The $64 Question:
Welfare Reform in New Jersey
by Ted Goertzel and John Hart
Note: a version of this paper appeared as "The Politics of Welfare Reform in New Jersey," in The
Politics of Welfare Reform (Donald Norris, ed.), SAGE Publications, 1995. This is the original
typescript and does not include any editing added by the book's editors.
The welfare reform passed by the New Jersey legislature in January of 1992
received national attention because of the requirement that women who conceive and deliver an
additional child while on AFDC be denied additional cash benefits for that child. This provision
was of great political and symbolic importance, although its economic impact was expected to be
modest. The approximately 95,000 women on welfare in New Jersey have about 1,000 births a
month, of which about 300 are born to mothers who have been on welfare for 10 months or
longer. Thus, this new provision affects less than 4% of the welfare mothers in the course of a
year. Even for these mothers, the benefit loss is only $64 per month, a one-third of which is
made up by a compensatory increase in food stamps.
This new provision was strongly opposed by many liberal advocates and defenders of the
poor, who saw it as a case of "blaming the victim." They denounced the "myth" that welfare
recipients have additional children to receive the benefits. They locked in a bitter political
struggle with New Jersey Assemblyman Wayne Bryant, the initiator and chief proponent of the
reform. Bryant was adamant in insisting on this provision as a means of sending a message to
welfare recipients that welfare must be temporary, not a way of life. He was certain that word of
this change would spread instantly through the inner city community, and that it would
encourage welfare mothers to take advantage of other features of the welfare reform which were
designed to strengthen families and facilitate their entry into mainstream society. He insisted
that opponents consider his Family Development Plan as a whole, not just focus on the one
provision they found most objectionable.
The New Jersey welfare reform is a remarkable case study in legislative
entrepreneurialism by a single state Assemblyman. Wayne Bryant decided that the Family
Development Plan was necessary, wrote the bills, brought them to the public's attention,
persuaded the legislature to pass them and Governor James Florio to implement them. Bryant's
status as an influential African-American Democrat whose district included the City of Camden,
New Jersey's poorest city, denied the opposition the argument that the reform was motivated by
racism or mean spiritedness. Many people who might otherwise have simply rejected such a
proposal out of hand were forced to rethink their assumptions or at least temper their opposition
because of Bryant's sponsorship. For example, human services advocate Catherine DeCheser,
known throughout the state as a fiery advocate for the dispossessed, observed that :
I'm afraid the philosophy behind Wayne's plan will pander to the bigots out there
who feel they should limit the number of minority babies born - in any way they can.
Some minorities see that as a form of genocide.
On the other hand, I know Wayne cares deeply about the black family, and some
1
blacks tell me he's right and I'm wrong. They say I'm still stuck in a 60s mentality, when
black entrepreneurship and responsibility are the way to go(Magyar, 1991).
The "Bryant bills," as the legislation that created the Family Development Plan came to
be known, were very much Wayne Bryant's personal project. As majority leader of the New
Jersey Assembly, Bryant was an experienced and skilled political leader with a long record of
advocacy for the poor. He lobbied tirelessly for his bill with the general public and in both the
Assembly and the Senate. He won the strong support of then-Governor James Florio, a liberal
Democrat from Southern New Jersey who had been his close ally throughout his political career.
He traveled the state speaking eloquently about the need to liberate black and other poor New
Jerseyans from the debilitating effects of the welfare system.
The Family Development Plan was a comprehensive legislative package designed to help
poor families take responsibility for their own lives. Requiring welfare recipients to meet with a
case worker to agree on a comprehensive plan for the family as a whole, it promised long-term
support for recipients who chose to continue their education, even through college. It also offered
incentives to make it easier for women to marry without losing benefits. Bryant's intention was
to expose welfare recipients to the same economic incentives that apply to the American middle
and working classes.
Politically, Bryant's proposals were most galling to two groups who seldom find
themselves on the same side of an issue: feminists and Right-to-Lifers. His stress on the
traditional two-parent family was offensive to feminists, fearing that such a mind set would force
many women to become dependent on men who had been abusive or irresponsible. The Rightto-Lifers feared that the refusing to support additional babies conceived on welfare might lead to
an increase in the number of abortions. This awkward alliance was made more difficult by a
contradiction in the logic of their arguments: the feminists vehemently denied that women have
babies to get additional benefits, while the right-to-lifers feared that the change in benefits
would affect their decisions to carry pregnancies to term. Bryant's response to both arguments
was that he simply wanted to help welfare recipients assume the same responsibilities and make
the same choices as other Americans.
APPROACH AND BACKGROUND
This chapter will focus primarily on the politics of the Family Development Plan (FDP),
since this unique initiative offers an important contrast to developments in other states and a
useful alternative for national policy makers. Of course, we will place the FDP in the context of
New Jersey's welfare history, and will also discuss developments after the FDP became law. The
data for this analysis comes from a number of different sources. First, we interviewed a number
of very knowledgeable political leaders and activists and several knowledgeable officials in state
government. Assemblyman Wayne Bryant spent three hours answering our questions. We also
collected available reports in newspapers and magazines, many of which are cited in the
references to this paper. We also read the transcripts of the hearings conducted by the New
Jersey Assembly at which a great many New Jersey citizens, including some recipients, testified.
We incorporated the views of welfare recipients by conducting survey interviews and focus group
discussions with welfare mothers in Camden, one of New Jersey's poorest cities with a large
welfare population. Finally, we collected and analyzed voting statistics and the available data
on the impact of the program.
2
As an affluent, liberal eastern state, New Jersey's welfare benefits are comparatively
generous by national standards. The most important innovation in the period prior to FDP was
the REACH program, which was passed under the administration of the liberal Republican
governor Thomas Kean. When the REACH program (Realizing Economic Achievement) was
introduced, it too was heralded as an innovative reform designed to correct the defects of the
AFDC program. As recently as the Fall of 1989, former Republican Governor Thomas Kean
praised REACH as a "workfare" plan requiring able-bodied recipients to "draw up a contract, a
specific and detailed plan of action that spells out what the participant will do to help herself
and her children get off welfare" (Kean, 1989: 70). Several participants in the public hearings on
Bryant's proposed legislation observed that his Family Development Plan was actually quite
similar to the REACH program in many respects. They argued that if REACH had failed, it was
because of inadequate funding or ineffective implementation, not because of fundamental policy
deficiencies.
Bryant's argument regarding a shortage of resources to implement FDP is that there were
many under used resources available. State institutions, such as universities, should make their
services available to recipients free of charge because they are already being supported by the
state. There is no need to create new schools and training program when the state already
supported school systems in each community. These resources needed to be made available to
welfare recipients on a priority basis with a minimum of additional funding. The success of
Bryant's hopes to raise welfare recipients into the economic mainstream through education,
then, was dependent on enthusiastic support from welfare workers and from people providing
educational and support services throughout the state.
Table 1 lists the key differences between two plans. Although the Family Development
Plan was heralded as an important change, it is clear from the table that most of the differences
are incremental and qualitative, not drastic or revolutionary. Participation must begin when a
child is two under the FDP, while under REACH it began when the child was three. Under FDP
the whole family is expected to prepare a "family plan," while under REACH this applied only to
the recipient. College is included as an option under the FDP, and a recipient can continue to
receive benefits if she marries a man who is not the father of her children. And, finally, the
controversial FDP provision that a child conceived while the mother is on welfare will not lead to
an increase in the family's grant. This became known as the "$64" clause, because the cash
increase for a woman having an additional child was most frequently $64. Actually, the
difference in net income was somewhat less than that because the food stamp allotment is
automatically increased to partially compensate for the lower cash income.
It is clear that the differences in the plans as implemented may turn out to be less than
the differences on paper. On paper, the REACH program was originally intended to apply to all
eligible AFDC recipients. In practice, many of its provisions were limited to federally approved
target groups because of limitations in resources. It is likely that resources will continue to be
limited, given the current political and fiscal realities in the state. Many welfare workers and
officials believe that participation in educational and work programs should be voluntary; they
may not make a strenuous effort to force compliance on the reluctant recipient, particularly if his
or her work load is heavy and resources are scarce.
Table 1
3
Comparison of FDP and REACH
New Family Development Plan
Old REACH/JOBS Plan
Recipients with a child younger than two years
Participation
old
is voluntary for recipients with a child
must participate in counseling.
under two years of age.
AFDC recipients with a child two or more Recipients
years of with a child three years of age or older
age or older must participate in FDP activities.
must participate,
The
in principle. In practice,
assumption is that resources will be foundREACH/JOBS
for all].
served primarily those in federal
target groups.
Failure to participate without good cause leads
Failure
to to participate without good cause leads to a
reduction of benefits, a 90-day suspension reduction
and
of benefits for as long as six months.
eventually termination.
Each participant must develop a "family plan"
Each participant must prepare an "employability
including a written contract. The entire family
plan" is
and a written agreement. The plan focuses on
included in the plan.
the individual recipient.
Job development and placement, counseling,
Similar services are provided to recipients, but
vocational assessment, educational, and training
services extended to family members are much less
services are provided for the recipient and comprehensive.
family
members.
A high school diploma or equivalency is required
Only recipients younger than 25 years of age must
before assignment to vocational activity (unless
acquire
the
a high school diploma.
recipient is unable to complete it).
One or more full time job specialists in each
Nocounty
such provision.
to find and create jobs.
Scholarships available for vocational training,
Basic opportunity and Pell grants available, but
community college or 4-year college programs.
four year degree programs not supported.
Support services include child care, transportation,
The same services are provided with a 1-year
2-years extension of Medicaid eligibility. Medicaid extension if necessary because of earned
income.
