ACI AIRSIDE SAFETY HANDBOOK
(Third edition 2005)
FOREWORD
Words from ACI…..
INTRODUCTION
This handbook has been produced to provide airside managers with a comprehensive
set of guidelines to enhance safety and prevent incidents. Material has been provided
from major airports participating in ACI World Operational Safety Subcommittee and
has been summarised to produce a concise document. The aim has been to produce a
current “best practice” guidance document without being overly detailed – further
details are available from the useful documents and websites listed in Sections 5 and
6.
GENERAL
This handbook is a guide to airside safety. It is written for airside managers and builds
on previous work by ACI – namely the Apron Safety Handbook. The remit of this
handbook has been widened to include all topics relating to the safe operation of
airside areas.
Aviation throughout the world continues to grow, both in terms of the number of
flights and also in terms of aircraft size. Airfields become busier. The requirement is
to facilitate this growth in a safe environment for passengers, staff and aircraft.
Various bodies have produced both regulations and guidance covering a number of
aspects of airside safety, both nationally and internationally, including from within the
industry. This handbook is intended to complement such material by offering
guidance in areas perhaps not covered in sufficient detail. It updates and brings
together the best elements of managing airside safety from current experience of those
involved in this important task from airports around the world. The aim has been to
keep the contents brief and relevant.
CONTENTS
1. Safety Management
Safety Management Systems – policy, personnel, processes, reporting
& records.
1.2
Risk assessment and control.
1.3
Occupational Health & Safety.
1.4
Staff competencies, training requirements and competency checks.
1.5
Airside inspections and audits – runway, taxiway, aprons, surfaces,
markings and lighting.
1.6
Asset management – Un-serviceability reporting and rectification
1.7
Airside Driving, training, use of RTF, apron and manoeuvring area
1.8
Operation of vehicles airside .
1.9
Vehicle permits – requirements for vehicles.
1.10
Airside Construction Works - Control of contractors.
1.11
FOD Prevention.
1.12
Adverse weather operations
1.12.1 Snow / ice
1.12.2 Strong winds
1.12.3 Storms - lightning
1.12.4 Low visibility procedures
1.12.5 Aircraft de-icing.
1.13
Promulgation of information, local airport instructions to users.
1.14
Emergency and Contingency planning.
1.15
Airside Security.
1.1
2. Apron Safety
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
Apron layout and markings.
Apron installations – fuel hydrants, FEGP, PCA, etc
Aircraft guidance systems – visual docking guidance
Operation of airbridges, training, permits, audits
Airside roads markings and signs
Apron control and stand allocation
Apron cleanliness
Aircraft fuelling, including spillage procedures, de-fuelling
Aircraft marshalling
Incident reporting
Incident investigation and analysis – costs, hotspots, trends, causes
Aircraft turnround process and audits
Passenger evacuation procedures – terminal and aircraft
Hazardous materials
3. Airside Safety
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
3.11
Protection of navigation aids
Runway incursions
Runway friction measurement (maintenance and testing)
Aerodrome safeguarding – prevention and identification of obstacles cranes
Wildlife hazards
Airside Safety Committee
Airside Safety Promotion
Stakeholders - Interface with ATC, with operators, with Project Teams
Engine run-ups
Special flights
Aircraft recovery
4. Annexes
Annex A – Airfield Operations Competency Record – Aircraft Marshalling
Annex B – Airfield Works Permit
Annex C – Works Site Checklist
Annex D – Airbridge Checklist
Annex E – Airbridge Operation Safety Audit Check Form
Annex F – Aircraft Turnround Safety Audit Check Form
Annex G – Authorisation Permit for Cranes
5. Useful Documents
6. Useful Websites
1. SAFETY MANAGEMENT
1.1 Safety Management Systems – policy, personnel, processes, reporting
& records
1.1.1 Policy
An airport should have a safety policy or safety objective formally adopted.
A safety policy should outline who does what, when and how they do it. It
should set out how the company deals with health and safety at work and the
organisation and arrangements you have for putting that policy into practice.
The policy should show that arrangements are in place to assess and suitably
control the hazards associated with your business. A general policy should
include arrangements to;
 Protect employees
 Assess all risks to health and safety caused by the business
 Provide adequate controls for anyone affected (including customers,
thirds parties etc) whether safety or health related.
 Consultation processes with employees
 The provision and maintenance of equipment
 The provision of suitable instruction, training and other information
 Minimise accidents and incidents
 Arrangement to review this policy at suitable intervals
The policy should be signed by the Chief Executive or Chairman.
Responsibilities for line managers and employees should be agreed.
1.1.2 Personnel
Personnel should be adequately trained in all tasks they can reasonably be
expected to carry out and should remain proficient at these tasks. Staff should
demonstrate their continuing ability to carry out the tasks required of them and
this should be recorded (see section 1.4 – Competencies and Training).
1.1.3 Processes
Processes should be in place to support the organisation’s policy or objective.
Processes need to be consistently followed and the creation of standards and
procedures help to achieve this. Processes, standards and procedures need to
be clearly owned by a responsible person empowered to ensure they are
followed. These will be many and varied in nature covering for example
detailed activities of the airport duty teams through to the reviewing of overall
apron safety trends. Processes should be documented and form the basis of
staff training for new recruits. These by their very nature will need reviewing
and updating as things change on the airfield. The Aerodrome Manual is a key
part of the documentation and communication of certain processes to other
airfield users.
1.1.4 Reporting
Safety reporting has 2 purposes – one is to check progress against achieving
targets, monitoring incident rates or measuring if a change has resulted in
improved safety and the second is to monitor that the required processes or
activities have been completed – in other words to demonstrate safety
assurance. Reporting of both these aspects are useful in an SMS – one
measures the “input” and one measures the “output” or results. Ongoing
records should be kept.
1.1.5 Records
Records should be kept of all aspects of safety – processes to follow, processes
completed along with dates, personnel and their training records.
1.1.6 What does the successful introduction of an SMS result in ?
It results in the suitable and adequate management and delivery of safety to
both aircraft and people in a shared workplace environment.
An SMS ensures legal compliance, retains operating licence, improves
business performance and importantly is proactive not reactive.
There are 4 elements to this - Plan, Do, Check, Review.
Plan for Airfield Safety – Getting organised
Understand existing legislative and company requirements
Identify safety objectives
Establish contingency plans and business recovery plans
Confirm airfield procedures are documented and up to date for all activities
Check all risk assessments are complete
Doing Airfield Safety
Initial training
Competencies and refresher training processes in place
Infrastructure and equipment checks being carried out
Staff meetings and consultation processes talk about safety
Reporting of all incidents and near misses in place
Investigation and trend analysis of incidents takes place
Fault reporting process in place
Behavioural reporting in place
Record keeping
Checking Airfield Safety
Senior management audits or inspections of the airfield occur regularly
Audits of trainers and trainees occur – including any third parties
Different levels of checks take place for all areas of the airfield
Risk assessments remain valid?
Identify fault trends and incident trends
Measure safety performance
Review Airfield Safety
Identify root causes of incidents and near misses
Ensure preventative actions are taken and documented
Share safety information with airside community
Work with others to identify and understand industry best practice
Understand regulators future requirements in good time
Establish future safety objectives
Throughout all the above boxes run the themes of leadership, communication,
consultation and delivery.
The steps to achieving a safe airfield will need to include a clear
organisational structure, setting out clear roles and responsibilities for the
individuals involved. Risk assessments form a vital part of the management of
safety – Section 1.2 has more details.
Monitoring and auditing of safety including performance measurement should
be undertaken regularly in a way visible to all involved.
1.2 Risk assessment and control
Risk assessments should be carried out for every task likely to be carried out
by staff. Risk assessments can also be carried out on a higher level of business
risk, for example concerning birdstrikes or runway incursions.
There are 5 simple steps as outlined by the UK Health and Safety Executive;
(www.hse.gov.uk)
1. Identify the hazards
2. Decide who may be harmed and how
3. Evaluate the risks and decide whether the existing precautions are adequate
or whether more should be done.
4. Record your findings
5. Review your assessment and revise it if necessary.
In practice most aviation situations have already had some sort of risk
assessment applied to them and already have some sort of control measures in
place. In this situation the following steps may be useful;
1. Identify the tasks/areas to be assessed.
2. Analyse and break down the tasks into manageable pieces
3. Identify all the hazards, to whom, and list them.
4. Record and review the existing control measures (most effective first)
5. Assess the remaining level of risk using the matrix
6. Decide whether further action is needed to reduce the level of risk.
7. Complete and communicate the assessment
8. Review the assessment – whenever there is a change to the circumstances,
when there is an accident or serious near miss of after a set time.
The process of carrying out a risk assessment involves a trained risk assessor
and a group of experienced individuals familiar with the task. The hazards
need to be identified and the probability of them occurring should be tabulated
in a grid – an example of one is shown below.
5
4
3
2
1
1
2
Probability
1. Extremely improbable
2. Extremely remote
3. Remote
4. Reasonably probable
5. Frequent
3
4
5
Consequence
1. Low effect
2. Minor occurrence
3. Major occurrence
4. Hazardous occurrence
5. Catastrophic/serious occurrence
Once the grid is completed the hazards with high probability and severe
consequences can be prioritised in an action plan for remedial action to reduce
the risk – either the probability or consequences can be reduced by putting in
place additional control measures.
At present there are a number of matrices in use with varying definitions for
what the values 1-5 mean for both probability and consequence. Similarly the
definitions against the red/amber/green status can vary. It may be that in the
near future a standard layout is agreed. The actual detail of this is not so
important – the value from this assessment is that it prioritises certain risks for
remedial action or review.
