[AU: (from the Editor): Re the intro and conclusion it is arguable that nonviolence
is the preferred method if winning hearts and minds is the objective.
Communication and persuasion is much more difficult (if not impossible) in an
armed conflict situation: violence replaces politics or dialogue (Arendt). Please
mention this.] [I have tried to address this adequately in the revisions to the
introduction.]
<ET>Insurgent War and Peace Ethics.</ET> Insurgents, guerrillas, freedom fighters,
terrorists, “francs tireurs,” and unlawful combatants—militant forces opposing an
existing government or political order are often depicted as ignoring or flouting any sense
of ethical conduct of war. But the question of violence, and the ethics of its use (or
refraining from its use) is a key one for any militant movement. Insurgents opposing a
state with greater military force must rely to a large extent on “winning hearts and
minds,” undermining the state's ability to govern. Violence can serve as part of this
strategy, by intimidating a population or demonstrating the vulnerability of the
government. But it is always a danger for insurgents, since violence tends to crowd out
room for dialogue and political compromise – and, in a straightforward military contest,
insurgents are likely to lose. In addition, insurgents who genuinely take themselves to be
acting on behalf of an oppressed population may be committed to restrictions on violence
that go beyond merely tactical considerations.
<H1>The Question of Violence.</H1> Not all militant political movements use
violence. The ethics of insurgent violence must be understood as part of the broader
issue of the role violence ought to play in militant politics.
<H2>Nonviolent Militancy.</H2> Nonviolent tactics proceed from the
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recognition that any regime, even an authoritarian one, relies on some degree of popular
support or at least acquiescence; active, nonviolent, resistance involves denying that
compliance and hence drastically raising the costs of governance.
Perhaps the most influential approach to nonviolent militancy was Mohandas
(Mahatma) Gandhi’s satyagraha (soul force or truth force), which he applied as a leader
of India’s independence movement from 1916 to 1947. Satyagraha, and nonviolent
approaches generally, are sometimes described as “passive resistance,” at first even by
Gandhi, but this label is misleading. Far from being a form of acquiescence, nonviolent
militancy goes beyond persuasion/advocacy and normal politics, to embrace pressure,
and sanctions: coercive tactics, such as strikes, boycotts, and mass demonstrations.
Two advantages are claimed for nonviolence over violence. First, many
proponents of nonviolence believe that it is inherently morally superior to violence, and
able to communicate with opponents. Intending to harm or kill one’s adversary is
problematic because it fails to treat him or her as a moral thinking being, capable of
change, and therefore potentially deserving of respect and forgiveness: the finality of
killing assumes the infallibility of the killer’s own moral or ideological, religious views.
Second, governments often command superior powers of violence, making
nonviolence an attractive tactical choice. A movement that eschews violence may be able
to gain sympathy publicly, both within a given society, and internationally. Conversely,
the use of violence by a militant movement gives their opponents an opportunity to use
repressive force without censure.
Nonviolent militancy is still coercive, and so raises ethical questions. In
particular, although nonviolent movements do not maim or kill their opponents, they
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cause harm, as a way of inflicting costs on the government or society that the militants
oppose. For instance, the Indian boycott of British textiles in 1920 caused hardship in
Lancashire mill towns that relied on the Indian export market. When in Britain, Gandhi
visited the workers to explain the campaign. Although some proponents of nonviolence
have gone further and advocated truly passive tactics, Gandhi’s response was to focus on
intention (his solution was similar to the “doctrine of double effect” invoked in
contemporary just war theory to provide a limited excuse for “collateral damage”). Harm
that was merely a foreseen but unintended result of nonviolent tactics was acceptable
because the consequences of actions are so various and difficult to determine, that no one
can be expected to take them all fully into account; the intent was the morally important
element.
Gandhian ideas influenced other militant movements, especially during the
anticolonial struggles in Africa. Kwame Nkrumah’s “Positive Action” campaign for
Ghana’s (formerly the Gold Coast) independence from Britain was self-consciously based
on the Gandhian model, culminating in general strikes and boycotts. Although there was
rioting and looting in Ghana, the independence movement was predominantly nonviolent.
Nonviolent tactics were also prominently embraced by the African National Congress
(ANC) in South Africa, the Solidarity movement for labor and political rights in Poland
in the late twentieth century, and some elements of the 1987–1993 Palestinian intifada
(rebellion; literally, shaking off) against the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and West
Bank.
