Ryszard M. Machnikowski
Center for Strategic Studies and Forecast, WSSM in Łódź
Global Islamic Terrorist Networks (GITNs)
in Western Europe in the XXI st Century
1. Introduction: think globally, act locally.
Today’s global Islamic terrorist networks (GITNs) are the effect of the evolution of global
jihadi movement, having its intellectual, organizational and military roots deep in the
previous century. The most recent materialization of this movement is conventionally called
Al Qaeda. It can be assumed, after Jason Burke, that it is a hardcore organization, a network
of networks and a militant ideology.1 Hardcore organization was particularly visible during
the 1990s, when Usama Bin Ladin, its leader, operated relatively freely while staying in
Sudan (1991 – 1996) and Afghanistan (1996 – 2001). Its history was widely and precisely
researched in numerous books and articles.2 It seems that ideology is the coronation of the
ages-old intellectual process which involved a significant number of important scholars of
pure Islam – their work was meticulously studied and analyzed in many publications.3
In my article I want to focus attention on the second component of this violent global
social movement – network of networks. We adapt the stance expressed by Mark Sageman in
his insightful book Understanding terror networks: “A group of people can be viewed as a
network, a collection of nodes connected through links. Some nodes are more popular and are
attached to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. These more connected
nodes, called hubs, are important components of a terrorist network.”4 We consider his
analysis as an important first step in a difficult task to understand both motives and modus
1
J. Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, I. B. Taurus 2004
to mention only the most important: The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, W.W. Norton & Co., New York 2004; Anonymous, Through Our
Enemies’ Eyes. Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam and the Future of America, Brassey’s, Washington 2003; P.
Bergen, Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, ; J. Burke, Al-Qaeda…; S. Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret
History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, The Penguin
Press, New York 2004; R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. Global Network of Terror, Berkley Books, New York
2003
3
e.g. G. Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Belknap, Cambridge 2004; O. Roy, Globalized
Islam: the Search for a New Ummah (Columbia University Press, New York 2004; S. Bar, The Religious
Sources of Islamic Terrorism, Policy Review, June/ July 2004
4
M. Sageman, Understanding terror networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004, p. 137
2
1
operandi of this formidable contemporary enemy of the Western open society, as this task is
crucial first to constrain this enemy, and ultimately to win this drole de la guerre of the XXI st
century, taking place on many continents. The scope of activity of Islamic terrorists is truly
global as their actions are perfect illustration to a well-known slogan - think globally, act
locally.
However, I want to narrow our analysis to Western Europe only and some considerable
centers of terrorists webs there, as this is the continent of which our country, Poland, become
more and more an integrated part. It implies that sooner or later we encounter here challenges
and dangers so visible today in the streets of London, Madrid, Amsterdam, Paris, Rome etc.
In Al Qaeda Now both Peter Bergen and Rohan Gunaratna, recognized experts on the subject,
univocally claimed that “Europe is of central importance” to the struggle with AQ and that
throughout the last 15 years all major Islamist terrorist attacks were at some point planned or
prepared in Europe. 5 Ursula Mueller, a German diplomat went further when she noticed that
“Europe is the target area and at the forefront is the UK”.6 On the basis of the events of the
last few years it is hard not to agree with her.
I should also note that editorial demands limited a bit the depth of our analysis, as we
decided to present briefly some most striking cases, showing the structure and mode of
operation of the Islamic terrorists networks currently acting in Western Europe.
2. Spain. M 3/11 Cell.
Spain was the first European state to be successfully attacked by the Islamists in the XXI
st century. Attacks on Madrid’s mass transportation system on March 11, 2004, decisively
shattered Spanish political system, causing public outcry and influencing the result of the
parliamentary elections there. As a consequence, those in power in this country were changed
and it’s foreign policy significantly altered, when the new socialist government decided to
withdraw Spanish troops from the antiterrorist coalition. This tremendous political success of
the Islamists revealed complex and dense character of jihadi networks in this country and
their connections with other networks dispersed all over Europe. It is worth noting that in
December 2003, various jihadist websites published hints on the possibility of attacking Spain
– one of them submitted detailed analysis of the political situation in Spain, which included
Al Qaeda Now. Understanding Today’s Terrorists, ed. K. J. Greenberg, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2005, pp. 8, 36.
6
Ibid., p. 48; for details see Kacper Rękawek’s text in this publication.
