INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF ENVIROMENTAL MANAGEMENT
UNDER GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
J. Barkley Rosser, Jr.*
Professor of Economics and Kirby L. Kramer, Jr. Professor of Business Administration
MSC 0204
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, VA 22807 USA
Tel: 540-568-3212
rosserjb@jmu.edu
Marina V. Rosser
Professor of Economics
James Madison University
November, 2005
To be presented at AFEE/ASSA meetings, Boston, January 2006.
*Corresponding author. The authors thank Valerie Luzadis and Ajit Sinha for useful
comments. Neither is responsible for any errors or misinterpretations in this paper.
Abstract:
This paper examines how institutions for managing environmental resources
change over time with economic development and the seriousness of various
environmental problems. Different problems tend to be more serious at different levels
of development requiring different approaches. Traditional systems of management in
poorer countries were often effective at managing common good resources, and
institutions that replicate their advantages may work at higher levels of economic
development as well. Problems of inter-level relations are also be considered.
1
INTRODUCTION
We shall consider how different institutional forms can affect the management of
environmental problems at different stages of economic development, including for
managing biological resources and controlling pollution emissions. Problems of different
hierarchical levels from local to global will be considered.
Key to dealing with different stages of economic development is the
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), the hypothesis that pollution increases at first
during development and then declines after industrialization in an inverted U-shaped
pattern of pollution emissions against time.1 This term derives from the earlier empirical
observation of a tendency for income to first become more unequal and then more equal
as societies move through the industrialization process (Kuznets, 1955), producing a
similar inverted U-shape when time is on the horizontal axis and the Gini coefficient
(which rises with income inequality) is on the vertical axis. These both suggest that
societies may bear temporary costs to develop. However, critics have argued that they
may not generally hold, being subject to historical, institutional, geographic, and
technological specificities. The socialist world saw increasing income inequality during
industrialization, and India and China may leap to more advanced environmental control
technologies that limit their pollution as they industrialize, if they can adopt appropriate
institutions for implementation and enforcement.
PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
Various dynamic patterns of pollution and development relationships occur,
varying by pollutant and across societies. The classic EKC pattern has been found to
2
hold for sulfur dioxide (especially damaging to health), nitrogen oxides, suspended
aerosol particulates, carbon monoxide (Selden and Song, 1994; Grossman and Kreuger,
1995), heavy industrial emissions of arsenic, cadmium, lead, and nickel, and also
biochemical oxygen demand and fecal coliform in water (Gawande et al, 2001). Varying
“turning points” of income have been found in different studies for specific pollutants.
Some have even found that some of these may “re-link” with rising incomes to exhibit
“N-curve” patterns, possibly fecal coliform (Shafik, 1994) and sulfur dioxide in some
countries (de Bruyn and Opschoor, 1997).
The EKC pattern can arise due to high income elasticity for environmental quality
that leads to political action (Beckerman, 1992; Dasgupta et al, 2002). Higher income
countries can fund pollution control activities (Magnani, 2000) and also R&D in
improved pollution control technologies (Komen et al, 2000).
However, some pollutants vary inversely with income, notably basic water
pollutants that affect infant mortality (Dinda, 2004). Others seem to increase without
limit with national income, notably carbon dioxide, the major ingredient in global
warming (Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1995). Others seeming to increase monotonically
include solid municipal waste, traffic volumes, and general energy consumption (HoltzEakin and Selden, 1995; Horvath, 1997).2
For some such as deforestation there seems to be no relationship between
environmental damage and national income across countries or even within countries
(Koop and Tole, 1999; Bhattarai and Hemmig, 2001). Regarding endangered species,
political and institutional factors seem more important than income levels, especially civil
liberties (McPherson and Nieswiadomy, 2001).
3
A general criticism is that most of these studies were done on cross-sections of
countries rather than on more careful panels or time-series within specific countries,
which can seriously alter the results. (Stern et al, 1996; Stern and Common, 2001).