A recipient's natural children may continue
If to
a recipient remarries, the new spouse may be
receive benefits after she marries a man who
included
is not or excluded in the eligible unit. If
the father, so long as the total annual income
excluded,
does part of the new spouse's income is deemed
not exceed 150% of the poverty level.
available to the eligible unit.
A recipient who gives birth to another child
AFDC
will not
benefits increase with an increase in family
receive an increase in benefits. Working families
size. Working families with an additional child
with an additional child receive an additional
receive an additional earned income disregard
4
earned income disregard.
according to a different formula.
Men on municipal general assistance (without
This population participates only in a less
dependent children) must enroll and participate.
comprehensive general assistance employability
program.
Family resource centers to be established in
Non-existent.
each
county to handle service delivery.
When Governor Kean was replaced by Governor Florio in 1989, there was no reason to
expect major changes in welfare policy. Welfare was not an important issue in the campaign, in
which Florio defeated a much more conservative Republican candidate, James Courter.
Although the formal evaluation of REACH was never completed because the funds were cut off,
the legislature was convinced that REACH had not been successful. Indeed, the preface to the
Family Development Act legislation began with a statement to that effect (see Table 2).
New Jersey is an affluent state with a large suburban population. The welfare population
is concentrated in older cities with large minority populations, especially Newark and Jersey
City in the north, Trenton in the center of the state, and Camden in the south. The most
promising effort to realize REACH's objectives, however, was in Atlantic City, where the new
casino gambling industry had promised a substantial number of new jobs. An effort was made in
Camden County, but the efforts for change in Newark, the city with the largest welfare
population, were not impressive.
ACHIEVING AGENDA STATUS
Although New Jerseyans shared in the nation's concerns about welfare and the problems
of the urban underclass, welfare reform was not a major topic in New Jersey at the beginning of
the Florio administration. It became an issue entirely because of the political initiative of
Wayne Bryant. Bryant first became concerned by the long lines that formed outside Camden
banks on "Mother's Day" (the first day of the month when welfare checks were available). He
succeeded in getting legislation passed to have checks paid throughout the month instead of all
on one day, but the Kean administration never got around to implementing it. It was finally
implemented in 1993.
Prior to this effort, welfare had not been a focus of Bryant's legislative work. When he
entered the New Jersey Assembly in 1981, he steered away from the assignments that might
have been stereotypically expected of an African-American legislator. He thought he could be
more effective by working on committees that had major economic impacts. He was successful in
writing major initiatives, such as the Urban Enterprise Zone legislation, the Health Care
Reduction Act, the Insurance Reform Act, and the Mt. Laurel Fair Housing Bill. It was not until
1992, 11 years since entering office that he decided it was time to use his accumulated political
expertise and influence to reform the welfare system.
Bryant drew on his own experiences and ideas in developing his proposals. He did not
read the major academic works on the subject, nor did he consult extensively with experts in
state government or elsewhere. It was clear that previous efforts had failed, and he felt that it
was time for a fresh approach. Since the reform was Bryant's personal initiative, we can begin
5
our analysis with a summary of his key arguments for it. These arguments were made in
speeches around the state, in interviews with journalists, in his own press releases (Bryant,
1991), and in a lengthy interview with the authors.
Bryant often began his speeches with the dramatic assertion that welfare was a form of
slavery. This was true because government dependents have no real freedom. The welfare
system makes families dependent by forcing the men out of the home. He argued that welfare
recipients are ingenious people, as proved by their ability to survive on a grant of $424 a month,
and that they are capable of working for a living like everyone else. They need education and
training to enable them to make a decent living in contemporary American society, where almost
all jobs require at least a high school education. Welfare recipients must rejoin the mainstream
of American society, where parents support the children. No employers, not even the most
liberal ones such as the American Civil Liberties Union or the National Organization for
Women, give their employees a raise just because they have another baby. If working Americans
choose to have a baby, they may have to work additional hours to pay for the expenses. By
making children a source of income, welfare has put recipients in a situation where their
incentives are the opposite of those for other Americans. In Bryant's view, welfare recipients
must be given the same choices and opportunities as other Americans, not treated as an inferior
group unable to take responsibility for their own lives.
THE POLITICS OF POLICY CHANGE
When Bryant first presented his ideas, state welfare officials did not think they were
likely to ever become law. His ideas had not evolved out of any governmental policy planning
process and did not seem to be a priority with the Florio administration, nor did they seem to
have widespread public support. Indeed, there seemed little reason to believe that they would
ever be implemented. Yet, this "outside the system" beginning was actually a part of Bryant's
strategy. Although Bryant had been close to Florio throughout Bryant's political career, he told
Florio that he wanted to do this on his own. He was afraid that if he turned his proposals over to
legislative committees or government staffers, they would be diluted and split into parts. He
thought that the program would lose coherence if legislators picked only the most popular
proposals. His strategy from the start was to present his entire Family Development Plan as a
complete package, to be accepted or rejected as a whole.
With the assistance of his staff, Assemblyman Bryant developed a public relations
campaign to promote his plan as an innovative solution to the welfare problem. He wrote an oped piece that was distributed to local newspapers, personally visited the editorial boards of key
regional newspapers, and scheduled a series of public legislative hearings around the state. He
also solicited letters of endorsement from welfare boards and other groups on the county level.
Almost all of these letters endorsed his plan except for the provision to deny benefits for
additional children.
In public, Bryant never evaded what he called the "$64 dollar question," but he always
insisted on putting it into the context of the plan as a whole. He stressed the positive incentives
included in the plan, especially the educational and training opportunities that would be offered,
and the measures that would make it easier for a recipient to marry without losing benefits. He
also declared that the REACH program had been a failure. Indeed, the preamble to the
6
legislation asserted the failure of REACH.
The Public Hearings. The differing views about the legislation were articulated most
succinctly in public hearings held at several locations around the state. The hearings provided
an opportunity for interested citizens to express their concerns to legislators. Many citizens
came with carefully prepared statements expressing their points of view at considerable length.
Assemblyman Bryant attended these hearings, together with Assemblyman George Otlowski,
Chairman of the Assembly Health and Human Services Committee. The following section is a
summary of the debate at the hearings held at Trenton, Newark and Stratford in July and
October of 1992, as recorded in the minutes of the sessions.
First, the kinds of people and groups that chose to speak at the hearings were
representatives of community advocacy and religious groups, county and municipal political
leaders, and representatives of statewide liberal advocacy groups such as the NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund, the Association for Children of New Jersey, Legal Services of New
Jersey, the Lutheran Office of Governmental Ministry, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
New Jersey Catholic Conference, the National Association of Social Workers, the I Have a
Dream Foundation, and the Black United Fund of New Jersey. In addition, there were a few
representatives of state government agencies, including the Department of the Public Advocate
and the Department of Health and Welfare.
Although some theorists (e.g., Piven and Cloward, 1971) believe that welfare policy
represents the interest of the business class, no businessmen or representatives of business
groups spoke at any of the hearings from which we have been able to obtain transcripts. Nor
have we found that business interests played any significant behind the scenes role in this
decision making process. Rather than articulating the interests of different classes or groups in
society, the debate focused on sociological, philosophical, and ideological differences of opinion
among well-meaning people who were advocates for the poor. The majority of the speakers who
addressed the issue opposed the denial of additional benefits.
Perhaps the most adamant in opposing Wayne Bryant's proposal was Martha Davis, staff
attorney for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York City. In the written
statement that Davis submitted, NOW cited legal precedents to argue that two key provisions of
the legislation were discriminatory and unconstitutional: denying additional benefits for an
additional child, and providing incentives to women who marry. Davis argued that these
provisions were "an impermissible attempt to intrude on the private lifestyle choices of poor
women." Bryant's response was that he "just came up with another way that folks could be
responsible like the rest of us." He emphasized that the proposal gave recipients the chance to
work and earn the money to support additional children if they chose to.
Davis further objected that the provision that allowed women to marry and not lose
benefits was discriminatory against unmarried women. Bryant responded that this provision
was designed to parallel the situation in the larger society where a stepfather does not have to
assume financial responsibility for children who are not his own. "Why aren't we willing to
apply those same middle-class, working-class systems or programs we've already set up that
work so beautifully -- or at least we claim they do in America, for everyone else," Bryant argued.
"Why can't they apply within a system that we develop for who are trying to get out of poverty?"
Davis objected, saying "I think you can't ignore the fact, sir, that people who are on AFDC
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have very little resources and very little money." Bryant answered, "What I get annoyed at is
some folks view the system as a permanent poverty system, and therefore they get their wealth
from that system. They don't see it as a transitional system, so they come up with all kinds of
rational reasons to stop it from changing." Benefits are given to married people and stepparents
in the tax system, Bryant argued, so why not in the welfare system. Davis argued that the
situation of impoverished people is different because of their paucity of resources, and that the
state should give them additional opportunities, not provide "punitive financial incentives or
disincentives as part of the subsistence welfare benefits."
Davis and Bryant had their most bitter disagreement about the provision to deny benefits
for additional children born while the mother is receiving welfare. Davis insisted that this
provision created an illegal distinction among children. Bryant insisted that there was no legal
entitlement to welfare, so that we had a lot of "latitude and longitude as to how you develop the
system." Davis argued that this was "a basic human rights issue" and that it was "illegal and
unconstitutional, and not good policy, either" for the state to punish people for behaviors that are
perfectly legal, such as having children. She insisted that although there is no constitutional
right to welfare, "there is a constitutional right to equity once welfare is available." These are
subsistence benefits, she argued, and it is wrong for the state to deny funds people need to feed
their children.
Bryant objected vehemently, arguing that "working at McDonald's that have signs all over
Newark and Camden -- and every place else -- for 15 hours a week, at the minimum wage today - 15 hours a month, you get more than you have on welfare. Why is it a problem to tell a person
that if you make the mental decision to have a child -- I'm not stopping you from having it, you
can have it -- that you might have to go spend 15 hours a week or work within whatever
schedules, like you do and I do, and might work at McDonald's while we're also training you or
educating you to do whatever you want to do? Why is that such a problem?"
