Paper Title Arts and business: the impact of business models on the activities of performing arts organisations in Australia. Jo Caust Associate Professor University of South Australia Keywords Arts, government, business models, performing arts organisations Abstract The introduction of managerial business models to Australian performing arts organisations has now been around for ten years. Until the early nineties, Australian arts organisations were contextualised as ‘not-for-profit’ entities that had an overall objective of producing good art. Over the past decade however, Australian performing arts organisations have been viewed more and more as part of an ‘industry’. Within an industry construct, performing arts organisations are framed as business entities, with a need to prove positive financial outcomes as a first priority. This discussion explores what is meant by business models in the context of Australian performing arts organisations and what has been the impact of this approach. Background Over the past decade the framing of performing arts organisations as businesses first, has been both explicit and implicit in the Australian context. The creation of the Major Performing Arts Board at the Australia Council in 2000 (and before that the Major Organisations Board), signified a shift from the evaluation of the funding and activities of major performing arts organisations by peers (that is comparing like with like), to a situation where major performing arts organisations are assessed by business people using business performance measures, with little artform representation, input or evaluation. The approach of the Major Performing Art Board has trickled down to other artform boards within the Australia Council, and state arts funding agencies, so that business plans, performance contracts, boards dominated by business people and financial expectations of arts organisations, have become ‘de rigueur’. This paper tracks the development of this approach and considers its strengths and weaknesses. Ways of evaluating the success of arts organisations In terms of accountability it is noted that generally arts organisations see their major accountability to their largest funders; generally therefore in the ‘not for profit’ sector, government or its agencies (Turbide and Laurin 2003). If arts organisations see that their major responsibility for accountability, is to their funders, in reverse, the funders see that the organisations’ major accountability is to them also. So the reporting demands and accountability expectations are set by the funder. In the Australian context this is government, be it federal or state. Brokensha (1996:101) points out that the performance indicators that funders impose on arts organisations, are not measuring how the organisation is performing against its own objectives, but how it is measuring up against the funder’s objectives. It would seem that ways of approaching the evaluation of arts organisations, by government funding authorities in particular, has focussed on measurable quantitative outcomes, while qualitative and less tangible outcomes are not considered (Brokensha 1996, Gilhespy 1999, Turbide & Laurin 2003). Major performance criteria can be organised under either categories of ‘efficiency’ or ‘effectiveness’ (Gilhespy 1999). A priority given to ‘efficiency’ is likely to favour measures such as earned income, audience numbers and access while ‘effectiveness’ is more likely to reflect the quality of the work, the diversity of the audience and the audience response. Belfiore notes in the UK that ‘data collection’ has been the favoured means of evaluating the success of arts activities, and this has meant that, “Data were collected in a number of different ways: through audits, performance measurements, time series, impact studies, and studies on audiences (as well as non2 audiences). Most of it was based on the quantitative analysis of policy inputs and outputs, and the results of such number crunching tended to be presented as neat statistics” (Belfiore 2004: 189) So the ‘work’ (or ‘output’), which can be intangible in terms of its nature, is evaluated by positivist methods which do not necessarily have any relationship with the work itself or its intent. Brokensha (1996), a major architect of the National CulturalLeisure Statistical Framework, introduced by the Australian Bureau of Census and Statistics in 1991, believes that governments have an obsession with numbers and see them as the only way of evaluating performance. In the case of the arts he argues that qualitative indicators are essential but are not understood or used appropriately by government agencies (Brokensha 1996:99-101). Governments have certainly become increasingly preoccupied with a need to justify their expenditure in any domain, given competing priorities, as well as recent radical conservative attitudes to smaller government and reduced government spending. Expenditure by government in the cultural sector is always bound to be contentious, as, however it is evaluated, it still does not necessarily lend itself to clear objective, measurable outcomes. In fact there are likely to be disagreements about the nature of the outcomes, and what weighting should be given to different outcomes generated from the same activity. Further it is noted that, “In the arts and culture sector, management control systems need to balance monitoring the artistic mission with ensuring that the organization respects budget constraints. Many leaders deplore, rightly or wrongly, the fact that financial matters often take undue precedence over artistic matters in evaluations of the organization’s performance.” (Turbide et al 2008: 10). Throsby (2001:163) says however that, an exclusive emphasis on the commercial benefits of the arts skews the discourse, and 3 ignores the essence of what the arts are about. In addition the multi-dimensional character of cultural activity makes it unsuitable for evaluation by means of conventional market surveys or economic models (Choi, Papandrea & Bennett 2006; Throsby 2003). The use of the industry model to frame the arts in