Topicality 1NC
“Communications” is a distinct category of infrastructure --- it’s massive
Faulkenberry 11 [Ken, MBA – University of Southern California, “Infrastructure Investment: Energy,
Transportation, Communications, & Utilities”, Arbor Asset Allocation Model Portfolio Blog, September,
http://blog.arborinvestmentplanner.com/2011/09/infrastructure-investment-energy-transportationcommunications-utilities/]
Transportation Infrastructure Over the last several decades America’s infrastructure spending has
been less than one-half other developed nations and only a quarter of emerging market countries. Civil
engineers give our transport structures low marks. Our roads, railways, ports, and airports are all judged
mediocre. It has become well recognized that we must invest more in upgrading our transportation
infrastructure. But because of the years of neglect, substantial increases in operation and maintenance
budgets will also be required. The above engineering and construction firms could also benefit from
transportation infrastructure spending. Communications Infrastructure Communications
infrastructure would include items we take for granted everyday, such as the internet, telephone, television
(including cable TV), and satellite technology. Individual companies such as Cisco (CSCO) (internet)
AT&T (T) and Verizon (VZ) (telephone), Comcast (CMCSA) (television), Boeing (BA) and Loral Space &
Communications (LORL) (satellites), all play major roles in developing the communications infrastructure.
Violation: NextGen includes ADS-B, which is communications
FAA 7 [2/14/2007, “Fact Sheet – NextGen”
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsid=8145]
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control. As
the backbone of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots
with much more accurate information that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on
runways. Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position
in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and air traffic control
facilities. When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the first time, see the
same real-time displays of air traffic, substantially improving safety. The FAA will issue a rulemaking that
will mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B across the national airspace system, and will
work closely with stakeholders to determine the timeline.
Vote negative for limits and ground – other forms of infrastructure like
communications self-evidently explode the topic and require a different
and unrelated set of negative arguments – rejecting the plan is necessary
to preserve a manageable negative research burden and preserve
competitive equity.
States CP 1NC
Text: The 50 States, all relevant territories, and the District of Columbia should fully fund the
transportation infrastructure components for the Next Generation Air Transportation System
in the United States.
States are up to the task—testing proves
Huerta, 2-27 (Michael, Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Master's in
international relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton
University, "How States Have Fostered NextGen,"
http://www.faa.gov/news/speeches/news_story.cfm?newsId=13374) JD
The reauthorization clearly reflects Congress’ interest in integrating Unmanned Aerial Systems into our national airspace. We are working on how to
select six test ranges to serve as pilot programs for the safe integration of UAS, per the reauthorization language. I know a number of states have
a very significant
interest in this particular provision, and let me assure you that we will have an open and transparent process—but it’s also
important to note that no funding was included for this provision. The reauthorization also dovetails with our continued roll out of NextGen flight
procedures around the country, which make a better use of airspace and save precious fuel. We are currently analyzing the reauthorization act’s many
provisions and expect to have a full evaluation of all the programmatic and budgetary implications completed soon. One thing that I can say for sure is
that the FAA is committed to advancing the transformation of our airspace into the Next Generation. The President’s budget for 2013 requests about $1
billion for NextGen programs—and anticipates $4 billion over the next four years. People sometimes wonder exactly what NextGen means. It can be
something that seems overwhelming and hard to explain. But in reality, it’s quite simple. It means that we are using the GPS that we all use in our cars—
and perfecting it to track and guide aircraft. This is a very simple explanation, so the engineers in the room will have to forgive me. NextGen is a whole lot
more. But in the simplest terms, we are transitioning from the 1950s-era radar technology that we have used faithfully and successfully for many
decades, to newer satellite technology. As we move forward, I welcome help from all 50 states in maximizing the benefits
of NextGen. Two years ago we formally agreed to work with NASAO to advance NextGen and I’m looking forward to signing
our formal agreement tomorrow to continue to work together cooperatively on many fronts. The National Association of State Aviation
Officials has been around since before Amelia Earhart flew her Lockheed Vega across the Atlantic Ocean. It’s been around even before the
FAA. We value our collaborative working relationship. Let me give you a few examples of where state aviation officials have partnered with us to push
NextGen forward. First, let me start with the great state of Alaska– where it really all began. Alaska proves to be a wonderful testing ground for NextGen
technology. Alaska has very challenging terrain – mountains and vast stretches of territory without radar coverage. As they say, the private aircraft is like
a minivan for the people of rural Alaska. It’s how they get around. The FAA outfitted general aviation planes with state-of-the-art NextGen cockpit
displays in Alaska to help navigate around mountains that cut off large areas from radar coverage. This gave pilots better weather information and a
clearer view of mountainous terrain. It cut the accident rate almost in half. It was a collaborative effort between industry, the FAA, the University of
Alaska at Anchorage and the state of Alaska. The project won the National Aeronautic Association’s Collier Trophy. The state of Alaska helped
us determine
where to put ground-based transmitters to test Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). They helped us choose
2008, the state legislature of Alaska created a low
interest loan program to equip aircraft with ADS-B technology. Alaska has been a great partner in helping the development and
rollout of NextGen. We’ve also worked closely with other states. In Colorado, NextGen has opened up ski towns to
tourists during all kinds of weather. Many times, bad weather causes flight delays and cancellations to remote airports during ski season
the best airports for testing, which were mostly small airports in bush Alaska. Later in
from the months of November to April. Also, because of the mountainous terrain, air traffic controllers have to follow certain guidelines that slow
operations and spreads them out more because they can’t track the aircraft using radar. Radar does not go through mountains. But NextGen has created
a better way of tracking those aircraft. A technology that communicates with a plane’s transponder solves the problem of radar blockage in the
mountains of Colorado and allows the air traffic controllers to see the planes. Now, just to be fair to Alaska, let me state that yes, this technology was
already working at Juneau International Airport. Colorado is making it work in their state at several airports. This has been a great example of
cooperation between the FAA and the state of Colorado. The state and each of the four airports contributed a total of $4 million to the
project for a technical consultant to work full time to find a solution. The state made available, at reduced cost, the
telecommunications towers where the equipment was located.
