A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER I
THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES, 1775
The Americans of the eighteenth century were notably a maritime people and no
better sailors were to be found. The British colonies were close to the sea, and
were distant from each other, scattered along a coast line of more than a
thousand miles; so that, in the absence of good roads, intercommunication was
almost altogether by water. The ocean trade also, chiefly with England and the
West Indies, was extensive. Fishing was one of the most important industries,
especially of the northeastern colonies, and the handling of small vessels on the
Banks of Newfoundland at all seasons of the year trained large numbers of men
in seamanship. The whale fishery likewise furnished an unsurpassed school for
mariners.
A considerable proportion of the colonists, therefore, were at home upon the sea,
and more than this they were to some extent practiced in maritime warfare.
England, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was at war with
various foreign nations a great part of the time, and almost from the beginning of
the colonial period American privateers and letters of marque scoured the ocean
in search of French or Spanish prizes. Large fleets were fitted out and manned
by provincials for the expedition under Phips against Quebec in 1690 and for
Pepperrell's successful descent upon Louisburg in 1745. Privateering during the
French and Indian War of 1754 furnished a profitable field for American
enterprise and gave to many seamen an experience which proved of service
twenty years later. Even in times of peace the prevalence of piracy necessitated
vigilance, and nearly every merchantman was armed and prepared for resistance
(See Weeden's Economic and Social History of New England, chs. v, ix, xiv, xvi;
and Atlantic Monthly, September and October, 1861, for journal of Captain
Norton of Newport, 1741. See Appendix I for authorities.)
It would seem, then, that American seamen at the opening of the Revolution had
the training and experience which made them the best sort of raw material for an
efficient naval force. The lack of true naval tradition, however, and of military
discipline, and the poverty of the country, imposed limitations which, together
with the overwhelming force of the enemy, seriously restricted the field of
enterprise. Nevertheless, the patriotic cause was greatly aided and
independence made possible by the activities of armed men afloat.
The navigation laws of Great Britain were naturally unpopular in the colonies, and
their stricter enforcement after the peace of 1763, together with the imposition of
new customs duties, led to almost universal efforts to evade them. In 1764 the
British schooner St. John was fired upon by Rhode Islanders, and in 1769 the
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armed sloop Liberty, engaged in the suppression of smuggling, made herself so
obnoxious to the people of Newport that they seized and burned her. In 1772 the
schooner Gaspee, on similar duty, was stationed in Narragansett Bay and
caused great annoyance by stopping and examining all vessels. The people
were exasperated at the arrogant behavior of her commander, who in many
cases exceeded his authority. On the 9th of June, as the Gaspee was chasing a
vessel bound from Newport to Providence, she ran aground about seven miles
from Providence; she was hard and fast and the tide was ebbing. After nightfall a
party of men in boats descended the river from Providence and attacked the
schooner. After a short contest, in which the commanding officer of the Gaspee
was wounded, she was captured. The prisoners and everything of value having
been removed, she was set on fire and in a few hours blew up. Little effort was
made to conduct this affair secretly, and yet in spite of the diligent inquiry of a
court of five commissioners, all of whom were in sympathy with the British
ministry, no credible evidence could be adduced implicating any person; showing
a practical unanimity of feeling in the colony (R. I. Colony Records, vi, 427-430,
vii, 55-192; Bartlett's Destruction of the Gaspee; Staple's Destruction of the
Gaspee; Channing's United States, iii, 124-127, 151.)
The first public service afloat, under Revolutionary authority, was perhaps the
voyage of the schooner Quero, of Salem, Captain John Derby, despatched to
England by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress with the news of the Battle of
Lexington. She sailed April 29, 1775, some days later than General Gage's
official despatches and arrived at her destination nearly two weeks ahead of
them (Essex Institute Collections, January, 1900; Century Magazine, September,
1899.)
Early in May, 1775, the British sloop of war Falcon of sixteen guns, Captain John
Linzee, seized two American sloops in Vineyard Sound; "on which the People
fitted out two Vessels, went in Pursuit of them, retook and brought them both into
a Harbour, and sent the Prisoners to Taunton Gaol." (New England Chronicle,
May 18, 1775; American Archives, Series IV, ii, 608.) - PICTURE1
The islands in Boston Harbor had long been used by the colonists for pasturage
and were well stocked with cattle and sheep which the British troops in the town
took measures to secure for their consumption. Soon after the battle of Lexington
they succeeded in carrying off all the livestock on Governor's and Thompson's
Islands. The Americans, May 27, with the intention of forestalling similar raids,
landed between two and three hundred men on Hog Island who attempted to
bring off the cattle and sheep, while a detachment of about thirty men crossed
over to Noddle's Island (East Boston) for the same purpose, when "about a
hundred Regulars landed upon the last mentioned and pursued our Men till they
had got safely back to Hog Island; then the Regulars began to fire very briskly by
Platoons upon our Men. In the mean time an armed Schooner with a Number of
Barges came up to Hog Island to prevent our People's leaving said Island, which
she could not effect; after that several Barges were towing her back to her
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Station, as there was little Wind and flood Tide. Our People put in a heavy Fire of
small Arms upon the Barges, and two 3 Pounders coming up to our Assistance
began to play upon them and soon obliged the Barges to quit her and to carry off
her Crew; After which our people set Fire to her, although the Barges exerted
themselves very vigorously to prevent it. She was burnt [the next day] upon the
Way of Winisimet Ferry. We have not lost a single Life, although the Engagement
was very warm from the armed Schooner (which mounted four 6 Pounders and
12 swivels), from an armed Sloop that lay within Reach of Small Arms, from one
or two 12 Pounders upon Noddle's Island, and from the Barges which were all
fixed with swivels." (Boston Gazette, June 5,1775.) The American loss was four
wounded, one of whom died two days later; that of the British was said to be
twenty killed and fifty wounded. The stock, amounting to over four hundred
sheep, about thirty cattle and some horses, were brought away by the
provincials. During the siege of Boston various other attempts, successful and
unsuccessful, were made to bring away live stock from the islands of the harbor,
thereby reducing the possible sources of food supply of the British shut up in the
town (Sumner's History of East Boston, 367-389; Frothingham's Siege of Boston,
108, 109, 225; Green's Three Military Diaries, 86; Almon's Remembrancer, i,
112; Amer. Archives, IV, ii, 719; Boston Gazette, June 5, 1775; N. E. Chronicle,
May 25, June 15, July 27, October 5, 1775.)
Josiah Quincy in a letter to John Adams, dated September 22, 1775, proposed a
plan for making the investment of Boston complete and so forcing the
capitulation of the besieged British army. His proposal was to build five forts,
three of them on Long Island, so placed as to command the channels of the
harbor, including the narrows which were guarded by the enemy's men-of-war in
Nantasket Roads; these ships could be driven out by the fire of the forts. He
would then sink hulks in the narrows. No ships could thenceforth pass in or out
and "both Seamen and Soldiers, if they don't escape by a timely Flight, must
become Prisoners at Discretion." Quincy also thought that "Row Gallies must be
our first mode of Defence by Sea." (Adams MSS.)
Near the eastern frontier of Maine, in a situation most exposed to British attack,
lay the little seaport of Machias. The one staple of the town was lumber, and this
the inhabitants exchanged at Boston for the various supplies they needed. In the
spring of 1775 food was scarce, for the previous year's crops had failed.
Consequently a petition, dated May 25, was sent to the General Court or
Provincial Congress of Massachusetts at Watertown, begging for provisions and
promising to send back lumber in return. News of the fight at Lexington and
Concord had lately reached Machias and had stirred the patriotism of the people,
who in spite of their isolated position, were in the main devoted to the provincial
cause and had their committee of safety and correspondence. A committee of
the General Court reported June 7 in favor of sending the provisions. Meanwhile
Captain Ichabod Jones, a merchant engaged in trade with Machias, had
proceeded from Boston to that place with two sloops, the Unity and the Polly,
loaded with provisions and escorted by the armed schooner Margaretta under
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the command of Midshipman Moore of the British navy. They arrived June 2 and
Jones took measures to procure a return cargo of lumber for the use of the
British troops in Boston. As the only means of obtaining the much needed
provisions it was voted in town meeting, notwithstanding the opposition of a large
minority of staunch patriots, to allow Jones to take his lumber. He proceeded
accordingly to distribute the provisions, but to those only who had voted in his
favor. The patriots, under the lead of Benjamin Foster and Jeremiah O'Brien,
were determined to prevent the shipping of the lumber to Boston. On Sunday,
June 11, an unsuccessful attempt was made to capture Jones and the officers of
the Margaretta while at church. They took the alarm and Jones fled to the woods,
where he was taken some days later; the officers escaped to their vessel. Moore
then threatened to bombard the town (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., vi (April, 1895),
124-130.)
"Upon this a party of our men went directly to stripping the sloop [Unity] that lay
at the wharf and another party went off to take possession of the other sloop
which lay below & brought her up nigh a wharf & anchored in the stream. The
Tender [Margaretta] did not fire, but weighed her anchors as privately as possible
and in the dusk of the evening fell down & came to within musket shot of the
sloop, which obliged our people to slip their cable & run the sloop aground. In the
meantime a considerable number of our people went down in boats & canoes,
lined the shore directly opposite to the Tender, & having demanded her to
surrender to America, received for answer, 'fire & be damn'd'; they immediately
fired in upon her, which she returned and a smart engagement ensued. The
Tender at last slipped her cable & fell down to a small sloop commanded by
Capt. Tobey & lashed herself to her for the remainder of the night. In the morning
of the 12th she took Capt. Tobey out of his vessel for a pilot & made all the sail
they could to get off, as the wind & tide favored; but having carried away her
main boom and meeting with a sloop from the Bay of Fundy, they came to,
robbed the sloop of her boom & gaff, took almost all her provisions together with
Mr. Robert Avery of Norwich in Connecticut, and proceeded on their voyage. Our
people, seeing her go off in the morning, determined to follow her.
"About forty men armed with guns, swords, axes & pitch forks went in Capt.
Jones's sloop under the command of Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien; about twenty,
armed in the same manner & under the command of Capt. Benj. Foster, went in
a small schooner. During the chase our people built them breastworks of pine
boards and anything they could find in the vessels that would screen them from
the enemy's fire. The Tender, upon the first appearance of our people, cut her
boats from her stern & made all the sail she could, but being a very dull sailor
they soon came up with her and a most obstinate engagement ensued, both
sides being determined to conquer or die; but the Tender was obliged to yield,
her Capt. was wounded in the breast with two balls, of which wounds he died
next morning. Poor Mr. Avery was killed and one of the marines, and five
wounded. Only one of our men was killed and six wounded, one of which is since
dead of his wounds. The battle was fought at the entrance of our harbour &
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lasted for near the space of one hour. We have in our possession four double
fortifyed three pounders & fourteen swivels and a number of small arms, which
we took with the Tender, besides a very small quantity of ammunition." (Coll.
Maine Hist. Soc., vi, 130, 131 (report of Machias Committee of Correspondence,
June 14, 1775). Foster's schooner is said to have run aground and to have taken
no part in the battle. The Unity returned to Machias with the Margaretta as her
prize. O'Brien's five brothers were with him in this enterprise (Coll. Maine Hist.
Soc., 1847, January, 1891, April, 1895; New England Magazine, August, 1895;
Massachusetts Magazine, April, 1910; Sherman's Life of Jeremiah O'Brien, chs.
ii-v; Boston Gazette, July 3, 1775.)
Joseph Wheaton, one of the Unity's crew, wrote many years later a detailed
account of the action. He says that the Margaretta, after having replaced her
broken boom, "was Making Sail when our Vessel came in Sight; then
commenced the chace, a Small lumber boat in pursuit of a well armed British
vessel of war - in a Short time she cut away her three boats. Standing for sea
while thus pursuing, we aranged our selves, appointed Jeremiah Obrien our
conductor, John Steele to steer our Vessel, and in about two hours we received
her first fire, but before we could reach her she had cut our rigging and Sails
emmencely; but having gained to about one hundred yards, one Thomas Neight
fired his wall piece, wounded the man at the helm and the Vessel broached too,
when we nearly all fired. At this moment Captain Moore imployed himself at a
box of hand granades and put two on board our Vessel, which through our crew
into great disorder, they having killed and wounded nine men. Still two ranks
which were near the prow got a second fire, when our bowsprit was run through
the main shrouds of the Margarette and Sail, when Six of us Jumped on her
quarter deck and, with clubed Muskets drove the crew from their quarters, from
the waist into the hold of the Margarette; the Capt. lay mortally wounded, Robert
Avery was killed and eight marines & Saylors lay dead on her deck, the
Lieutenant wounded in her cabin. Thus ended this bloody affray." (Adams MSS.,
Wheaton to President Adams, February 21, 1801. See another account by
Wheaton in Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., ii (January, 1891), 109.) Wheaton says that
fourteen of the Americans were killed and wounded.
According to the British account the Americans attempted to board the
Margaretta with boats and canoes during the night before the battle, but were
beaten off. In the next day's chase Foster's schooner continued in company with
the Unity to the end. As these vessels approached they were received by the
Margaretta with a broadside of swivels, small arms, and hand grenades, but they
both came alongside, the Unity on the starboard and the schooner on the
larboard bow (British Admiralty Records, Admirals' Despatches 485, July 24,
1775, No. 2.)
The General Court of Massachusetts resolved, June 26, 1775: "That the thanks
of this Congress be, and they are hereby given to Capt. Jeremiah O'Brien and
Capt. Benjamin Foster and the other brave men under their command, for their
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courage and good conduct in taking one of the tenders belonging to our enemies
and two sloops belonging to Ichabod Jones, and for preventing the ministerial
troops being supplied with lumber; and that the said tender, sloops, their cargoes
remain in the hands of the said captains O'Brien and Foster and the men under
their command, for them to improve as they shall think most for their and the
public advantage until the further action of this or some future Congress." (Coll.
Maine Hist. Soc., vi, 132.) The Unity was fitted out with the Margaretta's guns,
renamed the Machias Liberty and put under Jeremiah O'Brien's command; she
was presumably chosen as a cruiser in preference to the Margaretta, on account
of her superior sailing qualities.
About a month after the capture of the Margaretta the British schooner Diligent,
carrying eight or ten guns and fifty men, and the tender Tapnaquish, with sixteen
swivels and twenty men (Wheaton (Adams MSS.) gives these vessels a smaller
number of men and guns), appeared off Machias. The captain of the Diligent
going ashore in his boat was seized by a small party of Americans stationed near
the mouth of the bay and sent to Machias. Jeremiah O'Brien in the Machias
Liberty and Benjamin Foster in another vessel were then sent down the river,
found the British vessels and took them without firing a gun. According to
Wheaton, O'Brien subsequently cruised in the Bay of Fundy and took a number
of British merchant vessels (Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., ii (1847), 246, ii (January,
1891), 111; Life of O'Brien, ch. vi; Massachusetts Mag., January, 1910.)
Foster and O'Brien were next sent by the Machias Committee of Safety to
Watertown to report their exploits to the Provincial Congress. Under their charge
went also the prisoners taken in the Margaretta, Diligent and Tapnaquish
together with Ichabod Jones. They proceeded as far as Falmouth (Portland), a
week's voyage, by water. The ruthless burning of Falmouth by the British under
Captain Henry Mowatt several weeks later is supposed to have been, in part at
least, an act of retaliation for the capture of the British vessels at Machias. The
journey of O'Brien and Foster from Falmouth to Watertown was made by land
and took about ten days. On August 11th the prisoners were delivered at
Watertown by their captors, who about the same time reported also to General
Washington at the headquarters of the army in Cambridge. They petitioned the
Provincial Congress for the privilege of raising a company of men among
themselves at the expense of the Province, to be used in the defense of Machias
and to give occupation to numbers of young men who in the distress of war times
were without means of support. They also asked that the officers of the Machias
Liberty be given commissions and that men be stationed on board her, this
vessel to be supplied and equipped and used for the defense of the town, which
might easily be blockaded by a small force. The petitions were favorably received
by the Congress and O'Brien was appointed to command both the Machias
Liberty and the Diligent. These vessels were thereby taken into the service of the
colony and became the nucleus of the Massachusetts navy. O'Brien soon
returned to Machias in order to oversee the fltting out of his vessels (O'Brien, ch.
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vi; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 346, 354; Records of General Court of Massachusetts,
August 21, 23,1775; Massachusetts Spy, August 16, 1775.)
Off Cape Ann, August 9, 1775, the British sloop of war Falcon, Captain Linzee,
fell in with two schooners from the West Indies, bound to Salem. One of these
schooners, says a report from Gloucester, was "soon brought to, the other taking
advantage of a fair wind, put into our harbour, but Linzee having made a prize of
the first, pursued the second into the harbour and brought the first with him. He
anchored and sent two barges with fifteen men in each, armed with muskets and
swivels; these were attended with a whale boat in which was the Lieutenant and
six privates. Their orders were to seize the loaded schooner and bring her under
the Falcon's bow. The Militia and other inhabitants were alarmed at this daring
attempt and prepared for a vigorous opposition. The barge-men under the
command of the Lieutenant boarded the schooner at the cabbin windows, which
provoked a smart fire from our people on the shore, by which three of the enemy
were killed and the Lieutenant wounded in the thigh, who thereupon returned to
the man of war. Upon this Linzee sent the other schooner and a small cutter he
had to attend him, well armed, with orders to fire upon the damn'd rebels
wherever they could see them and that he would in the mean time cannonade
the town; he immediately fired a broadside upon the thickest settlements and
stood himself with diabolical pleasure to see what havock his cannon might make
. . . Not a ball struck or wounded an individual person, although they went
through our houses in almost every direction when filled with women and children
. . . Our little party at the waterside performed wonders, for they soon made
themselves masters of both the schooners, the cutter, the two barges, the boat,
and every man in them, and all that pertained to them. In the action, which lasted
several hours, we lost but one man, two others wounded, one of which is since
dead, the other very slightly wounded. We took of the men of war's men thirtyfive, several were wounded and one since dead; twenty-four were sent to headquarters, the remainder, being impressed from this and the neighboring towns,
were permitted to return to their friends." (Pennsylvania Packet, August 28, 1775;
N. E. Chronicle, August 25, 1775.)
Captain Linzee, who makes the date of the affair August 8, states in his report to
the admiral at Boston that having anchored in Gloucester harbor he "sent Lieut.
Thornborough with the Pinnace, Long Boat and Jolly Boat, mann'd and arm'd in
order to bring the Schooner out, the Master coming in from sea at the same time
in a small tender, I directed him to go and assist the Lieutenant. When the Boats
had passed a Point of Rocks that was between the Ship and Schooner, they
received a heavy fire from the Rebels who were hidden behind Rocks and
Houses, and behind Schooners aground at Wharfs, but notwithstanding the
heavy fire from the Rebels, Lieut. Thornborough boarded the Schooner and was
himself and three men wounded from Shore. On the Rebels firing on the Boats, I
fired from the ship into the Town, to draw the Rebels from the Boats. I very soon
observed the Rebels payed little attention to the firing from the ship and seeing
their fire continued very heavy from the schooner the Lieutenant had boarded, I
7
made an attempt to set fire to the Town." Hoping that by this means the attention
of the Americans would be directed to saving their houses, so that the schooner
could be brought off, Linzee sent a party ashore to fire the town; but the powder
used for the purpose was set off prematurely, "one of the Men was blowed up,"
and the attempt failed. The town was then bombarded. "About 4 o'clock in the
afternoon the lieutenant was brought on board under cover of the Masters' fire
from the Schooner, who could not leave her. All the Boats were much damaged
by the shots and lay on the side of the Schooner next to the Rebels; on my being
acquainted with the situation of the Master, I sent the Prize Schooner to anchor
ahead the Schooner the Master was in and veer alongside to take him and
People away, who were very much exposed to the Rebels' fire, but from want of
an officer to send her in, it was not performed, the Vessel not anchored properly."
The master, despairing of succor, surrendered about seven in the evening "with
the Gunner, fifteen Seamen, Seven Marines, one Boy, and ten prest Americans."
The next morning the Falcon weighed anchor and proceeded to Nantasket
Roads (Magazine of History, August, 1905.)
Several other affairs, of little importance in themselves, showed the readiness of
the provincials for action upon the water at an early period, before there was
naval organization of any kind to give authority to their acts (Boston Gazette,
September 11, October 2, 9, 1775; Penn. Packet, September 4, 1775.) Boston
being the seat of war at this time, most of the maritime events naturally took
place in New England waters during the first year. As early as August, 1775,
however, a South Carolina sloop, sent out by the Council of Safety, captured a
British vessel on the Florida coast (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 180.)
The situation of affairs in America, as is well known, caused great concern in
England for a considerable time before the actual outbreak of the rebellion. Of all
the measures proposed by whig or tory for the adjustment of the difficulty,
probably the wisest, for the conservation of the empire, was suggested by
Viscount Barrington, the Secretary at War; but wisdom availed little with the
British ministry of that day. Barrington's advice was given in a series of letters
written in the years 1774 and 1775 to the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary for the
Colonies (Political Life of William Wildman, Viscount Barrington, by his brother
Shute (London, 1814), 140-152.) His opinion was that the colonies could not be
subdued by the army, and that even if they could, the permanent occupation of
America by a large force would be necessary, a source of constant exasperation
to the colonists and of enormous expense to the government. The troops, he
thought, should be withdrawn to Canada, Nova Scotia, and East Florida, and
there quartered "till they can be employed with good effect elsewhere." The
reduction of the rebellious colonies should be left to the navy. November 14,
1774, he writes: "The naval force may be so employed as must necessarily
reduce the Colony [Massachusetts] to submission without shedding a drop of
blood." (Ibid., 141.) A few weeks later, December 24, he goes a little more into
detail. Speaking especially of New England he says: "Conquest by land is
unnecessary, when the country can be reduced first by distress and then to
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obedience by our Marine totally interrupting all commerce and fishery, and even
seizing all the ships in the ports, with very little expense and less bloodshed." As
to the colonies south of New England, "a strict execution of the Act of Navigation
and other restrictive laws would probably be sufficient at present." A few frigates
and sloops could enforce those laws and prevent almost all commerce - "Though
we must depend on our smaller ships for the active part of this plan, I think a
squadron of ships of the line should be stationed in North America, both to
prevent the intervention of foreign powers and any attempt of the Colonies to
attack our smaller vessels by sea." "The Colonies will in a few months feel their
distress; their spirits, not animated by any little successes on their part or
violence of persecution on ours, will sink; they will be consequently inclined to
treat, probably to submit to a certain degree." (Barrington, 144-147.)
Concessions could then be made without loss of dignity, the mistake of imposing
further obnoxious taxes being avoided. Barrington wrote on the same subject to
Dartmouth the next year; and also to Lord North, August 8, 1775, saying: "My
own opinion always has been and still is, that the Americans may be reduced by
the fleet, but never can be by the army." (Ibid., 151)
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER II
NAVAL ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION
The events already related took place under the stress of circumstances, most of
them unauthorized by Continental or Provincial Congress. It is now necessary to
interrupt the narrative of naval operations in order to sketch briefly the various
sources of authority and the administrative systems under which acted the
different classes of vessels throughout the course of the war. These classes
were: First, Continental vessels; second, the state navies; third, the privateers,
commissioned either by the Continental government or by the various states, and
in some cases by both (In the preparation of so much of this chapter as relates to
the administration and organization of the American naval forms, Paullin's Navy
of the American Revolution has been closely followed. See also Am. Arch., IV, iii,
1888-1904, 1917-1957; Works of John Adams, ii, 462-464, 469, 470, 479-484, iii,
6-12.)
Public vessels cruising under Continental authority comprised not only the
Continental navy, strictly speaking, including vessels fitted out in France, but also
the fleets organized by Washington in Massachusetts Bay in 1775 and later in
New York; by Arnold on Lake Champlain in 1776 and by Pollock in 1778 on the
Mississippi River.
General Washington took the first actual step towards placing a Continental force
upon the sea by fitting out the schooner Hannah, which sailed from Beverly
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September 5, 1775, and returned to port two days later with a prize. An important
measure in making effective the siege of Boston, then in progress, was the
intercepting of supplies coming to the town by water; the supplies being at the
same time of the utmost value to the American army investing the town. Before
the end of the year seven other vessels, officered and manned from the army,
were fitted out by Washington. The next year he organized a similar but smaller
fleet at New York (see next chapter.)
The first official suggestion of a Continental navy came from the Assembly of
Rhode Island which, August 26, 1776, declared "that the building and equipping
an American fleet, as soon as possible, would greatly and essentially conduce to
the preservation of the lives, liberty and property of the good people of these
colonies," and instructed the delegates from that province in the Continental
Congress "to use their whole influence at the ensuing congress for building at the
Continental expence a fleet of sufficient force for the protection of these
colonies." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 231.) The Rhode Island delegates presented their
instructions to Congress October 3 and this brought the matter fairly before that
body. Discussion of these instructions was postponed from time to time and it
was several weeks before definite action was taken on them. Meanwhile
intelligence had been received of the sailing from England of two brigs laden with
military supplies bound to Quebec. The practicability of intercepting these
vessels was considered in Congress October 5. Strong opposition was
developed on the part of a vociferous minority to any participation of the
Continental government in maritime warfare; to them it appeared sheer madness
to send ships out upon the sea to meet the overwhelming naval force of England.
After a lively debate the matter was referred to a committee consisting of John
Adams, John Langdon, and Silas Deane. Upon the recommendation of this
committee it was decided to instruct Washington at once to procure two
Massachusetts cruisers for that service and to request the cooperation of the
governors of Rhode Island and Connecticut (Journals of Continental Congress,
October 3, 5,1775; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 950, 1038, 1888-1890.)
Elbridge Gerry wrote from Watertown, October 9, 1775, to Samuel Adams, then
a member of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, saying: "If the Continent
should fit out a heavy ship or two and increase them as circumstances shall
admit, the Colonies large privateers, and individuals small ones, surely we may
soon expect to see the coast clear of cutters." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 993.)
On the advice of the committee appointed October 5, Congress voted on the
13th to fit out two vessels, one of them to carry ten guns, to cruise three months
to the eastward in the hope of intercepting British transports. Another committee
of three was appointed to inquire into the expense. October 30, 1775, is an
important date in naval legislation. Congress resolved to arm the second of the
vessels already provided for with fourteen guns and also authorized two
additional vessels which might carry as many as twenty and thirty-six guns
respectively, "for the protection and defence of the United Colonies." By this vote
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Congress was fully committed to the policy of maintaining a naval armament. On
the same day a committee of seven was formed by adding four members to
those already appointed (Jour. Cont. Congr., October 6, 7, 13,17, 30, 1775.) This
committee was the first executive body for the management of naval affairs. It
was known as the Naval Committee and the members were John Langdon of
New Hampshire, John Adams of Massachusetts, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode
Island, Silas Deane of Connecticut, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Joseph
Hewes of North Carolina, and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina.
During the closing months of 1775 much legislation necessary for the
organization of the navy was enacted by Congress on the recommendation of the
Naval Committee. In the beginning there was strong opposition to all enterprises
of a naval character, but it gradually broke down before the arguments of the
more far-sighted and reasonable members. November 10 the Marine Corps was
established. On the 25th captures of British ships of war, transports, and supply
vessels were authorized and the several colonies were advised to set up prize
courts. The apportionment of the shares in prizes was prescribed. In the case of
privateers all the proceeds went to the owners and captors; in the case of
Continental or colony cruisers two thirds of the value of a prize when a transport
or supply vessel, one half when a vessel of war, went to the government, while
the captors took the rest. November 28, "Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of
the United Colonies" (See Appendix II) were adopted. These early navy
regulations were brief, relating chiefly to discipline and prescribing the ration and
pay. The rules provided for courts martial, but not for courts of inquiry; there was
much subsequent legislation on the subject of naval courts. Pensions for
permanent disability and bounties, to be awarded in certain cases, were provided
for, the necessary funds for which were to be set apart from the proceeds of
prizes. The rules of November 28 were framed by John Adams and were based
on British regulations. Adams was a leader in all this early legislation and the part
he took in the founding of the Revolutionary navy was important and influential
(Jour. Cont. Congr., November 10, 17, 23, 24, 25, 28, 1775; Adams's Works, iii,
7-11; Am. Arch., IV, v, 1111.)
In November the Naval Committee purchased four merchant vessels under the
provisions of October 13 and 30, to be converted into men-of-war. These
vessels, as named by the committee, were the ships Alfred and Columbus and
the brigs Cabot and Andrew Doria. The first was named in honor of the supposed
founder of the English navy, the second and third for famous discoverers, and
the fourth for the great Genoese admiral. Other vessels were authorized and
purchased from time to time, the first of which was a sloop called the Providence
(Adams, iii, 12; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1938; .Jour. Cont. Congr., December 2, 1775.)
Definite action was taken in Congress on the Rhode Island instructions
December 11, when a committee of twelve was "appointed to devise ways and
means for furnishing these colonies with a naval armament." Two days later this
committee "brought in their report, which being read and debated was agreed to
11
as follows: That five ships of thirty-two guns, five of twenty-eight guns, three of
twenty-four guns, making in the whole thirteen, can be fitted for the sea probably
by the last of March next, viz: in New Hampshire one, in Massachusetts Bay two,
in Connecticut one, in Rhode Island two, in New York two, in Pennsylvania four,
and in Maryland one. That the cost of these ships so fitted will not be more than
66,666 2/3 dollars each on the average, allowing two complete suits of sails for
each ship, equal in the whole to 866,666 2/3 dollars."
Of these frigates, the Raleigh, of 32 guns, was built at Portsmouth, New
Hampshire; the Hancock, 32, and the Boston, 24, at Salisbury and Newburyport
on the Merrimac River; the Warren, 32, and the Providence, 28, at Providence;
the Trumbull, 28, at Chatham on the Connecticut River; the Montgomery, 28, and
the Congress, 24, at Poughkeepsie on the Hudson River; the Randolph, 32,
Washington, 32, Effingham, 28, and Delaware, 24, at or near Philadelphia on the
Delaware River; and the Virginia, 28, at Baltimore. The actual number of guns on
a ship was generally in excess of the rate; a thirty-two gun frigate commonly
carried about thirty-six guns. With a few exceptions these frigates were armed
with no guns heavier than twelve-pounders. The smaller vessels of the
Revolutionary navy carried only four and six-pounders. All were long guns; the
light, short, large-calibre guns called carronades had not yet come into general
use. Some vessels carried a secondary battery, mounted on deck or in the tops,
of small light mortars called coehorns or of swivels, which were light guns
mounted on pivots. December 13, 1775, the day when these thirteen frigates
were provided for, is another important date in the early history of the navy. On
the 14th a committee of thirteen was chosen by ballot to superintend the
construction and equipment of the frigates (Jour. Cont. Congr., December 11, 13,
14, 1775. See Appendix V.)
From descriptions of three of these frigates, furnished nearly two years later to
Admiral Howe, commanding the British fleet on the North American station, we
are able to get an idea of their appearance and dimensions. The Hancock is
describedas follows, beginning with the figure head: "A Man's Head with Yellow
Breeches, white Stockings, Blue Coat with Yellow Button Holes, small cocked
Hat with a Yellow Lace, has a Mast in lieu of an Ensign Staff with a Latteen Sail
on it, has a Fore and Aft Driver Boom, with another across, Two Top Gallant
Royal Masts, Pole mizen topmast, a whole Mizen Yard and mounts 32 Guns, has
a Rattle Snake carved on the Stern, Netting all around the Ship, Stern Black and
Yellow, Quarter Galleries all Yellow." "Principal Dimensions of the Rebel Frigate
Hancock. Length on the upper Deck, 140 ft. 8 ins. Breadth on Do. 30.2. Length of
Keel for Tonnage, 116.2 3/4. Extreme Breadth, 35.2. Depth in the Hold, 10.7.
Burthen in Tons, 764. Heigth between Decks, 5.6. Do. in the Waste, 5.0. Size of
the Gun Ports, fore & aft, 2.7. up & down, 2.2. Length on the Quarter Deck, 57.8.
Length on the Forecastle, 31.3. Draught of Water, afore, 14.0, abaft, 15.10.
Heigth of the Ports from the Surface of the Water, Forward, 9.0, Midships, 8.2,
Abaft, 9.2." Then the Boston: "An IndianHead with a Bow and Arrow in the Hand,
painted White, Red and Yellow, Two top gallant Royal Masts, Pole mizen
12
topmast on which she hoists a Top gallant Sail, painted nearly like the Hancock
with Netting all round, has a Garf, a Mast in room of an Ensign Staff with a
Latteen Sail on it, and mounts 30 guns." "Dimensions of the Armed Ship named
the Delaware...Length on the Gun Deck, 121 Feet; Keel for Tonnage, 96;
Extreme Breadth, 32.6. The Ship lately built, Mounts twenty four Guns on the
Upper Deck; And when furnished with proper Artillery, capable of carrying twelve
Pounders with great facility." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Adm. Desp. 487, August 28, 1777,
nos. 7 and 8; A. D. 488, November 23, 1777, no. 3.) The figures for the Warren
and Providence, from the journal of the committee in charge of building those
ships, are: length on the gun deck, 132 feet, 1 inch and 124.4, respectively; keel
110.10 3/4 and 102.8 1/2; beam, 34.5 1/2 and 33.10 3/8; hold 11, and 10.8. The
committee voted to have a few eighteen pounders cast for these two frigates,
and accordingly some guns of that weight were mounted on them (Magazine of
History, December, 1908, and February, 1909. For the whole journal see lbid.,
November, 1908, to April, 1909. See Archives de la Marine, B7 459 (Whipple's
letter of May 31, 1778)
Meanwhile, November 2, 1775, the Naval Committee had been given power by
Congress to "agree with such officers and seamen as are proper to man and
command " the vessels they had purchased and were fitting out. On the 5th the
committee selected Esek Hopkins, an old sea captain of Providence and brother
of Stephen Hopkins, for the command of this little fleet (Field's Life of Hopkins,
78.) December 7 John Paul Jones "was appointed Senior Lieut. of the Navy."
(Jones MSS., October 10, 1776; Sands's Life of Jones, 33.) On the 22d the
Naval Committee "laid before Congress a list of the officers by them appointed,
agreeable to the resolutions of Congress, viz: Ezek Hopkins, Esqr., commanderin-chief of the fleet. Captains, Dudley Saltonstall, Esqr., of the Alfred, Abraham
Whipple, Esqr., of the Columbus, Nicholas Biddle, Esqr., of the Andrew Doria,
John Burrows Hopkins, Esqr., of the Cabot. 1st lieutenants, John Paul Jones
[etc.] . . . Resolved, That the pay of the commander-in-chief of the Fleet be 125
dollars per calendar month. Resolved, That commissions be granted to the
above officers agreeable to their rank in the above appointment." In addition to
those named above there were in the list four other first lieutenants, five second
lieutenants, and three third lieutenants (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 2,
December 22, 1775.) This is the beginning of a list of officers for the Continental
navy which, in the course of the war and including marine officers and those
commissioned in France, contained nearly three hundred and thirty names (See
Appendix VI.) There were in addition medical officers, pursers, midshipmen, and
warrant officers of whom no lists have been preserved. The largest number of
petty officers, seamen, and marines in the navy at any one time may have been
about three thousand.
Uniforms for the officers of the navy were adopted by the Marine Committee
September 5, 1776, but probably they were not commonly worn, as few officers
could afford a complete outfit. For line officers a blue coat with red lapels, blue
breeches, and red waistcoat were prescribed; for marine officers, a green coat
13
faced with white and with a silver epaulette on the right shoulder, white waistcoat
and breeches and black gaiters (Am. Arch., V, ii, 181.)
It has generally been supposed that the intention of Congress in making Hopkins
commander-in-chief was to give him the same rank that Washington held in the
army. It seems more likely, however, that Congress merely meant to give him
command of this particular fleet. The wording of his appointment by the Naval
Committee and of the resolutions quoted above, together with the fact that each
of the captains was assigned, also by resolution of Congress, to a specified
vessel, would indicate this. Stephen Hopkins, writing to Esek November 6, 1775,
says: "You will perceive by a letter from the Committee, dated yesterday, that
they have pitched upon you to take the Command of a Small Fleet, which they
and I hope will be but the beginning of one much larger." (Hopkins, 78.) A
resolution of Congress dated January 2, 1778, states that Hopkins "was
appointed commander in chief of the fleet fitted out by the Naval Committee."
