that there is also a need for a quick-reaction, crisis-management dialogue that would focus more specifically on emerging flash points. But they hold out little hope for such an interchange, saying the Pentagon opposes it. So the challenges facing the U.S.-China relationship, as seen from Beijing, are daunting but manageable . The course of events may depend on how Washington handles mounting frustration with China in the United States. "This is going to be very difficult," said Susan Shirk, a professor of political science at the University of California (San Diego). "The history of pressuring the Chinese to do things is not one of great success. When we pressure them, they dig in their heels. It turns into a contest of wills. And you can't keep any of this from the Chinese people anymore. The Internet sets the agenda, and Beijing has to react. So if we start venting, they will start to vent." Fortunately, said Kenneth G. Lieberthal, a China expert and a professor of political science at the University of Michigan, the relationship has proven quite resilient over the years. "We are far beyond the era when one or two issues could break the relationship," he said. 174 2NC – Extension – No China War Deterrence checks US China war Glaser, 11 — Professor of PoliSci and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University (Charles, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?”, March/April Foreign Affairs) What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation . Large-scale conventional attack by China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in China’s power would be large enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States’ massive conventional capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma . Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to China’s modernization of its nuclear force. This and thus help head restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition. 175 2NC – Extension – Iran Won’t Close Strait Iran won’t dare close the strait Glaser 11 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “ Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser_-_EnergySecurity-AUGUST2011.docx) Although difficult to estimate the probability that Iran would attempt to close the strait, analysts have offered reasons for expecting the probability to be quite low: Iran would lose the oil revenue from its own exports; and Iran would likely be deterred by the probable costs of U.S. intervention, which could include the destruction of key military bases and occupation of some of its territory. Because so much oil flows through the strait, the United States would almost certainly respond to keep it open. Intervention is inevitable even without oil dependence O’Keefe 12 (William O’Keefe, Chief Executive Officer of the Marshall Institute, President of Solutions Consulting Inc., “What’s Really Behind The Anti-Oil Movement?” Fuel Fix, April 24, 2012, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/04/24/whats-really-behind-the-anti-oilenergymovement/) Mr. Lutz claims that we are being “forced” to protect the Strait of Hormuz through which 20% of the world’s oil moves daily. The implication is that that oil comes to America. That is also wrong. If we didn’t protect the Strait, does SAFE think that the Chinese navy wouldn’t? Would we view that as acceptable? 176 2NC – AT: Add-On – Economy (1/2) No economic vulnerability – spare capacity, alternative routes, and structural insulation check Kahn 11 (Jeremy Kahn, journalist, “Crude Reality,” February 13, 2011, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full) There’s no denying the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the US economy. Although only 15 percent of imported US oil comes directly from the Persian Gulf, the region is responsible for nearly a third of the world’s production and the majority of its known reserves. But the oil market is also elastic: Many key producing countries have spare capacity, so if oil is cut off from one country, others tend to increase their output rapidly to compensate. Today, regions outside the Middle East, such as the west coast of Africa, make up an increasingly important share of worldwide production. Private companies also hold large stockpiles of oil to smooth over shortages — amounting to a few billion barrels in the United States alone — as does the US government, with 700 million barrels in its strategic petroleum reserve. And the market can largely work around shipping disruptions by using alternative routes; though they are more expensive, transportation costs account for only tiny fraction of the price of oil. Compared to the 1970s, too, the structure of the US economy offers better insulation from oil price shocks. Today, the country uses half as much energy per dollar of gross domestic product as it did in 1973, according to data from the US Energy Information Administration. Remarkably, the economy consumed less total energy in 2009 than in 1997, even though its GDP rose and the population grew. When it comes time to fill up at the pump, the average US consumer today spends less than 4 percent of his or her disposable income on gasoline, compared with more than 6 percent in 1980. Oil, though crucial, is simply a smaller part of the economy than it once was. No impact to oil shocks – prefer the consensus of new economic research and scholarship Kahn 11 (Jeremy Kahn, journalist, “Crude Reality,” February 13, 2011, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full) Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973. 177 2NC – AT: Add-On – Economy (2/2) No impact --- no diversionary war and violence decreases during times of economic crisis Drezner 12 (Daniel W. Drezner, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf) The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42 178 2NC – AT: Add-On – Terrorism (1/2) No impact to funding --- there’s no linkage between oil revenue and terrorism and terrorism will occur even without oil revenue Peter and Doran 08 – Jerry Taylor is member of the International Association for Energy Economics and adjunct scholar at the Institute for Energy Research, Peter Van Doran has taught at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (Princeton University), the School of Organization and Management (Yale University), and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, former postdoctoral fellow in political economy at Carnegie Mellon University (“The Energy Security Obsession”, The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Summer 2008, Vol. 6, No. 2 http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/taylor_vandoren_energy_security_obs ession.pdf) Does Western reliance on oil put money in the pocket of Islamic terrorists? To some degree, yes. Does that harm western security? Probably not – at least, probably not very much. Before we go on, it’s worth noting that only 15.5 percent of the oil in the world market is produced from nation-states accused of funding terrorism. 23 Hence, the vast majority of the dollars we spend on gasoline do not end up on this purported economic conveyer belt to terrorist bank accounts. Regardless, terrorism is a relatively low-cost endeavor and oil revenues are unnecessary for terrorist activity. The fact that a few hundred thousand dollars paid for the 9/11 attacks suggests that the limiting factor for terrorism is expertise and manpower, not money. That observation is strengthened by the fact that there is no correlation between oil profits and Islamic terrorism. We estimated two regressions using annual data from 1983 to 2005: the first between fatalities resulting from Islamic terrorist attacks and Saudi oil prices and the second between the number of Islamic terrorist incidents and Saudi oil prices. In neither regression was the estimated coefficient on oil prices at all close to being significantly different from zero. 24 Consider: Inflation-adjusted oil prices and profits during the 1990s were low. 25 But the 1990s also witnessed the worldwide spread of Wahabbi fundamentalism, the build-up of Hezbollah, and the coming of age of al Qaeda. Note too that al Qaeda terrorists in the 1990s relied upon help from state sponsors such as Sudan and Afghanistan – nations that aren’t exactly known for their oil wealth or robust economies. Producer states do use oil revenues to fund ideological extremism, and Saudi financing of madrassas and Iranian financing of Hezbollah are good examples. But given the importance of those undertakings to the Saudi and Iranian governments, it’s unlikely that they would cease and desist simply because profits were down. They certainly weren’t deterred by meager oil profits in the 1990s. 26 The futility of reducing oil consumption as a means of improving national / energy security is illustrated by the fact that states accused of funding terrorism earned $290 billion from oil sales in 2006. 27 Even if that sum were cut by 90 percent, that would still leave $29 billion at their disposal – more than enough to fund terrorism given the minimal financial needs of terrorists. Empirics prove our argument --- they’ll be funded no matter what Cleveland 10 – Professor of Geography and Environment at Boston University, Ph.D. in Geography from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Cutler, 17 June 2010, “The Myth of Energy Independence,” http://www.theenergywatch.com/2010/06/17/the-myth-ofenergy-independence/) Energy independence would not significantly reduce the risk of terrorism. Terrorism thrived when oil was $10 per barrel—it doesn’t need $100 a barrel oil. Terrorism can be done on the cheap: the 9/11 Commission found that those attacks were accomplished with as little as $500,000. 179 2NC – AT: Add-On – Terrorism (2/2) Terrorism won’t cause extinction --- people are more likely to die in a car crash Mueller 09 (John Mueller, Prof. Pol. Sci. – Ohio State U., in “American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear Threat inflation since 9/11”, Ed. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, p. 194) Although there are some who worry that al-Qaeda has been able to reconstitute itself and is now on the march (see Bergen 2007; Hoffman 2008; Mazzetti and Rohde 2008),2 estimates of the size of al-Qaeda central generally come in with numbers in the same order of magnitude as those suggested by Sageman. Egyptian intelligence, for example, puts the number at less than 200, while American intelligence estimates run from 300 to upwards of 500 (Wright 2008). One retired U.S. intelligence officer suggests it could be "as many as 2000" (Mazzetti and Rohde 2008), but that number should obviously be taken essentially to define the upper range of contemporary estimates. Another way to evaluate the threat is to focus on the actual amount of violence perpetrated around the world by Muslim extremists since 9/11 outside of war zones. Included in the count would be terrorism of the much-publicized and fearinducing sort that occurred in Bali in 2002, in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Turkey in 2003, in the Philippines, Madrid, and Egypt in 2004, and in London and Jordan in 2005. Three think-tank publications have independently provided lists of such incidents. Although these tallies make for grim reading, the total number of people killed comes to some 200 or 300 per year. That, of course, is 200 or 300 per year too many, but it hardly suggests that the perpetrators present a major threat, much less an existential one. For comparison: over the same period far more people have drowned in bathtubs in the United States alone. Another comparison comes from the consequences of policies instituted by the Transportation Security Administration. Increased delays and added costs at airports due to new security procedures provide incentive for many short-haul passengers to drive to their destination rather than flying. Since driving is far riskier than air travel, the extra automobile traffic generated by increased airport security screening measures has been estimated to result in 400 or more fatalities per year (Ellig et al. 2006: 35). Another assessment comes from astronomer Alan Harris. Using State Department figures, he estimates a worldwide death rate from international terrorism outside of war zones of 1,000 per year—that is, he assumes in his estimate that there would be another 9/11 somewhere in the world every several years. Over an 80 year period under those conditions some 80,000 deaths would occur which would mean that the probability that a resident of the globe will die at the hands of international terrorists is about one in 75,000 (6 billion divided by 80,000). In comparison, an American's chance of dying in an auto accident over the same time interval is about one in 80. If there are no repeats of 9/11, the probability of being killed by an international terrorist becomes more like one in 120,000. 180 ***APPEASEMENT DISADVANTAGE*** 181 Notes The thesis of the appeasement disadvantage is that US policy should not engage, but rather, should remain hardline and resolute against working with the three topic countries. The theory of appeasement is that the US should grant positive engagement to countries in order to induce positive changes in that country. The disadvantage not only argues that this policy isn’t effective, but also argues that other countries will pick up on the US’ policy of appeasement which gives them a green-light for a whole lot of global mischief. The 1NC impact evidence is particularly strong in isolating specific scenarios for global instability that could escalate should the US send the signal that it will not remain committed to hardline policies. An important strategic aspect of this disadvantage is that because it is based off of the perception of the plan in the world’s view, the disad accesses its links and impacts rather quickly, especially compared to trade-type advantages that require years for substantial markets to grow and develop. The perception based nature of the disadvantage also means that the negative does not need to win that the affirmative’s plan fails to win the link because even if Cuba, for example, accepts US engagement, it still sends a global signal of indecisiveness and a lack of resolve. The strongest part of the disad is the internal link and impacts. The weakest part of the disadvantage is the uniqueness because the US does take many soft-line approaches to countries around the world such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, and more. Beating back the uniqueness presses of affirmative teams and shaping your link story around the unique signal appeasement to the topic countries would send will help negative teams win this disadvantage. The links to Cuba and Venezuela are quite strong for this disadvantage whereas the link to Mexico affirmatives are weaker. Remember to insert a link into the 1NC that is specific to the affirmative you’re debating! 