the Australian context has been dominant since the publication of Creative Nation by then Australian Federal Government in1994. It has encouraged a mind set that sees the production of art as an industrial process, which can be evaluated by statistics set within a business model. The people who are best suited to doing this, are of course, business people. The Advent of the Business Model In 1999 the “Major Performing Arts Inquiry’ was commissioned by the then Federal Government. They appointed a committee (composed of two corporate bankers, a corporate lawyer and a CEO of a large corporate company) to enquire into the position of the major performing arts companies, given the precarious financial situation of several of them. The aim of the inquiry was to examine and make recommendations for the future, given an implicit acknowledgement that these large performing arts organisations were an essential part of the nation’s cultural infrastructure. The main premise of the inquiry was to ensure the future financial viability of these major performing arts companies, hence the title of its report, Securing the Future. The report made several recommendations but perhaps the key recommendation was the: “…endorsement of a new funding model that reflects the cost of the artforms; each company’s strategic role; and the commitment to geographic access.” (Nugent 1999: x). From the government’s point of view, the maintenance of the major (usually large) performing arts organisations with minimisation of risk and the least exposure of government to provide additional funding, were seen as primary goals. From the companies’ perspective, they wanted to be free of regular 4 government interference and allowed to get on with their ‘business’, with a long term guarantee of future funding. Companies such as the Australian Ballet Company or the Australian Opera Company, may have also wanted to be free of conditions that demanded that they demonstrate they were doing sufficient Australian content or developing new forms or doing the work of Australian writers/ composers or choreographers (as per the Australia Council’s mandate). Many of these companies believed their existence was not in question anyway, given that they were seen as an essential part of the country’s cultural infrastructure. They were therefore generally happy to be treated differently from the rest of the arts sector, if their funding was guaranteed and they were able to make their own choices re repertoire etc. As an outcome of the report, the Major Performing Arts Board (MPAB) was established as a separate entity at the Australia Council in 2000. Its role was to monitor and evaluate the arts organisations under its mantel. The MPAB operates under a different mandate than the other artform boards at the Australia Council, given its primary focus on financial issues. The Chair of the 1999 inquiry, Helen Nugent, a former merchant banker, became the first chair of this Board. The membership of the Major Performing Arts Board (MPAB) of the Australia Council has continued to reflect a business paradigm in terms of its membership. Of the eight members of the MPAB Board in 2008, only one has had hands on arts experience. The majority are from the business/commercial sector (Australia Council website at www.ozco.gov.au viewed April 2008). They are corporate accountants, corporate lawyers, full-time company directors and chief executives of corporate entities. This profile contrasts with the membership of the other artform boards at the Australia Council, who are all employed or work in their artforms (that is it is a system of ‘peer assessment’). It is stated on Australia Council website that: 5 “To be included in the Major Performing Arts Board, a company must meet all of the following criteria: be a dance, music, opera or theatre company or a hybrid thereof demonstrate the highest artistic standards in performances show an ongoing commitment to the development of the artform demonstrate an ongoing commitment to the development of artists within the artform show evidence of a sizeable and increasing audience base have a minimum average annual total income of $1.54 million over the previous three-year period demonstrate an ongoing ability to be financially viable, including increasing levels of financial support from the broader community. In 2000 there were 31 companies included as clients of the MPAB coming from the areas of Dance, Theatre, Music and Opera as well as Circus. Securing the Future Recommendations for the performing arts companies examined in Securing the Future (1999) included: the goal of filling all their available seats by improved marketing, seeing private sector support as their future major provider for earned income and reducing costs by establishing tender processes for productions, increasing economies of scale by merging functions of different companies (such as an opera company and an orchestra) and expecting more flexible practices from musicians and arts workers in general (Nugent 1999: xiii-xiv). A major strength of the report was the detailed statistics provided in it about every performing arts company being considered under its mantel (then 31 in total). These statistics included information about subsidy per seat, average ticket prices, cumulative deficits by artform and by company, international benchmarks in relation to 6 revenue and in relation to numbers of performances and profile of performance income by artform and by company. It is a wonderful set of numbers and an amazing snapshot of these companies in 1999. It doesn’t tell you about the quality of their work, their artistic highlights, the people who were employed or how their work was received. There is one table however that says it gives an ‘overview of the artistic development process comparing artform differences’ at four different stages (Nugent 1999:201). These stages are called: ‘create work, ‘create production, ‘build production’ and ‘rehearse and perform’. This table highlights whether particular people such as composers and designers are used ‘frequently’ or ‘occasionally’ in a typical production process in