Risk assessments should be reviewed on an annual basis to ensure they remain
valid. They should also be reviewed after any incident or accident. This is
particularly important to ensure any lessons learnt from an accident or serious
incident are incorporated into the risk assessment which may not have been
thought of when it was originally written. Here are some suggested areas for
assessment;
Staff Tasks;
 Aircraft marshalling
 Bird control and use of firearms
 Runway inspections
 Exposure to MMMF
 Runway change procedures
 Use of airfield cleaning vehicles
 Use of snow removal vehicles
 Spillage clean up process



Use of airbridges
Activating low-vis procedures
Aircraft recovery actions
Business Risks
 Runway incursions
 Snow & ice procedures
 Aircraft-aircraft collision on the ground
 FOD damage to aircraft
 Aircraft fire
 Major birdstrike causing accident
 Loss of supply of utilities
 ATC evacuation/loss of ATC service
1.3 Occupational Health & Safety
The health and safety of those working airside needs to be given careful
consideration. Risk assessments should be carried out covering each task that
staff are required to complete. (See previous section). An airport should also
ensure that third party companies operating airside also have completed risk
assessments for the activities of their staff. Once the hazards and residual risks
have been identified the hazard should be reduced. One method to do this is to
consider the following options – item 1 being the best and item 6 being the
minimum;
1. Eliminate – cease doing the task, remove the hazard altogether
2. Reduce – reduce the time exposed to the hazard, substitute
something less hazardous (eg a 12v system to replace a 240v system).
3. Isolate – physically isolate people from the hazard – fit guards,
enclose the hazard.
4. Control – put in place a safe system of work, require permits to work
to be issued, put supervision in place, require staff to use training and
follow procedures.
5. PPE – issue personal protective equipment appropriate to the hazard
6. Discipline – put procedures in place requiring staff to behave in a
particular way.
Staff should then be encouraged to wear the required PPE and follow the
procedures when carrying out a task.
Items of PPE may include – ear defenders, hi-visibility tabards/jackets, safety
shoes, gloves etc
Ideally all airside users should work in a safety culture where it is expected
that if PPE is not worn anyone from any other organisation can challenge an
individual.
Ideally this subject should be reviewed jointly by a number of companies that
operate in the same area and joint work undertaken to reduce exposure. This
approach can be applied to noise, fumes, slips/trips/falls, musculo-skeletal
disorders arising from manual handling or ergonomic issues. Reviewing
causes of staff absence can reveal trends that can usefully focus preventative
steps.
Removal of the source of the problem is the best method to bring about
improvements – wearing PPE is really the last step when nothing else can be
achieved to reduce the exposure.
1.4 Staff competencies, training requirements and competency checks
Staff should be trained for each task they are required to carry out. The details
of such training will vary depending on the persons experience and
background and the complexity of the task. Key elements of training to be
addressed include
 Theoretical training
 Practical training including demonstration.
Testing understanding and demonstrating ability are key parts to the successful
completion of training.
In order to be competent at a task the individual should then demonstrate that
the theory, practical training and local knowledge can be applied together in a
satisfactory way – this is the demonstration of being competent.
Competency checks can easily be completed during day-to-day activities if
someone suitable accompanies the individual on a task they are required to
complete and records all the steps taken to achieve the task. An example of a
competency check sheet for aircraft marshalling is included at Annex A.
Depending on the frequency of a task, refresher training should be arranged at
a suitable opportunity.
For a team or section to be recognised as competent, periodical audits or
checks should be carried out and recorded, addressing any shortfalls by
reviewing the training material, refresher training or the frequency of refresher
training. Similarly after any incident or accident it may be prudent to review
training, refresher training and the competency checking process to ensure it
remains adequate.
1.5 Airside inspections and audits – runway, taxiway, aprons, surfaces,
markings and lighting
A key aspect of ensuring airside is a safe place for the activities to take place
involves inspections and audits. All the facilities on the airfield need to be
periodically checked to ensure they are serviceable and available for use.
Particular attention needs to be paid to the aircraft movement area, including
the runway, taxiway, apron including airside roads and grass areas.
The purpose of such inspections is to ensure that;
 No FOD is present,
 The surface condition is suitable (no loose material),
 No birds or other wildlife are present,
 The paint markings are visible and correct,
 The lighting is serviceable,
 The signs are visible and correct,
 Equipment provided is safe for use and serviceable etc.
It is often beneficial to repeat these inspections after dark to check the lighting,
signs and markings.
The importance of diligence and accurate recording of these inspections
cannot be overstated. To reinforce this it is good practice to check that the
checks have been carried out and also to check the quality of the checks by the
supervisor on duty. Furthermore if senior management also carry out a
periodic check to ensure that the records have been completed, all faults
notified and passed for rectification and also visits the airfield to check that
everything has been reported, this adds a further reinforcement of the
importance of these tasks.
1.6 Asset management – Un-serviceability reporting and rectification
Asset Management is a structured method that addresses maintenance
responsibilities, ownership of items on the airfield, removal from service and
return to service procedures.
All assets of the airfield should have a clear owner within the organisation.
The owner should be a named individual. The benefits of this process include
clarity of who is responsible for which items, thus preventing possible gaps in
ownership of certain items. This owner is required to ensure that each asset is ;
 Registered with a unique identification
 Levels of serviceability are agreed
 Operating instructions are produced to enable staff to make safe use of
the asset and checks are made that they are followed in practice.
 Training for staff to ensure they are competent – both operators and
maintenance personnel
 A maintenance strategy exists to be carried out by trained and
competent people
 A maintenance inspection regime is in place and is carried out in
accordance with a specified scheme and schedule.
 Access strategy to ensure integrity when out for maintenance
recognising that even vital pieces of equipment need to be off-line for
maintenance.
 A process is in place to agree how modifications should be designed,
authorised and introduced
 Operational time windows should be agreed defining when
maintenance work can occur.
 A clear positive and unambiguous handover process occurs when
assets are taken out and returned to service,
 A works authorisation and control procedure is in place
 Contingency plans to deal with any failures
 Any legal or statutory checks are complied with, including fire
strategies, certification requirements etc
 Safety records are maintained
 Change control process is in place, including subsequent
communication to affected parties.
 Funding for maintenance and capital replacement is acquired.
All the above processes and activities should be recorded and documented.
These are key elements but are no means exhaustive.
1.6.1 Fault Reporting
Fault reporting should be easy to do in order to ensure all observed faults
actually get reported. The process should enable a specific location and
adequate detail to be given to ensure the correct location or piece of equipment
is identified along with the exact nature of the reported fault. Furthermore it
should be possible for those involved in airfield safety to subsequently track
the progress of the rectification work and to be aware when the fault is
completely rectified. This is important when conditions change such as the
onset of darkness or a deterioration in visibility. Historical records should be
kept and these can form a useful database of fault histories.
1.7 Airside Driving, training, use of RTF, apron and manoeuvring area
Driving airside presents a unique set of circumstances to drivers who may
already be experienced drivers on the public roads. Required knowledge
include particularly high awareness and familiarity with aircraft operations.
Medical standards for drivers should be implemented either to the same or a
higher standard than those required for driving on the public roads especially
in terms of visual standards (colour perception and eyesight).
Airport rules need to be widely disseminated, taught and tested in training and
reinforced during day to day operations. At most airports there are 2 levels to
being competent to drive airside – one concerns an ability to drive, handle and
understand the type of vehicle to be driven, and the second is to understand the
geography, layout, rules and procedures for driving safely at your particular
airport. Training should be provided to ensure these requirements are met. A
test should form part of the driver training and only on successful completion
of this should a Driving Permit be issued to an individual.
1.7.1 RTF training
If the driver is required to use the RTF to communicate then training should be
given in the correct use of RTF, standard phraseology etc. If the vehicle is
required to communicate with ATC then more formalised and detailed training
should be given to ensure professional RTF standards are adhered to when
operating amongst aircraft and communicating with ATC. Suggested training
material should include
 Phraseology and transmitting technique
 Local call signs
 Read-back requirements and understanding of clearances
 Radio failure procedures
1.7.2 Apron Areas Driver Training
Training should contain the following
 Regulatory requirements
 Local requirements and procedures
 Personal responsibilities
 Airport layout and organisation, speed limits, parking, height
limitations etc
 Vehicle standards
 Traffic rules
 Low visibility and night time hazards and precautions
 Aircraft and pedestrian hazards
 Driving on aircraft stands
 Security procedures
 Emergency procedures
1.7.3 Manoeuvring Area Driver Training
This requires a further level of knowledge, particularly in driving safely round
the airfield in darkness and in Low Visibility conditions. A detailed
geographical knowledge is required along with a detailed understanding of the
procedures, including proficient use of RTF. The same standards should be
required of all drivers, including airport and emergency services staff.
Details include
 Visual familiarity – runways, helicopter aiming points, signs &
markings, ILS areas etc.
 Formal classroom instruction
 Legal requirements – general and specific to each airport
 Airfield layout and map reading
 Awareness of hazards – jet blast and engine ingestion
 Vehicle requirements – R/T and obstruction lights
 Radio failure procedures
 Light signals
 FOD procedures
 Adverse weather including low visibility procedures, snow, ice &
storms
 Awareness of hazards driving at night
 Emergency procedures
 The dangers of runway incursions
Any third party providers of training should be audited. Refresher training
should be undertaken – a 3 yearly cycle is suggested.
Ideally the number of drivers permitted to drive on the manoeuvring area
should be kept to the minimum. Drivers may require a certain amount of apron
driving experience before being permitted to drive on the manoeuvring area.
A number of runway incursions have been caused by vehicles unintentionally
entering a runway and hence the need for thorough training and excellent
geographical awareness.
