Foreign Policy in the 1930s
Part 1: Attempts at Collective Security
The brutal World War of 1914-1918 left much of Europe devastated and destitute. The gruesome totals were more than
eight million dead, as both sides in the conflict lost the better part of an entire generation of males. The Allies had
accumulated vast national debts of seemingly unmanageable proportions. In contrast, the United States suffered
comparatively few combat deaths and emerged from the war with a significantly stronger economy. The profits from
arms sales to the Allies were in the billions of dollars, and in the first decade after the war America accounted for nearly
half of the world's industrial output.
Following the Versailles Treaty, the United States was thrust into the unfamiliar role of a world leader. Ultimately,
American and European diplomats failed to maintain the peace, but it was not for want of trying. The U. S. Senate did
refuse to join the League of Nations and the World Court, and during the 1920s America increasingly turned inward to
deal with domestic issues and hemispheric affairs. Congress reflected this mood by passing restrictive immigration laws.
But despite the influence of isolationists and "100% Americans," the United States took the initiative in attempting to
secure international peace and world order through diplomatic means.
The United States twice proposed an international law court at Hague conferences before the Great War, but the World
Court was based on arbitration. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes persuaded President Warren G. Harding to seek
the Senate's approval to join the World Court, but the opponents to the Versailles Treaty blocked ratification. Despite
this, Americans—including Hughes and another secretary of state, Frank Kellogg—served on the World Court.
Furthermore, American observers were sent to the League of Nations, and the United States joined in several Leaguesponsored social programs, including those directed against international "white slavery," or prostitution, and illegal drug
trade.
The United States was at the center of the complicated economic issue of war reparations and debts. The Versailles
Treaty included a "War Guilt" article that claimed Germany was solely responsible for the World War. Two years later,
an Allied commission saddled Germany with a reparations bill of about $33 billion, to be paid off at the rate of five
billion gold marks per year. The German government, however, soon found it impossible to pay the reparations in gold
and began printing paper money. This led to insurmountable inflation, wiping out the savings of the frugal middle class,
and Germany defaulted on its annual payments. In the meantime, the congressionally-appointed World War Foreign Debt
Commission placed the Allied debt to the United States at more than $22 billion, including interest.
Unfortunately, the global economic situation worsened during the 1920s and the Allied nations were unable to pay their
U.S. debts after Germany defaulted on its reparation payments. When Congress insisted on the debt payments, European
nations began portraying the U.S. as "Uncle Shylock," in large measure because most of the borrowed money had been
spent in this country on armaments and agriculture products. Additionally, high American tariff barriers made it even
more difficult for the debtor nations to establish a favorable balance of trade. In response, Charles G. Dawes, a Chicago
banker, devised a plan to reduce Germany's annual reparations payments. Five years later, Owen D. Young, chairman of
General Electric, headed a commission that lowered the annual payment to virtually the identical sum that the other
European nations owed the United States. Germany and the European nations were able to resume paying off their U.S.
debt until the global economic system collapsed with the Great Depression.
In late 1931, President Herbert Hoover put a one-year moratorium on both the reparations and debts payments. When
European nations proposed to cancel 90 percent of Germany's reparations if the United States similarly lowered their
debt payments, Congress refused. Some nations made an effort to meet their obligations when the moratorium expired,
but in the end only Finland paid its debts in full.
In the wake of the World War, the United States pushed for an agreement on naval disarmament. Many felt the World
War was caused by an armaments race in Europe and, with this in mind, the Republican administrations participated in
several significant international naval conferences. The timing was right for such an initiative since the carnage of the
Great War led to a revulsion against the use of military force to settle disputes between nations. Additionally, Americans
were interested in protecting their empire in the Pacific without an expensive naval build-up. The British likewise wished
to avoid the massive expenditures needed to maintain their supremacy on the high seas, and the Japanese sought to divert
most of their military budget to ground forces in preparation for action on the Asian mainland.