dance, theatre, music and opera. While this table may provide information that has some meaning to an uninformed observer of performing arts, it does not however provide meaningful or even accurate information to those who are from the performing arts. Perhaps its intent was to address the goal of “expecting more flexible practices from musicians and arts workers in general” (Nugent 1999: xiii-xiv). In 2003, 2005 and 2007, follow up progress reports were published by the MPAB and submitted to government. These summarised the achievements of the Board and the organisations it funded, over the period 1999-2007 (29 companies after 2001). The major thrust of these reports was again the presentation of statistics that were quantifiable and reflected issues such as earned income, financial health, number of performances and box office returns. In addition statistics about the number of new productions and the numbers of productions of Australian work were also included as tables. There is not as much detail provided as the original report, nevertheless they continue to use some identical tables as ongoing comparisons. These tables are organised under three categories: ‘Artistic Vibrancy’, ‘Breadth of Access’ and ‘Financial Results’. Under ‘Artistic Vibrancy’ they compare both ‘New Works by Artform’, ‘Total Australian Artworks by Artform’ and ‘New Productions’. Table 1 shows the total of Australia Artworks by Artform for the years 2001-2006. 7 Table 1 (Securing the Future 2007 :8) From Table 1 it is possible to deduce that there has in fact been an overall decline in Australian works over the period under review. This is most noticeable in Dance but also in Theatre. There has been a slight increase in Chamber Music and in Symphony Orchestras. But the figures used here only refer in the case of the Symphony Orchestras to the years since 2004, or since the orchestras have been completely separated form the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) (The ABC controlled the orchestras until this time). So it is not possible to know if this is an overall increase from the previous period when the repertoire was controlled by a central body. In the covering letter for the 2005 report to government from the Board, the then 8 Chair of the Board, Mel Ward (another former banker), notes however that, “ In meetings with companies with regard to the review, a number of representatives have expressed concern with regard to artistic compromises and to, some extent, access compromises that they have been forced to make in order to achieve positive financial outcomes” (Ward 2005). So this would suggest that there was concern being expressed from the arts organisations, that the focus on healthy financial outcomes was negatively impacting artistic decisions or outcomes. Certainly there is likely to be an impact in the production of new Australian work because this is likely to be the most risky financially. Again there is no qualitative information provided. Artistic achievements in terms of critical successes, breaking new artistic ground, recognition by peers, international invitations or even response by audiences, are not presented. A major goal of the original recommendations of Securing the Future in 1999 was to increase access of audiences, by increased participation. This was expressed as “the goal of filling all their available seats by improved marketing” This does not seem to have occurred in most artforms in the evidence provided under Table 2. In Dance, Theatre and Symphony Orchestras from this evidence, there has been a decline in attendances, a slight increase in Chamber music and an increase in Opera attendances. 9 Table 2 (Securing the Future 2007 :11) Another set of statistics by city (Table 3) also confirms that generally there has been a decline in attendances in all cities, with the exception of Canberra. 10 Table 3 (Securing the Future 2007 :13) The evidence from Table 2 and 3 would suggest there is a problem in terms of generating new audiences despite the added focus (and expenditure) on marketing. At the same time there has been an ongoing concern about the capacity of companies to take enough artistic risk and continue to promote the development of new Australian work when they must focus primarily on fiscal conservatism. A major success of the Major Performing Arts Board has been the levels of Net Assets held by the companies. The 2007 report notes that, “The number of companies with positive net assets greater than $1m has increased from six in 1999 to 19 in 2006, with a 356% 11 growth in total net assets of this category of companies from $18.9m to $67.4m. Conversely the number of companies with aggregate negative net assets had reduced from 10 in 1999 to two in 2006” ( Securing the Future 2007: 30). So perhaps the central goal of Securing the Future in 1999 has been achieved; a majority of the companies in 2007 under the mantel of the MPAB now have assets and are not in the ‘red’. But this begs the question of whether the drive to secure assets, has been made at the cost of doing new/risky/ artistically adventurous/ challenging work. The trickle down effect The Australia Council for the Arts is the Australian Government's arts funding and advisory body. Aside from the Major Performing Arts Organisations Board, other performing arts activities are assessed at the Australia Council by artform Boards such as Dance, Theatre, Music. The term ‘major’ therefore only refers to size. It does not refer to quality, contribution, influence or significance. The establishment therefore of two forms of evaluation (depending solely on an organisation’s size) within the mandate of the Australia Council, might be seen as contributing to an undermining of the principles of the funding body itself. That is the large performing arts organisations are primarily assessed on meeting their performance indicators related to financial goals. The smaller organisations in addition to achieving financial goals, are expected to make a significant contribution artistically. The Australia Council web site notes that: “Its mission is to enrich the lives of Australians