1.8 Operation of vehicles airside
Local rules for operating vehicles on the airfield should be widely
promulgated to all users. Requirements should include things such as;
 Airside vehicle permits
 Speed limits in defined areas,
 Vehicle serviceability standards,
 Environmental or emissions standards,
 Parking requirements,
 Livery or markings,
 Requirements for obstruction lights,
 Use of lights in darkness,
 Security of loads,
 The use of taxiway crossings,
 Limitations on the numbers of trailers towed,
 Rules for operating vehicles on stands and around aircraft,



Who has right of way,
Penalties for non-adherence to the rules,
Height restrictions, etc
Specialist vehicles may need variations on the standard rules depending on
their nature. Any non-standard operations will need clearly communicating to
all other road users so they are aware of the situation.
Aircraft tugs are an example of this. Agreed operating procedures need to be
in place and other road users and ATC need to be involved in agreeing such
procedures.
Aircraft tugs require special procedures due to their size, manoeuvrability and
nature of operation moving aircraft on the manoeuvring area.
Typically an aircraft pushback involves at least 2 ground staff.
Requirements may include;
 communication between the tug crew and the flight deck, and between
the tug crew and ATC must be maintained
 coordination of actions must be achieved covering the following points
- application/ release of the aircraft brakes
- ATC permission to pushback
- aircraft engine start
- application/release of aircraft brakes
- tow bar disconnection / raising or lowering of the aircraft if
towbarless tug used, removal of steering pins and gear locks,
tug crew at a safe distance for aircraft to taxi
 Tug drivers should maintain a listening watch on the appropriate ATC
frequency and be capable of clear use of the RT.
Manoeuvring area driving
Airports should have in place a training, licensing and assessment process.
Only those with a justified purpose should be permitted to drive on the
manoeuvring area in order to minimise the overall risks. It is also possible to
require a certain amount of manoeuvring area driving to be completed to
maintain a current permit to drive.
1.9 Vehicle permits – requirements for vehicles
For a vehicle to be granted airside access it is a common requirement for a
permit to be issued. The granting of a permit should require;
 Suitable livery and marking of the vehicle,
 The presence of an obstruction light,
 The inclusion of the vehicle height within the cab visible to the driver
 Proof of the serviceability and maintenance of the vehicle,
 Provision of third party insurance cover to the required level.
1.10 Airside Construction Works - Control of contractors
Construction and heavy maintenance activities need to occur from time to in
airside areas. If aircraft operations are to continue around the site or access is
required through airside areas there are a number of precautions that should be
taken to enhance the safety of the work. It is recommended that a Works
Permit system is used to ensure permissions are recorded and agreed between
the Airport and ATC and briefed to the contractors so they are fully aware of
what they can and cannot do.
An example of a Works Permit form is included in Annex B
Aspects of control may include;
 Unescorted contractor drivers must undergo airside driver training
 Access routes should be agreed to minimise interference with the
operation on the apron.
 Staff access routes should also be agreed and if such a route does not
exist then a risk assessment should be undertaken to ensure access can
be achieved safely.
 Hours of operation should be agreed.
 Service clearance checks should be undertaken before work
commences to ensure cables or pipes are not damaged.
 Suitable site fencing should be installed to protect from jet blast and to
prevent FOD escaping from the site. This should be clearly visible and
lit at night.
 Smoking restrictions should be described and enforced along with any
hot works restrictions (possibly involving a separate hot works permit)
 The use of look-outs and/or a listening watch on the appropriate ATC
frequency may be required, along with suitable training for this task.
 Any cranes are suitably lit and operating heights do not infringe the
protected surfaces.
 Can activity in the site or access to it continue in darkness or in low
visibility conditions? How will contractors know low-vis conditions
have started?
 Do the vehicle traffic levels require changes to the road layout?
 Do vehicles require escorts to cross taxiways to access the site ? In
daylight and darkness? In conditions of reduced visibility ?
 Are taxiway restrictions required? If so lighting and marking of the
taxiways may need to be altered.
 If strong winds are forecast what precautions should be taken to ensure
the site does not generate FOD?
 Do vehicles leaving the site need to be cleaned or washed to prevent
mud being deposited?
In terms of customer service and the availability of facilities a scheduling
process should be in place to ensure that construction works or maintenance
works do not close or restrict too many stands or operational areas at the same
time.
A checklist for establishing works sites and returning them to operational use
is included at Annex C.
Section 3.4 details the assessment and authorisation of cranes and other
obstacles.
1.11 FOD Prevention
Debris on the airfield clearly presents a hazard to aircraft. Education of all
airport staff about the hazard such debris presents is important – ideally this
can be achieved as part of the process to grant staff airside access (issuing an
ID card). Prevention through education is the first step. However it is also
necessary to have a process for regularly clearing parts of the airfield,
especially the apron areas, of rubbish. It should be everyone’s responsibility if
they see any FOD to remove it. Bins should be provided in some areas for
rubbish to be deposited. Specialist teams of staff with sweeper vehicles and
brushes may be required at some airports.
Other measures can help reduce the risks from FOD; these include;
 Ensuring all airlines/handling agents check an aircraft stand prior to the
arrival of the flight
 Installing catch fencing in open areas of the airfield to trap wind-blown
debris such as newspapers and plastic sheeting
 Organising joint airport – airline – handler apron FOD walks to check
for FOD and to identify the source of it.
 Organising campaigns and publicity to remind staff of the dangers
presented by creating FOD
 Ensuring contractors involved in construction projects are aware of the
need to contain all their materials on-site and not allow spillages to
enter the aircraft areas
 Organising a runway/taxiway/stand inspection or sweeping schedule of
suitable frequency
 Analysing items of FOD to identify the likely contributors
 Reviewing items of FOD at Airside Safety Group meetings involving
airlines, handling agents, support companies and aircraft maintenance
organisations.
Airport operators should include aircraft maintenance organisations in their
FOD reviews as tools and chocks have been accidentally left in aircraft which
subsequently fall out and become serious items of FOD.
1.12 Adverse Weather Operations
Adverse weather presents particular difficulties in maintaining the normal
operation, in terms of both runway capacity and safety. Local procedures
should be in place for a controlled and measured response to varying
conditions. Inevitably these procedures may result in a reduction of capacity
but should not result in a reduction of safety.
1.12.1 Snow / ice
When snow and ice occurs on an airfield there are 2 main consequences –
a reduction in surface friction and a covering of surfaces, lighting and
signage. Airports affected by snow should have procedures for clearing
runways taxiways and aprons and de-icing pavements.
Equipment and resources will need to be provided on a scale depending on
the size of the airport and the amount and occurrence of snow and the
required time to re-opening after runway sweeping.
Runway friction readings may be taken after snow removal to check the
effects of the removal and to assist decisions if further treatment is
required. Snow banks should be kept to the sizes specified in Annex 14.
Detailed local procedures are required for the planning, activation and
operation of snow clearing equipment and staff. Typical priorities are to
clear the runway first including any rapid exits, then the taxiways, then the
apron areas. Separate teams can achieve a quicker return to service than a
single team. Safety of both aircraft and staff (especially on the apron areas)
is important. Adequate surface water run-off controls must be in place to
prevent large quantities of pavement and aircraft de-icing fluid reaching
the local rivers or water supplies.
Further details are to be found in ICAO Doc 9137 Airport Services Manual
Part 2 – Pavement Surface Conditions.
Specific activities will vary from airport to airport and are too detailed to
itemise here. General principles include;
 Preparation and planning – equipment availability, staff rosters etc
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Communication of the snow plan to airlines, handlers, ATC etc
setting out what preparation and clearance activities will take place
when different types of weather forecast are received.
Communication of snow warnings when snow is forecast
Identification of snow removal areas / dumping locations
Communication of runway opening estimates to ATC, airlines etc
1.12.2 Strong winds
Strong winds can cause significant disruption to operations on the airfield.
The main hazards are aircraft engine ingestion, airframe damage and
personal injury. A system should be in place to bring to the attention of all
staff any forecast conditions of strong winds. To minimise the hazard it is
good practise for the airport to publish a set of requirements detailing
actions other parties should take upon receipt of strong wind warnings.
These can be graded depending on the forecast wind speed and maximum
gust speeds and should include appropriate restrictions, examples of which
are as follows;
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Use of airbridges for passenger embarkation / deplaning
Secure loose cargo and baggage containers ensuring they are tied down
Additional chocking requirements of parked aircraft
Parked aircraft may need orientating into wind
Waste containers should be securely fastened
Vehicles to have parking brakes set or to be chocked
Arriving aircraft must receive positive chocking communication from
ground crew before releasing parking brake
Restrictions on working at height in maintenance areas
Secure windmilling propellers
Early fuelling of aircraft to increase ballast
Restricting the extension of catering and other scissor lift vehicles
Restrictions on aircraft towing
Aircraft doors not to be opened
Aircraft rubbish to be immediately removed and not left on stand
Suspension of aircraft fuelling
Contractors works areas to be secured
Any items seen being blown by the wind should be reported
immediately
1.12.3 Storms - lightning
Lightning warnings can be issued based on forecasts of lightning in the
area or measurement of actual lightning in the close vicinity of the airport.
If there is a high likelihood of lightning activity the following precautions
can be taken;
- suspension of non-essential activities in open areas
- keeping clear of any tall or metal objects
- restrictions on working at height
- cease aircraft marshalling service
- cease headset communication between tug crew and cockpit
- cease loading and unloading of aircraft
- cease refuelling of aircraft
1.12.4 Low Visibility Procedures
Operations in low visibility were introduced many years ago. Airfield
procedures need to be in place to ensure adequate separation is maintained
between aircraft, vehicles and other users of the airfield since visual
separation involving aircraft cannot be relied upon and certain navigational
aids require additional protective measures. Depending on the visibility,
restrictions may be required to be put in place concerning runway capacity
agreed with ATC. If operations can continue in Category 2 or Category 3
conditions will depend on the availability of suitable navigation aids,
meteorological observations, secondary power supplies and authorised
procedures. Additional restrictions on the airfield may include;
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Physical protection of the ILS (glidepath and localiser)
Possible physical closure of some access routes to the airfield for
vehicles, such as taxiway crossings
Changes to the way taxiway crossings are to be used
Restrictions on vehicles operating on the taxiways, only allowing those
trained to operate under positive ATC R/T control
Restrictions on the towing of aircraft in certain areas
Restrictions on the types of work and areas of the airfield where
contractors or maintenance staff can work
In order to maintain capacity it is preferable to take some preparatory
actions for operations in low visibility before the actual weather conditions
deteriorate. Thus when visibility does drop further there is no time wasted
in establishing LVPs.