5
2
references to the elections in March 2004. M3/11 terrorist attack seems to be the response to
Usama Bin Ladin’s call to attack this country expressed by him on al-Jazeera in October
2003.7
Thorough investigation carried out after Madrid attacks revealed that they had been
perpetrated by the cell allegedly led by the Tunisian Serhane bin Abdelmajid Fakhet brother-in-law of the Moroccan Mustapha al-Maymouni, recruited earlier by his fellow
Moroccan Amer Azizi – a former member of the Syrian Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas aka
Abu Dahdah’s cell, closely connected to Moroccan Islamic Combatants Group (GICM or alJama`ah al-Islamiyya al-Muqatila bi’l- Maghrib) and Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, both
associated with Al Qaeda (Al Jazeera’s journalist, the Syrian Tayssir Alouni allegedly was
the member of this cell). Abu Dahdah cell was dismantled through the action of Spanish
antiterrorist police as early as at the end of 2001, following information that it members were
tied to 9/11 attackers in USA.8
After that Azizi and al-Maymuni continued their activity, creating terrorist networks
composed mostly of Moroccans in Madrid and Moroccan cities of Kenitra and Larache. AlMaymuni was later arrested, being involved in terrorist attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in
Casablanca on May 16, 2003, Azizi managed to escape. Two Spanish citizens of Syrian
origin, brothers Moutaz and Mohannad Almallah Dabas played an important role in this
cell’s activity. They had contacts with Abu Khalid (considered "Osama bin Laden's personal
representative in Europe") and with British resident of Egyptian origin, notorious preacher
of hate, Abu Qatada (Moutaz lived in London and attended the infamous Finsbury Park
mosque, Qatada was recently sentenced in UK – more on him in Kacper Rękawek’s text).
After al-Maymuni’s arrest, Serhane bin Abdelmajid Fakhet became the leader of this cell,
which included the Algerian Allekema Lamari, the Moroccan Jamal Zougam, and the
Moroccan Jamal Ahmidan. Serhane used to work in a real estate company as a
salesman, while pursuing a doctorate in economics at the University (he obtained a
Spanish government scholarship – sic!), Allekema was a former member of the Armed
Islamic Group (GIA) and spent 5 years in Spanish jail (being released in 2002), Zougam
owned a mobile phone shop in Madrid, Ahmidan was a narco-trafficker, who joined jihadi
movement in Spanish prison and whose main duty was to provide financial means to the cell
7
J. Jordán, R. Wesley, The Madrid Attacks: Results of Investigations Two Years Later, Terrorism Monitor,
Volume 4, Issue 5, March 9, 2006, [in:]
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369921
8
K. Haahr, Assessing Spain’s al-Qaeda Network, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 13, July 1, 2005, [in:]
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369733
3
and obtain weapons and explosives. Other noteworthy members of the group were the
Moroccans Mohamed Afallah and Driss Chebli. They were related to Yousef Belhadj, a
leading member of the GICM in Europe who is believed to be Aby Dujanah, Al Qaeda's
purported spokesman who claimed responsibility for the Madrid attacks on a videotape days
after the attacks (he was later arrested in Belgium and extradited to Spain). Afallah and
Chebli supposedly introduced Belhadj to Serhane.9
This cell was closely connected to two incredible individuals - Rabei Osman Sayed
Ahmed, known as Mohamed the Egyptian, and the Syrian Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, also
known as Abu Musab al-Suri aka Umar Abd al-Hakim aka Mustafa Abdul-Qadir
Mustafa Hussein al-Sheikh Ahmed al-Mazeek al-Jakiri al-Rifa'ei. The former, an AQ high
representative in Europe allegedly planned and executed the Madrid attacks as the cell’s Emir
and was very closely associated to Allekema Lamari. He supposedly controlled terrorist cells
in six European countries (Spain, Italy, Germany, Holland, Belgium and France) and is
currently detained and trialled in Italy after his arrest in Milan on June 7, 2004. Italian
security forces were tipped by the Spaniards and his phone calls were intercepted. One of his
cells was completing preparation to attack the European Parliament in Strasbourg and
NATO’s headquarters in Brussels (three members of this cell were already sentenced to seven
years (two of them) and six years in Belgium in February 2006).