Spending DA 1NC
A. Fiscal discipline now – political pressure will lead to debt compromise
Washington Post 7/18
Washington Post 7/18/12, http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2012/jul/18/coalition-aims-to-head-offdebt-disaster/
WASHINGTON — A coalition of business leaders, budget experts and former politicians launched a $25 million
campaign yesterday to build political support for a far-reaching plan to raise taxes, cut popular retirement programs
and tame the national debt. With anxiety rising over a major budget mess looming in January, the campaign — dubbed
"Fix the Debt" — is founded on the notion that the moment is finally at hand when policymakers will be forced to
compromise on an ambitious debt-reduction strategy. After nearly three years of bipartisan negotiations, the broad
outlines of that strategy are clear, the group's leaders said during a news conference at the National Press Club: Raise
more money through a simplified tax code and spend less on Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, the primary
drivers of future borrowing. "Everyone knows in their hearts and their minds what has to be done," said Democratic
former Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell, who is chairing the group with former New Hampshire Sen. Judd Gregg, a
Republican. The goal of the campaign is to "create a safe environment where it's not only good policy, but good
politics as well." The campaign was founded by former Clinton White House Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles and
former Republican Sen. Alan Simpson of Wyoming. The two men led an independent fiscal commission that in 2010
produced a $4 trillion debt-reduction framework that has won praise from politicians across the political spectrum. But
the Bowles-Simpson plan never won the explicit backing of President Barack Obama or GOP leaders and therefore
never gained real traction in Congress. The campaign plans to launch a social media drive to persuade lawmakers to
approve a plan similar to the Bowles-Simpson framework by July 4, 2013 — replacing $600 billion in abrupt tax hikes
and sharp spending cuts that are otherwise set to take effect in January.
B. New infrastructure spending kills fiscal discipline – it undercuts the spirit of “shared
sacrifice”
O’Hanlon 10
Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 12/22/10, “THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND
AMERICAN POWER,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/1222_defense_budget/20101222_defense_budget.pd
f
So the minute that someone says, well, defense is the top constitutional obligation of the federal government and therefore
it should be protected regardless, and we should make our deficit reduction out of other accounts. If we start a conversation
in those terms, then a big constituency is going to come up and say let's protect Social Security, or let's protect college loans
for students because that's our future after all. Or let's protect science research or infrastructural development, and you
get the idea pretty soon you've lost the spirit of shared sacrifice that I think is essential if we're going to have any hope of
reducing the deficit in the coming years. So that's the basic motivation. We're not probably going to reduce the deficit
effectively, and therefore strengthen our long-term economy and the foundation for our long-term military power, if we
don't establish a spirit of shared sacrifice.
C. Loss of fiscal discipline causes a downgrade
Mark Gongloff, Wall Street Journal, 08/2/’11, [Moody’s Affirms US AAA Rating,
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/08/02/moodys-affirms-us-aaa-rating/] VN
Moody’s just came out and said, great job, USA, you get to keep your AAA rating. For now. This follows Fitch, which
earlier said more or less that they were still reviewing the US rating, a process that could take through August. They
didn’t promise they’d keep a AAA rating at the end of the process, but called the debt deal “a step in the right
direction.” Now the big shoe dangling is S&P, which is really on the hook, having sounded the loudest warning about
a downgrade. The size of the debt deal doesn’t seem to hit the $4 trillion mark S&P has said would be necessary to
keep a AAA rating. My prediction? They’ll issue a similar placeholder statement soonish. Meanwhile, let’s hear what
Moody’s has to say: Moody’s Investors Service has confirmed the Aaa government bond rating of the United States
following the raising of the statutory debt limit on August 2. The rating outlook is now negative. Moody’s placed the
rating on review for possible downgrade on July 13 due to the small but rising probability of a default on the
government’s debt obligations because of a failure to increase the debt limit. The initial increase of the debt limit by
$900 billion and the commitment to raise it by a further $1.2-1.5 trillion by yearend have virtually eliminated the risk
of such a default, prompting the confirmation of the rating at Aaa. In confirming the Aaa rating, Moody’s also
recognized that today’s agreement is a first step toward achieving the long-term fiscal consolidation needed to maintain the US
government debt metrics within Aaa parameters over the long run. The legislation calls for $917 billion in specific
spending cuts over the next decade and established a congressional committee charged with making recommendations
for achieving a further $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction over the same time period. In the absence of the committee
reaching an agreement, automatic spending cuts of $1.2 trillion would become effective. In assigning a negative
outlook to the rating, Moody’s indicated, however, that there would be a risk of downgrade if (1) there is a weakening in
fiscal discipline in the coming year; (2) further fiscal consolidation measures are not adopted in 2013; (3) the economic
outlook deteriorates significantly; or (4) there is an appreciable rise in the US government’s funding costs over and above
what is currently expected.
D. Further downgrades would create a debt spiral, crippling the economy
Rowley 12 Charles Rowley, Professor Emeritus of Economics at George Mason University, 10/15/12, “Renewed threats to U.S.
credit rating,” Charles Rowley’s blog, http://charlesrowley.wordpress.com/2012/06/15/renewed-threats-to-u-s-credit-rating/
If Moody’s downgrades and if S & P further downgrades U.S. credit ratings, this would move the United States out of the
exclusive club of AAA-rated nations, and throw into question the privileged status of U.S. Treasury securities as a safe
haven for global investors. Any significant flight from Treasuries would raise Treasury bond rates, with crippling
consequences for the economy. A 1-percentage point increase in rates would raise Treasury debt payments by $1 trillion
over the next decade, wiping out the benefits of all the budget cuts enacted by Congress last year. The dynamics of such a
process may prove to be devastating, moving the U.S. federal government onto a path of sovereign downgrades that
accelerates an already worsening fiscal situation. Greece here we come.
E. Cross-apply Royal, Pietroburgo, & Kagan
Security 1NC
The affirmative’s obsession with ranking and managing risk is the essence of security
logic
Hagmann & Cavelty, 2012 (National risk registers: Security scientism and the propagation of permanent
insecurity, John Hagmann and Myriam Dunn Cavelty, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Sage Journals Feb 15
2012)
With the demise of communism as an overarching organizing principle and crystallization point, Western security
doctrines have seen the inclusion of a growing range of different security issues from political, societal, economic and
environmental sectors. By the same token, Western security politics has also been prominently infused with risk
narratives and logics since the 1990s (Petersen, 2011; Hameiri and Kühn, 2011). Particular to risk-centric
conceptualizations of public danger is the understanding that national and international security should take into
account a varied set of natural or man-made disaster potentials, as well as other probable disruptions with potentially
grave consequences for society. Also, specific to these dangers is the profound uncertainty regarding their exact form
and likely impact, and the substantial room for conflicting interpretations surrounding them. However, precise and
‘actionable’ knowledge of looming danger is quintessential to security politics, the shift to new security
narratives notwithstanding. Without conceptions of existing or upcoming collective dangers, security schemes are
neither intelligible nor implementable. Whether the matter at hand concerns the installation of hi-tech body scanners
at airports, the construction of avalanche barriers in the Alps or diplomatic initiatives for a global anti-terror alliance,
any security agenda is rhetorically and politically grounded in a representation of national or international danger. In
recent years, the epistemological foundations of security politics have been addressed by reflexive and critical
approaches, a literature that enquires into the formation, contestation and appropriation of (in)security discourses.