After Congress overwhelmingly approved a naval disarmament resolution introduced by William Borah, a leading
isolationist and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, President Harding invited nine nations to attend the
Washington Conference. Secretary of State Hughes stunned the conferees at the first session in November 1921 with his
sweeping proposals for naval disarmament. He called for a ten-year moratorium on the construction of the largest
warships, and declared that the United States was prepared to scrap 30 vessels under this plan. Hughes drew tremendous
applause—even tears from some of his listeners—and, more importantly, his proposals were incorporated into a series of
treaties.
The Four Power Treaty of 1921 between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France, prohibited new
fortifications throughout most of the Pacific. The Five Power Treaty, signed the following year, included Italy. It set a
limit for battleships based on a 5:5:3 ratio that gave the United States and Britain the most tonnage, but allowed the
Japanese to become the dominant power in the western Pacific. (The ratio for France and Italy was 1.67.) The London
Naval Conference of 1930 extended the moratorium on capital ships for another five years. Further attempts at
disarmament—at Geneva in 1932 and London in 1935—ended in failure, however, due to the growing distrust and
insecurity that erupted into the Second World War.
During the 1920s, an assortment of intellectuals, isolationists, and pacifists sought to prevent future wars by prohibiting
the use of military force to settle international disputes. James T. Shotwell, a professor of international relations at
Columbia University, wrote an influential essay calling upon all nations to "outlaw war" by making it illegal. In early
1927, French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, hoping to capitalize on this growing sentiment in the United States,
extended a public invitation to Secretary of State Kellogg to join in a mutual defense treaty. Kellogg at first ignored
Briand's invitation, realizing that it was directed against Germany, but public pressure mounted from a petition drive that
collected more than two million signatures. Determined not to be painted into a corner by Briand, Kellogg deftly
employed Shotwell's proposition. He called upon all countries to declare war unlawful.
In August 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed in Paris. Ultimately sixty-two nations joined in renouncing war as
"an instrument of national policy" and supporting "pacific means" to settle international quarrels. Among the signatories
were representatives from Germany, Japan, and Italy. The U.S. Senate overwhelmingly ratified the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
but most senators were not naïve enough to believe their vote was anything more than a symbolic gesture. It was soon
made clear that the efforts of both international idealists and diplomatic realists ignored the fundamental causes of
conflicts among nations.
Part 2: Diplomacy of the 1930s
The Great Depression triggered a change of leadership in Washington, as the Democrats under Franklin Delano
Roosevelt swept to power in the election of 1932. Domestic issues were paramount during President Roosevelt's first
term, but the impact of the economic debacle influenced foreign affairs as well. Expanding international trade was a top
priority, especially in the Western Hemisphere. Roosevelt built upon the foundation laid by prior Republican
administrations to establish a more cordial relationship with Latin American nations. During the 1920s, the United States
paid compensation or "canalimony" to Columbia for its loss of Panama and revenue from the isthmian canal and
withdrew its military forces from the Dominican Republic.
In 1928 at the Pan-American Conference held in Havana, Secretary of State Kellogg refused to issue an ironclad pledge
against future United States military intervention. Nonetheless, a change of attitude was manifest in the "Memorandum
on the Monroe Doctrine" written by Undersecretary of State J. Reuben Clark and made public in 1930. Although it was
ambiguously worded, the Clark memorandum seemed to promise an end to American military intervention based solely
on the Monroe Doctrine.
The "Good Neighbor Policy" pursued by the Roosevelt administration scrupulously avoided the use of military force.
The last of the American marines and soldiers sent to Latin America by Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were
recalled from Nicaragua and Haiti. At the seventh Pan-American Conference in 1933, held at Montevideo, Uruguay,
Secretary of State Cordell Hull agreed, that "no state has the right to intervene [militarily] in the internal or external
affairs of another." The Platt Amendment, which gave the United States oversight authority over domestic Cuban affairs,
was abrogated the following year. President Roosevelt personally attended the Pan-American Conference in Buenos
Aires in 1936 and promised to consult with Latin American nations for our "mutual safety." The Good Neighbor Policy
fostered hemispheric solidarity during the Second World War.
The Roosevelt administration was less successful in promoting unanimity among the 64 nations represented at London
Economic Conference. In April 1933, two weeks before the conference convened, Roosevelt took the United States off
the gold standard in an effort to forestall deflation and total economic collapse. Britain and several other European
nations, with the chief exception of France, already had abandoned gold in a similar effort to manipulate their currencies.