and their communities by supporting the creation and enjoyment of the arts. This mission is underpinned by a commitment to: 12 Excellent and distinctive Australian art - assisting Australian artists to create and present a body of distinctive cultural works characterised by the pursuit of excellence Access for all Australians - assisting Australian citizens and civic institutions to appreciate, understand, participate in, enjoy and celebrate the arts A strong and vibrant arts sector - providing infrastructure development for Australia's creative arts.” (Australia Council website at www.ozco.gov.au viewed April 2008). But the operation of the Australia Council has become increasingly ‘corporatised’ from the late nineties onward. For instance in the use of language to describe what they do, the Council talks about “investing in artists and arts organisations” (Australia Council website at www.ozco.gov.au viewed April 2008 - Author’s italics). Several years ago this might have been described as providing ‘support’ or ‘funding’ artists or arts organisations. The term ‘investing’ seems to be more associated with banking or the finance sector, than the arts. The present and previous two Chairs of the Australia Council are from the corporate world (Terry Cutler, David Gonski, James Strong). The present Chief Executive Officer of the Australia Council also has come from a corporate background. So the key people setting the agenda for all arts activities at the Federal level come from a corporate background, not from the arts. It is likely therefore that their preferences in terms of framing, evaluating and monitoring, are based on the model they are most comfortable with. The business paradigm has been adopted by other artform boards to some extent in their approach to evaluation and accountability. Middle to small scale arts organisations are certainly evaluated by their success as businesses. Arts organisations are encouraged by funding authorities to have business people on their boards rather than artistic people. They are expected to produce business plans before they receive any funding and are measured against financial success/performance criteria during their period of funding. 13 The CEO of the Australia Council recently observed that the, “ …vast majority, something like 90 per cent of new work comes from the small to medium sector” (Keele in the Age 2007) So while it is accepted by Council that this sector (the small to medium, not the major!) is critical for artistic innovation, is it also being evaluated primarily by financial indicators rather than artistic? What is the impact of the business paradigm? The framing of performing arts organisations as businesses, therefore produces several questions: What is the impact of the business model on performing arts organisations in terms of their priorities and outcomes? Has the business paradigm influenced the leadership, structure, culture and outcomes of performing arts organisations? Does the adoption of a business model influence artistic choices of a performing arts organisation, and if so, how? Is the implicit agenda of arts organisations being framed as businesses, essentially a drive for all performing arts organisations to become increasingly independent of government support? Answering these questions adequately is not simple. Certainly in the case of theatre, it has been observed that the production of new Australian work by state theatre companies has fallen dramatically over the past decade (Neill 2006). There is also a perception that state theatre companies are taking less artistic risks in order to maximise their returns at the box office (Archer 2005, Latham 2004, Neill 2006). A small theatre venue that has contributed enormously to the development of new Australian work over the past 30 years, was placed under review by the Australia Council in 2007, because it was not seen as operating within a good business model (i.e. it was unable to generate a profit) (Perkins 2007). In the dance field, a national contemporary dance company that has been producing internationally renowned artistic outcomes, has recently come under review from the Australia Council, because they believed it was not attracting enough sponsorship. This client was 14 rejected as a client of the MPAB in 2001 because it did not generate enough income. This company has been invited to perform in New York, Paris and London several times over the past five years, and has had its latest work commissioned and funded by a New York producer. Until late 2007, the artistic director also occupied a position on the board of the company after a State Government Review recommended this action in 1998. As a result of the 2007 Australia Council review however, the Board then restructured the company and advertised the position of General Manager as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), with the Artistic Director being taken off the Board and effectively needing to report through the CEO to the board. So in effect the person who has been providing the artistic inspiration to the company and its international reputation, is being sidelined. In 2007 another major contemporary dance company was rescued by the Federal government with a large financial package through the MPAB, because it was seen as essential for the cultural infrastructure, despite the fact that it has gone broke three times in the past 10 years. Currently this company has no artistic director and has not received an international invitation for several years, yet it is deemed more significant and worthy of help than the other company, without having to undergo a review. Different individuals working within particular arts organisations will also have different interpretations of the environment and the outcomes achieved depending on their role within the organisation. In the music area for instance, the corporatisation of a state orchestra has significantly reduced the income of the artists within it, while at the same time placing much greater expectations on them in terms of versatility, number of performances and after hours’ commitment. In