182 1NC – Appeasement DA (1/2) A) Uniqueness --- the perception of US resolve is on the brink --- sticking to our hardline policies are critical to avoid a collapse of overall credibility Etzioni 11 (Amitai Etzioni, Prof IR at George Washington, “The Coming Test of US Credibility” Military Review, 2011, http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2011/03/credibility.pdf) THE RELATIVE POWER of the United States is declining—both because other nations are increasing their power and because the U. S. economic challenges and taxing overseas commitments are weakening it. In this context, the credibility of U.S. commitments and the perception that the United States will back up its threats and promises with appropriate action is growing in importance. In popular terms, high credibility allows a nation to get more mileage out of a relatively small amount of power, while low credibility leads to burning up much greater amounts of power. The Theory of Credibility One definition of power is the ability of A to make B follow a course of action that A prefers. The term “make” is highly relevant. When A convinces B of the merit of the course A prefers, and B voluntarily follows it, we can refer to this change of course as an application of “persuasive power” or “soft power.” However, most applications of power are based either on coercion (if you park in front of a fire hydrant, your car is towed) or economic incentives and disincentives (you are fined to the point where you would be disinclined to park there). In these applications of power, B maintains his original preferences but is either prevented from following them or is pained to a point where he will suspend resistance. Every time A calls on B to change course, A is tested twice. First, if B does not follow A’s call, A will fail to achieve its goals (Nazi Germany annexes Austria, despite protests by the United Kingdom and France). Second, A loses some credibility, making B less likely to heed A’s future demands (Nazi Germany becomes more likely to invade Poland). On the other hand, if B heeds A’s demand, A wins twice: it achieves its goal (e.g., the United States dismantles the regime of Saddam Hussein and establishes that there are no WMDs in Iraq), and it increases the likelihood that future demands will be heeded without power actually being exercised (e.g. Libya voluntarily dismantles its In short, the higher a nation’s credibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actually employing its power or by employing less of it when it must exercise its power. WMD program following the invasion of Iraq). Political scientists have qualified this basic version of the power/credibility theory. In his detailed examination of three historical cases, Daryl G. Press shows that in each instance, the Bs made decisions based upon their per ception of the current intentions and capabilities of A, rather than on the extent to which A followed up on previous threats. Thus, if A does not have the needed forces or if A’s interests in the issue at hand are marginal, its threats will not carry much weight no matter how “credible” A was in the past. For example, if the United States had announced that it would invade Burma unless it released opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest (she was eventually released in November 2010), such a threat would not have carried much weight—regardless of past U.S. actions—because the issue did not seem reason enough for the United States to invade Burma, and because the U.S. Army was largely committed elsewhere. Another political scientist, Kathleen Cunningham, has shown that the credibility of promises—as opposed to the credibility of threats—is much more difficult to maintain because the implementation of promises is often stretched over long periods of time. 1 The bulk of this essay focuses on dealing with threats, rather than promises. Declining U.S. Power and Credibility Over the last few years, much attention has been paid to the relative decline of U.S. power, but much less has been said of changes in U.S. credibility. While there has been some erosion in the relative power of the United States measured since 1945 or 1990), the swings in the level of its credibility have been much more pronounced. When the United States withdrew its forces from Vietnam in 1973, its credibility suffered so much that many observers doubted whether the United States would ever deploy its military overseas unless it faced a much greater and direct threat than it faced in Southeast Asia. Additional setbacks over the next decades followed, including the failed rescue of American hostages in Iran during the last year of the Carter administration and President Reagan’s withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Lebanon after the October 1983 Hezbollah bombing of U.S. barracks in Beirut. The bombing killed 241 American servicemen, but it elicited no punitive response—the administration abandoned a plan to assault the training camp where Hezbollah had planned the attack. 2 Operation Desert Storm drastically increased U.S. military credibility. The United States and the UN demanded that Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait. When he refused, U.S. and Allied forces quickly overwhelmed his military with a low level of American causalities, contrary to expectations. Saddam’s forces were defeated with less than 400 American casualties. 3 The total cost of defeating Saddam was $61 billion—almost 90 percent of which was borne by U.S. allies. 4 When Serbia ignored the demands of the United States and other Western nations to withdraw its hostile forces and halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO forces defeated the Serbs with little effort, losing only two troops in a helicopter training accident. 5 U.S. credibility reached a high mark in 2003, when the United States, employing a much smaller force than in 1991, overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime swiftly and with a low level of American casualties, again despite expectations to the contrary. In the Those who hold that credibility matters little should pay mind to the side effects of Operation Iraqi Freedom. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Libya did not merely stop developing WMDs or allow inspections, it allowed the United States to pack cargo In short, the higher a nation’s credibility, the more it will be able to achieve without actually employing its power …4 March-April 2011 first phase of the war—up to 1 May 2003, when the Saddam regime was removed and no WMDs were found—there had been only 172 American casualties. 6 Only $56 billion had been appropriated for Iraq operations. 7 MILITARY REVIEW planes with several tons of nuclear equipment and airlift it from the country. 8 The country surrendered centrifuges, mustard gas tanks, and SCUD missiles. It sent 13 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to Russia for blending down, destroyed chemical weapons, and has assisted the United States in cracking down on the global black market for nuclear arms technology. 9 The reasons are complex, and experts point out that Muammar al-Gaddafi, the leader of Libya, was under considerable domestic pressure to ease his country’s economic and political isolation. 10 Gaddafi also believed he was next in line for a forced regime change. In a private conversation with Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s prime minister, in 2003, Gaddafi is reported to have said, “I will do whatever the Americans want, because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.” 11 Iran’s best offer by far regarding its nuclear program occurred in 2003, at a time when U.S. credibility reached its apex. In a fax transmitted to the State Department through the Swiss ambassador, who confirmed that it had come from “key power centers” in Iran, Iran asked for “a broad dialogue with the United States.” The fax “suggested everything was on the table—including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.” 12 (The Bush administration, however, considered the Iranian regime to be on the verge of collapse at the time, and, according to reports, it “belittled the initiative.”) 13 Richard Haass, who at the time was serving as director of policy planning at the State Department, stated that the offer was spurned because “the bias [in the Bush administration] was toward a policy of regime change.” 14 Still, in 2004, Britain, France, and Germany secured a temporary suspension of uranium enrichment in Iran. 15 It lasted until 2006, when American credibility began to decline. 16 Also in 2004, Iran offered to make the “European Three” a guarantee that its nuclear program would be used “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” as long as the West would provide “firm commitments on security issues.” 17 In 2005, as U.S. difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan mounted and its level of casualties—as well as those of its allies and of the local populations—increased without a victory in sight, U.S. credibility was gradually undermined. Since 2005, more than 4,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have died, and the direct cost of military operations in the country has exceeded $650 billion. 18 The same holds true in Afghanistan—only more strongly—already the longest war in which the United States has ever engaged, with rising casualties and costs. Both credibility-undermining developments were the result of a great expansion of the goals of the mission. In Iraq, the mission was initially to overthrow the regime and ensure that it has no WMDs. In Afghanistan, the mission was initially to eradicate Al-Qaeda. But in both countries, the mission morphed into the costly task of nation building—although other terms were used, such as reconstruction and COIN (counterinsurgency)— which includes building an effective and legitimate government composed of the native population. In popular terms, the United States won the wars but has been losing the peace. The distinction between the pure military phase (which was very successful in both countries) and the troubled nationbuilding phase that followed has eluded the Nation’s adversaries, who have focused on the fact that the United States seems to have great difficulties in making progress toward its expanded goals. Thus, even if the United States achieves its extended goals Saddam Hussein is seen in this image from video broadcast on Iraqi television, 2003. in these two nations, it will have done so only with great efforts and at high costs. And many observers are ver y doubtful that these nations will be turned into stable governments allied with the United States—let alone that they will be truly democratic. The fact that the United States is withdrawing from Iraq (and is on a timeline, however disputed, to begin with drawal from Afghanistan)—regardless of whether its goals are fully accomplished—further feeds into the significant decline in its credibility. This stands out especially when compared to the credibility it enjoyed in 2003 and 2004. The fact that the United States has, on several occasions, made specific and very public demands of various countries, only to have these demands roundly ignored—without any consequences— has not added to its credibility. On several occasions, the United States demanded Israel extend the freeze on settlement con struction in the West Bank and cease building in East Jerusalem. While one can question whether such a call for a total freeze was justified, especially as no concessions were demanded from the Palestinians, one cannot deny that, as Israel ignored these demands and faced no consequences, U.S. credibility was diminished. The same has occurred in Afghanistan. The United States voiced strong demands, only to be rebuffed very publicly by a government that would collapse were it not for American support. Moreover, the United States was forced to court President Hamid Karzai when he threatened to make peace on his own with the Taliban and was courted by Iran. A particularly telling example took place on 28 March 2010, when President Obama flew to Kabul and “delivered pointed criticism to Hamid Karzai” over pervasive corruption in the Afghan government. 19 Then-National Security Advisor James Jones voiced the president’s concerns, stating that Karzai “needs to be seized with how important” the issue of corruption is for American efforts in the country. 20 But Karzai was “angered and offended” by the visit.” 21 Only days later, he made a series of inflammatory remarks about Western interference in his country, accused foreigners of a “vast fraud” in the Afghan presidential election, and threatened to ally himself with the Taliban. 