Geographical effects can vary across countries (Ezzati et al, 2001) as can enforcement
effects, even within the U.S. across states (Selden et al, 1999), reflecting political and
cultural factors (Magnani, 2000), including corruption (Lopez and Mitra, 2000).
COMMON PROPETY, OPEN ACCESS, AND THE PROBLEM OF
COOPERATIVE RESOURCE MANAGMENT
Gordon (1954) argued that “common property” would lead fisheries to be
overexploited in the bioeconomic sense that rents would be dissipated as individual
agents generate negative externalities on each other and overharvest the fishery.3
Considering grazing commons during the enclosure movement, Hardin (1968) declared
common property to bring the “tragedy of the commons” endemic to both biological
resources such as fish, grazing animals, and forests, and non-biological such as oil pools.
Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) clarified that the problem is not common
property but open access. If a well-defined group owns the resource and is able to
control access to it, the group may be able to establish institutional arrangements to
manage the commonly owned resource optimally (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1991).
However, even a privately owned resource will not be managed optimally if its owner
cannot control access to it.
Thus in the American plains, although farmers claimed private property
ownership of fields, they could not control access to them by the cowboys and their cattle
4
grazing until after the invention of barbed wire (Libecap, 1981). Feudal lords in the
Middle Ages were often unable to prevent peasants from poaching in their forests.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union was able to control access to the state-owned sturgeon
fisheries in the Caspian Sea. However, this control of access broke down after the
dissolution of the USSR and the subsequent privatizations of these fisheries, with the
result that they have seriously collapsed and beluga caviar is now in danger of complete
elimination (Rosser and Rosser, 2004, pp. 34-35).
Whereas open access involves a situation in which the number of agents can
increase indefinitely, thus driving rents to zero, managing common property with
controlled access implies a fixed population of agents who must at a mutually satisfactory
set of arrangements. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) analyzed this problem as an
evolutionary game theoretic prisoners’ dilemma, the issue being achieving a dynamically
stable cooperative solution that is self-enforcing rather than a defecting, each-for-his own
solution that can lead to collapse of the common property resource.
Examples of sustained common property cases are more likely within relatively
homogeneous groups that are able to communicate well and have been stable over long
periods of time. Among fisheries successful examples include the Icelandic cod fisheries
(Durrenberger and Pàlsson, (1987) and the Maine lobster fisheries (Acheson, 1988). The
list of failed fisheries that have suffered catastrophic declines is long and includes among
others blue whales, Antarctic fin whales, Hokkaido herring, Peruvian anchoveta,
Southwest African pilchard, North Sea herring, California sardine, Georges Bank herring
and cod, and Japanese sardine (Clark, 1985, p. 6).
5
Sethi and Somanathan (1986, pp. 781-782) discuss the collapse of the Kumaun
and Garhwal forests in Northern India, which had been divided among villages who
managed their portions by internally evolved rules of allocation. Between 1911 and 1917
the British took over management to extract logs for railroad construction. Protests by
the villagers led the British in 1925 to end restrictions on use and the forests became open
access. By 1931 an observer noted that “the oak is melting away in Kumaun like an
iceberg on the equator.” Bromley (1991) has documented similar cases in Africa where
herds of wildlife well managed under traditional arrangements declined following
colonial imposition of higher level controls leading to essentially open access outcomes.
Forestry management becomes more complicated because there are many
different outputs from forests beyond timber: grazing, hunting, fishing, recreation,
pharmaceuticals, preservation of endangered species, aesthetics, and many more, which
can result in multiple optimal equilibria for rotation periods (Swallow et al, 1990) and
multiple optimal methods of management (Rosser, 2005). These problems are
exacerbated in developing economies with indigenous groups living in the forests,
leading to potential conflicts over property rights and income distribution (Kant, 2000).