The latter, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar is a person of an almost unmatched calibre in
Islamist networks - a veteran jihadi militant who took part in almost every Islamic insurgency
since the early 80s. His c.v. is interesting – he fought in Syria, Afghanistan and Algeria,
travelled around the world (living in Spain and Great Britain), worked for the Taliban and Al
Qaeda. His work not only included training of the mujahideen, as an explosives engineering
and urban guerrilla warfare expert but also the authorship of lengthy Islamic treatises, books
and audio lectures – he was a warrior, a propagandist and a strategist, combining many talents
and being one of the most important and formidable jihadi activist, close to the top of its
hardcore structure. He is said to be a founder of Abu Dahdah’s cell in Spain, passing his skills
and experience to its leaders. On October 31, 2005 he had been arrested by the Pakistani
security forces in the city of Quetta and quickly passed to the Americans, who are currently
9
J. Jordán, R. Wesley, After 3/11: The Evolution of Jihadist Networks in Spain, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4,
Issue 1, January 12, 2006, [in:] http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369863
4
having the opportunity to extract some of his knowledge on the Islamic jihadi movement in
Europe and the rest of the world.10
Arrests made after 3/11 revealed that although new Spanish government primarily acted
according to Islamists demands, this country maintained endangered by the terrorist actions of
radical Muslims. Javier Jordán and Robert Wesley observed: “The hurried withdrawal of
Spanish troops from Iraq by the new government of President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero,
which assumed power following the Madrid attacks, has not diminished the terrorism threat.
In fact, there have been at least four foiled terrorist attacks since the withdrawal. One of these
groups was composed of Pakistanis who had relationships with important members of original
al-Qaeda cadres. The other three networks were primarily composed of members with familial
origins in the Maghreb. In addition to these groups, Spanish police arrested two Moroccans
related to the Madrid attacks network in December 2004, who were in possession of a camera
with photographs of a nuclear power plant”.11 Numerous counterterrorist raids constantly
disrupt terrorist cells e.g. disrupting “prisons cells” (November 2004), “Iraqi cells”
(Operation Tiger, June & December 2005), showing the growing development of jihadi
networks in Ceuta and Melila – Spanish Moroccan Communities.12 As Kathryn Haahr
observes: “The Spanish government’s recent counter-terrorism operations illustrate the depth
and breadth of radical Islamic operations in Spain in support of al-Qaeda’s operations
overseas, particularly in Iraq. Over the last decade, militant Islamists in Spain organized
themselves into distinct cells for specific jihadist activities. This “bee-hive” organizational
infrastructure – which replicates the activity of other jihadist networks in Europe – became
increasingly sophisticated in terms of recruiting individuals in Spanish prisons and mosques
for overseas terrorist operations. The Muslims involved in jihadist activities in Spain were not
necessarily members of al-Qaeda. Instead, they were religious activists that either individually
or in groups or cells, decided to act locally in support of al-Qaeda’s global jihad ideology.”13
10
S.Ulph, Setmariam Nasar: Background on al-Qaeda's Arrested Strategist, Terrorism Focus, Volume 3, Issue
12, March 28, 2006, [in:] http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?search=1&articleid=2369941;
Murad Al-shishani, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadists, Terrorism Monitor,
Volume 3, Issue 16, August 11, 2005, [in:]
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?search=1&articleid=2369766
11
J. Jordán, R. Wesley, After 3/11: The Evolution of Jihadist …
12
K. Haahr, Emerging Terrorist Trends in Spain's Moroccan Communities, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue
9, May 4, 2006, [in:] http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369982
13
K. Haahr, Assessing Spain’s al-Qaeda …
5
3. Holland. The Hofstad Cell (the Polder Mujahideen).
Holland was the second European country to familiarize itself with Islamic terrorism in
the XXI st century. The killing of the Dutch controversial film director Theo Van Gogh (a
substitute target as the prime target – Ayan Hirshi Ali - Dutch member of parliament and
outspoken critic of radical Islam was well protected by the police) in Amsterdam on
November 2, 2004 by the Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent, Muhammad Bouyeri, aka
Abu Zubair was aimed at terrorizing the society of Holland and was planned to be the first in
the series of subsequent terrorist attacks, fortunately prevented due to the police work and
dismantling of so called Hofstad cell later on. Hofstad cell, called after the name of Dutch city
the Hague, where it has it’s origins, was founded and recruited by another preacher of hate,
the Syrian Qur’an teacher Ridwan al-Issar aka Abu Khalid (who suddenly disappeared
shortly before Boyeri’s attack - probably he escaped to Syria).14 He gathered and organized a
group of young Muslims born in the Netherlands, providing them with his spiritual support
and connections in Pakistan, where some members of this cell allegedly were trained. It is not
exactly known how Bouyeri joined this group, possibly he was contacted through the asSunna Mosque in the Hague, where he and other member of this cell were frequenting. He
radicalized himself probably in jail, where he spent 7 months for violence-related-crimes,
where he could have close contact with radical Muslims, as jails are the places where they are
easy to spot, not only in Holland. Some other members of this cell were Samir Azzouz and
his wife Abida Azzouz, Ahmed Hamdi, Ismael Akhnikh aka Suheib, Jason Walters aka
Abu Mujahied al-Amrikie, his brother Germaine, Outhman Ben Ali, Nouredine el Fathni
and his wife Soumaya Sahla, and Malika Shabi.