Detailed steps to be taken will depend on many local factors at each
airport, such as runway geometry, lighting systems, ATC facilities etc.
To advise drivers of vehicles of the onset of these procedures it may be
necessary to activate a number of signs around the airfield to advise them,
or have a radio based method of notification both for activation and deactivation of these procedures
1.12.5 Aircraft de-icing
Aircraft de-icing is often carried out by airlines or their handling agents to
specific standards identified by control authorities such as national aviation
authorities. These typically cover product approval, methods of application
and holdover times. Airports need to cater for this activity and provide
facilities such as space or areas for de-icing, including fluid capture or
treatment. Some airports collect and recycle the used fluid.
Preventative steps must be taken to ensure large quantities of fluid do not enter
the local rivers or contaminate water courses. This may be done through the
designation of certain areas for de-icing aircraft or defining how the task will
be undertaken.
1.13 Promulgation of information, local airport instructions to users
Procedures should be established to enable the dissemination of aeronautical
information to users. NOTAMs including temporary restrictions due to snow
clearance, low visibility conditions or works in progress may need to be
issued. Other mechanisms may be appropriate for local dissemination such as
using ATC to broadcast on ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service).
An effective method of communicating local rules or instructions to airport
users is required. Temporary changes to procedures, road layouts, apron
changes etc need to be communicated to relevant users. This can take the form
of separate notices or instructions circulated electronically to users as and
when required, or one large manual that is updated whenever there are
changes. This should be widely available to all airport users.
A suggested list of subjects is as follows;
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Aircraft blast hazards
Aircraft arrival and departure from stand
Stand Entry Guidance/ Marshalling
Airbridges
Fixed Electrical Ground Power
Minimum H&S Induction Training for Staff Operating Airside
FOD
Disposal of Waste
The Handling and Storage of Hazardous Materials
Spillages
Aircraft Fuelling
Accident Reporting
No Smoking Airside
Adverse Weather – snow plan, ice, strong winds etc
Low Visibility Operations
Pre winter awareness and preparation
Airside Driving, Operation of Vehicles Airside Vehicle Standards
Engine Ground Running Safety
Maintenance of Aircraft on Stand
Aircraft Recovery
Radio Communications
ATC Communications
Helicopter Operations
Procedures for Working Airside
Procedures for the approval of crane operations at or near the airport
Aerodrome development procedures (safeguarding)
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Safety of Passengers on the Apron
Aircraft Turnround Monitoring
1.14 Emergency and Contingency planning
Effective contingency planning for all eventualities will result in better
coordination between the various organisations when they are required to be
put into practise. Airports should coordinate all the emergency services and
practice the activity in an exercise periodically. ATC, Airport Fire Service,
airlines, ground handlers, Police, local Fire Service and Ambulance Services
should be involved in addition to many aspects of the airport management –
not least including the media / Public Affairs teams and passenger support
teams in the terminals. Agreed categories of response should be identified and
simple action sheets itemised for staff on duty from each organisation
involved. These can be distributed to those involved in a set of instructions,
typically called “Emergency Orders” or similar.
Categories of incident may include amongst others;
 Aircraft accident
 Aircraft accident imminent
 Aircraft ground incident
 Local Standby
 Bomb warnings
 Domestic fires
Local rendezvous points should be agreed with safe procedures for access to
all parts of the airfield with the minimum of delay. These should be clearly
signed and marked and kept clear at all times.
A reliable activation and communication process is needed to rapidly ensure
all relevant parties are informed as soon as possible, including basic
information about the incident.
Contingency planning for major incidents should include consideration of how
the airport will continue to operate whilst the incident is dealt with.
It is good practise to carry out regular exercises to test all these procedures
with all the organisations involved.
1.15 Airside Security
Most airports have existing security staff to meet the requirements of national
Governments. Airside Operations teams can work together with security staff
in a number of ways –
 Perimeter fence inspections can be carried out by Airside Operations
staff whilst carrying out airfield patrols.
 Detection of any intruders can be reported to security
 The presence of any birds close to the airfield can be reported to
Airside Operations by Security.
2. Apron Safety
2.1 Apron layout and markings.
The safety of the operation on an apron area can be enhanced if the area is planned
from the start with adequate space. However many airports develop over time and
do not have the luxury of adequate planning from day 1. Some guidance is given
in ICAO Annex 14. Factors in apron layout design include the clearances around
the aircraft, airside roads, clearways and vehicle parking space.
Apron markings should differentiate between those meant for vehicles and those
for aircraft – aircraft guidance markings are a solid yellow line. Vehicle markings
can be in white or red. The use of colour can help differentiate the purpose of
markings – for example passenger walkways or evacuation routes may be in
green, vehicle parking areas in red, no parking areas hatched and aircraft guidance
lines in yellow. Particular markings to indicate no parking in areas such as the
airbridge movement area, or around fuel hydrants may be useful.
2.2 Apron installations – fuel hydrants, FEGP, PCA, etc
Various services may be installed on an apron in preference to mobile services.
These can commonly include
 Fuel hydrants
 Fixed electrical ground power
 Pre Conditioned Air
Other services such as the movement of baggage, water supplies etc are possible
but remain relatively uncommon.
Fuel hydrants offer improvements to the aircraft turnaround process and can
deliver greater volumes of fuel than vehicle tankers. The cost and benefits of such
a system will however have to be evaluated specifically at each airport given the
traffic levels etc. Awareness of the hoses and electrical connectors should form a
part of apron safety training and efforts should be made to highlight them visually
to reduce the chances of accidental contact. Emergency fuel cut-off switches
should be provided and clearly signed at the head of stand.
Fixed electrical ground power (400Hz) is often provided at airports and is a costeffective alternative to stand alone generators, in addition to the environmental
benefits. Supplying the cable to the aircraft can be done in 2 ways – either via
underground pits, offering the cable close to the aircraft, or running the cable on
lengths of transporter on wheels from a storage area at the head of stand.
Whichever method is used it is good practice to store the cable away after each
use to reduce the risk of damage to it.
Pre Conditioned Air is an alternative to APU running to cool or heat the cabin of
parked aircraft, saving on fuel burn and reducing noise and emissions. It is
installed at some airports particularly where the climate is hot. Hoses used for the
air supply to the aircraft should be highly visible when extended out to the aircraft
to avoid accidental damage by vehicles or being a tripping hazard to staff.
If the airport provides these facilities then it will be necessary to produce training
material for users to be trained in the safe, correct and proper use of this
equipment.
2.3 Aircraft guidance systems – visual docking guidance
Stopping an aircraft in the correct location to enable the airbridge and various
services to successfully connect to it requires some guidance. ICAO Annex 14
refers. The basic elements involved are to provide left/right guidance and stopping
position guidance. The calculation of the aircraft stopping position needs to take
into account
 the movement envelope of the airbridge (if provided)
 the location of the fuel hydrants and length of hose available
 the location of any other fixed services (eg FEGP)
 the space required around the aircraft for apron servicing
 clearance from the taxiway
Clearly the aircraft type itself is a key factor and details will need to be established
of the pilots eye position in order for this to be the basis of the overall aircraft
stopping position.
Many different systems are in use around the world and it is recommended that
details of the systems in use at your airport are published to users.
Systems include simple marshalling to a nosewheel stopping position, AGNIS and
PAPA, and radar based electronic parking aids that detect the aircraft and offer
stopping guidance to the pilot on a display ahead.
Whichever system is used there remains a need to keep it up to date with airline
fleet changes.
2.4 Operation of airbridges, training, permits, audits
Airbridges are unusual pieces of equipment to enable passengers to transfer from
the terminal to a variety of aircraft types under cover. The operation of the
airbridge requires special training in order for it to be safely operated. It is
recommended that operators receive training, theoretical and practical, followed
by a test and successful demonstration in order to receive a permit for that type of
airbridge.
Training should include
 Manoeuvring, steering, and speed of operation
 Approach to the aircraft
 Setting the autoleveller
 Security procedures concerning any doors
 Backing off the aircraft
 Correct parking
 Emergency procedures
Training can be provided by the airport directly or given by third party companies
including handling agents. If other organisations deliver training then audits of the
training should be carried out. If new airbridges or models with different controls
are installed then suitable training material and perhaps specific permits will need
to be introduced.
An example of an airbridge check form is at Annex D.
An example of an airbridge operator audit form is at Annex E.
2.5 Airside roads markings and signs
Road markings and signs should as far as possible replicate those used on the
public roads. This will ensure driver familiarity and reduce the chances of
misunderstandings.
Markings should remain in good condition to ensure they are visible to all road
users in all conditions – especially at night. Signage should similarly be provided
to agreed standards. Checks should be undertaken from time to time to ensure
adequacy, check that no confusing signs have appeared or sightlines blocked and
that paint markings remain in good condition. Signs should be provided of an
adequate size and placed in good locations with clear lines of visibility to those
expected to see them.
Particular care should be taken when establishing temporary road diversions or
alternative road layouts. Clear new signage should be used and any redundant
paint markings should be blacked out or removed. The changes should be widely
promulgated to all road users in advance – especially if any lower vehicle height
restrictions are introduced.