Many of the other speakers at the hearing made points similar to Davis and Bryant.
Cecilia Zalkind, representing the Association for Children of New Jersey opposed denying
benefits to additional children on the grounds that this would "penalize children." The Newark
Council President, Frank Bell, thought that the Bryant's proposal "assumes that AFDC welfare
benefits are a sexual stimulant, enticing men and women to make unwanted children. Clearly
this is not the case." Many participants denounced the "myth" that women have children just to
get the welfare benefits. Many perceived the denial of benefits for an additional child as
government interference in family life. Margaret Woods, director of an alternative high school in
Newark, questioned whether "the government has the right to dictate or regulate family size
simply because a woman is poor and on public assistance."
There was general support for the positive incentives provided in the reform, such as the
Medicare extension, child care benefits, and training. There was some skepticism, however, that
these positive benefits would actually be delivered. Reverend Willie Simmons, representing the
Black Churches Homeless Program and several other groups, thought that there was really little
difference between this program and REACH, and that neither met the basic problem, which
was a lack of jobs. Bryant responded that REACH placed the primary emphasis on job training,
with more fundamental education a secondary goal. Bryant said, "I reversed the spin. I say
education is primary, and then we do job training." Bryant pointed out that his bill provided for
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the opportunity to go to college, and that it stressed strengthening families. All of these were
differences with REACH.
Regina Purcell, speaking for the New Jersey Catholic Conference, was adamantly opposed
to denying benefits for additional children. She argued that "in a worst case scenario, a mother
could be put in the position of determining whether to abort her baby rather than attempting to
spread her already meager resources to support another child." She called for increasing public
assistance levels "so that those who are attempting to live on this assistance may do so with
some measure of human dignity."
The abortion issue was only occasionally mentioned in the debate about the New Jersey
reforms, in the public hearings or elsewhere. New Jersey Right-to-Life opposed the bill, which
put them and the National Organization for Women in the unusual situation of being on the
same side of an issue. Perhaps both sides felt that highlighting the possibility that the bill
would lead to an increase in abortions would split their ranks and distract attention from more
potent arguments on which they were in agreement. In any event, they would have found it
difficult to argue that it is a that myth welfare benefits encourage women to have children, but
that they would abort them if they did not get a $64 increment.
There were a few participants who supported Bryant's entire legislative package, or who
were at least willing to give it the benefit of the doubt. Lloyd Oxford, of the Black United Fund
of New Jersey, the leading black philanthropic organization in the state, stated that "we believe
that Aid to Families with Dependent Children and other forms of public assistance represent a
form of genocide that perpetuates a poverty culture in the black community. By design, the
system is one that neither adequately prepares or equips recipients for social and economic
survival after public assistance." He commended Bryant for initiating a far-reaching reform that
"could potentially place the recipients on the road to self-sufficiency." He supported Bryant's
program, including the measures intended to "discourage and prevent family expansions when it
is not economically feasible for both the parents and their teenaged siblings."
Reverend Philip Hirsch of the Camden Lutheran Parish, remarked that "I was first
outraged at the proposal to cut AFDC to families having more children." He went out and spoke
to many AFDC mothers and grandmothers, including one grandmother who had 19 children
herself, and said that "the overwhelming consensus was that this particular benefit program was
providing incentive to some young women to have more children. Many know that if they have a
child, they will get a check." He commended Bryant's proposal, but felt that perhaps it was too
sweeping and that the funding sources had not been evaluated thoroughly enough.
The preponderant opinion at the hearings was to support the positive incentives in the
new legislation, but to oppose cutting any benefits. This clearly reflected the views of the liberal
advocates who attended, not public opinion in the state as a whole. Assemblyman Bryant
showed no signs of being swayed by the disagreements presented; instead, he used the hearings
as an opportunity to vigorously defend his own views.
Welfare Ideologies. Excerpts from the public hearings show that the debate on the Family
Development Plan fundamentally revolved around ideological differences. The issues that were
raised are the same as those that motivate much of the national debate on welfare. In simplified
form, welfare ideologies can be classified into three major schemas, all relevant to the New
9
Jersey debate, presented here:
"Victims of the System" Schema: Poor people are victims of the defects of the American economic
and social system. The pathologies observed among poor people are a consequence of racial,
class and gender-based oppression. Unless the fundamental structure of American society is
changed, the only solution is to give the poor more money and benefits to raise them out of
poverty (Harrington, 1962; Piven and Cloward, 1971, 1991; Devine and Wright, 1993).
"Welfare Dependence" Schema: The welfare system perpetuates poverty by giving people
disincentives to work. The solution is to cut or restructure benefits so that people will find it
worth their while to accept even minimum wage jobs. They will then acquire job experience and
have an incentive to advance themselves (Murray, 1984).
"Culture of Poverty" Schema: Poverty persists because people in poor communities have been
socialized into value systems that deprecate traditional values such as the work ethic, sexual
chastity, deferred gratification, and family responsibility. The solution is to advocate for these
values while changing legal and social institutions and programs that tend to undermine them.
In general, liberals and others most sympathetic to the plight of the poor have adhered to
the victim of the system schema, which was eloquently advocated by Michael Harrington in the
early 1960s and provided the impetus for the War on Poverty. Early versions of the culture of
poverty schema were vehemently denounced by these liberals as "blaming the victim," a phrase
popularized by William Ryan (1971). When the war on poverty failed to solve the problem, there
was a swing of opinion towards the conservative Republicans who argued that the welfare
system itself was the cause of the problem. This position was best articulated in Charles
Murray's book Losing Ground (1984), which was bitterly attacked by liberals (see Devine and
Wright, 1993). The cuts that the conservatives imposed on benefits, however, also failed to solve
the problem. Most recently, there has been a revival of the culture of poverty schema, which
some people believe was the missing element in both the liberal and conservative schemas (see
Magnet, 1993).
Wayne Bryant's Family Development Plan is most consistent with the culture of poverty
and welfare dependence schemas. He sees the welfare system as a root cause of the poverty and
dependence of poor people, particularly African Americans in inner city ghettos, such as the
Camden constituency he represents. He believes that a culture of poverty has developed in these
communities largely because people have been accustomed to depending on public assistance.
His requirement that each family be required to meet with a social worker to draw up a family
development plan is a straightforward attempt to teach the poor middle class cultural values
such as responsibility for one's own future and the value of education.
Liberals generally believe that the welfare dependence and culture of poverty schemas are
rationalizations for racist and classist attitudes. Bryant's status as an African American and a
prominent liberal Democrat, prevented them from using that means of attack on the Family
Development Plan. Bryant's inclusion of expanded educational benefits in the plan showed that
his goal was to bring underclass citizens into the middle class. As Steve Adubato (1991)
commented in the Trenton Times:
If a white legislator, especially from a middle class suburban district, proposed the same
exact welfare reform, he or she might be called a 'racist' or a 'welfare basher.' But right or
wrong, the fact that the proposal comes from Bryant, who has proudly and effectively
10
represented poor inner city constituencies, makes his effort even more credible and
courageous.
Adubato, a Rutgers instructor, television commentator, and former Democratic state
legislator, as well as a newspaper columnist, reflected the thinking of many liberals who did not
sympathize with crude welfare bashing, but also had doubts about the current system.
While growing up in a working class ethnic neighborhood in Newark, hardly a day would
go by that I didn't hear someone make a negative reference to some lazy so-and-so on
welfare... While never publicly agreeing with this criticism of welfare, I privately had
questions about it. Isn't there good reason to question a system of doling out taxpayer
dollars to certain folks who are able-bodied and women who continue to have children
knowing full well that the rest of us have to pick up the tab? Yes, even "progressive"
thinking people have their questions about welfare.
Of course, Bryant's proposal also appealed to people whose objections to the welfare
system were less tempered with "progressive" sensibilities. In the mass media, the element of
the plan that received by far the greatest attention was the denial of benefits for additional
children. This was clearly a popular measure among middle class white voters. Governor Florio
bragged about this element of the Bryant welfare reform - and no other - in television
advertisements and debates in his 1993 re-election campaign. Some people suspected that
Bryant included the "$64" provision as a sop to conservatives who might not otherwise have
supported his reform package; Bryant vehemently denied this was the case. In fact the "$64"
provision was passed with the smallest margin of all Bryant's bills in the New Jersey legislature.
Many legislators had grave doubts about the cutting of benefits for additional children, but they
favored the other elements of the plan and they trusted Bryant's motives. Most importantly,
they recognized that the current welfare system wasn't working, and were eager to support
something different and innovative. Bryant was able to persuade enough of them to swallow
their doubts about this provision to put together a narrow majority to pass the bill in the New
Jersey legislature.
Wayne Bryant: A Portrait. Because this reform was so much the personal initiative of
Assemblyman Wayne Bryant, it is important to understand his social roots and his personal
style (Heidorn, 1991). Although Bryant's legislative district includes the city of Camden, it also
includes a number of white working class and middle class suburbs and the suburb of Lawnside
where Bryant lives. Lawnside has been an African American community since before the Civil
War, when the Quakers in the adjoining town of Haddonfield helped to resettle escaped slaves
from the southern states. The population of 3,000 is 99% black, but the town is surrounded by
predominantly white communities and Lawnside students attend an integrated high school.
Most of the residents are small businesspersons, skilled workers, professionals, or civil servants.
Bryant's own family settled in Lawnside in the 1780s, and he is the senior partner in a
successful law firm.