They were very young, second generation immigrants, Dutch citizens of North African
descent, who were under surveillance of Dutch security service AIVD at least since 2002 and
initially considered as not particularly dangerous. Samir Azzouz and Muhammad Bouyeri
were allegedly the leaders of this cell, Ahmed Hamdi was its treasurer, Ismael Akhnikh and
Jason Walker (a convert to Islam and a son of African American father and Dutch mother)
managed to receive some training on the Afghan – Pakistani border and were responsible for
purchase and preparation of arms and explosives, Outhman Ben Ali, who worked as a
translator for AIVD was the cell’s mole there. Nouredine el Fathni seems to be a spotter,
recruiter and propagandist, showing propaganda materials, including beheadings, to the
J. Neurink, Mujahideen of the Lowlands” on Trial in the Netherlands, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 24,
December 20, 2005, [in:] http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369856
14
6
newcomers to the group. Interestingly, Samir Azzouz was arrested, among others, in
November 2004 and later cleared of plotting terrorist attacks by the Dutch court. In his house,
police found maps and fertilizers and chemicals that could be used for bomb-making. Yet the
court decided that evidence of planning alone was not enough to convict him – finally he and
other members of this cell were arrested in October 2005 in a huge police raid against Islamic
terrorist cells in this country. They are now in court awaiting for the judgment. Their plans
included attacks on politicians (including Geert Wilders and Ayan Hirshi Ali), governmental
buildings, the parliament, AIVD’s offices, Amsterdam’s Schiphol airport and Borssele
nuclear power plant station.
As Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Report (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt FFI), entitled The slaying of the Dutch filmmaker – religiously motivated violence or Islamist
terrorism in the name of global jihad? notes: “The Hofstad Network was involved in
activities outside the Netherlands, and established multiple international jihadist connections.
The group allegedly maintained contacts with Islamist militants in Morocco, Belgium, Spain,
Switzerland and Saudi Arabia. The terrorist suspects who were arrested in October 2003
allegedly exchanged “coded communications” with a Moroccan Islamist militant, imprisoned
in Spain, who has been identified as Abdeladim Akoudad aka Naoufel. In Naoufel’s
calendar police found encoded telephone numbers of members of the Hofstad Network.
Naoufel allegedly is a member of a Moroccan Salafist-Jihadist group established by so-called
“Afghan Arabs” who returned to Morocco. (…) Moroccan authorities want Naoufel because
they believe he was involved in the terrorist operation in Casablanca on May 16, 2003.”15
Another personal link between these cells is Algerian militant currently imprisoned in
Switzerland, Muhammad Achraf. He was: “regularly in contact with militants in Spain and
members of the Hofstad Network in Holland. For example, he made several phone calls to
Muhammad Bouyeri. According to The New York Times he also wired money to members of
the Hofstad Network. One of the detainees held in Spain in connection with the High Court –
plot, Abdol Ghaffar Hashemi, held a Dutch passport, whereas another, Mourad Yala, a
friend of Samir Azzouz was arrested in Holland in 2003, suspected of falsifying travel
documents. Spanish investigators believe these two militants had been trying to convert
laptops into bombs that could be used in terrorist attacks in the Netherlands.”16
P. Nesser, The slaying of the Dutch filmmaker – religiously motivated violence or Islamist terrorism in the
name of global jihad? Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment report, 2005/00376, p.17 - 18)
16
ibidem, pp. 18 - 19
15
7
Moreover, as NDRE report states: “The Hofstad Network was also involved in planning
attacks outside the Netherlands. On 11 June, 2004, Portuguese police arrested a group of
Islamist militants in Porto. It is suspected that they planned to assassinate the Portuguese
president-designate of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, as well as
other foreign guests, at a reception at the Freixo Palace on the night before the opening match
of the Euro 2004 championship soccer tournament. Portuguese intelligence received a
warning from their Dutch colleagues that three Dutch-Moroccan members of the Hofstad
Network had travelled to Portugal. One of the terrorist suspects had shared an apartment with
Van Gogh’s killer, and they drove from the Netherlands to Portugal in a VW Golf registered
in the name of Bouyeri.”17 In May 2005 French police arrested in Tours a 25-year-old
Chechen in connection with the murder of controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh.
