QUESTION 1
Explain how Mill, Harman and Scanlon would answer the question "Why be
moral?" Assess their answers. If you think there a better answer, explain what it
is and why it is better.
I.
Mill’s Answer: Utilitarianism
A. Fundamental principle: We should be moral to maximize aggregate
happiness.
1. Happiness is the only thing “desirable as an end”
2. “Happiness is a good” that we desire and the aggregate of our individual
happiness is the general happiness (308).
3. Happiness is the sole impartial good: something that everyone has
reason to desire, setting aside their own position and looking at the
world as a whole
4. Nothing other than the happiness of various individuals is impartially
good in itself.
i. People do desire things like virtue and freedom from pain, but Mill
views these as constituent parts of happiness and not separate
ii. Desiring something is the same thing as thinking it pleasant
iii. Likewise, will originate from desire and thus leads to happiness as
well.
5. All of this implies that “the general happiness” is the standard of
morality
B. Objections to Mill’s answer:
1. Are there things other than happiness that count morally?
2. Mill hasn’t shown that everyone desires the aggregate happiness, but
has only shown that it works for the individual person
i. Perhaps the individual person doesn’t want the aggregate—why
should they be moral?
3. Is the sum of happiness the most fundamental basis for justification in
all cases? (similar to B.1)
i. What about the motivational basis for mankind?
ii. What about the basis for unity?
II.
Harman’s Answer: Relativism—Harman links the rational “ought” with the
moral “ought” (relativist implication arises only because it is supposed that the
relevant motivating reasons are not universal)
A. Fundamental principle: We should be moral because morality is based on
our motivational reasons and attitudes and their relationships with others.
1. What we ought to do is dependent on the idea that we have a reason to
act in accordance with them
i.
Summarized logically: Given that A has motivating attitudes M, and
given considerations C, A has most reason to do D
ii. Morally, the agent who “ought” to do something accepts these
reasons and normally the audience does as well: the “moral” part
comes from the idea that the standards are based on assumptions
shared by others
2. Thus, what we ought to do is a function of our circumstances and
considerations and what conclusions we come to as a result of implicit
agreement or understanding about our relations with one another
3. This sharing of motivational basis between the agents, audience, and
speaker result in a shared framework and basis on which we make our
judgments.
4. Why be moral?
i. Under Harmon’s definition of morality, we only “ought” to do that
which we have most reason to do.
ii. Therefore, we should be moral because we are motivated to do so
and because we have most reason to be moral.
B. Objections to Harman’s answer:
1. Is morality merely a matter of socially approved behavior?
i. If true, why should it hold any particular meaning for us?
ii. Does this mean that it has no more importance than grammatical
rules or styles of dress?
iii. Why should we be moral then?
2. What about the existence of an external moral truth? Is it ignored?
III.
Scanlon’s Answer: Contractualism
A. Fundamental principle: We should be moral because we have reason to
care whether our actions are justifiable to others on grounds they have
reason to accept.
1. An act is wrong if it would be disallowed by any system of rules for the
general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a
basis for informed, unforced, general agreement.
2. Someone who commits an act which he/she cannot justify to someone
else feels a lot of regret, remorse
3. This regret or remorse is “psychologically hard-wired into us”-Scanlon
4. Therefore, we should be moral in order to avoid the burden of feeling
regret or remorse. Our life would go better as a consequence of this
avoidance.
B. Objections to Scanlon’s answer:
1. Does it rule out plausible aggregative arguments?
i. Ex. Trolley problem may not be justifiable to others to kill the one,
but, perhaps on large enough scales, it would make more sense to
kill the one, but Scanlon doesn’t cover that case, in which what may
be justifiable to others doesn’t weigh out over a greater quantity of
good that would be produced
2. Is this regret or remorse worse than the alternative consequences of our
actions? It seems compelling, in many cases, that the guilt one would
feel as a consequence of an action wouldn’t seem an adequate enough
sanction to be moral.
IV.
V.
Better answer?
A. I have only ideas for this, and it’s largely up to you, though I’d suggest
sharing your thoughts if you have any, but here are some of my
suggestions, if you like them:
1. Take an evolutionary stance: Say we are moral because evolution
created our morals and therefore we should be moral to be “altruistic” or
to be more evolutionarily fit
2. Take another stance we discussed in lecture, like a stronger form of
moral relativism. You’d have to formulate a basic code of moral
conduct, and since, to my recollection, we really only covered
Utilitarianism, Contractualism, and Relativism, you could do either a
different flavor of one of those or make up your own moral reasoning,
which you’d have to explain (probably beyond the scope of the essay).
Helpful resources for each answer:
A. Mill: Lecture 6 (especially II), Ch IV Utilitarianism, starts p. 307
B. Harman: Lecture 18, Harman’s essay, starts p. 109 coursebook
C. Scanlon: Lecture 9
Outline for Question 2
Give examples to show how, according to theories of the three kinds Parfit
considers “what makes someone’s life go best” can vary, depending on the
kind of society in which the person lives. Should we find this kind of relativity
troubling? Does this kind of variation in what makes a person’s life better
lead to a form of relativism about moral right and wrong? Explain why or
why not.
1) Three theories discussed by Parfit (Parfit, p 493)
a) Hedonistic Theories
i) Quality of life depends on the amount of pleasure that it contains
ii)
b) Desire Fulfillment Theories
i) Quality of life defends on the degree to which the person’s desires are
fulfilled
ii) ?
c) Objective List Theories
i) Quality of life depends on having good things and avoiding bad things.
Things should be desired because they are good and avoiding because
they are bad.
ii) ?
2) Examples where “someone’s life goes best” varies depending on the kind of
society in which the person lives
a) Mark “could go to a party to enjoy the various pleasures of eating, drinking,
laughing, dancing, and talking to [his] friends” or he could “stay at home
and read Kind Lear” (Parfit, p493). Assume the following: Reading King
Lear would give Mark more pleasure, but he does not know this fact. Mark
would like to go to the party. And objectively speaking, going to parties is
good while reading is bad.
i) If Mark lives in a society where hedonistic theories are endorsed, it
“makes Mark’s life go best” to read King Lear.
ii) If Mark lives in a society where desire fulfillment theories are endorsed,
it “makes Mark’s life go best” to go to the party.
iii) If Mark lives in a society where objective list theories are endorsed, it
“makes Mark’s life go best” to go to the party
b) Susan “strongly [wants] not to be deceived by other people” (Parfit, p 494).
Assume that if she is deceived in something she does not know it and
moreover that being deceived in not objectively good or bad.
i) By a society with hedonistic theories, Susan’s life “goes best” whether
or not she is deceived (because she does not know it (in not
introspectively discernable)
ii) By a society with desire fulfillment theories her life “goes best” when
she is not deceived (because these theories appeal “to all of our
preferences about our own lives” not just those that are “introspectively
discernable” (Parfit, p 494)
iii) By a society with objective list theories her life “goes best” whether on
not she is deceived (as being deceived is not good or bad)
c) Assume that it is objectively good to help orphans and bad to help
criminals. Frank is choosing between helping orphans and criminals. He
knows that he would have more pleasure helping criminals, and he prefers
to help criminals.
i) On hedonistic theories Frank’s life “goes best” of he helps the criminals
ii) On desire fulfillment theories, his life “goes best” if he helps criminals
iii) On objective list theories, his life “goes best” if he helps orphans
3) Should we find this relativity troubling?
a) Yes, if you think the examples above lead to moral relativism and moral
relativism is troubling
b) No, if you think the examples above lead to moral relativism and moral
relativism is not troubling or you do not think that the examples above lead
to moral relativism
4) Does this kind of variation lead to a form of moral relativism (relativism about
moral right and wrong)? (I summarize of both the affirmative and negative
answers.)
a) Yes
i) The variation in answers to the examples above (in as much as these are
examples of moral questions) is evidence of a divergence in moral
reasoning between societies (ones that have different claims about what
makes a person’s life “go best”)
ii) It is arrogant to assume that one claim about what makes a person’s life
“go best” is better than another (as long as there are good arguments for
that claim).
(1) Why think that one claim is right?