DEVELOPING COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS
Important in developing cooperative institutions to manage common property
resources is trust among those involved. Trust is learned over time through successfully
repeated cooperative interactions. Buildup of trust over time has been identified as
accumulation of social capital, an idea with many problems of definition and
conceptualization.4 In practice many analysts use indexes of “generalized trust” as
6
measures of social capital, which has been associated with economic growth (Fukuyama,
1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Woolcock, 1998; Dasgupta, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001).
However, this may not hold for cases where trust is just within specific groups, what
Putnam (2000) labels “bonding” social capital in contrast with “bridging” social capital
associated with generalized trust. While both involve reducing transactions costs among
those involved that can enhance productivity, bonding social capital may involve the
narrow group damaging broader productivity through corruption, crime, or other means.
Bonding versus bridging social capital becomes complicated when we are dealing
with the management of common property natural resources. This may be a case where
the usually looked-down-upon bonding form within a specific group may be optimal,
especially for resources located in particular locales such as the Icelandic cod fishery or
the Kumaun forest of Northern India. What may matter is that there be strong relations
within the local group, these sufficing to induce the cooperation necessary to manage the
resource. For these local group bonding social capital relations may be strong, inducing
an ability to enforce sanctions on defectors who may be unable to conceal their behavior
from their neighbors (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004). In the lobster fisheries of Maine,
those who do not follow agreed-upon management practices may find their lobster pots
damaged, with similar accounts holding for the Icelandic cod fishery.
While good for maintaining cooperative practices, this can make it harder for the
practices to survive interaction with outsiders or higher level authorities. Fishing
communities are often insular and isolated from their surrounding societies, with the
people belonging to distinct ethnic groups or speaking unusual dialects different from
those around them, even when technically the same ethnicity (Charles, 1988). While this
7
may support their own internally generated cooperative practices, it can lead to problems
if outsiders try to impose rules or practices, even those needed. Outsiders can destroy a
group’s cooperative institutions, but may be unable to enforce their rules or substitute
anything effective instead. The bonding social capital may remain strong enough for the
local group to resist and undermine the rules of the outsiders, but may not be strong
enough to preserve their own cooperative institutions.
At the higher level of industrial development, the more generalized trust
associated with bridging social capital becomes important. In studying Italy, Putnam et
al (1993) observed that in low social capital southern Italy there is a nexus of corruption,
lack of generalized trust, and a general breakdown of law and order, in contrast with
higher social capital northern Italy with its more entrenched civic associations and
generalized trust (and better overall economic performance). Both the ability to
formulate widely acceptable environmental policies and to enforce them would appear to
depend strongly upon this more generalized social capital, which is known to be linked
with democratic and inclusive structures. This is likely to be true even for such systems
as marketable pollution permits.
Social capital and democracy seem linked with other elements in general patterns
of social cohesion. Apparently involved in the complex interaction of trust, corruption,
and lawlessness is income equality (Uslaner and Badescu, 2004; Ahmed et al, 2005).
Ahmed et al found in a global data set that there appear to be strong and direct relations
between the degree of income equality, levels of generalized trust, a lack of corruption,
and the propensity not to participate in the underground economy.5 Thus, a society’s
ability to decide upon and enforce environmental regulations at any level of economic
8
development should be easier with greater income equality, generalized trust, and open
democratic structures. There may be a link here between the two different Kuznets
curves; the increase in equality with higher development may help the implementation of
environmental regulatory policies that bring about the improving side of the
environmental Kuznets curve (Magnani ,2000; Lopez and Mitra (2000).
The level of hierarchy in the ecologic-economic system is also a serious
management issue. Forms of pollution that seem to exhibit more the EKC pattern are
ones that are more local in their impact rather than global. This may reflect that national
level regulation can internalize the relevant externalities. For more global pollutants,
such as CO2, national level regulation fails to achieve this. A global level pollutant must
be regulated globally. But it is harder to obtain national level adherence, just as a higher
level of government may have trouble getting a fishing community to go along with its
rules. This failure to enforce such global level regulations may be partly why such
pollutants have not exhibited the EKC pattern (although SO2 has been a matter of
controversy and diplomacy across national boundaries).