A tall, trim, middle aged man with close cropped hair and goatee, Bryant is very much a
member of New Jersey's Democratic establishment. His grandfather was calendar clerk in the
Assembly in 1925, and his uncle Horace was commissioner of banking and insurance in the
Hughes administration. His father was an Internal Revenue Service employee, and served as
11
President of the Lawnside school board after his retirement. His brother Mark is mayor of
Lawnside. His son is a marketing major at Howard University.
Bryant feels that living in Lawnside has contributed to his and his family's success.
Lawnside has been controlled by blacks since it was incorporated in 1922, and the residents have
felt responsible for their own affairs. He observes that:
Lawnside has no slums, and it's not that everybody's rich. It is because of their own selfdetermination. I have a tremendous feeling that given the opportunity, the power over
your own destiny, any group of people will act basically the same (Heidorn, 1991).
Bryant attended Howard University, graduated from Rutgers Camden Law School in
1972, and became involved in Democratic Party politics. In 1979, then-Congressman Jim Florio
recruited him to join in a struggle against Camden Mayor Angelo Erichetti for control of the
Camden County Democratic Organization. The Florio forces were victorious, in large part
because Erichetti was caught by federal agents accepting a bribe in the Abscam sting operation.
Bryant won a seat on the Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders, then moved up to an
Assembly seat when one became vacant.
In Trenton, Bryant has a reputation for being a bit aloof or even arrogant. One
Republican Assemblyman, who chose to remain anonymous, described Bryant's attitude on the
floor as:
"curt, quick, `I'm in charge and screw you.' He does have that air of being in control.
There's nothing wrong with that, but there are times when he could be a little humble."
(Heidorn, 1991):
Another Republican Assemblyman, John Rocco of nearby Cherry Hill, however, says that Bryant
is friendly on a one-to-one basis, but:
"the only time you see that so-called arrogance or rigid philosophical position come out is
when he's defending his position on bills dealing with Camden."(Heidorn, 1991):
Bryant responds:
Why some people believe that I'm stubborn, or think that I have an air about me, is
because I make them face some of the realities of their own bigotry in terms of how they've
treated what I call the least of us, the poor. I also think people feel I'm arrogant because I
do have a bottom line. I am not a politician that believes in compromise, compromise,
compromise (Heidorn, 1991).
Although Bryant's Fifth District includes the City of Camden, its population overall is
only 30% black. Bryant works closely with Senator Walter Rand and Assemblyman Joseph
Roberts, the two other legislators from the district, who are both white. They campaign as a
team and Bryant is proud that he often runs slightly ahead of his teammates, all quite secure in
the strongly Democratic district. They have been quite successful promoting the district's
interests to the state. Their most recent accomplishment was in getting funding for a $52
million state aquarium, recently opened on the Delaware River in Camden. Bryant is criticized
by some activists in Camden for being closely associated with the establishment. They feel he
should do more for the neighborhoods in Camden, instead of focusing on glamorous projects such
as the aquarium. He insists he does what he can, and that the aquarium would have been built
somewhere else if he and his colleagues hadn't made sure Camden got it.
Bryant has also been criticized for using his legislative clout to win large campaign
12
contributions, and for using his political connections to win contracts for his law firm with state
and local governments. He argues that his law firm actually suffers because he spends so much
time in Trenton, and his supporters insist that his activities are well within the traditional
norms and legal guidelines for New Jersey politics.
U.S. Representative Robert Andrews describes Bryant as part of the "second wave" of
black politicians. He says that (Heidorn, 1991):
Wayne is sort of like the Bill Gray of New Jersey in that he's got the same emotional and
political commitment to that movement but he's got the skills and legislative expertise
and political savvy to build on that.(Heidorn, 1991):
Some feminist critics see Bryant's proposal as representing a male-oriented point of view,
in contrast to the position advocated by groups such as the National Organization for Women,
which is eager to defend the rights of female-headed families. NOW's Martha Davis, for
example, believes that the New Jersey, Wisconsin and similar reforms are based on the "common
theme...that women who form female-headed families should be controlled through a system of
government-sponsored economic penalties and rewards that condition their very survival on
their marital and childbearing choices" (Davis, 1991). She sees these measures as a violation of
women's constitutional rights.
By contrast, Wayne Bryant seeks to restore authority to fathers who are denied their
traditional role by a welfare system that makes them hide from caseworkers so that the family
can get benefits. "I call him the invisible man," Bryant says of the father of children on AFDC.
"The reason for that is the system is designed so he cannot become visible" (Moran, 1991).
Bryant's plan includes incentives for women who marry men who are not the fathers of their
children, since he believes it is unfair and unrealistic to expect these men to be able to pick up
the expenses for children who are not their own. NOW interprets these provisions as
discriminating against women who choose to remain single.
Sociologically, Bryant's proposal can perhaps best be seen as an expression of the
sentiments of the growing African American middle class. Middle class blacks, in New Jersey as
elsewhere, often express frustration with people who remain dependent on welfare year after
year. They feel that opportunities are available for African Americans who finish school, delay
child bearing, and work hard even though they may sometimes have to struggle to overcome
barriers of prejudice and discrimination.
Bryant vehemently disagrees with white liberals who believe that poor black people
cannot be held responsible for their own occupational, educational and family planning decisions.
He believes that these affluent liberals are distant from the people they claim to represent, and
do not really understand them. He purposely scheduled several of his hearings on the Family
Development Plan in inner city locations, knowing that these advocates would be fearful of
visiting these neighborhoods.
Despite the opposition of some vocal liberal groups, Bryant's reforms have been popular
with the general public. In a South Jersey survey conducted by the Forum for Policy Research in
March, 1993, 80% of the respondents supported the new policy of denying additional cash
benefits to recipients for additional children. This included 55% of the black respondents and
52% of the Hispanics, as well as 89% of the white respondents.
13
The Vote. The Bryant bills were passed by New Jersey's 204th legislature during the very
last days of its term, in January 1992. In November, 1991, the voters had expressed their fury
against Democratic Governor Jim Florio by voting a large number of Democratic Legislators out
of office. The next legislature would be Republican-controlled, with Wayne Bryant serving as
Minority Leader.
Bryant's proposals were presented to the legislators in six separate bills as shown in the
Table 2:
Table 2
The "Bryant Bills"
Assembly Bill 4700 - Establishing the basic framework of the "Family Development Act"
including the provisions described above in Table One. The text states that "the REACH
program has failed to provide a viable programmatic approach to the increasing problem of
welfare dependency in New Jersey, with its attendant features of broken families and wasted
lives. A new more comprehensive approach...is required."
Assembly Bill 4701 - Establishing a comprehensive 24-hour social services information
hotline, to more effectively provide services for individuals with multiple needs with a single
phone call.
Assembly Bill 4702 - Providing for AFDC eligibility for otherwise eligible children whose
mother has married a man other than their father. The text states that "this bill is intended
to encourage marriage and family stability among AFDC recipients..."
Assembly Bill 4703 - Providing that no further benefits be paid to women having an
additional child while on AFDC, but increasing their earned income disregard. The text
states that "This bill is intended to discourage AFDC recipients from having additional
children during the period of their welfare dependence, while at the same time giving an
incentive to work to those families that do have additional children..."
Assembly Bill 4704 - Directing the Department of Human Services to provide full benefits to
two parent families. The text states that "currently, these families suffer a reduction in their
AFDC benefits, which serves as a disincentive to maintaining family unity..."
Assembly Bill 4705 - Establishing a Council on Community Restoration to advise the
governor on neighborhoods to be targeted for demonstration projects.
14
Each of the 40 legislative districts in New Jersey elects one Senator and two
Assemblymen. Passing a bill requires an absolute majority of both houses. The formula to pass
legislation is 21 (Senate votes) plus 41 (House votes) plus the governor's signature. Abstentions
have the same practical effect as negative votes, but allow legislators to tell their constituents
that they didn't vote against a measure. The final votes on the Bryant's bills were as follows:
House (1/8/92):
4700
4701
4702
4703
4704
4705
Senate (1/13/92):
4700
4701
4702
4703(6:18 p.m.)
4703(7:00 p.m.)
4704
4705
Yea Nay Not Voting
56
3
21
49
12
19
58
5
17
49
4
27
56
2
22
46
18
16
13
22
29
27
28
26
4
4
0
26
1
1
0
23
14
11
1
12
11
14
13
The real drama was on bill 4703 in the Senate, the provision to deny additional benefits to
women who have additional children while on AFDC. Too few Senators were prepared to pass
this bill when it first came up, so Walter Rand, the Senator from Bryant's Fifth District, "moved
that the bill lost," a parliamentary maneuver which allowed him to bring it up again later.
In the 42 minutes between 6:18 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., Assemblyman Bryant left his seat in
the middle of an Assembly debate and strode down the hall to the Senate to personally lobby for
the bill. Although the bill had received only 13 positive votes the first time around, three
Senators told Bryant that they were prepared to vote for the bill but had simply not been able to
do so at 6:18. To the best of Bryant's recollection, they were Senators Edward O'Connor, Thomas
Cowan and Carmen Orechio. When a bill is opened for voting at the New Jersey legislature, the
votes are tallied on a board with green lights for Yea votes and red lights for Nay. The board
quickly showed 18 green lights, so Bryant was able to tell other Senators that he just needed
three more to go over the top. Bryant remembers talking in depth with Senators John Russo and
Wynona Lipman, who represent opposite poles ideologically but both of whom he knew well. He
also spoke to Senators Phillips and Robert Menendez, to whom he had not had a chance to speak
to personally about the bill.
In addition to Bryant's personal lobbying, strong pressure in support of the bill was
applied by Governor Florio, who sent two of his stop staff members, chief of staff Joseph Salema
and management and policy director Brenda Bacon, an African American, to join Bryant on the
Senate floor. Florio's counsel for legislation and policy, Greg Lawler, lobbied senators in the
hallway.