(2) Different societies have different reasons to accept different claims.
b) No
i) Most of the examples above are evidence of difference in factual
beliefs, not moral beliefs (make sure to consider that this is because
moral questions are not being discussed, and if moral questions were
discussed that the three different claims above would not give different
examples)
ii) There are still arguments (see Parfit) that one such claim is objectively
better than the other
iii) There exists an objective morality such that some of these claims are
correct and some are incorrect
5) Is moral relativism troubling?
a) Yes
i) Relativism or at least tolerance based on relativism seems to be a moral
claim itself
ii) Undermines the authority of our own moral judgments
iii) In some cases we are unable to judge horrible actions (like Hitler killing
Jews) as morally wrong
b) No
i) Either you do not find the three reasons above problematic, or you think
there is some way to resolve them
(1) Personally I find the three reasons about very problematic.
Give examples to show how, according to theories of the three kinds Parfit
considers “what makes someone’s life go best”can vary, depending on the
kind of society in which the person lives. Should we find this kind of relativity
troubling? Does this kind of variation in what makes a person’s life better
lead to a form of relativism about moral right and wrong? Explain why or
why not.
--Parfit describes three kinds of self-interest theories i.e. about “what makes person
life best”:
1- Hedonistic theories
2- Desire theories
3- Objective list theories
1-Hedonistic theories: “what would be best for someone is what makes their life
happiest.”
This theory is also know as experientialism. A person’s life is made better by the
pleasures he experiences and worse by the pains. These features are only
“introspectively discernable” and therefore the answer this theory provides for
makes someone’s life best is very subjective with respect to that individual.
Example:
Perhaps people in a very wealthy community who are used to getting everything
they want people would be more likely to be hedonists. They would associate
pleasure with a better life. Even is something they preferred happened without
their knowing, not experiencing that pleasure, to them would mean no change in
their life.
2-Desire theories: “what would be best for someone is what, throughout his life,
would best fulfil his desires.”
They key point on which Desire theories differ form hedonistic ones is that what
actually happens in reality matters (state of world over state of mind).
Unrestricted Desire Theories which “should be rejected” because they require that
all of a person’s desires, including those about strangers that are fulfilled without
the person’s knowing, add to improving a person’s life. Success theory states that
only those desires which are related to oneself (although this distinction is also
blurry) contribute to the improvement of ones life, regardless of whether that
person is aware of their being fulfilled. Global version of a success theory only
appeals to a preference “about one part of one’s life considered as a whole, or is
about one’s whole life.”
Example:
Perhaps people who tend to do a lot of humanitarian work. Say they build a school
in a poor area and then leave. If children do start studying in that school, whether
they become aware of it or not, they would consider their lives to have improved
because their goal is being achieved.
3-Objective list theorist: “certain things are good or bad for us whether or not we
want to have the good things, or avoid the bad things.”
Certain things like loyalty, honesty etc. are good and being a bad friend or a parent
etc are bad, regardless of whether or not these things give you personal satisfaction
or discomfort (more 3rd person like- not subjective). This theory differs from the
other two in that it relies on what it claims are facts about value about a certain
acts or objects rather than preferences made given the “non-evaluate facts about
the alternatives.”
Example:
Conservative religious communities. Drinking or sex for example is frowned upon
in certain religions and thus societies that follow those religions. A person in such
a society would give priority to what they consider to be divine laws over their
personal pleasure and believe that following this “objective list” would make their
life best.
-Through maybe more examples show that different societies have different
opinions about what makes their life best.
-reasons why this kind of variation is troubling:
 There is a difference of opinion in the first two theories and the last in
whether what makes a persons’ life better is subjective issue or an objective
one. An objective list theorist may act paternalistic towards the followers of
other theories.
 Interaction between people of different opinions would be difficult in that
what one may consider to be making someone’s life better would in their
opinion be making their lives worse or vice versa.
-why it is not troubling:
 What people consider to be making their lives better does not necessarily
coincide with what they ought to be doing. If someone gives preferrance to
what gives them pleasure for example, they may be willing to overlook
what they ought to be doing.
Going with the last point- this relativity about what makes someone’s life better
does not lead to a form of relativity about moral right or wrong. (I’m not a
relativist so my argument may differ in what you may want to write here)
 The subjective theories give priority to personal preferences and desires.
They do not appeal to facts about value. (Although what they may desire
may be in line with the conclusion that would be drawn if considering
values.) Therefore they do not necessarily give priority to moral right or
wrong but give it to what satisfies them. Therefore their differing opinions
does not affect what is morally right or wrong.
 An objective list theorist claims that certain things are good or bad based
on values. They appeal more to a moral standard by saying certain right
things make life better and certain wrong things make life worse. However,
people may follow different objective lists and here the issue of relativism
in morality can arise.
 We can then present arguments against relativism:
o There is idea of ethnocentrism involved with people who follow
objective list theories
o What is actually right or wrong does not change just because there
are differing views about it.
Question 3
Some philosophers have argued that for a person to hold moral responsibility
for an action, that they “could have done otherwise,” all that is required is
that the person would have done otherwise if he or she had wanted to do so.
The theory conforms well with the form of compatibilism introduced in the course
and outlined in Galen Strawson’s article on the impossibility of moral
responsibility. The compatibilists argues that we can accept the main stipulations
of determinism and still be free and morally responsible agents. More succinctly,
compatibilists argue that one can be truly responsible for what one does when one
acts, so long as one is not caused to act by any of a certain set of constraints.
These types of constraints exist outside of the individual’s control, and can range
from neuroses and post-hypnotic commands to threats and compulsions to act
under extreme duress. The compatibilist form of responsibility ignores the basic
argument for the impossibility of ultimate responsibility: how one ultimately is
does not affect that individual’s ability to choose freely in realistic situations.
In order to appreciate this connection between compatibilism and the notion
that a person could have acted otherwise if he or she had wanted to do so, let’s
take as an example a man being presented with the opportunity to donate money
while on his way to buy himself a new videogame. If the individual chooses to
keep the money for himself instead of donating it, the compatibilist can impose
responsibility on that individual only if we accept that the person would have
donated the money if he had wanted to. On the other hand, if that person were
compelled at gunpoint to donate the money, then the compatibilists, along with the
philosophers suggested by the prompt, would not hold that individual morally
responsible, since there was a compulsion beyond that individual’s personal desire
to act.
Galen Strawson would raise the serious objection of the basic argument for
the impossibility of moral responsibility on the individual choosing freely to buy
the videogame instead of donating the money. If he or she has acted the way he or
she “freely” chooses, it is only because of the way in which that person is. To
quote Strawson, “One does what one does entirely because of the way one is, and
one is no way ultimately responsible for the way one is. So how can one be justly
punished for anything one does?” (17). Strawson acknowledges that we are
capable of shaping the way we want to be, by participating in conscious and
intentional shaping procedures. But in order to engage in these procedures, we
must have certain features of the way we already are that compel us to want to
change. Ultimately, nothing can be causa sui (the cause of itself) in any respect at
all, and the logical line of regression will lead us to the claim for the ultimate
impossibility of moral responsibility. So, for a person to be held morally
responsible so long as that person would have done otherwise if he or she had
wanted to do so ignores the impossibility of causa sui; we must acknowledge that
the person’s desire to act is based on attributes that are outside of that person’s
ultimate control. His or her character, motivations, genetic traits, and exposure to
situations are either within the control of others or entirely random, but certainly
not the result of his or her own command. Therefore, the ability to act otherwise if
the desire exists for that individual still falls short of the claim for moral
responsibility.
Strawson’s claim seems to make logical sense, and raises a strong objection
to the possibility for moral responsibility accepted under the compatibilist
argument. As Strawson points out, compatibilists might argue that the notions of
true moral responsibility applied by proponents of the Basic Argument (of the
impossibility of moral responsibility) cannot possibly have any application to
reality, and suggest that the objection is not really worth considering. However, I
would side with Strawson; despite the obvious nature of the objection to ultimate
moral responsibility, the point raised is a necessary one. It rejects the notion that
we can truly denote a difference between proximate situations and ultimate
responsibility, since the two are inherently linked in a causal chain that regresses
to the point at which the individual cannot be held responsible.
Question #4
What step in Galen Strawson’s argument for the impossibility of moral
responsibility would Gary Watson or Peter Strawson (choose one) reject.
Explain why he would reject this step and evaluate his reasons.
The step that Gary Watson would reject would be step 3 outlined in Strawson’s
essay, page 179 in our coursepacks: “(3) So if one is to be truly responsible for
how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking – at
least in certain respects.”
Watson states is his article on page 201 of the coursepack: “To speak of Harris’s
moral self is not to explain his conduct, but to indicate the way he is morally.
What we are responsible for are the particular things we consent to. We need not
consider whether we are responsible for the genesis of the entity whose
characteristics necessitate those accts of consent, for there is no such entity.”