Situating itself in this broader literature, this article focuses on national risk registers as a particular means for
authoritative knowledge definition in the field of national security. National risk registers are fairly recent,
comprehensive inventories of public dangers ranging from natural hazards to industrial risks and political perils.
Often produced by civil protection agencies, they seek to provide secure foundations for public policymaking,
security-related resource allocation and policy planning. Evaluating and ranking all kinds of potential insecurities,
from toxic accidents and political unrest to plant diseases, thunderstorms, energy shortages, terrorist strikes, wars
and the instability of global financial markets, risk registers stand at the intersection of the
broadening of security politics and the adoption of risk logics.
In particular, infrastructure development is the essence of modern securitization – it
translates the normal function of life into the discourse of security
Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 10 (Tom Lundborg, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Nick
Vaughan-Williams, University of Warwick, “There’s More to Life than Biopolitics: Critical Infrastructure, Resilience
Planning, and Molecular Security,” Paper prepared for the SGIR Conference, Stockholm, 7-10 September, 2010)
While the terrain of security studies is of course fiercely contested, what is common among a range of otherwise
often diverse perspectives is the core premise that ‘security’ relates to a realm of activity in some sense beyond the
‘norm’ of political life. Thus, in the language of the Copenhagen School, a securitizing move occurs when an issue not
previously thought of as a security threat comes to be produced as such via a speech act that declares an existential
threat to a referent object (Buzan et al 1998). A similar logic can be identified in approaches to security that focus on
exceptionalism: the idea, following the paradigmatic thought of Carl Schmitt, that sovereign practices rely upon the
decision to suspend the normal state of affairs in order to produce emergency conditions in which extraordinary
measures—such as martial law, for example—are legitimised. For this reason, a tendency in security studies—even
among self-styled ‘critical’ approaches – is to privilege analysis of high-profile ‘speech acts’ of elites, ‘exceptional’
responses to ‘exceptional’ circumstances, and events that are deemed to be ‘extraordinary’. Arguably this leads to an
emphasis on what we might call the ‘spectacle of security’, rather than more mundane, prosaic, and ‘everyday’ aspects
of security policy and practice. By contrast, the world of CIs necessitates a shift in the referent object of security
away from the ‘spectacular’ to the ‘banal’. Instead of high-profile speech-based acts of securitization, we are here
dealing with telecommunications and transportation networks, water treatment and sewage works, and so on: ‘semiinvisible’ phenomena that are often taken-for-granted fixtures and fittings of society, yet vital for the
maintenance of what is considered to be ‘normal daily life’. For this reason our subject matter calls for a rethinking of the very ‘stuff’ considered to be apposite for the study of international security. Indeed, analysing the role
of CIs and resilience planning in global security relations adds particular resonance to existing calls within the
literature to broaden and deepen the way in which acts of securitization are conceptualised (Bigo 2002; Balzacq
2005; McDonald 2008; Williams 2003). Those adopting more sociologically-oriented perspectives, for example, have
sought to emphasise the way in which securitizing moves can be made by institutions (as well as individuals), through
repeated activity (as well as one-off ‘acts’), and involve various media (not only ‘speech’, but visual culture, for
example). From this reconfigured point of view it is possible to then see how the design, planning, management, and
execution of CIs also constitute an arena in which processes of securitization—of physical and cyber networks—takes
place.
Their dependence on the security logic transforms the ambiguity of life into a quest for
truth and rationality, causing violence against the unknown and domesticating life.
Der Derian, 93. James Der Derian, “The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” The
Political Subject of Violence, 1993, pp. 102-105
The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference that which is not us, not certain,
not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown.
Unlike the positive will to power which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth
produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The
Gay Science Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the
will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the
instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the
restoration of a sense of security?" The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce
a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the
surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and
everything true reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge
which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: A
safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as
evil, and evil provokes hostility - recycling the desire for security. The 'influence of timidity,' as Nietzsche puts
it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the 'necessities' of security: 'they
fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences'." The point of
Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show the perilous conditions which created the security imperative - and the
western metaphysics which perpetuate it - have diminished if not disappeared; yet the fear of life persists: 'Our
century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old
habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." Nietzsche's worry is that the collective
reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of
man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the
sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox - all that makes life
worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical
questions:
Alternative – Reject the affirmative’s security logic – only resistance to the discourse of
security can generate genuine political thought
Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]
The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian
and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of
bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something
that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity
after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to
consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now
become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and
discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the
political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in
which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be
fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might
transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while
purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates
about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political
discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security
fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond
security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises
state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with
Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away
security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no
hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or
revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of
these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the
terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another
vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of
bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of
critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of
what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as
significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois
society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding
'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves
to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate
ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant
securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the
existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also
allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of
thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be
emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly
requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security
is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up
the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities'
that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it
politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the
gift."'
1NC Terrorism
1. Plan either fails to secure airports or causes a systematic shift to easier, more damaging
attacks
Flintoff 12 [Corey, foreign correspondent for NPR, 5/15/2012, “Why Do Terrorists So Often Go
For Planes?”
http://www.kqed.org/news/story/2012/05/15/94125/why_do_terrorists_so_often_go_for_planes?category=
u.s.]
"Terrorists like to do what they know how to do," says terrorism analyst Jessica Stern.¶ But the difficulty of
breaching airport security does appear to be generating other approaches.¶ Two Different Types Of Plots ¶ Stern says she
sees two trends. One involves developing new and more sophisticated techniques for evading security measures and
attacking airplanes.¶ The other involves "looking for low-tech ways to attack softer targets," she says. This is a way of
encouraging "leaderless resistance," says Stern, the author of Terror in the Name of God.¶ For example, the latest issue of Inspire, the jihadi magazine
produced by the Yemen-based group al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, includes an eight-page feature that encourages readers to start
wildfires in Australia and the United States.¶ It recommends that would-be saboteurs in the U.S. study weather patterns in order to determine when
vegetation will be dry and winds favorable for a wildfire.¶ It specifically suggests Montana as a good site for practicing pyro-
terrorism, because of the residential housing that is in wooded areas.¶ Stern says the aim of terrorism is to frighten the public and push governments
into over-reacting — so spectacular, random-seeming attacks like airplane bombings work well.¶ "Terrorists do really aim for what we call symbolic
targets," she says. "Terrorism is a form of theater, so they're going to hit targets that will make us maximally afraid, and inflict the maximum amount of
humiliation."¶ In that sense, she says, arson in populated forest areas could be "a good second best" for a target.¶ A Range Of
Vulnerabilities¶ Security
analysts have pointed to dozens of potential terrorist targets and vulnerabilities, from
military bases to passenger trains, chemical plants to storage for liquefied natural gas.¶ Former CIA agent Charles Faddis
says he expects that there will be more attacks on targets that, by their nature, are hard to defend.¶ Faddis, the author of
Willful Neglect: The Dangerous Illusion of Homeland Security, says he particularly fears situations where suicide gunmen might attack people at a public
event.¶ "There are an infinite number of targets where you can find large numbers of people — college campuses,
pro sports events," he says.¶ Even where such events have security screening, Faddis adds, they often don't have armed guards, so a determined,
suicidal shooter would be hard to stop.