(Jour. Cont. Congr., January 2, 1778.) He does not appear to have been
mentioned officially and authoritatively, that is to say by the Naval or Marine
Committee, though he was once by a special committee (Sands, 310.), as the
commander-in-chief of the navy. In addition to his own fleet, several other
Continental vessels cruised in 1776, which do not seem to have been under his
orders (see ch. V) Hopkins was an elderly man at this time, having been born in
1718. He had spent much of his life at sea and was a privateersman in the
French and Indian War (Hopkins, ch. i.)
Of the members of the committee of thirteen chosen December 14, 1775, "for
carrying into execution the resolutions of Congress for fitting out armed vessels,"
ten had served on the committee of twelve which had recommended building the
frigates and five had been members of the original Naval Committee. This new
committee, consisting of one representative from each colony, became the
second executive body for the administration of naval affairs. It was called the
Marine Committee and was at first constituted as follows: Josiah Bartlett of New
Hampshire, John Hancock of Massachusetts, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island,
Silas Deane of Connecticut, Francis Lewis of New York, Stephen Crane of New
Jersey, Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, George Read of Delaware, Samuel
Chase of Maryland, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Joseph Hewes of North
Carolina, Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina, and John Houston of Georgia.
The membership changed from time to time. The Naval Committee continued in
the meantime to occupy itself in fitting out the small fleet of vessels purchased for
the service and placed under the command of Commodore Hopkins, and to
prepare for an expedition which was being planned. January 25,1776, although
the Marine Committee had already taken charge of general naval affairs,
Congress voted to leave the direction of this fleet to the Naval Committee, which
soon afterwards, this duty being accomplished, ceased to exist (Jour. Cont.
Congr., January 25,1776.) The Marine Committee employed agents to supervise
the construction of the frigates in the distant colonies, taking charge itself of
14
those at Philadelphia. Before the end of the year 1775 the organization of a
Continental navy was achieved.
In the course of time the mass of details connected with naval administration
became too much for the Marine Committee easily to handle. Prize agents in the
various seacoast towns were appointed to superintend the trial and
condemnation of the prizes taken by Continental cruisers. Most of the prize
agents were also Continental agents, in which capacity they performed various
other duties of a naval sort. John Bradford at Boston had the most important of
these agencies (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1113, 1114.) For the further relief of the Marine
Committee and at their suggestion, Congress appointed three persons,
November 6, 1776, "to execute the business of the navy, under the direction" of
the committee. This body of three was known as the Navy Board and the men
appointed to serve on it were John Nixon and John Wharton of Pennsylvania and
Francis Hopkinson of New Jersey. The lack of maritime knowledge and
experience among members of Congress was keenly felt at this time. William
Ellery of Rhode Island, who had recently become a member of the Marine
Committee, wrote home to his friend William Vernon, November 7, 1776, "The
Conduct of the Affairs of a Navy as well as those of an Army We are yet to learn.
We are still unacquainted with the systematical Management of them."
(Publications of R.I. Hist. Soc., viii (January, 1901), 201.) April 19, 1777, another
committee of three was authorized, to take charge of naval affairs in New
England; the men selected for this board were William Vernon of Rhode Island,
James Warren of Massachusetts, and John Deshon of Connecticut. The first of
these boards was then called the Navy Board of the Middle Department or
District, the second the Navy Board of the Eastern Department, or they were
called the boards at Philadelphia and at Boston respectively (Jour. Cont. Congr.,
April 23, November 6,1776, April 19,1777.)
The Eastern Navy Board, owing to its distance from the seat of government at
Philadelphia, was allowed more discretion and became a more important body
than that of the middle department. The greater naval activity in New England
waters, due to remoteness from the centre of military operations, put more work
and responsibility on the eastern board. Its original members retained office
several years without change. Their instructions, dated July 10, 1777, imposed
upon them "the Superintendance of all Naval and Marine Affairs of the United
States of America within the four Eastern States under the direction of the Marine
Committee" in "whatever relates to the Building, Manning, and fitting for Sea all
Armed Vessels of the United States built, or ordered by the Congress to build in
the Eastern Department, and to provide all materials and Stores necessary for
that purpose." They were "to keep an exact Register of all the Officers, Sailors,
and Marines in the Continental Navy fitted and Manned within" the eastern
district, and were "empower'd to order Courts Martial." They were also instructed
to keep strict account of expenditures and to do many other things (Publ. R.I.
Hist. Soc., viii, 207-210.)
15
With further experience it became apparent that the Marine Committee was too
large and its members too deficient in special knowledge of naval science to
admit of prompt, capable, and expert handling of the affairs entrusted to them. In
October, 1776, John Paul Jones wrote to Robert Morris (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1106;
Sands, 55) that efficiency in naval administration could only be obtained by the
appointment of a competent board of admiralty. William Ellery wrote to William
Vernon, February 26, 1777: "The Congress are fully sensible of the Importance
of having a respectable Navy and have endeavoured to form and equip One, but
through Ignorance and Neglect they have not been able to accomplish their
Purpose yet. I hope however to see One afloat before long. A proper Board of
Admiralty is very much wanted. The Members of Congress are unacquainted
with this Department. As One of the Marine Committee I sensibly feel my
Ignorance in this Respect." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 204.) For three years,
however, little was done in the way of improving administration except the
appointment of the navy boards and agents. Finally, October 28, 1779, upon the
recommendation of the Marine Committee a Board of Admiralty was established
by Congress. This was a body of five members, two of whom were to be
members of Congress, while the other three, called commissioners, were to be
men possessing a knowledge of naval matters. A quorum of three was necessary
for the transaction of business. The Marine Committee then came to an end, but
the navy boards at Philadelphia and Boston and the navy agents were retained
under this reorganization (Jour. Cont. Congr., June 9, October 28, 1779.)
Positions on the Board of Admiralty were declined by several to whom they were
offered, and it was not only difficult to keep two congressional members
continuously on the board, but it proved to be impossible to find three suitable
persons willing to serve as commissioners. Consequently the membership was
never full and the work of the board was much interrupted by frequent lack of a
quorum. As first organized, in December, 1779, the Board of Admiralty contained
three members: Francis Lewis of New York, commissioner; James Forbes of
Maryland and William Ellery of Rhode Island, congressional members. A few
months later Forbes died and his place was taken by James Madison of Virginia.
The Board of Admiralty was much hampered by half-hearted cooperation on the
part of Congress and by want of money. Its membership dwindled to a point
where nothing could be done in default of a quorum, until finally, in the summer
of 1781, it passed out of existence (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 26, December
3, 7, 8, 1779.)
Meanwhile, February 7, 1781, Congress had passed a resolution putting the
affairs of the navy under a single head, to be called the Secretary of Marine. No
one was found, however, to take the place and the office was never filled. Robert
Morris, who as Superintendent of Finance had close relations with the navy,
gradually assumed direction of naval affairs as the Board of Admiralty became
more and more helpless. August 29 Congress voted to appoint an Agent of
Marine to take charge of naval matters until a secretary could be found, and
September 7 it placed these affairs under the care of the Superintendent of
16
Finance until an agent could be appointed. The navy boards were abolished,
although the board at Boston continued its functions several months longer. The
result of it all was that Morris continued to direct naval affairs, as Agent of
Marine, during the remainder of the war. He had already served on the Marine
Committee and his great ability, business experience, and familiarity with
maritime affairs made him the best executive head that the navy could have had
(Jour. Cont. Congr., February 7, August 29, September 7, 1781.)
By way of summary it is perhaps well to review in a few words the history of the
administration of the Continental navy. The first executive of the service was the
Naval Committee which in 1775 began the work of organizing a navy. Next came
the Marine Committee which directed naval affairs for four years, ending in
December 1779. Then followed the Board of Admiralty which managed the
department a year and a half, when, in the summer of 1781, Robert Morris took
charge and as Agent of Marine remained at the head of the navy until after the
end of the war.
As soon as representatives of the United States had established themselves in
France, naval affairs became an important part of their duties. This began in July,
1776, with Silas Deane, the first American agent. After the arrival of Benjamin
Franklin and Arthur Lee in the following December, to serve with Deane as
commissioners, they shared the duties with him, although he still continued to
exercise special supervision of naval matters until the spring of 1778, when he
was superseded as commissioner by John Adams. After this, Franklin did the
largest share of naval work, and from the time of his assuming the office of
minister to France in February, 1779, he had sole charge of naval affairs abroad
until the end of the war. This naval office in Paris had agents in various ports of
France and in a few of Spain and Holland. It performed many functions, such as
buying, building, manning, and fitting out vessels and providing naval stores,
commissioning officers, directing cruises, disposing of prizes, exchanging
prisoners, and commissioning privateers. Besides this office in France the naval
interests of the United States in the West Indies and in Louisiana were entrusted
to agents. These were William Bingham at Martinique, and Oliver Pollock in New
Orleans (Paullin, ch. ix; Wharton's Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution,
letters of Deans and Franklin; Hale's Franklin in France.)
The sentiment of local independence and the loose federation of the colonies,
united only for mutual protection, naturally led to individual action, and the need
that each state felt of the defense of its own shores, too urgent to wait for the
deliberations of the Continental Congress, brought about the establishment of
separate small navies; so that, in addition to the Continental navy, eleven of the
thirteen states maintained armed vessels, New Jersey and Delaware being the
exceptions. Naval administration in the various states was generally, at the
outset, in charge of the Committee of Safety, and later, of the state executive or
of a board which had under its care naval affairs alone or in combination with
military affairs. The state navies varied much in size and force. Being used
17
chiefly for coast defense, the vessels were usually smaller than those of the
Continental navy, and many of them were merely boats and galleys adapted for
operating in shallow waters. Some of the state ships, however, were ocean
cruisers of considerable size and force (For the state navies, see Paullin, chs. xixvii.)
The first American armed vessels commissioned by any public authority were
two sloops fitted out by Rhode Island, June 15, 1775. The people of this colony
had been annoyed by the British frigate Rose, cruising in Narragansett Bay.
These sloops immediately went to sea under the command of Abraham Whipple,
and on the same day, June 15, chased ashore and destroyed a tender of the
Rose (Boston Gazette, July 3, 1775; Historical Magazine, April, 1868; Am. Arch.,
IV, ii, 1118; Hopkins, 63-67; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 485, June 19, 1775.) One of
the sloops, the Katy, was subsequently taken into the Continental service under
the name Providence. The state of Rhode Island afterwards kept a small force
cruising in the bay.
In the course of the war the Massachusetts navy comprised fifteen seagoing
vessels and one galley.
The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, after some ineffectual attempts in
June, 1775, to provide for armed vessels, made a beginning August 21, by taking
the Machias Liberty and Diligent into the service of the colony (Jour. Third
Provincial Congress of Mass., June 7, 11, 13, 20, 1775.) The actual
establishment of a state navy, however, came in the following winter, when a
committee was appointed December 29, of which John Adams was a member,
"to consider & report a plan for fitting out Armed Vessels for the defence of
American Liberty." (Records of General Court of Mass., December 29, 1775,
January 11, February 7, 8, 17, April 20, 1776; Paullin, ch. xi.) In decisive action
looking towards a naval force Connecticut preceded Massachusetts. Early in
July, 1775, two vessels were provided for and in August they were purchased. A
valuable prize was taken in October. Connecticut fitted out twelve vessels during
the war, four of them galleys (Papers New London Hist. Soc., Part IV, i (1893),
34; Am. Arch., IV, iii, 264-268; Paullin, ch. xii.)
Pennsylvania began July 6, 1775, by providing for the defense of the Delaware
River by means of boats and galleys. The Pennsylvania navy consisted of about
ten vessels and nearly thirty boats and galleys for river and bay defense. The
fleet was under the command of a commodore (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 495, 510, 511,
858, 862, 1811, 1820, 1836, 1839, iv, 515, 521; Penn. Archives, Series II, i;
Wallace's Life of William Bradford; Paullin, ch. xiii.) The Virginia navy, authorized
by the Provincial Convention in December, 1775, comprised first and last seventy
two vessels of all classes including many ships, brigs and schooners; but
apparently most of them were small, poorly manned, and lightly armed, and were
used largely for commerce. The naval duties of the fleet were confined mostly to
Chesapeake Bay (Southern Literary Messenger, January to April, 1857; Virginia
18
Hist. Register, July, April, October, 1848; Va. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., July, 1893;
Am. Arch., IV, iv, 114, 866, v, 227, vi, 1598; Paullin, ch. xiv.) Maryland shared
with Virginia the defense of Chesapeake Bay, and in addition to one vessel of
some size and force, maintained a considerable fleet of galleys, boats, and
barges (Am. Arch., IV, v, 1509,1510.) The chief concern of North Carolina was to
protect and keep open Ocracoke Inlet, connecting Pamlico Sound with the
ocean, through which an important part of the commerce, not only of North
Carolina but of Virginia, was carried on. A small fleet for this purpose was
stationed in the sounds (Ibid., 1357, 1363.) Georgia's navy was small and
unimportant, consisting mostly of galleys. A schooner, however, was
commissioned as early as June, 1775 9Paullin, ch. xvi, for Georgia, Maryland,
and North Carolina.) The defense of Charleston required a considerable force,
and South Carolina was one of the first states to begin the organization of a
navy. She appears to have had about fifteen sea-going vessels, some of them
larger and more heavily armed than any other state or Continental ships. The
force also included several galleys (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 180, iv, 45-54; Paullin, ch.
xv.) As regards the two remaining states, New York's naval enterprise was
confined to organizing a small fleet for local defense. The early occupation by the
British of New York City and the adjacent waters prevented any further
operations (Jour. Prov. Congr. of New York, i, 228, 349; Am. Arch., IV, v, 1401,
1450.) New Hampshire voted in 1776 to build a galley and appointed a
committee to procure an armed vessel. After this her only naval activity, aside
from encouraging privateering and setting up a prize court, consisted in fitting out
a twenty-two-gun ship for temporary service in 1779 (Ibid., 10, 15, 17, 24; Paullin,
ch. xvii.)
Privateers composed the third and a very important class of vessels employed
during the Revolution. The word privateer was used at that time, and later, too,
with the utmost disregard of its true meaning. Persons with an understanding of
maritime affairs constantly spoke of Continental and state cruisers, especially the
smaller ones, as privateers. The term was often wrongly used even in official
correspondence. It is necessary that lines should be sharply drawn between
these different classes of armed vessels. Letters of marque, so called from the
letters or commissions they carried, were armed trading vessels authorized to
make prizes. They also were generally, and more properly, called privateers. The
latter name should, strictly speaking, be reserved for private armed vessels
carrying no cargo and devoted exclusively to warlike use. All kinds of armed
vessels, however, during the Revolution, even Continental frigates, were
employed under special circumstances as cargo carriers.
The General Court of Massachusetts, November 1, 1775, passed "An Act for
Encouraging the Fixing out of Armed Vessells, to defend the Sea Coast of
America, and for Erecting a Court to Try and Condemn all Vessells that shall be
found infesting the same." The preamble of this important measure, written by
Elbridge Gerry, set forth in detail the justification of the colonists in taking up
arms. "Whereas the present administration of Great Britain, being divested of
19
justice and humanity and strangers to that magnanimity and sacred regard for
liberty which inspired their venerable predecessors, have been endeavouring
thro' a series of years to establish a system of despotism over the American
colonies and by their venal and corrupt measures have so extended their
influence over the British parliament that, by a prostituted majority, it is now
become a political engine of slavery; and whereas the military tools of these our
unnatural enemies, while restrained by the united forces of the American
colonies from proceeding in their sanguinary career of devastation and slaughter,
are infesting the sea coast with armed vessells and daily endeavouring to
distress the inhabitants by burning their towns and destroying their dwellings . . .
and making captures of provision and other vessels, being the property of said
inhabitants; and whereas their majesties King William and Queen Mary by the
royal charter of this colony . . . did grant, establish and ordain that, in the
absence of the governor and lieutenant-governor of the colony, a majority of the
council shall have full power . . . for the special defence of their said province or
territory, to assemble in martial array and put in warlike posture the inhabitants of
their said province or territory and to lead and conduct them and with them to
encounter, expulse, resist and pursue by force of arms, as well by sea as by
land, . . . and also to kill, slay, destroy, and conquer by all fitting ways,
enterprizes and means whatsoever all and every such person and persons as
should at any time thereafter attempt or enterprize the destruction, invasion,
detriment or annoyance of their said province or territory . . . ; and whereas it is
expressly resolved by the grand Congress of America, 'That each colony, at their
own expence, make such provision by armed vessells or otherwise . . . as their
respective assemblies . . . shall judge expedient . . . for the protection of their
harbours and navigation on the sea-coasts,' . . . and it is the duty and interest of
this colony to exert itself, as well for the purpose of keeping supplies from the
enemy as for those mentioned in the paragraphs of the charter and resolve now
recited; therefore . . . Be it enacted," etc. This act authorized a majority of the
council to commission masters of private armed vessels. During the following
winter and spring other acts were passed supplementing or superseding that of
November 1. Courts for the trial of prizes were established at Plymouth, Ipswich,
and Falmouth (Portland); and April 13, 1776, it was provided that in addition to
these places courts might also be held in Barnstable or Dartmouth for the
southern district, in Boston, Salem, or Newburyport for the middle district, and in
Pownalborough (Wiscasset) for the eastern district (Acts and Resolves of the
Province of Massachusetts Bay, November 1, 1775, February 14, March 19, April
13, May 8, 1776.) Massachusetts probably sent out not far from one half of all the
American private armed vessels commissioned during the Revolution.
The Continental Congress authorized privateering March 23,1776, and on April 2
and 3 adopted a form of Commission for privateers and resolved to send copies
in blank, signed by the President of Congress, to the various colonies, there to be
issued to privateersmen giving bonds; a set of instructions for commanding
officers was drafted (See Appendix III.) Several of the colonies or states used
these Continental commissions altogether, not establishing state privateering.
20
Pennsylvania sent out flve hundred vessels under Continental commissions and,
it is believed, used no others. Six hundred and twenty-six Massachusetts
privateers sailed under Continental letters of marque, but that state also sent
nearly a thousand others to sea under her own commissions; it is probable,
however, that in many instances the same vessel may have sailed at one time
under one commission and later under the other. New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, Maryland, and South Carolina, and probably some of the other
states, issued their own commissions, but the first four also employed those of
the Congress - Connecticut and Maryland more than two hundred each. Sixtyfour Virginia privateers sailed under Continental commissions. The American
Commissioners in Paris - later the minister to France - and the naval agent of
Congress in the West Indies likewise commissioned privateers. A rough estimate
only of the total number and force of American vessels engaged in privateering
on the patriotic side during the Revolution is possible. The Library of Congress
has printed a list of nearly seventeen hundred letters of marque issued by the
Continental Congress to privateers carrying, approximately, fifteen thousand
guns - probably light ones for the most part - and fifty-nine thousand men. After
deducting duplicates, that is to say, in cases of two or more commissions being
successively issued to the same vessel, and deducting also armed boats and
galleys, there remain more than thirteen hundred sea-going vessels. The
thousand commissions issued by Massachusetts probably represented more
than seven hundred different vessels, after making the same proportionate
allowance for duplicates. Several hundred additional privateers must have been
commissioned by other states and in France and the West Indies. Assuming the
total number of private armed vessels to have been two thousand, and there
were probably a good many more, they doubtless carried very nearly eighteen
thousand guns and seventy thousand men. There seem to have been about the
same number of British privateersmen, according to Governor Hutchinson, who,
speaking of the difficulty of manning the British navy, says: "Some have
proposed pressing the crews of all privateers, in which service it is computed
70,000 men are employed." (Diary, ii, 264 (June 27, 1779.) Judging from the
scanty information at hand concerning British privateering, it is probable that their
vessels engaged in this form of warfare were considerably less numerous but
decidedly superior in force to the Americans; the latter seem to have carried on
the average between eight and nine guns and less than thirty-five men, the
British about seventeen guns and seventy-five or more men (Jour. Cont. Congr.,
March 23, April 2, 3, 1776, May 2,1780; Naval Records of Amer. Rev. (calendar),
217-495; Emmons's Statistical History of the Navy, 127; Mass. Archives, clxiv to
clxxii; Penn. Archives, II, i, 366; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 27;
Sheffield's Rhode Island Privateers; Paullin; Diary and Letters of Thomas
Hutchinson; Williams's History of Liverpool Privateers, App. iv, list of 95 vessels;
London Chronicle, April 1, 29,1779, lists of 100 privateers from Liverpool and 121
from New York; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, February 27, 1779, No. 3, list of 69
New York privateers. See Appendix VII.)
21
Valuable service to the country was rendered by the privateers, and they
contributed in a large degree to the naval defense, and so to the fortunate
outcome of the war. On the other hand, the system was subject to abuses and
was in many ways detrimental to the regular naval service. William Whipple,
writing to Josiah Bartlett from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, July 12, 1778, says:
"I agree with you that the privateers have much distressed the trade of our
Enemies, but had there been no privateers is it not probable there would have
been a much larger number of Public Ships than has been fitted out, which might
have distressed the Enemy nearly as much & furnished these States with
necessaries on much better terms than they have been supplied by Privateers ? .
. . No kind of Business can so effectually introduce Luxury, Extravagance and
every kind of Dissipation, that tend to the destruction of the morals of people.
Those who are actually engaged in it soon lose every Idea of right & wrong, & for
want of an opportunity of gratifying their insatiable avarice with the property of the
Enemies of their Country, will without the least compunction seize that of her
Friends . . . There is at this time 5 Privateers fitting out here, which I suppose will
take 400 men. These must be by far the greater part Countrymen, for the
Seamen are chiefly gone, & most of them in Hallifax Gaol. Besides all this, you
may depend no public ship will ever be manned while there is a privateer fitting
out. The reason is plain: Those people who have the most influence with
Seamen think it their interest to discourage the Public service, because by that
they promote their own interest, viz., Privateering." (Historical Magazine, March,
1862.)
As intimated in the foregoing, privateers at times made trouble by seizing neutral
vessels. In his advocacy of a strong navy in preference to a service under private
control Whipple was in advance of his time. William Vernon, of the Navy Board at
Boston, wrote to John Adams, December 17, 1778, that the Continental ships in
port "may sail in Three Weeks, if it was possible to get Men, wch we shall never
be able to accomplish, unless some method is taken to prevent desertion, and a
stopage of Private Ships Sailing, until our ships are Mann'd. The infamous
practice of seducing our Men to leave the ships and taking them off at an outPort, with many other base methods, will make it impossible ever to get our ships
ready to Sail in force, or perhaps otherwise than single Ships." He wishes that
"an Embargo upon all Private Property, whether Arm'd or Merchant ships, may
take Place thro' all the United States, until the Fleet is compleatly Mann'd.... You
can scarsely form an Idea of the increase and groath of the extravagance of the
People in their demands for Labour and every Article for Sale &c; dissipation has
no bounds at present; when or where it will stop, or if a reform will take place, I
dare not predict." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 256.) The expedient of laying a
temporary embargo upon privateers was occasionally resorted to.
A more favorable opinion of privateering is found in a letter of John Adams to the
President of Congress, dated Amsterdam, September 16, 1780. Speaking of
commerce destroying he says: "This is a short, easy, and infallible method of
humbling the English, preventing the effusion of an ocean of blood, and bringing
22
the war to a conclusion. In this policy I hope our countrymen will join [the French
and Spanish] with the utmost alacrity. Privateering is as well understood by them
as any people whatsoever; and it is by cutting off supplies, not by attacks, sieges,
or assaults, that I expect deliverance from enemies." (Wharton, iv, 58. On the
Profits Of privateering, see Channing, iii, 398.)
No doubt what was then needed, as in every war, was a well-balanced naval
force made up of a sufficient number of fighting ships and commerce destroyers
in the right proportions. Privateering was more popular than the regular naval
service on account of the greater freedom from the restraints of military discipline
and because the profits were larger; for privateersmen were devoted almost
wholly to commerce destroying and were consequently likely to take more prizes
in the long run. In addition to this and besides having higher pay, the entire value
of their prizes went to the owners and captors. When the prizes of Continental
cruisers were ships of war, one half the proceeds went to the captors, and in
other cases only one third. In October, 1776, Congress increased the shares of
the captors to the whole and to one half the value of these two classes of prizes
respectively, in order to put Continental vessels more nearly on terms of equality
with privateers. Bounties and other inducements were resorted to for the purpose
of obtaining recruits. It would probably have been better if not more than half as
many private commissions had been issued, provided that a correspondingly
more powerful regular fleet could have been put upon the sea (Jour. Cont.
Congr., April 17, August 5, October 30, 1776, March 29, 1777, July 11, 1780. For
further discussion of privateering and commerce destroying, see ch. XIX.)
It occasionally happened during the Revolution that vessels built or purchased
and fitted out for the Continental service subsequently found their way into one of
the state navies, or perhaps became privateers ; and the reverse was also true in
one or two instances. It was also the case not infrequently that two or all three of
the different classes of vessels cruised together in squadrons or on expeditions.
Officers likewise, beginning as privateersmen or in state service, were
sometimes transferred to the Continental navy; and, on the other hand,
unemployed Continental officers and seamen, especially towards the end of the
war, sought service in the state navies or in privateers. For these reasons there
was to some extent a sort of blending of the three classes of sea service, both as
regards ships and personnel. The narrative therefore will follow a more natural
course in describing the naval operations of the war to a certain extent in a
chronological or geographical order and not strictly in conformity with the classes
of service concerned.
The disparity between the sea power of America and that of England, great as it
actually was, will be found less marked than mere figures would indicate, when
we inquire into the true condition of the British fleet and of naval administration in
England. Our enemy had many difficulties to contend with which must be set off
against the numbers of ships, guns, and men to be found in statistical tables.
After the Revolution of 1688 the navy was less dependent on the King than it
23
formerly had been and looked more to Parliament for favor, which was an
advantage in some ways, but brought the service more into partisan politics.
During the first three quarters and more of the eighteenth century the British navy
suffered much from corruption and mismanagement in civil administration, and at
times also from incompetent commanders at sea. Before the end of the Seven
Years' War in 1763 a high degree of efficiency had been brought about, but after
that a decided falling off took place and continued many years (Hannay's Short
History of the Royal Navy, ii, 2, 101, 117, 118,133,134,136.)
It is not easy to make an estimate of the real strength of the British navy at the
time of the American Revolution, for figures derived from different sources vary,
and many ships were sent to sea in such poor condition that they were by no
means able to perform the service to be expected from their nominal force. The
number of vessels of all classes in 1775 was stated to be two hundred and
seventy, including one hundred and thirty-one ships of the line, that is, ships
carrying sixty or more guns on two or more decks; in 1783 the number was four
hundred and sixty- eight, including a hundred and seventy-four ships of the line.
During the same time the number of men increased from eighteen thousand to
one hundred and ten thousand. In January, 1778, there were supposed to be two
hundred and seventy-four vessels of all classes ready for immediate service, of
which ninety-two were on the North American station besides thirteen at
Newfoundland and forty-one in the West Indies. At the end of the year the total
effective force was three hundred and seventeen, while the numbers in the
Western Hemisphere were somewhat reduced. These figures seem formidable
when compared with those of the Continental navy, including Washington's little
fleet in Massachusetts Bay, which comprised altogether, during the whole course
of the war, between fifty and sixty vessels in actual service, rating from thirty-twogun frigates down to small schooners and sloops. To these are to be added the
small craft on inland waters, the state navies, including perhaps forty or more
sea-going cruisers, and the privateers, numerous to be sure, and capable of
inflicting serious injury upon commerce, but in no sense a menace even to the
lighter regular cruisers of the enemy. These American figures of course very
greatly exceed the number in service at any one time. Nevertheless the British
were beset with manifold troubles and their ships found plenty of occupation. The
active and fast-sailing rebel privateers required close watching and led their
pursuers many a long chase. Supplies had to be brought from Europe, and for
the convoy of these as well as of troop-ships a considerable part of their force
must be diverted from purely warlike employment. The loss of the seafaring
population of America as a source of supply for the manning of the British navy
was likewise severely felt at a time when naval expansion was necessary. In
1778 the navy of France and later those of Spain and Holland entered the
contest against England and threatened her naval supremacy (Hannay, ii, 210214, 219; Clowes's Royal Navy, iii, 327, 328; Schomberg's Naval Chronology, i,
424, 436, 440, 453, ii, 1, 36, 68, 124; Beatson's Naval and Military Memoirs, iv,
291; Data collected by R. W. Neeser from Parliamentary Reports and other
24
sources. See also Weeser's Introduction to Naval History Society Publications,
iii.)
Yet a foe to the British navy more malign than foreign navies was found in the
Admiralty at home, and that was maladministration. In 1771 the Earl of
Sandwich, who had previously been first lord of the Admiralty for two short terms,
was again appointed to the office and held it until 1782. The administration of the
navy under Sandwich was not only weak, but reached nearly the lowest depths
of corruption. In 1778, "embezzlement, larceny, swindling" and other like abuses
prevailed in the dockyards. Money was voted for repairs and the ships were not
repaired. "Vessels reported as well found and ready for sea lay in the naval
harbours rotting." From 1775 to 1782, seventy-six vessels of the navy, including
fourteen of sixty-four or more guns, "capsized, foundered, or were wrecked." The
nation was charged with four thousand more men than were rated on the books
of the navy. There was collusion between dockyard officials and shipowners; the
former would inspect and condemn vessels and the latter, having bought a ship,
would change her name and appearance and sell her back to the government for
transport service (Belcher's First American Civil War, i, 290-292.) Some of the
admirals participated in the fruits of embezzlement, and the management of
naval affairs at New York under Arbuthnot was corrupt. Maltreatment of seamen,
bad food, scurvy, and other evils were due largely to the dishonesty of pursers.
Insubordination and disaffection resulted, and it was said that from 1774 to 1780
forty-two thousand men deserted from the navy. During the same time eighteen
thousand died of disease. Incompetent medical service was the rule, and the
mortality, especially in tropical seas, was appalling; but an exception to this is to
be found in the fleet of Admiral Rodney, whose surgeon brought about reforms
which saved countless lives (Belcher, 295-297, 304-308; Publications of Navy
Records Soc., xxxii, 80-83; Hannay, ii, 205-210, 214-216; Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc.,
xliv, 364-368 ; Data collected by R. W. Neeser.)
Charles Middleton, the comptroller of the navy, in the course of correspondence
with Sandwich, spoke very plainly of the abuses in naval administration (Navy
Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 2-10, 16-30.) In 1779 he writes, "The desertions from ships
and hospitals are beyond imagination. The discipline of service is entirely lost,
and to a great measure owing to admiralty indulgences, but still more to admiralty
negligence. The want of vigour at that board has weakened its authority to such a
degree over the officers of the fleet, that no respect is paid to its orders . . . For
want of Plan, for want of men of professional knowledge used to business to
assist at the admiralty, and for want of method and execution, one error has
produced another, and the whole has become such a mass of confusion, that I
see no prospect of reducing it to order. All I can do at the navy office will avail but
little if the admiralty continues what it is at present. It is, indeed, so wretchedly
bad, that if I waited for official orders and kept within the mere line of duty without
pressing or proposing what ought to come unasked for, we must inevitably stand
still . . . The whole system of the admiralty is rotten . . . The dockyards, from want
of proper attention to appointments, are in wretched disabled state, without spirit,
25
without discipline." (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 4, 5, 6.) In another letter he says:
"For want of proper men to conduct the business at the ports, no expedition is
used in refitting the ships. The officers are not kept to their duty. The men are
daily deserting in scores, and those who remain are inclined to mutiny." (Ibid., 7.)
Again, February 3, 1781, after relating much of the same sort, he observes: "I
cannot be an acquiescent witness of the present weak state of the yards, and
likely to continue so, according to the current arrangements, at a crisis when the
utmost efforts of every officer in every department of the navy from the highest to
the lowest, are most loudly demanded." (Ibid., 26.) To this Sandwich replies: "I
have neither leisure nor inclination to enter into a discussion upon the subject of
the letter with which you have favoured me." (Ibid., 27.) In 1786, Middleton,
speaking of Sandwich's administration, says that "all his successors,
notwithstanding their great pretensions to a regard for the public service, have
proceeded in the same way; and I find politics have got too great a hold on this
branch of the navy for me to withstand it." (Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 30.)
It may be inferred from all this that the British navy was less formidable than the
imposing array of ships on the printed lists would indicate; and yet service
traditions of the right sort and fitness for the sea gave the English a superiority as
a fighting force over other European navies out of proportion to their numbers.
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER III
WASHINGTON'S FLEET, 1775 AND 1776
General Washington took command of the American army at Cambridge July 3,
1775, and the siege of Boston was closely maintained at every point except on
the water side of the town. Here the British received provisions and military
stores without interruption. It was of great importance to intercept these supplies
as far as possible with a view to distressing the enemy; and furthermore the
scarcity of the munitions of war with the colonists suggested their capture from
the British as the readiest means of obtaining them. In August, Washington had
some correspondence with the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts as to the
advisability of fitting out armed vessels for the purpose, but without immediate
result (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 327.)
Accordingly, there being no Continental naval establishment at that time, he
determined to employ detachments of the army, for which he required no further
authority than the general discretion allowed him for the effective prosecution of
the siege. The regiments recruited in Salem, Marblehead, Beverly, and other
shore towns were composed largely of seafaring men; the regiment of Colonel
John Glover of Marblehead afterwards became noted for ferrying the Continental
army across the East River to New York after the Battle of Long Island and
26
across the Delaware before the Battle of Trenton. Washington drew upon these
regiments of sailors and fishermen for the crews of the vessels fitted out in the
fall of 1775.
The first of these vessels was the schooner Hannah, and Captain Nicholson
Broughton was put in command. His instructions, signed by Washington and
dated September 2, 1775, were as follows: "You, being appointed a Captain in
the Army of the United Colonies of North-America, are hereby directed to take
the command of a detachment of said Army and proceed on board the Schooner
Hannah, at Beverly, lately fitted out and equipped with arms, ammunition and
provisions, at the Continental expense. You are to proceed, as commander of
said Schooner, immediately on a cruise against such vessels as may be found
on the high seas or elsewhere, bound inwards and outwards, to or from Boston,
in the service of the Ministerial Army, and to take and seize all such vessels
laden with soldiers, arms, ammunition or provisions, for or from said Army, or
which you shall have good reason to suspect are in such service." Broughton
was to send his prizes into "the safest and nearest Port to this camp"; papers
disclosing the enemy's designs were to be searched for; prisoners were to be
humanely treated, allowed to retain their private property and sent to
headquarters under a guard furnished by the Continental officer stationed at the
port; the apportionment of prize money was prescribed; armed vessels of the
enemy were to be avoided, the sole object of the enterprise being the
interception of supplies; a system of signals was to be established for
communicating with other vessels to be sent out. The instructions concluded with
the injunction "to be extremely careful and frugal of your ammunition; by no
means to waste any of it in salutes, or any purpose but what is absolutely
necessary'' (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 633.)
Broughton went to sea September 5; two days later he put into Gloucester and
made the following report: "I sailed from Beverly last Tuesday at ten o'clock, with
a fair wind; proceeded on my cruise. On the same day, about five o'clock, saw
two ships of war; they gave me chase. I made back towards Cape Ann, but did
not go in. Next morning I saw a ship under my lee quarter; she giving me chase, I
run into Cape Ann harbour. I went out again that night about sunset and stood to
the southward. Next morning saw a ship under my lee quarter; I perceived her to
be a large ship. I tacked and stood back for the land; soon after I put about and
stood towards her again and found her a ship of no force. I came up with her,
hailed, and asked where she came from; was answered, from Piscataqua, and
bound to Boston. I told him he must bear away and go into Cape Ann; but being
very loth, I told him if he did not I should fire on her. On that she bore away and I
have brought her safe into Cape Ann harbour, and have delivered the ship and
prisoners into the hands and care of the Committee of Safety for this Town of
Gloucester, and have desired them to send the prisoners under proper guard to
your Excellency for further orders." This prize was the ship Unity, loaded with
naval stores and lumber (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 668,683.) It was the first capture
made by a Continental vessel.