On the next page he writes, “I do not think the idea that consent is undetermined is
in itself particularly problematic. The trouble begins only when we ask why this is
required. Thee ground of this requirement is the intuition that unless consent were
undetermined, we would not truly be originators of our deeds.”
To sum this up, Watson believes that it is not important whether a person is
responsible or not for whom he has become. What Watson instead focuses his
energies on is proving that this theory is historically irrelevant.
“The idea that one is responsible for and only for what one consents to is not of
course distinctive of libertarianism; that idea has no historical implications.” (202)
What Watson emphasizes is not the impossibility of moral responsibility through
logic, but the necessity for moral responsibility in a historical and humanistic light.
In essence, he sees the question of how one became the way one is as morally
irrelevant because it is historically irrelevant.
“If holding one another responsible involves making the moral demand, and if the
making of the demand is the proneness to such attitudes, and if such attitudes
involve retributive sentiments and hence a limitation of goodwill, then skepticism
about retribution is skepticism about responsibility, and holding one another
responsible is at odds with one historically important ideal of love.” (Sourcepack,
204)
Question 5
In Plato’s Gorgias, Callicles claims that moral norms, such as the norm that
rules out lying, are conventions introduced to constrain the strong for the
benefit of the weak. Harman suggests that such norms are the result of
“implicit bargaining” between the rich and strong on the one hand, and the
poor and weak on the other. Explain how Harman thinks a norm ruling out
lying might arise from such a process. How would Harman respond to
Callicles’ claim that the rich and strong have no reason not to violate such
norms when they are able to do so?
"By nature, in fact, everything that is worse is uglier, just as suffering wrong is;
but to do wrong is uglier merely by convention. For to suffer wrong is not the part
of a man at all, but that of a slave for whom it is better to be dead than alive, as it
is for anyone who is unable to come either to his own assistance when he is
wronged or mistreated or to that of anyone he cares about. I can quite imagine that
the manufacturers of laws and conventions are the weak, the majority, in fact. It is
for themselves and their own advantage that they make their laws and distribute
their praises and their censures. It is to frighten men who are stronger than they
and able to enforce superiority that they keep declaring, to prevent
aggrandizement, that this is ugly and unjust, that injustice consists in seeking to
get the better of one's neighbor. They are quite content, I suppose to be on equal
terms with others since they are themselves inferior.
This, then, is the reason why convention declares that it is unjust and ugly to seek
to get the better of the majority. But my opinion is that nature herself reveals it to
be only just and proper that the better man should lord it over his inferior: it will
be the stronger over the weaker. Nature, further, makes it quite clear in a great
many instances that this is the true state of affairs, not only in the other animals,
but also in whole states and communities. This is, in fact, how justice is
determined: the stronger shall rule and have the advantage over his inferior. By
what principle of justice, then, did Xerxes invade Greece or his father Scythia?
One could, of course, cite innumerable examples of this same sort of thing. To my
mind men are acting in accordance with natural justice when they perform such
acts, and, by heaven, it is in accordance with law, too, the law of nature - though,
no double, it hardly coincides with the one we frame when we mold the natures of
the best and strongest among us, raising them from infancy by the incantations of
a charmed voice, as men do lion cubs; we enslave them by repeating again and
again that equality is morality and only this is beautiful and just. Yet I fancy that if
a man appears of capacity sufficient to shake off and break through and escape
from all these conventions, he will trample under foot our ordinances and charms
and spells, all this mass of unnatural legislation; our slave will stand forth revealed
as our master and the light of natural justice will shine forth!" (483-484)
- Callicles' basic argument is that norms establishing equality as an aspect of
morality are created by the weak because they are inferior, so equality with the
strong would be a step up.
- He believes that it is "just and proper" for the stronger to rule the weaker; it is the
natural state of affairs within other animal species, and it is true, on a larger scale,
in international relations.
Harman suggests that such norms are the result of "implicit bargaining"
between the rich and strong on the one hand, and the poor and weak on the
other.
"It is enough if various members of society knowingly reach an agreement in
intentions - each intending to act in certain ways on the understanding that the
others have similar intentions. Such an implicit agreement is reached through a
process of mutual adjustment and implicit bargaining.
Indeed, It is essential to the proposed explanation of this aspect of our moral views
to suppose that the relevant moral understanding is thus the result of bargaining. It
is necessary to suppose that, in order to further our interests, we form certain
conditional intentions, hoping that others will do the same. The others, who have
different interests, will form somewhat different conditional intentions. After
implicit bargaining, some sort of compromise is reached." (13)
- Harman believes that all moral "ought" judgements are based on a motivating
attitude derived from an agreement.
- He gives the example of how people place more weight on "not harming" than on
"helping." His explanation is that everybody would benefit from a universal "not
harming" policy, but only the weak would benefit from a policy to help the weak.
Explain how Harman thinks a norm ruling out lying might arise from such a
process.
- Like "not harming", "not lying" is a principle that equally benefits everyone. For
most people, in most situations, the costs of not lying are worth the benefits of
knowing that others will not lie. In situations where this is not the case, such an
agreement could be the result of implicit bargaining. For example, in a parentteenager relationship, the teen may see it in their best interest to do what they want
and to lie about it if necessary. However, the parent would want their child to do
what the parent wants and to never lie. The two may compromise and come to the
agreement that the teen can occasionally break their parent's rules, but ought not to
lie about it.
How would Harman respond to Callicles' claim that the rich and strong have
no reason not to violate such norms when they are able to do so?
- While Callicles believes that norms are created by the weak for their own
benefit, Harman believes that they are created by both the weak and the strong
through compromise and implicit bargaining. Because of this, Callicles believes
that the strong have the right to violate norms (as they had no part in their
creation), whereas Harman believes that they do not because they were involved in
creating the norms. Through implicit bargaining, both the strong and the weak
have come to an agreement on norms, and the agreement is not to be broken.
Harman states that "it is enough if various members of society knowingly reach an
agreement in intentions - each intending to act in certain ways on the
understanding that the others have similar intentions." The role of the
understanding is key. The rich and strong do have reason not to violate norms;
their continued engagement in any agreements with the weak and poor depend
upon it.
Question #6
Is it ever morally permissible to kill yourself? If it is not, explain why not. If
so, explain what conditions must be fulfilled in order for this to be
permissible. If there are conditions under which suicide is permissible, and a
person for whom these conditions are fulfilled asks someone else for help in
ending his or her life, could it be wrong for that person to give this help?
Explain why or why not.
Lectures 15 & 16
Readings: Velleman: “A Right of Self-Termination”, Velleman: “Against the
Right to Die”, Thompson: “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments”
It is morally permissible to kill yourself but only under very specific
circumstances when a person’s dignity has been lost. Whether it is permissible to
aid someone else’s suicide is less clear because it is dependant on many factors in
the doctor’s intentions, but there are specific situations in which it is morally
permissible.
The value of personhood
-there is a greater inherent value to life that makes suicide not ok all the
time
•velleman quotes kant here: “trading one’s person in exchange for
benefits…denigrates the value of personhood” (614)
•similarly people have to right to sell themselves into slavery, even
willingly, because it is harming themselves and violating their
personhood
-if someone’s life has greater value, then it’s not permissible for them to
kill themselves
•velleman here quotes darwall: “a person’s good is a rational object
for anyone who cares about that person” (610)
•people normally have moral claims on others – if people depend on
you – then it is wrong to desert them
•scanlon expanded this to what’s good for you doesn’t matter if you
don’t matter
-if there is something that makes you matter, then this gives
reason for you to stay alive and does not make suicide
permissible
When dignity is lost
-the idea of dignity is the basis of the kantian moral theory
•this theory says that dignity is a value that makes a person’s good
matter and which a person has in himself but not for anyone else
-dignity normally gives reason for a person to stay alive, but sometimes it is
the reason a person can kill themselves
•when someone is to the point that out of respect for themselves they
should be dead then it is permissible
•when pain has irretrievable undermined the patient’s dignity –
dying for the sake of dignity not of self-interest
-like a corpse that is buried or burned so as not to see it decay,
or a tattered flag that is properly destroyed to save them from
their dignity being disgraced
Killing vs. letting die
-when the question is about whether you can aid someone else’s suicide if
the above criteria are met, it focuses on killing vs. letting die
•with a physician there is a big difference between pulling the plug
on a life support machine and injecting a lethal drug in someone’s
arm
•it is never permissible to actively kill someone, according to
Thomson
•it is sometimes ok to let them die, though you cannot say that this is
always true because a someone who sneaks into a hospital to unplug
their enemy is not justified in doing so
•the difference is that in one the patient is dying of their underlying
medical condition and in the other they are being killed by the doctor
•from lecture “a doctor has a liberty-right to not provide aid, or to
stop providing it” when appropriate
-the patient’s consent is an important part to letting die as well
•a patient who has been put on a respirator has the right to continue
to use it, just like someone leasing a house has the right to continue
(Thomson 504)
•when the patient gives her liberty-right to the doctor to unplug, that
is when it is morally permissible to do so
The Principle of Double Effect
-this says that if the good effect of an action is proportionally good enouh
for morality’s sake, they may perform the act if they only intend the good
effect but they are fully aware of the bad effects (510)
•this sites the doctor’s aims as important to the decision
-not entirely conclusive because Thomson says this covers some but not all
drug cases
-basically, one may knowingly bring about bad effects if they are not
intended either as ends or as means according to Scanlon
In general the hardest thing about aiding someone in suicide is knowing whether
their situation is really one in which that last resort is permissible. How would one
know that their dignity is lost and that they do not matter to anyone without truly
being in their shoes? The facts of whether the doctor’s situation is then permissible
is just very specific and difficult to generalize about but. Suicide is normally not
morally permissible except in the few specific cases outlined here.