2. Can’t solve aviation security—no mechanisms to protect data transmission
Butts et al., 11 (Jonathan Butts, Donald McCallie & Robert Mills are analysts at the Air Force Institute of
Technology, 7/7/2011, “Security analysis of the ADS-B implementation in the next generation air
transportation system,” http://dx.doi.org.proxy.uchicago.edu/10.1016/j.ijcip.2011.06.001) JD
The current national airspace system relies on an infrastructure that dates back to the 1970s [4]. In an attempt
to increase the capacity and safety of air transportation operations, the US Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is moving forward with a fundamental overhaul. The new framework, called Next Generation (NextGen),
will drastically change the infrastructure and operations [5]. A key component of the NextGen upgrade is the
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system for air traffic management. Historically, new
technologies have been deployed with a focus on functionality as opposed to security; ADS-B is no exception.
ADS-B provides continual broadcasts of aircraft position, identity, velocity and other information over
unencrypted data links [6]. There are no apparent security mechanisms to protect the confidentiality, integrity
and availability of the data transmitted between aircraft and air traffic controllers. As a result, a motivated
attacker could inject false data or prevent legitimate data from being displayed properly. Such actions could
have devastating effects on the national airspace system. This paper examines the security vulnerabilities
associated with the ADS-B implementation plan. It provides a taxonomy of attacks and examines the impact
that the attacks may have on air transportation. The taxonomy helps provide a comprehensive understanding
of the threats associated with the ADS-B implementation and, thus, supports risk analysis and risk
management efforts. The paper also provides recommendations for addressing the complex security issues
related to NextGen in general, and ADS-B in particular.
3. No impact to attacks—industry is resilient
Thomas 11[Geoffrey, chief editor at Air Transport World, 9/12/2011, “OAG Report: Airline Industry
‘Amazingly Resilient’ to Crises” http://atwonline.com/airline-finance-data/news/oag-report-airline-industryamazingly-resilient-crises-0909?cid=nl_atw_dn&YM_RID=`email`] LZ
An OAG report revealed the airline industry has been amazingly resilient to events such as terrorism,
pandemics and natural disasters over the past 30 years, and that most serious events occurred after Sept. 10, 2001, according to its World
Crisis Analysis. OAG is a division of UBM Aviation.¶ The report—which rated events as low- (country), medium- (region) and high-impact (global)—
found there were seven low-impact events over the prior 20 years before 9/11 that affected aviation growth. However, after Sept. 10, 2001 there
have been a total of nine crises—three low-, four medium- and two high-impact events.¶ According to the report, airline capacity grew
an average of 3.1% per year since 1979, and has “been largely immune to regionalized events such as natural
disasters, conflicts and fuel price spikes.Ӧ The report found that the Global Banking Crisis had a far greater effect on aviation growth,
with a 9% drop, than the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, at 3%.¶ From 1979 to Sept. 11, 2001, world airline capacity steadily increased an average of
5%, or 94 million seats per year, but since that date—although not because of the terror event—capacity grew an average of 2.6%, or 81 million seats per
year.¶ According to UBM Aviation CEO Peter von Moltke, in the vast majority of crises there was a negligible impact on global
airline capacity; at a regional level, capacity dropped less than 4% and recovered within three months.¶ "The
OAG World Crisis Analysis shows how quickly the aviation industry responds and adapts in the face of almost
any disaster, which is reassuring news for world markets and the ancillary industries that depend on aviation," Peter von Moltke said.¶ "Informed by
sound historical data and analytics that provide a reliable picture of how external factors affect passenger demand, airlines are able to quickly
adjust their flight capacities based on market needs, thus mitigating the impact of crises.".
***4. NextGen can’t solve security—no system level analysis
Butts et al., 11 (Jonathan Butts, Donald McCallie & Robert Mills are analysts at the Air Force Institute of
Technology, 7/7/2011, “Security
analysis of the ADS-B implementation in the next generation air transportation system,”
http://dx.doi.org.proxy.uchicago.edu/10.1016/j.ijcip.2011.06.001) JD
To clarify the impact of attacks and facilitate formal risk analysis, it is useful to categorize the attack instances based on their effects with respect to three
high-level system objectives: confidentiality of data, situational awareness and the ability to control assets. Loss of confidentiality occurs when an attack
reveals information about national airspace system operations (e.g., aircraft altitude, vector and identification number). Based on the NextGen
implementation plan, it should be assumed that loss of confidentiality is universal. Loss of situational awareness occurs when a pilot
or ground controller is unable to obtain accurate and timely information. For an adversary, it may be sufficient to simply reduce trust in the system.
Indeed, a carefully crafted attack could create multiple indications, making a pilot or ground controller unsure of which data to trust. The most
dangerous attacks result in the loss of control. In this situation, the actions of ground controllers or pilots are dictated by the adversary. For example, a
ghost inject attack could cause a pilot to perform course corrections, or an attack that jams the signal of an approaching aircraft could cause a taxiing
aircraft to cross an active runway. 6. Security recommendations Securing a large-scale system that is designed for information sharing is not a trivial task
— one needs to look no further than the Internet to gain a sense of the challenge. Schneier [22] has discussed the constant trade-offs that are made
between security and functionality. To increase ADS-B security, the level of functionality must be reduced in some respect. The question that arises is:
Does the decreased functionality have a negative impact on safety? For ADS-B and the national airspace system, a contradiction arises in that increased
security appears to negatively impact safety; however, decreased security appears to negatively impact safety as well. Determining the correct trade-offs
and their precise degree will be key to ensuring secure and safe operations. This section provides some general recommendations for addressing the
complex security issues related to the NextGen and ADS-B implementations. The first recommendation is the release of
information related to FAA’s security certification and accreditation procedures. Time and again, it has been demonstrated that security through
obscurity does not work. If the system is indeed secure, then releasing the data or, at a minimum, details about specific tests and their results should
carry minimal risk. Such information would help researchers to understand the scope of the security problem, and formulate appropriate mitigation
strategies and tactics, if problems exist. The second recommendation is a complete and holistic security analysis of the
NextGen implementation plan. The 96-page NextGen document [8] references safety more than 100 times and efficiency at least 50 times. However,
there are just four references to security principles. The most notable reference relates to the Security Integrated Tool Set (SITS) [23], which is intended
to support automated threat detection and tracking, data correlation, and security and emergency impact analysis in the national airspace system.