27
Early in October Colonel Glover was instructed to procure two other vessels in
Salem or Newburyport and fit them out as soon as possible. The Hannah was
laid aside, and in her place another schooner was hired, "of better fame for
sailing." There was considerable delay in getting these vessels ready for sea
(Ibid., 946, 948, 994.) Meanwhile Washington had received the instructions of
Congress of October 5, to attempt the capture of the two brigs bound to Quebec
(See above, p. 22.) Governor Cooke of Rhode Island was unable to give aid in
this matter, one of the Rhode Island vessels being unfit for service, while the
other, the sloop Katy, Captain Whipple, was on a voyage to Bermuda in quest of
powder. For several weeks General Washington and Governor Cooke had been
corresponding in regard to this enterprise. The scarcity of gunpowder in the
American army caused Washington great anxiety, and at his solicitation the
governor had dispatched the Katy to Bermuda, which at that time seemed to be
the most likely place to get it (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 36, 69, 137, 461, 631, 653, 654,
682, 710, 718, 728, 808, 842, 1037.) The people of Bermuda were friendly to the
popular cause in America and gave trouble to the British by their opposition to
the enforcement of laws forbidding trade with the Revolutionists (Brit. Adm. Rec.,
A. D. 488, No. 55, March 16, 1778.)
For the expedition to the Gulf of St. Lawrence two of the schooners recently
procured were chosen. They were called the Lynch and the Franklin and were
put under the command of Captains Broughton and Selman. Their orders were
issued October 16: "The honourable Continental Congress having received
intelligence that two north country brigantines of no force sailed from England
some time ago for Quebeck, laden with six thousand stands of arms, a large
quantity of powder and other stores, you are hereby directed to make all possible
despatch for the River St. Lawrence and there to take such a station as will best
enable you to intercept the above vessels. You are also to seize and take any
other transports laden with men, ammunition, clothing, or other stores for the use
of the Ministerial Army or Navy in America, and secure them in such places as
may be most safe and convenient." Captain Broughton was to command the
expedition. If they found that the brigs had already passed, they were still to
cruise off the mouth of the river as long as the season would permit and attempt
to seize all vessels in the service of the British army. It was thought that in case
of the capture of Quebec by the Americans, such vessels would be likely to come
down the river. Canadian vessels, however, not in the British service, were not to
be in any way molested. After some further delay the Lynch and Franklin sailed
from Marblehead October 21 (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1068, 1075, 1076, 1083, 1109,
1134.)
Soon after this, Captain Whipple returned from Bermuda, where he had been
well received by the people, but found no powder. The Katy was at once fitted
out for a cruise to the eastward. In the meantime work had been pushed on other
vessels for Washington's fleet under many difficulties, and by the end of October
four, in addition to the Lynch and Franklin, were ready for service. They were the
schooners Lee and Warren at Salem and Marblehead and the brigantine
28
Washington and schooner Harrison at Plymouth. The Lee, commanded by
Captain Manley of Marblehead, and Harrison, Captain Coit of Connecticut, were
at sea October 29; the Warren, Captain Adams of New Hampshire, and the
Washington, Captain Martindale of Rhode Island, got away early in November.
Their services were needed, as the enemy's transports continued to arrive in
Boston. Colonel Joseph Reed, Washington's military secretary, suggested as
colors for the fleet "a flag with a white ground, a tree in the middle, the motto,
'Appeal to Heaven.'" This, the New England pine-tree flag, was used on the
floating batteries about Boston, and six months later was prescribed by the
Provincial Congress for the Massachusetts navy (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1083, 1126,
1134, 1167, 1181, 1182, 1208, 1246,1250,1251,1345; Rec. Gen. Court Mass.,
April 29, 1776.)
The Lynch and Franklin arrived in the Strait of Canso early in November and
cruised in this neighborhood about two weeks, not being able to get further at
that time on account of head winds. They took a few small vessels which were
afterwards released, not being considered lawful prize. November 17 they
appeared before Charlottetown, the capital of the Island of St. John's (Prince
Edward Island). This was the farthest point they reached. Here the conduct of
Broughton and Selman showed a singular want of propriety for which their only
excuse seems to have been the information they had received that preparations
were being carried on there for assisting in the defense of Quebec. They
supposed they "should do essential service by breaking up a nest of recruits
intended to be sent against Montgomery, who commanded our forces in
Quebeck." In the excess of their zeal the Americans seized both public and
private property and brought away as prisoners three prominent citizens,
including the acting governor. Upon arriving at Cambridge, these men were
promptly released and their property restored by General Washington, who
severely reproved Broughton and Selman. Washington was disappointed and
dissatisfied with the results of this enterprise, and believed that if they had gone
farther and cruised in the mouth of the St. Lawrence, "all the vessels coming
down that river must [have fallen] into their hands." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1337, 1379,
1407, 1419, iv, 158, 178, 181, 214, 451; Salem Gazette, July 22, 1856, quoted in
Waite's Origin of the American Navy.)
Meanwhile the other vessels of Washington's little fleet cruised with more or less
success. The Harrison brought two prizes into Plymouth November 6; they were
a schooner and sloop from Nova Scotia bound to Boston with provisions. As the
season advanced and the weather became severe, some of these soldier sailors
grew discontented and troublesome. William Watson, Washington's agent at
Plymouth, on November 23 found the crew of the Harrison "an uneasy set of
fellows who have got soured by the severity of the season," and on the 29th he
wrote to the commander-in-chief "that the people on board the Brigantine
Washington are in general discontented and have agreed to do no duty on board
said vessel, and say that they enlisted to serve in the army and not as marines. I
believe Capt. Martindale has done all in his power to make things easy. His
29
people really appear to me to be a set of the most unprincipled abandoned
fellows I ever saw. I am very apprehensive that little is to be expected from
fellows drawn promiscuously from the army for this business; but that if people
were enlisted for the purpose of privateering, much might be expected from
them." Washington wrote to the President of Congress December 4: "The
plague, trouble and vexation I have had with the crews of all the armed vessels is
inexpressible. I do believe there is not on earth a more disorderly set. Every time
they come into port we hear of nothing but mutinous complaints. Manly's success
has lately, and but lately, quieted his people. The crews of the Washington and
Harrison have actually deserted them, so that I have been under the necessity of
ordering the agent to lay the latter up, and get hands for the other on the best
terms he could." On the same day, however, news of a fortunate cruise of
Captain Manley having reached Plymouth, Watson wrote: "After repairing on
board the brig Saturday night, inquiring into the cause of the uneasiness among
the people and finding it principally owing to their want of clothing, and after
supplying them with what they wanted, the whole crew, to a man, gave three
cheers and declared their readiness to go to sea the next morning. The warm
weather at that time and the news of Captain Manly's good success had a very
happy influence on the minds of the people." (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1378, 1658,
1713, iv, 179, 181.)
John Manley was the most successful of the captains and was regarded by
Washington with especial favor. He was about forty-two years of age and of
English birth, but had lived since early manhood in Marblehead. His vessel, the
Lee, was a seventy-two ton schooner carrying a large square-sail on the fore
topmast; she mounted four four-pounders and ten swivels, and was manned by
fifty soldiers from Glover's regiment. Early in November Manley captured two or
three small vessels. About the middle of the month a British frigate arrived at
Boston with another vessel under convoy. It was learned that a third vessel which
had been with them had not arrived. Manley, who happened to be at Beverly,
received this information from headquarters and immediately went to sea in
search of the belated vessel. On the 29th he sighted a sail which proved to be
the object of his search, the brigantine Nancy, which when overhauled
surrendered without resistance and was taken into Gloucester. The Nancy
carried a large cargo of ordnance and military stores which were of the utmost
value to the American army. Besides other things there were two thousand
muskets, thirty-one tons of musket shot, three thousand round shot, several
barrels of powder, and a thirteen-inch brass mortar, which promised to be most
useful in the siege of Boston. A few days later the mortar was "fixed on its bed
before the Continental Laboratory [in Cambridge]. It is called The Congress, and
is pronounced to be the noblest piece of ordnance ever landed in America." (N.
E. Chronicle, December 7,1775.) Manley continued his cruise, and within a few
days captured a three hundred ton ship called the Concord. A little later he took
two other vessels and still another before the end of the year. On board one of
these prizes were important letters of Lord Dunmore, the royal governor of
Virginia (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1537, 1721, 1722, iv, 168, 179, 180, 181, 214, 227,
30
314; Coll. Essex Institute, January, 1909; Boston Gazette, December 4, 25, 1775
; Mass. Spy, December 15, 1775.)
In regard to the capture of the Nancy, Lord Sandwich, then at the head of the
Admiralty, said: "The loss of the ordnance store ship is a fatal event, and by what
Mr. Pringle tells me, has been most probably owing to the treachery of the
master, who went out under convoy which he parted from on his passage and
tho' a frigate on the coast of America, which he met at sea, took him under her
protection, he parted from her also and continued to be beating backwards and
forwards near the shore till he was picked up by the enemy's whaleboats." (Hist.
Manuscripts Commission, Stopford-Sackville MS., 20.)
From the preceding narrative it appears that the close of the year 1775 found the
Americans beginning in a resolute if somewhat feeble way to curtail in a slight
measure the complete control of the sea held by their enemy. In a letter to
Richard Henry Lee, dated November 27, before Manley's more notable
successes, Washington sums up the situation in New England waters: "In answer
to your inquiries respecting armed vessels, there are none of any tolerable force
belonging to this Government. I know of but two of any kind; those very small."
He doubtless alludes to the Machias Liberty and Diligent and to the provincial
government of Massachusetts. "At the Continental expense I have fitted out six,
two of which are upon the cruise directed by Congress; the rest ply about Capes
Cod and Ann, as yet to very little purpose. These vessels are all manned by
officers and soldiers, but how far, as they are upon the old establishment which
has not more than a month to exist, they can be ordered off this station, I will not
undertake to say; but suppose they might be engaged anew. Belonging to
Providence there are two armed vessels, and I am told Connecticut has one."
(Am. Arch., IV, iii, 1687.) As it was usual to call most armed vessels privateers,
references to them in the newspapers and in correspondence cannot be relied
on, but presumably some of those commissioned by Massachusetts had begun
to cruise by the end of the year. Colonel Joseph Ward, writing to John Adams
from the camp at Roxbury December 3, expresses his belief that naval enterprise
on the part of the separate colonies will bring the best results (Adams MSS.)
On the 1st of January, 1776, Washington appointed Manley commodore of his
fleet and he hoisted his pennant on board the schooner Hancock, which had just
been added to the force. The terms of enlistment of the soldiers who had
manned the vessels having just expired, new crews were recruited from the
seafaring population along shore. All the vessels received new commanders.
Daniel Waters took the Lee, Samuel Tucker the Franklin, Charles Dyar the
Harrison, John Ayres the Lynch, and William Burke the Warren. The
commissions and instructions of the first three of these captains were dated
January 20; of the other two, February 1. The Washington, Captain Martindale,
had been captured by the British frigate Fowey off Cape Ann in December, and
taken into Boston (Coll. Essex Inst., January, 1909; Am. Arch., IV, iv, 257, 791,
31
793, 910; Sheppard's Life of Tucker, 31-35, 49, 50; Boston Gazette, January 1,
1776; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 485, December 15, 1775.)
In January, Manley took two prizes off Nantasket and was convoying them to
Plymouth when he fell in with a British eight-gun schooner and had a brisk
engagement in sight of the enemy's fleet in Nantasket Roads. The schooner
sheered off and ran into Boston Harbor. Washington wrote to Manley, January
28: "I received your agreeable letter of the 26th instant giving an account of your
having taken and carried into Plymouth two of the enemy's transports. Your
conduct in engaging the eight-gun schooner with so few hands as you went out
with, your attention in securing your prizes and your general good behavior since
you first engaged in the service, merit my and your country's thanks." He goes on
to suggest appointing stations for the different vessels, so as to give a better
chance of intercepting the enemy's supplies, saying that the other captains,
having been instructed to take orders from Manley, dared not disobey; "I wish
you could inspire the captains of the other armed schooners under your
command with some of your activity and industry." (Ford's Writings of
Washington, iii, 382, 383.) A few days later Manley had another encounter with
the enemy. As he was coming out of Plymouth January 30, an armed brig (which
went from Boston for the purpose of taking him, as he supposed) gave him
chase, upon which he ran his vessel on shore a little south of the North River in
Scituate. The brig came to anchor and fired not less than four hundred times
upon the privateer; but, very remarkable, no man was even wounded. One ball
entered the stern and passed but about six inches from Captain Manly, who was
confined by sickness in his cabin. The next day one hundred and thirty balls were
found upon the adjacent shore. Besides the above, which is from a
correspondent near where the affair happened, we hear that after the brig
ceased firing she manned her boats, boarded Captain Manly's vessel (the people
being ashore) and endeavoured to set her on fire; but seeing our people coming
upon them, they were glad to get off without effecting their design. She has since
been got off, is refitting and nearly ready for another cruise." (Am. Arch., IV, iv,
910 (letter from Cambridge, February 1, 1776) The Hancock took two prizes in
March, one of which was armed and only surrendered after an engagement. The
Lee and Franklin captured a large brigantine early in February and sent her into
Gloucester (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 863, 883, 910, 936, v, 196, 834; Washington, iii,
382, 403; Tucker, 56; Coll. Essex Inst., January, 1909; Boston Gazette, January
22, 29, February 12, March 11, 18, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, February 1, 8, 1776.)
Meanwhile, during the occupation of Boston by the British, other vessels than
those of Washington's fleet were cruising in Massachusetts Bay and to the
eastward. In December the Rhode Island sloop Katy, Captain Whipple, captured
one of the enemy's ships. The privateer Yankee Hero of Newburyport cruised in
February and March with success. Among the prizes taken was "a large Ship
from and own'd in London, laden with Coal, Cheese and Porter, bound for the
Ministerial Assassins at Boston." February 26, 1776, fifteen prizes were
advertised to be tried at Ipswich, and March 25, twelve others at Plymouth
32
(Boston Gazette, December 11, 1775, January 22, February 19, 26, March 4, 18,
25, 1776; Mass. Spy, January 26, 1776.)
The great event of the month of March was heralded with a joy which found
expression in somewhat extravagant language. On the 18th the evacuation of
Boston was announced in the "Gazette," which was published at Watertown: "On
Friday [March 15] it was reported they were plundering the town, breaking and
destroying everything they could not carry away. And yesterday morning this last
account was verified by the speedy and precipitate retreat of the whole of the
Ministerial butchering, murdering and plundering Banditti of Lord North's
mercenaries." March 22, Colonel Joseph Ward wrote to John Adams: "The 17th
Inst. the Pirates all abandoned their Works in Boston & Charlestown & went on
board their Ships, & on the 20th they burnt & destroyed the Works on Castle
Island. They now lye in Nantasket Road waiting for a fair wind; we keep a vigilant
eye over them lest they should make an attack on some unexpected quarter."
(Boston Gazette, March 18,1776; Adams MSS.)
Soon after the evacuation Washington went to New York with the main army,
leaving General Artemas Ward in command at Boston. The fleet then passed
under Ward's orders. Captain Manley was appointed to command one of the new
frigates authorized by Congress in December, 1775, and gave up the schooner
Hancock to Captain Tucker; and the Franklin was commanded for a short time by
James Mugford of Marblehead. The Hancock on May 7 captured two brigs off
Boston Harbor in sight of two or three British men-of-war at anchor, which had
remained after the evacuation. The prizes were taken into Lynn (Am. Arch., IV,
vi, 396; N. E. Chronicle, May 9, 1776; Boston Gazette, May 13, 1776.)
On May 17 the Franklin captured the ship Hope with a large cargo of military
stores including seventy-five tons of powder. Mugford took his prize into Boston,
running by the British fleet in the harbor. "The enemy on board the men of war
below, intolerably vexed and chagrined that the above ship should be taken and
unloaded in their open view, formed a design of wreaking their vengeance on the
gallant Capt. Mugford, who took her. The Sunday following [May 19] Capt.
Mugford, in company with Capt. Cunningham in the Lady Washington, a small
privateer armed with swivels, blunderbusses and muskets, fell down in order to
go out in the bay. The enemy observed their sailing and fitted out a fleet of boats
for the purpose of surprizing and taking them in the night; and the Franklin's
running aground in the Gut gave them a good opportunity for executing their
plan. The Lady Washington came to anchor near capt. Mugford, and between 9
and 10 o'clock he discovered a number of boats which he hailed and received for
answer, that they were from Boston. He ordered them to keep off, or he would
fire upon them. They begged him for God's sake not to fire, for they were going
on board him. Capt. Mugford instantly fired and was followed by all his men, and
cutting his cable bro't his broadside to bear, when be discharged his cannon
loaded with musket ball directly in upon them. Before the cannon could be
charged a second time, 2 or 3 boats were alongside, each of them supposed to
33
have as many men on board as the Franklin, which were only 21, including
officers. By the best accounts there were not less than 13 boats in all, many of
them armed with swivels and having on board, at the lowest computation, 200
men. Capt. Mugford and his men plied those alongside so closely with fire arms
and spears and with such intrepidity, activity and success, that two boats were
soon sunk and all the men either killed or drowned. But while the heroic Mugford,
with outstretched arms, was righteously dealing death and destruction to our
base and unnatural enemies, he received a fatal ball in his body, which in a few
minutes put a period to a life, from which, had it been spared, his oppressed
country would undoubtedly have reaped very eminent advantages. After our
brave men had maintained this unequal contest for about half an hour, the
enemy thought proper to retire. The carnage among them must have been great,
for besides the two boat loads killed and drowned many were doubtless killed
and wounded on board the others. Great execution was done by the spears. One
man with that weapon is positive of having killed nine of the enemy. The number
of boats which attacked the Franklin was about 8 or 9. The remainder, to the
number of 4 or 5, at the same time attacked Capt. Cunningham in the Lady
Washington, who then had on board only 6 men besides himself. This brave little
company gave the boats such a warm reception that the enemy were soon glad
to give over the contest, after suffering, it is thought, considerable loss." (Boston
Gazette, May 20, 27, 1776; Am- Arch., IV, vi, 495, 496.)
General Ward's report of May 20 differs somewhat from the above as to the
manner of Mugford's death. He says: "Captain Mugford was very fiercely
attacked by twelve or thirteen boats full of men, but he and his men exerted
themselves with remarkable bravery, beat off the enemy, sunk several of their
boats, and killed a number of their men; it is supposed they lost sixty or seventy.
The intrepid Captain Mugford fell a little before the enemy left his schooner; he
was ran through with a lance while he was cutting off the hands of the pirates as
they were attempting to board him, and it is said that with his own hands he cut
off five pairs of theirs. No other man was killed or wounded on board the Franklin
. . . Mr. Mugford was not commissioned Captain of the Franklin, but Master; and
as the other officers had left the schooner, he took command." A week later Ward
gave further details as to the part taken by the Lady Washington: "The Franklin
had twenty-one men, officers included; the Lady Washington had seven, Captain
Cunningham commander. She was attacked by five boats, which were supposed
to contain near or quite a hundred men; but after repeated efforts to board her
they were beaten off by the intrepidity and exertions of the little company, who
gloriously defended the Lady against the brutal ravishers of liberty." (Am. Arch.,
IV, vi, 532, 602.)
In regard to the Franklin's prize, General Howe wrote from Halifax, June 7, to
Lord George Germain: "It is with concern I am to advise your lordship of another
ordnance store ship, named the Hope, being taken in Boston Bay. She had a
large proportion of entrenching tools on board and, it is said, 1500 barrels of
powder. I understand the master was suspected of treachery before the ship left
34
England and that Captain Dickson, commanding the Greyhound, gave
information of the suspicion to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,
sometime before she sailed under his convoy." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 35.)
Many transports sailed from England for America in the spring of 1776. It was
reported by a shipmaster lately arrived from France that a fleet of about forty with
five thousand troops on board had sailed from Plymouth March 10 (Adams MSS.,
April 30,1776.) Another fleet of thirty-three troopships conveying three thousand
Highlanders sailed from Scotland for Boston before news of the evacuation of the
town reached England. Some of them arrived while the British fleet was still in
the harbor and were able to join it. One of them, however, early in June was so
unfortunate as to fall in with the schooners Lee, Captain Waters, and Warren,
Captain Burke, and was captured and taken safely into port. She had about a
hundred soldiers on board (Papers of Cont. Congress, 152, 2, 45; Boston
Gazette, June 10, 1776.)
In a letter to Washington dated June 16, 1776, General Ward gives an account of
the measures taken to make complete the evacuation of Boston. He says: "The
thirteenth Instant at evening I ordered five Hundred men with proper officers, a
detachment of the Train with a thirteen Inch Mortar, two Eighteen pounders and
some small Cannon, under the Command of Colo. Whitcomb, to take post on
Long Island to annoy the Enemys Ships; the necessary works were thrown up in
the night and the next morning our Cannon and Mortar began to play upon the
pirates, which soon drove them all out of the harbour. The Fleet consisted of
thirteen in number, the Renown of fifty Guns, several smaller ships of War and
some transports with Highlanders on board; as near as we could judge there
were about eight hundred Troops on board the Transports. They blew up the
Light house as they went off and then put to sea with their Fleet. I think it
probable they will leave some Frigates to cruize in the bay. A number of the
Colony troops and militia were to have thrown up some works the same night on
Petticks Island and Nantasket head, but by some unfortunate obstructions they
did not get their Canon ready in time; however, they gave the Enemy a number
of Shot as the Ships passed through the Channel. Our shot cut away some of
their yards and rigging and several sent into the ships sides, but the Shells from
the Mortar terryfied them most; they returned a fierce shot from the Commodores
ship without any effect and got under sail with all expedition." (Pap. Cont. Congr.,
152, 2, 99.) An officer of the militia, sent to Nantasket Head, says that, after great
and unavoidable delay, guns were mounted on Quaker Hill. The fleet had already
dropped down and anchored opposite the lighthouse. "The Commodore lay
foremost and after firing the second shot he blew up the Light-House, and at the
fourth round the whole fleet got under way a second time. Some of our shot we
have no doubt struck him, as all the boats in the fleet were sent to tow him off.
He fired but one shot, but we pelted him till out of reach of our cannon." (Am.
Arch., IV, iv, 946.) The British fleet, commanded by Commodore Banks,
consisted of eight ships, two snows, two brigs, and a schooner. The Renown,
with two other men-of-war and twelve transports, arrived at Halifax July 6 (Ibid.,
35
917, 931, 945; Almon, iii, 201, 235, 236; Boston Gazette, June 17,1776;
Continental Journal, June 20,1776; Adams MSS., June 16, 1776.)
It is probable that some of the fleet of Scotch transports bound to Boston were
intercepted by Commodore Banks and taken into Halifax with him; several of
these ships got safely into that place eventually. But June 16, only two days after
the last British vessel had been driven out of Boston Harbor, two of these
transports unsuspiciously approached the port. The officer of militia stationed at
Nantasket gives an account of what passed under his notice, as the vessels
came within view of that point, saying: "On Sunday afternoon we saw a ship and
a brigantine standing in for the Light House channel, chased and fired upon by
four privateers." One of these seems to have been the schooner Warren, Captain
Burke, of Washington's fleet. The combatants "frequently exchanged broadsides.
We, supposing them to be part of the Scotch fleet, got every man to his quarters
and carried one eighteen-pounder to Point Alderton on purpose to hinder their
retreat should they get into the road, opposite where we had three eighteen
pounders. About five o'clock the privateers left them and stood for the southward,
when the ship and brig crowded all their sail for the channel. Our orders were not
to fire till the last [the brig] got abreast of us. In tacking, she got aground just
under our cannon, when we hailed her to strike to this Colony; they refused and
we flred one eighteen-pounder loaded with round and canister shot, when she
struck and cried out for quarters. We ordered the boat and Captain on shore and
then fired at the ship, but being quite dark, we supposed she had struck. By this
time the privateers came up. A Captain of the Highlanders in the brigantine's boat
came on shore. Some time after, the ship got under way and stood for the
Narrows, when a fine privateer brigantine [the Defence of the Connecticut navy],
commanded by Captain Harding of New Haven, . . . and five schooners gave
chase. The brig came alongside, when a hot engagement ensued, which lasted
three quarters of an hour, when the ship struck. The brigantine floating, took
advantage of the confusion and attempted to follow, both supposing the enemy in
possession of Boston." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 946; Continental Journal, June 20,
1776. )
The Defence had sailed from Plymouth in the morning. One of her lieutenants,
Samuel Smedley, says that firing was heard in the direction of Boston. It was
foggy, but cleared in the afternoon and the vessels in action were then seen. On
account of light wind it was sunset before the Defence came up with the
schooners, which were then making off, and learned that the strangers were
transports. "We made the best of our way towards them and at eleven at night
found them at anchor a small distance above where the Light-House formerly
stood. We likewise ran close to them and anchored. Hailed them from whence
they came. They answered from England. Captain Harding ordered them
immediately to strike. They, like brave soldiers, refused and immediately a very
heavy fire began and at the end of near two hours we made them surrender."
(Am. Arch., IV, vi, 1127.) According to this statement the Defence captured the
transports without any help from the schooners, which Smedley accuses of
36
cowardice and thinks should not share in the prizes. General Ward in his report
says "that the Continental Privatiers have taken and brought into Nantasket in
this Harbour a Ship and a Brig from Glasgow with two hundred and ten
Highlanders on board." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 2, 99.) The losses are variously
stated, the lowest for the Americans being three wounded, one of them mortally;
for the British, four killed including a major, and eight or ten wounded. Two days
later another vessel was taken, with one hundred and twelve Highlanders, but
whether by privateers or by Washington's fleet is not clear. There were now over
four hundred soldiers, taken on transports, confined in the vicinity of Boston. It
was reported that at just about the same time two more of these Scotch
transports were taken by a Rhode Island privateer and sent into Dartmouth (New
Bedford), and two others were captured by the Continental brig Andrew Doria
(Continental Journal, June 20, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, June 20, July 4,1776;
Boston Gazette, June 24, July 15, 1776; Letters of John and Abigail Adams, 95,
96; Tucker, 57-60; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 36; See ch. 6.)
The capture of their transports was disturbing to the British authorities, and the
Admiralty called upon Admiral Howe, who in 1776 relieved Admiral Shuldham in
command of the North American station, for an investigation, to which he replied
in February, 1777. In this report was inclosed a letter written by Shuldham in
February, 1776, in which, referring to the earlier captures made by Washington's
fleet, he had suggested "that all Supplies to this Country might be sent in Armed
Vessels, I mean such as our Old Forty Gun Ships with only their upper Tier of
Guns, for however numerous our Cruizers may be or however attentive our
Officers to their Duty, it has been found impossible to prevent some of our
Ordnance and other valuable Stores, in small Vessels, falling into the hands of
the Rebels, and here I must take occasion to say that in the course of my Service
I never found Officers perform their Duty with so much perseverance and
Vigilance as ours on this important Service; indeed the firmness with which they
have resisted the rigor of this long and severe Winter in constantly keeping the
Sea on their respective Stations is unprecedented and incredible. At the same
time I must beg leave to observe to you the very few Ships I am provided with to
enable me to co-operate with the Army, Cruize off the Ports of the Rebels to
prevent their receiving Supplies, or protect those destined to this place from
falling into their hands." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, February 26, 1776.) Howe's
inquiries brought out the fact that Shuldham in March, 1776, had detailed seven
small cruisers to remain with Commodore Banks in Boston Harbor, in order to
insure the safety of such transports as might arrive after the departure for Halifax
of the main body of the British. Other service, however, prevented these vessels
from being on hand when needed. The frigate Milford and two or three smaller
vessels, with the Renown, made up the whole available force for the protection of
the transports. Howe added that "respecting the Use that has been made of the
Harbour of Boston as an Asylum for the Rebel Cruizers and their Prizes, their
Lordships knowing the Nature and Circumstances of the Port will be apprised of
the Impossibility to prevent an Enemy from profiting greatly by the Advantages of
such a Situation." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, No. 24, February 20, 1777.)
37
The vessels of Washington's fleet continued to cruise in Massachusetts Bay
during the whole of the year 1776. Captain Tucker in the Hancock and Captain
Skimmer, who had taken Mugford's place in the Franklin, captured the armed
ship Peggy and two brigs in July. Tucker is said to have taken thirty or forty
prizes in all, of which the last was brought into port in December and furnished
the army with much-needed clothing. The operations of the fleet and of other
American armed vessels were a good deal hampered by British cruisers in
Massachusetts Bay. John Adams learned from a correspondent that "Our Bay is
infested with 3 or 4 frigates which have retaken some valuable Prizes and
interrupt our coasting trade." (Adams MS., September 17,1776.) It was recorded
in a newspaper that "Monday and Tuesday last the British Tyrant Frigate Milford
was seen in our Bay, and to have two Schooners and a Sloop as Prizes. She has
taken the Continental Privateer Warren, Capt. Burk, and is continually cruizing
between Cape-Cod and Cape-Ann, that we apprehend she will intercept all our
Trade. 'Tis hoped that some of our American Frigates win come this Way and rid
our Coast of this inhuman Plunderer." (Continental Journal, September 5, 1776;
Am. Arch., V, ii, 116.) The Warren is believed to have been the only one of
Washington's fleet to be captured, except the brigantine Washington taken in
December, 1775. Early in the year 1777 the fleet was broken up by order of the
Marine Committee; the Lee, however, continued to cruise several months longer.
The vessels were disposed of as they were put out of commission, and some of
the officers were taken into the Continental navy (Ibid,, i, 662, iii, 685, 799;
Tucker, 61-65; Boston Gazette, July 8, August 5, September 9, 1776; Marine
Committee Letter Book, 59, 62, 114 (February 7, March 21, November 22, 1777)
Upon his arrival in New York in April, 1776, General Washington began to fit out
another but much smaller fleet for the defense of the neighboring waters. He was
aided by the cooperation of the New York Committee of Safety. Two sloops, the
General Schuyler and the General Mifflin, were fitted out. Other vessels, wholly
or partly under Washington's control or under the New York Committee, were the
schooner General Putnam, the sloop Montgomery and the galleys Lady
Washington, Washington, and Spitfire. The galleys were used in the defense of
the Hudson and the two last named came from Rhode Island. The larger vessels
cruised, mostly about Long Island and along the New Jersey shore, with some
success. In June one of the transports which had been captured by the Andrew
Doria, as has just been related, was retaken by the British frigate Cerberus and
was then taken again by the General Schuyler, under the command of Lieutenant
Joseph Davison. In the same month the Schuyler, cruising in company with the
Montgomery, recaptured four prizes of the British frigate Greyhound (Am. Arch.,
IV, vi, 410, 545, 563, 564, V, i, 141; N. E. Chronicle, July 4,1775; Washington, iv,
167, 318; Jour. N.Y. Prov. Congr., i, 416; R.I. Colonial Rec., vii, 582; Pap. Cont.
Congr., 152, 2, 131 (Davison to Washington, June 27, 1776)
On August 3, Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Tupper reported to General
Washington the operations of a flotilla of five galleys on the Hudson: "I am now to
inform your Excellency that my flag being hoisted on board of the Washington, I
38
came up with the Ships [Phoenix and Rose] & attacked at 1/4 past One this
Afternoon. The Phoenix fired the first Gun, which was return'd by the Lady
Washington, whose Shot went thro the Phoenix. Upon my Orders the Lady
Washington put about to form a Line; the tide was such that the Washington &
Spitfire was exposed to the Broad Sides of the Ships for 1/2 of an hour without
Suffering mutch Damage. We engaged them an hour & a half and then we
thought to retreat to Dobb's Ferry about 4 miles below the Ships." (Pap. Cont.
Congr., 152, 2, 337 (Tupper to Washington, August 3, 1776); Am. Arch., V, i,
766.) The Americans lost one killed and thirteen wounded, one of them mortally.
Another account says that the Washington "came within grape shot of the ships
and sustained their whole fire for a quarter of an hour before the other ships
could come up, the Lady Washington falling into the line according to orders. The
Spitfire advanced to the assistance of the Washington and behaved well. We had
as hot a fire as perhaps ever was known for an hour and a half. The Washington,
on board of which I was, had her bow guns knocked away, many of her oars, and
some shot in her waist. The Lady Washington had her bow gun, a 32 pounder,
split seven inches. The Spitfire was hulled between wind and water. The Phoenix
was hulled six times. We had four men killed and fourteen wounded. Our force
was very inferior to the enemy; the lower tier of one side of the Phoenix was
equal to that of all gallies. Yet our Commodore resolved to attack them, and for
six small gallies to lie near two hours within grape shot of one ship of 44 guns
and another of 24 guns is no contemptible affair." (Almon, iv, 49 (letter from
Tarrytown, August 4, 1776) ; Am. Arch., V, i, 751.)
The British account says that at one o'clock six of the Rebels' schooners and
Row Gallies attacked us. We began and kept up a constant fire at them for Two
Hours, at which time they Row'd away down the River and came to an anchor in
sight of us." One of the galleys was seen to have sustained considerable
damage. The Phoenix, which had received only two shot in her hull, prepared to
run down to the American flotilla, but the wind shifted and the pilot advised
against it on account of the narrowness of the channel (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D.
487, August 4,1776. See Mag. of History, November, 1905.) Two weeks later the
Phoenix and Rose, at anchor in the river, were attacked by fireships (Brit. Adm.
Rec., A. D. 487, August 17, 1776. See ch. 5.) Movements in the immediate
vicinity of New York were brought to an end after the occupation of that place by
the British in August, 1776.
39
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER IV
THE NEW PROVIDENCE EXPEDITION, 1776
The Naval Committee was busy during the winter of 1775 and 1776 fitting out the
four vessels which had been purchased in November - the Alfred, Columbus,
Andrew Doria, and Cabot. Commodore Hopkins arrived in Philadelphia early in
the winter on board the sloop Katy, Captain Whipple, which brought seamen from
Rhode Island to man the fleet (Hopkins,81; R.I. Hist. Mag., July, 1885, journal of
Lieutenant Trevett.) The Katy was taken into the navy and called the Providence.
Three other vessels were added to the fleet - a sloop named the Hornet and two
schooners, the Wasp and Fly. The Hornet and Wasp were at Baltimore.
On January 5, 1776, the Naval Committee issued "Orders and Directions for the
Commander in Chief of the Fleet of the United Colonies." These general
instructions related to discipline and to matters concerning the management of
the fleet. The commodore was to correspond regularly with Congress "and with
the commander in chief of the Continental forces in America." He was to give his
orders to subordinate officers in writing, and the captains of the fleet were to
make him monthly returns of conditions on board each vessel, the state of the
ship and of the crew and the quantity of stores and provisions. He was to give
directions for the captains to follow in case of separation; to appoint officers for
any vessels that might be captured; to give special attention to the care of the
men under his command and to the arms and ammunition; and prisoners were to
"be well and humanely treated." (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 578; Hopkins, 84.)
The committee also gave the commodore special instructions and sailing orders
of the same date. He was "to proceed with the said fleet to sea and, if the winds
and weather will possibly admit of it, to proceed directly for Chesapeak Bay in
Virginia, and when nearly arrived there you will send forward a small swift sailing
vessel to gain intelligence of the enemies situation and strength. If by such
intelligence you find that they are not greatly superior to your own, you are
immediately to enter the said bay, search out and attack, take or destroy all the
naval force of our enemies that you may find there. If you should be so fortunate
as to execute this business successfully in Virginia, you are then to proceed
immediately to the southward and make yourself master of such forces as the
enemy may have both in North and South Carolina, in such manner as you may
think most prudent from the intelligence you shall receive, either by dividing your
fleet or keeping it together. Having compleated your business in the Carolinas,
you are without delay to proceed northward directly to Rhode Island and attack,
take and destroy all the enemies naval force that you may find there." He was
also ordered to seize transports and supply vessels, advised as to the disposal of
40
prisoners, and directed to fit out his prizes for service when suitable and appoint
officers for them, calling on the assemblies and committees of safety of the
various colonies for aid, if necessary, in all matters. Notwithstanding these
particular orders which it is hoped you will be able to execute, if bad winds or
stormy weather or any other unforseen accident or disaster disable you so to do,
you are then to follow such courses as your best judgment shall suggest to you
as most useful to the American cause and to distress the enemy by all means in
your power." (Hopkins, 94-97.)
In the fall of 1775, Governor Dunmore of Virginia organized a flotilla of small
vessels in the Chesapeake with which he ravaged the shores of the bay and of
the rivers flowing into it (See infra, and ch. 5.) It was for the purpose of
attempting the destruction of this fleet that Hopkins was ordered to begin his
cruise by entering Chesapeake Bay.
The Alfred was selected as the flagship of the fleet, and when she was ready to
be put into commission the commodore went on board and the Continental colors
were hoisted by Lieutenant John Paul Jones, for the first time on any regular
naval vessel of the United States, and were properly saluted. This was a yellow
flag bearing "a lively representation of a rattlesnake," with the motto "Don't tread
on me." The exact date of this ceremony is uncertain (Hopkins, 98; Am. Arch., IV,
iv, 360.)