2.6 Apron control and stand allocation
The apron is a complex area of often intense activity as many different
organisations attempt to turn an aircraft around in a limited space. Good apron
management will contribute towards reducing the hazards. This involves
allocating aircraft to stands to ensure there is sufficient clearance between the
aircraft and other aircraft, vehicles or buildings. To achieve this and meet
customer requirements it is common for airports to have an agreed process for
allocating stands. The safety aspects of this involve ensuring that aircraft can only
be allocated to stands that are large enough to accommodate them with the
required margins. Similarly to ensure safety it is necessary to know when aircraft
arrive and depart from each stand. The exact “rules” or preferences for which
flights use which stands will depend on local agreements and passenger service
targets often linked to facilities or preferred areas within the terminal. If a plan can
be produced ahead of time based on the schedule or updated details this can assist
in making best use of the pier served or jetty served stands available. Systems can
vary from simple maps allocating aircraft to stands “by hand” to computerised
resource allocation tools in more complex situations.
Procedures and communications with interested parties will be needed to close
and re-open stands for planned maintenance work due to incidents or spillages.
Often the Apron Control systems provide the main computerised output to Flight
Information Displays and other public information services.
Low cost operators may have different needs and prefer lesser facilities with quick
turnround times.
2.7 Apron cleanliness
Keeping the apron clean from FOD is an important aspect of housekeeping and
preventing FOD damage to tyres and engines. All apron staff of all companies
should be expected to remove and dispose of small items of FOD found on the
apron. FOD bins can be an effective part of this process but they then need
emptying periodically. Aircraft stands should be inspected before the arrival of
aircraft. In addition to these procedures it may be necessary to sweep the stands,
airside roads and equipment areas to remove all debris. This can be done by
dedicated staff, contractors using specialist vehicles or by brushes operated by
hand. Equipment manufacturers create specialist vehicles that offer a variety of
sizes and methods to remove FOD from the apron. Particular care and attention
should be given to works sites and contractors compounds. Joint airline – airport –
handling agent FOD audits should be undertaken to jointly check the amount of
FOD on the apron areas and also to jointly try to identify the sources of it.
At some airports a published process of implementing penalties is used if
companies or staff do not maintain a FOD free area after first having the FOD
pointed out to them. Various levels of financial penalties or other action are in use.
FOD should also be a standing agenda item on the Airside Safety Committee to
ensure its importance is not forgotten.
2.8 Aircraft fuelling, including spillage procedures, defuelling
Photo Keith Brooks
Fuelling procedures for aircraft are technical and detailed. Fuelling can occur from
bowsers or from a hydrant system. At modern airports with a hydrant system it is
prudent to ensure that some bowser capacity is retained as this will be required if
it becomes necessary to defuel an aircraft for any reason.
The key points include;
 Someone should be nominated as in overall charge of the refuelling
process
 Fuelling zones of 6m should be established around all filling and
venting points in use on the aircraft and vehicle
 The aircraft should be chocked
 All hoses etc used in fuelling should be electrically bonded
 Personnel should not be able to generate sources of ignition
accidentally
 Equipment used should be intrinsically safe
 Escape routes for staff, passengers and vehicles should be free of
obstruction.
 Aircraft APUs should not be started during refuelling
If passengers are on board during refuelling the following precautions are
necessary
 The Captain, Engineer and Airport Authority should be made aware
 Aircraft emergency chute deployment areas should be clear of
obstructions if no airbridge is used
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The aircraft internal “no smoking” and “exit” signs must be
illuminated
Cabin aisles and emergency exits must be kept clear
Passengers should be advised
Adequate numbers of cabin staff must be present to assist with an
evacuation
Communication should exist between the flight deck and the fueller in
charge.
Fuelling activities should be included in apron safety awareness training for all
staff and especially in driver training to make staff aware of the risks associated
with the high pressure hoses delivering fuel into aircraft from the hydrants and the
presence of the electrical bonding wire.
Fuelling with passengers on board the aircraft may require additional fire service
cover.
Spillages from fuelling can occur and a procedure to absorb the spilt fuel followed
by proper disposal should be devised. At some airports it is possible to wash the
fuel into the drainage system but at others an absorbent material needs to be used
to soak up the fuel and ensure correct disposal. A requirement should exist for
those involved to report all spillages to the relevant authorities and the airport.
2.9 Aircraft marshalling
An aircraft marshalling service should be available to aircraft on request. Standard
ICAO marshalling signals can be found in various national and international
documents. A set of marshalling signals are included in a Visual Aids Handbook
produced by the UK CAA – details are in the References section 5.
Marshalling training can be provided by the airport or third party companies.
Adequate training and competency checks should be given to ensure staff remain
current. Note that different signals are required for helicopter marshalling.
Aircraft are permitted at some airports to “power-back” or self manoeuvre without
the use of a push-back tug. In permitting this type of operation a number of factors
will need to be considered in the risk assessment;
 jet-blast or propeller blast
 noise levels
 communication with other users that a powerback is about to take
place (especially if there is a tail of stand road)
 manoeuvring space
Marshalling signals should be performed at a steady pace and should not become
stylised with local variations from the standard. Illuminated marshalling wands
are available for marshalling in darkness.
If sight lines from the approaching aircraft become obstructed during a manoeuvre
then consideration should be given for 2 man marshalling to ensure continuity of
safe guidance is maintained.
2.10 Incident reporting
When incidents occur in Airside areas there needs to be procedures and processes
in place to ;
 deal with aftermath of the incident.
 report and record all the pertinent details of the incident to enable
subsequent investigation (See para 2.11)
These steps include procedures to ensure
 Emergency services attendance,
 establishing safe temporary closures of the area affected,
 cleaning up and returning to service,
 communication with other airfield users
Ideally there should be a widely known telephone number or radio reporting
method for everyone involved in, or witnessing an incident. A single central
telephone number should be used that is easily remembered. There should be a
clear requirement on everyone working airside to report incidents in a timely
manner. Accidents, incidents and near-misses should all be reported. All incidents
should be responded to in a positive manner taking each report seriously. Clearly
at the reporting stage there should be no allocation of blame – dealing with the
aftermath and identifying the cause are the key activities at this stage.
The staff receiving these calls should have “action sheets” or other system to
record the call details and subsequent actions for them to take such as notifying
the Fire Service, Airfield Operations etc. Staff should attend the scene to record
all details and if possible take photographs- see para 2.11.
At some airports an automatic computerised notification system is in place,
relaying key incident details over a computer network to interested parties.
Once the immediate needs of the people involved have been dealt with the more
detailed report should be completed. This should include all relevant details in
order to enable a full investigation which can identify the root cause of the
incident. To assist this process the full details of all incidents should be recorded
on a database which enables queries and detailed analysis.
2.11 Incident investigation and analysis – costs, hotspots, trends, causes
Individual incidents should be investigated in order to correctly identify the root
cause or causes. The purpose of doing this is to aid prevention of future possible
incidents. Often there can be a number of factors that all combined at the same
time to cause the incident. These can be, for example;
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Misunderstood communication
Poor signs or markings
Poor training of those involved
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Trained staff not acting in a way they were trained to
Too infrequent refresher training
Poor equipment / mechanical condition / mechanical failure
Tasks with inadequate resources being carried out too quickly
Failure to use PPE
Inadequate risk assessment
Laziness
Inadequate response to changing circumstances
On a periodic basis an analysis of all incidents that have taken place should be
undertaken. A database should contain all details of accidents, incidents and nearmisses. A classification system of incident types may be used but there are many
different systems in use. A common one is to describe the collision such as
“vehicle- vehicle” or “vehicle – aircraft”. To gain the fullest picture all incidents
should be included including personal injuries, damage to vehicles, equipment and
aircraft. Classifications can also be used to denote the seriousness of incidents.
Investigative trend analysis can be completed, analysing the databases in a number
of ways which may include by;
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Airline
Handling agent
Stand number / Location
Time of day / night
Staff trained in the task they were doing?
Staff within date of refresher training requirements?
Aircraft type / vehicle type / equipment type
Years of airside experience
Type of incident – eg slips or trips, falls from height, jet-blast, baggage
loader contacting aircraft fuselage etc
The use of this data is for prevention. Understanding what has gone wrong in the
past enables steps to be taken to prevent their recurrence in the future.
The data will reveal the magnitude of the problem, determine overall costs of
incidents, analyse trends to direct future preventative actions, and pinpoint
particular areas of tasks that are “high risk”. Trends in any of the above factors
will point to aspects that are in need of review and providing trend data to all
airside companies collectively will give incident prevention a high profile. This
will be enhanced even further if companies can provide indicative costs of
incidents including not only repair costs but also aircraft downtime or delay costs
and staff sickness / costs of overtime providing staff cover.
Analysis can be presented in a number of ways;
 “Hot-spot” maps of incident locations
 Graphs of numbers of incidents by month
 Graphs of each type of incident by month
 Graphs of incidents factored per 1,000 aircraft movements or per 10,000.
Note the Apron Safety Survey conducted by ACI each November from member
airports reveals trends and illustrates ways in which data can be collected and
presented.
2.12 Aircraft turnround process and audits
The aircraft turnround process is the key activity on the apron. It is where the
aircraft, many vehicles and staff from different organisations come together in a
time pressured and constrained space.
In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive have produced a document HSG 209
“Aircraft Turnround” which focuses on the requirement for the turnround to be a
coordinated activity involving all companies.
There are a number of software systems that assist in planning and real-time
allocation of staff to tasks involved in the turnround process which can highlight
potential conflicts.
To proactively monitor the turnround process and adherence to procedures a
simple step is to sample a number of turnrounds per day and record the findings.
This can be completed by video or by completing a check-sheet whilst observing
the turnround process. An example of such a sheet is at Annex F.
Overall scores can be given and averages built up for different companies over
time. Common themes might reveal areas worthy of refresher training focus.
2.13 Passenger evacuation procedures – terminal and aircraft
Passengers may need to be evacuated from aircraft at any time and also
passengers or staff from buildings, terminals etc. To reduce the hazards in these
time-constrained activities involving a large number of people an evacuation plan
should exist.