Curiously, while SITS encompasses air threats, system-level analysis is not considered. It is critical that security
be integrated throughout the system development and implementation lifecycle — a bolt-on security mindset for
NextGen and ADS-B could have devastating consequences. The third recommendation calls for operational security
assessments of NextGen components to include the ADS-B infrastructure, aircraft avionics upgrades, ground station security and the impact of
RF interference on system reliability. The assessments should leverage red teams and penetration testing to identify vulnerabilities in system
design and implementation. It is important that guidelines for security assessments, as well as the aforementioned security
analysis, are explicitly detailed in an updated NextGen implementation plan.
5. Can’t solve air-terrorism—planes could still be hijacked and blown-up before they reach high
value targets and still have the same impact on the economy perceptually.
6. No impact—1AC Ayson evidence is talking about nuclear terror, which they can’t possibly
solve.
1NC Econ
1. No industry collapse—airlines resilient
Huerta, 3-7 (Michael, Acting Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Master's in international
relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, 3-7-12,
“FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2012-2032,”
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/aerospace_forecasts/2012
-2032/media/2012%20FAA%20Aerospace%20Forecast.pdf)
Since the beginning of the century, the commercial air carrier industry has suffered several major shocks that have led to
reduced demand for air travel. These shocks include the terror attacks of September 11, skyrocketing prices for fuel,
debt restructuring in Europe and the United States (U.S.), and a global recession. To manage this period of extreme
volatility, air carriers have fine-tuned their business models with the aim of minimizing financial losses by
lowering operating costs, eliminating unprofitable routes and grounding older, less fuel efficient aircraft. To
increase operating revenues, carriers have initiated new services that customers are willing to purchase. Carriers have
also started charging separately for services that were historically bundled in the price of a ticket. The capacity
discipline exhibited by carriers and their focus on additional revenue streams bolstered the industry to profitability in
2011 for the second consecutive year. Going into the next decade, there is cautious optimism that the industry has been
transformed from that of a boom-to-bust cycle to one of sustainable profits. As the economy recovers from the most
serious economic downturn and slow recovery in recent history, aviation will continue to grow over the long run. The 2012 FAA
forecast now calls for one billion passengers in 2024, three years later than projected last year. Growth over the next five years will be moderate, with a
return to historic levels of growth only attainable in the long term. This delayed trajectory represents the downward adjustments of the overall economy,
here in the U.S. and abroad, and the aviation sector’s responses. One of the many factors influencing the delayed recovery is the uncertainty that
surrounds the U.S. and European economies. The latter, primarily those belonging to the Euro area, have been hit hard by the pressure from bond
markets for fiscal austerity. Combined with the slow pace of these economies, debt restructuring pulled the European economy into recession in early
2012. This has not helped the pace of U.S. economic growth given the importance of its trade with Europe. Despite this and the ambiguity surrounding
its own fiscal imbalances, the U.S. economy has managed to avoid a double dip recession and trudges along the path of slow recovery
2. Status quo solves the impact—new study proves
Costello 12 [Caroline, active member of the Society of American Travel Writers and Travel Deals editor,
4/3/2012, “Surprising New Study Says Airlines Are Doing a Good Job”
http://www.smartertravel.com/blogs/today-in-travel/surprising-new-study-says-airlines-are-doing-goodjob.html?id=10946921] LZ
It may seem like the airline industry is collapsing into an anti-flyer, fee-happy machine of misery, but a new study says
otherwise. The 2011 results from a well-known annual industry survey are in, and the findings reveal that U.S. airlines
are shaping up in a big way. The study, called the Airline Quality Rating (AQR), was developed by researchers at Purdue and Wichita State
universities and focuses on performance data for 15 major U.S. airlines. AQR analysts looked at published Department of Transportation
(DOT) statistics for on-time arrivals, bumping (denying seats to passengers on overbooked flights), lost luggage, and customer
complaints. Using a mathematical formula, the analysts ranked major domestic carriers based on level of total quality.
AirTran—for the third year in a row—has come out on top, with Hawaiian and JetBlue following in second and third place, respectively. Here are the
rankings in order based on the results of the AQR study: AirTran, Hawaiian, JetBlue, Frontier, Alaska, Delta, Southwest, US Airways, SkyWest,
American, Continental (which now operates as United), United, Atlantic Southeast, Mesa, and American Eagle. AirTran, the carrier with the overall
highest quality rating, had the lowest number of mishandled bags for the third year in a row. Hawaiian ranked number one in on-time performance. And
JetBlue bumped fewer passengers than any other airline, coming in first in the denied-boarding category. But even the carriers lagging at the
end of the list have bragging rights this year. On the whole, the airline industry—despite all the recent news of shrinking
seats and panicking pilots—seems to be getting better. According to AQR, fewer bags were lost, more planes arrived on time,
and fewer passengers issued complaints in 2011 when compared to 2010. Part of the reason the airlines saw fewer late flights probably
had to do with a mostly mild winter at the end of 2011. Still, the numbers show that the industry may be making significant strides. Dean Headley, a
coauthor of the study, told the AP,"[The airlines] realize that people are paying a lot more money, and the system is more complex than it was, and
they have to do a better job. To their credit, I think they are doing a better job."