22 A few weeks after these state ments, Karzai The Next Test As I will show shortly, in recent years a large and growing number of U.S. allies and adversaries — especially in the Middle East—have questioned American commitment to back up its declared goals—that is, they question the Nation’s credibility. Hence, the way the United States conducts itself in the next test of its resolve will be unusually consequential for its position as a global power. I cannot emphasize enough that I am not arguing that the was in Washington as a guest of the White House, where he was wellreceived, and all seemed forgiven. United States should seek a confrontation, let alone engage in a war, to show that it still has the capacity to back up its threats and promises by using conventional forces. (Few doubt U.S. power and ability to act as a nuclear power, but they also realize that nuclear power is ill-suited for many foreign policy goals.) However, I am suggesting that the ways in which the U.S. will respond to the next challenge to its power will have strong implications for its credibility — and for its need to employ power. One’s mind turns to two hot spots: North Korea and Iran. B) Link --- <<<insert specific link about Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela>>> 183 1NC – Appeasement DA (2/2) C) Impact --- signaling weakness makes a laundry list of global conflicts inevitable Hanson 09 (Victor Davis Hanson, professor of classics at California State University, Fresno, and is currently the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, December 2009, “Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama,” http://pjmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davishanson/) BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when. 184 2NC – Uniqueness – Cuba The status quo is hardline policies toward Cuba Kovalik 6/28/13 (Dan Kovalik, Senior Associate with the AFL-CIO, Citing Lamrani, a USCuba relations expert “Trying to Destroy the Danger of a Good Example: The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba” 6/28/13, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the-unrelentingeconomic-war-on-cuba/) Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the rulers of the U.S. have imagined this, and with terror in their hearts. Indeed, Lamrani quotes former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, as quite rightly asserting: Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it is afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cuba’s economic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we would demonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small insurgent island. The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the good example of Cuba in the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator, Barack Obama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end, and yet, while loosening the screws just a bit, President Obama has continued to aggressively enforce the blockade. He must be called to task on this. In addition, Congress must be lobbied to end the legal regime which keeps the embargo in place. In addition, we must support Venezuela and its new President, Nicolas Maduro, as Venezuela has been quite critical in supporting Cuba in its international medical mission. And indeed, one of the first things President Maduro did once elected in April was to travel to Cuba to reaffirm his support for these efforts. It should be noted that Maduro’s electoral rival, Henrique Capriles – who led an attack against the Cuban Embassy in Caracas during the 2002 coup — vowed to end support for, and joint work, with Cuba. 185 2NC – Uniqueness – Venezuela (1/2) No appeasement now --- conversations on both sides have shut down Bercovitch 7/21/13 (Sascha Bercovitch, With “Zero Tolerance to Gringo Aggression,” Maduro Cuts Off Venezuela-U.S. Talks, July 21 2013, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/9872) Caracas, July 21st 2013 (Venezuelanalysis.com) – The conversations that were started a month and a half ago between Venezuela and the United States have definitively ended, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced yesterday at an event of the Strategic Regions of Integral Defense (REDI) in Cojedes state. “My policy is zero tolerance to gringo aggression against Venezuela. I'm not going to accept any aggression, whether it be verbal, political, or diplomatic. Enough is enough. Stay over there with your empire, don't involve yourselves anymore in Venezuela,” he said. The announcement comes after controversial statements from Samantha Powers, President Barack Obama’s nominee for U.S. envoy to the United Nations, who testified to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Wednesday that she would fight against what she called a “crackdown on civil society being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela.” In a statement written on Friday that marks the last communication between the two countries, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua wrote, “The preoccupation expressed by the U.S. government regarding the supposed repression of civil society in Venezuela is unacceptable and unfounded. To the contrary, Venezuela has amply demonstrated that it possesses a robust system of constitutional guarantees to preserve the unrestricted practice and the respect of fundamental human rights, as the UN has recognized on multiple occasions.” No rapprochement with Venezuela --- any trade is maintained for strategic interests only Rivera 13 (Michael Rivera, Intelligent Analysis on the Americas, "Calling it Quits?: How Strategic Interest Outweighs Political Rivalry Among Nations" 7/28/13 http://riveragroupinternational.wordpress.com/2013/07/28/calling-it-quits-how-strategicinterest-outweighs-political-rivalry-among-nations/) Relations between the US and Venezuela reached a boiling point on several occasions during the presidency of Hugo Chavez. The two countries have been in conflict on a variety of issues over the past 14 years, including human rights, freedom of media, capitalism, and ideology. Although some analysts were guardedly optimistic about the possibility of normalized relations between the US and Venezuela after the death of Chavez earlier this year, diplomatic fallout over the Edward Snowden affair has reminded observers that the process of thawing such deeprooted trust will not occur over night. There may be little hope for an improvement in political relations in the near future, but how much do poor diplomatic ties affect commercial relations between countries in conflict? One would expect trade levels between the US and Venezuela to have diminished in recent years considering the fiery anti-imperialist rhetoric Chavez employed as president. U.S. Census data shows that bilateral trade levels have continued to increase since Chavez first took office in 1999. The annual total of American exports to Venezuela more than doubled from 1998 to 2012, while imports have quadrupled during that time frame to $38 billion. The United States has been a critical market for Venezuelan goods, as exports to the US accounted for over 39% of the country’s total exports in 2012. This has not been dispelled by the fact that these two countries mutually expelled their respective ambassadors in 2008. Domestic and foreign investors are guaranteed the same legal protections under the current Venezuelan constitution. The same article of protection also states that exceptions are made for “strategic interests”, including oil and other goods for public benefit. This exception obviously creates the legal pathway for nationalization. Although Maduro has yet to invoke this policy during his time in office, his predecessor frequently nationalized firms to assert governmental control. American firms were not the only ones subject to having their assets seized during Chavez’s time in office. Foreign oil companies have been frequently targeted; but to say that Exxon Mobil and Conoco Phillips were singled out for being North American firms would an incomplete explanation at best. Oil was, and continues to be, the crux of the chavista economic program. In addition to being its primary revenue stream, it is often used as a source of repayment for loans from China. It is also used to support its alliances with countries like Belarus, Cuba, Iran, and Syria. Thus, a firm of any national origin with a controlling interest in a key asset like energy, is far more likely to be nationalized than an American company with no assets of strategic value for the Venezuelan government. 186 2NC – Uniqueness – Venezuela (1/2) Obama taking hardline policy against Venezuela now AP 11 (“Without ambassadors, US-Venezuela tensions grow”, Associated Press/Fox News, 1/1, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/01/ambassadors-venezuela-tensions-grow/) The United States and Venezuela are starting the year without ambassadors in Caracas and Washington due to an intensifying diplomatic dispute that is likely to persist and boost President Hugo Chavez's long-standing antagonism. Both sides have shown firmly entrenched stances and no willingness to compromise in the past week as the U.S. government revoked the Venezuelan ambassador's visa in response to Chavez's refusal to accept the chosen U.S. envoy. "They thought we were going to back down. Anything negative that happens will be the responsibility of the United States," veteran Venezuelan diplomat Roy Chaderton told the Caracas-based television channel Telesur on Thursday. Chaderton, a close Chavez ally and former foreign minister, said the Venezuelan government is "studying the case with sensitivity ... and will make the respective decisions." Chavez skipped an opportunity to respond during a three-hour speech Thursday night, saying nothing about the U.S. government's decision to revoke the visa of his ambassador, Bernardo Alvarez. President Barack Obama's administration took that step in response to Chavez's rejection of Larry Palmer, the White House nominee for ambassador who has been awaiting Senate confirmation. It is unclear what concrete effects those actions could have on U.S.-Venezuela relations. Diplomats from the two countries have already long had reduced contacts due to tensions fed both by Chavez's condemnations of the U.S. and also by the State Department's criticisms of deteriorating democracy in Venezuela. "Much of the cooperation between the United States and Venezuela in recent years has involved lower-level and lower-profile individuals and agencies than the ambassadors, so the immediate fallout will be limited," said Shannon O'Neil, a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "But this latest round of escalating tensions ends any hope for calmer relations or more expansive cooperation. Demonizing the United States remains too important a political foil for Chavez," O'Neil said. Palmer angered Chavez by suggesting earlier this year — in written responses to questions from Republican Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana — that morale is low in Venezuela's military and that he is concerned Colombian rebels are finding refuge in Venezuela. Chavez has accused Palmer of dishonoring the Venezuelan government by expressing concerns on several sensitive subjects — including 2008 accusations by the U.S. Treasury Department that three members of Chavez's inner circle helped Colombian rebels by supplying arms and aiding drug-trafficking operations. "This outcome was predictable from the moment Palmer's comments were made public by Senator Lugar in July," said Miguel Tinker Salas, a Latin American studies professor at Pomona College in Claremont, California. "For the State Department to allow this predictable outcome to develop shows that they had no interest in improving relations with Venezuela." Chavez had vowed not to back down in his opposition to Palmer and dared the U.S. government to expel Alvarez before diplomats confirmed on Wednesday that his visa was revoked. Alvarez was outside the United States when the action was taken, preventing his return. U.S. State Department spokesman Mark Toner said earlier this week that the United States hopes to improve strained relations with Venezuela. "We believe it is precisely because there are tensions in the relationship that it is important to maintain diplomatic communications at the highest level," Toner said. The U.S. Embassy has been without an ambassador since Patrick Duddy finished his assignment and left in July. A previous dispute prompted similar expulsions of ambassadors at the end of President George W. Bush's administration. In September 2008, Chavez expelled Duddy and withdrew his own envoy, saying it was in solidarity with Bolivia after President Evo Morales ordered out the U.S. ambassador and accused him of helping the opposition incite violence. The Bush administration denied it and reacted by expelling the envoys of Venezuela and Bolivia. After more than nine months, in June 2009, the Obama administration and Chavez's government announced they were restoring their ambassadors. Since then, the relationship has again grown more hostile. In the past month, the U.S. State Department has strongly criticized decree powers granted to Chavez in the waning days of an outgoing congress firmly controlled by his allies. A new National Assembly takes office Jan. 5 with a bigger opposition contingent, and the decree powers will allow Chavez to bypass congress and enact laws in a range of areas for the next year and a half. Despite such friction, the two countries are linked by deep trade ties. Chavez's economy relies heavily on oil sales to the U.S., and also imports large quantities of consumer goods from the United States. Oil sales to the U.S. have declined in recent years as Chavez has sought to diversify his oil market, selling more to allied countries such as China. Chavez, whose anti-U.S. position has been a defining feature of his 12-year presidency, is likely to use the latest dispute to step up his criticism and rally supporters. Larry Birns, director of the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs, said the stances of both sides make for a volatile situation, and that if their "rhetoric becomes more shrill, the situation can deteriorate faster than either side originally intended." Some in the U.S. Congress, meanwhile, are calling for the U.S. to take a hard line against Chavez. 187 2NC – Uniqueness – Latin America US is taking a firm stance in Latin America now Benner 09 – Assistant Director of the Managing Global Insecurity Project, Brookings Institution, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State, and the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at USAID, and U.S. Embassy Kathmandu. (Holly, “President Obama’s first 100 days,” Brookings Institution – Managing Global Insecurity, 5/1, http://www.brookings.edu/media/Research/Files/Reports/2009/5/01%20obama%20mgi/oba ma_mgi.PDF) Management and Mitigation at USAID, and U.S. Embassy Kathmandu. Obama faces an unenviable set of foreign policy challenges, including a global financial crisis and two ongoing wars, as well as obstacles in building domestic constituencies for a globalist agenda in a dismal budgetary environment. It is also premature to evaluate success on issues and policies that will take months and years to achieve. However, high-level appointments, speeches, diplomatic visits, and early policies provide an indication of the new administration’s priorities and strategies. Despite these challenges, the new administration has changed the tone of U.S. engagement with the international community and arguably made progress towards reestablishing U.S. leadership in certain areas – specifically in Latin America. The administration has taken a firm stance in regard to these countries, contrary to what rightwing activists are saying. The Obama administration has demonstrated progress in articulating a new vision for global engagement. However, the test will come in implementing this vision—developing polices on complex and interrelated issues and ensuring domestic politics are aligned to support the global agenda. 