Question 7
The Principle of Double Effect states that although it is permissible under
some circumstances to act in a way that one can foresee will lead to the death
of an innocent person, it is always impermissible to aim at an innocent
person’s death, either as your end or as your chosen means. Why would this
principle seem to be correct? Evaluate the objections to it raised by Judith
Thomson.
Intro:
1. What the principle of double effect is: although it is permissible under
some circumstances to act in a way that one can foresee will lead to the death of
an innocent person, it is always impermissible to aim at an innocent person’s
death, either as your end or as your chosen means.
2. How it is appealed to: philosophers use it to explain the moral difference
between Bystander and Hospital cases and the permissibility of assisted suicide
(killing and letting die does not suffice)
Why would this principle be correct:
1. It seems to fit with what we instinctively believe morally. We recognize
it as morally wrong to intend to hurt an innocent person but we can
readily think of circumstances in which we would choose to hurt an
innocent person rather than do something else (bystander at the switch);
in which choosing to hurt an innocent person appears our best/the right
option.
circumstances in which our best option is to choose a path (literal or figurative)
that will make it the case that we will have caused the death of an innocent person.
2. It makes sense from a utilitarian perspective. We want to be able to
allow acts that might lead to the death of one if that produces the better
result (the result being not killing five). Moreover, we want to be able to
distinguish between these types of acts and those, which intend the
death of an innocent person to make our own life better. We do not
want to fear being killed as an innocent.
Kantian perspective: we want lives to MATTER. A life cannot be used a means to
an end because life is an end in itself.
Objections to this principle:
A. Judith Thomson’s in Bystander at the Switch:
-uses PDE to articulate difference between surgeon and bystander
-the loop variant problematizes this difference…a bit of track cannot
make a significant moral difference
B. Judith Thomson in Assisted Suicide:
PDE:
1. There are certain bad effects (such as the death of an innocent
human being) that one may not bring about as one’s end or chosen
means
2. But one may knowingly bring these about if they are not intended
either as ends or as means, and if
3. What one does intend is some other effect that is sufficiently
valuable
C. JT’s objects to the idea that the good effect of pain relief may be so great that it
outweighs the negative effect of dying and thus the action, which causes both is
morally permissible. ON what grounds?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
This is an argument about intent. Can we really know
anything about the doctor’s intent?
a. Can this do the work of differentiating between druginjecting and drug-providing cases? NO
PDE assumes good and bad effect in which the bad effect is
the death of the patient – it might be good for someone to
die in a particular condition
PDE requires supposing that the doctor must not intend the
patient’s death
a. As an ends
b. As a means to an end (the end of pain relief)
Nurse wants man to be relieved of pain—and thus kills him—
this is morally impermissible according to PDE
No matter how bad the pain is, you can’t give drug
Another drug—put into coma that will lead eventually
to death…do the patient’s wishes not matter?
wants death as an END
a. you can intend a death as an end and not out of malice (ex.
Nurse who takes care of patient in coma, finds he has a
DNR equivalent and removes equipment keeping him
alive)
b. different from nurse who wants the patient to die because
of something he did to her.
i. Under PDE both are considered morally
impermissible and this feels wrong to us
do a doctor’s intentions matter to the legal permissibility of
actions? Moral permissiblity?
a. One doctor disconnects intending patient’s death as a
means to an end (patient’s pain relief). Should they get a
doctor who doesn’t intend this?
b. INTENTIONS should not be the fault line. Should turn
on the patient’s wishes and condition
According to PDE, the question whether it is morally permissible for the
doctor to inject a lethal drug turns on whether the doctor would be doing
so intending death or only intending relief from pain. That is just an
absurd an idea.
If a doctor intends death as an end because he wants to enact revenge,
that matters morally. BUT, it is not morally impermissible UNLESS
the patient does not want to be injected
c. while it matters morally that she intends to kill the patient
out of spite, it is not morally impermissible because the
patient wants to be lethally injected/drugged. It says that
she is morally BAD.
i. The question whether it is morally permissible for a
person to do a thing just is not the same as the
question whether the person who does it is thereby
shown to be a bad person
d. fear that leads to the persistence of PDE: if we agree that
the agent’s intentions in acting are irrelevant to the
question whether he may act, then we must become
consequentialists.
i. This is not true. RIGHTS TRUMP UTILITIES.
1. What fixes whether an act would infringe a
right is not the agent’s intentions but rather
his circumstances, that what, in virtue of his
circumstances, he would in fact be doing to,
or not doing for, his victim
2. We are not forced to become
consequentialists by virtue of a commitment
to distinguishing between the moral worth of
a person who does a thing and the moral
permissibility or impermissibility of his
doing it.
Question 8 Outline
Slavery strikes most of us now as morally wrong. But there have been other
times and places when it was widely practiced and not universally
disapproved of. Could our belief that it would be wrong for us to have an
institution of slavery be defended in a way that does not imply that such a
practice was also wrong for other societies (such as the ancient Greeks and
Romans)? Defend your answer. Explain why theories we have read in the
course (such as Utilitarianism, Contractualism, or Harman’s relativism) that
seem to support an answer different from yours do not do so, or else are
mistaken.
Possible thesis: Slavery is and has always been morally wrong. Quite
clearly,there have been times historically where slavery has been practiced
widely. However, this does not change the fact that enslaving some to serve
others is always immoral.
This view could be supported by Mill's Utilitarianism:
1) Although slavery COULD be seen as promoting the greatest aggregate
happiness,
Mill clarifies the relationship between the importance of promoting the greatest
utility and the importance of protecting individual rights in Chapter V of his
Essay "Utilitarianism". See pages 314-338 in Ryan.
2) See page 304 on how Mill views history as humankind's process of learning
about morality. In this way, slavery can be seen as a historical "mistake" from
which humankind must learn.
3) Happiness of each individual as having "indissoluble association between his
own happiness and the good of the whole" (Ryan 289). Therefore, slavery of
individuals as injurious to aggregate good/happiness.
4) Mill's ideal of "unity" with fellow creatures. Compare to Scanlon's basic
theory of Contractualism.
This view could also be supported by Scanlon's Contractualism:
1) Contractualism: ideal morality that of being able to justify your actions to
others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject. (Pg 43/ 154) Could
slavery ever be justified to slaves on grounds that they could not reasonably
reject?
2) Compare to Mill's idea of "unity" in "Utilitarianism".
Therefore, slavery is always wrong. : )
11. Slavery strikes most of us now as morally wrong. But there have been
other times and places when it was widely practiced and not universally
disapproved of. Could our belief that it would be wrong for us to have an
institution of slavery be defended in a way that does not imply that such a
practice was also wrong for other societies (such as the ancient Greeks and
Romans)? Defend your answer. Explain why theories we have read in the
course (such as Utilitarianism, Contractualism, or Harman’s relativism) that
seem to support an answer different from yours do not do so, or else are
mistaken.