<H2>The Difficulties of Nonviolence.</H2> Nonviolence poses two
difficulties even for militants who support it in principle. First, nonviolent tactics
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rely on mass noncompliance with authority. Nonviolence, in highly charged
situations of political conflict, requires restraint and discipline; this is exacerbated
by the need for nonviolent movements to maintain discipline in a large number of
people, rather than a relatively small military vanguard. Second, for militants
seeking national liberation or control of an existing state, it raises questions about
the nature of the state they hope to take charge of.
The shift to violent tactics in South Africa is representative of the difficulty of
maintaining nonviolent discipline. The ANC, which worked against the apartheid
(separation) system of racial discrimination and minority rule in South Africa, began with
nonviolent tactics aimed at preserving the possibility of communal reconciliation. In
1961, Umkhonto we Sizwe (spear of the nation) was launched by Nelson Mandela, a
leader in the ANC and later South Africa’s first post-apartheid president, and other ANC
members. Umkhonto was not founded as a part of the ANC but shared some membership
and leadership with the political organization, and the ANC dropped its absolute
condemnation of violence to accommodate the movement. Initially, Umkhonto engaged
only in acts of sabotage, such as bombing (unoccupied) power stations. Later in its career,
it was implicated in bombings that killed civilians, executions, and a brief campaign of
laying landmines. At his 1964 trial for sabotage and high treason, Mandela argued the
leadership of the ANC remained committed to nonviolence as an ideal but recognized
that many of its members and constituents did not share these convictions, or have the
discipline to respond to violent state suppression without violence. Founding Umkhonto
was intended as a way to bring that inevitable violence under control.
Commitment to nonviolence is challenged in a different way for movements that
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become, or aspire to become, governments. Northern Rhodesia’s (now Zambia)
independence movement, for example, was largely nonviolent, in part reflecting a
principled stance by Kenneth Kaunda, who would become the first president. Afterward,
Kaunda came to believe that a nation could not be governed using only nonviolent
tactics—police and an army were necessary.
Gandhi himself called on members of the Congress Party, the main independence
organization in India, to turn away from politics, once independence was achieved, and
focus on building decentralized social structures at the level of the community. Few of
the prominent Congress leaders followed his advice.
<H1>The Decision to Use Violence.</H1> When militant groups choose to
use violence, their ethical arguments for doing so, and for the way in which violence
is used, tend to follow well-worn categories of just war theory—although they may
not be couched in classical terminology. Insurgents concern themselves both with jus
ad bellum, the morality of going to war, and jus in bello, the justice of war’s conduct.
This section discusses the resort to violence; the next will consider the ethics of
conducting insurgency.
Insurgents most often advance one of two traditional jus ad bellum justifications:
an argument from necessity, i.e., that all non-violent means of redress have been
exhauseted, or a claim that they are acting in self-defense or retaliation. Some insurgents,
famously Frantz Fanon, argue that violence may have inherent value as well; this will be
discussed below.[AU: (from the Editor): please give an example.].
Just war theory allows groups with a just cause to use force if no other means of
redress is available. Most insurgent groups devote the bulk of their efforts to establishing
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the justice of their cause. Just cause is a very important element in the ethical quality of
an insurgency, but the arguments presented are too varied to survey here.
Some insurgencies leave the requirement that violence be absolutely necessary to
the achievement of their goals as an implicit corollary to the argument that their causes
are just. Others point to the failures of peaceful movements, or argue necessity on the
grounds that nonviolent tactics are inherently incapable of bringing about the required
social change. Vladimir Lenin, leader of Russia’s Bolshevik revolution, argued that a
proletarian state could only come about through violent revolution because the capitalist
state was in its very essence a violent tool for oppressing the masses, and so could not
even in principle be reformed but must be replaced.
Rather than argue that violence is necessary to achieve a just cause, some
insurgents justify violence as defense against or reaction to state violence. This argument
is easiest when the state engages in egregious violence against the insurgents’ claimed
constituency. Frantz Fanon, a prominent participant in, and theorist of, the 1954–1962
Algerian war of independence, describes the ways in which the colonial situation laid
bare the violent nature of the state. Suffering use of force by police is a rarity for affluent
citizens in Western nations, but state brutality and military operations against the
populace are a daily reality for the colonized. According to Fanon, this daily experience
of violence, among other things, makes colonized peoples skeptical of calls for their
reaction to be nonviolent.