15
On emerging from the Senate floor, Brenda Bacon summarized the argument she had
used:
I think that there are merits to tying responsible behavior to welfare benefits. I think
that is a philosophy a lot of people are coming to believe is important in breaking the cycle
of poverty (Hooker, 1992).
After the vote, Bryant (Chicowski, 1992) explained that he had to "explain it to the
senators so they understood that it was part of the theme of responsibility that ran through all
the bills they had just passed." Bryant thought that:
Some senators didn't understand. This package offers both help and responsibility to
improve the quality of life of welfare recipients, and you can't take the linchpin of
responsibility out of the package (Magyar, 1992).
Four Senators had voted against the plan at 6:18 p.m.:
One was Louis Bassano, a Union County Republican who told the Senate: "In good
conscience, I can't support this. What you are doing with this legislation is taking money from
children who need that help" (Leusner, 1992). He argued that: "The money that's given to a
mother is money that's given to support her child - not her" (Associated Press, 1992).
Another was Richard Codey, a Democrat whose District includes the Oranges and part of
Newark and has a majority Black population. He also did not want to "penalize children ... who
didn't ask to be brought into this world."
The third was Ronald Rice, a Democrat whose District includes Irvington and parts of
Newark. At one point in the debate, Brenda Bacon and Wayne Bryant flanked Senator Rice, and
Bryant knelt beside Rice in a prayerful pose. Despite this effort, Rice remained adamant and
voted Nay.
Last was John Russo, a Democrat whose District is located along the New Jersey coast.
Russo was best known for his conservative views on capital punishment and other legal issues.
Russo had not run for re-election in 1991, and was retiring as a state Senator. He had argued
against the bill in caucus, and voted against it at 6:18. When the measure came up for the
second vote, he rose to explain his change of heart to the Senators. He had been concerned that
the bill would penalize unborn children, but had been persuaded that "I alone shouldn't block
this effort". Russo was a thoughtful and influential Senator, and he explained his change of vote
in full after the session:
I voted against the bill the first time because, while I understood the message we
wanted to send, I was concerned that poor children would be hurt. I was concerned that
because of the mother's actions, we would be punishing the child. When a little less
money comes in, there might be a little less food and a little less heat.
But then Wayne Bryant and Brenda Bacon made the pitch that black people are
never going to get off welfare unless we take this kind of approach. It would have been
different if two rich white officials were making this argument. But who am I to tell
people like Wayne and Brenda who live in Camden County what to do for black kids? And
who am I to block this reform they believe in so deeply from going through? (Magyar,
1992).
At the crucial 7:00 p.m. vote, Russo swallowed his reservations and voted Aye. Bassano,
Codey and Rice were joined in voting Nay by Republican Senator James Cafeiro of Wildwood,
16
who represents the First District at the southern tip of New Jersey, a low-density coastal region
with a high proportion of retired residents. Cafeiro had not voted at 6:18; thus the total Nay
votes remained at four.
Overall, the final votes on Assembly Bill 4703 broke down along Party lines as follows:
Yea Nay Not Voting
House (1/8/92):
Republicans 18
3
16
Democrats
31
1
11
Total
49
4
27
Senate (1/13/92):
Republicans 3
2
12
Democrats
19
2
2
Total
22
4
14
Although this was not a strict party line vote, it is clear that the strongest support came from the
Democrats, especially in the Senate. All ten of the Senators who abstained from voting on 4703
at the 6:18 vote but supported it at 7:00 were Democrats; three were retiring from the Senate.
The strong support from the Florio administration made a crucial difference, even though
Florio's negative image with the public had cost many of the Democratic legislators their seats in
the recent elections. The bill was clearly a product of the Florio administration and the lame
duck Democratic legislature, and one which Florio and the Democrats could use to appeal to
suburban voters in campaigns to come. Many of the Republican Senators may have been
reluctant to give the lame duck Democratic legislature the political credit for welfare reform.
Their not voting rather than voting Nay may suggest a concern with political timing rather than
ideological conviction.
Despite its strong Democratic origins, the bill did receive the essential support of three
Republican Senators and 18 Republican Assemblymen. It is difficult to detect a sociological
pattern in the voting on these measures. Although most of the liberal speakers at the hearings
thought of Bill 4703 as an assault on the poor, many of the legislators representing the state's
poorest districts were apparently not convinced. The 29th District, for example, consists of the
core of the city of Newark and has a 70% Black population. From this District, Senator Wynona
Lipman and Assemblyman Jackie Mattison supported all of Bryant's bills, although Lipman
abstained from voting on Bill 4703 at 6:18 p.m. Senator Lipman supported the measure even
though she chaired the Commission on Sex Discrimination in the Statutes which had passed a
resolution opposing the measure on the ground that it punished women and children
(Commission, 1991). Assemblyman Willie Brown, the third legislator from the 29th District, on
the other hand, did not vote on any of Bryant's measures. All three had been recently re-elected
by overwhelmingly Democratic constituents. Bryant believes that his personal credibility
carried considerable weight with Senator Lipman, as well as with Senator Russo and others with
whom he had worked closely over the years.
Statistically, there is some relationship between the socio-economic characteristics of the
Districts and voting on Bill 4703. To obtain sufficient cases for a statistical analysis, we have
combined the Senate and Assembly votes for a total of 120 votes (Bureau of Government
Research, 1990, 1992). The votes on Assembly Bill 4703 broke down as follows:
17
Votes from
Yea
Nay or not voting
Districts with:
Fewer than 10% Blacks
53%
47%
More than 10% Blacks
69%
31%
(chi-square = 2.8, p = .09)
Mean income under $15,000 71%
29%
Mean income over $15,000
46%
54%
(chi-square = 8.25, p = .004)
The analysis suggests that support for Bill 4703 was strongest from the least affluent
districts of the state, which also have a larger African American population. This goes against
the expectations of many of the bill's opponents who viewed it as an assault on the low income
population. However, this statistical pattern would be expected because the bill was largely
supported by Democratic legislators, who come from the less affluent districts in
disproportionate numbers. To try to untangle the causal links between socioeconomic characteristics of the districts, party affiliations of the legislators, and the vote on Bill 4703, we performed
a multivariate analysis that is summarized in the path diagram in Figure 1. These path
coefficients are based on the 120 legislative votes in both houses.
The path diagram shows that, as expected, districts with more African Americans and
lower median incomes were more likely to have Democratic representatives, and Democratic
legislators were more likely to vote for the measure. However, controlling for the party
affiliation of the legislator, median income had an independent effect on the vote, with
legislators from higher income districts being less likely to support the measure. The path
coefficient for the direct effect of percent black in the district is -.13, suggesting a weak tendency
18
for legislators from districts with more black constituents to vote against the bill once the effect
of income and party affiliation are controlled. However, this coefficient is not statistically
significant, so the best interpretation is that the racial composition of the districts had only a
weak and ambiguous empirical relationship to voting on this issue.
In short, the voting analysis shows that this was primarily a Democratic measure. It
received somewhat greater support from legislators representing districts at the lower end of the
socio-economic spectrum. Racial composition of the district had very little effect on the vote
which undoubtedly reflects mixed feelings about a bill that was the pet project of a respected
African American legislator, but that was questioned by some leaders from the black community.
It may seem surprising that so many Republicans opposed a bill which was generally
perceived, especially outside of New Jersey, as an anti-welfare measure. There are two
explanations. First, the Republicans knew that they would be taking control of the legislature in
a few weeks and that Governor Florio would be facing a difficult reelection campaign in only one
year. They may have wanted to deny the Florio administration the opportunity to take credit for
this bill during the campaign. Less cynically, many of the Republicans simply felt bad about
taking money away from poor children. Senator Bryant believed that many of the Republicans
(and Democrats) were quite sincere in this concern, and focused his lobbying effort on persuading
them that this was a necessary part of a package which would benefit poor children.
OPINIONS OF RECIPIENTS Much of the debate about the welfare reform revolved
around its expected impact on the recipients. The Forum for Policy Research at Rutgers
University in Camden, collected data from welfare mothers in 1992 just before the reform was
implemented, and in 1993, after it had been in place for almost 1 year. The research
methodology included focus groups and sample surveys in both years.
Pre-reform focus groups.
In the summer of 1992 we conducted two group interviews with mothers who were
receiving public assistance and living in Camden. These women were selected from among our
survey respondents, and were not members of any organized group. There is, of course, no
assurance that they were statistically representative of the population receiving AFDC. Indeed,
they themselves thought that fact that they were willing to come to Rutgers and participate in a
group interview meant that they were among the better motivated of welfare recipients. They
were, however, quite familiar with opinions and cultural patterns among welfare recipients in
Camden, New Jersey's poorest city. They were, therefore, in a position to offer an informed
judgment about the reform.
The groups were equally divided between black and Latino respondents, and the smaller
of the two groups was conducted in Spanish with entirely Latino women. There appeared to be
significant differences in attitudes between the black and Hispanic women, as we will describe
below.
At the time the interviews were conducted, the welfare reform had been passed by the
legislature, but it had not yet gone into effect. We explained the key provisions to the women,
only a few of whom had heard about it, and asked for their reactions. They had many questions
about what the reform would mean and expressed a range of opinions about its probable effects.
One respondent thought that it was aimed at giving welfare recipients self-sufficiency:
19
"They want to give parents that's on welfare outlook of being self-sufficient, they don't
have to sit around and wait on welfare, they gonna get out, go to job training school, or they'll
put you in school."
All thought this was a fine idea if it would work, but many respondents were skeptical
that sufficient jobs could be found. One said, "I don't think there's enough job opportunities out
there for all these welfare mothers."
The respondents also questioned whether child care would be provided. Many felt that the
system was obligated to compensate them for the extra effort and expense involved. One asked:
"If they're going to do that are they going to supply the baby sitter services? ... What are
you going to do for me if you tell me what do?"