This led to extreme fluctuations of the rates of exchange and worsened the global depression by impeding international
trade. To alleviate these conditions, the London delegates were expected to set the value of the world's major currencies,
lower trade barriers, and discuss reducing the annual payments of the war debts owed the United States. The conference
ended abruptly, however, when Roosevelt announced that he opposed any mandated currency stabilization until "the
majority of nations learned to balance their budgets and live within their means."
In another move with serious international consequences, President Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition to the
Soviet Union. Republican Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes had made it clear that the American government
broke relations with the USSR because the communists repudiated the Russian national debt, confiscated American
property in the Soviet Union, and supported communist propaganda within the United States. But non-recognition did
not change Soviet policy, and American businessmen were interested in expanding their markets. Additionally, it was
thought that the Soviet Union could restore a balance of power in Europe and Asia in light of the expansionist policies of
Germany and Japan.
The United States extended diplomatic recognition to the USSR in 1933, and the Soviets promised to halt subversive
propaganda, guarantee civil and religious liberty to Americans in the Soviet Union, and resolve the national debt and
property claims issues at a later date. William Bullitt was sent to Moscow as the first United States ambassador, but he
returned home disgusted by the Stalinist purges of the mid-1930s. Although it was past time that the United States and
the Soviet Union formally open diplomatic channels, the USSR did not serve as an immediate barrier to either German or
Japanese expansion.
Democratic and Republican presidents during the early twentieth century were committed to protecting American
holdings in the Pacific. The Four Power Treaty, for example, allowed the United States to fortify Hawaii. The Philippines
were another major concern. The secret Taft-Katsura memorandum, drafted by Secretary of War William Howard Taft
during Theodore Roosevelt's administration, pledged the United States and Japan to recognize each nation's respective
interests in the Philippines and Korea. In 1916, the Jones Act promised the Filipinos their independence, although at an
unspecified time. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 affirmed Congress's intention to grant independence to the
Philippines after ten years as an autonomous commonwealth under the protection of the United States. A national
constitution was drafted and a president elected, but the Japanese conquest of the Philippines during the Second World
War upset the timetable. Filipino independence was formally granted on July 4, 1946, after the surrender of Japan.
Part 3: The Rise of Fascism and Militarism
During the 1920s and 1930s, as the communists were consolidating their control in the Soviet Union, right-wing
totalitarian states ruled by dictators or military cabals emerged in Europe and Japan. Benito Mussolini set the pattern for
these governments when he gained power in Italy in 1922. Mussolini's fascist movement emphasized aggressive
nationalism, bombastic patriotic fervor, and a socialistic partnership between government and big business. "Il Duce," or
"the leader" as he styled himself, sent Italian troops into the African nation of Ethiopia in the fall of 1935. The League of
Nations imposed economic sanctions, but could not prevent the annexation of Ethiopia. Mussolini thus set into motion
his grandiose plans to carve out a new Roman empire. Unfortunately, his dreams of territorial expansion were soon
eclipsed by another fascist dictator.
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party—the Nazis—rose to power in large measure by playing on the German
public's sense of betrayal directed against the Versailles Treaty and the reparations burden. With the economic collapse
of the democratic Weimar Republic, Hitler and the Nazis seized their chance. On January 30, 1933, Hitler became
chancellor, and embarked on the plan he created in his autobiographical book Mein Kampf. With the acquiescence of the
Reichstag, the national legislature, the "fuhrer" established one-party rule, stripped Jews of their citizenship, and
denounced the disarmament clauses and territorial losses dictated by the Versailles Treaty. Hitler withdrew Germany
from the League of Nations, and pledged to achieve lebensraum ("living space") for the German people. American
ambassador William Dodd ominously warned from Berlin that most Germans would support the fuhrer even in "outright
conquest."
Hitler announced in March 1935 that the Third Reich—a synonym for Nazi Germany—was beginning a re-armament
program that included an army of 500,000—five times that allowed under the Versailles Treaty. Britain and France
protested, but took no military action. In America, the depth of the Great Depression and disillusionment over America's
participation in the "War to End All Wars" was reaching a peak. Since the United States had never ratified the Versailles
Treaty, President Roosevelt and an increasingly isolationist Congress left the entire matter to the European allies.
