I.
Introduction
Emperor Hsien-feng was just twenty when he ascended to the throne. Being an emperor so young,
he was quite ambitious to achieve two goals: revival of the past glory of the Manzhus and the
expulsion of the foreign invasions, which were left by his father or brought by the barbarians.
However, he was physically weak, coward and always indulged in carnal pleasures. In face of the
twin evils of the internal rebels and the external pressure, as manifested by the nationwide
outbreaks of the Taiping Rebellion, the Nien Rebellion, and the Muslim Rebellions and by the Allied
Invasion led by the Combined Anglo-French troops, he found himself in a helpless position to tackle
them, not to mention the goals he set for himself. Worse still, when the barbarous troops
were approaching Beijing, he had to leave his government and people but escaped to Jehol （熱河）
where, disheartened as he was, he died. As what his father left behind him manifold problems to be
solved, he also left behind him mounting problems to be handled by his six-year old son,
Tsai-chun（載淳）, viz, Emperor Tongzhi.
II.
External Problems
As mentioned above, the young emperor wanted to adopt a hard-line uncompromising policy
towards the foreigners. Mu-chang-a, who motivated most of the decisions in his early reign, was
dismissed. Ch'i-ying, the advocate of appeasement, was demoted although he once earned the
reputation of soothing the barbarians in the South during the reign of Emperor Tao-kuang. The
emperor appointed Lin Zexu as the acting governor and imperial commissioner to manage the
barbarian affairs. But Lin died en route to Kwangsi. The post then went to a xenophobic official,
Hsu Kuang-chin while the governorship of Kwangtung went to another Yeh Ming-ch'en1. The
appointment of these two marked the re-emergence in the new government of the anti-foreign
element, which had been in eclipse since the defeat. What followed was the government's
determination to oppose discussing the issue of treaty revision and to praise the heroic action of the
Cantonese people to resist the entry of the British into Canton. The increasing confrontation with
the West and the growing dissatisfaction of the westerners towards the trading conditions of China
cumulated into the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Chinese War of 1856-1860.
The fall of Canton (December 1857) and the rapid advance of the Allied troops at Tianjin (April
1858) convinced the young emperor of the futility of continuing the hostility. Further
misunderstanding resulted in foreign invasion and the looting of the imperial city (August 1860).
All these ended in the signing of the Second Treaty Settlement which consisted of the Treaty of
Tianjin (1858) and the Beijing Convention (1860). Because of the most-favoured-nation treatment,
France, the United States and Russia equally shared the fruits of the British labours.
Apart from heavy indemnities and territorial loss, what dealt the Chinese government a great blow
was the end of the myth -- a myth which stated that China was superior to the outside world.
Through intimidation and by force, the outmoded tribute system became crumbled and in its place
was the treaty port system created by the despised barbarians. The whole country was now
undoubtedly laid open. For the next eight years, China was turned into a semi-colonial state.
1
Yeh’s inflexibility and uncompromising attitude in dealing with foreigners was later commemorated in a
local jingle: pu-chan, pu-ho, pu-shou; pu-ssu, pu-hsiang, pu-hsiang, pu-tsou.（不戰、不和、不守、不死、不降、
不走）
1
Under the treaty port sytem, opium was recognized as a legal import, although it was more as a sign
of humiliation to the Chinese.
Access to the imperial city was granted and embassies would be
established therein, which indicated that Beijing would no longer be able to keep a distance from
the barbarians. Further concession of the Kowloon Peninsula was comparatively a trivial matter,
when compared to the loss of 300,000 to 400,000 square miles of territory in the north to Russia.
The opening of the Yangtze valley and the granting of foreign shipping and trade inland meant that
the full opening of the country was only a matter of time. For the decades to come, while the
western states sought commercial interest and economic concessions through the creation of treaty
ports and the extension of trade, Russia stressed territorial acquisitions as well as commercial gains.
In face of the above loss, both materially and psychologically, what else could the new government
do? Should it adopt a line in cooperation with the barbarians or a hard line policy to drive them
out of the sacred country? Should it think of the ways to defend the country against further and
more serious humiliation?
III. Internal problems
A.