Mothers universally felt that two years of age was too young to leave their children with
baby sitters or day care and go out to work or job training. They knew of cases when children
had been abused by baby sitters or day care services and were very apprehensive about leaving
their children at such a tender age. One remarked:
"That age is too young, all baby sitters do not treat your children as you do, sometimes
they mistreat them. They should raise the age to five."
The Hispanic mothers agreed that mothers should not have to go out to work or school
until the children reached school age, while the black mothers were willing to consider leaving
children in day care at three since they get some educational advantages from it. In general, the
Hispanic respondents seemed to be more oriented towards home and family and less interested
in going out to work. They said that they loved having large families and had strong family
values. One woman said:
"in my opinion it is a pleasure to have children, I have twelve children and I am very
happy with them...I have to wash clothes by hand, I don't have a washing machine, but I am
happy with my children. `Where one person eats everyone eats' [an idiomatic expression] and
clothing is always available. The money we get from welfare is not enough, but I've learned to
stretch it."
Although the welfare benefits are low, the women found it possible to supplement them. One
women commented that:
"We go on welfare because we need the assistance. The government knows the money we
get is not enough to live. They force us to lie because to live we must find other ways of
supplementing our income. We are forced to lie about a husband or boyfriend who helps with the
expenses."
They were unhappy with the fact that the fathers tended to be discounted by this system,
20
commenting that, "Fathers don't exist as far as school goes," and "children learn to discount their
father as the system does." They were very skeptical, however, about the provision which would
allow women to retain their benefits if they marry a man who is not the father of their children.
They saw this as an assault against the family. One woman commented: "If I'm going to marry
anybody if I'm still with my kid's father I would prefer to marry him than go with some other
man so I can keep my benefits. That's stupid right there."
Although the initial reactions were negative, the respondents seemed to have more
enthusiasm for the new welfare system after talking about it for a while. One said "the law is
good. We will learn to plan our children and consider how many children can I raise and give
them what we want for them." Another said: "I agree with the new law but I feel the ones to
suffer will be the children. Still I feel that it will motivate people to help themselves and not
depend on anyone. Government should provide more employment. Many women would prefer to
work. We should be able to provide for ourselves. What they give us in a month we could earn
in a week."
Others expressed fear that they would fail at job training, and thought that the real
problem was providing more employment for people with limited skills.
There was strong opposition to the proposal to cut off benefits if a woman has a second
child while on welfare. The respondents thought that the real issue was getting the fathers to
pay support. They had little sympathy for women who claimed they didn't know who was the
father of their children. Comments included: "Don't do it to the mothers who can't come up with
the father, there's a lot of them who say they don't know where the father's at. If you come into
my office and say you don't know where he's at, then no."
In general, the respondents argued that there were two kinds of welfare recipients: good
recipients like themselves who were trying to be responsible and irresponsible women who
simply exploited the system. They were especially disapproving of women who did not try to
maintain a stable relationship with the father of their children. They felt that these women
would never join a focus group or respond to a survey.
Post-reform focus groups. Two focus groups were held in the summer and fall of 1993,
after the reform had been in place for almost a year. The participants were long term welfare
recipients with several children. Most had been on welfare since they first got pregnant in their
teens or early twenties. Some had been on and off welfare during that period. When asked what
they knew about the welfare reform, they immediately focused on the denial of additional
benefits for additional children. Some of them misunderstood this provision as saying that one
could only receive benefits for two children, but others understood it correctly. Some also knew
of other provisions of the reform which allowed them to marry without losing benefits, or to earn
additional money to support an additional child.
The respondents believed that the change in the law might well have the effect of
discouraging women from having additional children. They said they knew women who had
children primarily to get the benefits. One remarked:
"I have a girlfriend, when it comes time for one of her children to get off the grant she has
another one. She is 42 years old and every time it comes time for someone to get off her
grant, she has another one, to me that's just breeding them for the welfare grant..there's
nothing wrong with her physically to make her get up off her butt and stop having babies
21
and get a job...for people like her, I think it's great."
They saw little hope that the new law would have any effect on teenagers, however. Most
of the women had themselves become pregnant as teenagers and dropped out of high school.
With hindsight they agreed that this was a mistake, but they had little hope that teenage girls
could be convinced of that. They felt that teenagers thought they knew what child care would be
like because of their baby sitting experiences, and that they would not believe how hard it would
be to be responsible for a child full time. One remarked "when I was 17 I was having too much
fun to care, but when the baby came it raised me up real quick."
Several of the women indicated that the change might discourage them from having an
additional child. On the other hand, two of the focus group recipients had become pregnant since
the plan came into effect. Both indicated that they had really wanted to have another child and
had not been deterred by the change in welfare provisions. Remarks included:
"it's only $64, how bad can it be."
"If they let me work and make up that difference, I can make more than that a month...if
they let me work I'll be fine."
"I'm thinking how harder can it be them not giving me no more money, when the money
that they're giving me I'm struggling with that. The only thing that'll be different is I'm
gonna have another child, hopefully it's a boy so he can get the clothes from the first boy."
Most of the respondents had been called into the welfare office to develop a family plan.
They did not see this process as a major change in past practice, however, and they continued to
refer to the office they were sent to as "REACH" rather than as the "FDP." They did not object to
educational provisions in the program in principle, but they voiced many objections to the
slowness and rigidity with which the program sometimes operated.
Although they generally
accepted the educational programs, it was clear that getting more education was not the first
priority for most of them. When asked for their suggestions as to how the welfare system could
be changed, their suggestions were mostly for ways to make life better on welfare, not for ways
to help them get off it. The first concern was that welfare simply didn't pay enough money, so
they all had to have a source of income on the side. Extra money came from husbands or boy
friends, other family members, from working on the side, or from sharing housing expenses with
a roommate not known to the welfare department. A major concern was the shortage of
subsidized "Section Eight" housing. Those who had subsidized housing, as well as a cash grant a
food stamps, were best able to survive. Otherwise, the cost of rent itself often exceeded the
welfare grant.
A major aspiration for the future is to move out of Camden to a suburban neighborhood
where the schools would be better for their children. If they are unable to move, they would like
to improve their current neighborhoods and schools. One respondent had been working two jobs
in the hopes of achieving accumulating enough money to move. One job was from 7 in the
morning to 5 at night, the other from 5 to 10. Her mother watched her child at this time. When
asked if she was on welfare at the time, she replied "Yes, I was. You gotta beat the system."
22
Others remarked, "that's right, you gotta work" and "I know I'm going to beat the system every
chance I get, I'm beating them now."
One seldom discussed problem with the welfare reform may be that many women simply
do not have time to go to school because they are working off the books as well as taking care of
their children and homes. They would prefer a program which would allow them to work while
receiving welfare or going to school. This is particularly true for those who do not have middle
class career aspirations which would require extensive schooling. When asked what kind of
work they would like to do in the future, for example, one woman commented that she liked
factory work because it kept her from getting bored. If well paying factory work were available,
she would prefer that to welfare. One told how much she enjoyed working in a typewriter ribbon
factory: "You come home with stuff on your fingers and stuff and you come home and it makes
you look like you was really working hard, you was doing something."
One respondent stated that said that she enjoyed working, but that it simply did not pay
her to leave welfare and work, given the wages that she could earn. Nevertheless, she hoped to
get off eventually. Others, however, were bored with factory work and had aspirations for
mobility into middle class jobs. One left a job in a factory because she "I just couldn't see
packing pretzels for the rest of my life." For her, welfare provided an opportunity to get some
support for going to school. Another had completed two years in a community college, and was
eager to complete her degree. She wasn't working because the only job she had been able to get
was as a personal care worker for elderly people, which she found distasteful. She commented:
I didn't go to two years of college to clean nobody's butts, but when I got nothing that's
what I ended up doing...it all depends on how desperate you are for a job, if they told me
tomorrow you won't get a check next month, I would go back to cleaning people's butts."
Most of the respondents felt that if welfare was changed so that they would be cut off after
two years, they would be able to find some kind of employment so as to survive. However, they
also felt that this would lead to a lot of unrest, with people "bombing city hall," and that a lot of
people would go on disability if they couldn't get welfare.
All the respondents agreed that dealing with the welfare office was distasteful. They
found it humiliating to be asked how much money they had in their pockets at the time of the
visit, or to be criticized for wearing a leather coat that a parent had given them for Christmas.
They felt that the case workers often looked down on them and they didn't necessarily follow
correct procedures or limit themselves to the questions on their forms. They found it irritating to
be told they had to sell their life insurance policies or hide personal possessions in order to
receive a check. One remarked, "welfare wants you to do what they want to do, I want to do
what I want to do." Other complaints reflect little more than irritation about the appropriate
enforcement of system rules, e.g., "they cut me off for not going to meet the case manager."
A woman who had become pregnant with her second child when her first was seven years
old, reported the following exchange with a case worker:
[case worker] "you sure waited a long time...well you made a bad choice because you can't
get no more money...how are you going to take care of two kids...
[recipient] "I asked, is that on that paper, ask me the questions that are on the
23
paper...treat me with respect...I hate going in there."
On the other hand, some had case workers who helped them get around the regulations.
One reported that her caseworker had told a relative that she could have her own check if she
got a different address from her mother. She didn't have to actually move, just bring in an
envelope mailed to her at a different address.
Several respondents felt that the welfare department should provide help with child care
and transportation costs if a woman should find a job on her own, even if it did not come through
the formal program. Others reported that they had only gone on welfare in the first place
because they couldn't find child care or afford medical insurance, e.g., "When I went on welfare I
had two jobs, I couldn't go back because I didn't have day care for my daughter..."
While the respondents found the welfare department too intrusive in their own lives, they
thought that the department should do more to demand good behavior from women who spend
their money on drugs or men and don't take care of their children properly. When asked how
welfare should be changed, they volunteered the idea that case workers should go into the homes
to make sure that there is food in the refrigerator, that the children are well clothed, and so on.