As Mussolini and Hitler rose to power, a similar situation was unfolding in Japan. The tradition-bound Japanese military
became more democratic after the World War, paving the way for young patriotic commoners to enter the officer ranks.
These men and their commanders were determined to make Japan a world power, and they planned to use the "Showa"—
the reigning name of Emperor Hirohito—as the figurehead for territorial expansionism. China, a natural geographic
target for the Japanese militarists, was torn by civil war between the Nationalist forces led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek) and the communists under Mao Zedong.
In September 1931, the Japanese began a military offensive against the Chinese in Manchuria. This was a direct violation
of the League of Nations charter, the Nine Power Treaty, and the more recent Kellogg-Briand Pact. The League of
Nations sent a commission, headed by the Earl of Lytton, to investigate the Manchurian crisis. When the Japanese
expanded their attack, Secretary of State Henry Stimson responded in January with the so-called "Stimson Doctrine," of
non-recognition. Drawing upon the Open Door policy and the Nine-Power Treaty, Stimson pledged that the United
States would refuse to recognize any military conquests. The Hoover administration, however, was not prepared to back
up this policy with force, and the Japanese established a puppet regime—"Manchukuo." The Lytton Commission
eventually urged the withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese forces from Manchuria and the creation of an autonomous
government for the region. The Japanese, however, withdrew from the League and occupied Manchuria until 1945.
Part 4: American Isolationism
As war clouds gathered over Asia and Europe during the 1930s, disillusioned Americans were determined not to be
drawn into another world war. The root causes of this isolationism were many. Well known historians, including Charles
A. Beard, absolved Germany of total responsibility for the Great War, and emphasized that the reparations burden had
led to the failure of the Weimar Republic. Recalling the end of the Progressive movement and the Espionage and
Sedition Acts, social reformers feared that another world war would end the New Deal and trample on civil liberties.
Some well known public figures, including Charles Lindbergh and Senators William Borah and George Norris, swelled
the chorus that condemned America's participation in the Great War.
The most effective argument raised by the isolationists—although not necessarily the most valid one—was that
America's entry into the World War was dictated by munitions makers and arms dealers who profited from the conflict.
American bankers, who had loaned billions to the Allies and wanted to protect their investments, were also singled out.
The March 1934 issue of Fortune, an influential business magazine, contained an article titled "Arms and the Men," that
blamed the armaments industry for encouraging and then prolonging the Great War. This thesis was popularized in a
Book-of-the-Month Club selection written by Helmuth Englebrecht and Frank Hanighen, The Merchants of Death,
published that same year.
The most effective argument raised by the isolationists—although not necessarily the most valid one—was that
America's entry into the World War was dictated by munitions makers and arms dealers who profited from the conflict.
American bankers, who had loaned billions to the Allies and wanted to protect their investments, were also singled out.
The March 1934 issue of Fortune, an influential business magazine, contained an article titled "Arms and the Men," that
blamed the armaments industry for encouraging and then prolonging the Great War. This thesis was popularized in a
Book-of-the-Month Club selection written by Helmuth Englebrecht and Frank Hanighen, The Merchants of Death,
published that same year.
The Nye Committee's findings, coupled with the Japanese and Italian military incursions, led to the passage of the
Neutrality Acts. Congress clearly hoped to prevent the United States from being dragged unwillingly into another
worldwide conflict. The first Neutrality bill passed Congress with little debate in August 1935. It prohibited any arms
and munitions trade with warring nations and authorized the president to ban Americans from travel on belligerent
vessels. Obviously, Congress hoped to shackle the "merchants of death" and prevent another Lusitania incident.
President Roosevelt, however, warned that an impartial arms embargo favored an aggressor and might "drag us into war
instead of keeping us out." Overwhelming public opinion and an implacable Congress, however, forced the president to
sign the bill into law.
In early 1936, the Second Neutrality Act added an additional sanction to the first law, prohibiting loans to belligerents.