This should include designated evacuation routes from buildings into safe areas on
the apron. Both routes and safe areas must be kept clear of equipment and other
obstructions at all times to enable their safe use by passengers who will not be in
familiar surroundings. Ideally they should be well signposted or painted on the
ground.
Procedures for dealing with the evacuation of aircraft should be covered in the
Airport Emergency Procedures. Should an evacuation occur staff should muster
passengers in a safe area away from and upwind of the aircraft until the
Emergency Services arrive.
2.14 Hazardous materials
Hazardous materials can be safely carried in aircraft holds. The Emergency
Services should be able to obtain from the airline’s cargo manifest particulars of
materials carried on a specific flight. Further details can be found in the IATA
Ground Handling Manual.
Airport Emergency Services will require suitable Personal Protective Equipment
to deal with aircraft damage incidents involving modern composites increasingly
used in aircraft construction. These man-made mineral fibres (MMMF) pose
specific hazards which require thick protection and masks.
3. Airside Safety
3.1 Protection of navigation aids
Key aids to navigation need to be protected to ensure their continued reliable
operation. This is particularly the case if bad weather can occur – fog, heavy rain,
low cloudbase, falling snow etc can all reduce visibility into “instrument”
conditions. Examples of equipment include;
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ILS localiser and glidepath aerials
ILS sensitive areas
IRVR transmissometers
On airfield VORs or other beacons
The exact protection required will vary on the precise location of the equipment.
The general principles involve;
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keeping vehicles, contractors and other airport staff away from the facility
providing warning signs, markings or lights at the edge of the sensitive
area to prevent accidental intrusion in to the sensitive areas
providing clear surface markings or fences (that do not interfere with the
facility itself)
physically placing temporary barriers across certain routes
roads and access routes should be planned to stay clear of such facilities
procedures exist to ensure snow clearing vehicles, sweeping vehicles or
grass cutting vehicles do not infringe the areas without permission and
coordination with Air Traffic Control.
3.2 Runway incursions
Runway incursions present one of the greatest aviation hazards with potentially
very serious consequences. A number of serious fatal accidents have occurred
around the world resulting from runway incursions.
In recognition of the seriousness and growing frequency of runway incursions a
number of years ago the FAA and Eurocontrol began a concerted industry wide
review to seek to reduce the numbers of runway incursions. This work in Europe
gave rise to the Eurocontrol “European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway
Incursions” which involved many industry sectors. This is available on the
Eurocontrol website:
www.eurocontrol.int/runwaysafety/public/standard_page/EuropeanAction.html
The conclusion was that a local Runway Safety Team should be established at
each airport. Further details can be found in the Eurocontrol Action Plan.
Recommendations were made relating to;
 Aerodrome operators
 Aircraft operators
 Air Navigation Service Providers
 Communications
 Regulators
 Data collection and lesson sharing
3.3 Runway Friction Measurement (maintenance and testing)
Runway friction is a key aspect of aircraft performance on landing or departure.
Newly built or surfaced runways should have a design specification to achieve
high friction. Once in use friction can deteriorate due to use, rubber build up or
contamination by materials such as ice, snow or sand.
Thus there are 2 reasons for measuring friction –
- trend monitoring of the runway surface over time
- to check instantaneous friction values in periods of snow or ice.
Friction should be measured periodically to ensure the friction value remains
acceptable and resurfacing or treatment is considered when the value is low.
Friction should also be measured when ice or snow is present to enable operations
to continue. After the surface is cleared measurements should be made to ensure
the effectiveness of the clearing operation.
There are various different types of friction measurement devices in use around
the world. Measurement may involve straightforward use of the equipment
between aircraft movements or may involve a calibrated application of water
ahead of the measurement device to obtain standardised readings for a wet
runway.
Results from friction measurement should be retained to reveal trend information
over time and to identify any particular areas requiring attention – for example
rubber deposits in the touch down zones.
Further details are to be found in ICAO Doc 9137 Airport Services Manual Part 2
– Pavement Surface Conditions.
3.4 Aerodrome safeguarding – prevention and identification of obstacles –
cranes
ICAO has defined surfaces around a runway which should be kept free of
obstructions. Details can be found in Annex 14.
These surfaces should be protected from developments that may infringe them.
To achieve this a safeguarding or checking process is needed that captures
applications for new developments in the relevant areas with the relevant height
details. Checks can then be made to ensure proposed new buildings do not
infringe the protected surfaces. Clearly it is far easier to resolve these issues at the
planning stage than after construction has started.
During construction of new buildings it is possible that cranes will be used and
these may be erected to a height greater than the finished building, even if only
temporarily. To ensure this is not the case a process should be established to check
crane operating heights during on-airport construction and under the protected
surfaces. Crane heights should also be checked at the planning stage of new
buildings as outlined in the process above. In addition crane operating heights
should be checked during construction to ensure things have not changed resulting
in the crane operating at a height greater than planned. Cranes if erect in the hours
of darkness should also be lit with red obstruction lights.
To assist in this process it is often worthwhile if airports contact and educate crane
operating companies about the requirements for operating cranes in the vicinity of
airports.
Some airports use a Crane Permit system that gives authorisation for cranes to
operate up to a specific height in a specific location. An example of a crane permit
form is attached at Annex G.
Surveys may need to be undertaken periodically to ensure the safeguarding
process outlined above is functioning and also to monitor tree growth to ensure
the surfaces are not penetrated. These surveys should cover the areas within the
protected surfaces.
3.5 Wildlife hazards
Wildlife around airports can present serious hazards to aircraft operations. The
most obvious of these is the presence of birds but other animals such as deer,
foxes and other mammals can present a hazard.
Adequate fencing around the airside areas is fundamental to keeping mammals off
the airfield.
Birds present a hazard to aircraft in flight. Birdstrikes with civil aircraft have
resulted in the death of over 250 people to date. Clearly it is impossible to
guarantee no birdstrikes will occur but there are a number of activities an airport
can undertake to reduce the probability of this happening.
These include;
 Collecting accurate information on all birdstrikes that occur, including
details of the species involved
 Observations of bird species and bird behaviour both on the airport and in
the surrounding areas
 Identifying the hazard presented by each species by carrying out a species
based risk assessment
 Prioritising efforts towards the most hazardous species
The largest hazard is clearly presented by large birds that fly in flocks.
Practical steps that can be taken to reduce the attractiveness of an area to birds
include;
 Cutting the grass so it does not provide invertebrates but not too short that
it provides a resting area
 Ensuring no new water features or refuse tips are placed around the airport
that might generate hazardous flightlines across aircraft arrival or
departure routes
 Not providing perches, ledges or other structures favourable to roosting
flocks of birds



Placing nets or other systems over water features to prevent access
If raptors or hawks are present ensure there are not rabbits or mice
attracting them to feed
Ensuring no bushes or shrubs are planted as part of airport landscaping that
produce berries which might attract birds.
In addition to the habitat management steps outlined above it is good practise to
have a bird detection and dispersal team on duty whose role is to detect and
disperse any birds seen on the airfield. This may involve the use of bird distress
calls, shell-crackers or “bangers” and potentially shooting if the other methods do
not deter the birds adequately. Accurate logging of all bird species, numbers,
location and behaviours is essential.
Further guidance is available in the ACI Wildlife Hazard Manual (2005)
3.6 Airside Safety Committee
An Airside Safety Committee should be hosted by the airport periodically to
review safety in the airside areas. The Committee should consist of airlines,
handling agents, aircraft catering companies, aircraft cleaning companies,
refuelling companies, ATC – ideally all large organisations that operate in airside
areas.
The Terms of Reference should include;
 The promotion of safety awareness through training, licensing and the
publication of safety bulletins
 Establishing and discussing local safety procedures and guidelines
 Incident reporting and investigation, subsequent data analysis and
dissemination of trends, common causes etc
 Generation and evaluation of safety suggestions
 Preparation of regular joint safety campaigns.
The atmosphere of the group should be an open one to maximise the learning
about improving safety. It is suggested meetings are held either monthly or
quarterly.
3.7 Airside Safety Promotion
Safety will benefit from being promoted in an airport environment. Occasional
focus on some particular aspect will make it more memorable and reinforce the
continual importance of safety. Collaboration to promote positive safety attitudes
across all organisations working airside is essential.
An ideal opportunity to promote a safety culture is in training when staff are new
to the airport. Clear safety messages concerning their responsibilities to
themselves and to others will set the scene well. Following procedures and
carrying out tasks in the ways they have been trained is an important message to
push at the start.
Ideally on the apron everyone who works there should feel able to point out shortcuts or examples of bad practise to anyone else working improperly.
“Roadshows” or safety promotional vehicles could be used to tour the airside
areas and rest rooms or staff restaurants to bring to the attention of ramp staff the
latest safety message.
The annual ACI Safety Survey of members airports provides statistics that can be
used in safety promotions.
3.8 Stakeholders - Interface with ATC, with operators, with project teams,
A close working relationship at a professional level between the various duty
managers of organisations such as ATC, the airport, control authorities and any
based-airlines is vital. This should be an on-going continual process and ideally
involve joint meetings each day. In such circumstances individuals dealing with
an incident will be able to work together much more effectively.
When major developments occur in Airside areas then Project Managers can be
introduced to that forum to deal directly with any issues arising from the activities
of the other organisations.
Companies providing services on the airport to airlines such as aircraft cleaning
and catering may be present on the airfield purely due to history, having been
there for many years, or they may be appointed as a result of a tender or
qualification process. To that end it is good practise to set out to the companies
operating airside the requirements from the airport. These requirements may
include;
 A requirement for the company to document and implement its own Safety
Management Plan covering all safety aspects of its operation
 A requirement for all staff to be properly trained to carry out the tasks
expected of them
 Compliance with airport notices / directions / safety alerts
 Keeping up to date with legislation
 A named safety manager is appointed to oversee all matters of training,
maintenance of equipment
 The company will co-operate in the implementation of airport wide safety
programmes
 Provide a safe, efficient and high quality service without disruption to the
operation of the airport
 Allow access to documents
 Participate in regular joint inspections of service areas with the Airport
 Conduct risk assessments
 Ensure clean and tidy storage and proper disposal of materials
 Notify the airport of any particular hazards
 Ensure hazardous materials are properly stored and labelled.