They thought that there should be mandatory random drug testing. They felt that the welfare
system encouraged women who were irresponsible and made no effort to take care of themselves.
Another objection was that the welfare system encourages families to break up. One
woman was eager to get back with her husband, who was eager to come to his family, but they
simply could not afford to live on his salary. He paid child support and gave her money on the
side as well, and they maintained a monogamous sexual relationship. Another had a relative
who filed for legal separation from her husband so as to get benefits, although they actually
continued to live together.
When we raised the issue of whether women should be required to give the welfare
officials the name of their baby's father, many felt that this should not be done as long as he was
helping out financially. "I figure if the man is helping you, then welfare will have nothing to do
with that...if the man ain't helping you they should say, this man shouldn't be there." Another's
philosophy was "If the man is there helping you, you can say it was a one night stand, you
shouldn't have to turn him in...when he fucks up, then you turn the fucker in."
A major disincentive to listing the father is that if a man pays child support through the
welfare department, the welfare department keeps most of the money. One woman objected that
"he paid $75 a week and you get only $50 a month." On the other hand, others observed if a man
is paying informally "they can just decide not to give you nothing..." Also, he may have children
with another woman, and she will get priority if she has formally listed him as a father. And
finally, if he should die, it is almost impossible to get disability payments from social security if
he was not formally listed as the father before his death. All in all, the consensus was that it
was better to have the father listed with welfare, but to encourage him to pay as much support
as possible on the side.
IMPACTS
In New Jersey, welfare programs are administered by county government, following
federal and state guidelines. This meant that implementation of the Family Development
Program was more complex than it would have been if it had been a single state program, but it
also allowed for flexibility to adjust to conditions in differing regions of the state.
24
Implementation began in October, 1992, in the three New Jersey counties with the largest
welfare populations. This priority of implementation was specified in the legislation, because
Assemblyman Bryant did not want to see a repetition of the REACH experience where the major
implementation effort was in Atlantic County where the task was easiest because of funds made
available by the newly established casino gambling industry. He wanted to tackle the most
serious problems first, and the Florio administration agreed. The other counties were added in
steps throughout the next year.
The implementation efforts varied greatly from county to county. Essex county has a
third of New Jersey's welfare recipients, mostly concentrated in the city of Newark. Its welfare
officials were resistant to the FDP, on both practical and ideological grounds. They thought that
they were simply too burdened with the routine tasks of giving out benefits, and objected that
many of their clients were simply not employable. Wayne Bryant engaged in several heated
conversations with them during the course of the program. When they objected that some of
their clients couldn't find work because they could only read on a third grade level, for example,
Bryant explained that they didn't have to find work immediately. Their plan could be to learn to
read on a 8th grade level, then to go on to high school, and perhaps then on to work. The
Newark officials felt they were too burdened with emergency needs to focus on such long term
goals. Ideologically, they argued that the welfare system should be revised to provide an
adequate standard of living for women who are victims of the system. It should not be used to
force them to change their family plans.
Essex County has a "generic caseworker" system in which a single caseworker is
responsible for all aspects of a client's needs, including both eligibility assessment and the kinds
of services that REACH and FDP offered. These caseworkers were primarily concerned with
keeping their error rates under 5% in order to meet federal audit requirements. Although the
State Department of Human Services sent additional funds to cover FDP activities, it was simply
never used. New caseworkers were never hired to take on the activities. Essex County officials
stated that they simply lacked the resources to adequately implement the program. Finally, the
State announced a "partnership" which largely took responsibility for the FDP out of the hands
of Essex County officials.
Under this "partnership," requests for proposals were issued to Essex County community
organizations, asking them to bid to take responsibility for aspects of the program. One RFP
offered $1,140,000 for an agency to take over the case management functions, with an additional
$400,000 for child care. The other created a pool of $4,949,000 dollars for organizations to
provide services such as vocational assessment and counseling, education and employmentdirected activities, job search, community work opportunities, occupational or vocational
education, higher education, on the job training, work supplement programs, and job readiness.
Eligibility to bid on these RFP's included for-profit and non-profit organizations, anyone who
could get the job done.
While this may not seem like a lot of money for a county with 30,000 welfare cases, the
problem had not been a shortage of money but the inability of officials to spend the money which
had been allocated. This upset the leaders of a number of community organizations, who felt
that their constituents were being denied benefits to which they were entitled. By offering these
groups a chance to bid for the money themselves, the state was doing an end run around the
25
county bureaucracy, and building a constituency for the FDP.
The implementation in Camden county, Wayne Bryant's home base, was a complete
contrast to that in Essex county. In Camden county, the REACH program had always been
organizationally separate from the Welfare Department, and it had a tradition of aggressively
implementing policy initiatives. The administrator, William Maguire, was strongly committed
to making the FDP a success. They began preparing family plans immediately, at a rate of
about 400 plans a month. Camden county opens 4000 new cases a year, so even at this rate it
will take time before their total client base of 15,000 families is enrolled. Most of the activities
mandated by the FDP were also included in REACH, and clients still think of themselves as
going to the REACH office.
Our independent survey of welfare mothers in Camden confirmed that most were aware of
the reform, and that many had been asked to participate in it. In particular, about half of the
respondents reported that they had been asked to take part in educational activities.
Participation in educational activities is the first major change that the program would be
expected to have on participants' lives.
The implementation in Hudson County may not have been quite as aggressive as that in
Camden County, but it has gone reasonably well. Other counties, in which the welfare
population is smaller, have adapted the program to their own histories and organizational
structure. In Cumberland county, training is offered on the welfare department's own site, and
participation is very high. In Atlantic County, the case managers are in the County Welfare
Offices, while other services are outstationed in schools in keeping with a program which had
been established before FDP. Passaic county also bases the program in the County Welfare
Offices.
In statewide statistics, the major change since the implementation of the FDP has been a
much greater emphasis on enrolling clients in educational programs, rather than shorter term
job readiness or training programs. There is also some increase in the percentage of recipients
receiving benefits as members of couples rather than as single mothers, which Bryant interprets
as a sign that the FDP is succeeding in strengthening some families. However, these statistics
are preliminary and a great deal of work needs to be done just to get the data processing systems
into shape to produce definitive statistics. Slowness in the data processing systems have also
hampered full implementation of the reforms. A year after the program was formally
implemented, for example, the state's computers had still not been reprogrammed to handle the
3000 Camden county cases which were not eligible under REACH, but were under FDP.
It is too early for a definitive assessment of the impact of the reform on the recipients.
August 1, 1993, was the first month in which the "$64" provision might have had an impact.
Preliminary results were announced by the New Jersey Department of Human Services during
the 1993 election campaign, apparently in the hope that they would help in Florio's reelection
campaign. Officials were careful to emphasize that these were preliminary figures which would
need to be verified over a long period of time. Critics (Laracy, 1994) objected that proponents of
the New Jersey reform were too eager to draw conlcusions on the basis of preliminary figures.
They speculated that some of the decrease may have been due to increased delays in reporting of
births.
26
At the time of this writing, figures are available through February of 1993, and they show
a consistent month-by-month decline in the birth rate among New Jersey's AFDC recipients
(Figure 2). The figures for August and September in this Figure are as complete as they ever
will be.
These
figures suggest
that women may
indeed be
having fewer
babies because
of the change in
the law.
However, it may
also be that
some woman are
not be reporting
new babies in
the mistaken
impression that
to do so would
imperil their
existing grant.
Actually,
however, it is to their benefit to report new children so as to obtain medicare coverage and food
stamps for the new child. It may take time before all recipients fully understand and believe the
fact that their existing grant is not in any way jeopardized by reporting a new baby. There may
also be some increased delays in updating the records within the Department of Family
Development. Despite these provisos, the best data suggests that there has been some decline in
the birth rate in response to the change in the law.
Officials also reported that there was no increase in the number of abortions reported
during these months, although the data on abortions are also soft. The department also reported
that 3,683 recipients got full-time jobs at an average wage of $6.29 and left welfare. They
attributed this change to the welfare reforms. Wayne Bryant was pleased by this report,
commenting "the numbers show that the reforms are encouraging public-assistance clients to get
out of the welfare trap and attain self-sufficiency and self-respect" (Superville, 1993).
Preliminary feedback from focus group interviews conducted by the Department of Human
Services, suggests that most women do not view the $64 itself as the most important factor in
changing their life plans. They are more concerned with the availability of subsidized housing,
and work and training opportunities.
Welfare reform was a minor issue in the gubernatorial election between Florio and
Republican challenger Christine Todd Whitman. A New York Times survey showed that only 1%
of voters included welfare among the issues they most wanted the next governor to concentrate
on (New York Times, 1993), and the candidates naturally focused on higher priority issues such
27
as taxes, crime and economic recovery. Whitman was approached by the New Jersey National
Organization for Women chapter in the hopes that she would denounce the "$64" provision.
NOW was naturally predisposed to support a candidate who might become New Jersey's first
woman governor, but they were concerned about her position on welfare and other issues. The
most she would give them was a statement that she was "open to alternatives" on welfare. She
went on record as supporting the Bryant reforms. Her openness to alternatives was enough to
persuade a 19 to 18 majority of the state board of NOW to vote to "recommend" Whitman (but
not to "endorse") her (LeDuc, 1993). NOW President Myra Terry said that Whitman might have
received a full endorsement if she had pledged to overthrow the $64 provision, but she refused to
do so.