The ice in the river delayed the sailing of the expedition, which it was hoped
would get away by the middle of January. Meanwhile on the 4th the following
notice was published: "The Naval Committee give possitive orders that every
Officer in the Sea and Marine Service, and all the Common Men belonging to
each, who have enlisted into the Service of the United Colonies on board the
ships now fiting out, that they immediately repair on board their respective ships
as they would avoid being deemed deserters, and all those who have undertaken
to be security for any of them are hereby called upon to procure and deliver up
the men they have engaged for, or they will be immediately called upon in a
proper and effectual way."(Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, March 8, 1776, No. 5, from
a copy sent to the British admiral.) On the same day the four largest vessels cast
off from the wharf at Philadelphia, but were unable to make way through the ice
until January 17, and then only as far as Reedy Island on the Delaware side of
the river. Here they remained until February 11, when, having been joined by the
Providence and Fly, they proceeded down to Cape Henlopen. The Hornet and
Wasp, having come around from Baltimore, arrived in Delaware Bay on the 13th;
these two are believed to have been the first vessels of the Continental navy to
get to sea. The fleet sailed from the Delaware February 17, 1776 (Hopkins, 91,
100; Am. Arch., IV, v, 823; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, March 8, 1776, No. 10;
Ibid., July 8, 1776, inclosing " A Journal of a Cruse In the Brig Andrew Doria,"
taken in a recaptured prize.)
41
The force was made up as follows: the ships Alfred, 24, flagship, Commodore
Hopkins and Captain Saltonstall, and Columbus, 20, Captain Whipple; the brigs
Andrew Doria, 14, Captain Biddle, and Cabot, 14, Captain John B. Hopkins, son
of the commodore; the sloops Providence, 12, Captain Hazard, and Hornet, 10,
Captain Stone; and the schooners Fly, 8, Captain Hacker, and Wasp, 8, Captain
Alexander. Each of the first two was manned by a crew of two hundred and
twenty, including sixty marines; the Alfred carried twenty and the Columbus
eighteen nine-pounders on the lower deck, with ten sixes on the upper deck. The
Andrew Doria and the Cabot were armed with six-pounders, the former having
sixteen, the latter fourteen, and each carried twelve swivels; the Doria had a crew
of a hundred and thirty and the Cabot a hundred and twenty, with thirty marines
in each case. The Providence, though sometimes called a brig, was rigged as a
sloop, and mounted twelve six-pounders and ten swivels; her crew consisted of
ninety men including twenty-eight marines (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, March 8,
1777, No. 4, being information collected by agents of the British admiral, a
source not always perfectly reliable.)
It is evident that several days before sailing Hopkins had determined to disregard
his instructions and, taking advantage of the discretion allowed him in case of
unforeseen difficulties, to abandon the projected cruise along the southern coast.
In his first orders to his captains, dated February 14, three days before his
departure, he says: "In Case you should be separated in a Gale of Wind or
otherwise, you then are to use all possible Means to join the Fleet as soon as
possible. But if you cannot in four days after you leave the Fleet, You are to
make the best of your way to the Southern part of Abaco, one of the Bahama
Islands, and there wait for the Fleet fourteen days. But if the Fleet does not join
you in that time, You are to Cruise in such place as you think will most Annoy the
Enemy and you are to send into port for Tryal all British Vessels or Property, or
other Vessels with any Supplies for the Ministerial Forces, who you may make
Yourself Master of, to such place as you may think best within the United
Colonies." (MS. Orders to Captain Hacker.) At the same time the Commodore
furnished the Captains with a very complete set of signals. In appointing a
rendezvous at Abaco, Hopkins had in mind a descent upon the island of New
Providence in the Bahama group, for the purpose of seizing a quantity of powder
known to be stored there. Scarcity of powder was a cause of the greatest anxiety
to Washington, especially during the first year of the war. Congress in secret
session had considered the feasibility of obtaining powder from New Providence
(Am. Arch., IV, iv, 1179, 1180; Hopkins, 101; Jour. Cont. Congr., November 29,
1775.)
In his report of the expedition, addressed to the President of Congress and dated
April 9, 1776, Hopkins says: "When I put to Sea the 17th Febry. from Cape
Henlopen, we had many Sick and four of the Vessels had a large number on
board with the Small Pox. The Hornet & Wasp join'd me two days before. The
Wind came at N. E. which made it unsafe to lye there. The Wind after we got out
came on to blow hard. I did not think we were in a Condition to keep on a Cold
42
Coast and appointed our Rendezvous at Abaco, one of the Bahama Islands. The
second night we lost the Hornet and Fly." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 11, 33; Ain.
Arch., IV, v, 823.) From this it would seem to have been the commodore's
purpose to give the impression that the state of the weather after be got to sea
had caused him to change his plans; whereas be had fully made up his mind in
advance. The fleet arrived at Abaco March 1. Hopkins says: "I then formed an
Expedition against New Providence which I put in Execution the 3rd March by
Landing 200 Marines under the Command of Captn. Nicholas and 50 Sailors
under the Command of Lieutt. Weaver of the Cabot, who was well acquainted
there." Two sloops from New Providence had been seized, to be used for
transporting the landing party. They embarked Saturday evening March 2. The
next morning the fleet got under way and at 10 o'clock came to at some distance
from the island. It had been intended to take the place by surprise, but the fleet
had been seen and the forts fired alarm guns. "We then ran in," says Lieutenant
Jones of the Alfred, "and anchored at a small key three leagues to windward of
the town, and from thence the Commodore despatched the marines, with the
sloop Providence and schooner Wasp to cover their landing. They landed without
opposition." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 11, 33; Journal of the Andrew Doria;
Sherburne's life of John Paul Jones, 12. For an account of the expedition, see
Hopkins, ch. iv.)
Samuel Nicholas, captain of marines on the Alfred, in a letter dated April 10, says
that on March 3, at two o'clock he "landed all our men, 270 in number under my
command, at the east end of the Island at a place called New-Guinea. The
inhabitants were very much alarmed at our appearance and supposed us to be
Spaniards, but were soon undeceived after our landing. Just as I had formed the
men I received a message from the Governor desiring to know what our
intentions were. I sent him for answer, to take possession of all the warlike stores
on the Island belonging to the crown, but had no design of touching the property
or hurting the persons of any of the inhabitants, unless in our defence. As soon
as the messenger was gone I marched forward to take possession of Fort
Montague, a fortification built of stone, about half way between our landing place
and the town. As we approached the fort (within about a mile, having a deep
cove to go round, with a prodigious thicket on one side and the water on the
other, entirely open to their view) they fired three twelve pound shot, which made
us halt and consult what was best to be done. We then thought it more prudent to
send a flag to let them know what our designs were in coming there; we soon
received an answer letting us know that it was by the Governor's orders that they
had fired. They spiked up the cannon and abandoned the fort and retired to the
fort within the town. I then marched and took possession of it." (Mass. Spy, May
10, 1776; Am. Arch., IV, v, 846.) In the fort were found seventeen cannon, thirtytwo-pounders, eighteens and twelves, from which the spikes were easily
removed. Nicholas and his men spent the night in the fort. In the evening
Hopkins, hearing that there was a force of over two hundred men in the main fort
at Nassau, published a manifesto addressed to the inhabitants of the island
declaring his intention "to take possession of the powder and warlike stores
43
belonging to the Crown and if I am not opposed in putting my design in
execution, the persons and property of the inhabitants shall be safe, neither shall
they be suffered to be hurt in case they make no resistance." (Am. Arch., IV, v,
46.) This had a good effect and no opposition was met with.
"The next morning by daylight," says Nicholas, we marched forward to the town,
to take possession of the Governor's house, which stands on an eminence with
two four pounders, which commands the garrison and town. On our march I met
an express from the Governor to the same purport as the first; I sent him the
same answer as before. The messenger then told me I might march into the town
and if I thought proper into the fort, without interruption; on which I marched into
the town. I then drafted a guard and went up to the Governor's and demanded
the keys of the fort, which were given to me immediately; and then took
possession of fort Nassau. In it there were about forty cannon mounted and well
loaded for our reception, with round, langridge and cannister shot; all this was
accomplished without firing a single shot from our side." (Mass. Spy, May 10,
1776.) The fleet, which had been lying behind Hog Island, soon afterwards came
into the harbor; the commodore and captains then landed and came up to the
fort. In Fort Nassau were found great quantities of military stores, including
seventy-one cannon - ranging in size from nine-pounders to thirty-twos, fifteen
brass mortars, and twenty-four casks of powder. The governor had contrived to
send off a hundred and fifty casks of powder the night before, thereby defeating
in great measure the main object sought in taking the island. The value of the
property brought away, however, largely made up for this disappointment. After
this the governor was kept under guard in his own house until the fleet was ready
to sail. About two weeks were occupied in loading the captured stores on board
the fleet, and it was necessary to impress a large sloop in order to carry
everything. This vessel, called the Endeavor, was put under the command of
Lieutenant Hinman of the Cabot. During this time the Fly rejoined the fleet and
"gave an Account that he got foul of the Hornet and carried away the Boom and
head of her Mast and I hear since she has got into some port of South Carolina."
It afterwards turned out that the Hornet was driven off the coast of South Carolina
by bad weather and finally succeeded in getting back into Delaware Bay about
April 1. Hopkins took on board the fleet as prisoners the governor and lieutenantgovernor of New Providence and another high official (Mass. Spy, May 10, 1776;
Am Arch., IV, v, 407, 823, 824; R.I. Hist. May., July, 1885; Life of Joshua Barney,
31-33.)
The fleet set sail on the return voyage March 17. The next day Hopkins issued
orders to his captains: "You are to keep company with the ship I am in if possible,
but should you separate by accident you are then to make the best of your way
to Block Island Channel and there to cruise in 30 fathom water south from Block
Island six days, in order to join the fleet. If they do not join you in that time, you
may cruise in such places as you think will most annoy the Enemy or go in Port,
as you think fit." (Am. Arch., IV, v, 47.) The Wasp parted from the fleet soon after
sailing. For over two weeks the voyage to Rhode Island was uneventful. April 4
44
the British six-gun schooner Hawk was captured by the Columbus. The Hawk
belonged to the British fleet at Newport. Captain Nicholas says: "We made Block
Island in the afternoon [of the 4th] ; the Commodore then gave orders to the brigs
to stand in for Rhode-Island, to see if any more of the fleet were out and join us
next morning, which was accordingly done, but without seeing any vessels." At
daylight the brig Bolton was taken by the Alfred after firing a few shots; she was a
bomb-vessel of eight guns and two howitzers. The fleet cruised all day in sight of
Block Island, and in the evening took a brigantine and sloop from New York. 1,
We had at sunset 12 sail, a very pleasant evening." (Mass. Spy, May 10, 1776.)
Of the events of the night Hopkins gives a brief account in his report. Very early
in the morning of April 6 the fleet "fell in with the Glascow and her Tender and
Engaged her near three hours. We lost 6 Men Killed and as many Wounded; the
Cabot had 4 Men killed and 7 Wounded, the Captain is among the latter; the
Columbus had one Man who lost his Arm. We received a considerable damage
in our Ship, but the greatest was in having our Wheel Ropes & Blocks shott
away, which gave the Glascow time to make Sail, which I did not think proper to
follow as it would have brought an Action with the whole of their Fleet and as I
had upwards of 30 of our best Seamen on board the Prizes, and some that were
on board had got too much Liquor out of the Prizes to be fit for Duty. Thought it
most prudent to give over Chace and Secure our Prizes & got nothing but the
Glascow's Tender and arrived here [New London] the 7th with all the Fleet. . . .
The Officers all behaved well on board the Alfred, but too much praise cannot be
given to the Officers of the Cabot, who gave and sustained the whole Fire for
some considerable time within Pistol Shott." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 11, 33.)
Nicholas gives a more minute recital of the affair: ,At 12 o'clock went to bed and
at half past one was awaked by the noise of all hands to quarters; we were soon
ready for action. The best part of my company with my first Lieut. was placed in
the barge on the main deck, the remaining part with my second Lieutenant and
myself on the quarter deck. We had discovered a large ship standing directly for
us. The Cabot was foremost of the fleet, our ship close after, not more than 100
yards behind, but to windward with all, when the brigantine came close up. The
ship hailed and was soon answered by the Cabot, who soon found her to be the
Glasgow; the brigantine immediately fired her broadside and instantly received a
return of two fold, which, owing to the weight of metal, damaged her so much in
her hull and rigging as obliged her to retire for a while to refit. We then came up,
not having it in our power to fire a shot before without hurting the brigantine, and
engaged her side by side for three glasses as hot as possibly could be on both
sides. The first broadside she fired, my second Lieutenant fell dead close by my
side; he was shot by a musket ball through the head." (Mass. Spy, May 10,
1776.)
John Paul Jones's narrative of the action in the Alfred's log-book gives a few
additional details: "At 2 A.M. cleared ship for action. At half past two the Cabot,
being between us and the enemy, began to engage and soon after we did the
45
same. At the third glass the enemy bore away and by crowding sail at length got
a considerable way ahead, made signals for the rest of the English fleet at Rhode
Island to come to her assistance, and steered directly for the harbor. The
Commodore then thought it imprudent to risk our prizes, &c. by pursuing farther;
therefore, to prevent our being decoyed into their hands, at half past six made
the signal to leave off chase and haul by the wind to join our prizes. The Cabot
was disabled at the second broadside, the captain being dangerously wounded,
the master and several men killed. The enemy's whole fire was then directed at
us and an unlucky shot having carried away our wheel-block and ropes, the ship
broached to and gave the enemy an opportunity of raking us with several
broadsides before we were again in condition to steer the ship and return the fire.
In the action we received several shot under water, which made the ship very
leaky; we had besides the mainmast shot through and the upper works and
rigging very considerably damaged." (Sherburne, 14.)
Captain Whipple of the Columbus reported to the commodore that when the
Glasgow was sighted he was to leeward and "hauled up for her," but the position
of the other ships "Instantly kill'd all the wind, which put it out of my Power to get
up with her. I strove all in my Power, but in vain; before that I had got close
enough for a Close Engagement, the Glasgow had made all Sail for the Harbour
of Newport. I continued Chace under all Sail that I had, except Steering Sails and
the Wind being before the Beam, she firing her two Stern Chaces into me as fast
as possible and my keeping up a Fire with my Bow Guns and now and then a
Broadside, put it out of my Power to get near enough to have a close
Engagement. I continued this Chace while you thought proper to hoist a Signal to
return into the Fleet; I accordingly Obeyed the Signal." (Hopkins, 130, 131; Am.
Arch., IV, v, 1156.)
Apparently the Andrew Doria was less closely engaged than the others. One of
her officers, Lieutenant Josiah, says that the Cabot having fired the first
broadside at the Glasgow, "she return'd two fold, which oblig'd ye Cabot to sheer
off and had like to have been foul of us, which oblig'd us to tack to gett clear; the
Commodore came up next and Discharg'd several Broadside and received as
many, which did Considerable Damage in his hull & Riggen, which oblig'd him to
sheer off. The Glascow then made all the sail she possible could for Newport &
made a running fight for 7 Glases. We receiv'd several shott in ye hull & riggen,
one upon the Quarter through the Netting and stove ye arm Chest upon the
Quarter Deck and wounded our Drummer in ye Legg." (Journal of the Andrew
Doria.)
The Glasgow was a ship of twenty guns and a hundred and fifty men,
commanded by Captain Tyringham Howe, whose report of the engagement says:
"On Saturday the 6th of April, 1776, At two A.M. Block Island then bearing N. W.
about eight Leagues, we discovered a Fleet on the weather beam, consisting of
seven or eight Sail; tacked and stood towards them and soon perceived them to
be two or three large Ships and other Square Rigged Vessels. Turned all hands
46
to Quarters, hauled up the Mainsail and kept standing on to the N. W. with a light
breeze and smooth Water, the Fleet then coming down before it. At half past two
a large Brig, much like the Bolton but larger, came within hail and seemed to
hesitate about giving any answer, but still kept standing towards us and on being
asked what other Ships were in company with her, they answered 'the Columbus
and Alfred, a two and twenty Gun frigate.' And almost immediately a hand
Grenadoe was thrown out of her top. We exchanged our- Broadsides. She then
shot a head and lay on our bow, to make room for a large Ship with a top-light to
come on our Broadside and another Ship ran under our Stern, Raked as she
passed and then luft up on our Lee beam, whilst a Brig took her Station on our
Larboard Quarter and a Sloop kept altering her Station occasionally. At this time
the Clerk having the care of the dispatches for the So. Ward to destroy, if the
ship should be boarded or in danger of being taken, hove the bag overboard with
a shot in it. At four the Station of every Vessel was altered, as the two ships had
dropt on each quarter and a Brig kept a stern giving a continual fire. Bore away
and made Sail for Rhode Island, with the whole fleet within Musket shot on our
Quarters and Stern. Got two Stern chase guns out of the Cabin and kept giving
and receiving a very warm fire. At daylight perceived the Rebel fleet to consist of
two Ships, two Brigs and a Sloop, and a large Ship and Snow that kept to
Windward as soon as the Action began. At half past six the Fleet hauled their
Wind and at Seven tacked and stood to the S. S. W. Employed reeving, knotting
and splicing and the Carpenters making fishes for the Masts. At half past seven
made a Signal and fired several guns occasionally to alarm the fleet at Rhode
Island Harbour. The Rose, Swan and Nautilus then being working out. We had
one Man Killed and three Wounded by the musketry from the Enemy." (Brit. Adm.
Rec., A. D. 484, April 19,1776; London Chronicle, June 11, 1776; briefer
accounts in Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Letters, No. 1902, 22 (April 27, 1776), and
Captains' Logs, No. 398 (April 6, 1776)
An American prisoner on board the Glasgow says that the sloop Providence,
joining in the attack, directed her fire at the Glasgows' "stern without any great
effect. The most of her shot went about six feet above the deck; whereas, if they
had been properly levelled, they must soon have cleared it of men. The Glasgow
got at a distance, when she fired smartly, and the engagement lasted about six
glasses, when they both seemed willing to quit. The Glasgow was considerably
damaged in her hull, had ten shot through her mainmast, fifty-two through her
mizen staysail, one hundred and ten through mainsail, and eighty-eight through
her foresail; had her spars carried away and her rigging cut to pieces."
(Constitutional Gazette, New York, May 29, 1776, quoted in Sands, 45, 46.)
The Glasgow was seriously crippled and her escape from a superior force shows
a lack of cooperation on the part of the Continental fleet, and perhaps excessive
prudence in not carrying the pursuit farther towards Newport. It was an instance
of the want of naval training and esprit de corps to be expected in a new, raw
service. Moreover, the American vessels, except the Alfred, were inferior sailing
47
craft to begin with, and besides this were too deeply laden with the military stores
brought from New Providence to be easily and quickly handled.
Hopkins took his fleet and prizes into New London April 8. Here over two
hundred sick men were landed; also the military stores. The next day the Andrew
Doria was sent out on a short cruise and recaptured a prize from the British.
Some of the heavy guns from New Providence were sent to Dartmouth, on
Buzzard's Bay; and upon the departure of the British from Narragansett Bay soon
afterwards, the Cabot, Captain Hinman, was sent to Newport with several of the
guns. The prisoners brought from New Providence were paroled. The
commodore's report of April 9 was read in Congress and published in the
newspapers. It caused great satisfaction, and Hopkins received a letter of
congratulation from John Hancock, the President of Congress. His popularity at
this time, both in the fleet and among the people, seems to have been genuine.
The Marine Committee suggested the purchase of the prize schooner Hawk for
the service, to be renamed the Hopkins. John Paul Jones, who as a lieutenant on
the Alfred had had an opportunity to estimate the commodore's qualifications,
wrote of him, April 14: "I have the pleasure of assuring you that the commanderin-chief is respected through the fleet and I verily believe that the officers and
men in general would go any length to execute his orders." (Sherburne, 13.)
There was a reaction, however, later on. Upon reflection people came to the
opinion that the escape of the Glasgow was unnecessary and discreditable.
Captain Whipple was accused of cowardice and demanded a court-martial, by
which he was honorably acquitted. Captain Hazard of the Providence was less
fortunate; he also was court-martialed and was relieved of his command. (Am.
Arch., IV, v, 824, 867, 956, 966, 1005, 1111, 1156, 1168, vi, 409, 552, 553;
Hopkins, 125-135 ; Journal of the Andrew Doria.)
The British fleet, consisting of the frigate Rose, the Glasgow, the Nautilus, Swan,
and several tenders, had found Newport Harbor an uncomfortable anchorage.
April 5 they went to sea, but all except the Glasgow and her tender returned in
the evening and anchored off Coddington Point, north of Newport. At daylight the
next morning, while the Glasgow was engaged with the American fleet, the
Continental troops mounted two eighteen-pounders on the point, opened fire,
and drove them from their anchorage. When the Glasgow came in after her
battle, she and some of the smaller vessels anchored off Brenton's Point; the
others went to sea. On the morning of the 7th the Glasgow and the vessels with
her were fired upon by guns which had been mounted on Brenton's Point during
the night, and driven up the bay. Later they too went to sea and the whole fleet
sailed for Halifax. April 11 another British man-of-war, the Phoenix, brought two
prizes into Newport, but she was driven out again and the prizes recaptured
(Boston Gazette, April 15, 22, 1776; Constitutional Gazette (New York), April 17,
May 29, 1776, quoted in Sands, 46-48.) After the Glasgow had arrived at Halifax,
Admiral Shuldham, in command of the station, wrote to the Admiralty that he
found her "in so shattered a Condition and would require so much time and more
Stores than there is in this Yard to put her into proper repair, I intend sending her
48
to Plymouth as soon as she can be got ready." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, April
19, 1776.)
Commodore Hopkins received one hundred and seventy men from the army to
take the place of those he had lost through sickness. He then sailed, April 19, for
Newport, but "the Alfred got ashore near Fisher's Island and was obliged to be
lightened to get her off, which we did without much damage." They went back to
New London and sailed again April 24; they went up to Providence the next day.
There Hopkins landed over a hundred more sick men. Just at this time he
received an order from Washington to send back to the army the men who had
been loaned to him, as they were needed in New York. It was practically
impossible to get recruits in Providence, because the attractions of privateering
were so superior to those of the regular naval service. Delay in getting their pay
for the first cruise also caused discontent and tended to make the service
unpopular. The commodore had received information from the Marine Committee
of two small British fleets in southern waters. A force organized by Governor
Dunmore in Virginia consisted of the frigate Liverpool, 28, two sloops of war, and
many small. vessels. "It is said & believed that both the Liverpool & Otter are
exceedingly weak from the Want of Hands, their Men being chiefly employed on
Board a Number of small Tenders fitted out by Lord Dunmore to distress the
Trade on the Coast of Virginia & Bay of Chesepeak. His Lordship has now
between 100 & 150 Sail of Vessels great & small, the most of which are Prizes &
many of them valuable. Those, so far from being any Addition in point of Strength
will rather weaken the Men of War, whose Hands are employed in the small
Vessels." The British had another naval force at Wilmington, North Carolina.
"Whether you have formed any Expedition or not, the Execution of which will
interfere with an Attempt upon either or both of the above Fleets we cannot
determine; but if that should not be the Case, there is no Service from the
present Appearance of things in which You could better promote the Interest of
your Country than by the Destruction of the Enemie's Fleet in North Carolina or
Virginia; for as the Seat of War will most probably be transferred in the ensuing
Campaign to the Southern Colonies, such a Maneuvre attended with Success
will disconcert or at least retard their Military Operations for a Length of Time,
give Spirits to our Friends & afford them an Opportunity of improving their
Preparations for resistance." (MS. Letter of Marine Committee, April, 1776.)
Apparently because the Marine Committee became convinced that this plan was
impracticable in view of the weak condition of the fleet, it was given up and, May
10, Hopkins was ordered. to send a squadron against the Newfoundland fishery.
He himself had already been preparing for a four months' cruise, but all such
schemes now had to be abandoned for lack of seamen to man his fleet. Three
vessels, however, were fitted out and sent away. The command of the
Providence was given to Jones, May 10, and he was ordered to New York with
the men who were to be returned to the army. The Andrew Doria and Cabot were
sent off on a cruise May 19. The Fly was kept for a while on the lookout for
British men-of-war off the entrance of Narragansett Bay. The Alfred and
Columbus remained at Providence waiting for fresh crews. (Am; Arch., IV, v,
49
1001, 1005, 1079, 1140,1168, vi, 409, 410, 418, 430, 431, 551; Hopkins, 135140; Journal of the Andrew Doria.)
Dissatisfaction with the conduct of Commodore Hopkins and some of his officers
gradually increased in and out of Congress. Complaints of ill treatment on board
the fleet, as well as instances of insubordination and desertion, came to the ears
of the Marine Committee. All this of course still further increased the difficulty of
manning the ships, with consequent delay apparently endless and the increasing
probability of nothing important being accomplished. A committee of seven was
appointed by Congress to investigate, and June 14 the commodore and Captains
Saltonstall and Whipple were ordered to Philadelphia to appear before the
Marine Committee and be interrogated in regard to their conduct. Saltonstall and
Whipple were examined in July and were exonerated by Congress. The inquiry
into Hopkins's case came in August and he was questioned on three points: his
alleged disobedience of orders in not visiting the southern coast during the cruise
of his fleet; his poor management in permitting the escape of the Glasgow; and
his inactivity since arriving in port. His defense was that, as he did not sail until
six weeks after his orders were issued, conditions had changed, especially in
regard to the force of the British, which had increased in Virginia and the
Carolinas; but there is no mention of this in his report of April 9. He had written to
his brother before the inquiry: "I intended to go from New Providence to Georgia,
had I not received intelligence three or four days before I sailed that a frigate of
twenty-eight guns had arrived there, which made the force in my opinion too
strong for us. At Virginia they were likewise too strong. In Delaware and New
York it would not do to attempt. Rhode Island I was sensible was stronger than
we, but the force there was nearer equal than anywhere else, which was the
reason of my attempts there." (Hopkins, 154.) Hopkins was doubtless justified in
using the discretion allowed him in his orders to depart from those orders in case
of apparent necessity or expediency, and being on the spot he was presumably
the best judge of the course to be pursued; but in order to establish his naval
reputation it was incumbent upon him to convince others of the necessity or
expediency. As to the second point, relating to the Glasgow, Hopkins seems to
show a disposition to shift the blame upon his subordinates; no doubt some of his
officers were not to be depended upon for prompt and efficient action. On the
third point, the excessive amount of sickness in the fleet and the practical
impossibility of obtaining recruits in sufficient numbers should have extenuated
his shortcomings. There appears to have been a strong prejudice against
Hopkins in Congress and it fared hard with him, although he was zealously and
ably defended by John Adams. August 15, Congress resolved "that the said
Commodore Hopkins, during his cruize to the southward, did not pay due regard
to the tenor of his instructions, whereby he was expressly directed to annoy the
enemy's ships upon the coasts of the southern states; and that his reasons for
not going from [New] Providence immediately to the Carolinas are by no means
satisfactory." The next day it was further resolved "that the said conduct of
Commodore Hopkins deserves the censure of this house and the house does
accordingly censure him." Three days later he was ordered back to Rhode Island
50
to resume command of his fleet (Am. Arch., IV, v, 1698, vi, 764, 885,
886,1678,1705, V, i, 994; Jour. Cont. Congr., August 15, 16, 1776; Hopkins, ch.
v.)
Of the result of this inquiry John Adams wrote: "Although this resolution of
censure was not in my opinion demanded by justice and consequently was
inconsistent with good policy, as it tended to discourage an officer and diminish
his authority by tarnishing his reputation, yet as it went not so far as to cashier
him, which had been the object intended by the spirit that dictated the
prosecution, I had the satisfaction to think that I had not labored wholly in vain in
his defense." (Hopkins, 160.) When John Paul Jones heard of the outcome he
wrote a friendly and sympathetic letter to his commander, saying: "Your late
trouble will tend to your future advantage by pointing out your friends and
enemies. You will thereby be enabled to retain the one part while you guard
against the other. You will be thrice welcome to your native land and to your
nearest concerns." (Ibid., 162.)
The fleet of Commodore Hopkins performed no further service collectively, but
the fortunes of the various vessels composing it, during the remainder of the year
1776, may be conveniently followed here. The sloop Providence, having taken to
New York the soldiers who had been borrowed from the army, returned to
Providence, and in June was occupied for a while convoying vessels back and
forth between Narragansett Bay and Long Island Sound. "In performing these
last services Captain Jones found great difficulty from the enemy's frigates then
cruising round Block Island, with which he had several rencontres in one of which
he saved a brigantine that was a stranger from Hispaniola, closely pursued by
the Cerberus and laden with public military stores. That brigantine was
afterwards purchased by the Continent and called the Hampden." (Sands, 38
(Jones's journal prepared at request of the king of France.) Jones was then
ordered to Boston, where he collected a convoy which he conducted safely to
Delaware Bay, arriving August 1. At this time the British fleet and army were on
their way from Halifax to New York. Jones saw several of their ships, but was
able to avoid them (Sands, 37, 38; Am. Arch., IV, vi, 418, 511, 820, 844, 972,
980.)
The Andrew Doria and Cabot sailed on a short cruise to the eastward May 19.
Soon after getting to sea they were chased by the Cerberus and became
separated. May 29, in latitude 41° 19' north, longitude 57° 12' west, the Andrew
Doria captured two Scotch transports of the fleet bound to Boston. "At 4 A.M.
saw two Ships to ye North'd, Made Sail and Hauld our Wind to ye North'd. At 6
Do. Brought the Northermost too, a Ship from Glascow . . . with 100 Highland
Troops on Board & officers; made her hoist her Boat out & the Capt. came on
board. Detained the Boat till we Brought the other too, from Glascow with ye
same number of troops. [Lieutenant James Josiah, the writer of the journal] went
on board and sent ye Capt. and four Men on board ye Brig [Andrew Doria],
receiv'd orders for sending all the troops on board the other ship and went Prize
51
master with Eleven Hands. Sent all the Arms on board ye Brig from both Ships,
two Hundred & odd." (Journal of the Andrew Doria.) These transports were the
Crawford and Oxford. All the soldiers, two hundred and seventeen in number,
with several women and children, were put on the Oxford. The Andrew Doria
cruised with her prizes nearly two weeks and then, being to windward of
Nantucket Shoals, they were chased by five British vessels. Captain Biddle
signaled the transports to steer different courses and lost sight of them. The
Crawford, in command of Lieutenant Josiah as prizemaster, was retaken by the
Cerberus, but was captured again by the General Schuyler of Washington's New
York fleet (See ch. 3.) Josiah while a prisoner was treated with such severity as
to occasion threats of retaliation, but he was eventually exchanged. On board the
Oxford, containing the soldiers, the prize crew was overcome by the prisoners,
who got possession of the ship and carried her into Hampton Roads. Their
triumph was brief, however, for she was soon recaptured by Captain Barron of
the Virginia navy. The next year the Oxford again fell into the hands of the British.
The Andrew Doria put into Newport June 14 and soon went out again. She
cruised most of the time during the rest of the year, taking several prizes. In
October she changed her captain. The Columbus also went to sea in June and
on the 18th had a brush with the Cerberus, losing one man. At this time there
were three British frigates around Block Island. The Columbus took four or five
prizes before the end of the year and the Cabot made a few captures. (Am.
Arch., IV, vi, 430, 431, 539, 551, 902, 931, 972, 979, 998, 999, V, i, 659, 832,
1094, 1095, ii, 115, 132, 378, 1226, iii, 667, 848; Boston Gazette, June 24, July
29, September 16, 30, October 7, 28, 1776; N. E. (Independent) Chronicle, July
4, October 10, 1776; Military and Naval Mag. of U. S., June, 1834; So. Lit.
Messenger, February, 1857; R. I. Hist. Mag., October, 1885; Brit. Adm. Rec., A.
D. 484, July 8,1776, inclosing Journal of the Andrew Doria; Williams, 202.)
Captain Jones in the Providence sailed from Delaware Bay August 21. In the
latitude of Bermuda he fell in with the British frigate Solebay, 28. "She sailed fast
and pursued us by the wind, till after four hours chase, the sea running very
cross, she got within musket shot of our lee quarter. As they had continued firing
at us from the first without showing colours, I now ordered ours to be hoisted and
began to fire at them. Upon this they also hoisted American colors and fired guns
to leeward. But the bait would not take, for having everything prepared, I bore
away before the wind and set all our light sail at once, so that before her sails
could be trimmed and steering sails set, I was almost out of reach of grape and
soon after out of reach of cannon shot . . . Had he foreseen this motion and been
prepared to counteract it, he might have fired several broadsides of doubleheaded and grape shot, which would have done us very material damage. But he
was a bad marksman, and though within pistol shot, did not touch the Providence
with one of the many shots he fired." (Sands, 49 (letter of September 4, 1776.)
After cruising about two weeks longer, being short of water and wood, Jones
decided to run into some port of Nova Scotia or Cape Breton. "I had besides," he
says, "a prospect of destroying the English shipping in these parts. The 16th and
17th [of September] I had a very heavy gale from the N. W. which obliged me to
52
dismount all my guns and stick everything I could into the bold. The 19th I made
the Isle of Sable and on the 20th, being between it and the main, I met with an
English frigate [the Milford.], with a merchant ship under her convoy. I had hove
to, to give my people an opportunity of taking fish, when the frigate came in sight
directly to windward, and was so good natured as to save me the trouble of
chasing him, by bearing down the instant he discovered us. When he came
within cannon shot, I made sail to try his speed. Quartering and finding that I had
the advantage, I shortened sail to give him a wild goose chase and tempt him to
throw away powder and shot. Accordingly a curious mock engagement was
maintained between us for eight hours," until nightfall. "He excited my contempt
so much by his continued firing at more than twice the proper distance, that when
he rounded to, to give his broadside, I ordered my marine officer to return the
salute with only a single musket. We saw him next morning, standing to the
westward." Jones then went into Canso and got a supply of wood and water; also
several recruits. About a dozen fishing vessels were seized there and at the
Island of Madame, three of which were released and as many more destroyed.
"The evening of the 25th brought with it a violent gale of wind with rain, which
obliged me to anchor in the entrance of Narrow Shock, where I rode it out with
both anchors and whole cables ahead. Two of our prizes, the ship Alexander and
[schooner] Sea Flower, had come out before the gale began. The ship anchored
under a point and rode it out; but the schooner, after anchoring, drove and ran
ashore. She was a valuable prize, but as I could not get her off, I next day
ordered her to be set on fire. The schooner Ebenezer, taken at Canso, was
driven on a reef of sunken rocks and there totally lost, the people having with
difficulty saved themselves on a raft. Towards noon on the 26th the gale began
to abate." (Sands, 50, 51, 52 (September 30, 1776).) To remain longer in these
waters, with so many prizes to protect, seemed an unwarrantable risk, and Jones
therefore turned homeward. September 30 he was off Sable Island and just a
week later in Newport Harbor. On this cruise he had ruined the fishery at Canso
and Madame and had taken sixteen prizes; half of them were sent into port and
the others destroyed or lost. (Am. Arch., V, i, 784, ii, 171-174, 624, 1105, 1226,
1303, 1304; Sands, 39, 48-54; Independent Chronicle, October 17, 1776; Boston
Gazette, October 28, 1776.)
Jones proposed an expedition with three vessels to the west coast of Africa,
where he was sure it would be possible to reap a rich harvest of prizes.
Commodore Hopkins, however, determined to send a small squadron to Cape
Breton in order to inflict further injury upon the fishery, and to attempt the capture
of the coal fleet and the release of American prisoners working in the mines. The
Alfred, with Jones in command of the expedition, and the Hampden, Captain
Hacker, sailed towards the end of October. Jones wished to take the Providence
also, but could not enlist a crew for her. At the outset, however, the Hampden ran
on a ledge and was so injured that she was left behind, her crew being
transferred to the Providence. The expedition, with the Alfred and Providence,
made a fresh start November 1. On that day Jones issued instructions for
Captain Hacker, saying: "The wind being now fair, we will proceed according to
53
Orders for Spanish River near Cape North on the Island of Cape Briton"; and
prescribing signals for foggy weather (MS. Letter.) On his way through Vineyard
Sound, Jones boarded a Rhode Island privateer, acting under the orders of
Commodore Hopkins, and impressed some deserters from the navy. Thence he
proceeded directly for his cruising grounds and soon after his arrival, took three
prizes off Louisburg. These were a brig and snow, which were sent back to
American ports, and a large armed ship called the Mellish, with so rich a cargo of
soldiers' clothing that Jones kept her under convoy. He wrote to the Marine
Committee, November 12: "This prize is, I believe, the most valuable that has
been taken by the American arms. She made some defence, but it was trifling.