Both Neutrality Acts were due to expire on May 1, 1937, but Congress extended them on that day. By that time, the
Spanish Civil War was raging, and a Third Neutrality Act kept the basic provisions of the previous laws and added that
the president could impose the restrictions in cases of "civil strife." Significantly, the new law also allowed the sale of
non-military goods to belligerents on a "cash-and-carry" basis; that is, warring factions had to pay for the goods in full
and transport them on their own ships. Most of the law's provisions were made permanent, but the Cash-and-carry
proviso was due to expire in two years.
With Europe on the brink of war in the spring of 1939, the Roosevelt administration pushed Congress to repeal the
Neutrality Act. Isolationists, however, refused to budge, and Congress adjourned without acting on the president's
request. Three weeks after German troops moved into Poland and the Second World War commenced in earnest,
Roosevelt called Congress into special session and requested the repeal of the arms embargo. He also asked Congress to
allow belligerents to purchase arms and munitions on a cash-and-carry basis.
After six weeks of bitter debate, the Fourth Neutrality law was passed over Republican protests. Roosevelt got what he
wanted, but the isolationists carried a few points. American citizens were forbidden to sail on belligerent vessels, and U.
S. ships were blocked from belligerent ports and (in certain cases) from combat zones. By 1939, Congress was prepared
to tilt toward those nations that controlled the high seas—especially Great Britain—but the final Neutrality Act was of no
benefit to China and many other nations fighting the Axis Powers of Japan, Germany, and Italy. It remained to be seen if
isolationism and neutrality would keep the United States out of World War Two.
Part 5: The Military Harbingers
Throughout most of its history, the United States followed George Washington's advice to "avoid permanent alliances."
During the First World War, America fought as an "Associate Power," not as a formal ally of Britain and France. The
Neutrality Acts were designed by Congress to keep the United States safely insulated from the armed conflicts breaking
out in Asia and Europe during the 1930s. The ironic effect of this isolationist policy, however, was that it sent a message
to aggressor nations that the United States would not come to the aid of their victims.
While America isolated itself, a threat was brewing in Europe. The Spanish Republic, a liberal democratic government,
was established in 1931. Five years later, General Francisco Franco led the Spanish forces in Morocco across the strait,
and began an uprising against the Republicans, or Loyalists. In October 1936, Hitler and Mussolini established the
Berlin-Rome Axis, and agreed to aid Franco. A month later, Germany and Japan joined in the Anti-Comintern Pact,
directed against the Soviet Union and global communism. Italy formally signed the pact a year later, and the alliance of
the Axis Powers was complete. In the meantime, Hitler and Mussolini sent military aircraft, artillery, tanks, and tens of
thousands of troops to bolster the fascist rebel forces under Franco. To a lesser degree, the Soviet Union supported the
Republic. Britain and France also favored the Loyalists, but did not intervene militarily in the Spanish Civil War.
President Roosevelt worked with Congress to keep the United States scrupulously neutral. This generally pleased
American Roman Catholics, who tended to support Franco against the leftist Republic and its communist ally. Many
other Americans, however, viewed the war as an epic struggle between democracy and fascism. Senator Gerald Nye, a
staunch supporter of the Neutrality Acts, introduced a resolution to repeal the arms embargo against the Loyalists.
Several thousand Americans joined the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and fought for the Republic. Those that survived
discovered that the State Department had revoked their passports. Franco's forces ultimately prevailed in the spring of
1939, after providing Hitler and Mussolini a training ground for the larger war that soon broke out in Europe.
In Asia, the Japanese broadened the military offensive against China that had commenced in 1931 with the invasion of
Manchuria. In July 1937, Japanese and Chinese forces clashed at the Marco Polo Bridge outside Peking (Beijing), in
what was dubbed "the China incident." The Japanese also served notice that they would no longer abide by the
Washington and London naval limitations treaties. Ambassador Joseph Grew reported from Tokyo that the Japanese
were the aggressors in China, but he warned that economic embargoes or military action by the United States would
strengthen the hands of the extremists within the Japanese army.