There was considerable division within the 12,000 member organization, as Florio was
viewed as generally more liberal despite his support of the "$64" provision, while Whitman had
ties to conservative Republican circles. The South Jersey chapter voted to endorse Florio,
reflecting strong pro-Florio sentiment in his home region. The President of the Morris County
NOW chapter, Beth Hess, denounced the Whitman recommendation as "utterly stupid," claiming
that Florio was "a better feminist" and that Whitman was a member of the "WASP elite" who
makes "a mockery of our claims to multicultural sensibilities" (Lopez, 1993). Pre-election
surveys showed Florio running more strongly among women than among men, perhaps because
of his greater commitment to funding social programs (LeDuc, 1993b). Whitman's campaign
revolved around a promise to cut taxes, a promise which Florio labeled as unbelievable. She did
not appeal specifically to women for support.
Rather than relying on the Bryant reforms as a campaign issue, the Florio administration
announced a series of new welfare reform proposals in September 1993. These were developed
by his political staff, and emphasized politically popular issues. The key provision was a
requirement that welfare mothers be cut off from benefits if they refused to provide the name of
their baby's father. Florio presented this as a proposal to require parents, not taxpayers, to pay
for child support.
Whitman's gut reaction to Florio's proposal was negative, and she denounced it in strong
terms, arguing that
"The Governor is playing to the most vicious stereotype of a welfare recipient in the
most demeaning and degrading way possible. What is the Governor's next idea in his
headlong rush to embrace extreme right-wing radicalism? A program of tattoos for
welfare mothers? A badge sewn onto their clothing identifying them as welfare recipients?
Creation of colonies like leper colonies, where welfare recipients would be forced to live?"
(Norquist, 1993)
Whitman's stance on this issue received very negative commentary on newspaper and
television editorials, however, and as one reporter observed "Whitman reversed herself several
days later after she and her staff realized the obvious. The plan played well with many
financially hard-pressed, middle-class voters" (Mondies, 1993a). She explained that she had
been misinformed about the details of the plan, which did allow an exemption for women who
were raped or who honestly did not know the name of the father. In her debate with Florio,
Whitman pointed out that only 1% of welfare mothers currently do not provide the father's
name, a statistic which had been distorted by the Florio campaign. Florio's proposal was
28
probably intended primarily for campaign rhetoric, since no additional resources were provided
for child support collection. The state already has a large backlog of fathers who are behind in
their payments and whose names are known, but there is insufficient staff to follow them up.
Florio's other key proposal was to require adolescent mothers to live with their parents
rather than obtaining a grant on their own. This, also, was presented as a measure to
strengthen the family. There was no discussion of how to deal with situations where the
adolescent mother's family is abusive or unstable. Other proposals included allowing families to
retain savings if they are earmarked for purchase of a home, increasing the dollar value of a car
that recipients can own, and requiring patenting and conflict resolution classes and
immunizations.
Florio recovered remarkably in popularity, given the intense anger the voters had felt
about his tax increases only three years earlier, and the loss of the legislature to the Republicans
two years before. His approval ratings has sunk as low as 19% at one time, and "Florio Free in
'93" bumper stickers could be seen all over the state, distributed by the National Rifle
Association. His opponent, Christine Todd Whitman, had almost toppled the popular Senator
Bill Bradley in 1992 because many voters wanted to punish Bradley for Florio's tax increase.
Florio conducted a highly professional campaign, led by celebrity Democratic campaign
consultant James Carville, while Whitman's campaign started slowly under the leadership of her
brother Webster "Dan" Todd, Jr., a Montana rancher. She waffled on several issues, delayed
responding to Florio's attacks, and offered a sketchy two-page plan for cutting expenditures to
permit a 30% tax cut over three years. Welfare was a minor issue in the campaign, but it played
to Florio's benefit.
In the last stage of her campaign, however, Whitman replaced her brother as campaign
manager with veteran Republican campaign strategist Ed Rollins. In television commercials in
the last three weeks, she succeeded in presenting herself as a warm and personable candidate
who had been unfairly criticized by Florio's negative campaign ads. She refocused the voter's
attention on Florio's tax increase, scandals in his administration, and his own lack of a positive
vision for the next four years. She won the election with 50% of the vote to Florio's 48%. The
Republicans retained their comfortable majority in the state legislature, although the Democrats
did regain some seats lost in the 1991 landslide. Assemblyman Bryant and his colleagues were
reelected with over two-thirds of the votes in the strongly Democratic Fifth District. As Minority
Leader, Bryant will have some influence to advocate for the welfare reform, but the Republicans
will have the final decision making power.
The New York Times (November 14, 1993) exit poll showed that Whitman received 55% of
the men's votes and only 47% of the women's. She received strong support from conservatives,
Republicans and white voters, while Florio did best with black and Jewish voters and liberal
voters. The voter in cities with large welfare populations were strongly pro-Florio, but the big
news was that turnout was much lower than it had been in previous years (Borowski, Zimmer
and Espinoza, 1993). In the city of Camden, especially, only 39% voted as compared to 53%
when Thomas Kean was elected in 1981. Some commentators speculated that this might have
been due to resentment of the welfare reform, but there was no increase in the Republican vote
which might have been expected if voters had been angry at Florio. In Camden City, 81% of
those who did vote voted for Florio. Local observers blamed the low turnout on voter apathy and
29
overconfidence by the Democratic organization, who believed the polls almost all of which
showed Florio comfortably in the lead up until the last minute (Mondies, 1993b).
The greatest controversy came when Whitman's campaign manager Ed Rollins remarked
that his campaign had spent $500,000 in "walking around money" to persuade politically active
ministers and city Democratic political workers to play down the campaign in urban areas with
large minority populations. They supposedly did not ask anyone to endorse Whitman, but
simply that they not make a big effort to get out the vote for Florio. African American clergy
vehemently denied that they had received this money, but the matter is currently under
investigation as a possible violation of campaign law (Lowe, 1993). Whitman denied that any
such payments had been made.
At this point, it is unclear Whitman and her Republican associates have in mind for
welfare reform. Whitman had not advanced any new ideas on the topic during the campaign,
and welfare has not been a priority for the Whitman transition team. She had expressed
general support for the Bryant reforms, but her sympathies seemed to lie more with the view of
welfare mothers as victims of the system. Nor had the Republicans advanced new welfare
legislation in the two years since they won control of the legislature. The "$64" provision
remains locked in state law, and it seems unlikely that a Republican legislature would reverse it,
but the Whitman administration may be less vigorous in defending it against legal challenges
than a Florio administration would have been. Her major promise to the voters was to cut taxes
30% in three years, so one consequence of her election may be a shortage of funds to implement
the positive incentives in the Family Development Program. Florio had used state money to
implement provisions not covered by federal grants, such as programs for men on general
assistance. Whitman may find it necessary to cut these programs if she is to achieve her fiscal
goals. In general, however, welfare does not offer much opportunity for savings unless Whitman
should decide to cut the size of the grants, which seems unlikely.
Governor Florio had accepted a position as head of President Clinton's task force on
welfare reform, which put him in a position to impact welfare reform nationally. As a former
governor, however, he may not be so useful in this role. In early discussions between New Jersey
welfare officials and Clinton staffers, significant differences emerged. The Clinton staffers were
strongly in favor of placing a two year limit on welfare, while the New Jersey approach allows for
a longer period as long as the woman is making progress towards self-sufficiency. Although
welfare reform was not a major factor in the election, Florio's defeat may make the New Jersey
model less influential nationally.
As of the November elections, no lawsuit had been filed on behalf of any women who had
been denied additional benefits, a fact which surprised officials since opponents of the provision
knew of a number of women who were pregnant and could have served for a test case. Possibly
opponents were waiting until after the November gubernatorial elections, since the publicity
surrounding such a case might have helped Governor Florio's reelection campaign. Shortly after
the election, a class action lawsuit was filed by the NOW Legal Defense Fund, together Legal
Services of New Jersey and the New Jersey chapter of the American Civil liberties union
(McLarin, 1993). The suit, on behalf of seven welfare recipients and their children, charged that
the welfare reform violated the women's right to privacy and prevented them from getting basic
food and shelter needed for their families.
30
CONCLUSIONS
In New Jersey, the innovative ideas, political skills and personal credibility of a single
state Assemblyman brought about an important experiment in welfare reform. Officials from
the State Department of Human Services officials played no important role in formulating this
legislation, nor were there any significant political forces demanding it. The political interest
groups which became involved were politely overruled when their views conflicted with
Assemblyman Bryant's. There was no mobilization of pressure groups in favor of the reform,
despite the fact that its provisions were generally popular with state residents.
Of course, Bryant could not have accomplished this without the support of the Florio
administration. But there is no way that the Florio administration would have come up with
this particular reform package on its own. Florio's support, and that of many Senators and
Assemblymen, undoubtedly reflected the fact that this kind of reform was expected to be popular
with the voters.
Implementation of the reform, of course, required the conscientious efforts of state and
local officials. The Florio administration's support was essential to obtaining federal waivers,
providing funds to support aspects of the plan not covered by federal money, and in overcoming
the resistance of the welfare bureaucracy in Essex County. It remains to be seen whether the
Whitman administration will provide sufficient support to give the plan a fair chance at success.
Despite the focus of public attention on the largely symbolic "$64" question, Bryant's
Family Development Plan as a whole offers a less punitive approach to welfare reform than the
proposal, now being tried out in Wisconsin, to place a two year limit on welfare benefits. If
federal guidelines are changed to enforce a two year limit on welfare, New Jersey could adjust to
those limits, but they would put a obstacle in the way of a full evaluation of the potential of
Bryant's approach. Instead of trying to get recipients off welfare as quickly as possible, the New
Jersey plan offers them help in making a longer and more lasting transition to mainstream
family values and occupational commitments. In essence, it reflect Wayne Bryant's conviction
that ghetto families in Camden and elsewhere can make the transition to the middle class life
style enjoyed by his African American neighbors in suburban Lawnside. It is a vision which
deserves to be tested, at least in one state if not in the country as a whole.
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31
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33