188 2NC – Uniqueness – AT: Appeasement Now US is holding an offensive position against other rogue states --- no appeasement now Boyle 6/24/13 (professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law (Francis, “Obama Prepares to Wage Offensive, First-strike Strategic Nuclear Warfare against Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Syria”, Global Research, 6/24, http://www.globalresearch.ca/obama-prepares-to-wage-offensive-first-strike-strategic-nuclearwarfare-against-russia-china-iran-north-korea-and-syria/5340299) Since “nuclear deterrence” is not now and has never been the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policy from the get-go, then by default this means that offensive first-strike strategic nuclear war fighting is now and has always been the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policy. This policy will also be pursued and augmented by means of “integrated non-nuclear strike options.” (Ibid). Therefore the entire 2013 NPR and Obama’s recent nuclear arms “reduction” proposals must be understood within this context of the United States pursuing an offensive, strategic first-strike nuclear war-fighting capability as augmented by non-nuclear strike forces: “After a comprehensive review of our nuclear forces, the President has determined that we can ensure the security of the United States and our Allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level established in the New START Treaty.” Id. at 6. And we know now for sure that all the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems that Obama is currently in the process of deploying in Europe, Asia, and the United States, on land, at sea and perhaps in Outer Space are designed to provide the United States with a strategic, offensive, first strike nuclear war fighting capability against Russia and China and Iran and North Korea and Syria for starters. The latter three because the United States has taken the position that they are not in compliance with their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: “…the United States has relied increasingly on non-nuclear elements to strengthen regional security architectures, including a forward U.S. conventional presence and effective theater ballistic missile defenses…” Id. at 9. So the United States government is currently preparing to launch, wage and win an offensive, first-strike strategic nuclear war against Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Syria. All the rest is just palaver. Including by our Dissembler-in-Chief. An “honors” graduate of Harvard Law School. 189 1NC – Link – Cuba Embargo Lifting the embargo emboldens global regimes and collapses the credibility of US resolve Brooks 09 – Senior fellow for National Security Affairs in the Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation (Peter – Heritage foundation “Keep the Embargo, O,” April 16, 2009, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o) In another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba. Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance. Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America. And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there. In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not. And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift. Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies. So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us. Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang. Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course. Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left. Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad. The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in. We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.) With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere. The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time. Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers. The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it . Haven't we learned that yet? Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides. 190 2NC – Link – Cuba Embargo Lifting the embargo would send the wrong message to enemies of the US --shatters credibility Suchlicki 07 – Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. (Jaime - FrontPageMagazine.com “Don't Lift the Cuba Travel Ban” Wednesday, April 11, 2007 http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=26082) Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980. Lifting the travel ban without any major concession from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the U nited S tates”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United Sates; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid. Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. While the U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. A normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent. Supporting regimes and dictators that violate human rights and abuse their population is an ill-advised policy that rewards and encourages further abuses. The plan sends a signal of foreign policy weakness Bustillo 13 (Mitchell, “Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo”, International Policy Digest, May 9, 2013, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75391) When thinking of U.S.-Cuba relations, the trade embargo, or el bloqueo, is first and foremost on people’s minds . In 2009, President Barack Obama eased the travel ban, allowing Cuban-Americans to travel freely to Cuba, and again in 2011, allowing students and religious missionaries to travel to Cuba, as recently demonstrated by American pop culture figures, Beyoncé and her husband Jay-Z. Despite a history of hostile transgressions, the U.S. is inconsistent with its implementation of the embargo, which sends mixed signals to Havana and displays our weak foreign policy regarding Cuba. 191 1NC – Link – Mexico The plan will be perceived as appeasement and as rewarding Mexico for human rights violations and corruption Camarena 13 (Rodrigo Camarena of The Guardian, “Mexico needs tough love from the US, not just hope for change,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/06/mexicoobama-trip-tough-love-from-us) Missing in this sunny narrative is the validation of the Peña Nieto government by its most important ally, the United States. International monitors continue to highlight Mexico's unabated human rights violations, limits on the press, and high homicide rate, while the foreign business press gives its cautious, yet steady, approval of Peña Nieto's work. In this context, the President Obama's forward-looking speech to the Mexican public could not have been more welcomed by the Peña Nieto administration. As Obama remarked: "The young people of Mexico, you honor your heritage, thousands of years old, but you're also part of something new, a nation that's in the process of remaking itself … I've come to Mexico because I think it's time for us to put the old mindsets aside, it's time to recognize new realities, including the impressive progress of today's Mexico." And yet this refashioned Mexico continues to show the same dysfunctions of its very recent past. Take Peña Nieto's truce with opposition parties, the Pacto Por Mexico (Pact for Mexico), for instance. The pact, responsible for the president's successes in passing major structural reforms, has recently come into danger of unraveling, after reports of a vast vote-purchasing scheme, which was allegedly orchestrated by Peña Nieto's party and other officials during recent elections in the state of Veracruz. Hallmarks of Mexico's apparent corruption can also be found in the lauded overhaul of Mexico's educational system, which only passed after the sudden incarceration of the head of Mexico's teacher's union (a longtime bulwark against educational reform and no stranger to controversy herself). The government's campaign against hunger has also raised eyebrows, for both its gamified approach to poverty (you can "like" sponsor's products on Facebook and a kilogram of dehydrated milk will be donated to a family in need) and the participation of PepsiCo and Nestle in development of low-cost nutritional supplements for Mexico's 7.4 million citizens living in extreme poverty. While President Obama's effort to move the conversation beyond border security and organized crime is important for the long-term, the visit failed to address Mexico's difficult relationship with transparent governance and representative democracy. As the US seeks to reshape its relationship with its southern neighbor, it would do well to keep a close watch on the new administration's muddled positions on public safety. The US should not just talk about the future – it should reinforce the democratic principles that will truly drive Mexico's change today. 192 1NC – Link – Venezuela The plan’s engagement with Venezuela emboldens the regime and undercuts democratic opposition Christy 13 (Patrick Christy, senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative, The Foreign Policy Initiative, U.S. Overtures to Maduro Hurt Venezuela’s Democratic Opposition, June 13, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/us-overtures-maduro-hurtvenezuela%E2%80%99s-democratic-opposition) For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions. The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's government come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by María Corina Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on power. Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting, and various public scandals – especially those related to institutional corruption – could further erode public confidence in the current government. By resetting relations with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protégé's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro. 193 2NC – Link – Venezuela Engaging with Venezuela is appeasement Harper 10 – a journalist for America’s Quarterly (Liz Harper, “Venezuela’s Formal Rejection of Ambassador-Designate Larry Palmer”, America’s Quarterly, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/taxonomy/term/2741) On one side, you have those espousing "strategic engagement," keeping in line with the Obama administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In short and broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us with North Korea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on areas of mutual interest. You raise concerns discretely and express disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one person said, engagement should be “subversive," because you seek to assert positive influence by being present and through cooperation on areas such as business development, financial opportunities, or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer was the right guy to carry out this mission. But, the engagement policy, as it is practiced with Venezuela, is more like "appeasement," say people clamoring for a tougher approach. After all, for years now, we have witnessed a democracy's death by a thousand cuts. This past week, Hugo Chávez got one of his Christmas wishes with the approval of new decree powers, thereby further eroding the country's once well-established institutional checks and balances. Chávez threatens more than human rights and democratic norms; the U.S. has legitimate national security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and narcotrafficking. Yet, as Chávez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S. working to halt the downward spiral? Even oil cooperation appeases and emboldens Venezuela Koch 10 (Edward Koch, Newsmax, April 05 2010, Drilling Won't Mask Appeasement, http://www.newsmax.com/Koch/Koch-Obama-Venezuela-Iran/2010/04/05/id/354811) The president is to be commended for opening offshore areas for oil exploration. According to The Times of March 31, the president is ending “a long-standing moratorium on oil exploration along the east coast from the northern tip of Delaware to the central coast of Florida, covering 167 million acres of ocean.” Obviously, the action is intended to respond to the United States’ need for oil and our dependence on foreign sources. One large foreign source currently is Venezuela, whose leader, Hugo Chavez, is a sworn enemy of the U.S. According to The Times of April 3, “Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin of Russia visited Venezuela on Friday to sign a series of military and oil agreements with President Hugo Chavez, who is seeking to expand ties with Russia as a way of countering the influence of the United States in Latin America.” The Times also reported that “Mr. Chavez had suggested before Mr. Putin’s arrival that the countries could cooperate ambitiously on nuclear energy and a satellite-launching base in Venezuela.” What would we do if Venezuela invited Russia to build a missile launch pad, or Russia provided Venezuela with the plans and materials for building nuclear weapons? Would there be a replay of the Cuban missile crisis of the 1960s? Based on our continuing failure to confront North Korea and Iran with regard to their nuclear activities, I suspect we would do nothing. I fear that we have lost the battle and lost our nerve. It appears that the Obama administration has decided to live with the idea that these two rogue states — North Korea and Iran — can do as they please on the nuclear front. There is a foul whiff of Munich and appeasement in the air. 194 2NC – Impact – Turns LA Stability Latin America will take advantage of appeasement --- weakness invites regional instability and aggression Wilson 11 – the President of Americans for Limited Government (Bill, “Obama’s Appeasement to the South,” NetRightDaily, January 4, 2011, http://netrightdaily.com/2010/12/obamasappeasement-to-the-south/) As noted by a December 26th, 2010, editorial by the Washington Post, “Soft on Nicaragua,” the U.S. has failed to respond and “has not condemned the Nicaraguan land grab. In fact, the State Department has yet to say anything about the matter”. But perhaps this is all a part of Barack Obama’s grand strategy to not condemn as a means of achieving concessions. Of course, at some point, appeasement begins to look like approval. The silence has been inexcusable, but the statement by U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua Robert Callahan that the communist state was now a candidate for U.S. foreign aid via the Millennium Challenge Corporation is an insult. And Valenzuela’s handshake with Ortega a week after the invasion began is a crime against liberty. Making matters worse, Nicaraguan dictator Daniel Ortega has stacked that country’s Supreme Court simply so it could rule he is eligible to run for reelection — even though he is term-limited by the constitution. Clearly, Ortega has taken a page from Manuel Zelaya, who attempted a similar coup in Honduras to stay in power for life. Moreover, the Sandinistas have seen fit to “reprint” the Nicaraguan constitution to allow term-limited officials, including Supreme Court justices and election magistrates, to stay in power indefinitely, undoubtedly to solidify Ortega’s hold on power. This is the same regime responsible for the murder of thousands of Nicaraguans in Weakness invites aggression, and it is clear that the ineptitude of the Obama Administration has not gone unheeded in the region. In the last week of the year, Chavez expelled U.S. envoy Palmer for his comments about Venezuela’s proxy war against U.S. ally Columbia. Columbia, like Costa Rica, is in danger from these insurgent forces seeking to topple freedom in the region. the 1980’s as it waged its revolution. Venezuela has unsurprisingly refused to condemn the Nicaraguan invasion of Costa Rica in the Organization of American States, and itself has a horrendous record of suppressing opposition