Problems arise when lower level entities attempt to regulate pollutants or
processes transpiring at a higher level of the ecologic-economic hierarchy. There can
also be problems when higher level entities attempt to manage pollutants or processes
operating at lower levels. Besides the sorts of enforcement problems that can arise in
dealing with local communities as in the case of the fisheries, there can be inappropriate
controls decided upon. Wilson et al (1999) have shown that managing fisheries at too
high a scale of hierarchy can lead to overfishing of crucial local stocks. Thus, Rosser
9
(1995) argues that there should be a coordination of property rights and levels of
ecologic-economic hierarchies.
CONCLUSIONS
The responsiveness of a system to its people wanting to attain high environmental
quality depends on the levels of trust and cooperativeness within the society. Many
factors are involved in bringing about institutions that reinforce cooperation rather than
defecting conduct in regard to environmental and natural resource contexts. Greater
social cohesion may be enhanced by greater income equality, the ability to bring
corruption under control, and the willingness of citizens to participate in the legal
economy and in democratic political processes. One Kuznets curve may help the other.
A final note is that in resolving environmental problems, high income countries
might mimic traditional communal management institutions and practices of poorer
countries. However, local management of local problems by homogeneous groups is
easier than higher level management of higher level problems by heterogeneous groups.
ENDNOTES
1
This term was neologized by Panayotou (1993) and empirically studied by Grossman
and Krueger (1991) and Shafik and Bandyopdhyay (1992) prior to that.
2
It should be kept in mind that even after their emissions begin to decline, pollutants can
continue to accumulate in the environment for a long time afterwards (Arrow et al, 1996).
10
3
Problems of open access fisheries manifest themselves as backward-bending supply
curves of fish (Copes, 1970), which can lead to catastrophic collapses or other complex
dynamics (Clark, 1990; Hommes and Rosser, 2001; Rosser, 2001).
4
Alternatives include accumulating “social debts” through the giving of gifts (Bourdieu,
1977) and the widening of memberships in civic and social organizations (Putnam, 2000).
See Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) for a critique of the social capital concept.
5
Rosser et al (2003) studied these dynamics for transition economies with multiple
equilibria arising from the social dynamics associated with income inequality. Economic
experiments confirm that equality increases the willingness to contribute to public goods
(Gunnthorsdottir et al, 2006).
REFERENCES
Acheson, James M. The Lobster Gangs of Maine. Hanover: University Press of New
England, 1988.
Ahmed, Ehsan, J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., and Marina V. Rosser. “A Global Perspective on
the Non-Observed Economy, Inequality, Corruption, and Social Capital.” Mimeo,
Department of Economics, James Madison University, 2005.
Arrow, Kenneth J., Bert. Bolin, Robert Costanza, Carl Folke, Crawford S. Holling,
Bengt-Owe Janson, Simon Levin, Karl-Göran Mäler, Charles Perrings, and David
11
Pimentel. “Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity, and the Environment.” Ecological
Applications 8, no. 17 (1996): 13-15.
Beckerman, Wilfred. “Economic Growth and the Environment: Whose Growth? Whose
Environment?” World Development 20, no. 4 (April 1992), 481-496.
Bhattarai, Madhusudan and Michael Hammig. “Institutions and the Environmental
Kuznets Curve for Deforestation: A Cross-Country Analysis for Latin America.” World
Development 29, no. 6 (June 2001): 995-1010.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1977.
Bromley, Daniel W. Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
Charles, Anthony T. “Fishery Socioeconomics: A Survey.” Land Economics 64, no. 3
(August 1988): 276-295.
Ciriacy-Wantrup, Siegfried V. and Richard C. Bishop. “’Common Property’ as a Concept
in Natural Resources Policy.” Natural Resources Journal 15, no. 4 (October 1975): 713727.