3. NextGen doesn’t solve congestion—assumes perfect weather
Smith et. al. 10 [Jeremy Smith, NASA Langley Research Center, Nelson Guerreiro, PhD student at University
of Maryland, Masters in Science and Aerospace Engineering, ATK Space Systems, Jeffrey Viken, Langely
Research Center, Samuel M. Dollyhigh, ATK Space Systems, and James W. Fenbert, ATK Space Systems,
“Meeting Air Transportation Demand in 2025 by using Larger Aircraft and Alternative Routing to Complement
NextGen Operational Improvements”
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100033386_2010036546.pdf] LZ
This reduction in delays for the most-delayed passengers has a cost. Total system-wide origin-to-destination travel time increases by 0.4% and some of
the delayed passengers are inconvenienced to the extent that they abandon their first choice of route or transportation mode. Relying on the
adaptive behavior of passengers is not a solution to the capacity problem. The increase in total travel time is undesirable, the
avoidance of long delays by the most delayed passengers leads to a small overall increase in trip times. It is clearly preferable to have
sufficient capacity to meet demand. If sufficient capacity cannot be achieved at a few airports, adaptive behavior of passengers will likely
lead to a system that functions without very large system-wide average delays in ideal weather. ¶ The ACES simulation results from this
study determined that: ¶ • NextGen Operational Improvements alone, using the estimated capacity-benefit values, do not
provide sufficient airport capacity to meet the projected demand for passenger air transportation in 2025 without
significant system delays. ¶ • Using larger aircraft with more seats on high-demand routes and introducing new direct routes, where
demand warrants, significantly reduces delays, complementing NextGen improvements. This still does not reduce delays to acceptable
levels on some routes. ¶ • Alternative air routes are available avoiding congested routes and, for some shorter trips, passengers will choose to
drive, reducing delays on most routes to acceptable levels for the 2025 scenario. Mean delay per flight from simulation, is less than three minutes for this
second-choice scenario; this is similar to the 2006 baseline scenario mean delay. The penalty is that the alternative routes and option to
drive increases overall trip time by 0.4% and may be less convenient than the first-choice route, if that first choice
had sufficient capacity. ¶ The results rely on transportation demand projections from TSAM for the year 2025 and estimates of the ¶ increased airport
capacity that may be available, due to both NGIP 2018 and NextGen 2025 improvements. Results are for perfect weather, Visual
Meteorological Conditions.
4. Economic collapse does not cause war—their historical arguments are wrong
FERGUSON 2006 (Niall, MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University. He is a resident faculty member of
the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. He is also a Senior Reseach Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct)
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern
historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story
leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries
affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of
aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some
wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic
catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.
5. NextGen can’t solve congestion – empirics prove increased demand from air
carriers
Barkowski 12 [Justin T. Barkowski is graduated from Pepperdine University School of Law and was admitted to the Bar. Mr. Barkowski
received the Ronald Sorenson Award and, prior to attending Pepperdine, he graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, where he studied
economics. Mr. Barkowski is an instrumentrated private pilot and is active in the firm’s business litigation and insurance law practices. “Managing Air
Traffic Congestion Through the Next Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite Based Technology, Trajectories, and - Privatization?”
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=plr, 2-2-2012] Lin
With or without an ATC commercialization debate, the airlines and the new Secretary of Transportation, Ray LaHood, strongly believe that NextGen is
the key to solving congestion. 223 One author even argues that "airside capacity shortages and suboptimal usage/management of airspace" is the
underlying cause of air traffic congestion. 224 While these concerns undoubtedly need to be addressed through NextGen, there is a severe
problem when airspace capacity increases but corresponding airport resources and
infrastructure do not. This will be the case in high-density areas where any room for expansion
is nearly impossible. 225 Even the JPDO is skeptical that NextGen is a "cure-for-all," stating that where
"airport infrastructure [development] cannot be accomplished using existing resources," the airports will have to implement "market-based mechanisms
such as peak period pricing to ease congestion" in times of high demand. 226 Merely increasing the availability of landing
and takeoffs at a highdensity airport may not have the desired cure-for-all effect that industry
participants might expect. For example, in 2004 American and United Airlines agreed with the FAA to voluntarily
reduce the number of scheduled flights out of Chicago O'Hare by 12.5% in order to help fight
congestion. 227 In ef fect, this increased the number of potential flights out of that airport during the agreed upon times through its voluntary
reduction, just as NextGen would do. However, the opening up of more space simply resulted in other airlines
adding "flights while the hub carriers cut their schedules," providing no relief to the airport
congestion problem. 228 NextGen essentially creates this increased capacity without any
supplemental FAA policies to address how this extra space in the system will be allocated to air
carriers that are continuously demanding more flights than the system can handle. 229 To prevent air
traffic congestion from resulting after the implementation of NextGen, like it had in Chicago, effective demand-management
policies are therefore critically in need. Given the historical struggles, 230 this may be difficult to accomplish. NextGen is not the
sole answer for air traffic congestion at the increasing number of high-density airports. When airports cannot develop infrastructure, or when demand
exceeds the marginal increases in capacity, the FAA needs allocation policies to arrange the airports' limited ground facilities and take-off and landing
slots. 23 1 Commentators tend to analyze airport demand-management solutions by only looking at either the FAA or the publicly-owned airport's
perspective. 232 A straight-forward and thorough analysis must examine functions of both actors in order to propose effective solutions.
6. Bosch, Eckard, and Singal 98 evidence is empirically disproven – accidents like
Hudson river crash, and 9/11 disprove their argument and they have no evidence that
accidents will occur in the status quo absent Nextgen
7. Economic decline doesn’t kill heg—American leadership is unique and their predictions have
been denied for decades
Blackwill 2009 – former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for
Strategic Planning (Robert, RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf, WEA)
First, the United States, five years from today. Did
the global recession weaken the political will of the United States to, over the long
its external interests? Many analysts are already forecasting a “yes” to this question. As a result of what they see as the international loss of faith
in the American market economy model and in U.S. leadership, they assert that Washington’s influence in international affairs is bound to
recede, indeed is already diminishing. For some, the wish is the father of this thought. But where is the empirical evidence? From South
Asia, through relations with China and Russia through the Middle East peace process, through dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and
North Korea’s nuclear weaponization and missile activities, through confronting humanitarian crises in Africa and instability in Latin
America, the United States has the unchallenged diplomatic lead. Who could charge the Obama Administration with diplomatic passivity
term, defend
since taking office? Indeed, one could instead conclude that the current global economic turbulence is causing countries to seek the familiar and to rely more and not less on
their American connection. In any event, foreigners (and some Americans) often underestimate
the existential resilience of the United
States. In this respect, George Friedman’s new book, The Next Hundred Years,14 and his view that the United States will be as dominant a force in the 21st century as it was
in the last half of the 20th century, is worth considering. So once again, those who now predict, as they have in every decade since 1945,
American decay and withdrawal will be wrong 15— from John Flynn’s 1955 The Decline of the American Republic and How to Rebuild It,16 to Paul
Kennedy’s 1987 The Rise and Fall of Great Powers,17 to Andrew Bacevich’s 2008 The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism,18 to Godfrey Hodgson’s 2009
The Myth of American Exceptionalism19 and many dozens of similar books in between. Indeed, the policies of the Obama Administration, for better or worse, are likely to be
far more influential and lasting regarding America’s longer-term geopolitical power projection than the present economic decline. To sum up regarding the United States and
the global economic worsening, former Council on Foreign Relations President Les Gelb, in his new book, Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign
Policy,20 insists that a nation’s power
is what it always was—essentially the capacity to get people to do what they don’t want to do, by pressure and coercion,
shape of global power is decidedly pyramidal—with the United
States alone at the top, a second tier of major countries (China, Japan, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Brazil), and
several tiers descending below. . . . Among all nations, only the United States is a true global power with global reach. Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of the Republic
of Singapore, agrees: “After the crisis, the US is most likely to remain at the top of every key index of national power for
decades. It will remain the dominant global player for the next few decades. No major issue concerning international peace and stability can be resolved without US
leadership, and no country or grouping can yet replace America as the dominant global power.”21 The current global economic crisis will not alter this
using one’s resources and position. . . . The world is not flat. . . . The
reality. And the capitalist market model will continue to dominate international economics, not least because China and India have adopted their own versions of it.