 Ensure all plant and equipment is adequately and safely stored in adverse
weather conditions.
These third party safety processes can be used in a number of ways;
 In a contractual relationship between the supplier and the airport
 As a transparent process enabling comparison of different companies
compliance with each element.
 As an assessment process for future contractual awards.
3.9 Engine run-ups
Engine testing is handled in many different ways at different airports. Key factors
include if there is a maintenance organisation based at the airport and also the
proximity of nearby residential areas.
Engine testing may be limited for environmental reasons to;
 Only low power tests at night with a maximum duration per run and a
maximum total duration for each night
 Only to occur in specific acoustic enclosures at night
 Only to occur in remote parts of the airfield at night
 Only to aircraft needed for an early morning departure the next day
Safety aspects of engine tests include
 Having a wing-man on the ground to ensure no third parties encounter the
jet blast – a “lookout”. Two wing men may be needed in busy situations.
 Continuous contact with ATC whilst the run takes place
 Permission from the airport operator to carry out a run
 Assessment of the wind speed and direction
 If balancing thrust is needed from other engines on the other wing
 Use of anti-collision and navigation lights when the run occurs
 Use of cones or other physical deterrents around the aircraft to improve
safety
 Checking for FOD in the area concerned before the run takes place, both in
front and behind of the aircraft
 Ensuring the aircraft brakes are applied
 Ensuring engine blast does not present a hazard to any nearby staff
3.10 Special flights
Procedures should be in place to deal with flights of an unusual nature. These may
include;
 Outsize cargo flights
 Royal flights, VIP flights, Government Ministers, State Visits etc
 Ammunition or firearms flights
 Military flights
 Flights shipping specialist livestock such as racehorses
 Helicopter flights
These should ideally be planned some time in advance involving all the handling
companies, ATC, control authorities etc to understand the specific requirements of
the flight and to ensure all unusual matters are identified and planned.
Factors to consider include;
 Any special approach procedures









Aircraft routeing from the runway
Aircraft parking place
Access airside for any third parties not normally airside
Vehicular routes
Marshalling requirements
Specialist cargo handling facilities
Spacing from other activities
Other aircraft arrival or departure routes affected
Involvement of Public Affairs teams to handle media interest
3.11 Aircraft recovery
Contingency plans need to be drawn up to handle an incident where a disabled
aircraft needs to be moved. This can involve a relatively simple task such as an
aircraft with deflated tyres to a full accident recovery requiring lifting and moving
of large aircraft. Often this can be a time-pressured situation as the re-opening of
the airfield can depend on the timely removal of the aircraft.
To assist in this process it is beneficial if detailed layout drawings are available of
the airport showing the locations of electricity cables underground, telecoms
wires, network cables, fuel pipes, water pipes, fire mains, airfield lighting circuits
etc. These can be important considerations in dealing with the recovery.
Depending on the size of the aircraft anticipated to be moved and the recovery
equipment available it can be useful to carry out aircraft recovery exercises.
The benefits of this include;
 Staff familiarity with specialist equipment that is rarely used
 Increased experience in team-work with the airlines and their insurers
 Testing of communications protocols with other organisations involved
 Practical understanding of how to move the aircraft and where to park it
 Availability of cranes and other heavy equipment and locating them airside
 Experience with chains, pulling gear and aircraft tugs in moving the
aircraft
The recovery process will involve liaison with the airline and its insurers and will
also require permission from Accident Investigators. Close liaison with the Police
will also be necessary.
Key aspects of aircraft recovery include
 The exact location and height of the aircraft. This may necessitate redeclaring distances for aircraft operations to continue from a reduced
runway length.
 The recovery can only begin once the passengers have left the aircraft
and the accident investigators give permission for the aircraft to be
moved.
 The airlines insurers need to give permission
 It may be necessary to provide matting or a temporary road surface to
either enable the aircraft to power out of the grass or for a tug to pull it
out.




It may be necessary to offload cargo and bags in-situ before the
recovery commences. How will this be achieved ?
De-fuelling may be necessary -are there sufficient empty containers or
bowsers available at the airport to enable this to happen ?
Flat-bed trucks may be required to transport parts of the aircraft
Sweepers may then be necessary to clean the area afterwards
Annex A
AIRFIELD OPERATIONS COMPETENCY RECORDS
AIRCRAFT MARSHALLING
Date:
Day/Night:
Marshaller:
Auditor:
Aircraft Type:
Stand:
Weather:
s - satisfactory
n/s - not satisfactory
n/a - not applicable
PART ONE - PREPARATION FOR THE MANOEUVRES
PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF AIRCRAFT
1
Timely arrival of Marshaller
s
3
FOD if any removed
yes
5
Parking of vehicles/equipmnt s
7
Are SEG’s used to assist
yes
9
PPE worn? Hi-vis, feet, ears?
yes
n/s
no
n/s
no
no
2
4
6
8
10
Stand size limitation check
Parking of adjacent aircraft
Position of Airbridge
Position of personnel
Surface condition check
12
14
16
Manoeuvre planned?
Adequate wingtip clearance
Assistance from 2nd marshaller
yes
s
s
s
yes
no
n/s
n/s
n/s
no
PART TWO - THE AIRCRAFT MANOEUVRE
MARSHALLING OF AIRCRAFT
11 Aircraft recognition
s
13 Awareness of blast/downwash
yes
15 Aircraft parked into wind
yes
17 Marshaller visible to pilot at all times
n/s
no
no
yes
s
yes
yes
no
no
n/s
n/a
no
PART THREE - MARSHALLING REQUIREMENTS
RULES AND REGULATIONS
18 Local instructions understood
s
n/s
19
Correct equipment used
20 Standard ICAO signals used – not too stylised, correct speed, clarity of intention
s
s
n/s
n/s
PART FOUR - FOLLOW ME PROCEDURES
FOLLOW ME PROCEDURES FOR AIRCRAFT/VEHICLES
21 Correct leader vehicle speed
s
n/s
22
23 Appropriate RTF used
s
n/s
24
GENERAL COMMENTS / FURTHER ACTIONS AGREED
Correct “follow me” message
Appropriate driving style
yes
s
no
n/s
Annex
AIRFIELD WORKS PERMIT No.
Ops Duty Manager, Airfield Operations,
Building 497, West Park,
Gatwick Airport Ltd, Gatwick Airport, West sussex RH6 ONP
TEL > 01293 50 3085 OR OPS CONTROL EXT 3090
START DATE
FINISH DATE
DESCRIPTION OF WORKS
TIME
TIME
CONTRACTOR / DEPARTMENT
Works to be conducted as per works schedule
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
DO NOT obstruct Aircraft / Vehicle movement
CLOSE
STAND
Withdraw as necessary to allow aircraft to pass
TAXIWAY NONE
Beware of aircraft blast
BLOCK
Be prepared to clear at short notice
OTHER
Work only within coned area
SITE MARKINGS
Leader in attendance when working outside coned area.
RT CALLSIGN
Men to proceed on foot with handtools only
ACCESS ROUTE
Site to be cleared at cessation of work
VEHICLE
EQUIP PARKING
(Backfill Trenches, Remove spoil etc)
None
EQUIPMENT TO
BE USED
Mark working area at cessation of work
NONE
NONE
NONE
HOIST
NO workwithin 47.5M of TAXIWAY
OTHER DETAILS
NO vehicle parking within 47.5M of TAXIWAY
Dedicated LOOKOUT or RT man Required
LOW VIZ RESTRICTIONS
Work only outside clear & graded area.