Insurgent thinkers also appeal to less extreme forms of state violence. All states
use violence to maintain themselves to some extent, in the form of police and military
forces. In legitimate states, most people do not consider it appropriate to resist or reject
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this force, if it is lawfully used. But insurgents reject the legitimacy of the state, or states,
they are fighting against. As a result, they do not accept that the violence used by the state
is more legitimate than violence used by insurgents – and, in fact, many insurgents
maintain that it is less legitimate. [Insurgent violence must be either equated with or
distinguished from state violence – those seem to be jointly exhaustive options. I hope
my re-revision keeps the spirit of the revision.] Insurgent violence, some argue, should be
understood as justified retaliation or self-defense against state violence, not as an
initiation of violence. It is asymmetric. [I'm not sure that I like this last added sentence –
the argument from state violence is mostly about overcoming a judgment of asymmetry
in favor of the state, even though it is often taken to create a new asymmetry in favor of
the insurgents. But, more pragmatically, I don't think it adds much, and the referent of
the pronoun is potentially confusing.]
The idea of insurgency as defense against state violence is articulated by Enresto
“Che” Guevera, one of the preeminent Latin American theorists of insurgency, and a
guerrilla leader in Cuba, Bolivia, and Africa. He argued that a viable guerrilla movement
is not practicable in any state where democracy or political legitimacy exists—as a moral
matter, in genuinely legitimate states alternatives to violence exist; as a practical matter,
the populace will not support violence if they feel the government is giving a fair hearing
to their grievances without it. But once an oppressive government has lost that
legitimacy, “peace is considered already broken.”
A variation on the argument about state violence - most often seen in Marxist or
anarchist thought - is the argument regarding “structural” violence. “State violence”
justifications focus on the overt force used by the state, in the form of police and the
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military. “Structural violence” justifications focus on the ways in which existing systems
inflict harm on certain classes in society, such as the deprived or members of a particular
ethnic group, without the overt use of force. Poverty, starvation, or infant mortality can
leave someone just as dead as a bullet or a knife. Thus, a state/system that creates poverty
for some of its members, through allowing or encouraging their exploitation, is using
violence against them whether or not it actually applies the instruments of force directly;
it is thus claimed to be ethical to respond with physical, direct violence.
Thus far, the decision to use force has been discussed from a traditional just war
perspective in which violence is regarded as regrettable but sometimes necessary. Not all
theorists of insurgency accept this assumption; some see an inherent value in violence.
The most prominent example is Fanon. Fanon makes much of the psychologically
“cleansing” power of violent action. The colonized person, in Fanon’s theory, sublimates
futile feelings of rage against oppression into magical thinking and violence against other
colonized persons. Violence against the oppressor refocuses the mind on the real
problems at hand and fosters psychological integration. The view that violence is
necessary for the perfection of the oppressed’s character was popular both with African
anticolonial theorists and other insurgents. Other insurgency theorists, such as Guevara,
stress the moral character created through violent struggle more generally, similar to the
way in which states stress that military service fosters courage and self-discipline.
Fascists, too, praised the use of violence as a creative, energizing force, in their struggles
to gain power in the 1920s and 1930s.
<H2>Ethical Use of Violence.</H2> The most pressing question of jus in bello,
justice in war, is the proper relationship between combatants and noncombatants.
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Insurgent movements are most often criticized for denying or ignoring the core principle
that noncombatants are immune from attack.
<H2>Targeting Civilians.</H2> Few insurgents deny the principle of
noncombatant immunity outright; they may claim exceptions, however, or define the
class of noncombatants in different ways than traditional just war theorists.
Military operations by states inevitably involve “collateral damage” to civilians,
whether through accidental targeting, the use of indiscriminate weapons, environmental
effects such as contamination from depleted uranium munitions, or damage to
infrastructure used by both the military and civilians, such as electrical grids. Traditional
just war theory distinguishes between targeting civilians and unintentionally (but
forseeably) harming them, but insurgent arguments may not make this distinction. Others
imply that the extent of civilian deaths, and the failure of states to take appropriate steps
to prevent or minimize those deaths, belie protestations that the deaths are unintentional.