Dutch prosecutors claimed that Bouyeri was helped by Chechen separatists, among them
Ismailov. Press reports say Ismailov's fingerprints were found on a suicide note left behind by
Bouyeri. A month later 32 year-old Dutch national Racid Belkacem was held by officers from
Scotland Yard's extradition unit in a street in Whitechapel, east London. He maintained close
contact with members of Hofstad cell as computer files were found at his house in the
Netherlands suggesting the recruitment of persons for the jihad.
4. Belgium. The Maaseik “Support” Network.
Muriel Degauque, 38 years old Belgian woman, was the first white Western European
female suicide bomber, killed in Iraq on 9 November, 2005. A convert to Islam, recruited to
carry out suicide mission in Iraq against American soldiers, managed only to wound one of
them before killing herself in a blast. Her case loudly revealed the presence of Islamic
terrorists in Belgium. However, it was a Maaseik network, which shows the connectivity and
embeddedness of jihadi networks in Western Europe.18 This small city which is located in the
Belgian province of Limburg, a few miles from the Dutch and German borders, used to be a
hotbed for Islamic networks.
In January 2004 Belgian police arrested Khalid Bouloudo, aged 30, born in this country,
but wanted by the Moroccan authorities. In the trial which started on November 2005 he was
accused by the Belgian prosecutors of supporting bombers who killed 191 people in Madrid
17
ibidem, p. 19
C. Whitlock, How a Town Became a Terror Hub Belgian Haven Seen At Heart of Network, Washington Post,
November 24, 2005; p. A01
18
8
in 2004, and 45 people in Casablanca in 2003. In June, July and September 2004 Belgian
police, tipped by the Spaniards and the Italians, arrested in a series of raids almost two dozen
of suspects, including Lahoussine Haski after he returned from a trip to Syria and Turkey.
This Moroccan militant who participated in fight against infidels in Algeria, Chechnya and
Afghanistan, was wanted by the Saudi Arabian authorities, for his alleged role in a series of
bombings in the kingdom - he was listed by the government as one of the 26 most-wanted
terrorist suspects. Also Moroccan justice had issued a warrant for his arrest on terrorism
charges, as he was connected to recent bombings in Casablanca previous year. He was the
member of GICM and married to local, Maaseik Muslim women. His brother, Hassan Haski
was arrested in December, 2004 in the Canary Islands and charged by the Spanish prosecutor
with trying to set up yet another GICM cell to launch attacks on the Spanish mainland.
Spanish court documents describe him as "one of the most important current leaders" of the
network. Another defendant, Mourad Chabarou, was tap-recorded while talking by phone
with the suspected architect of the Madrid attacks, Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed. He was also
accused of giving refuge in his house in Brussels to one of the Madrid bombing suspects,
Mohammed Afalah. Next arrested member of this cell was already mentioned - Yousef
Belhadj has been extradited to Spain on suspicion of appearing in a videotape admitting
responsibility for the Madrid attacks. Some members of Maaseik cell allegedly had close
contacts with the Hofstad cell. They were under surveillance of Belgian State Security
Agency, initially being suspected of smuggling illegal farmworkers into Limburg. Their
widespread terrorist connections were revealed later on. Currently they are on trial – although
police found no bombs and explosives, no weapons and no plans for an imminent attack, they
are considered to be a logistical support cell.
5. France. The “Chechen” Network.
France was the first country in Western Europe, which encountered and suffered from
Islamic extremism, as she was attacked many times in the late 1980s and mid and late 1990s–
first by the Iranian and then by the Algerian terrorist networks, including the “Strasbourg”
plot and so called “Roubaix gang” and it’s offshoots. Hence, it is probably best prepared to
deal with this growing danger, both intellectually and organizationally. French police and
security forces have done countless raids and arrests of terrorist suspects, expelled dozens of
radical Islamic preachers and co-operated with services in almost each Western European
country to tackle the problem of jihadi terrorism effectively.