I Utilitarian response
a) Definition: An action is right if it leads to greater happiness than next best
alternative.
i) Bentham argues that an action or policy is right if and only if it leads to
a greater sum of happiness than any available alternative.
ii) Bentham reduces the questions of right, wrong, rights, justice, to
questions of “the good”
b) This “good” means that the best state of a world can be produced, and when
this is produced, the greatest amount of happiness is achieved. General
happiness here is the standard for morality.
i) This standard of “good” can be applied to actions that people commit
(Act Utilitarianism) or in terms of rules and motives.
c) Utilitarianism gives a systematic account of right and wrong, but there are
exceptions or cases where it seems clear that an act would be wrong even
though it would have better consequences than any alternative, such as the
example of keeping as slaves from certain perspectives (Greek/Roman)
i) Yet, here one might argue that SECURITY and individual rights take
precedence over a mass sum of happiness and must thereby take priority
over it.
d) The question of Security is one of what constitutes a RIGHT.
i) Mill states that I right should be guranteed BECAUSE of utility.
ii) Definition of a right – a claim of an individual that society ought to
protect.
iii) This is the OUGHT of expediency
e) Complicating Factors
i) In the keeping of slaves, what about the question of SECURITY? Their
happiness?
ii) If slaves in ancient society would bring the greatest amount of
happiness, then is that a good? is collective happiness more important
that the individual?
iii) But this applies in our society as well. There is no temporal quality
here. This is not the position that holds – unless Security is the right we
need before all else. Maybe in the past keeping slaves was the only way
to guarantee other individual’s security through, but doesn’t this
establish a hierarchy of individuals?
II Contractualist Response
a) Definition: Act is wrong if it would not be permitted under a system of
general rules that no one can reasonably reject as a basis for informed,
unforced, general agreement.
b) We can reasonably reject keeping on the informed, unforced, general
agreement of our society that we do not wish to violate anyone’s rights, and
that we deem keeping slaves as unjust.
c) In the past, perhaps this view of keeping slaves as not viewed as inhumane
and unjust, but that there was a that not all individuals were equal and
thereby this was a legitimate response that could be justified
d) The individuals defending the keeping of slaves would want to be moral
because they would have reason to care whether their actions are justifiable
to others on grounds that they have reason to accept. If our society does not
think it is proper to keep slaves, the assumption is that the government
would not want to carry out this act because society would not deem it
justifiable.
e) In Contractualism, there is a focus on individuals instead of the general
collective. In utilitarianism, individual happiness doesn’t matter if greatest
happiness is more. A Contractualist view must consider how an action
(slavery) would affect individuals.
f) Complicating Factors:
i) Contractualism requires individual judgments of right and wrong and it
does not provide concrete answers. If the individuals that constitute
society could change, then so could the contractualist account.
(1) Other factors could affect their judgment, such as the ability to
reason
(2) If both societies had equal abilities to reason, perhaps in ancient
societies it would not have been acceptable to approve of slavery
(3) we cannot justify that it would be acceptable for them to keep slaves
and not for our current society if we suggest that a human’s ability to
reason was the same.
III Harman’s Relativism
a) Inner agreements: a group of people reach an implicit agreement or come to
a tacit understanding about their relations with one another” (3).
b) According to this agreement, moral principles are formed mainly a result of
a bargaining process (13).
c) Why is this bargaining process necessary?
i) People will bargain on the basis of their individual needs and goals.
ii) Because people tend to have similar goals and needs in their respective
societies, whether it is for their survival or general well being, they will
bargain to come to a basic understanding in terms of those individual
needs.
d) Because societies have varying needs, they will inevitably also have
different moral principles.
i) the ultimate moral principles that arise in each society can vary from
place to place; yet because they are still grounded on these shared
intentions, they avoid being labeled as arbitrary.
e) Why can it be acceptable for a different society to permit slavery and not in
another?
i) we cannot pass our own inner judgments on other societies and people if
we do not share the same moral understanding.
ii) From this we can conclude that Harman would say that we cannot pass
judgment and say that slavery is wrong in a society we are not part of.
iii) If a society accepts practice, through bargaining, then we should accept
this practice as morally sound. This practice would become an ultimate
moral principle to that society.
iv) Equally, another society, like ours, may come to the understanding that
slavery is not permissible, but they too had to have come to that ultimate
principle through an implicit agreement from members of their society.
Therefore, we understand that different ultimate standards apply to
different societies.
Question 9
Singer appeals to the example of the child drowning in a pond to support the
more moderate of his principles requiring us to aid those who are living in
extreme poverty. In what ways is the case of the drowning child like the case
of world poverty? In what ways is it different? Consider whether any of the
ways in which it is different undermine the duty to aid.
I.
Introduction
a. Singer’s Approach to Addressing Moral Issues
i. “Downward” argument from a general theory of morality
1. He strives to find “first principles,” and then works
downward to determine how to react to actual
scenarios
2. He believes that society must alter its moral scheme
a. Current moral scheme finds it acceptable to
looking at disaster relief as “charity.” There is
nothing wrong with not giving. Singer believes
this view can’t be justified.
b. First principles for the duty to aid
i. “Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, medical care
are bad”
II.
ii. Strong version- requires the prevention bad things from
happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing
something of comparable moral significance. Reduces us to
marginal utility. Singer thinks this is the correct one.
1. Moderate version- prevent bad things from happening
until the point at which we’d have to give up anything
of moral significance, even if it is less severe than the
suffering we could be preventing
a. Seems simple but has grand implications for
society
b. Principle takes “no account of proximity or
distance”
c. Principle does not distinguish between cases in
which one or many people are capable of
providing assistance
Comparison
a. Culpability
i. Only one person at the pond who has power to save the girl,
one assignable individual
1. Whereas, Billions of people have ability to send a
check (of any amount). Can point around to many who
didn’t pay also.
a. Singer argues that technology & transportation
makes everyone our neighbor. If we accept any
principle of impartiality, universalizability, or
equality – we must not discriminate who we
offer aid to, whether neighbor or far away
citizen.
b. Nature Of Benefit
i. All or nothing; if there is intervention, the girl lives
1. Whereas, if there is intervention, no guarantee
anyone’s life is saved (check may go to admin, money
may not be enough to pay for a single meal, a few
meals won’t keep them from eventual death)
a. Singer does not directly address this. He would
argue that people often feel they must be
physically close to ascertain how they could
best help, but he would say we have to believe
that our aid will help.
c. Qualifications
i. Almost anyone is qualified to save the girl (simply requires
someone tall enough to wade through water or just minimum
swimming skills)
1. Whereas, not everyone is qualified to donate without
doing moral harm to themselves, according to
moderate principle. Strong principle would require
harm to the point of marginal utility.
a. Singer argues if everyone qualified paid the
minimum amount, no one would have to pay
more than their share – ideal case.
Another perspective
a. Contractualism
i. View the situation in terms of what we owe each other and
what behavior could be reasonably accepted or rejected as
moral behavior. The relationship between the afflicted and
possible donor is very relevant.
1. Those afflicted in distant developing countries will
likely never come into contact with me. A drowning
child I walk by is part of my community, and therefore
should be treated differently. This is not arguing that
the suffering far away should not be helped. Rather, it
does argue that proximity is relevant.
2. For example, it would seem inappropriate for many to
treat a complete stranger equal to one’s mother
Conclusions
a. Depends on what principles and perspective you hold
i. If you are a downside, act utilitarian who agrees society must
work together to minimize harm (but not, necessarily, to
increase benefit) then you would be convinced by the strong
principle that the duty to aid is just as persuasive.
ii. If you are a contractualist, proximity and assignability
become more important. If I had equivalent relationship with
my dependants as I do the starving in India, then I should aid
just the same. However, more likely that these factors will
undermine.
III.
IV.
Singer appeals to the example of the child drowning in a pond to support the
more moderate of his principles requiring us to aid those who are living in
extreme poverty. In what ways is the case of the drowning child like the case
of world poverty? In what ways is it different? Consider whether any of the
ways in which it is different undermine the duty to aid.
I.
Singer’s Arguments
II.
III.
IV.
a. Strong Principle: If it is in our power to prevent something bad from
happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral
importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
i. Murphy’s Simple Principle
b. Moderate Principle: If one can prevent something very bad from
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant,
we ought, morally, to do it.
c. Case of the Drowning Child: If I am walking past a shallow pond
and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child
out.
Argument for the moderate principle
a. In the pond example the sacrifice is getting my clothes muddy 
relatively insignificant because presumably the death of a child
would be a very bad thing
b. By “without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance”
he means without causing anything else comparably bad to happen,
something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral
good comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can
prevent.
c. By this definition we all have the ability/requirement to aid those
who are living in extreme poverty.
Differences
a. The pond case differs from the extreme poverty case only in virtue
of distance and the fact that others could also help.
b. Differences
i. Principle takes no account of proximity or distance. It makes
no moral difference whether the person I can help is a
neighbor’s child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name
I shall never know ten thousand miles away.