Either way, attacks on civilians are justified as retaliation for a prior state violation of
civilian immunity.
Other insurgent groups target populations or particular groups or communities
that the insurgents do not regard as civilian, even if they may not be traditional
combatants. The general argument is that individuals who do not participate directly in
the conflict may nonetheless be “combatants” because of the material or political support
they give. For example, Palestinian insurgents have debated whether all Israelis are
legitimate targets of attack as supporters of the occupation, only Israeli military forces
may be targeted, or whether Israeli citizens generally are civilians, but those who have
settled in certain areas of the occupied territories have forfeited protected civilian status
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by choosing to live on illegitimately appropriated (in the insurgents’ view) land.
Combined with a version of the structural violence argument, an expansion of
combatant status to those who support the military effort opposed by an insurgency can
cast the net very wide. If, for instance, insurgents regard poverty as structural violence
that results from the developed world’s capitalist economic policies, anyone who benefits
from global capitalism may look like a legitimate target. This would include almost any
citizen of a North American or European nation. Osama bin Laden, leader of the al-Qaeda
organization that carried out the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and on the
Pentagon, justified the attack on the World Trade Center in an October 2001 interview by
arguing that those in the World Trade Center were part of the economic system that the
United States used to oppress the Muslim peoples, and so they were not innocent
civilians.
<H2>Conduct Among Civilians.</H2> Insurgents often see themselves as
fighting on behalf of the people, and so—at least in rhetoric—value treating civilians
in their area of operations with respect. In addition, the guerrilla warfare tradition,
exemplified by Guevara and Mao Tse-Tung, leader of China’s communist
revolution, makes much of ethical conduct as a tactic, aside from any inherent
importance. Guerrillas are not able to engage large state militaries directly, and so
guerrilla warfare requires mass support to undermine the state. Both Guevara and
Mao thought it important that the guerrilla live a life of great personal rectitude,
even asceticism, and refrain from abuses against the populace.
Guevara and Mao also made moral conduct toward the enemy an important part
of their strategy. Before the communist revolution, during World War II, Mao’s guerrillas
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fought against the Japanese occupation of China. Mao argued that the general population
of Japan, including most members of the Japanese armed forces, did not support the
occupation—or would not if they realized the evils of Japanese imperialism. Therefore,
captured Japanese soldiers were to be treated well and instructed in the justice of the
Chinese cause, then sent on their way. In this way, contact with enemy forces could be
turned into a propaganda opportunity. Guevara and others in the classic guerrilla tradition
have counseled similar tactics, although in practice such armies have rarely been so
scrupulous.
Despite the claimed ethical basis of good conduct toward civilians, insurgents are
often criticized for using close integration with civilians as a tactic. Mao famously argued
for good relations in part so that guerrillas could swim like fish in the ocean of the
people, and hence avoid discovery by government forces. But if guerrillas are
indistinguishable from noncombatants, this endangers noncombatants—even a very
scrupulous state military may mistakenly target civilians, believing them to be guerrillas.
Insurgent tactics of “basing” among civilians may further endanger them, as powerful
modern weapons such as bombs and missiles will inevitably catch civilians in their blasts
if they are too nearby. Insurgents rarely engage with this argument directly, instead
implicitly holding that difficulties in targeting are the moral responsibility of the attacker.
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<H1>The Special Role of Religion.</H1> For much of the twentieth century,
the most prominent insurgencies were secular: independence movements or would-be
communist, fascist, or capitalist revolutions. In the twenty-first century, religious
insurgency is at the forefront of many discussions—the influence of religion affects not
only the motivations of insurgents but also their ethical arguments for conduct in war.
In addition to forming part of the argument that a cause is just, appeals to revealed
religion can substitute for argumentation in terms of ethical theory. For example,
Mohammed J. Hafez, in a study of Iraqi suicide bombers in the insurgency against the
U.S. presence, discusses the role that reports of religious visions play in recruitment and
justification. Insurgents in Iraq would sometimes claim that they had received visions in
dreams either that a successful suicide bomber was in heaven, or that someone
contemplating a suicide mission would soon be there. Although this is not an argument,
someone who believes that these are authentic visions sent by the deity will be assured
that suicide bombings are morally correct, even if they cannot produce an argument to
that effect. Justifications in terms of revealed religion are not restricted only to Muslim
suicide bombers, or even only to violent insurgents. Gandhi’s nonviolence, for example,
was rooted as much in his mystical practice and beliefs as in any philosophical argument
against violence. It was a “way to truth.”