President Roosevelt chose not to invoke the Neutrality Act in this case, and arms and munitions reached the beleaguered
Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi). The Japanese continued to purchase war material in even
greater quantities, and the onslaught continued. Peking fell within weeks, and the Chinese were forced to abandon
Shanghai in early November. After heavy fighting that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and brutal atrocities that
culminated in the "rape of Nanking" by Japanese troops, the Chinese moved their capital to Chungking. In a very real
sense, the Second World War had commenced—the fighting in China did not end until 1945.
American sentiment went out to the Chinese people. The loosely organized "China Lobby," led by novelist Pearl Buck
and Time magazine publisher Henry Luce, acted as a public relations agency and churned out press releases on behalf of
the Chinese government. Congressional leaders hoped to keep alive the fiction of the "Open Door" and America's
"special relationship" with the Chinese, but public opinion was clearly opposed to military intervention in Asia.
On December 12, 1937, an incident occurred that threatened to draw the United States into the war raging in China.
Japanese pilots bombed and sank an American gunboat, the USS Panay, on the Yangtze River as its crew helped
evacuate the embassy at Nanking. Two Americans were killed and 30 wounded. Several American and British oil tankers
were also attacked. The Japanese Foreign Office, not nearly as aggressively expansionist as the military command,
moved quickly to defuse the tension. The foreign minister extended a personal apology to Ambassador Grew, and more
than two million dollars was paid in reparations. The diplomatic crisis passed, but the Panay incident stimulated
Congress to vote on the "Ludlow amendment." Louis Ludlow, a representative from Indiana, introduced a constitutional
amendment that would prohibit war—except in case of invasion—without the majority approval of voters in a national
referendum. It took tremendous political pressure from the White House to defeat the Ludlow resolution by an
uncomfortably narrow vote of 209 to 188.
With the escalation of fighting in China, the Roosevelt administration called for a "moral embargo" of military
technology against nations that bombed civilians. This was directed at the Axis Powers aiding Franco, as well. An
informal private boycott of Japanese goods was also expanded, and President Roosevelt authorized the purchase of
Chinese silver. This allowed the Nationalist government to meet the "cash-and-carry" provisions of the Neutrality Act.
Japan ominously responded in November 1938, by announcing a "New Order" in East Asia based upon the exploitation
of China and Manchuria.
Conditions continued to deteriorate in Europe. Adolf Hitler began implementing his plan to unite all ethnic Germans
within the Third Reich. In early 1938, the Fuhrer demanded that the Austrian chancellor appoint local Nazis to his
cabinet. Kurt von Schuschnigg responded by calling a plebiscite—or vote—to rally popular support against the German
pressure. Hitler acted too quickly, however, and stationed troops menacingly close to Austrian border. Schuschnigg
resigned to prevent bloodshed. He was replaced by an Austrian Nazi, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who invited the Germans
into Austria to keep order. The Anschluss, the political unification of Austria and Germany, was completed by the middle
of March. A subsequent plebiscite revealed overwhelming Austrian support for joining the Third Reich.
In November 1938, Americans were shocked with news of "kristallnacht." Nazi thugs, spurred on by black-shirted SS
(Schutztaffeln) secret police forces, rampaged through Jewish neighborhoods. They vandalized homes, synagogues, and
shops—shattering windows in the "night of the broken glass." This began a systematic confiscation of Jewish property
and the restriction of German Jews to "ghettos." Roosevelt recalled the American ambassador in protest, and the State
Department refused to apologize for Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes's characterization of Adolf Hitler as a "brutal
dictator."
Part 6: The Diplomatic Response
President Roosevelt moved cautiously in the face of increased tensions in Europe and Asia. He was alarmed by the rise
of fascist and totalitarian states but recognized that the vast majority of Americans opposed intervention. In a speech
delivered to a Chicago audience on October 5, 1937, he urged a "quarantine" of aggressor nations to isolate "the
epidemic of international lawlessness." Initial reaction to the "Quarantine Speech" was generally favorable, but
opponents of the speech were not muted. The Chicago Tribune, a leading isolationist newspaper, charged that Roosevelt
was stirring up "war fright" among the American people. The Wall Street Journal admonished the president to "stop
foreign meddling" because the nation wanted peace. Several isolationist congressmen threatened impeachment
proceedings. Roosevelt's intentions in calling for a "quarantine" are open to interpretation. Nonetheless, he soon retreated
from any implication that he was calling for even moral or economic pressure against the aggressors.