1. The development of the world into a “global village”
has made a difference as we can direct our aid to a
refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get
it to someone in our own block.
ii. The principle makes no distinction between cases in which I
am just one among millions in the same position.
1. Numbers don’t lessen obligation. I should not consider
that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of
the pond if on looking around I see other people no
further away than I am who have also noticed the child
but are doing nothing.
Challenges
a. Requires us to “alter our moral conceptual scheme”
i. Distinguish between duty and charity
1. The traditional distinction cannot be drawn, or at least,
not in the place we normally draw it. Giving money is
regarded as an act of charity; it is not thought that there
is anything wrong with not giving. The man who is not
charitable is not condemned. Singer argues we ought
to give money away, and it is wrong not to do so.
ii. Alter our spending
1. We don’t have to give until we reach the level or
marginal utility - that is, the level at which by giving
more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my
dependents as I would relieve by my gift.
2. We would have to give away enough to ensure that the
consumer society, dependent as it is on people
spending on trivia rather than giving to famine relief,
would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely.
b. Does it demand more than one’s fair share?
i. Murphy: Commonsense morality will require us to promote
good where the cost to me is slight, but typically not where
the cost to me is high, as it is the case of the poverty relief.
ii. My optimal level of sacrifice in the pond case would be no
different under full compliance, whereas in the case of
poverty relief it would clearly be much less under full
compliance.
iii. Accept over-demandingness objection?
1. Belief that there are limits to the demands of
morality’s requirements that we promote to the good.
It is a belief any person might reasonably have
(Murphy).
Question 10
Murphy presents three principles of beneficence: the Simple Principle, the
Limited Principle, and the Cooperative Principle. Describe a case in which
giving aid would be required by the Simple Principle but not by either of the
other two principles. Would failing to give aid in such a case be wrong
according to the account of wrongness that Mill defends in Chapter V of
Utilitarianism? Would the person who would be helped by such an action
have a right to be aided, according to Mill?
Simple Principle:
Agents are required sacrifice, or act in a way that will have the greatest positive
effect on the general utility. The agent is morally required to give to the greatest
extent possible without diminishing the overall utility. In this principle, the overall
utility is negatively affected when the agent sacrifices to the point where he is not
able provide for his essential needs (i.e., food, shelter, health etc)
Limited Principle
Agent-centered prerogative. Agent subject to Simple Principle but has a
prerogative. Agent weighs his interests vs. others’, giving them more weight than
interests of others (multiplying them by some factor). The greater the agent’s selfinterest, (or multiplying factor) the less that will be demanded of him. Serves to
limit the demands that the Simple Principle makes on agents. However, in this
“agent-centered prerogative” (Murphy, 275) agents cannot adequately respond to
fluctuations in the compliance of other capable agents.
Cooperative Principle
Requires agents to give only their fair share (what they would be required to give
under full compliance of capable agents), even if giving more under partial
compliance would improve the outcome
Describe a case in which giving aid would be required by the Simple Principle
but not by either of the other two principles.
A small self-sufficient island in the pacific is subject to a devastating natural
disaster. There is massive damage and loss of life. A Relief organization starts a
campaign asking individuals from unaffected nations to supply aid. After several
weeks into the campaign, there has been an insignificant amount of relief aid
donated (visible on a donation meter featured on the organization’s website).
In this case, if an agent was asked to contribute to this relief fund, the
requirements would vary between the three principles.
 The Simple Principle would say that the agent must sacrifice as much
toward the general welfare without diminishing the overall utility. So even
though no one else has/will contribute, the agent must give to the greatest
extent possible, even though his contribution is not significant enough to
create greater utility
 Cooperative Principle-would require little or nothing from this person, b/c
he is only required to contribute that which would be his fair share under
full-compliance
 The Limited Principle would also require nothing of the agent. If agent
realizes that no one else is complying, then he could increase his self
interests, to the point where nothing is required of him
Would failing to give aid in such a case be wrong according to the account of
wrongness that Mill defends in Chapter V of Utilitarianism?
Wrongness:
Wrong  ought to be punished. It would be expedient (promote greater utility) if
society took action against inexpedient actions. A wrong is an actions that if
punished by society, or one’s conscience, leads to greater overall utility.
In Mill’s framework, it would be expedient for people to give aid in this situation.
However, the punishment of their action (or inaction) cannot be justified.
Would the person who would be helped by such an action have a right to be
aided, according to Mill?
Mill defines a right as a claim to something that society ought to defend us in the
protections of. It would be expedient (promote greater general utility) to defend
them or punish those who have infringed upon them.
Although not aiding others could be seen as morally wrong because punishment or
sanctions for not doing so would be expedient, but it is not unjust because agent
has not infringed on rights. Not being generous, charitable, beneficent (Lyons) is
not a requirement under Mill’s framework. The agent’s actions are not unjust
because the benefit it brings each individual seems too remote or not that great,
and, therefore, not so clear that each individual has a right to such a benefit. No
one has a moral right to our beneficence, because the society does not have to
protect it.
Question 10
Murphy’s Simple Principle of Beneficence:
-- The principle that we are morally required to help others to the point of
marginal utility; we are required to help others until our suffering becomes as
great as their suffering.
-- A fundamentally utilitarian principle – for these principles require us to give to
the highest degree possible, and therefore optimize the overall outcome.
The Limited Principle:
-- Requires us to give as much as possible up to a certain point; Murphy proposes
the “multiplying factor idea:” you should weight your interests more heavily that
others’ interests. But these limited principles are difficult to defend, for it is hard
to find a well-defined ‘limit’ that applies in all cases.
The Cooperative Principle:
-- Main objection to the Simple Principles: it is too demanding.
-- Murphy’s Cooperative Principle dissolves this objection: we are required to
perform the actions that make the outcome best except in cases of partial
compliance.
-- Partial compliance: cases in which some individuals do not act to make the
outcome best. In cases of partial compliance: we are required to give only the
amount that would be optimal in a case of full compliance.
-- In the simplest terms: the Cooperative Principle requires us to do our fair share.
Cases where giving aid would be required by the Simple Principle but
not by the Cooperative Principle or the Limited Principle:
-- Any case in which the amount of giving would be extreme.
--For example, the real-life case of the tsunami that hit South Asia in December
2004.
-- Assume the tsunami victims were the only needy people in the world, and that
the situation was one of partial compliance.
-- The Limited Principle sets a limit to how much you need to give; once you have
given that much, you are no longer required to give.
-- Cooperative Principle sets a limit to how much you need to give, once you have
given as much as you would need to give to optimize the outcome under full
compliance, you are no longer required to give.
-- On the other hand, the Simple principle would require every individual not
affected by the tsunami to help to the highest degree possible without sacrificing
anything of comparable moral importance. That is, it does not matter if you have
already satisfied the Cooperative Principle and the Limited Principle requirements,
you still must give to the point of marginal utility.
Would failing to give aid in such a case be wrong according to the account of
wrongness that Mill defends in Chapter V of Utilitarianism?
-- Mill’s wrongness: something is considered wrong only when it is thought that
the person should be punished either by law, opinion, or conscience. That is, it
would promote general utility to sanction that activity.
-- So the question is: Would it promote general utility to discourage people from
not giving to the point of marginal utility? Or, equivalently, would it promote
general utility to encourage people to give to the point of marginal utility?
-- I would argue: YES, Mill would think that failing to give aid in this case is
wrong. To promote maximum happiness, everyone should give to the point of
marginal utility. Thus, to sanction the act of not giving would promote maximum
happiness.
Would the person who would be helped by such an action have a right to be
aided, according to Mill?
-- For Mill, a right means that a person has a valid claim on society to protect him
or her in the possession of that right.
-- A right is not separate from justice, but rather a manifestation of the other
aspects of justice: the desire for punishment and the fact that there is an assignable
person who has been harmed.
-- The reason for society to defend rights: to promote general utility (this is how
Mill links justice and utility). Rights like the right for everyone to have security –
something people need in order to do anything else – need to be defended in order
to promote maximum utility.
-- We could appeal to this right of security – a right that Mill emphasizes as
fundamental to our well-being as humans – to answer this question:
The person who would be aided does have a right to his or her security –
and Mill would argue that it is worth it for society to defend all individuals’
rights to security.