1NC Solvency
1. FAA is terrible at monitoring programs—undermines effectiveness
Mitchell 10 [Mike, AvStop.com, 4/6/2010, “FAA’s Oversight of Air Carrier Inspection Continues to be
Ineffective”
http://avstop.com/news_april_2010/faa_s_oversight_of_air_carrier_inspections_continues_to_be_ineffecti
ve.htm]
April 6, 2010 - DOT’s Inspector General’s Office testified before congress, Subcommittee on Transportation, in their report they indicated the FAA’s oversight of the Air
Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) inspections continues to be ineffective at the national level in large part because the FAA
does not collect data on all overdue inspections or fully utilize the data it already collects.¶ ¶ In response to DOT 2008
recommendation, the FAA established a process to compile inspection data at the national level and distribute quarterly reports to alert regional managers to overdue inspections. However,
FAA’s data tracking efforts still lack accountability in two key areas. First, FAA does not monitor completion of a key
group of inspections, those identified as scheduled, but not yet assigned.¶ ¶ From June 2008 through June 2009, 237 scheduled
inspections were left unassigned and uncompleted—and none were being tracked by FAA to completion. While local oversight offices rescheduled some of the inspections, they were not projected for
completion for as much as 4 years beyond the original inspection date.¶ Unless the FAA holds regional managers accountable for ensuring that local inspection offices complete these inspections,
they will continue to lapse beyond the minimum inspection intervals established by FAA. Inspecting air carrier
programs at required time intervals is critical to validate the levels of risk that might exist in air carrier
programs.¶ ¶ Second, the FAA’s quarterly inspection status reports do not include any trend analyses or
cumulative data roll-up from the rest of the year that could help identify offices where inspections are habitually late. Moreover, regional managers stated that they did not find
the Headquarters reports useful and, in many cases, were already tracking the progress of their local oversight offices in completing assigned inspections using locally developed systems. Yet, those
systems were not monitoring the 237 overdue inspections identified during DOT review to completion.¶ ¶ The FAA introduced (ATOS) in 1998 as its new tool for conducting air carrier safety
inspections. ATOS was a major shift in FAA’s oversight system as it moved beyond the traditional inspection method of simply checking an air carrier’s compliance with regulations to identifying and
assessing safety risks to preclude accidents. FAA initially implemented ATOS at 10 of the Nation’s largest passenger air carriers.¶ ¶ Over the past 7 years, DOT has reported on a number of weaknesses
within ATOS. In 2002, DOT recommended that FAA establish strong national oversight and accountability to ensure consistent ATOS field implementation. Today, all Part 121 passenger air carriers
in the United States are being inspected using ATOS.¶ ¶ In 2005, DOT again recommended that FAA strengthen its national oversight of field offices by establishing policies and procedures to ensure
air carrier inspections are conducted in a timely and consistent manner. More recently, in 2008, DOT recommended that FAA implement a process to track field office inspections and alert the local,
regional, and Headquarters offices to overdue inspections.¶ ¶ To conduct this review, DOT obtained and analyzed ATOS inspection data and interviewed FAA Flight Standards Division
(Headquarters) and regional managers to evaluate their role and effectiveness in analyzing data and ensuring timely completion of inspections.¶ ¶ ATOS is FAA’s approach to air carrier safety
oversight. FAA inspectors assigned to local oversight offices use ATOS to conduct surveillance of air carrier operations and maintenance programs at more than 100 Part 121 air carriers in the United
States.¶ ¶ ATOS is designed to allow FAA inspectors to use data to focus their inspections on areas posing the greatest safety risks and adapt their inspection plans in response to changing conditions
within air carriers’ operations. ATOS helps inspectors assess air carriers across three primary areas:¶ ¶ • System Design: Inspectors evaluate air carriers’ policies and procedures to determine if their
operating systems comply with safety regulations and standards. System design evaluations are required every 5 years.¶ • Performance: Inspectors determine whether an air carrier is following its
FAA-approved procedures and that those procedures and operating systems are working as intended. Performance evaluations are conducted at prescribed intervals depending on the likelihood of
failure in air carrier programs.¶ • Risk Management: Inspectors examine air carrier processes dealing with hazards and associated risks that are subject to regulatory control (e.g., enforcement actions
and rulemaking). FAA uses these analyses as a basis to target resources towards the most at-risk programs.¶ ¶ The frequency of performance evaluations is based on the significance of the program to
an air carrier’s operations. Inspections of high-criticality maintenance programs, such as Airworthiness Directive Management, are performed every 6 months; lower-criticality programs, such as
Carry-On Baggage or Service Difficulty Reports, are inspected every 12 or 36 months, respectively.¶ ¶ Since ATOS is an automated oversight system, results of inspections and decisions made by
managers to mitigate risk levels are collected and organized in a centrally located repository within ATOS. This allows Headquarters and regional officials to monitor the current status of all ATOS
inspections.¶ ¶ FAA headquarters does not use inspection status data to hold local oversight offices accountable for completing ATOS inspections. Inspections are automatically scheduled in ATOS
based on intervals established within the system, and it is the responsibility of local oversight office managers to assign inspectors to complete these inspections.¶ ¶ However, DOT review of
inspection data indicates that not all scheduled inspections are being assigned, including those with increased levels of risk. For example, four local oversight offices that transitioned to ATOS since
2006 have yet to complete any scheduled system design or performance inspections for 10 air carrier operations programs. At the time of DOT review, these inspections were unassigned.¶ ¶ In DOT
June 2008 report, DOT recommended that FAA implement a process to monitor field office inspections and alert local, regional, and Headquarters management to overdue inspections. In response,
the FAA developed a process to track the status of ATOS inspections. In July 2008, the FAA Headquarters ATOS Division Manager began sending quarterly inspection status reports—commonly
FAA Headquarters
only tracks the status of assigned inspections for timely completion. Unassigned inspections pose a greater
problem for FAA because managers have not committed inspector resources to complete these inspections.¶ ¶ Once these inspections
become past due, there is no sense of urgency to complete them. FAA Headquarters officials also use the quarterly reports during FAA’s “Dashboard” meetings.