9
Interesting example of a plot showing worldwide connections of Islamic militancy is the
plot against Russian Embassy in Paris. On December 16, 2002 nine Islamic militants were
detained in France, mainly in the suburbs of Paris.19 Arrests included the Algerians
Merouane Benahmed and his wife, Menad Benchellali, Nouredine Merabet, Said Arif,
Mohamed Merbah and Ahmed Belhoud. These men were planning to attack Russian
Embassy in Paris, as a revenge for the killings of their brothers in Russian’s spetsnaz
operation in Dubrovka a month earlier. They also intended to attack Paris underground station
with chemical weapons and destroy Eiffel Tower and shopping centre in Paris. All pf them
had been veterans of Islamic jihad in Chechnya, Georgia and Afghanistan, where they
received proper training, and they were affiliated with the GSPC (GIA splinter group)
militants in France. They already bought a substantial amount of chemicals, as well as parts
for remote detonators and other equipment. After search of their houses there was a suspicion,
they can use radiological or chemical weapons, as traces of poison and protective suit were
found; police also found cash and fake documents. The leader of the “Chechen Network”,
Merouane Benahmed was also believed to be trained in the manufacturing and use of
chemical weapons and toxins and had connections with Islamist militants all over the world.
They were sentenced in a trial which ended on June 14, 2006.20
As another NDRE report entitled Jihad in Europe claims: “According to the French
Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy, Benahmed had been in touch with Rabah Kadri, an
Islamist militant arrested in London in November 2002, suspected of being a member of a
terrorist cell planning to launch a cyanide attack on the London Underground (The Tube). It
was the interrogation of Kadri that led to the raids against “The Chechen Network”. In turn,
the interrogations of Benahmed led to the arrests of Algerians in London manufacturing ricin
in January 2003. Further investigations into a possible link between the ricin cell in London
and the Chechnya veterans operating in France revealed that several of the detainees in
London came to the United Kingdom from France shortly before they were arrested. Knowing
this, the ricin found in France was seen as a sign of a U.K.-France-connection. Merouane
Benahmed was also suspected of providing expertise in bomb making to the group convicted
of planning an attack in Strasbourg in December 2000 (see above). In addition he appears to
have been affiliated with an alleged al-Qaida cell in Italy. Information from Benahmed’s
19
Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe, Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004, report,
2004/01146
20
France jails 25 for attack plot, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5078812.stm
10
computer resulted in the arrests of North African Islamists in Scotland and in the United
Kingdom.”21
6. Italy
Italy is very often mentioned in different reports and pieces of news related to the
activities of the Islamic terrorist networks in Europe. In late May 2006 Kathryn Haar, writing
for the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus, mentioned the “recent pronouncements” by
Baltazar Garzon and Pierre de Bousquet, head of French counterintelligence, on the issue of
“Iraqi foreign fighters” coming back to Europe and setting up new or restarting old “networks
to support terrorist operations in Europe”. Italy was mentioned in the context of the places in
which such networks are being currently established.22 This operation is now being made
much easier because of developments such as the verdict of the Milanese tribunal which in
early 2005 supported the theory that the accused were indeed part of a network recruiting
fighters for the Iraqi insurgents but were still acquitted of all “terrorist” charges due to the fact
that, according to the judge, they were to wage “guerrilla warfare” there.23
At the very moment it looks as if Italy has already undergone a journey “from logistics
base to potential target”.24 Throughout the 1990s and the early 21st century the country earned
itself a reputation of a launching pad for many of the Islamic terrorist plots prepared in
Europe with the city of Milan and its Viale Jenner mosque as the “hotbed” of Islamic
extremism.25 The mosque can easily be compared with London’s Finsbury Park mosque
which has just been called a “Suicide Factory”.26 The Italian mosque played the same role –
that was the place where Muslims were recruited to wage Jihad in Bosnia and Chechnya.
What is more, the Milanese Islamic militants had links with the 1993 World Trade Centre
bombers and Ayman al-Zawahiri who was sending instructions and advice.27 More recently,
the recruitment drive shifted towards sending potential suicide bombers to Iraq (especially for
21
Petter Nesser, Jihad in Europe..., p. 62
K. Haahr, „New reports allege foreign fighters in Iraq returning to Europe”, [in:] Terrorism Focus, Volume 3,
Issue 20 (May 23, 2006), [in:] http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370003.
23
L. Vidino, „Is Italy next in line after London?”, [in:] Terrorism Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 18 (September 21,
2005), [in:] http://www.jamestown .org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369788.
24
G. Olimpio, „Italy and Islamic militancy: from logistics base to potential target”, [in:] Terrorism Monitor,
Volume 3, Issue 18 (September 21, 2005), [in:]
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369789.
25
Ibid.
26
S. O’Neill, D. McGrory, The Suicide Factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque, HarperCollins,
London 2006.
27
Olimpio, op. cit.