Question 11
Ruse argues that evolutionary explanation undermines the idea that there is a
place for rational justification of our moral beliefs, because “There is no
guarantee that evolution has directed us to believe precisely that which
coincidentally happens to be objectively true.” (Ruse, p. 507) How might a
utilitarian or a contractualist respond to this claim? Assess this response.
Ruse’s point: If evolution has favored people that have certain types of moral
predispositions and methods of determining moral ‘truths,’ then we cannot be
certain that the moral truths we discover is actually true or “objective” as opposed
to just an expression of our tendencies in a certain train of thought (such as our
tendency, as social beings, to be compassionate towards one another). Thus, Ruse
would argue, we have no guarantee that the evolution has directed us to believe
precisely that which coincidentally happens to be the objective moral truth. He
argues, “Success of the successful” is a function of their superior features, and
natural selection promotes human cooperation (biological altruism) by
evolutionarily favoring those who help each other and are ‘altruistic.’ It then
follows that humans are programmed to think in certain ways and are motivated
with the need to cooperate (social contract). There is no room for the rational
justification of morality since we can’t tell if “no killing” is a natural tendency or
the objective moral truth. Regardless, Ruse believes that we have the choice to be
moral or not moral (steal or not steal), but we cannot decide in the beliefs we have
(stealing is right or wrong?) The danger to suggesting that morality has no
biological basis is that we might not believe in it and stop cooperating, which
would cause social collapse.
However, if we redefine what is meant by morality by the Utilitarian perspective,
then Ruse’s argument is no longer valid. If we take the Utilitarian standpoint then
what is moral is defined by the actions that should be overall encouraged within a
society in order to promote greatest happiness. Conversely, immoral actions are
those that should be overall discouraged within a society to prevent unhappiness.
From this standpoint whatever actions or tendencies in actions that promote the
overall survival of our species above others can be seen as nothing but good, since
everyone dying off should be greatly discouraged. Similarly, evolution ensures
that the traits that are more conducive to survival propagate and persist within a
society over those that don’t. For instance, if there were two populations of
people: one that were predisposed to think that killing out of emotional urges was
okay and another one that was predisposed to think that it wasn’t, the population
that thought that killing out of emotional urges was okay would soon perish, as
they would all kill each other. The population that learned to restrain their
emotional urges, on the other hand, would persist, and over time, the vast majority
of the population would be predisposed to intuitively think that killing out of an
urge is not okay. As a result, evolution ensures that the tendencies that persist are
in fact the ones that are truly moral, as seen from the Utilitarian standpoint,
because they, better than all others, ensure the our survival.
Ruse argues that evolutionary explanation undermines the idea that there is a
place for rational justification of our moral beliefs, because “There is no
guarantee that evolution has directed us to believe precisely that which
coincidentally happens to be objectively true.” (Ruse, p. 507) How might a
utilitarian or a contractualist respond to this claim? Assess this response.
Ruse, Michael, “The significance of evolution,” A Companion to Ethics, Edited by
Peter Singer, pp.500 – 510
Harman, Gilbert, “Moral Relativism Defended,” The Philosophical Review, (Vol.
LXXXIV, No.1): 3 – 22
Evolution is not directed or progressive.
The most fit individuals are the most fit as a result of their environment,
which can be varied and arbitrary. The traits they possess which characterize their
fitness are not objectively better.
David Hume’s is/ought barrier is a relevant in explaining how how
biological adaptations and fitness do not translate into moral superiority or
objectivity
The utilitarian links morality to the maximization of expediency of
pleasures and considers an action wrong by whether or not the punishment of such
an action would increase expediency. Similarly, a contractualist would argue that
an action is wrong only if it cannot be reasonably justified to other people.
These views advocate that a rational justification does not have to be one
that links moral values to an objective system of truths, but simply to another
universal principle such as expediency or justifiability. The basis of these
principals might often be related to objectively advantageous utilities that can be
rationally justified. Although they may be dependent on the environment, being
well fed, sheltered and protected are objectively related to the health of
individuals.
Ruse supposes that people who endorse a moral system are truly suppose
themselves to be in touch with an objective framework of morality, and that this is
biologically advantageous.
Question 12: Moral Blame and Responsibility
Suppose that human males have a greater tendency toward sexual
promiscuity than human females, and that this tendency has an evolutionary
explanation. Would it follow, on any of the views of moral responsibility that
we have discussed, that males are not properly blamed for infidelity, or that
they should be blamed less severely than females? State clearly the account of
moral responsibility and moral criticism that you are relying on, and explain
how the conclusions in question follow from this view.
Defend the view that men ARE properly blamed for infidelity using Peter’s
Strawson’s account of moral responsibility.
Background:
 Peter Strawson’s idea of moral blame and responsibility involves the reactive
attitudes, which could be resentment, indignation and guilt. A person is only
responsible for an action if others react to him or her in these ways.
 These reactive attitudes could be suspended on two accounts: Excusing
conditions and Exempting Conditions. Exempting Conditions are relevant in
this case.
Why one could argue that males should NOT be blamed:
 One could argue that Males with the trait that makes them more sexually
promiscuous should be exempted from reactive attitudes because their
promiscuous behavior does not reflect their moral self.
 Moral self is the way they would act had they not been subjected to other
factors such. Biological factors are influencing their actions, hence should not
be blamed. In short, “They are not themselves” and have never been
themselves.
Implication of previous argument:
 Not holding males responsible for promiscuous because of their biological trait
implies that determinism matters in suspending reactive attitude. This belief in
determinism would require us to extend the reactive attitudes universally.
 Critics would argue that we should all be exempted from moral blame because
every wrong action is due to some imperfection in us, and all our behaviors do
not reflect our moral self.
Peter Strawson’s Point
 Peter Strawson’s view asserts that suspending reactive attitudes is independent
of the belief in determinism. We don’t need determinism in order to suspend
moral blame.
 If determinism was relevant, we could refer to all males with this trait as
“abnormal” i.e. they differ from females by being more promiscuous. So
according to exempting condition, they should not be held responsible for their
behavior.
 But we all act badly due to some imperfection in us. Therefore we are all
“abnormal.” That cannot be the case that everyone is abnormal.
Conclusion:
 The best way to settle this issue is by looking at how individuals are and not
how they came to be. We need not focus on facts that made males
promiscuous. We hold males morally responsible for their promiscuity based
on their character now. Though background facts are relevant, they are only
evidence that some other exempting condition is satisfied but on their own,
they would not matter.
 So men are just as responsible for promiscuous behavior as females.
Exempting males because of their trait would require that everyone be
exempted from all moral responsibility.
Question 12
Suppose that human males have a greater tendency toward sexual
promiscuity than human females, and that this tendency has an evolutionary
explanation. Would it follow, on any of the views of moral responsibility that
we have discussed, that males are not properly blamed for infidelity, or that
they should be blamed less severely than females? State clearly the account of
moral responsibility and moral criticism that you are relying on, and explain
how the conclusions in question follow from this view.
 Smart’s article and his account of moral responsibility and criticism show that,
when applied to this case, the human males should be blamed less severely
than females.
o The reasoning applied to the case of Tommy and the aluminum plate
can be used here as well
o Strawson argues against moral responsibility, stating that because we
are not morally responsible for who we are, then we cannot be morally
responsible for our actions either
o Smart supports The Causal Thesis (all our actions are caused by factors
out of our control) to a point
o Building on this theory, Smart introduces the concept of free will to
show how placing blame is dependent upon whether one ‘could have’
acted differently in a given situation. Example: the lazy Tommy ‘could
have’ done his homework but didn’t. ‘could have’ = within one’s own
control
o ‘could have’ is the opposite of ‘pure chance’
o If something happens out of “pure chance” then no one is morally
responsible because there is no free will involved
o This ‘could have’ distinction is how one can attribute praise and blame
o Praise acknowledges something good or commendable in someone or
their actions, whereas the opposite of praise is broken up into ‘dispraise’
and ‘blame’, the difference between the two is the ascription of moral
responsibility
o Dispraise: an action or quality that is disliked, but lacking in moral
criticism or responsibility (praise and dispraise as forms of ‘grading’ but
not judging)
o Blame: an action where moral responsibility is ascribed because of the
choice made by the person i.e. The lazy Tommy can be blamed for not
doing his homework because he chose not to do it, whereas if Tommy
was stupid, he cannot be morally responsible for not doing his
homework because he lacks intelligence
o Metaphysical Determinism: No free will and every human action is out
of our hands due to preexisting circumstances
 The Case of Sexual Promiscuity in Males
o There are two distinctions to make here: The predisposition and The
choice
o The Predisposition: The greater tendency toward sexual promiscuity in
males is apparently a result of evolution and therefore is out of any
man’s control. In a moral context, he cannot be blamed for something
that’s out of his control. This is a result of “pure chance”
o The Choice: By definition, the decision to engage in sexual activity,
whether predisposed or not, is a choice attributed to one’s own free will
and therefore the person making the choice is morally responsible.