NONE
NONE
Remain CLEAR of ILS restricted areas as per
PARA 12 of Safety Instructions
HOT WORKS
YES
NO
DO NOT ENTER ILS restricted areas without
permission of ATC / TELS
Maintain listening watch on GMC 121.8 OR
TOWER 124.22
No work if RUNWAY
26L / 08R
No work if RUNWAY
26R / 08L
ATC
Initials
metres
No equipment / CRANES above
TIME
1ST SITE VISIT
B 2ND SITE VISIT
INITIALS
ODM
Initials
A/OPS
Initials
TIME
ISSUED
Contractor
Initials
Annex C
WORK SITE CHECKLIST
DATE: ………………..TIME: …………………WORK PERMIT NO:……………………LOCATION:
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
Setting Up Site:

1. Ensure Works Permit clearance with ATC Watch Manager & Apron advised of stands affected
2. Close area with ATC on RTF - either Ground or Tower
3. Inform Ops Control Desk of area closed, who will advise Fire Service by land line
4. Isolate area with Barriers
5. Ensure green centreline routes are suppressed through works area
6. Ensure taxiway centrelines are blacked out
7. Ensure taxiway sign boards are amended
8. Check clearances from taxiway centreline to work site fencing & height
9. Check work site lighting
10. Safe Contractor’s route to site










Re-opening Site:
Date: …………………. Time: ………………… 
1. Check that pavement surface is sound & clean
2. Check that light fittings are secure and clean
3. Ensure all pit lids are closed
4. Check grass areas are clear of debris
5. Check grass areas are reinstated & secure from aircraft blast
6. Inspect reinstated taxiway lighting routes
7. Ensure painted taxiway centrelines are reinstated
8. Ensure taxiway sign boards are reinstated
9. Final sweep of area
10. Remove Barriers and reopen area with ATC on RTF – either Ground or Tower
11. Inform Ops Control Desk of re-opening, who will advise Fire Service via land line











Annex D
AIRBRIDGE CHECKLIST
_________
APRON LEVEL
Satisfactory /Non satisfactory
Cable tray hanging
Paint
Rust
Oil Leaks
Safety Hoop
Tyre condition
Lighting - Floodlight
Loose nuts/bolts
Stairs
Stair Light
Doors - swipe
INTERNAL
Condition of flooring
Patio door
Lighting
Signage
Telephone
Monitor - camera
Alarm - strobe
Water ingress
Canopy
Graphics - graffiti
Driving *
Height indicators
Floor
Heaters
Inspection doors
Auto leveller
Control Panel
SEG Controls
CLEANLINESS
Carpet
Glass panels
Remote console
Walls
Ceiling
Tunnel runners
Drainage
Obvious leaks
Stairs
Cabin area
Comments
Annex E
Airbridge Operation Safety Audit - Check Form
Date:
Airline/Handling Agent:
Operator name:
s - satisfactory
Time:
Aircraft Type/reg:
Permit Number:
n/s - not satisfactory
Auditor:
Stand:
Airbridge type:
n/a - not applicable
PART ONE - PRE-AIRBRIDGE OPERATION
Airbridge parked in appropriate box/ circle
1
Check control panel for faults/alarms
2
Airbridge internal lighting on
3
Airbridge floodlighting on
4
Barriers/Doors are closed
5
Operator has checked outside for any infringements
6
Operator/essential staff only on airbridge
7
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
PART TWO - DOCKING THE AIRBRIDGE
Aircraft Anti-collision lights off
1
Aircraft chocked
2
Align floor bumper to aircraft
3
Check of auto leveller operation
4
Operator/rep remained in the vicinity until all pax embarked/disembarked
5
Airbridge stopped 1-2m from aircraft
6
Floor level 150-200mm below aircraft door sill
7
Key removed
8
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
PART THREE - RETRACTING THE AIRBRIDGE
Aircraft door closed and airbridge
1
s
n/s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
n/s
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
doors/barriers closed
Parking of vehicles/equipment
Operator has checked outside for any infringements
Airbridge parked in appropriate circle /box
All airbridge doors closed
All non-essential personnel have left the airbridge
Wheels are aligned correctly before retracting from aircraft
Airbridge parked below horizontal unless stated otherwise
Airbridge floodlighting off
Cleanliness of airbridge
Airbridge internal lighting off
GENERAL COMMENTS/ACTIONS TAKEN
Annex F
AIRCRAFT TURNAROUND SAFETY AUDIT - CHECK FORM
Date:
Airline/Handling Agent
Time:
Aircraft Type/reg:
Print names:
Stand:
PART ONE - AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL
CHECKS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF AIRCRAFT
1 Is the turnaround Co-ordinator clearly identifiable?
2 Has Stand been checked for obstructions / FOD ?
3 Have adjacent aircraft parked on the correct centreline ?
4 Parking of vehicles / equipment
5 Position of airbridge
6 Correct SEG selection
7 Position of personnel
8 Is high – vis clothing worn?
9 Adequate PPE – ears / feet / hands?
Comments / Actions taken
YES
YES
S
S
S
S
S
YES
YES
NO
NO
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
S
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
N/S
SHUTDOWN OF AIRCRAFT
10 Is dispatcher still in attendance?
11 Has the aircraft parked on the correct centreline?
12 Were the Anti-collision lights off, Engines/propellers stopped before being chocked?
13 Were crew / dispatcher / 3rd parties advised that the aircraft was chocked?
14 Did staff / vehicles / airbridge approach aircraft before it was chocked? (BA Protocol)
15 Overall approach of turnaround service teams
Comments / Actions taken
PART TWO - AIRCRAFT TURNAROUND
OFF-LOAD
16 Airbridge in use (If yes go to 19)
17 Are Pax being escorted
18 Is Pax route clear
19 Are adequate staff positioned to ensure pax safety (either
airline and handling agent)
20 Vehicles / equipment parked in starburst
20 Positioning/Use of airbridge
21 Positioning of vehicles – e.g. obstructing, parked in starburst
22 Are assembly routes clear of equipment
N/A
N/A
YES
YES
YES
S
NO
NO
NO
N/S
YES
S
S
YES
NO
N/S
N/S
NO
Comments / Actions taken
SERVICING OF AIRCRAFT
23 Freight / Baggage removal e.g. positioning, manual handling,
adjusting of equipment
24 Blocked fuel /SEG switches?
25 Is Fuelling route clear?
S
YES
YES
N/S
NO
NO
26 Is the fuel overseer identifiable ?
27 Are banksmen being used?
28 Are steps, catering and cleaning vehicles positioned before aircraft
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
29 Are safety guards being used when working from heights –
Engineers, caterers, ramp
30 Vehicles running/unattended
31 Are personnel stepping between trailers
32 Overall supervision/co-operation
Comments / Actions taken
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
doors are opened?
GENERAL
Check various operators understanding of risk from those working around
them?
Are they aware of the turnaround plan?
Can they identify the turnaround co-ordinator?
Are all staff aware of actions to be taken in an emergency?
Comments:
ON-LOAD
33 Are Pax being escorted
34 Is Pax route clear
35 Pax guidance equipment used
36 Freight / Hold Baggage loading
37 Are adequate staff positioned to ensure pax safety (either airline and handling agent)
38 Is High-Vis clothing worn
39 Adequate PPE - ears/feet/hands
S
N/S
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
S
S
S
S
S
YES
YES
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
NO
NO
Y
S
Y
Y
Y
N
N/S
N
N
N
S
S
S
S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
Comments / Actions taken
PART THREE - AIRCRAFT DEPARTURE
40 Is stand checked for FOD prior to pushback
41 Airbridge/FEGP/other services stored correctly before pushback
42 Is traffic alerted to pushback on ‘back of stand roads’
43 Is tug positioned ahead of the aircraft after disconnect
44 Is return route taken by pushback crew safe and expeditious
Comments / Actions taken
STAND CHECK AFTER DEPARTURE
45 Equipment parking
46 Vehicle parking
47 Stand cleanliness
48 Positioning of airbridge/FEGP etc
Comments/ Actions taken
GENERAL COMMENTS E.g. Staff attitude, co-operation, co-ordination
AUTHORIZATION PERMIT FOR CRANES
Annex G
AND OTHER TALL CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
CRANE PERMIT NO:
SECTION 1 - TO BE COMPLETED BY APPLICANT (Block Capitals)
NOTE: A MINIMUM OF THREE WORKING DAYS NOTICE IS REQUIRED TO PROCESS AN APPLICATION.
TOWER CRANES AND OBSTACLES IN CRITICAL LOCATIONS MAY TAKE UP TO FOUR WEEKS TO PROCESS.
1 Crane/Equipment Registration Number
2 Crane/Equipment Hire Company (as liveried)
3 Type of Crane/Equipment (e.g. Tower, Mobile, etc.)
4 Maximum WORKING HEIGHT of Crane/Equipment
Metres AOD/AGL (delete as appropriate)
5 LOCATION (e.g. OS Grid Ref, Address, Road Name, Building, Stand No, Terminal, etc):
RADIUS OF OPERATION (of fixed crane/equipment):
AREA OF OPERATION (of fixed crane/equipment):
AIRSIDE / LANDSIDE / OUTSIDE AIRPORT BOUNDARY
(delete as appropriate)
PROJECT NAME (If Applicable):
6 Date(s) of operation (inclusive):
7 Local times of crane operation (inclusive):
8 Name of Sponsoring Company:
9 Contact name and phone number ON SITE:
10 I confirm the details given above and shall comply with any additional operational requirements specified
by the Airside Safety & Operations Department in Section 2 below:
Name Of Applicant:
Print:
Applicant's Contact details:
Phone:
Sign:
Fax:
Email:
SECTION 2 - TO BE COMPLETED BY AIRSIDE SAFETY & OPERATIONS
11 Additional Requirements specified to the Sponsor or Operator:
Obstacle Light:Obstacle light to be attached to top of jib and / or highest point of crane during darkness
YES
Intensity
NO
CANDELA
Type
STEADY FLASHING
Colour
RED
WHITE
Airfield Operations to be notified BEFORE operation commences on Tel: 123456
YES
NO
Operation subject to Runway in use being
YES
NO
Other:
12 NOTAM action required by Airside Safety & Operations
YES
NO
13 Details of Crane/Equipment Position:metres from ARP (Aerodrome Reference Point)
Bearing
Issued By:
nautical miles
degrees True/Magnetic (delete as appropriate)
Initials:
Date:
feet AMSL
Local Time:
Additional Comments:
14 Authorized By (Signature):
NOTAM No:
Date:
5 Useful Documents
ACI Wildlife Hazard Handbook (2005) in draft at time of going to press
Eurocontrol: European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions
ICAO: Safety Oversight Audit Manual (Doc 9735)
ICAO: Annex 14 Volume 1 various paras
ICAO: Doc 9137 Airport Services Manual Part 2 – Pavement Surface Conditions.
ICAO: Manual on Certification of Aerodromes (ICAO DOC 9774)
ICAO: Manual On Safety Management For Aerodrome Operators (in draft at time of going to press)
UK CAA – CAP 168 Licensing of Aerodromes
UK CAA – Visual Aids Handbook CAP 637
6. Useful websites
Airports Council International
www.aci.aero
ACI Europe
www.aci-europe.org
Birdstrike Canada
www.birdstrikecanada.com
Eurocontrol
www.eurocontrol.int
European Aviation Safety Agency EASA
www.easa.eu.int
Transport Canada
www.tc.gc.ca
International Birdstrike Committee – IBSC
www.int-birdstrike.com
International Standards Organisation
www.iso.ch
Joint Aviation Authorities
www.jaa.nl
UK Civil Aviation Authority
www.caa.co.uk
UK Health and Safety Executive
www.hse.gov.uk