The loss will distress the enemy more than can be easily imagined, as the
clothing on board of her is the Last intended to be sent out for Canada this
season and all that has preceded it is already taken. The situation of Burgoyne's
army must soon become insupportable. I shall not lose sight of a prize of such
importance, but will sink her rather than suffer her to fall again into their hands."
(Sands, 56.) Jones afterwards recommended that the Mellish be armed and
taken into the service.
A few days after this, during a stormy night, the Providence parted company and
returned to Rhode Island; there had been discontent on this vessel among both
officers and men, who represented that she leaked badly and was unsafe. Jones
says that "previous to this step there had been an Unaccountable murmering in
the Sloop for which I could see no Just foundation and in Vain had I represented
to them how much humanity was concerned in our endeavours to relieve our
Captive, ill treated Brethern from the Coal Mines. Since my arrival here I
understand that as soon as Night came on they Put before the Wind. Being thus
deserted the Epedemical discontent became General on Board the Alfred; the
season was indeed Severe and everyone was for returning immediately to port,
but I was determined at all hazards, while my provision lasted, to persevere in my
first plan. When the Gale abated I found myself in sight of the N. E. Reef of the
Isle of Sable & the wind continuing Northerly obliged me to beat up the South
side of the Island. After exercising much Patience I weathered the N. W. Reef of
the Island and on the 22d [of November], being off Canso, I sent my Boats in to
Burn a Fine Transport with Irish Provision Bound for Canada., she having run
aground within the Harbour; they were also ordered to Burn the Oil warehouse
with the Contents and all the Materials for the Fishery, which having effected I
carried off a small, fast sailing schooner which I purposed to Employ as a Tender
instead of the Providence. On the 24th off Louisburg, it being thick weather, in
the Afternoon I found myself surrounded by three Ships. Everyone Assured me
that they were English Men of War and indeed I was of that opinion myself, for I
had been informed by a Gentleman who came off from Canso that three Frigates
on that Station had been Cruising for [me] ever since my expedition there in the
Providence. Resolving to sell my liberty as dear as possible, I stood for and . . .
Took the nearest; I took also the other two, tho' they were at a Considerable
distance assunder. These three Ships were . . . Transports Bound from the Coal
Mines of Cape Briton for N. York Under Convoy of the Flora Frigate; they had
54
Seen her a few hours before, and had the weather been clear she would then
have been in sight. They left no Transports behind them at Spanish River, but
they said the Roe Buck man of War was stationed there and that if there had
been any Prisoners of ours there they had entered [the British service]. I made
the best of my way to the Southward to prevent falling in with the Flora the next
day, and on the 26th I fell in with and took a Ship of Ten Guns from Liverpool for
Hallifax." She was a letter of marque called the John. "I had now on Board an
Hundred and Forty Prisoners, so that my Provision was consumed very Fast; I
had the Mellish, the three Ships from the Coal Mines and the last taken Ship
under Convoy; the best of my Sailors were sent on Board [these] Five Ships and
the number left were barely sufficient to Guard the Prisoners. So that all
circumstances considered, I concluded it most for the interest and Honor of the
Service to Form the Prizes into a Squadron and proceed with them into Port. I
was unfortunate in meeting with high Winds and Frequent Gales from the
Westward. I however kept the Squadron together till the 7th of December on St
Georges Bank, when a large Ship [the frigate Milford] Gave us chace. As she
came so neare before Night that we could distinguish her as a Ship of War, I
ordered the Mellish . . . and the rest of the Fastest Sailers to Crowd Sail and go a
Head. I kept the Liverpool Ship with me, as She was of some Force and her
Cargo by invoice not worth more than £1100 Sterling. In the Night I tacked and
afterwards carried a Top light in order to lead the Enemy away from the Ships
that had been ordered ahead. In the Morning they were out of Sight and I found
the Enemy two points on my lee Quarter at the same distance as the night
before. As the Alfred's Provisions and Water were by this time almost entirely
consumed, so that She sailed very ill by the Wind, and as the Ship I had by me,
the John, made much less lee way, I ordered her to Fall a Stern to Windward of
the Enemy and make the Signal Agreed on, if She was of Superiour or inferiour
Force; that in the one Case we might each make the best of our way, or in the
other come to Action. After a considerable time the Signal was made that the
Enemy was of Superiour Force, but in the intrim the wind had encreased with
Severe Squalls to a Hard Gale, so that in the Evening I drove the Alfred thro' the
Water Seven and Eight Knots under two Courses, a point from the Wind.
Towards Night the Enemy Wore on the other Tack, but before that time the Sea
had risen so very high that it was impossible to Hoist a Boat, so that had he been
near the John it would have been impossible for him to have Taken her, unless
they had wilfully given her up and continued voluntarily by the Enemy through the
whole of the very dark and Stormy night that ensued." Yet the John, however
unnecessarily, surrendered to the Milford. Admiral Howe in reporting this affair
says that the Alfred was chased "without effect, by means of the thick weather
that critically happened and secured her Escape." According to the log of the
Milford a boat was lowered from the frigate and took possession of the John (Brit.
Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, March 31, 1777, and Masters' Logs, No. 1865 (log of
Milford.) The report of Captain Jones goes on to say that in the evening of
December 14, being then in Massachusetts Bay and fearing to be driven out, "I
resolved to run into Plymouth, but in working up the Harbour the Ship missed
Stays in a Violent Snow Squall on the South side, which obliged me to Anchor
55
immediately in little more than three Fathom. She grounded at low water and
Beat considerably, but we got her off in the morning and Arrived the 15th in the
Nantasket Road with a tight ship and no perceptible damage whatever. I had
then only two days provision left and the Number of my Prisoners brought in
equalled the Number of my whole Crew when I left Rhode Island." (Pap. Cont.
Congr., 58, 107 (Jones to Marine Committee, January 12, 1777.) The John was
apparently the only prize lost. The Mellish ran through Nantucket Shoals and got
safely into Dartmouth. It was fortunate for Jones and for his valuable prize that
fate did not lead them to Rhode Island, for a powerful British fleet had taken
possession of Newport December 7 (Am. Arch., V, i, 1106, ii, 454, 1194, 1195,
1226, 1277, 1303, iii, 490, 491, 659, 668, 738, 789, 1162, 1281, 1282, 1283,
1284, 1356; Sands, 40-42, 54-57; Independent Chronicle, November 28,
December 26, 1776; Boston Gazette, December 2, 23, 30, 1776; R.I. Hist. Mag.,
October, 1885. For experience of Lieutenant Trevett, as a spy in Newport soon
after this, see Ibid., January, 1886.)
After Jones had sailed on this cruise in November, Hopkins received orders from
the Marine Committee, dated October 10, 23, and 30, to proceed southward with
the Alfred, Columbus, Cabot, Providence, and Hampden, or as many of them as
were available; one or both of the new frigates under construction in Rhode
Island might be joined to the squadron if they could be got ready for sea. He was
to cruise in the neighborhood of Cape Fear, North Carolina, where he would find
three British men-of-war with a large number of prizes and other vessels under
their protection; and later perhaps still farther south. On the way to the Carolinas
he was to look for two other British cruisers, the Galatea, 20, and Nautilus, 16,
said to be off the Virginia capes. All these vessels, it was thought, might be
captured or destroyed. "As this Service to the Southward is of much publick
importance, we expect from Your Zeal and Attachment to the Interest of the
United States that you proceed on and execute this Service with all possible
Vigor and despatch." (MS. Letter to Hopkins, October 23, 1776; Mar. Com. Letter
Book, 38.)
Two of the vessels it was proposed to send were with Jones and others could not
be manned without great delay; so the enterprise fell through. Some of the small
vessels of Hopkins's original fleet, however, were in more southern waters and
performed what little service they could. In the spring of 1776 the Wasp and
Hornet were in Delaware Bay and the former took part in an action with two
British frigates (See ch, 5.) The Fly was sent to New York in June and after that,
cruised along the New Jersey shore. The Wasp was ordered to Bermuda and the
West Indies in August; she sent a valuable prize into Philadelphia and later
joined the Fly. They were instructed by the Marine Committee, November 1 and
11, to keep a lookout for vessels going into and out of New York, now occupied
by the British. Hopkins and Jones had also been ordered to intercept, when
possible, storeships from Europe bound to New York. "We immagine there must
be Transports, Store Ships and provision vessels daily arriving or expected to
arrive at that place for supplying our enemies with provisions and other Stores,
56
and the design of your present Cruize is to intercept as many of those Vessels
and supplies as you possibly can." The Fly and Wasp, if chased, were to run into
some river or inlet on the New Jersey coast. Prizes were to be sent to
Philadelphia, or into Egg Harbor, or any other safe place, as seemed most
expedient. "You must be careful not to let any british frigate get between you and
the land and then there's no danger, for they cannot pursue you in shore and
they have no boats or Tenders that can take you; besides, the country people will
assist in driving them off shore, if they should attempt to follow you in . . . Altho'
we recommend your taking good care of your Vessel and people, yet we should
deem it more praiseworthy in an officer to loose his vessel in a bold enterprise
than to loose a good Prize by too timid a Conduct." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 42
(to Captain Warner of the Fly, November 1, 1776.) November 11 the committee
wrote: "We have received intelligence that our enemies at New York are about to
embarque 15,000 Men on board their Transports, but where they are bound
remains to be found out. The Station assigned you makes it probable that we
may best discover their destination by your means, for it will be impossible this
fleet of Transports can get out of Sandy hook without your seeing them.
When you discover this fleet, watch their motions and the moment they get out to
Sea and shape their course, send your boat on Shore with a Letter to be
dispatched by express informing us what course they steer, how many sail they
consist of, if you can ascertain their numbers, and how many Ships of war attend
them . . . If this fleet steer to the Southward either the Fly or Wasp, whichever
sails fastest, must precede the fleet, keeping in shore and ahead of them . . . The
dullest sailer of the Fly or Wasp must follow after this fleet and watch their
motions . . . In short we think you may by a spirited execution of these Orders
prevent them from coming by Surprize on any part of this Continent, and be
assured you cannot recommend yourself more effectually to our friendship. If you
could find an opportunity of attacking and taking one of the fleet on their coming
out, it might be the means of giving us ample intelligence." (Mar. Com. Letter
Book, 43 (to Warner.) This was the fleet which soon afterwards occupied
Newport; it sailed from New York December 1, the transports passing through
Long Island Sound, the larger men-of-war outside. About the end of November
the Fly returned to Philadelphia and on December 21 was sent down the
Delaware to watch some British vessels cruising off the capes. The Wasp
continued on the New Jersey shore for a while and then watched these vessels
from the outside. The Hornet cruised during the summer and in December was
ordered to the West Indies; but she did not go, being in Christiana Creek and
unable to get out through a British fleet in Delaware Bay (Am. Arch., V, i, 137,
1118, 1181, ii, 970, 1199, 1200, 1292, iii, 461, 507, 637, 904, 1148, 1175, 1176,
1213, 1331, 1332, 1458, 1484; Pennsylvania Gazette, October 16, 1776; Mar.
Com. Letter Book. 17, 30, 38, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48 (August 23, October 10, 23, 30,
November 1, 11, 29, December 14, 25, 1776).)
According to Admiral Howe's letter of February 20, 1777, the British vessels
employed in Delaware and Chesapeake Bays during 1776, some or all of them
57
being stationed part of the time in one bay and part in the other and occasionally
cruising off the capes, were the Roebuck of forty-four guns, the frigates Liverpool
and Fowey, and the sloop of war Otter; while the frigate "Orpheus appears to
have been rather appointed for the necessary and more general purpose of
cruising between the port of New York and Entrance of the Delaware, than
confined to the particular Guard of the last." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, No. 24.)
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER V
OTHER EVENTS ON THE SEA IN 1776
Having followed the movements of two fleets in service during 1776, there
remain to be considered various cruises and actions of a number of single
vessels, public and private, that went out upon the sea in that year; and some
other events as well.
The Massachusetts navy began its existence in August, 1775, when the Machias
Liberty and Diligent were taken into the service of the province and Jeremiah
O'Brien was put in command of them. The Diligent was afterwards commanded
by Captain John Lambert. These vessels cruised intermittently and with some
success for over a year, or until October, 1776. In February they were at
Newburyport and received new crews. In the spring O'Brien took two or three
small prizes (O'Brien, chs. vii, viii, ix; Am. Arch., IV, iv, 1294, vi, 800, V, iii,
384,387; Massachusetts Mag., January, April, 1910; Boston Gazette, June 10,
July 29, 1776; Mass. Court Rec., February 8, March 23, 1776.)
Meanwhile the force had been increased. As a result of the report of the
committee appointed December 29, 1775, to consider the subject of a state navy,
ten vessels were authorized by the General Court of Massachusetts in February,
1776, the number being shortly afterwards reduced to five. April 20 it was
resolved "that the Brigantine building at Kingston be called the Independence,
that the Brigantine building at Dartmouth be called the Rising Empire, that the
Sloop building at Salisbury be called the Tyrannicide, that one
of the Sloops building at Swanzey be called the Republic and the other the
Freedom." The Tyrannicide was changed into a brigantine a few months later.
Another vessel, the brigantine Massachusetts, was built at Salisbury in the
spring. The Tyrannicide, Captain John Fisk, carrying fourteen guns and seventyfive men, seems to have been the first of these newly constructed vessels to get
to sea. She sailed July 8 and four days later captured a prize. Captain Fisk's
report, dated July 17, says: "This may serve to acquaint your Honours that in
latitude 40° 26' north, longitude 65° 50' west, I fell in with the armed schooner
Despatch from Halifax, bound to New York; and after an engagement of oneand-a-half hour, she struck to the American arms. I boarded her and found on
58
board eight carriage guns and twelve swivel guns, twenty small arms, sixteen
pistols, twenty cutlasses, some cartridges, boxes, and belts for bayonets, nine
half barrels powder, all the accoutrement for said cannon. The Commander and
one man were killed, and seven others wounded. The crew consisted of thirty
men and one boy. I lost one man killed and ten wounded, and my vessel was
much shattered, which obliged me to return with my prize, which I have at anchor
in Salem Harbour, and wait your Honours' orders how to proceed with the
prisoners. All the Captain's papers and orders were thrown overboard." (Coll.
Essex Inst., January, 1906.) Fisk sailed again and during the month of August
took four prizes, one of which was recaptured by a British frigate which chased
and nearly caught the Tyrannicide. Upon Fisk's advice his sloop's rig was
changed after her return from this cruise. October 29, Fisk was ordered on
another cruise to the eastward of Nantucket Shoals as far as the ninth meridian
of longitude and south to the twelfth parallel of north latitude. Meanwhile the
brigantine Independence, Captain Simeon Sampson, whose instructions of July
26 were apparently the next issued after those of Captain Fisk, was "Directed
Imediately to proceed on a Cruize not only against our Unatural Enemies, but
also for ye Protection of the Trade of the United States, and you are directed to
Range the Coast of the Province of Main . . . and from thence proceed as farr
Southward as the Lattitude thirty-four North, and not further West than the Shoals
of Nantuckett, nor further East than the Island [of] Sable, on the Coast of Nova
Scotia." The Independence accomplished little during the year (Mass. Court
Rec., April 20, May 4, September 13, 1776; Rec. Mass. Council, July 26, October
29, 1776; Am. Arch., V, i, 405, 552; Boston Gazette, August 19, 1776;
Massachusetts Mag., April, 1908, January, 1909.)
Richard Derby of Salem reported, October 3, that on the previous evening the
brigantine Massachusetts, "belonging to this State, aryved here." She bad been
cruising during September under the command of Captain Daniel Souther, who,
Derby says, "Informs me that a few Days after he sailed he fell in with & Took a
Brigantine of about 250 Tons from Falmouth in England mounting six three
pound Cannon & having on board a Captain & about 20 Privates of the 16th
Regiment of Dragoons, with their Horse Accoutrements . . . He parted from the
Prize this Day week in a Storm which has Continued almost ever since, but as
the wind has been favourable this Day or two I Expect every moment to see or to
hear of her being aryved at Boston. The prisoners in all amount to 35 which Cap
Souther tho't too many to Cary the Cruise with him & therefor tho't best to Return
& Land them, Espetially as he Expected to Do it in a few Days, but Gales of wind
have prevented him. The Honble Board I hope will send me Directions how to
Dispose of the Prisoners . . . They say the People in Brittain know Nothing what
is passing in America & Capt Souther Informs me the Chaplain has told him the
People in England begin to grow very weary." (Massachusetts Mag., October,
1908; Boston Gazette, October 7, 1776.)
The sloops Republic, Captain John Foster Williams, and Freedom, Captain John
Clouston, when ready for sea were ordered to Boston. In October the Republic
59
was sent on a cruise off Nantucket and soon captured the British armed ship
Julius Caesar. The Republic was afterwards employed in commercial voyages.
Captain Clouston's orders are dated September 20, 1776: "The sloop Freedom
under your command, being in all respects equipped in a warlike manner and
being also well and properly manned, so as to enable you to proceed on a cruise,
you therefore are directed to range the eastern shore of this State laying between
the River Piscataqua and Machias, in order to clear that coast of any of the
enemy's cruisers that may be infesting the same; and from thence proceed to the
mouth of the River St. Lawrence and there cruise until the first of November, in
order to intercept any of the enemy's vessels that may be passing that way; and
from thence you must proceed to the coast of Newfoundland and there cruise
until the middle of November aforesaid, in order to surprise and seize such
vessels of the enemy as you meet upon that coast or in any of the harbours of
the same; after which you may proceed upon a cruise as far southward as
latitude 38° north and continue upon said cruise so long as you find it practicable
or expedient; and then you are to return to the harbour of Boston, always using
every necessary precaution to prevent the sloop under your command from
falling into the hands of the enemy. You are to observe and follow such orders
and directions as you shall from time to time receive from Captain Daniel
Souther, provided they are consistent with the instructions now given you. And
whereas you have received a commission by force of arms to attack, seize and
take on the high seas all ships and other vessels belonging to the inhabitants of
Great Britain, or others infesting the sea-coast of this Continent, you are
therefore punctually to follow the instructions already delivered you for regulating
your conduct in this matter, and in all things conduct yourself consistent with the
trust reposed in you." (Massachusetts Mag., April, 1909.) These instructions were
probably not carried out, and after her return from a short cruise, the Freedom
was altered into a brigantine, being fitted out with the masts, sails, and rigging of
the Rising Empire. This vessel for some reason, after a very short cruise, had
been reported by her captain to be "totally unflt for the service," and was put out
of commission (Ibid., April, July, 1909, July, 1911; Mass. Court Rec., October 9,
1776.)
In May, 1776, the Connecticut brig Defence, Captain Harding, captured several
tories crossing to Long Island. Harding then fitted out three small sloops to
search for tories, the Defence being too well known to them. In a letter
expressing well defined opinions of toryism, Governor Trumbull of Connecticut
acknowledged Harding's reports "communicating alarming intelligence of a most
unnatural and traitorous combination among the inhabitants of this Colony.
Possessed of and enjoying the most valuable and important privileges, to betray
them all into the hands of our cruel oppressors is shocking and astonishing
conduct and evinces the deep degeneracy and wickedness of which mankind is
capable. Have laid your communication before my Council. They are equally
shocked at this horrid baseness and will with me be ready to come into any
proper measures to defeat and suppress this wicked conspiracy to the utmost of
our power; and in the mean time approve and applaud your zeal and activity to
60
discover and apprehend any persons concerned in this blackest treason." (Am.
Arch., IV, vi, 503.) The Defence afterwards performed valuable service in
Massachusetts Bay, returning to New London in July, and continued cruising
during the rest of the year (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 439, 470, 482, 483, 503, 531;
Connecticut Courant, July 22, 1776; Continental Journal, October 10, 1776; New
London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 37.)
Delaware and Chesapeake Bays and the Carolina sounds witnessed a good deal
of marine conflict during the year 1776. Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia
maintained many small craft, as well as some large vessels, for defense, and a
number of captures were made early in the year. Several Continental vessels
also cruised in these waters. In March the British sloop of war Otter, with several
tenders and prizes, came up Chesapeake Bay nearly as far as Baltimore. The
ship Defence, Captain James Nicholson, of the Maryland navy, went out to meet
the Otter, drove her down the bay and recaptured her prizes. Governor Dunmore
of Virginia employed a considerable fleet in Chesapeake Bay, which in July
comprised more than forty vessels. Whatever British men-of-war happened to be
stationed in the bay, and there were generally a few at least, were attached to
this fleet. A family of tories, John Goodrich and several sons, also cruised about
the bay in Dunmore's service. The chief function of the state cruisers was to
check the ravages of these vessels along the shores of the bays and rivers.
Several of their prizes were recaptured by the navies of Virginia, Maryland, and
North Carolina, and other captures, some of them important, were occasionally
made. June 20, Captain James Barron of the Virginia navy took the Oxford, one
of the fleet of Scotch transports bound to Boston, and brought her into
Jamestown (Am. Arch., IV, iv, 114, 122, 123, 125, 126, v, 199, vi, 1559, V, i, 152,
525, ii, 162, iii, 821, 1607; Almon, iii, 31; Boston Gazette, February 5, May 20,
July 15, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, May 23, 1776; So. Lit. Messenger, February,
1857.)
After the departure of Hopkins's fleet for New Providence in February, the Marine
Committee fitted out other Continental vessels from time to time. Those that
cruised along the coast of the Middle States were the brigs Lexington and
Reprisal, of sixteen guns each, and the sloops Independence and Sachem, of
ten guns each, and Mosquito of four guns. April 7, in sight of the Virginia capes,
Captain John Barry of the Lexington reported to the Marine Committee: "I have
the pleasure to acquaint you that at one P.M. this day I fell in with the sloop
Edward [of eight guns], belonging to the Liverpool frigate. She engaged us near
two glasses. They killed two of our men and wounded two more. We shattered
her in a terrible manner, as you will see. We killed and wounded several of her
crew. I shall give you a particular account of the powder and arms taken out of
her, as well as my proceedings in general. I have the happiness to acquaint you
that all our people behaved with much courage." (Pennsylvania Gazette, April 17,
1776.) Captain Barry was an Irishman by birth and afterwards became a
distinguished officer of the navy. In July the sloop Sachem captured a heavily
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armed British letter of marque brig (Am. Arch., IV, v, 810, V, ii, 823; Almon, iii, 81;
Griffin's Life of Barry, 30; Barney, 45, 46; N. E. Chronicle, April 25, 1776.)
The British man-of-war Roebuck, 44, cruised about the Virginia and Delaware
capes from the middle of March until June. May 5, in company with the Liverpool,
28, and a number of tenders and prizes, she came up Delaware Bay. On the 8th
these vessels were met below Chester by thirteen Pennsylvania galleys and an
engagement followed which lasted all the afternoon. The Continental schooner
Wasp, Captain Alexander, came out of Christiana Creek, into which she had
been driven the day before by the British, and recaptured one of their prizes - a
brig. The Roebuck was considerably injured in her rigging and, in attempting to
get near the galleys, grounded on a shoal; the Liverpool anchored near by for her
protection. During the night the Roebuck got off and the British dropped down the
river. The galleys followed and another action took place. An American prisoner,
impressed on board the Roebuck, says that the galleys "attacked the men-of-war
the second day with more courage and conduct [and] the Roebuck received
many shots betwixt wind and water; some went quite through, some in her
quarter, and was much raked fore and aft . . . During the engagement one man
was killed by a shot which took his arm almost off. Six were much hurt and
burned by an eighteen-pound cartridge of powder taking fire, among whom was
an acting lieutenant." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 810.) The British ships then retreated. In
his official report to the admiral the captain of the Roebuck says: "On the 5th of
May I took the Liverpool with me, sailed up the River as far as Wilmington, where
I was attacked in a shallow part of the River by thirteen Row Gallies attended by
several FireShips and Launches, which in two long Engagements I beat off and
did my utmost to destroy . . . After having fully executed what I had in view, I
returned to the Capes the 15th." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, November 28,
1776.) The presence of the Reprisal and Hornet in the bay, or near by, although
they took no part in the action, may have contributed to the discomfort of the
Englishmen's situation (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 395, 408, 498, 809-811; Almon, iii, 173;
Boston Gazette, May 20, 1776 ; Barney, 40-43; Wallace's Life of Bradford, 367.)
The Reprisal, Captain Lambert Wickes, was ordered June 10 to Martinique, but
she did not sail at once; at the end of the month she was still in the Delaware. On
the 29th the armed brig Nancy, from the West Indies bound to Philadelphia with
ammunition and military stores, was chased off the Delaware capes by six British
men-of-war and tenders; she engaged the latter and beat them off. The
Lexington and Reprisal came to the Nancy's rescue, and under cover of a fog
she was run ashore near Cape May and the most valuable part of her cargo,
including two hundred and seventy barrels of powder, was saved. The fog soon
lifted and the British were seen to be very near and sending in boats. The
Nancy's captain and crew then quitted her after setting her on fire, a large
quantity of powder being still on board. Two or three of the British boats then
came in, boarded the Nancy "and took possession of her with three cheers; soon
after which the fire took the desired effect and blew the pirates forty or flfty yards
into the air and much shattered one of their boats under her stern. Eleven dead
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bodies have since come on shore with two gold-laced hats and a leg with a
garter. From the great number of limbs floating and driven ashore it is supposed
thirty or forty of them were destroyed by the explosion." (Am. Arch., V, i, 14.)
According to a British account, which may, however, refer to another incident, the
boats sent in "boarded amidst a heavy fire from the shore, where thousands of
people had assembled to protect her. Finding it impossible to get her off, we set
her on fire, with orders to quit her without loss of time, as we found her cargo
consisted of three hundred and sixty barrels of powder with some saltpetre and
dry goods; but unfortunately, before we had all left her, she blew up and a mate
and six men was blown to pieces in her. The oars of the other boats were all
knocked to atoms and two men had their ribs broke; but considering the whole,
we was amazingly fortunate, as the pieces of the vessel was falling all round for
some time." (Navy Rec. Soc., vi, 35, journal of Lieutenant (later RearAdmiral)
James, in which discrepancies in date and other details may perhaps be
accounted for by its having been written two years later, in prison.) The
Americans mounted a gun on shore and opened fire on the men-of-war. The fire
was returned and Lieutenant Wickes, brother of the captain of the Reprisal, was
killed (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 783, V, i, 14; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, narrative of
Lieutenant Matthewman.)
The Reprisal sailed July 3 for the West Indies, taking out as passenger William
Bingham, who was to be the American commercial and naval agent at
Martinique. The Reprisal convoyed thirteen merchantmen to a safe distance
beyond the Delaware capes. During the voyage she took and manned three
prizes, which left her very short-handed. As she was approaching the port of St.
Pierre, July 27, the British sloop of war Shark, 16, came out of the harbor.
Captain Chapman of the Shark says that at half-past five that afternoon a ship
was seen coming around the northern point of the bay and was suspected of
being an American. At seven the Shark slipped her cables and made sail. Half an
hour later the Reprisal tacked. "We wore and stood towards him & haild him
twice in French, to which he made no answer; we afterwards haild him in English,
he continued to make sail from us & made no reply. At 9 fir'd a shot ahead of him
and haild in English, told him we was an English Man of War; he made no
answer, but bore down and fired a Broadside into us, which we returned
immediately and continued engaging 1/2 an hour, then he back'd his Maintops &
dropt astern & afterwards tack'd; 1/4 past 10 we tack'd & stood towards him, at
1/2 past 10 they fired two shot at us from the shore, which occasioned us to bear
away; he kept his Wind and anchord in the Bay." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Captain's
Logs, No. 895 (log of the Shark.) Wickes says that be replied to both the French
and English hail of the Shark and that the latter fired a shot at ten o'clock
followed by three others in succession, to which the Reprisal returned four,
whereupon the English made sail in order to withdraw from the contest. A French
officer on shore thought that the English fire was the more rapid and better
delivered. He says that after parting from the Reprisal, the Shark chased a
schooner, which took refuge under a battery; whereupon the battery fired two
shot at the Shark. The next day she returned to her anchorage in the harbor. The
63
Reprisal went back to the United States in September and the sloop
Independence, Captain John Young, was sent out to take her place. Naval stores
were greatly needed at all times and the Marine Committee took measures to
obtain them in the West Indies, the depot for European goods of that kind. Ships
of war were largely employed for their transportation (Am. Arch., V, i, 180, 249,
609, 706, 741, ii, 324, 410; Almon, iv, 103; Archives de la Marine, B7 458; Pap.
Cont. Congr., 78, 23, 293, 295 (Wickes to Committee of Secret Correspondence,
July 11, 13, 1776) ; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 20, 26 (September 20, October 4,
1776); Boston Gazette, August 19, October 7, 1776; Independent Chronicle,
October 3, 1776.)
In the spring of 1776 a British expedition was sent against the southern colonies.
A fleet of transports with troops under the command of General Cornwallis sailed
from Cork convoyed by two fifty-gun ships and several smaller vessels
commanded by Commodore Parker. In May this force arrived in North Carolina
and was joined by General Clinton, who had left Boston with several regiments in
January; Clinton now assumed the command. The objective point of the
expedition having been left to his discretion, he determined to attack Charleston,
and on June 4 the fleet appeared off the bar at the harbor entrance of that town.
Meanwhile the Americans had been making preparations for defense. A force of
five or six thousand, less than half of them regulars and all raw troops, was
collected under the command of General Charles Lee. A fort of palmetto logs
was built at the southern end of Sullivan's Island whichcom manded the channel.
This fort was garrisoned by about three hundred and flfty regular troops and a
few militia under Colonel Moultrie. Seven or eight hundred men were stationed at
the northern end of Sullivan's Island to oppose the approach of the British from
Long Island. The South Carolina navy, at that time consisting of three vessels,
probably took some part in the defense of the town.
The British met with some difficulty and delay in getting over the bar, but by June
27 were ready for the attack. Their naval force consisted of the Bristol and
Experiment of flfty guns each, the twenty-eight-gun frigates Solebay, Syren,
Active, and Actaeon, the Sphynx, 20, the Friendship, 18, the bomb-vessel
Thunder, which carried two mortars, and a few smaller armed vessels (For the
expedition against Charleston, see Am. Arch., IV, vi, 1205-1210; Almon, iii, 142,
189-192, 264-267, 314-319; Dawson's Battles of the United States, ch. x;
Pennsylvania Gazette, September 11, Nov. 20,1776; Penn. Evening Post, April
23,1776; Winsor's Narrative and Critical History of America, vi, 168-172, 229;
Channing, iii, 226-228; Clowes, iii, 371-379.)
On the 28th the attack was made. Commodore Parker says in his report: "At half
an hour after ten I made the signal to weigh, and about a quarter after eleven the
Bristol, Experiment, Active and Solebay brought up against the fort. Thunder
Bomb, covered by the Friendship armed vessel, brought the Saliant Angle of the
East Bastion to bear N. W. by N. and . . . threw several shells a little before and
64
during the engagement in a very good direction. The Sphynx, Actaeon and Syren
were to have been to the westward, to prevent fireships and other vessels from
annoying the ships engaged, to enfilade the works, and if the rebels should be
driven from them, to cut off their retreat if possible. This last service was not
performed, owing to the ignorance of the pilot, who run the three frigates
aground. The Sphynx and Syren got off in a few hours, but the Actaeon remained
fast till the next morning, when the captain and officers thought proper to scuttle
and set her on fire." (Almon, iii, 189, 190 (July 9, 1776.)
The engagement lasted ten hours. The fort was little damaged by the
bombardment it received from the British, while the fire of the Americans was
delivered slowly and accurately, and with marked effect upon the ships of the
enemy. In his report to the President of Congress General Lee says the ships
"anchored at less than half musket shot from the fort and commenced one of the
most furious and incessant fires I ever saw or heard." About half-past four in the
afternoon the fort appeared to the British to have been silenced, but this was due
to a failure of ammunition, and upon the arrival of a fresh supply, an hour and a
half later, the fire was renewed. The Americans behaved extremely well, and
Lee, upon visiting the fort, "found them determined and cool to the last degree;
their behavior would have done honor to the oldest troops." (Am. Arch., IV, vi,
1205 (Lee's report, July 2, 1776.) Moultrie became thenceforth one of the heroes
of the Revolution and the fort was named for him. The British troops who had
landed on Long Island, to what number is uncertain, had intended to cross over
to Sullivan's Island and attack the fort in the rear, where it was partly open and
unfinished. The islands were separated by a shallow channel usually passable at
low tide, but continued easterly winds had so backed up the water that it was too
deep to be forded.
At about nine o'clock in the evening the British fire ceased and two hours later
the fleet dropped down to its former anchorage. The Actaeon, after she had been
set fire to and abandoned by her crew the next morning, was boarded by
Americans who brought away her colors and some other property; half an hour
later she blew up. The damage suffered by the British ships was heavy,
especially by the Bristol and Experiment, and upon these two ships also the loss
was greatest, which altogether amounted to sixty-four killed and a hundred and
forty-one wounded, many of the latter dying from their injuries soon afterwards.
The American loss was twelve killed and twenty-five wounded, five of them
mortally. The attack was not renewed, and after making repairs, the fleet sailed
for New York.
Under the encouragement of acts passed by the Continental Congress and the
various provincial assemblies, privateering flourished during 1776, although it
came very far from assuming the proportions that it attained in later years. Only
thirty-four private commissions were issued under the authority of the Continental
government, but probably a much larger number of privateers were sent out by
the separate states. Vessels of this class cruised at sea, along the Atlantic coast,
65
and in West Indian and European waters. The privateersmen were commonly
successful, but first and last a good many of them fell into the hands of the
enemy.
Captain James Tracy was unfortunate enough to fall in with a British frigate,
mistaking her for a merchantman. Tracy sailed from Newburyport, June 7, in the
brig Yankee Hero, carrying twelve guns and twenty-six men, including officers.
He expected to get more men at Boston. Off Cape Ann the captain sighted a sail
which he determined to chase, and here he received a reinforcement of fourteen
men who came out from the shore in boats; with forty, he still had only a third of
his complement. Tracy then bore away for the sail, which was five leagues
distant, to the east-southeast; when too late he discovered the chase to be a
man-of-war. He now put about for the shore with the ship, which turned out to be
the frigate Milford, in pursuit. The wind, which had been westerly, died away, and
in an hour and a half the frigate, having taken a fresh breeze from the south, was
within half a mile and began to fire her bow chasers. The wind shifted to the west
again. Tracy reserved his fire until the enemy should be within close range. She
soon came up on the Yankee Hero's lee quarter within pistol-shot and the
unequal contest became warm. The account of the affair was "chiefly collected
from those who were in the engagement." "After some time the ship hauled her
wind so close, which obliged the brig to do the same, that Capt. Tracy was
unable to fight his lee guns; upon this he backed under her stern, but the ship,
which sailed much faster and worked as quick, had the advantage and brought
her broadside again upon him, which he could not evade, and in this manner
they lay not an hundred feet from each other yawing to and fro for an hour and
twenty minutes, the privateer's men valiantly maintaining their quarters against
such a superior force. About this time the ship's foremast guns beginning to slack
fire, Capt. Tracy tacked under his stern and when clear of the smoke and fire,
perceived his rigging to be most shockingly cut, yards flying about without
braces, some of his principal sails shot to rags and half of his men to appearance
dying and wounded." The first lieutenant was among the wounded. The frigate
having sheared off there was a short lull, during which the wounded were carried
below and the crew began to repair the rigging. They were getting nearer shore
and Tracy hoped to be able to escape. Before things could be put to rights,
however, the frigate "again came up and renewed the attack, which obliged Capt.
Tracy to have recourse to his guns again, though he still kept some hands aloft to
his rigging, but before the brig had again fired two broadsides, Captain Tracy
received a wound in his right thigh and in a few minutes he could not stand; he
laid himself over the arm chest and barricadoe, determined to keep up the fire,
but in a short time, from pain and loss of blood, he was unable to command,
growing faint, and they helped him below. As soon as he came to, he found his
flring had ceased and his people round him wounded, not having a surgeon with
them, in a most distressed situation, most of them groaning and some expiring.
Struck severely with such a spectacle, Capt. Tracy ordered his people to take
him up in a chair upon the quarter deck and resolved again to attack the ship,
which was all this time keeping up her fire; but after getting into the air, he was so
66
faint that he was for some time unable to speak and finding no alternative but
they must be taken or sunk, for the sake of the brave men that remained he
ordered them to strike to the ship." (Mass. Spy, September 11, 1776.) The action
lasted over two hours and the Yankee Hero lost four killed and thirteen wounded.