Several factors precluded American intervention in Europe or China during these years; including the economic
imperatives of the Great Depression, the state of American military preparedness, and public sentiment. Old-line
isolationists joined with pacifists in urging that the United States remain apart from the various conflicts. In a visceral
reaction to the slaughter of the First World War, a large portion of the American intellectual community philosophically
embraced pacifism. Princeton University students, also motivated by the instincts of self-preservation, founded the
"Veterans of Future Wars," and with grim humor insisted on thousand dollar bonuses before marching off to foreign
battlefields.
In May 1937, Neville Chamberlain became prime minister of Great Britain and attempted to limit the territorial
expansion by Hitler through a foreign policy known as "appeasement." Chamberlain argued that the Fuhrer initially was
reacting to unfair provisions of the Versailles Treaty, and the prime minister appeared willing to acquiesce to the
inclusion of ethnic Germans into the Third Reich. Chamberlain was hopeful that once "Herr Hitler" was rightfully
appeased, Germany would join the western democracies in halting the spread of communism. With the general support of
the British people, who joined most Americans in opposing military action against the Axis Powers, Chamberlain offered
only ineffectual diplomatic protests when Germany absorbed Austria.
After the Anschluss, Hitler focused his acquisitive intentions toward the German-speaking minority in the Sudetenland
region of Czechoslovakia. As the Fuhrer blustered, the Prague government indicated a willingness to put its well-trained
army in the field and counted on the military support of its allies, France and the Soviet Union. Deluded that they could
appease Hitler, Chamberlain joined French premier Edouard Daladier in pressuring the Czechs to resolve the crisis
peacefully. In an effort to settle the crisis, Hitler met with Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich in late September 1938.
Mussolini was also present, but the Czechs were not invited.
The outcome of the Munich Conference was what Hitler demanded. The Sudetenland was incorporated into the Third
Reich, and Chamberlain returned to London to announce "peace for our time." Hitler solemnly pledged that the
Sudetenland was his "last territorial claim." Portentously, however, Josef Stalin had not received an invitation to Munich
and he was convinced—with good reason—that Britain and France planned to deflect further German expansion
eastward against the Soviet Union. Although not directly involved in the negotiations, President Roosevelt congratulated
Chamberlain for preserving the peace and held out the hope that a final settlement had been reached in Europe.
Six months later, Hitler gave graphic testimony to the worthlessness of his promises, when Germany absorbed the
remainder of Czechoslovakia. He also pressured Poland for the port city of Danzig and a strip of land linking Germany
with East Prussia. The Polish leaders refused these demands, and Britain and France gave assurances that they would
honor their defense commitments to Poland. In April, Italian troops moved into Albania, and the western democracies
pledged to defend Romania and Greece.
At this juncture, President Roosevelt sent a remarkable message to Hitler and Mussolini, urging them to guarantee that
for ten years they would not attack any of 31 specified nations. This was most certainly a naïve and presumptuous
request, although it scarcely merited the scathingly insulting response that Hitler publicly presented to the Reichstag. In a
two-hour address laced with sarcasm, the Fuhrer evoked laughter from the admiring legislators by reeling off the names
of the 31 countries and denying any aggressive intentions against them.
Well-placed Soviet fears of isolation drove Stalin in the spring of 1939 to seek military pacts with Britain and France, as
well as Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states. Not a single nation, however, agreed to an alliance with the Soviet Union.
On August 23, German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Russian Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov
stunned the world by signing a mutual non-aggression pact. Hitler and Stalin promised to remain neutral if either became
involved in war. Secretly, they agreed to carve up the Baltic States and Poland "in the event of a territorial and political
transformation."
Foreign Policy in the 1930s
Name:
Period:
Date:
Section Title:
Main Idea/Summary Statement:
(Be as specific and complete as you can – while still summarizing the section in a complete
sentence.)
Supporting Details/Key Terms:
(Identify supporting details (which may also be key terms) and state each in a clear,
concise, complete sentence.)