in its country. Chavez has made himself dictator-for-life and has eliminated privately-run press organizations. And Barack Obama has done nothing, and his stooge, Valenzuela, since being appointed to his post continues to project a weak U.S. posture in the region. That won’t be changing any time soon, and certainly not in time to save nations like Nicaragua from once again falling into the grips of an authoritarian regime. Freedom will not long endure in the Americas without U.S. leadership, and under the Obama Administration, Central and South America are becoming less free. Hopefully, the incoming House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairwoman Ileana RosLehtinen and her counterparts in the U.S. Senate will immediately conduct in-depth hearings so that Assistant Secretary of State Valenzuela can explain in detail the weak appeasement policies of the Obama Administration in Central and South America. He needs to answer for Hillary’s handshake — and his own. 195 2NC – Impact – Iran Prolif (1/2) 1NC Hanson evidence says loss of credibility means Iran will get the bomb --signal of weakness causes rampant nuclearization and leads to nuclear war Kroenig and McNally 13— Matthew, assistant professor and international relations field chair in the department of government at Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Robert, served as Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, March 2013 (Matthew and Robert, “Iranian Nukes and Global Oil,” The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 4.) But the impact of sanctions on future Iranian production pales in comparison to the other geo-economic implications of nuclear weapons in Iran. A nuclear Iran will likely increase the frequency and scope of geopolitical conflict in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. While policy analysts continue to debate how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, most agree a nuclear-armed Iran would have grave repercussions for the region. In March 2012 President Obama stated that U.S. policy was to prevent—not contain—a nuclear-armed Iran, and he explained why: “The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation.”10 President Obama’s fears are well-founded. Iran harbors ambitious geopolitical goals. After national survival, Iran’s primary objective is to become the most dominant state in the Middle East. In terms of international relations theory, Iran is a revisionist power. Its master national-historical narrative holds that Iran is a glorious nation with a storied past, and that it has been cheated out of its rightful place as a leading nation: Like pre-World War I Germany and China today, it is determined to reclaim its place in the sun. Currently, Iran restrains its hegemonic ambitions because it is wary of U.S. or Israeli military responses —particularly the former. But if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, its adversaries would be forced to treat it with deference if not kid gloves, even in the face of provocative acts. Iran would achieve a degree of “inverted deterrence” against stronger states by inherently raising the stakes of any military conflict against it to the nuclear level.11 As such, nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a cover under which to implement its regional ambitions with diminished fear of a U.S. military reprisal. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up its support for terrorist and proxy groups attacking Israeli, Saudi and U.S. interests in the greater Middle East and around the world; increase the harassment of and attacks against naval and commercial vessels in and near the Persian Gulf; and be more aggressive in its coercive diplomacy, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to intimidate adversaries and harmless, weaker neighbors alike. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran would exacerbate current conflicts in the Middle East, and this likely bears jarring consequences for global oil prices. Because of the heightened threat to global oil supply that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose, market participants would certainly add a large “risk premium” to oil prices. Oil prices reflect perceived risk in addition to information on actual events or conditions in the market. Recent history shows that even without nuclear weapons, Iran-related events in the Middle East have affected oil prices on fears they could spark a regional war. Traders bid up oil prices in January 2006 when the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council. In subsequent months, news reports about heated Iranian rhetoric and military exercises helped to drive crude prices up further. The surprise outbreak of the Israel-Hizballah war in 2006, not entirely unrelated to concerns about Iran, triggered a $4 per barrel spike on contagion fears. The Iran risk premium subsided after 2007, but a roughly $10–$15 per barrel (10 percent) risk premium returned in early 2012 after the United States and the European Union put in place unusually tough sanctions and hawkish rhetoric on both sides heated up. A survey of nearly two dozen traders and analysts conducted by the Rapidan Group found that a protracted conventional conflict between the United States and Iran that resulted in a three-week closure of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a $25 per barrel rise in oil prices, despite the use of strategic petroleum reserves.12 Were Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, the risk premium would greatly exceed the $4–$15 per barrel (roughly 4–15 percent at current prices) already caused by a non-nuclear Iran.13 We expect a belligerent, nuclear-armed Iran would likely embed a risk premium of at least $20–$30 per barrel and spikes of $30–$100 per barrel in the event of actual conflict. Such price increases would be extremely harmful to economic growth and employment. The challenges a nuclear-armed Iran would pose for the oil market are exacerbated by a prospective diminished U.S. ability to act as guarantor of stability in the Gulf. U.S. military presence and intervention has been critical to resolving past threats or geopolitical crises in the region. It has also calmed oil markets in the past. Examples include escorting oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, the destruction of much of Iran’s surface fleet in response to Iran’s mining the Gulf in 1988 and leading a coalition to repel Saddam Hussein’s short-lived invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Currently, the United States can use and threaten to use force against Iran without fear that Iran will retaliate with nuclear weapons. When Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in the past, for example, the United States has announced that it would reopen the Strait if Iran went through with it, confident that the U.S. military could quickly prevail in any conventional 196 2NC – Impact – Iran Prolif (2/2) <<<CONTINUED --- NO TEXT REMOVED>>> conflict with Iran while running very little risk of retaliation. If Iran had nuclear weapons, however, U.S. military options would be constrained by inverted deterrence. U.S. threats to use force to reopen the Strait could be countered by Iranian threats to use devastatingly deadly force against U.S. allies, bases or forces in the region. Such threats might not be entirely credible since the U.S. military would control any imaginable escalation ladder up to and including the nuclear threshold, but it wouldn’t be entirely incredible, either, given the risk of accident or inadvertent nuclear use in a high-stakes crisis. If, further, Iran develops ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States—and the annual report of the U.S. Department of Defense estimates this could happen as soon as 2015— Iran could also threaten nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland in retaliation for the use of conventional forces in the region. Any U.S. President would have to think long and hard about using force against Iran if it entailed a risk of nuclear war, even a nuclear war that the United States would win. Most worrisome, an unstable, poly-nuclear Middle East will mean that nuclear weapons will be everpresent factors in most, if not all, future regional conflicts. As President Obama noted in the remarks excerpted above, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other states might follow suit. Nuclear weapons in these states would extend the boundaries of any nuclear exchange. Even if Iran’s leaders are less reckless and suicidal than their rhetoric would suggest, international politics, crises and miscalculation do not end when countries acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers still challenge nuclear-armed adversaries. As the early decades of the Cold War remind us, nucleararmed states do sometimes resort to nuclear brinkmanship that can lead to high-stakes nuclear standoffs. We were lucky to survive the Cold War without suffering a massive nuclear exchange; President Kennedy estimated that further complicate the nuclear balance in the region and potentially the probability of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone was as high as 50 percent.14 The reference to the early days of the Cold War is not merely decorative here. Nearly all of the conditions that helped us avoid nuclear war during the latter half of the Cold War are absent from the Iran-Israel-U.S. nuclear balance. Then, there were only two players, both with secure, second-strike capabilities and strategic depth; relatively long flight times for ballistic missiles between states, enabling all sides to eschew launchon-warning postures; clear lines of communication between capitals; and more. In a high-stakes nuclear crisis with Iran and its adversaries, there is a real risk that things could spiral out of control and result in nuclear war. 197 2NC – Impact – North Korea War 1NC Hanson evidence says loss of credibility means North Korea will risk lashing out --- this escalates and goes nuclear Maginnis 13 (Robert Maginnis, retired Army lieutenant colonel, national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television, “6 Ways North Korea is Aiming at Nuclear War,” Human Events, January 29, 2013, http://www.humanevents.com/2013/01/29/6-ways-north-korea-isaiming-at-nuclear-war/) Further, intelligence and monitoring agencies confirm North Korea is not bluffing about its weapons programs. The Hermit Kingdom has made considerable progress in its nuclear and missile programs despite five rounds of U.N. sanctions and Jan. 27 North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered officials to take “substantial and high-profile important state measures,” indicating imminent plans to explode another nuclear device in defiance of the U.N. What do these threats mean? First, it means Kim Jong-un decided that confrontation is a better strategy than economic reform — reform which that country desperately needs. Kim assumed power in December 2011 following the death of his father, Kim Jong-il and used the December rocket launch to consolidate his authority and to gain future diplomatic leverage especially vis-à-vis the U.S. and South Korea. Now, the anticipated third nuclear test will further consolidate the dictator’s authority at home in spite of chronic economic problems caused by frequent crop failures, a failed industrial base and large-scale military spending that draws off resources from the civilian sector. Second, it means Pyongyang is confident in its rudimentary ability to target the U.S. and given time it will field a credible intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat. The December launch showed North Korea has the capacity to deliver a rocket that could travel 6,200 miles, potentially putting San Francisco in range. Mark Fitzpatrick, director for non-proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, said the significance of the North’s December launch was the “successful separation between the threestages of the rocket…this certainly furthers their ICBM ambitions.” Staging, however, is only part of the challenge that the North must overcome before it can deliver a weapon on American cities. “You need a warhead that is small enough to fit on top of the missile … China is helping Pyongyang’s ICBM project overcome some of these technological challenges. A South Korean military official said that and you need shielding to protect the warhead … during re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere,” according to Fitzpatrick. some of the parts used in North Korea’s December 2012 rocket launch appear to have been made in China and in “some European countries.” The South Korean military analyzed missile debris from the North Korean launch that fell into the Yellow Sea, according to a Japanese broadcaster. Third, it means North Korea will continue to test nuclear devices until it has a weapon suitable for an ICBM and the next test could happen soon. Satellite photos taken last week show that roads have been kept clear of snow and it appears the North sealed the tunnel into a mountainside at the Punggye-ri site where a nuclear device would be detonated. Further, Pyongyang followed missile launches in 2006 and 2009 with nuclear tests but the next test will be different, say the North Koreans. What does the North mean by the statement the next effort will be a “higher level” test? The North could mean a breakthrough regarding miniaturization for a missile warhead. But more likely it means this will be the first test of a uranium device, created from Pyongyang’s newly revealed uranium-enrichment program. Prior nuclear tests used plutonium fissile fuel, harvested from a now-closed nuclear reactor. Fourth, it means North Korea will share its weapons technologies with Iran, which makes them more dangerous than if they acted alone. The North Korea-Iran military weapons technology cooperation dates back to the 1980s and explains why Tehran’s missiles are based on North Korean designs. That cooperation took on a formal relationship last fall. Open Source Intelligence suggests as many as 100 Iranian nuclear weapons technicians and scientists are now in North Korea, following a September 2012 North Korea-Iran agreement. Iran’s leader Ayatollah Khamenei said that agreement helps the countries cooperate to reach their unstated goals despite the pressure and sanctions from others, namely the West. That relationship explains why North Korea’s next nuclear test may be based on uranium, an expertise heretofore associated with Iran. But there is reason to believe Iran and North Korea already jointly tested uranium-based devices, according to Fox News. Last year, the Swedish Military Research Agency argued that radio isotopes coming out of a suspected North Korean nuclear site in 2010 were evidence of nuclear tests based on enriched uranium. These incidents were not widely reported in part because underground Yes, the latest threats are more specific than ever before. While the North is years away from having the ability to strike the U.S. with a nuclear warhead, it has a robust conventional capability which it will likely use soon. North Korea’s tough explosions are difficult to detect. Fifth, North Korea’s nuclear war threats are overblown for now but it means there will be military action. talk is an attempt, as before, to bolster its bargaining position in diplomatic negotiations. Last Friday North Korea threatened to take “physical countermeasures” against South Korea if it helps enforce tightened U.N. sanctions against the North, calling the un-endorsed penalties a “declaration of war.” The South Koreans understand Pyongyang is not joking, but it will go ahead and enforce the U.N. sanctions. North Korea followed through on similar threats in 2010 by shelling a border island and sinking a South Korean warship. Those episodes brought the two Koreas closer than ever in recent times to full-scale war. Finally, We should the latest threats mean our past policies to eliminate North Korea’s missile and nuclear threats totally failed. expect Kim to continue the cycle of intrigue established by his father – provocations like rocket launches, U.N. condemnation, Pyongyang’s warnings of “physical countermeasures,” and Western efforts to draw the North back to talks. Unfortunately, President Obama appears set on his naïve status quo policy called “strategic patience,” hoping to lure North Korea back to talks that lead to denuclearization. Unless there is a radical change in our policy, North Korea will acquire nuclear-tipped missiles capable of targeting our homeland and then America will face a Cuban missile-like crisis with North Korea and/or Iran. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis brought the U.S. to the brink of nuclear war with the former Soviet Union and this time once again, America faces possible nuclear war with two less predictable, radical regimes. We avoided war with the Soviets because we had strong leadership and a clear- headed, tough policy, but this time all we have is President Obama and his status quo policy of “strategic patience.” “Patience” is nothing more than appeasement as understood by Iran and North Korea. It is the very policy of Europe and America toward Hitler that led directly to World War II. The coming provocation must be answered with force or we will suffer even greater in the near future and our policy must be announced now. 198 2NC – Impact – Sino-Indo War 1NC Hanson evidence says loss of credibility means India and China will attempt to escalate border skirmishes --- this escalates and goes nuclear Kahn 09 (Jeremy Kahn, Pew International Journalism Fellow – Johns Hopkins University and Former Managing Editor – New Republic, “Why India Fears China”, Newsweek, 10-10, http://www.newsweek.com/id/217088) China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months. Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan. The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides. Beijing appears increasingly concerned about the safe haven India provides to the Dalai Lama and to tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles, including increasingly militant supporters of Tibetan independence. These younger Tibetans, many born outside Tibet, are growing impatient with the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach—a willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for true autonomy—and commitment to nonviolence. If these groups were to use India as a base for armed insurrection against China, as Tibetan exiles did throughout the 1960s, then China might retaliate against India. By force or demand, Beijing might also seek to gain possession of important Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that lie in Indian territory close to the border. Both politically and culturally, these monasteries are seen as key nodes in the Tibetan resistance to Chinese authority. 199 2NC – Impact – Taiwan War 1NC Hanson evidence says loss of credibility means China will make a grab for Taiwan --- escalates and goes nuclear Glaser 11 — Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University (Charles, “Will China's Rise Lead to War?: Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011, lexis) ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action , leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race . Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations. 200 ***AFF ANSWERS TO APPEASEMENT DA*** 201 2AC – Non-Unique The disad isn’t unique --- appeasement now --- Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela Diaz-Balart 12 (Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart represents the 21st congressional district, “Mario Diaz-Balart: Obama has Pursued Policy Appeasement,” August 21, 2012, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/08/21/mario-diaz-balart-obama-has-pursuedpolicy-appeasement-toward-castro-regime/) These compliments – and the fact that they were not disavowed by the White House – come as no surprise, given President Obama’s appeasing stance regarding anti-American totalitarian regimes. Since he took office in January 2009, President Obama has pursued a policy of appeasement toward the totalitarian Cuban dictatorship. Despite the Castro brothers’ harboring of international terrorists and their increasingly relentless oppression of the Cuban people, President Obama weakened U.S. sanctions and has increased the flow of dollars to the dictatorship. In response, the Castro brothers amped up their repression of the Cuban people and imprisoned American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross for the “crime” of taking humanitarian aide to Cuba’s small Jewish community. Clearly, President Obama is not concerned about the threat posed by the Cuban dictatorship, nor has he manifested genuine solidarity with the pro-democracy aspirations of the Cuban people. - U.S. Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla. The Cuban people are protesting in the streets and demanding freedom. But rather than supporting the growing, courageous pro-democracy movement, President Obama instead has chosen to appease their oppressors. While President Obama claims that his policies aim to assist the oppressed Cuban people, his actions betray that he is not on their side. You cannot credibly claim to care about the oppressed while working out side deals with their oppressors and welcoming the oppressors’ elite into the United States with open arms. And you cannot claim to support political prisoners while increasing the flow of dollars to their jailers. The failures of the Obama administration in Cuba are Around the world, President Obama has taken an approach of appeasement when it comes to some of our most virulent enemies. In addition to Cuba, from Iran to Syria to Venezuela, President Obama has shown an unwillingness to stand firm when anti-American forces threaten our interests, and his weakness has emboldened America’s enemies. If we are going to reassert our not an isolated foreign policy failure. position in the world, we need a change at the top. 202 1AR – Non-Unique Obama’s appeasing China and Japan on trade policies now --- most recent evidence Morici 6/3/13 (Peter Morici, economist and professor at the Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, “Obama’s Appeasement of China and Japan is Wrecking the Recovery,” June 3, 2013, http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/obama-appeasement-china-japanwrecking-recovery-183646641.html) Tuesday the Commerce Department is expected to report the April deficit on international trade in goods and services was $41.2 billion, up from $24.9 billion when the economic recovery began. The Obama Administration’s ill-conceived energy policies and appeasement of China and Japan are responsible for this jump in the trade gap and the slow pace of economic recovery. Obama’s also appeasing Russia and tons of other Middle Eastern bullies now Sentinel and Enterprise 8/12/13 (Sentinel and Enterprise, Editorial, “Obama’s Finally Seen the Light on Putin,” August 12, 2013, http://www.sentinelandenterprise.com/editorial/ci_23843077/obamas-finally-seen-lightputin) Obama vowed to build a better relationship with Putin. He called it a "reset" of U.S.-Russian cooperation. Yet at every turn, Putin has been an obstinate blockhead. At the United Nations, Russia has wielded its veto power on the Security Council to frustrate U.S. attempts to tamp down Iran's nuclear ambitions and its arming of extremist terror groups in Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. While Obama has sat back, Russia's influence has grown dramatically in international circles despite the nation's decaying economic and military prowess. What seems to have pushed Obama over the edge was Russia's protection of Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency computer whiz who is wanted on espionage charges. After weeks of negotiations, Russia granted Snowden temporary asylum for up to one year. It was a shocking development. While we never agreed with Obama's appeasement policy toward global bullies, including Middle Eastern mullahs, we held out hope that maybe the commander in chief could gain some traction with a new way of thinking. Now we've seen the result -- and so has Obama. 203 2AC – Link Turn – Embargo The embargo is already destroying US credibility --- the plan is key to restore our leverage and influence with rogue nations Hinderdael 11 (Klaas Hinderdael, M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, B.A in History and Economics from University of Virginia, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, 6/11/11, http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-thelogjam.html?printerFriendly=true, Google Scholar) The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies. In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind. The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies. At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52 At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a postCold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years. American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists. 204 1AR – Link Turn – Embargo Lifting the embargo won’t be perceived as weakness --- it will usher in a transition against the regime and restore US credibility and global image --- this means their links are backwards Perez, 10 – JD, Yale Law (David, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department” 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187, Spring, lexis) As discussed above, any major reform in Cuba should first begin in the economic sector, as opposed to the political sector. The Cuban government will likely accept foreign investment and introduce elements of private ownership into its economy long before it releases its stranglehold on politics and holds free elections. Although the first stage of economic reform has already begun, this stage can end at a moment's notice. Policy performance matters, and nothing breeds success like success. Therefore, the U.S. should design a policy that helps ensure that these initial reforms are successful. Success of reform will breed more reform and an increased demand for a different economic environment. In this way, an initial aperture's success will punch a hole in the Cuban government's ability to restrain economic [*235] activity while maintaining credibility. While Cuba introduces these financial reforms, the U.S. should resist calls to strengthen the economic sanctions, and should instead respond to any economic opening on the island with more bilateral trade opportunities. By engaging Cuba economically , rather than isolating it politically, the U.S. could help link an entire generation of Cubans to the capitalist world. Ultimately, closed regimes survive not because they are constantly adapting to changed circumstances, but rather because they are able to maintain a certain level of consistency, both domestically and in their foreign relations. Rapid change in either sphere can become destabilizing. To that end, facilitating closer economic ties between the U.S. and Cuba could also function as an external shock to the Cuban regime. n156 External shocks promote reform by forcing the regime to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, which may then open the Pandora's box of transformation. Reformists will quickly gain credibility in the government and among the people if their policies begin to solve the island's economic woes. The reformists will be more able to sell their policies at the popular level, solidifying their power bases, which will then encourage more reform. n157 The notion of popular support will become especially important in a post-Castro environment where any successor will be particularly sensitive to popular discontent along with popular legitimacy. That being said, a successor government interested in reforming the system may still resort to kangaroo trials and heavy-handedness. As these reformists gain power, the U.S. should resist efforts to punish the regime when it resorts to classically repressive tactics to consolidate its power, or when it tries to goad the U.S. into a reaction it can later use to its advantage. n158 If the U.S. were to react hostilely to these measures, it would only destabilize the situation and encourage more violence. Once the political situation has stabilized, violence is likely to subside, and the reformists can refocus their efforts on changing the system, rather than worrying about a U.S. intervention. Although Cuba poses no existential threat to America, the fear that America poses an existential threat to [*236] Cuba runs deep, especially among the regime's hardliners. Reactionaries attempting to truncate the onset of reforms may seek to entice the United States to overreact to their repressive tactics by either passing additional economic sanctions, or worse yet, intervening militarily. Both options, in the midst of a transition, however far along it may be, would be strategically catastrophic. One might reasonably argue that the success of these piecemeal reforms would give the regime more breathing space to survive. This is a valid concern, but is analytically unsound. The regime has survived despite a terrible twenty-year economic depression that began after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although it sounds counter-intuitive, economic success will be the harbinger of structural collapse in Cuba. For fifty years one system has ruled supreme; but if another system, however nascent, begins to show that it can meet the needs of the people more effectively, the prevailing system will begin to erode from the ground up. To an extent, the United States can influence this process. As the global financial