On the Milford were thirty American prisoners who had been impressed and were
forced to fight against their countrymen. The frigate took her prize to Halifax
(Ibid., June 21, September 11, 1776; Am. Arch., IV, vi, 746-749; Mil. and Nav.
Mag. of U. S., May, 1835.)
In May, 1776, the American privateer Camden, 14, fought three hours with the
brigantine Earl of Warwick, 16. An explosion then took place on the Warwick
which killed and wounded thirty men and she was obliged to strike (London
Chronicle, July 13, 1776.) About the same time the privateer Cromwell, 20,
captured and took into Philadelphia the British sloop of war Lynx (Ibid.) The
private armed sloop Yankee, Captain Henry Johnson, of Boston, cruised in the
English Channel, and, having taken two prizes, had many prisoners on board.
The captain of one of the prizes and one or two other British officers, being in
Captain Johnson's cabin, seized a cutlass which had been carelessly left within
reach, and, arousing the other prisoners, soon had possession of the Yankee,
which they took into Dover (Am. Arch., V, i, 684, 755, 750; Boston Gazette, July
15, December 9, 1776. For other operations of privateers in 1776, see Am Arch.,
V, i, 588, 874, 958, ii, 232, 346; Almon, iii, 34, 235, 267, 268, iv, 159, 160, 161 ;
Boston Gazette, June 17, August 12, September 2, 16, 30, November 25,
December 30, 1776; Independent Chronicle, June 13, October 17, November 14,
28, 1776.)
Several attempts were made during the Revolution to destroy British men-of-war
at anchor. Such an enterprise was discussed in 1775 in reference to the British
fleet in Boston Harbor, and some preparations seem to have been made to carry
it out. Samuel Osgood wrote to John Adams from the camp at Roxbury, October
23,1775: "The famous Water Machine from Connecticutt is every Day expected
in Camp; it must unavoidably be a clumsy Business, as its Weight is about a Tun.
I wish it might succeed [and] the Ships be blown up beyond the Attraction of the
Earth, for it is the only Way or Chance they have of reaching St Peter's Gate."
(Adams MSS.) The "Water Machine" here referred to was probably the
contrivance of David Bushnell of Counecticut, which afterward excited great
interest; yet just at this time John Hancock, President of Congress, wrote to
General Washington: "Captn. John Macpherson having informed the Congress
that he had invented a method by which with their leave he would take or destroy
every ministerial armed vessel in North America, they appointed Govn. Hopkins,
Mr. Randolph & Mr. J. Rutledge to confer with him on the subject, for he would
not consent to communicate the secret to any but a committee & you. These
Gentlemen reported that the scheme in theory appeared practicable and that,
though its success could not be relied on without experience, they thought it well
worth attempting on the fleet in & about Boston harbour, their destruction being
an object of the utmost consequence. The Congress have therefore directed
67
Capt. Macpherson to repair immediately to Cambridge." (Letters to Washington,
89, 72 (October 20, 1775).)
These projects went no farther at the time, and the British continued to ride safely
at anchor in the harbor until they saw fit to take their departure the next spring. In
July, 1776, preparations of a similar nature were made. On the night of August
17 two fireships in the Hudson River attacked the ships Phoenix and Rose, which
had recently been assaulted by galleys. One of the fireships ignited the Rose's
tender, which was "totally consumed." The other approached the Phoenix,
whereupon that ship opened fire and cut her cable. The English account says:
"Ten Minutes Afterwards she boarded us upon the Starboard Bow, at which time
the Rebels set fire to the Train and left her. Set the Fore Topsail and Headsails,
which fortunately cast the ship and disengaged her from the Fire Ship, after
having been Twenty Minutes with her Jibb Boom over the Gun whale." (Brit.
Adm. Rec. A. D. 487, August 17,1776, remarks on board H.M.S. Phoenix.) The
British then prudently dropped down the river to a new anchorage. The most
interesting attempt to destroy a British manof-war was made in New York Harbor
about the same time, with a submarine boat and torpedo designed by David
Bushnell. The operator succeeded in bringing his boat under a British ship, but
was unable to attach the torpedo to her side, on account of the copper sheathing,
then drifted away and lost his bearings. The torpedo, left floating in the harbor,
afterwards exploded with great force ; it contained a hundred and fifty pounds of
powder which was ignited by a time-lock. Two subsequent trials, made in the
Hudson River, also failed. The next year Bushnell endeavored to draw a torpedo
against the side of a ship in Black Point Bay, near New London, by means of a
line. But the line, having been discovered, was hauled in by the crew of a
schooner near by; whereupon the torpedo exploded, demolishing the schooner
and killing three men (Am. Arch., V, i, 155, 451, 692; Almon, iii, 341, vi, 90; Ford's
Washington, iii, 202, iv, 348, x, 504; Clark's Naval History, i, ch. v; Mag. Amer.
Hist., March, 1893; Boston Gazette, August 26, 1776; N. E. Chronicle, August
29, 1776.)
Towards the end of the year 1776 some of the thirteen frigates authorized by
Congress in December, 1775, were nearly ready for service. The Raleigh's keel
was laid at Portsmouth March 21 and just two months later she was ready to
enter the water. "On Tuesday the 21st inst. the Continental Frigate of thirty-two
guns, built at this place under the direction of John Langdon, Esq., was
Launched amidst the acclamation of many thousand spectators. She is
esteemed by all those who are judges that have seen her, to be one of the
compleatest ships ever built in America. The unwearied diligence and care of the
three Master-Builders, Messrs. Hacket, Hill and Paul, together with Mr.
Thompson under whose inspection she was built, and the good order and
industry of the Carpenters deserve particular notice; scarcely a single instance of
a person being in liquor, or any difference among the men in the yard during the
time of her building, every man with pleasure exerting himself to the utmost; and
altho' the greatest care was taken that only the best of timber was used and the
68
work perform'd in a most masterly manner, the whole time from her raising to the
day she launched did not exceed sixty working days, and what afforded a most
pleasing view (which was manifest in the countenance of the spectators) this
noble fabrick was compleatly to her anchors in the main channel in less than six
minutes from the time [of] the run, without the least hurt; and what is truly
remarkable, not a single person met with the least accident in launching, tho'
near five hundred men were employed in and about her when ran off." (New
Hampshire Gazette, May 25, 1776, quoted in N. H. General Rec., January,
1907.)
On September 21 the Marine Committee directed that the frigates Boston,
Captain Hector McNeill, and Raleigh, Captain Thomas Thompson, should be
fitted out as expeditiously as possible, and these vessels were ordered to cruise
in Massachusetts Bay and to the eastward, in search of the British frigate Milford.
October 23 these orders were modified by joining with these two vessels the
frigate Hancock, and instructions were issued for Captains Manley, McNeill, and
Thompson: "You are hereby directed to act in concert and Cruize together for the
following purposes and on the following stations. Your first object must be to
inform yourselves in the best manner possible, if any of the British men of war
are Cruizing in the bay of Boston or off the Coast of Massachusetts, and all such
you are to endeavour with your utmost force to take, sink, or destroy. Having
effected this service you are to proceed together towards Rhode Island and there
make prize of or destroy any of the enemies Ships of war that may be found
Cruizing off the Harbour or Coast of Rhode Island. The Prizes you make are to
be sent into the nearest Port. When you arrive at Rhode Island, if Commodore
Hopkins should not be already sailed on his Southern expedition and the two
frigates built in that State should not be ready for the Sea, in that case you are to
join Commodore Hopkins and proceed with him on the said expedition, producing
those orders to him to justify the measure. But if the Rhode Island frigates should
be ready for the sea, there will be no Occasion for you or either of you to go
Southward. And you will then proceed, taking with you any Continental Vessel
that may be at Rhode Island and ready, if Commodore Hopkins should be sailed
before you come there, and proceed to Cruize against the enemies Ships &
Vessels that may be found off the Coast between the Harbour of Newport and
the Banks of Newfoundland. We have no doubt from your zeal and attachment to
the cause of America that you will execute this service with all possible dispatch
and vigor, and so bid you heartily farewell." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 39.) The
frigate Randolph, built at Philadelphia, was put under the command of Captain
Biddle and was expected to sail before the end of the year. For one reason or
another, however, chiefly, no doubt, the difficulty of manning the ships and the
British blockade, no Continental frigate got to sea in 1776 (Am. Arch., V, ii, 428,
1200, iii, 826, 827, 1198, 1254, 1332, 1484; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 21, 22, 23,
24 (September 21, 1776.)
In October the Reprisal was placed at the disposal of the Committee of Secret
Correspondence of Congress and the Lexington, Andrew Doria, and Sachem
69
were put under the orders of the Secret Committee; these were two distinct
committees. These vessels, in addition to other duties, carried important
dispatches. The Reprisal was ordered to take Franklin, who had been appointed
a commissioner to France, to his post; and afterwards to cruise in the English
Channel. She sailed about the 1st of November and anchored in Quiberon Bay a
month later; two small prizes were taken during the voyage. Franklin went ashore
at Auray, and made the best of his way to Paris, where he arrived December 22
(Mar. Com. Letter Book, 34, 35 (October 17, 18, 1776); Pap. Cont. Congr., 37,
75, 83, 95 (October 24, 1776) ; Am. Arch., V, ii, 1092, 1115, 1197-1199, 12111213, 1215, iii, 1197.)
The Lexington, Captain William Hallock, went to the West Indies in the service of
the Secret Committee of Congress and on her way back from Cape Francois, in
December, was captured off the Delaware capes by the British frigate Pearl.
About this time there were six British ships in this vicinity or stationed in the bay,
which at the end of the year was closely blockaded. A lieutenant and a small
prize crew were put on the Lexington and seventy of her own crew were left on
board. The same evening these prisoners recaptured the ship and, though
without officers to direct them, took her safe into port (Am. Arch., V, iii, 1484,
1486; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, narrative of Lieutenant Matthewman; Port
Folio, June, 1814, memoir of Commodore Dale.)
Under orders dated October 17, 1776, the Andrew Doria, Captain Isaiah
Robinson, sailed for the Dutch island of St. Eustatius for a cargo of military
supplies. Upon arriving at that place and anchoring in the roads, November 16,
the Andrew Doria fired a salute of eleven guns, which was returned by the fort
with two guns less, as for a merchantman. This has been called the first salute
given the American flag in a foreign port, but about three weeks before this an
American schooner had had her colors saluted at the Danish island of St. Croix.
In response to a British complaint the salute to the Andrew Doria was disavowed
by the Dutch government and the governor of St. Eustatius was recalled. The
Andrew Doria, having taken on the stores for which she was sent, sailed for
Philadelphia. On the return voyage, near Porto Rico, she captured the British
twelve-gun sloop of war Racehorse after an engagement of two hours. A few
days later another prize was taken, but was recaptured. The Andrew Doria and
Racehorse arrived safely in port (Barney, 47-51; Amer. Hist. Rev., viii (July,
1903), 691-695; N. E. Mag., July, 1893; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 34; Pap. Cont.
Congr., 28, 173 (March 28,1777.)
70
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER VI
LAKE CHAMPLAIN, 1776
In the days when the frontier severing Canada from New England and New York
was a wilderness, the only easy avenue of communication was by way of Lake
Champlain and the Richelieu River. With the exception of a few miles of rapids in
the river, the whole distance from the St. Lawrence to the head of Lake
Champlain was navigable, and as the shores were rough and densely wooded,
the only practicable route was by water. This natural gateway was therefore of
great military importance, and a struggle for its possession has marked every war
involving Canada and the colonies or states to the south.
Even before the outbreak of hostilities in April, 1775, it was understood that the
British had planned to get control of Lake Champlain and Lake George and the
Hudson River, so as to separate New England from the other colonies (MassHist.
Soc. Proc., xii (April, 1872), 227 (letter Of Samuel Adams, November 16, 1775.)
In anticipation of this, Ticonderoga was taken by the Americans under Ethan
Allen and Benedict Arnold, May 10, and Crown Point two days later. A schooner
had been impressed at Skenesborough (Whitehall) at the extreme head of Lake
Champlain, and in her Arnold proceeded with fifty men, May 14, to St. John's on
the Richelieu, at the head of the rapids. This place was taken on the 18th. Having
found there nine bateaux, Arnold destroyed five of them and brought away the
other four, together with a seventy-ton sloop. He then returned up the lake to
Crown Point (Am. Arch., IV, ii, 645, 839.) The Americans now had full control of
the lake. All naval enterprises on these inland waters were carried on by the
army, which was under the command of General Schuyler.
The British entered upon the construction of two vessels at St. John's in the
summer of 1775, but this place was again taken by the Americans under General
Montgomery in November. Montgomery then began his progress through
Canada, which ended with his death at Quebec on December 31. Meanwhile
Arnold, having accomplished his remarkable and arduous winter march through
the wilds of Maine, shared in the unsuccessful assault of Montgomery on
Quebec. He spent the winter before that stronghold, hoping to gain possession of
it in the spring; but upon the arrival of a British fleet in the St. Lawrence in May,
1776, the Americans were obliged to fall back up the river and evacuate Canada,
finally withdrawing from St. John's to Isle aux Noix June 18. The retreat from
Sorel was conducted in an orderly manner and with trifling loss by General
Sullivan, all the baggage and stores being dragged up over the rapids of the
Richelieu in bateaux. The army was much weakened by the prevalence of
smallpox and by disability through inoculation as a protection against that
disease. Everything that could have been of value to the enemy at Chambly and
71
St. John's was destroyed. General Schuyler wrote to Sullivan, June 25: "Painful
as the evacuation of Canada is to me, yet a retreat without loss greatly alleviates
that pain, not only because it reflects honour upon you, but that I have now a
confidant hope, that by recruiting your Army and keeping up a naval superiority
on the Lake, we shall be able to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the
inhabited parts of these Colonies." (Am. Arch., IV, vi, 1107.) Arnold, who had left
Montreal June 15 and joined Sullivan at St. John's, advised building twenty or
thirty gondolas, row-galleys, and floating batteries for the defense of the lake,
and for this purpose believed that three hundred ship carpenters would be
needed. Gondolas were flat-bottomed boats, difficult to handle, while galleys
were larger and probably had keels; oars and sails were employed in both (Ibid.,
iii, 468, 738, 1208, 1342-1344, 1392-1394, vi, 1101-1108.)
Meanwhile American naval interests on the lake had not been wholly neglected.
During the preceding twelve months some construction had been undertaken
and different officers had been from time to time in command of the vessels in
service. The last of these officers to be appointed commodore of the little fleet
was Captain Jacobus Wyncoop, who received his orders from General Schuyler
in May, 1776. After the return of the army from Canada in June, ship-building at
Skenesborough was pushed with vigor, urged on by the restless energy of
Arnold, who had had some nautical experience and who in August was put in
command. He wished to build at least one powerful frigate, but that was beyond
the resources at his disposal. This activity of the Americans compelled the British
also, as soon as they had recovered possession of St. John's, to begin the
construction of a fleet. A ship and two schooners were taken apart, transported
over and around the rapids, and rebuilt at St. John's. Besides these large vessels
the British had thirty long-boats from the squadron in the St. Lawrence, many flatbottomed boats, a heavily armed radeau, a gondola weighing thirty tons which
had been left by the Americans at Quebec, and more than four hundred bateaux
for the transportation of troops and supplies. According to Captain Douglas,
commanding the British squadron in the St. Lawrence, this force included "above
thirty flghting vessels of different sorts and sizes." In this contest of ship-building
during the summer of 1776 the British had a great advantage. Their fleet of menof-war and transports in the St. Lawrence furnished them with an abundant force
of ship carpenters and other artisans, as well as regular naval crews for the
vessels when finished. It was with the greatest difficulty that the Americans
procured a sufficient number of mechanics to build the fleet with which they were
later obliged to meet the greatly superior force which the British brought against
them. The demand for carpenters in the seaport towns for work upon public and
private naval craft was far beyond the supply (Am. Arch., IV, iii, 4, 11-14, 49, v,
437, 1397, 1460, 1464, 1694, V, i, 563, 603, 744-746, 747, 797, 937, 969, 1277,
ii, 1178, 1179.)
On August 7, General Gates issued instructions to Arnold to take the fleet as far
as Split Rock or to, but not beyond, Isle aux Tetes, and there make stand against
the enemy; but if the British had decidedly superior force, Arnold was to fall back
72
to Ticonderoga. Ten days later, the fleet being at Crown Point, an advance of the
British was reported. At this time Wyncoop, who commanded the schooner Royal
Savage, claimed also to be still in command of the fleet. The conflicting orders of
Arnold and Wyncoop on the occasion of this supposed advance of the British
naturally caused confusion. Gates ordered Wyncoop to be put under arrest and
sent back to Ticonderoga and thenceforth Arnold's authority was undisputed. The
fleet left Crown Point August 24, went into Willsborough September 1, having
encountered a severe storm, and on the 18th was at Isle la Motte. Arnold then
wrote to Gates: "I intend first fair wind to come up as high as Isle Valcour, where
is a good harbour and where we shall have the advantage of attacking the
enemy in the open Lake, where the row-galleys, as their motion is quick, will give
us a great advantage over the enemy; and if they are too many for us, we can
retire." (Am. Arch., v, ii, 481.) Arnold appears, however, to have remained in the
vicinity of Isle la Motte until September 23. The American fleet then retreated up
the lake to the strait between Valcour Island and the New York shore. This
locality, which had previously been surveyed, afforded an excellent and secluded
anchorage in a cove on the west side of the island, almost concealed by trees
from vessels passing up the lake in the channel to the east of Valcour. October 1,
Arnold received intelligence that the British were nearly ready to advance from
St. John's, and their movement began on the 4th (Ibid., i, 826, 1002, 1003, 1051,
1096, 1123, 1185-1187, 1201, 1266, 1267, ii, 185, 186, 481, 834, 835.)
The two fleets were now ready for the conflict, and a statement of their
comparative strength at the time may be made. The American force under
Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold consisted of the sloop Enterprise, Captain
Dickenson, carrying twelve four-pounders, ten swivels, and fifty men; the
schooners Royal Savage, Captain Hawley, with four six-pounders and eight
fours, ten swivels, and fifty men, and Revenge, Captain Seaman, with four fourpounders and four twos, ten swivels, and thirty- five men; the gondolas New
Haven, Providence, Boston, Spitfire, Philadelphia, Connecticut, Jersey, and New
York, each carrying one twelve-pounder and two nines, eight swivels, and fortyfive men; and the galleys Lee with one twelve-pounder, one nine, and four fours,
Trumbull with one eighteen-pounder, one twelve, two nines, and four sixes,
Congress with two twelve-pounders, two eights, and four sixes, and Washington
with one eighteen- pounder, one twelve, two nines, and four fours, the galleys
altogether carrying also fifty-eight swivels and three hundred and twenty-six men.
The American force on the lake likewise included a schooner, the Liberty, and a
galley called the Gates, but these two vessels took no part in subsequent events.
The opposing fleet was commanded by Captain Thomas Pringle of the British
navy, who had with him on his flagship General Carleton, commanding the army.
The force consisted of the ship Inflexible, mounting eighteen twelve-pounders;
the schooners Maria with fourteen six-pounders and Carleton with twelve sixes;
the radeau Thunderer with six twenty-four-pounders, six twelves, and two
howitzers; the gondola Loyal Convert, seven nine-pounders; twenty gunboats,
each with one twenty-four-pounder or a nine and some of them with howitzers;
four longboats armed with one carriage gun each; and twenty-four long-boats
73
loaded with provisions and stores. The American fleet of fifteen vessels therefore
mounted eighty-six guns, throwing a total weight of metal of six hundred and five
pounds, and a hundred and fifty-two swivels, while the British had about the
same number of guns, but much heavier ones, discharging a total weight of over
a thousand pounds. The superiority of heavy guns to light ones is much greater
than in proportion to the difference in weight of projectile, one twelve-pounder
being far more effective than two sixes. The Inflexible alone was a match for a
good part of the American fleet; but on the other hand, the powerful battery of the
Thunderer was in great measure useless because of her slowness and
clumsiness. As to men, the full complement of the American fleet was eight
hundred and twenty-one, but the number actually engaged was doubtless much
smaller, as only five hundred had been obtained by October 1; there may have
been about seven hundred at the time of the battle, and those in large part at
least of poor quality, for Arnold had to take what be could get; their conduct in the
battles that followed, however, could not have been better. The British fleet was
manned by six hundred and ninety-seven officers and men from the regular navy.
Arnold hoisted his flag on the galley Congress, and the second in command,
General David Waterbury, on the galley Washington. Pringle and Carleton were
both on the schooner Maria (Am. Arch., V, i, 1123,1201, iii, 834, 1017, 1039,
1179.)
The British fleet anchored during the night of October 10 between Grand and
Long Islands and got under way the next morning with a northeast wind. It was
seen at eight o'clock by the Americans off Cumberland Head. Waterbury
promptly went on board the Congress to consult with Arnold, to whom he
expressed the "opinion that the fleet ought immediately to come to sail and fight
them on a retreat in main Lake, as they were so much superiour to us in number
and strength, and we being in such a disadvantageous harbour to fight a number
so much superiour and the enemy being able with their small boats to surround
us on every side, as I knew they could, we lying between an island and the main.
But General Arnold was of the opinion that it was best to draw the fleet in a line
where we lay, in the bay of Valcour. The fleet very soon came up with us and
surrounded us, when a very hot engagement ensued." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1224.)
Through neglecting to reconnoitre, the British did not discover the American fleet
until they had passed Valcour Island, and it was then necessary to attack from
the leeward, at a disadvantage. Arnold, in his report of October 12 to General
Gates, says that when the British were first seen on the morning of the 11th, "we
immediately prepar'd to receive them, the gallies and Royal Savage were
ordered under way, the rest of our fleet lay at anchor. At Eleven O'Clock [the
enemy] ran under the lee of Valcour & began the attack. The schooner [Royal
Savage] by some bad management fell to lee-ward and was first attack'd, one of
her masts was wounded & her rigging shot away; the Captain thought prudent to
run her on the point of Valcour, where all the men were saved . . . At half past
twelve the engagement became general & very warm. Some of the enemy's
ships & all their Gondolas beat & row'd up within musket shot of us . . . The
74
Enemy landed a large number of Indians on the Island & each shore, who kept
an incessant fire on us, but did little damage; the Enemy had to appearance
upwards of one thousand men in batteaus prepared for boarding. We suffered
much for want of Seamen and gunners; I was obliged myself to point most of the
guns on board the Congress, which I believe did good execution." The enemy
"continued a very hot fire with round & Grape Shot until five O'Clock when they
thought proper to retire to about six or seven hundred yards distance & continued
[their fire] until dark." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163; Am. Arch., V, ii, 1038.)
Arnold's decision to hold his ground and fight was wise; retreat would have been
demoralizing and disastrous.
Captain Pringle's report, dated October 15, says: "Upon the 11th I came up with
the rebel fleet commanded by Benedict Arnold. They were at anchor under the
island of Valicour and formed a strong line extending from the island to the west
side of the continent. The wind was so unfavorable that for a considerable time
nothing could be brought into action with them but the gun boats; the Carleton
schooner, commanded by Mr. Dacres, by much perseverance at last got to their
assistance, but as none of the other vessels of the fleet could then get up, I did
not think it by any means adviseable to continue so partial and unequal a
combat. Consequently, with the approbation of his excellency general Carleton,
who did me the honour of being on board the Maria, I called off the Carleton and
gun boats and brought the whole fleet to anchor in a line as near as possible to
the rebels, that their retreat might be cut off." (London Chronicle, November 26,
1776; Am. Arch., V, ii, 1069; Almon, iv, 86. For reports of Douglas and Carleton,
see Ibid., 84.)
Of the American losses Arnold says: "The Congress and Washington have
suffered greatly; the latter lost her first Lieutenant killed, Captain and Master
wounded . . . The Congress reciev'd seven shot between wind and water, was
hull'd a dozen times, had her main mast wounded in two places, & her yard in
one; the Washington was hull'd a number of times, her main mast shot through &
must have a new one. Both vessels are very leaky and want repairing . . . The
New York lost all her officers except her Captain. The Philada. was hull'd in so
many places that she sunk about one hour after the engagement was over. The
whole kill'd & wounded amounted to about sixty." After dark the British set fire to
the Royal Savage, fearing that the Americans would again take possession of
her and float her; she soon blew up. In concluding his report Arnold says: "I
cannot in justice to the officers in the fleet omit mentioning their spirited conduct
during the action." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163. On the whole campaign, see
Dawson's Battles of the United States, ch. xiii, with official reports and many
references; Mahan's account in Clowes, iii, 354-370, and in Scribner's Mag.,
February, 1898; Amer. Hist. Record, October, November, 1874; Coll. Conn. Hist.
Soc., vii (1899), 239-291.)
After the battle was over it was evident that the American fleet could not endure
another day's contest under such disadvantages. "On consulting with General
75
Waterbury & Colo. Wigglesworth," says Arnold, "it was thought prudent to return
to Crown point, every vessel's ammunition being nearly three fourths spent & the
Enemy greatly superior to us in Ships and men. At 7 O'Clock Col. Wigglesworth
in the Trumbull got under way, the Gondolas and small vessels followed, & the
Congress and Washington brought up the rear; the Enemy did not attempt to
molest us." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163.) Waterbury says that a council was
held, "to secure a retreat through their fleet to get to Crown Point, which was
done with so much secrecy that we went through them entirely undiscovered."
(Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163.) It is remarkable that thirteen American vessels
should have been able to pass through the British fleet without detection. Pringle
merely says that his purpose to cut off their retreat was "frustrated by the
extreme obscurity of the night, and in the morning the rebels had got a
considerable distance from us up the Lake." (London Chronicle, November 26,
1776.) It has been suggested that Arnold led his fleet around the north end of
Valcour and so avoided the British fleet (Amer. Hist. Rec., November, 1874, and
Hag. Amer. Hist., June, 1881. The author, W. C. Watson, presents strong though
not wholly convincing evidence in favor of this view.)
The Americans retreated south up the lake, and early in the morning, October 12.
reached Schuyler's Island, ten miles from Valcour. Here Arnold wrote his report
to General Gates of the preceding day's battle, adding: "Most of the fleet is this
minute come to an anchor; the Wind is small to the Southward. The Enemy's
fleet is under way to Leeward and beating up. As soon as our leaks are stopp'd
the whole fleet will make the utmost dispatch to Crown point, where I beg you will
send ammunition & your farther orders for us. On the whole, I think we have had
a very fortunate escape." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 163.) But it was too early to
talk of escape, with the enemy in hot pursuit. Such repairs as were possible were
hastily made; two of the gondolas were so much injured that it was necessary to
abandon them, and they were sunk. "We remained no longer at Schuyler's
Island," says Arnold in a later report, "than to stop our leaks and mend the sails
of the Washington. At two o'clock P.M., the 12th, weighed anchor with a fresh
breeze to the southward. The enemy's fleet at the same time got under way; our
gondola made very little way ahead." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1079 (to General
Schuyler, October 15,1776.) Waterbury says of his vessel, the Washington, that
she was "so torn to pieces that it was almost impossible to keep her above water;
my sails was so shot that carrying sail split them from foot to head." "In the
evening," continues Arnold, "the wind moderated and we made such progress
that at six o'clock next morning we were about off Willsborough, twenty-eight
miles from Crown Point. The enemy's fleet were very little way above Schuyler's
Island. The wind breezed up to the southward, so that we gained very little by
beating or rowing; at the same time the enemy took a fresh breeze from the
northeast, and by the time we had reached Split Rock, were alongside of us. The
Washington and Congress were in the rear; the rest of our fleet were ahead,
except two gondolas sunk at Schuyler's Island." (Ibid.)
76
Waterbury's story of the retreat on the night of October 12 and the next morning
gives fuller details. "The enemy still pursued all night. I found next morning that
they gained upon us very fast and that they would very soon overtake me. The
rest of the fleet all being much ahead of me, I sent my boat on board of General
Arnold, to get liberty to put my wounded in the boat and send them forward and
run my vessel on shore and blow her up. I received for answer, by no means to
run her ashore, but to push forward to Split Rock, where he would. draw the fleet
in a line and engage them again; but when I came to Split Rock, the whole fleet
was making their escape as fast as they could and left me in the rear to fall into
the enemy's hands. But before I struck to them, the ship of eighteen twelvepounders [Inflexible] and a schooner of fourteen six-pounders [Maria] had
surrounded me, which obliged me to strike, and I thought it prudent to surrender
myself prisoner of war." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1224.)
Arnold's narrative of the running fight continues: "The Washington galley was in
such a shattered condition and had so many men killed and wounded, she struck
to the enemy after receiving a few broadsides. We were then attacked in the
Congress galley by a ship mounting eighteen twelve-pounders, a schooner of
fourteen sixes and one of twelve sixes, two under our stern and one on our
broadsides, within musket shot. They kept up an incessant fire on us for about
five glasses with round and grape shot, which we returned as briskly. The sails,
rigging and hull of the Congress were shattered and torn in pieces, the First
Lieutenant and three men killed, when to prevent her falling into the enemy's
hands, who had seven sail around me, I ran her ashore in a small creek ten miles
from Crown Point, on the east side; when, after saving our small arms, I set her
on fire with four gondolas, with whose crews I reached Crown Point through the
woods that evening and very luckily escaped the savages who waylaid the road
in two hours after we passed." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1080.)
Pringle's report says: "Upon the 13th I again saw 11 sail of their fleet making off
to Crown Point, who, after a chace of seven hours, I came up with in the Maria,
having the Carleton and Inflexible a small distance astern.; the rest of the fleet
almost out of sight. The action began at twelve o'clock and lasted two hours, at
which time Arnold in the Congress galley and five gondolas ran on shore and
were directly abandoned and blown up by the enemy, a circumstance they were
greatly favoured in by the wind being off shore and the narrowness of the lake."
(London Chronicle, November 26, 1776.) The British loss in killed and wounded
was about forty. A letter from Albany, dated October 17, says that the second
engagement was fought "most of the time in musket shot, very warm and sharp,
in which our men conducted with inimitable spirit and bravery, but were obliged to
submit to superior strength. In this affair our fleet is almost totally ruined; only one
galley escaped, with sloop Enterprise and two small schooners (One of then
must have been the Liberty which was not in the action.) and one gondola; the
rest all taken, burnt and destroyed." The Washington "is the only vessel that the
enemy possessed themselves of. Col. Wigglesworth in the Trumbull galley is
arrived at Ticonderoga." (Boston Gazette, October 28,1776.) Arnold concludes
77
his story of this series of disasters by recounting that at four o'clock in the
morning of October 14 he reached Ticonderoga "exceedingly fatigued and
unwell, having been without sleep or refreshment for near three days. Of our
whole fleet we have saved only two galleys, two small schooners, one gondola
and one sloop. General Waterbury with one hundred and ten prisoners were
returned [on parole] by Carleton last night. On board of the Congress we had
twenty odd men killed and wounded. Our whole loss amounts to eighty odd. The
enemy's fleet were last night three miles below Crown Point; their army is
doubtless at their heels." (Am. Arch., V, ii, 1080.) An early attack on Ticonderoga
was expected.
Captain Douglas at Quebec, when he learned of the British victory, wrote to the
Admiralty: "The ship Inflexible with the Maria and Carleton schooners, all
reconstructions, did the whole of the second day's business, the flat- bottomed
rideau called the Thunderer and the gondola called the Loyal Convert, with the
gunboats, not having been able to keep up with them." (Ibid., 1178. For
Carleton's report, see lbid., 1040.) The British ship and schooners, armed with
eighteen twelve-pounders and twenty-six sixes, had the Americans at their
mercy, especially in the running fight of the 13th. The clumsy gondolas were
practically useless and the galleys not much better.
Ezra Green, a surgeon in the American army wrote from Ticonderoga, October
30, to a friend, giving a brief account of the battles on the lake and of subsequent
events. He says the American prisoners, after their release on parole, reported
that they had been "treated very kindly by the Indians as well as by the King's
troops who were at the time at Crown Point within 15 miles of this place, where
they have been ever since the destruction of our Fleet. We have lately been
alarm'd several times. On Monday morning last there was a proper alarm
occasioned by a number of the enemies boats which hove in sight, and a report
from a scouting party that the Enemy were moving on; where the Fleet is now I
can't learn, or what is the reason they don't come on I can't conceive. 'T is
thought they are 10 or 12 thousand strong, including Canadians and Indians. We
are in a much better situation now than we were fourteen days ago and the militia
are continually coming in. Our sick are recovering and it is thought we are as
ready for them now as ever we shall be. There has been a vast deal of work
done since the fight and we think ourselves in so good a position that we shall be
disappointed if they don't attack us. However, I believe they wait for nothing but a
fair wind." (Diary of Ezra Green, 5, 6.)
By the time the British had taken Crown Point the season was far advanced. This
fact and the presence of a formidable American force deterred them from at once
attempting the capture of Ticonderoga. They withdrew to Canada for the winter,
and their purpose of occupying the valley of the Hudson and separating New
England from the other states was put off. They returned the next year under
General Burgoyne, but the opportunity had passed. Howe had gone to
Philadelphia and Burgoyne, unsupported from the south, was forced to surrender
78
his army at Saratoga. The French alliance followed as a direct consequence. The
American naval supremacy on Lake Champlain in the summer of 1776 had
compelled the British to spend precious time in building a fleet strong enough to
overcome it. The American defeat which followed was a victory. The obstruction
to the British advance and a year's delay saved the American cause from almost
certain ruin. It thus came about through a singular instance of the irony of fate,
not altogether pleasant to contemplate, that we owe the salvation of our country
at a critical juncture to one of the blackest traitors in history.
The end of the year 1776 found the War for Independence well advanced and a
fair share of the strife had fallen upon the sea forces of the Revolutionists. A
comparatively few small vessels, mostly converted merchantmen, under
Continental and state authority, supplemented by privateers, had done the
enemy a good deal of injury. It would be difficult to make even an approximate
estimate of the number of American privateers at this period. Thirty-our were
commissioned by the Continental Congress in 1776; probably a much larger
number by the various states, as Continental letters of marque do not seem to
have come into common use at this early date (Naval Records of the American
Revolution (calendar), 217-495.)
In 1776 the British navy appears to have had somewhat more than a hundred
vessels in active service manned by twenty-eight thousand seamen and marines.
According to the returns of Admiral Shuldham the fleet on the North American
station comprised forty-three vessels of all classes in March and fifty-four in July.
Probably forty of these were superior to the best ships on the American side in
that year. In September, Admiral Howe reported a total of seventy vessels on the
station. In November, according to a letter from London, "the Marine Force of
England now in America consists of two ships of the line, ten fifties, and seventyone frigates and armed vessels, amounting in the whole to eighty-three ships and
vessels of war and 15,000 seamen." (Boston Gazette, February 24,1777; Brit.
Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, March 22, July 6, 1776, A. D. 487, July 28, September 18,
1776; Am. Arch., V, i, 463, ii, 1318; Schomberg, iv, 318-321.)
The British attempted to meet the difficulties encountered in manning their ships
by impressing Americans that fell into their hands or by inducing them to enlist.
Their crews were thereby made up in part of unreliable material which required
close watching. The disadvantages of this state of things appear in a letter of
Shuldham to the Admiralty calling their attention to the many supernumeraries in
the ships' companies. He says: "I must beg they will please to observe that these
being composed of Men taken out of the Rebel Vessels, no confidence can be
placed in them, and although the Captains of His Majesty's Ships under my
Command have all of them more or less entered Americans to fill up their
Complements and are now by the Law empowered to do so with regard to Men
taken in future, yet it deserves to be seriously considered that if, by a constant
diminution of the British Seamen upon this Service, this measure was carried to
excess without any Supply from home to be distributed among the Fleet, the
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consequence may be very alarming; their Lordships will therefore see the
necessity there is of my keeping compleat the parties of Marines belonging to the
different Ships." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 484, April 25,1776.)
From March 10, 1776, to the end of the year the British took a hundred and forty
American vessels and recaptured twenty-six, said to be mostly small trading
vessels. American cruisers made three hundred and forty-two captures from the
British, of which forty-four were recaptured, eighteen released, and five burned at
sea, and the rest brought into port. The Continental navy alone made over sixty
captures (London Chronicle, May 15, 1777; Am. Arch., V, iii, 1523-1530; Almon,
iv, 312, v, 103-107; Neeser's Statistical History of U. S. Navy, ii, 24, 284; Clowes,
iii, 396, giving smaller figures. Probably all the lists are incomplete.) Besides the
loss inflicted upon commerce, troops and valuable military stores had been
intercepted, the evacuation of Boston had been hastened, and, most important of
all, the British advance from Canada had been checked.