22
11
the purposes of Ansar al-Islam) and providing logistical support to the Algerian GIA and
GSPC.28 Frequent raids carried out by the Italian police on the GSPC related sites (e.g. in
2002) and arrests of its operatives (e.g. throughout 2003, in September 2005) clearly point out
to the fact that this organisation established a strong presence in Italy. The latest arrests came
in November and December 2005 when five Algerians were arrested “on suspicion of
planning terrorist operations in Italy and the United States, and of providing
financial/weapons/logistical assistance to other jihadi cells in Europe”.29
Unfortunately, the aforementioned two organisations are not the only one radical groups
existing in Italy. The others include the Moroccan GICM and Hizb ut Tahrir. 30 However, in
many cases the alleged members of these groupings co-operate and even socialise together
what makes the real differentiation between them extremely hard. That might be the case with
the mixed Salafi-Jihadist networks comprising of Algerians and Moroccans with links to
“cells in Spain, Norway and other countries”.31
Italy might have been used by Al Qaeda as recruiting ground or logistical base (especially
in the field of forging documents)32 in the past, or as Gunaratna suggests a “safe haven for
operatives who were being hunted elsewhere in Europe”,33 but after 7/7 London bombings
and in the wake of the 2006 Winter Olympic Games held in Italy and the April’s general
elections it was becoming more and more obvious that: a) Italy had already been the target
area for the Islamic terrorist networks in the past and b) Italy should prepare itself for the
more or less imminent terrorist attack due to the fact that it was considered as the next
potential target for and potentially by the Islamic militants. The cry of being “next in line after
London” was heard and not surprisingly there existed a link between the 21/7 botched
terrorist attacks and Islamist circles in Italy – one of the unsuccessful terrorists, Ethiopian
Osman Hussain, escaped to Italy and tried to hide there with from the help of the local
militants.34
Just like in the UK the intelligence and security services uncovered a wide range of
terrorist plots within the country (some targeting the country itself) or elements of a
K. Haahr, „Italy: Europe’s emerging platform for Islamic extremism”, [in:] Volume 3, Issue 4 (February
24,2005), [in:] http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369318.
29
K. Haahr, “GSPC in Italy: the forward base of Jihad in Europe”, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 3
(February 9, 2006), [in:] http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369894.
30
Olimpio, op. cit.
31
K. Haahr, “GSPC in Italy…”, op. cit.
32
Ibid.
33
Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 171.
34
L. Vidino, „Is Italy next in line after London?”, [in:] Terrorism Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 18 (September 21,
2005), [in:] http://www.jamestown .org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369788 and “Italy and terrorism:
The Next Target”, The Economist, July 16th, 2006.
28
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functioning European wide Islamic terrorist networks. In April 2001 one of the Al Qaeda’s
key players in Europe and the leader for the North of Italy, a Tunisian Essid Sami Ben
Khemais, was arrested.35 The next year saw a string of arrests, the most notable include: in
February eight Moroccan men suspected of preparing a terrorist attack on the US embassy in
Rome were arrested36 and in July a logistical support cell working for Al Qaeda in Milan was
destroyed by nine arrests of Moroccan and Tunisian nationals.37 In the meantime, Venice was
“placed on terror alert” after it had been reported that the Islamists were planning an attack
against the city’s ancient Jewish ghetto.38 More arrests followed in January 2003 when the
police arrested five Morroccans for the illegal possession of explosives. The arrested were
also in possession of maps with ringed NATO bases in the North of Italy. 39 Later in the year,
Italy moved to deport six Moroccans, Algerian accused of aiding militant Islamic groups in
Italy. At the same time the infamous Senegalese imam of Lombardy, Abdul Qadir Fall
Mamour who once boasted that he had fought alongside UBL in Afghanistan, was also
deported.40 The crackdown continued into 2005 when the police moved in to dismantle the
Milan and Turin network allegedly aiding the GICM and with the aforementioned arrests
aimed at the destruction of the GSPC’s logistical base.41
7. Conclusions.
Marc Sageman observes that “global Salafi jihad has a very fuzzy boundary. (…) The
jihad is a dynamic social movement that forms and break bonds to various Salafi terrorist
groups, the nature of this bond may be financial support, logistical support, or common
planning for operations”.42 The aforementioned examples of the activity of Islamic terrorist
networks in Western Europe confirm his claim. European terrorist cells may act
independently and plan to execute various plots, but still there are some individuals having
connections and creating links between them, so they cannot be considered as entirely selfcontained. One can assume that they are controlled and guided to some extent by hardcore
organization. Most of them, as aforementioned examples show, were under extensive
35
Gunaratna, op. cit., p. 171.