Nationwide unrest
The most dangerous menace amongst all other problems was the epidemic outbreaks of revolts all
over the country. Here and there one could find the revolts of varying nature with different
objectives. The rapid growth of population, the uneven distribution of land, the militarisation,
the activities of secret societies and even racial discrimination accounted for this phenomenon.
Indeed from the early years of Chia-ch'ing (1796-1820), there had been recurrent outbreaks of
uprisings. In 1795 the Miao tribesmen revolted in Kweichow and Hunan. It was followed by a
much more large-scale one, the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804) which affected mainly Hupeh
and Szechuan and cost the treasury more than 200 million taels of silver. In the same year, the
pirates led by Ts'ao ch'ien （蔡牽）raided the coastal provinces in the southeast. Even the imperial
city was not spared for in 1813 there was a revolt led by T'ien-li-chiao under Li Wen-ch'eng and Lin
Ch'ing in conspiracy with the imperial eunuchs. In the northwest Chang Ko-erh also led his
Moslem people to cause troubles in the 1820s.
The above mentioned examples were sporadic and regional. With the exception of the White
Lotus Rebellion, they were subdued without much difficulties. Nevertheless, after the Opium
War, the situation was different. The Qing government was now contemplated as a "Paper Tiger".
Its weaknesses and incompetence were totally exposed.
Its army was completely no match for the
barbarians. Could it stand against the Han people? The deep-seated racial hatred embedded since
the beginning of the Qing dynasty and the peculiar conditions in the southern China finally
contributed to the occurrence of the revolts particularly in this part of the country, although there
were rebellions elsewhere.
The most influential rebellion without doubt was the Taiping Rebellion led by a Hakka, Hung
Hsiu-chuan. It lasted 14 years from 1851-1864, affecting sixteen provinces and more than 600
cities. Its rapid success and growth was echoed by the capture of Shanghai by Small Sword Society
in 1853 and the capture of Amoy by the Triad members in 1852. The Triads also looted the
provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien and Chekiang. In the southern China, because of the
specific factors the Hakka-Punti feud fightings （客家與本地人械鬥）were particularly frequent to
such an extent that the local governments did nothing to prevent and solve them. In Yunnan
the racial problems also cumulated into the large-scale Panthay Rebellion lasting between 1855 and
1873 at a very cost of human lives. Meanwhile in the mouths of Yellow River and Huai River the
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Nien Rebels which had already raided in the mid-1840s started revolt from 1853 to 1868. Last but
not least there was the Tungan Rebellion which tried to expel the Qing rule in Sinkiang. It started
in 1862 and ended in 1878.
The rebellions differed in their nature and objectives. Yet, they posed a great danger to the
crumbling decay empire. Once the Taipings set up a kingdom around Nanjing which denied from
time to time the constant Qing's attack and even led a small army which advanced to the vicinity of
Beijing. Once the Nien rebels made a similar advance and killed many of the famous Qing generals.
They claimed themselves a replacement of the alien (Manzhu) rule, as shown by the Taipings.
More dangerous still, there was a tendency that they might join together to achieve the common
goal of overthrowing the Qing government. The Taipings, for example, had thought of allying
with the Niens and the Northwest Moslems; the Assistant King of the Taipings also tried to recruit
the Yunnan Moslem and the Kweichow rebels. On the other hand, the Panthay Rebel leader, Tu
Wen-hsiu （杜文秀）, sent his son to England and Turkey to seek aid, whilst Russia also made use
of the disturbances in Sinkiang to occupy Ili （伊犁）until 1881.
B.
Decline in military force
The conquest of the Ming China in the mid-17th century was to a much extent credited to the
formidable Manzhu bannermen. However, they became the parasites and unproductive after they
had enjoyed the privileges in reward for their services. The Chinese lu-ying also underwent the
same process of degeneration. The persistent resistance of the White Lotus Rebels to the so-called
the best Qing force in Chia Ch’ing period was already a signal of the incompetence of the Manzhu
army. As a matter of fact, it was the local militia which managed to subdue the rebels. As
reported by contemporary sources, many of the Qing soldiers and officers were opium addicts.