The outlook for the next year was full of promise and encouragement for the
Americans. Besides the smaller vessels of the Continental navy, which had
already done good service, it was expected that thirteen fine new frigates would
soon be in commission. Experience and training were beginning to tell in greater
efficiency, and several of the captains showed signs of a capacity for developing
superior military and naval qualities. October 10, 1776, Congress revised the
navy list and established the relative rank of twenty-four captains. This difficult
and delicate task, though doubtless influenced to some extent by political and
personal considerations, was probably done with as much wisdom and justice as
could have been expected with the knowledge of conditions possessed by
Congress at the time. The arrangement caused dissatisfaction, however, on the
part of some officers, especially John Paul Jones, who as eighteenth on the list
felt that, having been the senior lieutenant, he should have stood much higher
upon promotion. Some months later he wrote to Robert Morris regarding the
qualifications of officers: "I cannot but lament that so little delicacy hath been
Observed in the Appointment and Promotion of Officers in the Sea Service, many
of whom are not only grossly illiterate, but want even the Capacity of
commanding Merchant Vessells. I was lately on a Court Martial where a Captain
of Marines made his Mark and where the President could not read the Oath
which he attempted to administer, without Spelling and making blunders. As the
Sea Officers are so subject to be seen by foreigners, what conclusions must they
draw of Americans in general from Characters so Rude & Contracted. In my
Judgement the Abilities of Sea Officers ought to be as far Superior to the abilities
of officers in the Army as the nature of a Sea Service is more complicated and
admits of a greater number of Cases than can possibly happen on the Land;
therefore the discipline by Sea ought to be the more perfect and regular, were it
compatible with short Enlistments." (Jones MSS., July 28, 1777. See Sands, 5965, 304-310.)
80
The last important naval legislation of the year 1776 was passed November 20,
when the Continental Congress resolved to build three ships of seventy-four
guns each, five frigates of thirty-six guns, an eighteen-gun brig, and a packet
boat. Only four of these vessels were completed, and those under modifications
of the act generally reducing their size (Jour. Cont. Congr., November 20, 1776,
July 25, 1777.) These four were the ship of the line America of seventy-four
guns, the frigate Alliance, and two sloops of war, the General Gates and the
Saratoga. Only the last three ever served in the Continental Navy.
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER VII
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1777
Owing to various causes the thirteen frigates provided for by Congress in 1775
were much delayed in fitting out and going into commission, and some of them
never got to sea. The Warren and Providence were perhaps the first to be
completed, but the difficulty of manning them and the occupation of Newport and
the lower bay by the British kept them in port. Commodore Hopkins hoisted his
pennant on the Warren early in December, 1776, perhaps before, and anchored
her in the Providence River. He had with him also the frigate Providence, the ship
Columbus, the brig Hampden, and the sloop Providence. January 2, 1777,
Hopkins, having been informed that the British frigate Diamond was aground
near Warwick Neck below the mouth of the river, went down to the vicinity in the
sloop Providence. The Diamond managed to get off during the night; for allowing
her to escape Hopkins was much criticized. Writing, March 13, to William Ellery,
the commodore says in self-defense that as it was blowing very hard it was
thought best not to try to get the frigates down the river. When he arrived on the
scene in the Providence he "found the Diamond ashore on a shoal which runs off
S. W. from Patience, about half a mile from that Island and a little more S. E.
from Warwick Neck, and as there is about eleven feet of water on that shoal at
low water and not a very hard bottom and the tide about half down, she did not
careen. There lay about one mile and a half" away "a fifty gun ship with her topsails loose and her anchor apeak, who, as the wind was, could have fetch'd
within pistol shot of the Diamond, but the wind blowing so hard was I think the
reason of her not coming to sail. The truth is the ships could not have got down,
and if the wind had not blow'd so hard and they could, it would not in my
judgment have been prudent, neither should I have ordered them down, as the
enemy's ships could have come to sail with any wind that our ships could and a
great deal better, as they lay in a wide channel and we in a narrow and very
crooked one . . . I went ashore at Warwick and saw Colonel Bowen, who told me
he had sent for two eighteen -pounders, and in less than half an hour they came.
I went on board the sloop and we dropp'd down under the ship's stern a little
more than musket shott off, it being then a little after sun sett. We fired a number
81
of shott, which she returned from her stern chacers. The ship careen'd at dusk
about as much as she would have done had she been under sail. After they had
fired about twenty-six shott from the shore, they ceased and soon after hail'd the
sloop and said they wanted to speak with me. I went ashore and was informed
they were out of ammunition. I offer'd them powder and stuff for wads, but we
had no shott that would do. They sent to Providence for powder and shott and I
went on board the sloop and sent some junk ashore for wads. Soon after they
hail'd again from the shore and I went to see what they wanted and gave Capt.
Whipple orders not to fire much more, as I thought it would do but little execution,
it being night and could not take good aim with the guns. When I got on shore,
the officer that commanded there desir'd I would let them have some bread out of
the sloop, which I sent the boat off for, but the people not making the boat well
fast, while they were getting the bread she drifted away and I could not get
aboard again. The ship by lightening got off about 2 o'clock the same night, and
on the whole, as the ship was on a shoal almost under cover of a 50 gun ship
and got off again before it was possible to have done anything with our frigates, I
thought it of no moment." (R.I. Hist. Mag., October, 1886; Hopkins, 167-177.)
Another ship took the Diamond's station and soon after this an abortive attempt
was made to destroy her with a fireship (R. I. Hist. Mag., January, 1886, journal
of Lieutenant Trevett.) Commodore Parker, commanding the British fleet at
Newport, wrote to the Admiralty, January 7: "The Continental Fleet is in
Providence River, beyond our reach at present." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 486. See
also Ibid., December 11, 1776.)
Hopkins was ordered by the Marine Committee, January 21, to get the Warren
and Providence to sea as soon as possible, to cruise from Rhode Island to
Virginia. But the commodore's active sea service in the navy had already come to
an end. As the result of a petition signed by some of the Warren's officers and of
the Marine Committee's examination of one of them, Captain John Grannis of the
marines, Congress resolved, March 26, that "Esek Hopkins be immediately and
he is hereby suspended from his command in the American Navy." After passing
the remainder of the year under suspension, the commodore was formally
dismissed from the service January 2, 1778. April 4, 1777, Captains John B.
Hopkins, Abraham Whipple, and Dudley Saltonstall were instructed to make
every effort to get to sea with the frigates Warren, Providence, and Trumbull, in
search of British transports and merchantmen; but these vessels were doomed to
idle away the entire year in their native rivers (Hopkins, 185-203 ; Jour. Cont.
Congr., March 26, 1777, January 2, 1778; Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 225-230
(February 19, 1777), 235; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 50, 65 (January 21, April 4,
1777)
The plans of the Marine Committee for preying upon British commerce and the
movements of American armed vessels in general might have been effectually
hindered if the British commander had adopted the suggestions offered to
General Howe by Lord George Germain, who wrote March 3, 1777, that the King
was of the "opinion that a warm diversion upon the coasts of the Massachusetts
82
Bay and New Hampshire would not only impede the levies for the Continental
Army, but tend much to the security of our trade, and indeed it scarcely admits a
doubt but that these benefits must inevitably result from such an arrangement.
For as on one hand, it is scarcely to be expected that those provinces will part
with men when their presence must be wanted for the internal defence of their
own respective districts, so on the other, a salutary check will unavoidably be put
to the successes of the rebel privateers, when we have destroyed or taken
possession of their ports. It is, therefore, the King's pleasure that Lord Howe and
you take this matter into your serious consideration so far as your intended plan
will admit." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 58.)
Early in the year the Marine Committee had intended sending to the West Indies,
and along the southern coast as far as Pensacola and the Mississippi, a
squadron composed of the Alfred and Cabot, then at Boston, and the Columbus,
sloop Providence and Hampden, in the Providence River, all under the command
of John Paul Jones; but the project was not carried out, owing, as Jones
believed, to the opposition of Commodore Hopkins (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 52,
54 (February 1, 5, 1777); Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 117-121, 191, 197 (February 28,
March 1, 1777) ; Sands, 58, 59, 64.) The Columbus and Hampden remained in
Narragansett Bay several months. The sloop Providence, Captain Jonathan
Pitcher, ran the blockade of the British fleet in the lower bay in February, passing
"so near a 50 gun ship about 2 A.M. as to hear them talking on board." She went
into New Bedford and then made a cruise to the eastward. Off Cape Breton she
captured a transport brig with a small body of soldiers for Burgoyne's army. This
vessel did not surrender, however, without resistance. John Trevett, lieutenant of
marines on the Providence, says that the "brig bore down on us and began a fire
at long shot; we ran from her about one hour, until we got in good order for
action, when we took in sail and let her come up close along side. The sea being
smooth, we cut away all her colors in forty minutes and they began to be slack,
but in a few minutes they began to fire as brisk as ever and cut our sails and
rigging badly; it lasted about forty minutes longer, when we cut away her maintopmast. We hailed them without a trumpet, being close on her starboard quarter,
to know whether they gave up or not, and the answer was 'yes.' . . . We found
she was direct from England and that she had 25 soldiers and two officers on
board, besides the crew, and was loaded with King's stores and bound for
Quebec." The Providence soon afterwards returned to New Bedford (R.I. Hist.
Mag., April, 1886.)
The brig Cabot, Captain Joseph Olney, also cruised to the eastward, and in
March, while off the coast of Nova Scotia, she was chased by the British frigate
Milford. The captain ran her ashore and had just time to escape with his crew;
they afterwards, it is said, seized a schooner and made their way back to Boston.
The Milford, "after a wearisome struggle of 14 days, got the Continental Brig
Cabot . . . off, and sent her to Halifax, where she arrived and is now fitting out
with the greatest expedition for sea." (Boston Gazette, June 16, 1777 ;
Continental Journal, April 10, 1777 ; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 607
83
(log of the Milford.) The Cabot was taken into the British navy; she is believed to
have been the first vessel of the Continental navy to be captured, except the
Lexington, which was recaptured.
On April 23 the Marine Committee ordered to sea the Alfred, Captain Hinman,
then at Boston, and the sloop Providence, which, after returning from her eastern
cruise, had been put under the command of Captain John P. Rathburne. The
vessels were to cruise separately "in such Latitudes as will be most likely to fall in
with and intercept the enemies Transport vessels coming to reinforce or supply
their Army at New York." Continuing their instructions the Committee wrote: "You
are to use your true endeavours to take, burn, sink, or destroy as many of the
enemies Vessels of every kind, as it may be your good fortune to fall in with. The
Prizes you may be lucky enough to take you will send into such Ports of the
United States as you shall think will be the safest and most convenient . . . It is
expected from every Commander in our Navy that he use his officers and people
well, still preserving strict discipline and decorum; that Prisoners be treated with
humanity; and that great care be taken of the ships, their materials and stores, all
which we desire you will carefully observe and advise us of your proceedings by
every opportunity. We expect your most dilligent exertions will be used to
execute these orders with all possible dispatch and in the best manner for the
service of your Country." The Alfred was to return to port by July 1 and then
receive fresh orders. The Providence was to cruise three months, and if, on
returning to port, she found no further instructions, she was then to take in
provisions and proceed on another three months' cruise (Mar. Com. Letter Book,
70, 71 (April 23,1777) The Alfred seems to have performed no important service
under these orders. Indeed she probably did not go to sea at all before July; very
likely she was unable to enlist a crew in time.
In June the sloop Providence sailed from New Bedford, and off Sandy Hook saw
a ship, brig, schooner, and sloop standing to the southeast and followed them.
"About 3 P.M.," says Lieutenant Trevett in his journal, "we came up with the ship,
the other vessels being near to her weather bow, and hailed her. She had her
pennant and ensign flying, but gave us no answer and we gave her a bow gun,
intending to break her cabin windows. We drew very near her, but the wind being
scant we found we could not get to windward, so we bore away and went under
her lee, as near as we could, and gave her a good broadside. She immediately
gave us as good a one and run us aboard on our starboard quarter and hung
there about five minutes, until she broke all our sweeps that were lashed there.
At the same time the brig of 10 guns and the schooner of 8 [guns] lost no time, all
three of them firing into us at once. As the ship fell off she gave us her starboard
broadside and we shot ahead of them with our sails and rigging much cut to
pieces. We then bore away, all hands employed in fixing our rigging. We had but
a poor crew at this time. Our loss was our sailing master, Capt. George Sinkins
of Newport, who was killed, and only two or three men slightly wounded. We
hove him overboard, got our rigging repaired as soon as possible, and made sail
for the ship. We came up with her just after sunset with a determination to board
84
her, for we well knew if we carried the ship that the rest of the vessels would fall
into our hands. We ran within half Pistol shot and gave her a full broadside, but
all three of them played their part so well we gave it up." The schooner was
taken, however, and from her it was learned that the ship carried sixteen guns.
After this the Providence cruised several weeks in the Gulf Stream. A sail was
seen, acting strangely, and was chased, and upon coming up with her in the
night, she was found to be an abandoned ship, evidently French, under full sail;
rudderless, though otherwise in good condition. It being apparently impracticable
to get her into port, she was burned to prevent her falling into British hands. The
Providence returned to New Bedford in August (R.I. Hist. Mag., April, 1886.)
Meanwhile Captain Jones remained on shore, having held out to him
successively various promises of active employment afloat. The disappointment
of his expectation of taking a squadron to sea occurred a few weeks after his
arrival at Boston in the Alfred, in December, 1776. In March he was appointed to
command one of three vessels which Congress had ordered to be purchased at
Boston. In May he was directed to proceed to France in the ship Amphitrite,
which had brought over military stores, and after his arrival there the American
Commissioners were expected, by order of Congress, to procure for him the
command of a frigate. These Plans were abandoned in turn; and June 14, 1777,
he was given command of the new eighteen-gun ship Ranger, just built at
Portsmouth. On the same day it was resolved in Congress: "That the flag of the
thirteen United States be thirteen stripes alternate red and white; that the Union
be thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new constellation." Jones is
said to have hoisted this flag on the Ranger for the first time it was ever raised on
any man-of-war. For several months after that be was busy fitting out his ship.
The Ranger was one hundred and sixteen feet long over all, twenty-eight feet
wide, and measured three hundred and eight tons. She mounted eighteen sixpounders; she was pierced for twenty-six guns, but Jones considered her too
light a ship for so heavy an armament (Sherburne, 36-40; Sands, 66-70; 7ones
MSS., Jones to Morris, April 7, July 28, 1777; Remick's Kittery in the Revolution,
9, 10, gives the Ranger 14 nines and 4 sixes; Admiral Arbuthnot reported in 1780
(Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 486, May 23,1780) that she mounted 20 sixes.)
The Randolph, built at Philadelphia, was one of the first of the frigates to be
ready for service, but the close blockade of Delaware Bay held her and other
Continental vessels in port several weeks; then there was further delay due to ice
in the river. January 30, 1777, the frigate was ordered to sail "the moment the Ice
will permit," accompanied by the Hornet and Fly and a convoy of merchantmen,
to be escorted "fairly off to sea." In these orders, signed for the Marine
Committee by Robert Morris, Captain Biddle received general instructions as to
his conduct. "For your encouragement in this service," says Morris, "I must
observe that there are no Cruizing Ships an over match for you, except the two
Deckers, for altho you think you have not seamen enough, yet that is just their
case; except the Roebuck there is none of them half manned, therefore you have
only to avoid two Deckers or engaging when there is more than one in sight. Any
85
of their other single ships you need not fear, especially if you can persuade your
men to board. Remember what a glorious exploit it will be, to add one of their
frigates or 20 Gun ships to our navy in a few days after you get out, and if the
Randolph has but Heels, I think you can and will do it; you will then get seamen
Plenty. If your ship sails remarkably fast, you may take libertys with them. If she
does not, be more cautious and try to find out her trim . . . You'l observe that
many merchant vessels are expected in with valuable Stores to this port,
therefore you'l afford them all possible protection and had best keep in their tract
as long as you can." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 49 (January 30, 1777) As soon as
the ice would permit, about February 1, the Randolph, Hornet, and Fly proceeded
down the river with their convoy and got safely to sea (Pap. Cont. Congr., 137,
App., 4, 49, 57, 115, 137, 147 (Morris to Hancock, December 14, 30, 1776,
January 3, 26, February 4, 10, 1777)
Morris wrote further instructions for Biddle February 15 and forwarded them to
him by the Fly, which had returned to port. The Randolph was now to proceed to
the West Indies. The Marine Committee had decided to send all the armed
vessels at Philadelphia to those islands. Biddle was given letters to William
Bingham, the navy agent at Martinique, and to other persons at St. Eustatius,
Curacao, Cape Francois, and Mole St. Nicholas, to whom he was to apply in
turn, until he had a full cargo of military stores and supplies for the army, to be
brought back at once to the safest port. The Dutch government had prohibited
the exportation of such supplies to America, but the traffic was still conducted on
a large scale, in Dutch as well as French ports. Arms, ammunition, and clothing
were brought from Europe to the West Indies for transshipment to the United
States. It was hoped that these stores could be procured in sufficient quantity
and without delay at Martinique. "These supplies are exceedingly necessary for
the service of the ensuing campaigne and you cannot render your Country a
more essential service than by bringing them soon and safe in . . . As you
command the first American frigate that has got out to sea, it is expected that you
contend warmly on all necessary occasions for the honor of the American flag. At
every foreign port you enter, salute their forts and waite on the Governor General
or Commander in Chief, asking the liberty of their ports for the ships of the United
States of America. Take care that your people do not molest their Trade nor
Inhabitants nor in any shape disturb that good understanding we have with
them." Prizes were to be sent into Martinique, St. Eustatius, or other ports, where
the cargoes might be sold, if to greater advantage, the vessels, however, being
always brought to American ports. "As the British men of war on the West India
stations are not often well manned, it would give great eclat to our Naval Service
it you can make prize of one or more of them and if so, you will do well to tempt
some of their best warrant officers, such as Boatswains, Gunners, Quarter
Masters and their several mates, to enter our service, for we would wish you to
bring both these and plenty of Common Sailors home, to assist in manning our
other ships of war." Seamen from other prizes also, and in the various ports
visited, were to be procured for the service when possible. "When your errand to
the West Indies is compleated, you'l observe it is mentioned already that you are
86
to return to some safe port in these United States of America. The uncertainty of
the fate of war makes us cautious of saying positively which shall be the best
port. There is little doubt but this [Philadelphia] will be the most convenient to
receive the stores at, being most centrical and probably not very distant from the
scenes of action, and as you are well enabled to defend yourself against most
single ships and capable, we hope, of outsailing any of the enemies, it appears
that you might venture to call at Cape Henlopen or Cape May for intelligence,
without incurring the charge of rashness, and we will endeavour to keep out
some small Cruizers about the time you are expected, to give you information."
(Mar. Com. Letter Book, 55 (February 15,1777) Signals were prescribed for
communication with the shore and with other vessels. Most unfortunately the
Randolph had not proceeded far on her voyage before she encountered a heavy
gale, in which she was dismasted and was obliged to put into Charleston in a
crippled condition. Before arriving there a mutiny broke out among English sailors
on board, but was soon quelled. March 29 the Sachem, Captain James
Robinson, was sent to Martinique with duplicates of the dispatches for Bingham
which the Randolph had not been able to deliver (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 55, 57,
58 (February 15, 17, 18, 1777), 59 (February 5, 1777), 64 (March 29, 1777); Pap.
Cont. Congr., 137, app., 151, 177 (February 10, 19, 1777) ; Port Folio, October,
1809; Amer. Hist. Review, viii (July, 1903), 687.)
The Raleigh, Hancock, and Boston were the only others of the thirteen frigates
that cruised at sea during 1777. The Virginia, built at Baltimore, was ready for
sea early in the year, and her commander, Captain James Nicholson, received
instructions in April to proceed to the West Indies, but, owing to the close
blockade of Chesapeake Bay by the British, she could not get out. Repeated
orders were sent to Nicholson to get the Virginia to sea, but she was forced to
remain idle in port throughout the whole year (Ibid., 51, 66, 85, 86, 104, 108, 116,
117 (January 24, April 8, 29, May 1, October 23, November 6, December 2, 12,
1777) The occupation of New York and Philadelphia by the British, in 1777,
prevented the frigates Montgomery and Congress, in the Hudson River, and the
Delaware, Washington, and Effingham, in the Delaware River, from rendering
active sea service; and the New York frigates were destroyed before the end of
the year, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy (Ibid., 65 (April 8,
1777); Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, app., 4, 9, 21 (December 14, 16, 21, 1776);
Almon, v, 425-431.) The Trumbull did not leave the Connecticut River, where she
was built, until 1779; and, as already related, the Warren and Providence were
held in port more than a year after they were ready for sea.
In April, 1777, an expedition was sent by General Howe from New York against
Connecticut under the command of General Tryon, the royal governor of New
York. A landing was made at Fairfield, whence they proceeded to Danbury and
destroyed a large quantity of public stores. Upon returning to their ships the
British were harassed by a small force of Americans under Generals Arnold,
Wooster, and Silliman. Arnold wrote to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, April
30: "After the enemy reimbark'd they imediately weighed Anchor and stood for
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Huntington harbour, Long Island, where they doubtless are at this time. I think it
very probable they have in Contemplation the Destroying the Continental Frigate
[Trumbull] at Saybrook, which may be easily effected by a few small Tenders, as
there is no Battery or Armed Vessell to Cover her. If she cannot be got over the
Barr & secured in harbour, will it not be prudent to move her up the river to some
place of greater safety? I know not If your honour or the Continental agents have
the Direction of her; that she is greatly exposed & ought to be secured, there is
no doubt. I should Imagine she might be easily got over the barr with proper
lighters & an Easterly wind, & secured In Guilford, Sachems head, or New
Haven, where she might be got in readiness for the Seas." (Trumbull MSS., vi,
90. See also Ibid., 87, 96, letters of General Silliman (April 29,1777) on the
operations against Tryon and of Captain John Shipman (May 1, 1777) on the
dangerous situation of the frigate Trumbull.)
In view of this clear statement of the frigate's situation, we learn with surprise that
- apparently in response to the orders of April 4, but possibly to earlier orders that
have not been preserved - Captain Saltonstall went to sea and on April 12 wrote
a letter to the Marine Committee dated "on board the Continental ship of war
Trumbull," off the Virginia capes, saying: "I have the pleasure to acquaint you
that at one P.M. I fell in with two transports from England, one of eight, the other
of ten guns. They engaged us three glasses, when they struck
their colours. They killed seven of our men and wounded eight more. We
shattered them in a terrible manner and killed and wounded numbers of their
crews. I have the pleasure to inform you that our people behaved well and with
much courage." (Almon, v, 135.) It is obvious that Saltonstall's "Continental ship
of war" could not have been the frigate Trumbull, which was securely shut up in
the river. It is likely that, owing to the importance of the service to be performed,
a vessel was impressed, chartered, or borrowed for the occasion, perhaps the
ten-gun sloop Trumbull, a Connecticut privateer (The sloop Trumbull is known to
have been in commission at this time. Saltonstall's name appears in a list of
Connecticut privateers as commander of the Governor Trumbull, a 20-gun ship,
though probably at a later date. See Conn. State Records, i, 567; Publ. R.I. Hist.
Soc., viii, 212, 214, 225, 229, 231, 256; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 28;
Nav. Rec. of Am. Rev. (calendar) 478; Conn. Gazette, July 18,1777; Data from
the Library of the Navy Department.)
Although the frigates Hancock and Boston had received cruising orders in the fall
of 1776, such was the delay in fitting them out that they did not get to sea until
May, 1777. The frigate Milford and other vessels of the enemy had long been a
terror to American navigators in eastern waters and the need of regular fighting
ships more powerful than the state cruisers and privateers was greatly felt. The
General Court of Massachusetts resolved, April 24, that the Hancock and Boston
ought to put to sea at once in pursuit of the Milford. It was arranged that the
Continental frigates should be accompanied for twenty-five days by nine
privateers, including two or three of considerable force, and by any others that
should be ready by May 1. The commanders of these privateers, serving under
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Captains Manley and McNeill of the Hancock and Boston, were to be put upon
the same footing for the time being as regular officers and their vessels were to
be insured by the state (Mass. Court Rec., April 24, 26, 1777.) As a squadron,
this assemblage of vessels amounted to nothing. With proper cooperation it
might have constituted a force capable of meeting with some prospect of success
any British squadron it was likely to fall in with. But the privateers took no part
whatever in the cruise after the first few days; becoming separated, they were
soon dropped behind by the frigates.
Another unfortunate circumstance, which may have had much to do with events
soon to happen, was the lack of cordial relations between the captains of the
frigates. Such being the case, it is perhaps not surprising that Dr. Samuel Cooper
should have had forebodings when he wrote to John Adams, April 3, 1777:
"Manly and McNeal do not agree. It is not, I believe, the Fault of the first . . . If
they are not better united, infinite Damage may acrue." (Adams MSS.) Another of
Adams's correspondents, Dr. William Gordon, wrote to him June 5: "The frigates
have been sailed about a fortnight. Maritime affairs have been most horridly
managed. We have beaten G. B. in dilatoriness & blunders. Where the fault hath
lain I know not, but the credit of the Continent & Congress requires amendment."
(Ibid.)
The squadron sailed from Boston May 21. Within six days the privateers had all
parted from the frigates, some by choice, the others through bad weather. May
29 a brig was captured; she belonged to a fleet of transports under convoy of the
Somerset, of sixty-four guns, and a frigate. "At break of day the 30th," says
Captain McNeill, "we discover'd the Somersett and three large Ships under her
Convoy. Capt. Manley was not convinced of the size of our Opponent untill she
was within Shott of him, when very luckily for him the Hancock's Heels saved his
Bacon. She nevertheless pursued him with great earnestness untill I tack'd upon
her Convoy, who was a good way astern of her at that time. As soon as she saw
me within random Shott of them, she left Capt. Manley & return'd to their
protection; she then chac'd me about Six hours, but not being able to come up
with me, she rejoin'd her Convoy just as night came on. Capt. Manley & myself
then Steer'd to the Eastw'd and Northw'd in hopes of falling in with some others
of the fleet, but saw no Enemy except a few miserable Fishermen untill Saturday
June the Seventh, on the Morning of which day we fell in with the Fox, a British
Frigate of 28 Guns Commanded by Capt. Patrick Fotheringham. She at first
meant to Engage, but thought I was best to try her Heels, which would have
effectually Saved her from me, but the Hancock coming up with her, an Action
ensued which did not end untill after we came up, by which time the Hancock &
the Fox were both very much damaged." (N.H. Geneal. Record, January, 1907
(McNeill to Marine Committee, July 16, 1777) A seaman on the Boston says of
the fight: "At 6 A.M. Capt. Manly & she Exchanged some guns and then she Run
& we in full Chace after her ... Betwixt the hours of 12 & one P.M. Capt. Manly
Began to Engage Broadside & Broadside, our ship coming up fast as Posable; at
last up we came and gave them a Noble Broadside which made them to strike a
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medeatly a Bout half after one." (N. H. Geneal. Record, January, 1907 (McNeill
to Marine Committee, July 16, 1777)
According to the British account the Hancock was sighted from the Fox at five
o'clock in the morning and the Boston soon afterwards. Captain Fotheringham
says that after a half-hour's action with the Hancock, "I could plainly see that the
other Ship to Windward was of nearly the same Force as the one I was engaged
with, which was of thirty-two guns." He then tried to escape, hoping to fall in with
some friendly cruiser or to draw the American ships apart, "but notwithstanding
all the Sail I could make, the Ship I had before engaged came up with me about
Noon and engaged me very close till a Quarter after one, when the other Ship
came up and raked me and carried away my Main Yard," and did other damage.
At half-past one the Fox would no longer answer her helm, and with one enemy
on the bow and another on the quarter, she could not bring guns to bear on
them. "I therefore at Quarter before two gave the Ship up in order to save my
People." The Fox lost her lieutenant of marines and one man killed and ten
wounded, two of them mortally; she was short of her full complement by thirtythree men (Brit. Adm. Rec., Courts Martial, No. 5309.) Admiral Montagu wrote
from St. John's to Germain, June 11: "I was yesterday made very unhappy by a
letter I received from Captain Fotheringham of his Majesty's ship Fox,
acquainting me that he was taken the 7th instant by two American privateers on
the banks, one called the Hancock of 32 guns and 347 men, the other of 28 guns
called the Boston, full of men, the largest commanded by Manly, the other by
McNeal." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 69.)
Continuing his report of the cruise McNeill says: "The weather proving
unfavourable for some time afterwards, we were severall days fitting the Fox &
Capt. Manley his own Ship. I had sent my first Lieut. (Mr Browne) on board the
Fox the day she was taken, but Captain Manley refused giving him the
Command & I was finaly obliged to withdraw him for the sake of peace. I urged
Capt. Manley to make the best of our way to Charlestown, South Carolina, there
to Join Captain Biddle, fitt & clean our Ships, & then to Cruise for the West India
Fleet untill towards the fall of the year, by which time our own Coast would
probably be clear & we might return without any risque compared with what must
be now Expected. He at first attended to my proposal, but afterwards did as he
pleas'd; the event will prove whether I judge right or not. In short we loiter'd away
three weeks or a Month before we sett our faces homeward, by which time the
Coast of New England from Cape Sable as far as New York was so cover'd with
cruisers that there was no escaping them.
"On Sunday the 6th of July, being 15 leagues to the Eastwd of Cape Sable, we
took a Sloop from Louisburgh bound for Halifax, but delaying some time with her,
we were chac'd towards evening by three Ships. We also being three, we did not
make any efforts to avoid those Ships in Course of the night; on the Contrary
Capt. Manley Tow'd the Sloop before spoken of untill next morning, by which
time one of the Ships was a head of us and Tack'd upon us, the Second Ship,
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which was a two decker, was on our Lee quarter about three Leagues from us,
and the third Ship about as far right a Stern. Capt. Manley then thought proper to
sett fire to the Sloop & quitted her and endeavour'd to make the best of our way,
but the first Ship being up within Shott about noon, we exchanged some Shott
with her at a distance & then having spoke Capt. Manley, we agreed to tack and
Engage her. We immediately Tack'd and Capt. Manley begun the Action with his
head to the Northward & the Enemy on the opposite Tack, we being close under
the Hancock's Stem, also fell in with the Enemy in our turn and Exchanged about
five broad Sides with her. Her Shott was so well aim'd that some of them pass'd
through our Ship under the wale, so that we could not Tack upon the Enemy
untill we had stop'd those holes; this was however done in a few Minutes, but not
before the two deck Ship had goten very near us. Unfortunately the Fox did not
tack at the same time we did, by which means the Enemy got between her and
us and she was obliged to pass under the fire of the first Ship above mention'd
and the fire of the two deck Ship also. Capt. Manley seeing that the Fox was
beyond Saveing, put about and stood to the Southd, the Fox bore away and run
to the Eastwd, and we kept the Wind to the Northwd. The two deck Ship then put
about and follow'd the Hancock, leaving the Fox and me to the other two Ships.
The Fox fled and defended herself bravely, haveing also some advantage in
point of Sailing; we were constrain'd to keep the Wind for our own Security, being
neither able to run from nor fight such force as then appear'd to Leward." (N. H.
Geneal. Rec., January, 1907.)
The vessel described by McNeill as a two-decker was the British forty-four-gun
ship Rainbow, Commodore Collier, and she was accompanied by the ten-gun
brig Victor. The third vessel, which appeared about the same time, was the
frigate Flora of thirty-two guns. Collier says in his report that July 6, in the
afternoon, being twelve leagues southwest of Cape Sambro, he first sighted the
American squadron. Night came on, and the next morning the American ships,
with a sloop in company, were five or six miles distant. They set fire to the sloop
and at six o'clock another sail was observed "standing towards the rebel ships."
This vessel was thought to be an American also and trying to join the others.
"About Ten in the Morning the Enemy's Ships went away lasking, and Three
Quarters of an Hour afterwards I was surprized to see several Shot exchanged
between the sternmost of them and the Stranger who had last joined and whom I
had hitherto looked upon as another of their Fleet. I then hoisted my Colours,
shortly after which the two sternmost of the Rebel Frigates hawled their Wind,
whilst the headmost kept away about two Points from it. This brought the English
Ship (which I afterwards found was the Flora) more abreast of them, who passed
to Windward, exchanging a Broadside with each and pursuing the Fugitive, who
from the Alteration two or three Times of her Course, seemed uncertain which to
steer. The Flora gained fast upon her, which she perceiving, hawled her Wind
again and soon afterwards tacked and stood after her Comrades, exchanging a
Broadside with the Flora as they passed each other. I was just putting about after
the two Ships when I observed this Manoeuvre of the Rebel Frigate, which made
me stand on something longer before I tacked, hoping to get her within Reach of
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my Guns as she passed us. I accordingly did so, but had not the good Fortune to
bring down either a Mast or Sail by my Fire. I tacked immediately after her and
soon afterwards saw the headmost Rebel Frigate put about; she passed me just
out of Gunshot to Windward and appeared a very fine Ship of 34 Guns with
Rebel Colours flying. One of the Gentlemen of my Quarter Deck had been a
Prisoner lately at Boston and knew her to be the Hancock, on board of whom
Manley commanded, the Sea Officer in whom the Congress place great
Confidence and who is the Second in Rank in their Navy. The Ship I had fired
upon I found outsailed me and soon after my tacking, went away lasking; whilst
the other Frigate kept her wind. I then saw with Concern that one of the three
must unavoidably escape, if they thus steered different Courses. I therefore
judged it best to put about and follow the Hancock, which appeared the largest
Ship. Whilst I was in Stays the Flora passed me very near, in Pursuit of the Ship I
had fired upon. It was about Two o'Clock in the Afternoon of Monday the 7th of
July that I tacked after Manley, who seemed at first rather to outsail the Rainbow,
but I understood afterwards that to endeavour making his Ship sail better, he
started all his Water forward and by that Means put her out of Trim. An Hour
before the Close of Day he altered his Course and kept away large; however, we
got so near to him before dark as enabled us by Means of a Night-glass to keep
Sight of him all Night. At Dawn of Day she was not much more than a Mile ahead
of me, soon after which we saw a small Sail to Leeward which we found to be the
Victor Brig, who as we passed fired at the Rebel Frigate and killed one of the
Men at the Wheel, but was not able from bad sailing to keep up or come near
any more. About Four in the Morning I began firing the Bow chace upon her, with
occasional Broadsides loaded with Round and Grape, as I could bring them to
bear, some of which struck her Masts and Sails. Half an Hour past Eight I was so
near as to hail her and let them know that if they expected Quarter, they must
strike immediately. Manley took a few Minutes to consider and a fresher Breeze
just then springing up, he availed himself of it by attempting to set some of the
Steering Sails on the other Side. I therefore fired into him, upon which he struck
the Rebel Colours to His Majesty's Ship, after a Chace of upwards of 39 Hours."
(London Chronicle, August 26, 1777.)
To make the story more complete we may quote from the report of Captain
Brisbane of the Flora. "On the 7th Instant at day break, Cape Sable bearing N. N.
E. about fourteen Leagues, we discovered three Sail of Ships and a Sloop on our
weather Quarter and a Sail on our Lee Quarter, standing to the Westward on the
same Tack the Flora was. I thought it my duty to see what they were, tacked and
stood towards them, upon which the Sloop, that was towed by the headmost
ship, was cast off and set on fire. We passed within point blank shot to leeward of
the three Ships, hoisted our Colours and fired a Shot at the headmost to show
theirs, which they paid no attention to, fired a second at the Sternmost, stood on
and as soon as we could fetch their wake, tacked and followed them.