12
Clark, Colin W. Bioeconomic Modelling and Fisheries Management. New York: WileyInterscience, 1985.
_____________ Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable
Resources, 2nd edition. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1990.
Dasgupta, Partha. “Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital.” In Social Capital:
A Multifaceted Persepective, edited by Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Seralgeldin, 325-424.
Washington: World Bank, 2000.
______________, Benoit LaPlante, Hua Wang, and David Wheeler. “Confronting the
Environmental Kuznets Curve.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 1 (Winter
2002): 147-168.
de Bruyn, S.M. and Johannes B. Opschoor. “Developments in the Throughput-Income
Relationship: Theoretical and Empirical Observations.” Ecological Economics 20, no. 3
(April 1997): 255-268.
Dinda, Soumyananda. “Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis: A Survey.”
Ecological Economics 49, no. 4 (2004): 431-455.
Durlauf, Steven N. and Marcel Fafchamps. “Social Capital.” NBER Working Paper No.
W10485, 2004.
13
Durrenberger, E. Paul and Gisli Pàlsson. “Resource Management in Icelandic Fishing.”
In The Question of the Commons, edited by Bonnie J. McCay and James M. Acheson,
370-392. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1987.
Ezzati, Majid, Burton H. Singer, and Daniel M. Kammen. “Towards an Integrated
Framework for Development and Environmental Policy: The Dynamics of
Environmental Kuznets Curves.” World Development 29, no. 8 (September 2001): 14211434.
Fukuyama, Francis. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York:
Free Press, 1995.
Gawande, Kishore, Robert P. Berrens, and Alok K. Bohara. “A Consumption-Based
Theory of the Environmental Kuznets Curve.” Ecological Economics 37, no. 1 (April
2001): 101-112.
Gordon, H. Scott. “The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The
Fishery.” Journal of Political Economy 62, no. 2 (April 1954): 124-142.
Grossman, Gene M. and Alan B. Kreuger. “Environmental Impacts of the North
American Free Trade Agreement.” NBER Working Paper 3914, 1991.
14
________________ and _____________ “Economic Growth and the Environment.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 2 (May 1995): 353-377.
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna, Daniel Houser, and Kevin McCabe. “Disposition, History and
Contributions in Public Goods Experiments.” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, forthcoming, 2006.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162, no. 3859
(December 13, 1968): 1243-1248.
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas. and Thomas M. Selden. “Stoking the Fires? CO2 Emissions and
Economic Growth.” Journal of Public Economics 57, no. 1 (May 1995): 85-101.
Hommes, Cars H. and J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. 2001. “Consistent Expectations Equilibria
and Complex Dynamics in Renewable Resource Markets.” Macroeconomic Dynamics 5,
no. 2 (April 2001): 180-203.
Horvath, Ron J. “Energy Consumption and the Environmental Kuznets Curve Debate.”
Mimeo, Department of Geography, University of Sydney, Australia, 1997.
Kant, Shanti. “A Dynamic Approach to Forest Regimes in Developing Economies.”
Ecological Economics 32, no. 2 (February 2000): 287-300.
15
Knack, Steven and Philip Keefer. “Does Social Capital have an Economic Payoff? A
Cross-Country Investigation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4 (November
1997): 1251-1288.
Komen, Marinus H., Shelby Gerking, and Henke Folmer. “Income and Environmental
R&D: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries.” Environment and Development
Economics 2, no. 4 (November 1997): 505-515.
Koop, Gary and Lise Tole. “Is There an Environmental Kuznets Curve for
Deforestation?” Journal of Development Economics 58, no. 1 (February 1999): 231-244.
Kuznets, Simon P. 1955. “Economic Growth and Income Inequality.” American
Economic Review 45, no. 1 (March 1955): 1-28.
Libecap, Gary M. Locking Up the Range: Federal Land Control and Grazing. San
Francisco: Pacific Institute for Public Research, 1981.
Lopez, Ramon and Siddhartha Mitra. “Corruption, Pollution, and Kuznets Environment
Curve.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 40, no. 2 (March 2000):
137-150.