During the Opium War, the Manzhu bannermen under Ch'i-shan was regarded by the local people
as a nuisance capable of bullying the countrymen but incapable of defending the country against
foreign invaders. As Robert Hart（赫特）remarked in his 1865 memorandum to the Qing
government, the Imperial troops advanced only when the rebels had already retreated, and reported
a great victory when they had killed a few peasants. If the rebels did not retreat, the troops did.
In parallel with this, there found in the countryside the formation of local militia. Originally
developed out of self-defense, they grew into regional forces in the rural areas under the leadership
of the literati and the gentry. During the times of unrest, as at the present time, they might
support the loyal side, like the Hsiang Army （湘軍）and the Huai Army（淮軍）; but they might
stand on the rebel side. The Manzhus were traditionally suspicious of their formation but to no
avail did they forestall it when disorder was prevalent throughout the country.
Indeed, the
regional forces of the late Qing period differed from the previous ones in that (1) the new armies
were larger, stronger, more cohesive and more independent.
The personal ties between
commanders and their subordinates and between generals and their soldiers were family-based
under moral instruction and guidance; the armies were supported by local revenues, independently
of the central government. (2) The new armies were exceptionally allowed to exist, as a result of
the government's failure to revitalise the regular government troops to counterweight them.
Dangers were discernible as a result of the development of the two incompatible forces.
While
the Central government had to rely upon the untrained, disobedient regular troops, it had to
tolerate the growth of regional armies whose loyalty depending upon their commanders-in-chief.
Thus, the government found that it had no armed force to keep order.
The survival of the
Manzhus, in this light, hinged upon how they managed to secure the support of these provincial
leaders rather than the overwhelming military force they possessed when they conquered China.
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C.
1.
Economic bankrupt
Loopholes of the imperial revenue system
The root of the Qing's fiscal system lay in the inherent weaknesses of the revenue system since the
time of K'ang-hsi (1662-1722). To show his mercy and concerns towards the subject and to silence
the opposition if there were within the empire, Emperor K'ang-hsi ordered that starting from 1713
no more land tax would be imposed on the quota set in that year; the amount of land taxation
thereafter would be inelastically fixed according to the amount calculated in 1713. From that
onward, the Qing government from time to time faced with the fiscal problem of finding other fiscal
solutions to cover any increased expenses. From Chia-ch'ing reign (1796-1820), the government
began to take ad hoc measures to prop up its economy. Since the land tax according to the
ancestral law had been fixed, what the government did was to (1) increase the surcharges, (2)
increase the sale of offices and titles （賣官鬻爵）and (3) meddle the powers of salt merchants by
introducing the pao-yen （票鹽）system. The first measure increased the revenue by 19.7%, the
second by 55% and the last by 11 to 13%. However, since the basic problem of the Qing revenue
system remained unresolved, deficit was still large. In general the revenue system was kept intact
until the reign of Kuang-hsu (1875-1908). Meanwhile, it was aggravated by recurrent outbreaks
of internal rebellions which simultaneously reduced the amount of cultivated areas but increased the
cost of military expenditure. Added to this was the influx of foreign trade since the opening of the
country which led to the rapid decline of the household industries and the distortion of silver-copper
ratio.
2.
Damage done by the Taipings
It was unfortunately to find that the areas affected most by the Taipings were the most productive
and fertile areas of the whole empire. The rice-bowl regions of the provinces of the Lower
Yangtze were greatly damaged. The area of land under cultivation declined sharply and the
population dropped by half. The constant battles and engagements between the government
troops and the rebels and the subsequent Nien Rebellion which ruined the Huai region （淮河地區）
nearby turned many of the wealthy cities into wasteland. The shrinkage of cultivated land could
be best reflected in the reduction of imperial revenue from this region. It was estimated that
during the Hsien-feng period the Beijing grain tax could only achieve one-third of what it should
have. The year 1857 was the worst because the grain tax dropped to one-tenth. The case of
Kiangsu was another illustration of this. Once the richest province in the country, the province
should contribute by law nearly 1.5 million piculs of grain. By 1859 because of the Taiping
warfare, the government reduced the demand to 0.4 million but the provincial officials reported that
even the figure of 0.25 million could not be made up.