Independent of rape, every sexual encounter involves a choice and even
if a male engages in sexual activity more often as a result of his genetic
makeup, he still ‘could have’ acted differently, just like the females.
o Smart would find this troublesome to assess because the ‘tendency’ is
not absolute like the aluminum plate and therefore not wholly
deterministic. As Smart writes on pg. 298, “whatever the initial
conditions had been (within a wide range) [the aluminum plate] would
not have broken”, but every time a man has the opportunity to engage in
sexual relations, his evolutionary tendency does not completely free him
of moral responsibility and making a choice.
Therefore, the latter conclusion drawn—that human males should be blamed less
severely than females—is the most appropriate because the biological tendency
removes a certain
amount of moral responsibility but does not entirely free them of blame or
judgment.
Lecture 16
Here are my notes on sections I and II:
Velleman’s argument about choice and consent:
Concerned with the moral force of choice
Velleman rejects the following idea: To give people more choice is
to give them more alternatives. If they do not like the alternatives, they can
simply reject them.
Instead, he says: choice -- having the option to do something -- is not
always costless. Sometimes, having a choice is valuable. But, Velleman
claims that the value of having a choice depends on the circumstances.
(Example: if you’re drunk, it would be better NOT to have the choice of
driving.)
The key reason why choice may not be good is because if you do not
choose something, you must refuse it. The option hurts old and sick people,
because they would have to justify life. (The Gift-giving analogy: people
feel obligations to give gifts, sometimes better for them not to give them the
option of doing favors or giving gifts.)
Here are my notes on section III:
Velleman questions: Is it a good thing to have options? Does consent matter
morally?
His two ideas about dignity:
Narrow sense: violating dignity if it embarrasses, humiliates. But the word
is often used more broadly, as the moral status and value of human beings (For
example, we might say that it is incompatible with the status of being human that
you are jailed without trial – it is an affront to your dignity.). Velleman appeals to
this broader sense of dignity.
Value of like should not be judged on ‘potential’
His main argument is by presupposition: an opponent thinks that like is
worth it if it is beneficial to them – but in order for it to matter that things are good
for you, you must matter.
What does ‘matter’ mean? Gives rise to moral claims on other people
Cases: Dying sooner would be better for you, but if ‘your sake’ matters,
there is reason to keep you alive, because you are valuabe – this is a little
paradoxical, and Scanlon does not agree with it.
--
Question 6
Is it ever morally permissible to kill yourself? If it is not, explain why not. If
so, explain what conditions must be fulfilled in order for this to be
permissible. If there are conditions under which suicide is permissible, and a
person for whom these conditions are fulfilled asks someone else for help in
ending his or her life, could it be wrong for that person to give this help?
Explain why or why not.
*NOTE: These are just a couple of ways to approach the question. Obviously it is
very open-ended and there can even be disagreement within these models, so take
this response with a grain of salt.*
We can address these issues using two key ethical frameworks studied in class,
namely utilitarianism and contractualism.
Utilitarianism
First, it is useful to revisit Mill’s definition of “wrongness” as presented in Chapter
V of Utilitarianism. An act is wrong if it would promote more happiness on the
whole if people were intrinsically opposed to doing it because of punishment by
the law, social sanctions, or the dispositions of their own consciences. Strictly
applied, therefore, it does not appear that suicide would be considered morally
wrong. Certainly, a person who commits suicide cannot be punished by either the
law or social sanctions. It is also fairly obvious that someone who takes his own
life cannot subsequently be punished by the pangs of his own conscience, unless
one considers the possible internal conflicting emotions that almost always
precede such an action. Hence, since the perpetrator in this scenario is dead before
any punishment can be inflicted, it does not follow that people would be
intrinsically opposed to suicide out of fear of punishment, and therefore there is no
such opposition to promote overall happiness. It should also be noted that because
suicide is a self-affecting action, it does not, in any obvious way, affect the
security of society as a whole.
The issue of assisted suicide is a bit more complicated. In this case, it may very
well be that any prospective assistant would be intrinsically opposed to carrying
out the plan for fear of punishment. Unlike the patient, he will continue to be alive
once the suicide is completed and therefore may face punishment doled out by the
law, social sanctions, or his own conscience. Punishment by one’s own
conscience seems the most likely even in the absence of punishment given by the
state or social sanctions, and therefore it promotes the greater happiness to be
individually opposed to assisted suicide. Overall, it appears that assisted suicide,
to a utilitarian, would be wrong.
Contractualism
The basic premise of contractualism is that an act is wrong if its performance
under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the
general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for
informed, unforced general agreement. In other words, if the reasons behind an
action are justifiable such that the victim of an action cannot reasonably reject
them, then the action is morally acceptable. For example, stealing is usually
considered morally wrong; however, if the thief steals as his only means of
preventing his children from starving, it is nearly impossible for the victim of the
theft to reasonably reject the thief’s rationale for his crime. The case of suicide is
less clear, however. If one assumes that the victim is the person who commits
suicide (and him only), then it would seem that suicide is acceptable given that the
person obviously has justified his reasoning to himself. This conclusion may
change, however, if one assumes that the subject is not the only victim—his
family and/or friends may be affected as well. In such cases, it may be that no
rationale will be satisfactory for these victims (e.g. the pain of losing their loved
one would be too great), and thus suicide would be morally unacceptable.
Similarly, in the case of assisted suicide, it would be wrong for someone to help
another person to kill himself as long as the “benefits” of doing so do not
sufficiently justify the action in the eyes of those affected by it.
4. What step in Galen Strawson’s argument for the impossibility of moral
responsibility would Gary Watson or Peter Strawson (choose one) reject.
Explain why he would reject this step and evaluate his reasons.
The Basic Argument:
1. You do what you do because of the way you are
2. To be truly morally responsible for what you do you must be truly morally
responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental respects
3. You cannot be truly responsible for the way that you are, so you cannot be
truly responsible for what you do
4. This is so because the way you are is (ultimately) either the result of factors
over which you have no control, or else is due to random factors, and in
neither case is it something you are truly morally responsible for
Step Rejected by Watson:
Reject 2nd step (of short version, 3rd of long version) of Strawson’s
argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility: To be truly morally
responsible for what you do you must be truly morally responsible for the way you
are—at least in certain crucial mental respects. (Lecture 22)
G. Strawson says that this because of this we can’t be held morally
responsible for our actions
Why?
Watson is a compatibalist (Lecture 22): believes that determinism is
compatible with moral responsibility, "a choice is free just in case the person
making the choice could have chosen differently if the circumstances had been
different"
-so still have causes, e.g. china plate and aluminum plate (different plate
would lead to different actions of agent handling plate)
Don’t have to be “truly morally responsible for the way you are,” but actually it is
more like partially morally responsible
Watson-responsible for the particular things we consent to
don’t need to consider whether we are responsible for the genesis of the
entity whose characteristics necessitate those acts of consent b/c no such entity
Watson also claims we are part of a “moral community” (from P.F. Strawson)
Case of Robert Harris
Evil, kills two teens (one point blank to the head) so reactive attitude is
resentment towards him, but he was abused as a child
Is he morally responsible? Watson says yes, because he rejects the moral
community,
Watson believes that we have some sort of moral core
What puts us where we are is moral luck, if we experienced the same abuse
and had the same genes as Harris, then would we be any different?
Watson says that because of the moral core it is possible that the things that
defeated Harris wouldn’t defeat me
So people can only be responsible for what they can control, and Harris
controlled whether he was part of the moral community, and he chose to reject it.
Conclusion
Watson believes in compatibilism and that we have a moral core, which
differentiates us from others such as Harris.
*Also can discuss reactive attitudes- holding one responsible is explained by these
attitudes. Each person reacts differently in circumstances “since they are reactions
to the moral qualities exemplified by an individual’s attitudes and conduct”
(Watson, 259)
- ex. You get jostled in a crowd; you see it as rude and disrespectful
That person might have also been bumped, didn’t mean to bump you, or didn’t
notice.
This brings about question when to resent and cast responsibility and different
conditions when blame is not called upon.
-Excusing conditions- valid excuse
-Exempting conditions- exempted from blame because psychotic, being a child,
hypnotized, etc.