referred to as the Quarterly ADI Completion Report—to regional managers.¶ ¶ However, DOT analysis of FAA’s quarterly inspection status reports showed that
DOT found 237 instances where ATOS inspections were unassigned and not completed at the required interval. For example, DOT review of ATOS data disclosed 11 inspections that were at least 90
FAA officials acknowledged that not all scheduled ATOS inspections will be
completed at the required interval. They informed DOT that in a risk-based oversight system such as ATOS, it is not practical or desirable to complete all
inspections just for the sake of completing inspections.¶ ¶ Therefore, Headquarters officials do not hold local oversight offices accountable for completing
days past due but not yet rescheduled. In other instances, FAA did reschedule unassigned inspections.¶ ¶
unassigned inspections because doing so would impede the time inspectors need to perform quality inspections for those areas that pose greater risk.¶ ¶ While DOT agreed that higher-risk air carrier
programs warrant being inspected ahead of lower-risk programs, some of the unassigned inspections were identified by inspectors as “high risk” programs but not inspected. Additionally,
ensuring that all areas, regardless of risk, are inspected is a critical step toward identifying and monitoring risk levels
before system failure occurs. Quarterly inspection status reports consistently pointed to a lack of inspector
resources as the main reason scheduled inspections have gone unassigned and uncompleted. Headquarters officials
acknowledged that they are aware of the resource issues cited by the regions, but they have not addressed this problem.
2. NextGen’s slow implementation causes uncertainty
Halsey 11 [Ashley, Transportation Writer for the Washington Post, 6/30/2011 , “New Guidance System for
Skies Could Face Delays” http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/antidote-to-air-gridlock-is-complexundertaking/2011/06/30/AG9bdnwH_story.html]
The very business of getting aloft — the time that passengers know as the minutes between the “buckle your seat belts” order and “you are free to
move about the cabin” — is an intricate choreography between controllers and the cockpit. “Two seventy on the heading, Southwest 658 going to
departure,” the pilot says just after liftoff from Dulles, repeating the compass direction given by the Dulles tower. Then he tells a controller based in
Warrenton that he’s climbing. “Potomac departure, Southwest 658, passing [1,800 feet] for 3,000, heading 270,” he radios. The new controller tells
him to keep climbing to 5,000 feet and maintain that altitude. That keeps him 1,000 feet below flights heading to land at Dulles. When the plane
reaches a waypoint known as “Blues,” a new controller takes over and orders Flight 658 to 12,000 feet. When Flight 658 reaches another waypoint,
over Linden, Va., the pilot is told to head for 17,000 feet. Then he is handed over to a new controller, on a different radio frequency, who takes the
flight to 27,000 feet before handing over to yet another controller who ultimately guides the plane to its 40,000-foot cruising altitude. Now, “you are
free to move about the cabin.” If all that sounds complicated and open to human error, one goal of NextGen is to replace almost all of it with new
technology, much of it in the cockpit. Can the FAA deliver? NextGen has virtually no credible enemies — not in the administration, not on Capitol
Hill and not in the airline industry. But the seemingly simple concept is layered like an onion with complexities. In
addition to demanding an enormous investment, there is a confluence of history and technology that creates
a hurdle to progress. Airlines fear that the FAA will not meet its timetable for creation of the network of
ground-based stations and satellite links that will make it all work. “The FAA’s track record on deployment
hasn’t been good,” said Russ Chew, a former airline executive and former FAA chief operating officer. “The FAA could be perfect in meeting
NextGen deadlines, but [private investors] are looking at past history.” Michael P. Huerta, the FAA deputy administrator who was given charge of
NextGen after an internal shake-up this year, said he is well aware of that. “How can they be sure that FAA will deliver on its
commitments? That’s a fair question,” Huerta said As for evidence of the rapid pace of technological advancement, one need look no
further than GPS. The technology is advancing so quickly that some car buyers opt against the factory-installed
unit for fear that it will be outdated in a year or two. Airlines have the same issue. “If I go first, I’ll have to
bear the cost of updating the software, and when [NextGen is] turned on, I’ll have the oldest, most obsolete
systems out there,” Chew said. In addition, the FAA must clear through a jungle of procedures and retrain 15,475 air traffic
controllers to deal with a system that will entirely replace the old one. “A lot of the tough stuff is new procedures, is human-machine interface
and human factors, moving from an air traffic control mind frame to an air traffic management mind frame” that puts greater responsibility in the
hands of pilots, said Bobby Sturgell, former acting FAA administrator. Congress has tossed more uncertainty into the mix by
extending the current FAA funding plan 20 times rather than approving a comprehensive long-term
spending plan that imposes strict NextGen deadlines on the agency. “NextGen is threatened,” Chew said.
“Everyone knows it. The FAA budget is under pressure. Even they will say that NextGen is on track, but it’s not.” JetBlue, with $4.2 million in
federal funding help, and Southwest Airlines, with federal incentives, have installed some of the technology, but other airlines are reluctant to move
ahead. “Absolutely I’m concerned about the schedule,” said Gary Kelly, chief executive of Southwest, which has spent $94 million on NextGen. “I’m
concerned that we don’t have metrics in place to measure the progress. Any investment, any project, has to be evaluated based
upon the risk of the return, and I’m not going to argue with you, this is a very high risk-return, because we’re not in
control of the benefits.”
3. FAA software full of bugs
Savain 10 [Louis, 4/24/2010, “Why the FAA's Next Generation Air Traffic Control System Will Fail”
http://rebelscience.blogspot.com/2010/04/why-faas-next-generation-air-traffic.html] LZ
There is no question that the FAA's NextGen effort will fail because of their chosen software model. Current
approaches to software construction are crap, primarily because deterministic timing is not an inherent and fundamental part of the
programming model. As a result, complex software systems used for automation become unreliable as their
complexity increases. Since NextGen falls into the category of extremely complex software systems, it's a
guarantee that it will be riddled with bugs, including potentially dangerous and/or costly bugs. However, I would
not advise the FAA to abandon their current overall design.