The devastation done by the Taipings could also be explained in terms of negligence of public works
and water conservancy measures in this region. This further affected its productivity and lowered
the rate of rehabilitation.
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3.
Natural disasters
On the eve of 1850 the Yangtze River flooded over the neighbouring provinces of Hupeh, Anhwei,
Kiangsu and Chekiang. In 1847 there was a serious draught in Honan and in 1849 a famine in
Kwangsi. In comparison, the most disastrous one was the changing course of the Yellow River
（黃河改道）from 1852 to 1857. The shifting of the river was not a new thing throughout its long
history of development, for over centuries it had moved north and south from time to time. In the
early Qing a fixed amount of three million taels a year was appropriated for its conservancy. The
figure reached 4.5 million by the early 19th century or one-tenth of the government's regular
expenditure. However, because of the accumulation of silt and insufficient maintenance of dikes,
there resulted in a rise in its river bed. The river finally broke loose with great damage and began
shifting from Kiangsu to the Gulf of Chihli（直隸）. During the interval of the shifting, great
damage was caused in terms of the productivity of the provinces concerned and the loss of revenue.
The relief work only provided more opportunities for official activity and speculation. It was
reported that large areas of fertile farm land were lost, lines of military communication were broken
and the vital Grand Canal became even not navigable at many points.
4.
Inflation
Lack of a sound fiscal system and policy resulted in the unlimited printing of paper money during
the Hsien-feng era to prop up the government finance. Basically, the failure of the traditional
sources of revenue called for "expedient" measures; but the shortage of silver resulting from the
unfavourable trade balance since the opening of the country also accounted for this problem. By
1850 the drainage of silver began serious so that the government was forced to turn to paper money,
no matter how nonconvertible they might be. Starting 1853 the paper notes were being
devaluated. By 1861 the value of Imperial notes had decreased to 3% of face value, that of
provincial notes to 4%. At the same time, the serious shortage of silver resulted in the devaluation
of copper coins. Since the peasant sold his rice for copper while silver remained the standard in
which taxes were computed, the actual taxes he paid increased sharply. As the stability of the
traditional Chinese monetary system had depended on the stability of the silver-copper ratio and on
adequate supplies of both metals, the debasement of the copper currency and the issue of
nonconvertible paper only reduced the Qing currency system to chaos.
5.
Anomalies of rural economy
Against the adverse economic background, the Chinese people shared the same suffering as their
government did. The merchant class was discontented because of the exorbitant interest rate.
The dislocation of the monetary system and the drainage of silver brought about the stagnation in
Chinese business as daily transactions were conducted on the basis of copper coins.
The peasantry suffered most not only because of inflation but also because of disparity of their effort
in tax payment. As a result of the imperial edicts issued in 1711-13, the taxpayers were those who
were registered that year. Once registered, they continued to pay taxes although with more
difficulty. But those who were exempt from paying taxes continued to be evaded from taxation.
The above loophole meant that there emerged uneven burden of tax payment. Moreover, the
government received less revenue from tax than it should have, considering the rapid growth of
population since the mid-Qing.
5
Tax evasion was serious as large landowners evaded tax payment while they were in possession of
the majority of land. Hua Kang （華崗）quoted a description by Wong Wing （王瑛）in saying
that "80% of the whole country was concentrated in the hands of landlords who constituted only
10% of the peasantry and the remaining 90% of the peasantry owned only 20% of the land." This
also meant that many of the peasants were compelled to become tenants to work for the landlords.
6.
Government's failure to raise revenue
Proposals were made to remedy the above problems.
Some of them were considered too
departure from tradition; others were too conservative. This ambivalent attitude of course resulted
in the rejection of most of the proposals; thus reducing the effectiveness of the economic measures to
be carried out in the Tongzhi era.
Proposals
(a)
Reasons for failure
The government should develop the
From Confucian points of view, merchants were regarded
treaty ports which had been opened
parasites of society.
since 1842.
stratum of the traditional society, thus, the promotion of
Commercial interest
therein should be promoted and the
They were placed at the lowest
their status would disrupt the social order.