conversation with the official representative of the musicians within the orchestra, there is a view expressed that the musicians feel that their views are not being heard by the Board or management. In 2008 the wages of the musicians had fallen to up to 60% less than those being given to their colleagues in other orchestras, and up to 30% less than members of the local police band. In addition the average wage of the musicians in 2008 represented only 75% of the Australian average weekly wage. The musicians feel that they are the ‘meat in 15 the sandwich’ between the drive by the Board to increase the orchestra’s earned income and the perceived shortfall in government funding to the orchestra as a whole. There is also concern that the low musician salaries will mean that good musicians will not be interested in working with the orchestra in the future, so that over time, the quality of the orchestra will decline. On the other hand the management of the orchestra is positive about the recent achievements of the orchestra. For instance there has been an increase in box office income of over 50% over the past 3 years. In addition unusual collaborations have occurred with rock, pop, hip hop and jazz musicians thereby attracting new audiences to a symphony orchestra experience. What is not clear though, is why the additional earned income, has not been translated into better wages for the musicians? It is noted in a recent doctoral study about the corporatisation of Australian orchestras that earned income has increased by up to 25% since the orchestras became independent of the ABC (Boyle 2007: 210). However there are significant differences between the earning capacities of large orchestras in big cities and smaller orchestras in smaller cities. At the same time from the musicians’ point of view, the drive to increase earned income has resulted in more conservative programming aimed at increasing box office returns (Boyle 2007:211). In addition in the smaller orchestras, the drive to increase activity has meant shorter rehearsal times and hence an impact on quality (Boyle 2007: 212). Certainly the business paradigm has influenced the membership of boards of arts organisations, priorities of board of arts organisations, selection of Chief Executive Officers of arts organisations, organisational structures and performance measurements of arts organisations (Caust 2005, Lawson 2003, Neill 2006, Palmer 1998). Economic justifiers for cultural activity have been the major argument used both to government and by government for their involvement in cultural support (Bott 2004, Nugent 1999,Throsby 2001). To achieve a business like approach arts organisations have to produce business 16 plans, have a business strategy and be led by a business focussed board, if they are to continue to receive subsidy (Caust 2005). A senior Australian arts consultant recently noted that, “The pendulum has swung so far in the direction of appointing people to arts boards whose primary skill is to be business people and who are appointed on the grounds that maybe they've been a subscriber or an audience member or they're described as a lover of the arts… This move had restricted the ability of arts boards to make informed judgments.” (Macdonnell qtd. in Morgan 2008) MacDonnell suggests there is a possible ongoing impact of the dominance of a business culture on the board of arts organisations. For instance a board composed of business people is likely to focus on financial outcomes (an area they feel knowledgeable about), ensure the company is at limited financial risk (encouraging little artistic experimentation), modelling the organisational structure of the companies on a corporate model ( hierarchies with a CEO at the top and the most senior artistic person having to report through that person to the board) and appointing CEOs who are not from the arts but from the corporate sector (thereby again reflecting the culture of the board). Another part of the change in the environment is the changing ratio between government funding and earned income in the organisations’ income overall. This change may in fact produce the greatest differences in approaches to performance indicators in the longer term. Certainly the ratio of earned income to grants in some major performing arts organisations has changed considerably over the past decade, so that grants now represent less than 40% of an organisation’s income (from around 80%) (Eccles 2004, Neill 2006). If this trend continues, then as an organisation’s dependence on government funding decreases, their obligation or desire to follow the demands of government may also reduce. Where or what they see as their major accountability, will be interesting to watch. Perhaps it might happen that, 17 “…performance indicators <could sic> be developed by cultural organisations themselves, primarily for their own use and benefit” (Brokensha 1996:101) Conclusion The focus of this discussion has been on the impact of the business model on the funding and evaluation of major performing arts organisations in the Australian context. From the evidence, it would appear the financial health of the organisations is generally better than it was ten years ago, given the amount of reserves that many of the organisations now hold and their general increase in earned income. However this picture is not evenly spread between either artforms or states. In addition there has not been an expected increase in audiences as was hoped by the implementation of a business focussed model from 2000. There has also been a reduction in the production of new Australian work particularly in dance and theatre. It is also evident that artistic outcomes are not seen as important as financial outcomes. There are limitations with using a business model as the main tool for evaluation, as it does not include the very core of the activity; the quality and impact of the artistic output. It would appear too that the focus on accountability and financial outcomes may have skewed the balance in terms of governance, expectations and activity. 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