Whether insurgents are orienting themselves by religious mores or in terms of a
more rationalistic ethic, understanding the codes they adhere to can be important. In
itself, it may suggest ways in which legitimate grievances can be addressed by state
parties. Or, if the insurgents are using morality disingenuously or cynically to secure
support, understanding the ethical norms they profess, can indicate how to make a case
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that they are hypocritical and do not deserve support. Finally, insurgent thinking about
ethical conduct is grounded in experience of trying to gain mass support—given the
importance of “winning hearts and minds” to modern attempts to end conflict, even
noninsurgents may find lessons here.
<XR>[Insurgency, counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, revolution, pacifism,
just war, decolonization, civil war]</XR>[AU: Please suggest some cross-references.]
[I no longer have the full list of entries to generate a XR list, but hopefully these
suggestions are sufficiently similar to the ones available.]
[AU: Please trim Bibliography to 10 essential sources, preferably books, if possible—
and/or delete annotations. Biblio exceeds recommended length. Thank you.] [I've
trimmed some below; I hope this brings it into line. There are 12 entries, but I have also
deleted or shortened annotations. My understanding was that you were interested in
extensive annotations in the bibliography, sorry for the misunderstanding.]
<BIH>Bibliography</BIH>
<BIL>Ackerman, Peter, and Jack Duvall. A Force More Powerful: A Century of
Nonviolent Conflict. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000. An accessible but sometimes
uncritical history of nonviolent political movements in the twentieth century, written as
the companion to a PBS television series.
Berdal, Mats, and David M. Malone, eds. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in
Civil Wars. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000. Although not focused on ethics per se,
the anthology covers various theories of insurgent motivation, including what may make
people believe they have a just cause.
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Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York:
Grove Press, 2004. English translation of Les Damnés de la Terre, first published in 1961.
Gandhi, Mohandas K. Non-violence in Peace and War. Edited by Mahadev Desai. 2 vols.
Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House, 1942. A comprehensive collection of
Gandhi’s writings, mostly from journals and magazines. Out of print, but available in
many university libraries. Several smaller collections of Gandhi’s writings are in print.
Guevara, Che. Guerrilla Warfare. Edited by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr.
3d ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. Reprint of a 1985 edition. This
volume contains Guerilla Warfare (1960), translated by J. P. Morray, “Guerrilla Warfare:
A Method” (1963), and “Message to the Tricontinental” (1967), along with case studies
of guerrilla wars composed by the editors.
Hafez, Mohammed J. Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007.
Kaunda, Kenneth. The Riddle of Violence. Edited by Colin M. Morris. New York: Harper
& Row, 1980. This book is an extended discussion of the resort to violence in anticolonial insurgency, especially from a Christian perspective.
Lawrence, Bruce, ed. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden. New
York: Verso, 2005.
Lenin, V. I. The State and Revolution. Translated by Robert Service. New ed. New York:
Penguin Classics, 1993. Original (in Russian) published in 1918.
Mao Tse-tung. On Guerrilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith II. Champaign:
University of Illinois Press, 2000. Reprint of a 1961 edition, an English translation of Yu
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Chi Chan, 1937.
Porter, David, ed. Vision on Fire: Emma Goldman on the Spanish Revolution. Oakland,
Calif.: AK Press, 2006. An interesting record both of a Western insurgency and of
anarchist thought about violent resistance.
Sutherland, Bill, and Matt Meyer. Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan African Insights on
Nonviolence, Armed Struggle, and Liberation in Africa. Trenton, N.J.: Africa World
Press, 2000. A fascinating if unsystematic look at African decolonization from the
perspective of questions of pacifism and violence. </BIL>
<CBY>Daniel H. Levine</CBY>[AU: This is the way your name is going to appear at
the end of the article and in the Directory of Contributors. Is this correct? Please
also supply your affiliation (department and institution) or ”Independent scholar”
(or some such). Thank you.]
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy
School of Public Policy
University of Maryland, College Park
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