Chinese merchants at these ports
should also be patronized.
(b)
The government should launch a
It was not practicable in view of the constant warfare the
large-scale cadastral re-survey of land
government had to deal with throughout the country,
cultivation to update the registration
lack of expertise, decentralization and inadequate
and productivity and rectify the tax
resources.
revenue system.
(c)
The government should find out other
Readjustment of land tax was still out of question but
items of revenue to provide extra
local tax was considered.
income to the coffer.
local tax on the transit movement of goods in the
Because of the success of the
province of Kiangsu, government consented to the
imposition of likin （釐金）. Nevertheless, even it was
permitted, it was mainly retained for local uses
(d)
The government should replace the
p'iao-yen
system2
Pending?
with a revived salt
monopoly system.
2
The p'iao-yen system was introduced in 1832 under which anyone could buy a ticket (p'iao) to transport and sell salt
(yen). Once allowed, the system was beset with lots of problems. While there were some provinces which practised
the old monopoly system, the government broke the privileges by selling salt directly.
In addition, the Taiping
Rebellion and the Nian Rebellion ruined the production areas and there was no means of transporting the salt to the
areas in which its sale was licensed. On the eve of the Restoration the salt merchants were bankrupt, the revenue was
inadequate and the supply to customers was short.
As salt tax occupied quite an important part of the government
revenue, the government was in urgent need of finding another new system to take the place of the abusive p'iao-yen
system
6
(e)
D.
The government should increase tariff
The traditional scorn of foreign products and the
on foreign trade.
growing fear of the domestic dislocations and foreign
China should make
use of the foreign trade to earn extra
wars about which the trade brought3 was the main
profits.
hurdle.
Cooperation with foreigners
The compradors favoured this proposal but
was quite good as shown by the
they were the minority.
establishment and running of the
since the HumenTreaty (1843) .
The tariff autonomy was lost
Imperial Maritime Customs since
the tax above 5% ad valorem, and because of the
1854.
most-favoured-nation clause, nor change the condition.
It could neither raise
Power Struggle at the court
While the country was under the threat of the internal unrest and external pressure, there took
place at the court a power struggle, the result of which affected the political development of the
Qing dynasty for half a century. When the Allied troops approached Beijing, Emperor Hsien-feng
fled to Jehol accompanied by a Board of Regents led by Su-shun（肅順）, Tsai-yuan 載垣 (Prince I)
and Tuan-hua 端華 (Prince Cheng) whilst he assigned his brother I-hsin 奕訢 (Prince Gong) to
stay at the capital to negotiate with the foreigners.
After the conclusion of the Beijing
Convention in 1860, the emperor refused to return to the capital city, thus resulting in the
co-existence of two governments in China. One was in Jehol and another at Beijing.
The death of Emperor Hsien-feng in Jehol, August 1861 precipitated a power struggle between the
two Empresses Dowager (Tz'u-an 慈安 and Tz'u-hsi 慈禧) and Prince Gong on the one hand,
and the Board of Regents on the other, while the six-year old boy Tsai-ch'un succeeded to the
throne as Emperor Tongzhi. The power struggle lasted short for in November all was settled and
the Prince Gong party won. Su-shun was decapitated, Tuan-hua and Tsai-yuan were allowed to
commit suicide. They were charged with the crime of "subversion of the state".
What concerns us most is not the process of the power struggle and the reasons for the victory of
the winning side but its outcome. The main difference which separated the two parties was that
perhaps because of his direct experience with the foreigners during the negotiation at Beijing,
Prince Gong saw the inevitability of compromising with the West and preferred cooperation, whilst
the Su-shun party insisted on anti-western attitude and line. Therefore, the success of the Prince
Gong party meant that a definite course of a pro-foreign policy was to be adopted. This provided a
favourable ground for the implementation of the programmes in the following decade. In this
light, the Tongzhi Restoration was initiated under the harmonious atmosphere with foreign
countries, which was a reverse of the past twenty years of China's diplomacy with the outside world.
3
In the words of Liu K'un-i（劉坤一）, "Foreign trade is harmful to our best manufactures."
7