F. Kennedy, „Analysis: ”Italy’s terror connection”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1840921.stm.
37
“Italy arrests nine operatives over al-Qaeda links”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2125101.stm.
38
“Venice placed on terror alert”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2123660.stm.
39
“Arrests trigger Italy terror alert”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2689915.stm.
40
F. Bordonaro, “Italy: The threat to the general elections”, [in:] Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 4
(February 23, 2006), [in:] http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369908.
41
D. Willey, „Italy holds terror cells suspects”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/4558531.stm.
42
M. Sageman, Understanding terror …, p. 151
36
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surveillance from the security organisations – despite that they managed to successfully
performed their missions in Spain and UK. That means that approach adapted by French,
Dutch and Belgian security institutions – to dissolve the cells and arrest their members well
before they develop terrorist plots is the key to success in terrorist prevention.
These networks gravitate around places where recruiters can attract attention and raise the
interest of the future members of particular cells, such as mosques, Islamic cultural centers,
prisons and universities. Special role is played there by the so called preachers of hate, like
Abu Khalid, Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri, who can attract and influence
ideologically individuals already seeking identity in complex, heterogenous Western
societies. It seems that radical Islam supplies them an answer to almost all earthly problems –
providing these individuals with the sense of life and, in many cases, the sense of their death.
Those people who are the centers of terrorist networks are called superhubs, as they usually
have links to more than one cell in more than one country. They are individuals like preachers
of hate, leaders like Abu Dahdah, Mohamed the Egyptian, Yousef Belhadj or Merouane
Benahmed. They are connected both to the nomadic mujahideen, wandering the world, like
Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, Lahoussine Haski or Naoufel, and to the hubs of local networks,
leaders like Serhane bin Abdelmajid Fakhet and Allekema Lamari, Muhammad Bouyeri and
Samir Azzouz, Khalid Bouloudo or Menad Benchellali. They create links to the other
members of the particular cell - nodes. Their experience sometimes differ significantly –
superhubs and nomads are usually veterans of many Islamic insurgencies, fighting in places
like Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia or Chechnya, hubs may attend jihadi training camps in such
places, although it is not always the rule (consider the leadership of the Hofstad cell), and
ordinary members – nodes - may frequently not even have any basic fighting experience –
their strong will and determination to harm those who are perceived as their enemies are their
primary weapons. To achieve this goal they are able to acquire useful knowledge via the
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Internet or through, sometimes very brief, encounters with more experienced jihadi militants.
FIG. 1 SCHEME OF TERRORIST NETWORKS
NOMADS
SUPERHUB
CELL
CELL
HUB
NODE
HUB
NODE NODE
NODE NODE NODE NODE
FIG. 2 TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISTS
Nomadic mujahideen
Mustafa Setmariam
Nasar
Superhubs
Abu Khalid
Hubs
Serhane bin Abdelmajid Fakhet
Abu Qatada
Allekema Lamari
Abu Hamza
Lahoussine Haski
Omar Bakri
Abu Dahdah
Muhammad Bouyeri
Samir Azzouz
Naoufel
Mohamed the
Egyptian
Khalid Bouloudo
Yousef Belhadj
Menad Benchellali
Merouane Benahmed
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What seems to be important is that one cannot fully adequately profile Islamic terrorists as
there are many alternative patterns of their behaviour and ways to martyrdom – they can be
young and old, men and women, immigrants and natives, Ph. D. students and narcotraffickers, natural-born Muslims and converts, experienced fighters or inexperienced
volunteers. There are probably only two things they have in common – their will to participate
in violent jihad against contemporary materialistic idolaters who are offending the one and
only true God, and their ability to find or be contacted by those who are spreading the seeds
of their hate and contempt towards the secular West and its people and institutions, and who
are willing to share their mortal skills. Taken altogether, they constitute a considerable threat
for the security of European societies and should be dealt with decisively and effectively,
otherwise next acts of severe atrocities will be seen in the streets of many cities in Europe.
Tekst został zaprezentowany na międzynarodowej konferencji “From total war to war against
terrorism. Transformations in international security 1914 – 2005”,
zorganizowanej przez
Dolnośląską Szkołę Wyższą Edukacji Towarzystwa Wiedzy Powszechnej we Wrocławiu w dniach 7 – 8
czerwca 2006. Autor dziękuje organizatorom: prof. Krzysztofowi Kubiakowi i prof. Piotrowi
Mickiewiczowi za zgodę na zamieszczenie na stronie internetowej.
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