Magnani, Elisabetta. “The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Environmental Policy and
Income Distribution.” Ecological Economics 32, no. 3 (March 2000): 431-443.
16
McPherson, Michael A. and Michael L. Nieswiadomy. “Sliding Along the Environmental
Kuznets Curve: The Case of Biodiversity.” Mimeo, University of North Texas, 2001.
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Panayotou, Theodore. “Empirical Tests and Policy Analysis of Environmental
Degradation at Different Stages of Economic Development.” ILO Technology and
Employment Programme, Geneva, 1993.
Putnam, Robert P. with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. Making Democracy
Work: Civic Traditions in Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
_______________ Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.
Rosser, J. Barkley, Jr. “Systemic Crises in Hierarchical Ecological Economics.” Land
Economics 71, no. 2 (May 1995): 163-172.
__________________ “Complex Ecologic-Economic Dynamics and Environmental
Policy.” Ecological Economics 37, no. 1 (April 2001): 23-37.
17
__________________ “Complexities of Dynamic Forest Management Policies.” In
Sustainability, Economics, and Natural Resources: Economics of Sustainable Forest
Management, edited by Shashi Kant and R. Albert Berry, 191-206. Dordrecht: Springer,
2005.
__________________ and Marina V. Rosser. Comparative Economics in a Transforming
World Economy, 2nd edition. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.
___________________ and _____________, and Ehsan Ahmed. “Multiple Unofficial
Economy Equilibria and Income Distribution Dynamics in Transition Economies.”
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 25, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 425-447.
Selden, Thomas M. and Daqing Song. “Environmental Quality and Development: Is
There a Kuznets Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 27, no. 2 (March 1994): 147-162.
_______________, A.S. Forrest, and J.E. Lockhart. “Analyzing the Reductions in US Air
Pollution Emissions: 1970-1999.” Land Economics 75, no. 1 (February 1999): 1-21.
Sethi, Rajiv and Eswaran Somanathan. “Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property
Resource Use.” American Economic Review 86, no. 4 (September 1996): 766-788.
18
Shafik, Nemat. “Economic Development and Environmental Quality: An Econometric
Analysis.” Oxford Economic Papers 46, no. 4 (October 1994): 757-773.
___________ and Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay. “Economic Growth and Environmental
Quality: Time Series and Cross-Country Evidence.” Background paper for the World
Development Report. Washington: World Bank, 1992.
Stern, David I., Mick S. Common, and Edward B. Barbier. “Economic Growth and
Environmental Degradation: A Critique of the Environmental Kuznets Curve.” World
Development 24, no. 7 (August 1996): 1151-1160.
____________ and ___________ “Is There an Environmental Kuznets Curve for
Sulfur?” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 41, no. 2 (Marech
2001): 162-178.
Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase and Gert Tinngard Svendsen. The Creation and
Destruction of Social Capital: Entrepreneurship, Co-operative Movements and
Institutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004.
Swallow, Steven K., Peter J. Parks, and David N. Wear. “Policy-Relevant
Nonconvexities in the Production of Multiple Forest Benefits.” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 19, no. 3 (May 1990): 264-280.
19
Uslaner, Eric M. and Gabriel Badescu. “Making the Grade in Transition: Equality,
Transparency, Trust, and Fairness.” Mimeo, Department of Political Science, University
of Maryland, 2004.
Wilson, James, Bobbi S. Low, Robert Costanza, and Elinor Ostrom. “Scale
Misperceptions and the Spatial Dynamics of a Social-Ecological System.” Ecological
Economics 31, no. 2 (November 1999): 243-257.
Woolcock, Michael. “Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Synthesis
and Policy Framework.” Theory and Society 27, no. 2 (Winter 1998): 151-208.
Zak, Paul and Steven Knack. 2001. “Trust and Growth.” Economic Journal 111, no. 463
(April 2001): 295-321.
20