crisis begins to negatively affect Cuba's state-benefactors (particularly Venezuela), as well as those private investors willing to enter a closed economy, the Cuban government will approach the point where only fundamental economic change will encourage sufficient growth. The United States can help ensure that Cuba reaches this point by encouraging more travel, rewarding economic liberalizations, and by bringing the island back into the global financial system. Conclusion For fifty In response, for nearly fifty years, the United States has tried to isolate Cuba, This policy has failed to achieve any discernible policy end, and has actually helped isolate the United States from the rest of the world. Moreover, America's hostile relationship with Cuba has become a symbolic rallying cry for an emerging class of Latin American leaders determined to convert anti-American sentiments into electoral victories. As a result, America's image has suffered , as has its ability to influence a region so intricately tied to its economic and years the Castro regime has ruled Cuba with an iron fist. politically and economically. national security interests. This report provides a starting point for dialogue with the Cuban government, which could eventually be used as a stepping-stone towards the normalization of relations. Additionally, this report attempts to accomplish another end: the fostering of a dialogue amongst policymakers in America who are ready and willing to listen to new ideas and a fresh approach. Implementing these recommendations will not be easy, but they certainly are not as insurmountable as some will claim. President Obama was the first Democrat to win Florida's Hispanic vote, and nearly tied Senator [*237] John McCain in the Cuban-dominated Miami-Dade County. n159 While in 2004 President Bush won 55% of the Hispanic vote, President Obama bettered that number by winning over 57%, compared to only 42% for Senator McCain. This emerging political climate has given the President enough room to maneuver around those who hope to continue the failures of the status quo. Freedom has always been an important part of America's narrative, but too many leaders in Cuba see America's promotion of human rights and democracy as a war on sovereignty. The new central premise of America's Cuba policy must focus on economic reform, including an American commitment to helping Cuba develop on its own terms. This approach would support our interest in one day seeing a free and open society flourish in Cuba. 205 2AC – No Impact – No Credibility Spillover Credibility has zero relationship to broader deterrence failure --- a single instance won’t spill over and hard power capacity ensures effective deterrence MacDonald 11 (Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44) These arguments have a number of limitations. First, opponents of retrenchment exaggerate the importance of credibility in the defense of commitments. Just because a state has signaled a willingness to retreat from one commitment does not mean it will retreat from others. Studies of reputation, for example, have demonstrated a tenuous link between past behavior and current reputation. 22 The capacity to defend a commitment is as important as credibility in determining the strength of a commitment. Quantitative studies have likewise found a mixed link between previous concessions and deterrence failure.23 The balance of power between the challenger and the defender, in contrast, is often decisive . For instance, after a series of crises over Berlin and Cuba, British [End Page 14] Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed to his cabinet, "The fact that the Soviet Government had agreed to withdraw their missiles and their aircraft from Cuba was not evidence of weakness but of realism. . . . But Berlin was an entirely different question; not only was it of vital importance to the Soviet Government but the Russians had overwhelming conventional superiority in the area."24 This finding supports the basic insight of retrenchment: by concentrating scarce resources, a policy of retrenchment exchanges a diffuse reputation for toughness for a concentrated capability at key points of challenge. 206 2AC – Impact Defense – Iran Prolif No Iran prolif or nuclear capability Risen and Mazzetti 12 (James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times, “U.S. Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build a Bomb,” February 25, 2012, http://www.postgazette.com/pg/12056/1212697-82.stm) WASHINGTON -- Even as the United Nations' nuclear watchdog said in a new report Friday that Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment program, American intelligence analysts continue to believe that there is no hard evidence that Iran has decided to build a nuclear bomb. Recent assessments by American spy agencies are broadly consistent with a 2007 intelligence finding that concluded that Iran had abandoned its nuclear weapons program years earlier, according to current and former American officials. The officials said that assessment was largely reaffirmed in a 2010 National Intelligence Estimate, and that it remains the consensus view of America's 16 intelligence agencies. At the center of the debate is the murky question of the ultimate ambitions of the leaders in Tehran. There is no dispute among American, Israeli and European intelligence officials that Iran has been enriching nuclear fuel and developing some necessary infrastructure to become a nuclear power. But the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies believe that Iran has yet to decide whether to resume a parallel program to design a nuclear warhead -- a program they believe was essentially halted in 2003 and which would be necessary for Iran to build a nuclear bomb. Iranian officials maintain that their nuclear program is for civilian purposes . "I think the Iranians want the capability, but not a stockpile," said Kenneth C. Brill, a former United States ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency who also served as director of the intelligence community's National Counterproliferation Center from 2005 until 2009. Added a former intelligence official: "The Indians were a screwdriver turn away from having a bomb for many years. The Iranians are not that close." Iran's efforts to hide its nuclear facilities and to deceive the West about its activities have also intensified doubts. But some American analysts warn that such behavior is not necessarily proof of a weapons program. They say that one mistake the C.I.A. made before the war in Iraq was to assume that because Saddam Hussein resisted weapons inspections --acting as if he were hiding something -- it meant that he had a weapons program. 207 1AR – Impact Defense – Iran Prolif Even if Iran proliferates, it won’t spill-over or escalate to a nuclear arms race Theodoulou 12 (Michael Theodoulou, Foreign Correspondent at the National, “A nuclear Iran unlikely to trigger Middle East arms race: study,” December 25, 2012, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/a-nuclear-iran-unlikely-to-trigger-middleeast-arms-race-study#page2) Barack Obama in March voiced the same fear in almost identical terms. But the assumption that Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon would have a domino effect in the Middle East and on what the US president termed the "most dangerous part of the world" is being strongly challenged. In a study published last week, two experts from the Department of War Studies at King's College in London argue that key regional players - Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey - are unlikely to follow suit and develop their own nuclear arsenals. Indeed, Christopher Hobbs and Matthew Moran argue that the Middle East itself offers evidence that "nuclear proliferation is not inevitable". Israel remains the region's sole nuclear-armed power - albeit an undeclared one - more than four decades after it acquired nuclear weapons capability. The flaw in the logic that "proliferation begets proliferation" is also demonstrated in North East Asia where North Korea's nuclear weapons have not provoked Japan or South Korea, countries with advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict. The authors of Looking Beyond a Nuclear Iran make clear there are reasons to be to be wary of Iran's nuclear ambitions. While Tehran insists its atomic programme is solely peaceful, they point out that Iran's growing stockpile of medium-enriched uranium is already far in excess of its civilian needs. Even so, Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran argue that this will not necessarily ignite a regional rush for the bomb. This is not to say there is no history of regional powers harbouring nuclear ambitions. Iraq's Saddam Hussein was thought to have embarked on a plan to refine weapons-grade nuclear fuel in the late 1970s, as did Syria's Bashar Al Assad in the early 2000's. In both cases, Israel responded with devastating air strikes. Still, this year, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia recognise that nuclear restraint is in their best interests - not least because, according to Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran, "strong security alliances with the United States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role in dissuading these countries from going nuclear". All three, moreover, are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and have long pressed for a nuclear-free Middle East. Peter Jenkins, a former UK ambassador to the UN's atomic watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, is also sceptical that a nuclear-armed Iran would trigger a regional nuclear arms race. Saudi Arabia, he argues, while deeply suspicious of Iran, would be loath to alienate the US, its long-standing top supplier of conventional arms, and tacit guarantor of the kingdom's security, by seeking a nuclear deterrent. "It is hard to imagine that the US would stand by while its Saudi ally set about proliferating, or that Saudi rulers would risk that friendship by defying America's wishes," Mr Jenkins said. It has long been said that in the event of a successful Iranian nuclear test, Saudi Arabia would swiftly purchase nuclear warheads off the shelf, most likely from Pakistan. The Times (of London) in February quoted an unnamed senior Saudi source saying: "Politically, it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom." But it appears that Saudi views on the prospect of Iran going nuclear are not uniform. He recalls a discussion in July hosted by the Global Strategy Forum, a London think tank, where Jack Straw, a former British foreign secretary, recounted a Saudi official's reply when asked about the kingdom's nuclear intentions. "We say that we will have to keep step with Iran," the official said. "But in reality our people would never forgive us for tolerating Israeli nuclear weapons for so many years and developing nuclear weapons to balance their acquisition by Islamic Iran." Turkey is another Sunni-dominated state keeping watch on Shiite Iran's ambitions for regional influence, even though the countries have strong trade and energy links. But as a Nato member, Turkey "already has indirect access to nuclear deterrent forces", Mr Jenkins said. And "for more than 40 years, Turkey shared a border with a hostile, nuclear-armed Soviet Union, but never sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent". Ankara's generally positive relations with Tehran also mean Turkey would be unlikely to view a nuclear-armed Iran as an "immediate threat", Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran write. And Ankara knows any attempt to go nuclear would "spell the end of Turkey's EU aspirations". Like Saudi Arabia, Egypt sees itself as a leader of Sunni Arab states. But Cairo has chosen a diplomatic response to the much closer challenge of Israel's nuclear arsenal, using the NPT and other international platforms to put pressure on Israeli leaders over its atomic programme for the past four decades. "It would seem very unlikely that the threat presented by a nuclear-armed Iran would cause Cairo to abandon this approach," Mr Hobbs and Mr Moran write. Recent political divisions and economic difficulties also mean the Egyptian government that emerged after the fall of Hosni Mubarak's regime would be ill placed to acquire a weapon. "It would also invite a pre-emptive strike by Israel that would be free of the logistic obstacles that have militated against a strike on Iran," Mr Jenkins said. Moreover, Egypt's Islamist leadership is far less hostile to Tehran than was Mr Mubarak's regime. 208 2AC – Impact Defense – North Korea No impact --- North Korea isn’t a threat, will quickly lose the war, and multiple defensive measures prevent escalation Kelly 13 (Robert E. Kelly, associate professor of IR in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, a leading university in South Korea, writes for the Diplomat, April 10th, 2013 “North Korea Is the Boy Who Cried Wolf: There Will Be No War” http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/10/north-korea-is-the-boy-who-cried-wolf-there-will-be-nowar/) But if you listen to the analyst community, particularly those of us in Korea or with genuine local expertise, there is near unanimity that there will be no war. I have seen lots of my friends on BBC, CNN and other outlets in the last few weeks, and we are all saying the same thing: there will be no war. My own sense that this is pretty well-known, but it is worth repeating: Pyongyang will lose a war – completely and quickly. As lots of analysts have been noting recently, North Korea’s military is clapped out and short on everything – food, fuel, spare parts. Indeed, one obvious reason for Pyongyang to acquire nuclear weapons is to shortcut the widening military gap between it and Seoul, much less the U.S. While we hear that the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) is the fourth largest force in the world, that might not actually be the case. Further, there are big questions as to its combat effectiveness and willingness to fight once the war turns and command-and-control begins to break down. (Today’s U.S. military tends to target command & control in conflicts with airpower. It is likely to do so in a second Korean conflict.) The KPA, like other, erstwhile communist militaries, is postured around WWII and the Korean War. Huge amounts of infantry, tanks, and artillery would fight in massive battles like Kursk in 1943. But that is simply not how the hi-tech U.S. and South Korean militaries will fight. North Korea is almost completely lacking in the ‘C4ISR’ (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) technologies that structure today’s ‘networked battlefield.’ All those North Korean teens with their ‘summer of 1914’ spirit will find their divisions pummeled by American airpower in particular will be so dominant and intrusive, and Korea is geographically so narrow, that any North Korean concentrations will be easy targets. One could easily imagine Gulf War 1-style ‘roads of death’ all over again. (The one conventional ace-in-the-hole stand-off strikes they can neither defend against nor respond to. Pyongyang has is its special forces. Estimates go as high as 200,000, and it is widely thought they will land in South Korea on minisubs and light planes, or pour through tunnels dug under the DMZ. [In fact DMZ tours will actually take you into a few of the tunnels the South has uncovered.] We assume these spec-ops forces will create behind the lines havoc, targeting bridges, power plants, etc. Given their Korean nationality, they will not have the ‘cultural fit’ problem of German soldiers who tried this on the Americans during the Battle of the Bulge.) While North Korean artillery could indeed devastate Kyeonggi, allied air power would target those firing tubes right from the start. Worse for North Korea, tens of thousands of dead South Korean civilians would be a humanitarian catastrophe but would not shake the constitutional and material foundations of the South. And it would immediately cost Pyongyang any remaining global sympathy. China in particular would have no choice after such a civilian holocaust but to abandon North Korea to its fate. If China did not, it would immediately confirm the fears of every neighboring state that it is a dangerous hegemonic aspirant, and it would face a very tight containment ring with Japan, India, and ASEAN working together. A similar logic applies to a Northern nuclear strike against the South. Estimates are that North Korea has between five and ten warheads with yields between five and ten kilotons each. (Those numbers come from U.S. and South Korean intelligence, but they are soft.) That yield – the energy released by the atomic chain reaction – is about half that of the Hiroshima bomb, which killed more than 100,000. A Northern strike would again create a humanitarian catastrophe, but almost certainly not knock the South out of war. With fifty million people, South Korea could ride out even a full North Korean first strike and still fight. Worse, large questions loom about whether the warheads could actually be delivered. North Korea’s air force is even more dated than its army, so we assume they would use a missile – hence all the tests. But this is still tricky. Nuclear warheads must be Precise targeting is hard; North Korean rockets may simply fall in the water. (This may seem unlikely, because South Korea is not that far away. But those who remember miniaturized to fit; the earliest U.S. bombs were enormous. the ‘throw-weight’ debate of the Cold War will recall that the USSR regularly built very large ICBMs, because their guidance missile defense technologies are improving, and the U.S. has begun moving such assets to the region . And finally, as with a conventional devastation of Seoul, a nuclear strike would immediately cost Pyongyang all global sympathy. Indeed, China might reckon at that point that nuke-using North technology was so primitive. It is not hard to imagine this applies to North Korea as well.) Worse, Korea is so dangerous that it should actually help the Americans and South Koreans invade the country. Lastly, a point rarely mentioned in the media coverage is that South Korea still has the death penalty. After a second Korean war, particularly if it involves enormous civilian casualties in the South, most think there would be war crimes trials. And given how awful North Korean human rights abuses are, there will likely be a truth and reconciliation process that will probably not offer much reconciliation. In a North Korea collapsing under U.S.-Southern airpower and a ground advance, one could easily see the Kim family running for their lives as did the Gaddifis or Ceaușescus. Angry North Koreans might simply lynch them as happened to Mussolini, while captured elites would almost certainly face the hangman like Saddam did. In short, most analysts think a war is extremely unlikely. Pyongyang will lose – quickly and completely. This will not be 1950 all over again. If there is a second war, Seoul will push for a final resolution to the long nightmare of North Korean orwellianism, and the U.S. will likely support that. China will be backed into a corner, because North Korea’s survival strategy depends on civilian counter-value strikes that will be intolerable to global opinion. And no one in the Kim family wants to wind up like Gaddifi or Milosevic. While Dennis Rodman’s new bff, Kim Jong-un, may be too young and naïve to know this stuff, I am all but positive, as are most in the analyst community, that the generals and Kim Jong Il loyalists who surround KJU on the National Defense Commission do know this well. 3. So What is the Point of this Crisis? Which They want no war, as they will lose it, badly and quickly, and then face the hangman . Hence I would say that this is simply more brinksmanship. I see four brings us to this current crisis, where the regime’s goals are once again very unclear. possible reasons, which are not mutually exclusive: 209 1AR – Impact Defense – North Korea South Korea won’t retaliate --- business interests Kim 10 (Jack Kim, June 16, 2010, Reuters, “Q+A - How serious is the Korean crisis and risk of war?” http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49340820100616) Many analysts doubt there will be war, as long as South Korea holds its fire. North Korea's obsolete conventional armed forces and military equipment mean quick and certain defeat if it wages full-scale war and Pyongyang is well aware of its limits. South Korea has made it clear it will not retaliate despite investigations that found a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine sank the corvette Cheonan in March. It knows the investment community will take fright if it does attack. President Lee Myung-bak's government has taken the case to the Security Council, rather than take the law into its own hands. 210 2AC – Impact Defense – Sino-Indo War Sino-Indian relations are improving ---- tensions won’t escalate into conflict Sant 12 (Shannon Van, December 5th, 2012, Voice of America, “Top Indian, Chinese Officials Discuss Border Dispute” http://www.voanews.com/content/top-indian-chinese-officialsdiscuss-border-dispute/1558841.html) Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon is in Beijing, meeting with top Chinese officials to discuss their long-running border dispute, development cooperation and other bilateral issues. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said Shivshankar Menon met with his Chinese counterpart, Dai Bingguo, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Wu Bangguo, the chairman of the National People's Congress and Premier Wen Jiabao. Hong Lei said the two countries agree that as the largest developing countries in the world, China and India face opportunities for development and challenges. He said the two countries can cooperate for common development. The talks between India and China focus in large part on boundary disputes. Analysts said the countries have made little progress since the first round of talks, which resulted in the 2005 agreement on guiding principles for boundary settlement. During the second stage of talks, diplomats aim to create a framework for boundary settlement. The boundary disputes concern several thousand kilometers of land bordering Tibet and India. Shivshankar Menon’s trip to China comes amidst rising tension about the South China Sea, a waterway rich in potential oil and gas reserves. India is not one of the countries that claims territory in the region, but this week Indian naval officials said they will protect their maritime and economic interests there. India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation has a stake in a gas field off the coast of Vietnam. Although China may claim the oil and gas deposits in the South China Seas, Shi Yinhong, professor or international relations at Renmin University, said nationalist passions will not ultimately determine the country’s foreign policy. “I think the statesmen on both sides are prudent and responsible," said Yinhong. "They know that India and China have rivalries and suspicions, but it will be enormously difficult to escalate into conflict.” 211 1AR – Impact Defense – Sino-Indo War Neither side will risk a war --- cooperative relations are also growing Times of India 12 (Times of India, “India for stable and cooperative relationship with China: S M Krishna” September 29th, 2012 http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-0929/india/34163269_1_s-m-krishna-stability-and-prosperity-india-us-higher-educationdialogue) External affairs minister S M Krishna has said that India's a key foreign policy priority is to invest in building a stable and cooperative relationship with China which will be a source of stability and prosperity in the region. Krishna, who is here to participate in the UN General Assembly session, said a stable and secure Asia, Indian Ocean and the Pacific region is a key requirement of India's own security and prosperity in the 21st century. "We will continue to invest in building a stable and cooperative relationship with China that is mutually beneficial, and also a source of regional stability and prosperity," he said in his lecture titled 'India's Foreign Policy Priorities for the 21st Century' at Rhode Island's prestigious Ivy league institution Brown University on Friday. He cautioned that Asia's extraordinary accomplishments in the last few decades could be reversed if "great power rivalry, national chauvinism and arms race" take hold of the region. "India is determined to avoid such an outcome by contributing actively to the deeper economic integration of the region and construction of a stable and inclusive political and security order for Asia and the Pacific." On India's relations with the US, Krishna said as new Delhi looks at its foreign policy priorities in the decades ahead, it sees convergence of interests with the US as well as a strong partnership in achieving the shared goals. Terming US an "important partner" in India's development efforts, Krishna said the success of the bilateral partnership would not only contribute to the prosperity of the two nations, but would be a model of international partnership and a factor of global and regional peace, security and stability. "For India, it will remain a relationship of great priority and importance in the 21st century," he said. Krishna noted that the India-US political dialogue is at an "unprecedented level" and the strategic consultations have expanded to cover every major region and challenge in the world. The strong strategic partnership between the two countries is also reflected in the intelligence and counter- terrorism cooperation. The engagement in higher education, science and research has been a strong bridge between India and the US, Krishna said, adding this has contributed in immeasurable terms to the close relationship that the two countries share today. He stressed that the ongoing India-US Higher Education Dialogue is bringing educational institutions, scholars and students into closer partnership. "Our two governments place a strong emphasis in our relationship on the youth, which not only easily embraces the future, but will also have the responsibility in shaping it," he added. Krishna stressed that India would work to build a regional architecture that promotes cooperation and reinforces convergence, reduces the risks of confrontation and conflicts, and draws all countries of the region into a common framework of norms and principles of engagement 212 2AC – Impact Defense – Taiwan War No invasion of Taiwan --- cross-strait business deters and the US won’t escalate the conflict Bremmer 10 – president of Eurasia Group and author (Ian Bremmer, “China vs. America: Fight of the Century,” Prospect, March 22, 2010, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/03/china-vs-america-fight-of-the-century/) China will not mount a military challenge to the US any time soon. Its economy and living standards have grown so quickly over the past two decades that it’s hard to imagine the kind of catastrophic event that could push its leadership to risk it all. Beijing knows that no US government will support Taiwanese independence, and China need not invade an island that it has largely co-opted already by offering Taiwan’s business elite privileged investment opportunities. 213 1AR – Impact Defense – Taiwan War Deterrence checks --- China thinks it can’t win and won’t risk invasion Bhakal 12 (Maitreya Bhakal, Freelance Writer at ABSAS Solutions Pvt. Ltd. “Five reasons why China will not invade Taiwan, and an analysis of Cross-strait Relation,” http://indiaschinablog.blogspot.com/2011/08/analysing-cross-strait-relations-and-5.html) The United States of America, the responsible superpower, has been engaged in more military conflicts around this world than any other. Since the Second World War, the US has: Attempted to overthrow more than 50 governments, most of them democratically-elected. Attempted to suppress a populist or national movement in 20 countries. Grossly interfered in democratic elections in at least 30 countries. Dropped bombs on the people of more than 30 countries. Attempted to assassinate more than 50 foreign leaders. Hence, the plain fact that needs to be realized is that the United States is more prone to violent outbursts than any other country. The PLA doctrinal textbook, Zhanyixue, explicitly states that China is not in the same league as “advanced countries” (The entire document never mentions the United States by name), argues Thomas J. Christensen in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Recent Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (CNA, 2005). He further states, Moreover, unlike in the heady early days of the Great Leap Forward, PLA strategists do not envision China closing that overall gap anytime soon. There is no stated expectation of short-cuts or leapfrogging to great power military status. In other words, China will have to accept that its relative technological backwardness and weakness in power projection will persist for a long time. And then goes on to quote the text of Zhanyixue explicitly: “Our military equipment has gone through major upgrading (很大 提高) in comparison with the past, but in comparison to advanced countries, whether it be now or even a relatively long period from now, there will still be a relatively large gap (仍有较 大的差距)…………….The most prominent objective reality that the PLA will face in fighting future campaigns is that in [the area of] military equipment, the enemy will be superior and we will be inferior.” As is clear, Chinese policy-makers are realists, and thus can be relied upon to heavily weigh the consequences of a possible US intervention. 214