At 9 A.M., Upon their finding that we weathered and came up with them, they
formed a line ahead, hoisted Continental Colours, and began firing their Stern
92
Chace. At 10 the two sternmost Ships shortened Sail, tacked and came close
under our lee Quarter. Exchanging Broadsides as we passed each other, we
stood on to the Ship who had not tacked, gave her our fire which she returned;
she attempted to stay, missed and wore, which gave us an opportunity of raking
her. We then wore and gave chace after her, the two other Ships being at this
time close upon a Wind on different tacks. During this transaction we run
considerably to leeward, which gave the Ship on our lee Quarter an opportunity
of joining us fast, and upon her being abreast of our Chace, she tacked and
proved to be His Majesty's Ship the Rainbow. She fired several well pointed Shot
at the Chace, one of the Enemy soon afterwards tacked and stood to the South
West, the Rainbow tacked and followed her; we continued standing to the
northward after the Chace, who, upon the Rainbow's tacking, kept away more
from the wind and set steering Sails and soon afterward began firing her Stern
Chace at us. At 6 P.M. we came up close to her, upon which she struck her
Colours and proved to be his Majesty's Ship the Fox, that had been taken a
month before that by the Hancock and Boston, Continental Ships, on the Banks
of Newfoundland. The Ship that we afterwards learned to be the Boston was, at
the time the Fox struck, as far to windward as we could but discover the head of
her Topsails out of the Water." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, August 28,1777, No.
2.)
The British took their prizes into Halifax. In his report Collier says the Hancock
had two hundred and twenty-nine men on board, her complement being two
hundred and ninety; and according to a letter of his to Germain, she carried
thirty-two guns, chiefly twelve-pounders, and was "said to be the largest and
fastest sailing frigate ever built . . . Manly seem'd filled with rage and grief at
finding he had so easily surrendered to a ship of only 44 guns, believing all along
that it was the Raisonable, of 64 guns, who was chasing him." (StopfordSackville MSS., 69, 70; London Chronicle, August 26, 1777 ; Boston Gazette,
July 28, August 11, 18, 1777 ;Almon, v, 262; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, August
28, 1777, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, Captains' Letters, No. 1611.2 (Collier to
Stephens, July 12, 1777), Captains' Logs, Nos. 360, 762 (logs of Flora and
Rainbow). No report by Captain Manley appears to be accessible.) The Hancock
appears to have been one of the very best and fastest of the Continental frigates,
and if Manley had not made the mistake of altering her trim in the vain attempt to
improve her speed, he might have escaped from the Rainbow. Failing in this, he
should have made a spirited resistance, in which, by some lucky accident, he
might possibly have succeeded in reversing the result; or by crippling his
adversary, have been able to escape. Manley's record in the naval service up to
this time had been excellent and his reputation was high among friends and foes.
Collier, in his letter to Germain, says of him: "We have all long wished to get this
man into our possession, from his talents and intrepidity, and fortunate it is that
we have clone so, as he was beginning to shew the Americans what they had not
been accustomed to, the seeing of one of his Majesty's ships in their possession,
for he had just taken the Fox of 28 guns . . . Every body here is overjoyed at the
capture of Mr. Manly, esteeming him more capable of doing mischief to the
93
King's subjects than General Lee was." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 70. General
Charles Lee had been taken prisoner by the British several months before.)
Manley rendered very efficient service also in the later years of the war, but on
this occasion he failed to stand the test. He should not have feared to exchange
a few shots, even in the belief that he was engaging the Raisonable, and would
then soon have discovered that he had only a forty-four to deal with. We shall
see that a few months later his fellow-officer, Captain Biddle, was not afraid to
engage a sixty-four, with no thought, apparently, of striking his flag before the last
extremity. Manley was sent a prisoner to New York, where he remained many
months. The loss of the Hancock was almost a calamity. She was taken into the
British service under the name of the Iris and fought only too effectually against
her old companions in the Continental navy.
Meanwhile the Boston escaped and found her way to Wiscasset. In his report to
the Marine Committee, which was dated at that place July 16, Captain McNeill
relates his proceedings since losing sight of his consorts on the 7th: "In a few
hours we saw two more of the Enemy about two points on our weather bow; from
these we were obliged to tack to the Southwd . . . After Standing two hours to the
Southwd we espied another Ship bearing S. W. of us, who appeared to be in
chace towards us. I then hove about to the Northwd again & stood on untill Nine
o'Clock the Evening; the chace coming down upon us very fast all the time. As
soon as the Moon was down I tack'd and Stood to the Southwd and in less than
an hour saw the Lights of the Chacing Ship Standing athwart our Stern about 3/4
of a Mile from us. On Tuesday Morning the 8th Current I saw five Sail of the
Enemy to the Leward of me, three on the Lee bow and two on the Lee Quarter,
at the same time saw Cape Sable bearing N.N.E., five leagues. The Wind
coming to the Southwd I stood across the Bay of Fundy, determin'd to Shelter
myself in the first port I could make and get intellegence, which happened to be
this river where I arriv'd on Thursday the 10th Instant. On my arrival here I found
that the Milford Frigate had been in about fourteen days past & that she had
penetrated up as far as we now are, Namely at Wichcasset point. There is scarce
a day, but one or two of the Enemys Ships are Seen off the Mouth of this river
and the Coasting Vessells are very much distress'd. In this my present Situation I
am much at a Loss what to do, my Ship's Company are so diminished by
Manning the Fox & the Men otherwise Lost since we Sail'd from Boston; my Ship
is very Fowl . . . and besides that, we cannot make her Sail fast, trim which way
we will . . . We have certain Accounts of twelve Sail of the Enemys Cruisers
between Cape Ann & Cape Sable, severall of whom are large Ships." (N. H.
Geneal. Rec., January, 1907.) Perhaps the size of the British fleet cruising in
eastern waters was magnified in McNeill's imagination. In due time he brought
his ship back to Boston, where his reception was not cordial. He was severely
blamed for not having come to the Hancock's rescue and was held by public
opinion in large degree responsible for the loss of that ship. He was tried by
court-martial and suspended (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 109 (November 12,1777);
Adams MSS., October 9, 1777, McNeill to John Adams, complaining of
conditions in the navy.)
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At Charleston, where the Randolph had put in for repairs after being dismasted,
Captain Biddle received orders from the Marine Committee, dated April 26 and
29, to cruise in the West Indies and later attempt to intercept a British fleet of
merchantmen which was expected to leave Jamaica under convoy about July 26.
In the first of these orders, April 26, the Committee wrote: "Your letter of the 14th
instant is the only one we have received since the misfortune of carrying away
your Masts or indeed since you left the Capes of Delaware, so that we are
strangers to the cause and manner of that unfortunate accident . . . We observe
with infinite concern that your people have been and remain Sickly'; this has
happened in so many of our Ships that we cannot help atributing it to some
cause that may with proper care & attention be removed. You should therefore
insist that your Officers do frequently see the Ship thoroughly and perfectly
cleansed, aloft and below from Stem to Stern, burn Powder and wash with
vinigar betwixt Decks, order Hammocks, all bedding and bed Cloths and Body
Cloaths daily into the quarters or to be aired on Deck, make the people keep their
persons cleanly and use exercise, give them as frequent changes of wholesome
food as you can, Fish when you can get it and fresh food in Port. Ventilate the
Hold and between Decks constantly. In short, cleanliness, exercise, fresh air and
wholesome food will restore or preserve health more than medicine and it is
deserving the utmost attention of any or every officer to preserve the Health &
Spirits of the men." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 73 (April 26, 1777)
The Marine Committee planned to collect as many vessels as possible to act in
concert against the expected Jamaica fleet, in the hope of capturing a number of
them. General orders dated April 29 were issued, addressed to the commanders
of vessels designated to take part in the enterprise. They were to rendezvous at
Abaco, one of the Bahama Islands, July 25, the senior captain was to take
command as commodore, and they were to hold a council of war and decide
upon the best cruising ground, the most effectual disposition of their ships, and a
code of signals. "The Commodore or Council of war are empowered to order or
do anything they may think necessary or essential to enable the Squadron to
perform the intended Service, whether pointed out by the Committee or not." All
information obtained regarding the Jamaica fleet must be reported to the
commodore. "These things done, and the sooner they are accomplished the
better, the Squadron must weigh and sail under the Signals and Orders of the
Commodore to the appointed Station, which we suppose will be near the
Havannah." While waiting for the Jamaica fleet the time should be spent in drill
and repeating signals. "The men should be constantly exercised at the Guns, and
infinite pains taken on board every Ship to sweeten the Air and keep not only the
Ship clean but the Men so in their Cloathing and Persons. During this Cruize
there is little doubt but Prizes will be taken by the Squadron before the Jamaica
fleet appears and such may be sent into Georgia or Carolina, but in doing this
care must be taken that no ship is much weakened by sending away their men in
such Prizes. Should they be of little value it may probably be best to burn them
and encourage the seamen found on board to enter our Service by offering them
share of Prize Money to be taken, Pay and allowance equal to those already
95
engaged, and assurance of good treatment." Inasmuch as "the main object of
this enterprize appears the Jamaica Fleet, it must be the business of the
Commodore to keep the Frigates together until he finds out the strength of the
Convoy, and if it be such as he judges he can cope with, with a tolerable
prospect of success, he is to make the proper disposition for attacking to the best
advantage and engage their ships of war, whilst all the smaller vessels are
employed in attacking and taking the Merchantmen. It must be remembered that
the enemy generally send home for Convoy such of their Ships of war as have
been long in the West Indies. They are frequently foul and ill manned, which are
circumstances favourable for engaging them, even if they should appear of
superior force. If you can but make Prizes of the Convoy or any part of them, we
think it will then be in the power of the Squadron to take any number of the
Merchantmen, and such as cannot be manned and brought into Port may be
sunk or Burned. Should the Convoy consist of such or so many Ships as it would
be folly or rashness to engage, the Squadron in that case had best to seperate
and hover after the fleet; for as we have little doubt but most of our ships will
outsail theirs, being cleaner, you may in this manner pick up a vast many of their
Merchant ships, altho protected by Superior force." If after this service the
squadron should be too distant from the seat of government to receive fresh
orders, the Commodore must call a Council of war of all the Commanders, with
him, and any enterprize or expedition planned by that Council, that has for its
object the service of the United States of America, to distress or disable the
enemies of these States or to Capture their Ships of war or Merchantmen, will
meet our approbation & if executed with vigour, will merit the praise of all
America. Our ships should never be Idle. The Navy is in its infancy and a few
brilliant strokes at this Era would give it a Credit and importance that would
induce seamen from all parts to seek the employ, for nothing is more evident
than that America has the means and must in time become the first Maritime
power in the world." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 78 (April 29,1777)
The Andrew Doria, Captain Isaiah Robinson, the sloop Surprise, Captain
Benjamin Dunn, and the Fly, Captain Elisha Warner, were ordered in April to
clear the Cape May channel of British ships, and a little later the Independence,
Captain John Young, was instructed to warn vessels away from Chesapeake and
Delaware Bays. In May the Andrew Doria and Surprise, together with the
Columbus, Captain Hoysted Hacker, still blockaded in Narragansett Bay, were
ordered to repair to the rendezvous at Abaco, where they were expected to meet
the Randolph and cruise after the Jamaica fleet. This promising and well
conceived project seems never to have been carried out or even entered upon,
presumably because a sufficient number of vessels, especially frigates, could not
be brought together (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 68, 69 (April 18, 1777), 73 (April 26,
1777), 77, 78 (April 29, 1777), 86, 88 (May 2, 1777), 90 (May 13, 1777), 91 (May
16, 1777)
The Randolph sailed some time during the summer and early in September was
off Charleston. Biddle reported: "I have the Pleasure to acquaint You that on the
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fourth of Sept. 30 Leags. S. E. of Charles Town Barr I met with and took, after a
little Resistance, the True Britain, Thomas Venture Master, of twenty sixpounders and seventy-four Men, the Brig Charming Peggy, Capt. Lyon, both
Laden with Rum for the British Army and Navy and bound from Jamaica to New
York, The Ship Severn, Capt. Henderson, of eight four-pounders, who had been
taken by an American Cruizer on His passage from Jamaica to London And
Retaken by the True Britain, Also a French Brig laden with salt going from the
West Indies for Charles Town, Which Capt. Venture had made Prize of. There
was a small Sloop in Company with those Vessels that made Her escape, the
Weather being Squally, whilst I was Manning the Rest. I Arrived Safe here with
my Prize the 7th inst. I have not laid Claim to Salvadge for the French Brig, as I
thought it would be most agreeable to Congress to give her up. . . The
Randolph's Bottom is very foul, having lain in this Port the three worst Months in
the Year since We Cleared; And Being apprehensive that the Worms will Ruin
Her Bottom unless they are soon destroyed, I have thought Proper and am
preparing to heave Her down. I shall be as expeditious as possible and hope to
be Ready to execute any Orders You may Please to send by the Return of the
Express. I cannot omit telling You that My Officers have on every Occasion given
me the greatest Satisfaction. Two better Officers are not met in the Service than
Barnes and Mcdougall, My first and second Leiuts. And the Men I took from here
behaved exceeding well." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 2, 241 (Biddle to Morris,
September 12,1777) The Marine Committee issued orders to Biddle, dated
October 24, to proceed to France as soon as his ship could be made ready for
the voyage. Upon his arrival there he was to report to the American
Commissioners and await their directions, in the mean time making a short cruise
in European waters, if it should seem advisable (lbid., 237,241; Mar. Cont. Letter
Book, 105 (October 24,1777); Port Folio, October, 1809.)
Captain Thomas Thompson, of the frigate Raleigh at Portsmouth, received
instructions, dated April 29, to cruise against vessels bound to New York until
June, but if he could not obtain suitable guns for his ship he was to proceed
directly to France for them; in July he was to open sealed orders. As late as May
22, according to information furnished to Admiral Howe, the Raleigh had only six
or eight of her thirty-two guns mounted. At this time there were at Portsmouth,
besides the frigate, the Ranger and three or four large privateers. The keel of the
America of seventy-four guns had just been laid. It was nearly the middle of
August when the Raleigh went to sea and set sail for France. Probably she had
received her guns by that time and her voyage was in the service of Congress
and the American Commissioners at Paris. She was accompanied by the Alfred,
Captain Hinman, who had also received sailing orders in April, which directed
him after cruising in the Atlantic to return to Boston for fresh instructions (Mar.
Com. Letter Book, 70, 81, 84 (April 23, 29, 1777), 92 (June 1, 1777), 102
(September 6, 1777); Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 487, June 29, 1777, No. 10; Remick,
216 (list of Raleigh's crew); N. R. Geneal. Rec., April, July, October, 1905.)
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The third day after sailing for France a small schooner from New York was taken
by the Raleigh, on board of which Captain Thompson found "275 Spanish milled
dollars, 137 counterfeited bills of 30 dollars each, in imitation of the bills emitted
by Congress May the 10th, 1775, and 40 counterfeited bills of seven dollars
each, imitating the Massachusetts sword-in-hand money; the whole making 4390
dollars which I shall commit to the flames after preserving samples. The
schooner being of little value we burnt her." The most important events of the
passage are told in Thompson's report, dated at sea September 28, 1777, in
latitude 49° 35' north, Iongitude 13° 13' west: "At daylight Sept. 2 we took a snow
called the Nancy . . . being part of the Windward Island fleet, which had outsailed
her the day before. Having by this capture discovered the situation of the fleet
and found that they were convoyed by the Camel, Druid, Weazel and Grass.
hopper ships of war, the former a very large, lofty ship, carrying twenty-two 12pounders . . . we made sail in quest of the fleet and next morning discovered
them from the mast head. At sun-set we were near enough to distinguish the
leading ship as well as their number, which was sixty sail, bearing East by North;
the wind being then west, I made a signal as being one of the fleet left astern, for
I had possessed myself of the signal from the prize. I hailed Capt. Hinman and
told him my intention was to run into the fleet in the morning and attack the
convoy, which I thought we were able to destroy; I therefore ordered him to keep
close under the Raleigh's stern until we come alongside the Commodore, which
ship we would both attack. Unluckily in the night the wind shifted to North; the
fleet then hauled up close to the wind, which brought us to leeward; in the
morning it came to blow fresh. At daylight we saw the body of the fleet bearing
about N.E. at two or three leagues distance, steering East North East. We made
sail and the Raleigh soon fetched up to the fleet under double reefed topsails, but
the Alfred, being tender-sided, could not carry sail and therefore fell a great way
to leeward and astern. I could not take in any sail for fear of being discovered to
be a strange ship; we therefore kept our sails shaking in the wind, thinking the
Alfred might come up, but Capt. Hinman made signal that his ship was
overpressed with sail. Seeing no chance of his coming up and being fearful of
being discovered, I determined to make sail and stand into the fleet and take my
chance alone. While we were laying to, most of the merchant ships had got
ahead into the fleet; however, I hauled in and passed a few of them and desired
them to go under the Commodore's stern. By this they took us to be some British
frigate which had joined the fleet. I stood on close to the wind, making for one of
the ships of war which was to the windward of all the fleet, repeating the
Commodore's signals. Our ports were down and our guns housed and we shot
up alongside within pistol shot; then we up sails, out guns, hoisted Continental
colours and bid them strike to the Thirteen United States. Sudden surprize threw
them into confusion and their sails flew all aback, upon which we complimented
them with a gun for each State, a whole broadside into their hull . . . Our second
broadside was aimed at their rigging, which had its desired effect . . . In about a
quarter of an hour all hands quitted quarters on board the British man of war, we
cleared her decks totally; not a man was seen nor a gun fired on board her for
twenty minutes before we left her. She lay like a log alongside of us entirely at
98
the mercy of our shot, which flew very thick; we fired twelve broadsides, besides
a constant fire from our musquetry. We were alongside of her forty-five minutes;
when we left her she seemed to be water logged and in a most shattered
condition. During this little engagement my officers and men behaved with the
greatest fortitude and resolution, particularly the green hands . . . My intention
was to sink the enemy's ship, if I could not bring her off, and I should have
effectually sunk her in a few minutes more, could we have staid. Our firing had
thrown the fleet into confusion. A squall prevented them from seeing us at first;
when it cleared up, one was running one way and one another, some upon the
wind and some before it. Their Commodore and the other ships of force tacked
and stood right for us, but had not the wind favoured him and we drifted to
leeward, he could not have fetched us and I should certainly have sunk the ship.
However, I staid by her until he came pretty near, and we being in danger of
being surrounded, I made sail and ran down to the Alfred, who was lying about
four miles to the leeward . . . When we had got pretty near the Alfred, I took in top
gallant sails and shortened sail to wait for the British Commodore, but he soon
tacked and stood again into the fleet." (Almon, v, 403, 404.)
The vessel engaged by the Raleigh was the fourteen-gun sloop of war Druid.
According to the report of Lieutenant Bourchier of the Druid, "on the 4th of
September, in the latitude 40.33. N., longitude 50.17. W., at half past four in the
evening, we discovered a strange sail on our larboard quarter, bearing West and
steering for us. We were then (from the irregularity of the fleet) about five miles
distant from the Camel, to windward, repeating the signal for the convoy to go
under the Camel's stern and obliging those ships to bear down; the Weazle at a
great distance to leeward and out of our sight. We cleared ship for action and
turned all hands to quarters. At five o'clock she came within pistol shot, when I
could plainly perceive her to be a rebel privateer mounting 38 or 40 guns, her
decks and tops full of men. She hailed and desired us to strike to the honour of
the Congress's colours, hoisted her ensign, and began to engage. The first
broadside sent a shot through Captain Carteret's thigh bone and killed the
master. I then took the command on the quarter deck and continued the action.
At half past five she came close alongside and kept an irregular but very hot
firing. At six she made sail ahead. I attempted to do the same and keep her
broadside on, but the shattered condition of the rigging rendered the sails almost
useless to the ship. As the head-sails only were of service, we edged away and
kept her nearly on our bow till twenty minutes past six. She then had the wind
abaft, sheared off, hauled down her colours, and made sail. I attempted to wear
ship and rake her, but the rigging being entirely shot to pieces, could not bring
her round. I then tried to make what sail I could and pursue the enemy, but found
most of the masts and yards wounded . . . with four feet ten inches water in the
bold. At half past seven we brought to, with our foresail and mizen on our
larboard tack, to plug the shot holes between wind and water, clear the wreck
and pump the ship out. I then perceived another rebel privateer laying to, bearing
S.S.W. six or seven miles off, and by her appearance I suppose she mounted
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about 20 guns. The Camel was then in chace about two or three miles distant;
soon after, the Weazle spoke to us and gave chace also." (Almon, v, 402.)
Conditions on board the Camel, the British commodore's ship, are set forth in her
log. "Fresh Breezes & Squally Wr. At 1 P.M. fired 2 guns & made the Signal for
the fleet to come under our Stern; the headmost Vessels paying no attention to
the Signal, Fired 3 Shott at them to bring them to. At 5 fresh Breezes & Hazy Wr.
Heard the report of a No. of Guns fired in the No. Wt. Quarter, which we
imagined was an Action, from the unusual quickness of their Firing. Wore Ship
with all possible speed & stood towards the report, when the Haze dispersing, we
perceiv'd His Majesty's Sloop Druid in close engagement with a large Rebel Priva
[teer] of 36 Guns, which she Beat off & upon perceiving us to be in chase of her,
made off under all the Sail she could possibly Croud, as did another Rebel
privateer which lay to Leeward of Her. Continued in Chase of them till Night,
when we lost sight both of them & the Convoy." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs,
No. 156 (log of the Camel); also No. 4172 (log of the Druid)
The Raleigh's loss was one killed and two wounded. The Druid had six killed and
twenty-six wounded, of whom five, including the captain, died of their wounds.
The Raleigh and Alfred followed the fleet several days, but without again
exchanging shots with the enemy. Thompson says: "We have since challenged
him for three days successively to come out of his fleet and engage us, but he
declines the challenge. Himself and the other armed ships keep close together a
little astern of the fleet and fine weather favours them; we wait for a storm and
then, if any advantage offers, intend to make the best use of it, but we must not
venture among them as they are now prepared, neither can we trust to the
Alfred's sailing. Had she been a stiff ship and sailed equally well with the Raleigh,
we should in all probability have destroyed the convoy and dispersed the whole
fleet, badly manned as we are, having only 180 men, chiefly green hands. I
cannot trust to working the ship were I to go into the fleet, but if the enemy will
attack where we have room, we are able to defend ourselves or destroy them. I
could at first have cut off several of the merchantmen, but must by that means
have been discovered and thereby have lost our chance at the King's ships; and I
am determined never to wax against merchantmen where I have an opportunity
of waxing against the King. I should have preferred sinking that ship to the richest
capture in the fleet." These excuses seem inadequate. John Paul Jones found
the Alfred capable of giving excellent service. If Thompson had been an
enterprising officer, it is difficult to believe that he would have allowed this rich
fleet to get away without leaving a single prize in his hands. As to warring against
merchantmen, American commanders had express orders to pursue fleets under
convoy and make as many captures as possible. The ships and cargoes were
needed by the impoverished Continental government, and every blow struck at
the enemy's commerce helped a little to turn the scale in this closely contested
war. In due time the Raleigh and Alfred arrived in France; also the sloop
Independence, Captain Young, which had been sent out with dispatches (Almon,
v, 401-405; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 99 (to Captain Young, July 5,1777)
100
Early in the year 1777 the sloop Revenge, American privateer of ten guns,
Captain Joseph Sheffield, cruising to the windward of Barbadoes, is reported to
have fought four hours with two British ships, each carrying fourteen guns, and to
have captured one of them. The ship Thomas, a prize of the Revenge and
presumably this same one, was recaptured by the sloop of war Unicorn while
running into Newport, not knowing it was occupied by the British (Boston
Gazette, February 24, 1777; London Chronicle, May 3, 1777; William's Liverpool
Privateers, 195-198.) The report came from New York, March 24, that within two
months the British men-of-war stationed about Chesapeake and Delaware Bays
had taken seventy American ships and privateers (London Chronicle, May 10,
1777.) The frigate Pearl fell in with the privateers Teaser, 18, and Resolution, 14,
with a convoy of three merchantmen. An engagement of an hour and a half
followed, when a gun on the Resolution burst and she struck. The Pearl also took
two of the merchantmen, but the other and the Teaser escaped (Ibid, June 10,
1777.)
The British naval schooner Prince William, of eight guns, was captured, and her
captain, writing from Boston Prison, May 13, says: "In my last I acquainted you of
my success in taking American prizes, but my fortune now is quite the reverse.
On the 2d of this month, falling in with the Spy, an American privateer snow of 12
guns, my vessel was taken after an engagement of three glasses and brought
into this port, where myself and crew are prisoners. Boston harbor swarms with
privateers and their prizes; this is a great place of rendezvous with them. The
privateersmen come on shore here full of money and enjoy themselves much
after the same manner the English seamen at Portsmouth and Plymouth did in
the late war; and by the best information I can get there are no less than fifteen
foreign vessels lately arrived in the harbour with cargoes of various articles."
(Almon, v, 173; London Chronicle, July 3, 1777.)
A letter from Nantucket, dated May 15, gives this account: "The 11th inst. Capt.
Simpkins, commander of the Fortune, Provincial ship of war of 22 guns, 4
cohorns, and 18 swivels, fell in with the English brig Boscawen, of 18 sixpounders, near this port, and after an engagement of upwards of an hour the
latter was taken and carried for Boston. We saw the action, which was continued
a considerable time very resolute by both parties and seemed to us rather
doubtful. The Captain of the brig was wounded and the officer that was second in
command was killed." (Almon, v, 174.)
On the 12th of July the ship Pole of Liverpool, in latitude 50° north, longitude 20°
west, "fell in with the Tartar, a rebel privateer mounting 20 nine-pounders on the
main deck, 8 four-pounders on the quarter-deck and 4 four-pounders on the
forecastle, full of men, supposed two hundred at least . . . She bore down on the
Pole under English colours, enquired from whence she came and whether she
was a King's ship. Being answered in the affirmative, the captain gave orders to
hoist the Thirteen Stripes and fire away, on which the engagement began and
continued from five until about twenty minutes past eight, when the privateer
101
sheered off. Captain Maddock [of the Pole] had two mates and a passenger
wounded and supposes that near one half of the people belonging to the
privateer must be killed or wounded, he having cleared their forecastle of men
three different times and says he heard dreadful cries among them. The Pole had
16 six-pounders and only forty people, passengers included." (Williams, 205
(quoting a Liverpool paper). In Williams's list of Liverpool privateers (Appendix iv)
the Pole is given 24 guns and 100 men.)
Many privateers cruised in the West Indies, and besides those that came out
from the United States, some were fitted out at Martinique under American
commanders, with French and Spanish crews and commissioned by the
American naval and commercial agent, William Bingham. Prices rose in the
British islands on account of the large amount of property taken by Americans.
Admiral Young, commanding the British station in the Leeward Islands, reported
the capture of many of these privateers (Almon, v, 141-143, 168, 171, 198, 199;
Boston Gazette, June 2, October 13, 1777; London Chronicle, April 22, August 5,
1777; Williams, 200, 201.) The privateer Revenge, Captain Isaac Freeborn,
sailed from Martha's Vineyard for the West Indies December 9, 1777. "About ten
Days after, we fell in with a Privateer Schooner, gave her a couple of Shot and
she run. About 8 Days after, we fell in with and took the Ship York, from Glasgow
bound to Barbadoes, laden with dry Goods, some Provisions, &c. which was sent
into Martineco. About 4 Days after, fell in with a large English Ship of 18 Guns,
which was too much for us. We afterwards came across a fleet of about 100 Sail,
to Windward of Barbadoes, but they being convoy'd by 5 Frigates and it blowing
a hard Gale, we could do nothing with them. We then bore away for Martineco,
sprung our Mast and carried away our Topmast, but luckily got in and found our
Prize safe." (Boston Gazette, March 9, 1778. For further accounts of privateering
in 1777, see Coll. Essex Inst., July, 1890; Continental Journal, December 25,
1777; Connecticut Gazette, July 18, 1777; London Chronicle, March 18, April 10,
1777; Pickering MSS., xvii, 50; Engagements by Sea and Land, 78, 79.)
Under orders issued March 14, 1777, by the Massachusetts Board of War the
brigantines Tyrannicide, Captain Jonathan Haraden, and Massachusetts,
Captain John Fisk, of the state navy, sailed together March 24 on a cruise to the
coasts of Ireland, England, and France. The brigantine Freedom, Captain John
Clouston, had already sailed March 8, under the same authority and for the same
cruising ground. April 1, in longitude 15° west, Clouston reported having taken
three prizes. He arrived at Paimboeuf May 1, having made twelve captures in all.
April 2 the Massachusetts and Tyrannicide, in latitude 41° 30' north and longitude
45° west, took the ship Chaulkly, and April 8, ten degrees farther east, the
Tyrannicide took the bark Lonsdale after a three hours' engagement, while the
Massachusetts was chasing another vessel. Just two weeks after this, in about
48° north and 16° west, they "fell in with a fleet of 9 sail bound to the Westward,
one of 60 & one of 14 Guns, British Ships of War, with 7 Transports from
Plymouth for New York. Being a Fresh gale we could not bare down on them;
however, finding one Brig to lay a stern, we took the liberty to take her under
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Convoy. She had on board 63 Troops, Hessens Chussers, with their
accountrements compleat." (Mass. Arch., clii, 165.) The Massachusetts arrived at
Nantes May 21, and Fisk reported: "I have not the pleasure to acquaint you that
the Tyrannicide is here with me, but am sorry to acquaint you that on the
seventeenth Instant at Nine in the Morning we gave chase to a Ship standing to
the Eastward and came up fast. At three got within two miles of the ship, then
saw three Sail in the N. E. bearing down to us; one of said Sail brought our chase
too & hoisted English colours. I bore away and made sail from them; the Ship
gave me chase. Capt. Haraden bore away also; the ship came up with us fast. At
Nine at Night I haul'd my Wind; Capt. Haraden bore away before the wind. At half
after nine, lost sight of Capt. Haraden and soon after, lost sight of the Ship. At
ten, saw three flashes of Guns, which I suppose the Ship fired at Capt. Haraden
and I am afraid the Ship took him, as I have not heard nor seen anything of him
since." (lbid., 216.) Fisk had taken eight prizes since leaving Salem. He sailed for
home in June, having on board four passengers, including General Pulaski. July
12, from a schooner Fisk learned of Haraden's safe arrival at Bilbao, after having
been obliged to throw overboard guns and stores to escape the British ship. The
Massachusetts arrived at Marblehead July 23, forty-four days from Nantes. The
Freedom had arrived at Boston two weeks earlier; she had taken sixteen prizes,
of which six had probably been retaken. The Tyrannicide came later, getting into
Boston August 30 (Mass. Arch., cli, 415, 416, clii, 134, 135, 144, 160, 165, 178,
182, 189, 216, 220, 230, 271, 292 ; Boston Gazette, June 2, 9, July 14,
September 1, 1777; Continental Journal, June 12,1777; London Chronicle, May
3, 1777; Massachusetts Mag., April, October, 1908.)
In the Massachusetts Council, August 6, 1777, the following measure was
adopted: "Whereas our Enemies have several small Cruisers upon this Coast, &
even in Boston Bay, which have taken several of our Coasting Vessels & greatly
Obstructed our Navigation; And as the Continental & State Vessels, as also most
of the Private Vessels of War, are improper to be employed for Clearing the
Coast of these Vermin, therefore Resolved, That the Board of War be & they
hereby are directed, without Delay, to take such Measures for taking or
destroying all such Cruisers as aforesaid, as they shall judge most proper."
(Mass. Arch., Revolutionary Rolls, xliv, 268.) The day before, the Board of War
had instructed Captain Fisk, who had returned from France two weeks before, to
cruise in the track of homeward-bound West Indiamen and "to use your utmost
Endeavours to take, burn, sink & destroy all armed and other Vessels, together
with their Cargoes, belonging to the Subjects of the King of Great Britain,
Enemies to the United States of America & the natural Rights of Mankind."
(Mass. Arch., cli, 426.) Captain Fisk soon set sail again in the Massachusetts,
and on the afternoon of August 19 "saw three sail to the Eastward. We gave
chase [and] at 4 found them to be two Schooners and a Ship. We soon saw the
two Schooners was attacking the Ship & after a few shot they fell a stern and the
Ship tack'd & made sail for us. At 5 we came up to the Ship & found she wore
British Colours; we gave her a Broadside [and] she struck to the American Arms."
(lbid., clii, 271.) This was the ship Johnson, bound from Liverpool to New York,
103
and the schooners were the privateers Speedwell and Active of Boston. August
31, in latitude 36° 28' north, longitude 51° west, the Massachusetts fell in with a
vessel bound from St. Christopher to Belfast, which had sailed with a British fleet
of a hundred and thirty sail under the convoy of four men-of-war. This was
probably the same fleet that the Raleigh and Alfred fell in with a few days later. At
this time Captain Fisk had three Massachusetts privateers cruising with him; they
were the schooner Dolphin of Marblehead and the brigantines Hampden of
Salem and Gloucester of Cape Ann. In October, Fisk reported the capture of two
brigs (Mass. Arch., clii, 330, 362, 391; Massachusetts Mag., October, 1908.)
The brigs Tyrannicide, Captain Haraden, Hazard, Captain Simeon Sampson, and
Freedom, Captain Clouston, cruised during the fall. The Hazard had just been
added to the Massachusetts navy. The brig Independence had been captured by
the enemy in the spring; and in September or October the Freedom was taken by
the British frigate Apollo, and Clouston was sent to the prison-ship Felicity at New
York. Regulations for the government of the Massachusetts navy, based on
those of the Continental navy, had been adopted in March (Mass. Arch., cli, 430,
clii, 414, cliii, 2, 3, clvii, 93, 103, 113; Mass. Court. Rec., March 21, 1777;
Massachusetts Mag., April, July, 1908, January, April, 1909.)
The waters about Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were a favorite cruising
ground, during the Revolution, for the armed ships and privateers of
Massachusetts and other New England states, and many visits were paid to the
Grand Banks and to the comparatively defenseless shores of those provinces.
Admiral Montagu wrote from St. John's, June 11, 1777: "The American privateers
have been very troublesome on the banks and have committed great
depredations among the fishermen, notwithstanding I have dispatched the menof-war as they arrived to the different parts of the fishing bank to cruize for their
protection. It gives me great concern to be obliged to inform your Lordship that
the privateers cruizing in these seas are greatly superior in number and size to
the squadron under my command and without a large force is sent out to me, the
bank fishery is at a stand." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 69 (Montagu to Germain).
The "privateers" which most worried the admiral at this time were the frigates
Hancock and Boston.) In August, Commodore Collier having learned of a
projected expedition against Nova Scotia from Machias, sailed for that place with
the Rainbow, 44, the frigates Blonde, 32, and Mermaid, 28, and the brig Hope,
18. An important object of the enterprise was to serve as a diversion in favor of
General Burgoyne, then approaching Saratoga. Collier's squadron arrived in
Machias Bay on the 13th and the frigates anchored, as there was not water
enough for them to ascend the river. The Hope, however, was sent up, and a
contemporary account says that her commander, Lieutenant "Dawson, kept
under Way till he came opposite a Breastwork thrown up about half a Mile from
the Town, garrisoned with only twelve Men, when he saluted it with a Broadside
which was returned from a two-Pounder and two Swivels several Rounds, when
Dawson sent his Boat to go ashore, but a few of our Men being in Ambush just
where they were about to Land, as soon as they came within Musket-shot an
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Indian, who desired the first Shot, fired and kill'd the Man at the Bow Oar, when
they immediately put back for the Brig. After which a Number of Boats with about
300 Marines and Mariners went ashore and burnt two Dwelling Houses, two
Barns full of Hay and a Grist Mill. By this Time about 150 of the Militia had
Mustered, who attack'd and drove the Enemy off; on seeing which, Dawson
weigh'd Anchor and was endeavoring to get down, when he luckily ran a-ground
and our People attacked him, with Small Arms only, so warmly as not a Man
durst shew his Head above Deck till the above Boats came to tow him off, which
our People beat off, having killed upwards of 60 of the Enemy; and 'tis thought
that if a very thick Fog had not arose, they would have near Kill'd all the Enemy, if
not destroy'd Dawson. Our Loss was only one, Mr. James Foster, Killed, and Mr.
Jonas Farnsworth Wounded, though not dangerous." (Boston Gazette,
September 8, 1777.) The British reported a loss of three killed and eighteen
wounded. The squadron, having accomplished little, got under way a few days
later and sailed back to Halifax. Collier was much criticized for the failure of this
expedition, which, according to General Massey, the commander at Halifax,
"might have prevented the Misfortunes that attend'd Lt. Genl. Burgoyne's Army."
Collier claimed a victory, saying that he took a fort and thwarted American
designs against Nova Scotia (Almon, iv, 139, 140; Amer. Hist. Rev., x (October,
1904), 69; Coll. Maine Hist. Soc., April, 1895; Proc. Cambridge Hist. Soc., v
(1910), 70, 71; N. E. Magazine, August, 1895; Engagements by Sea and Land,
108; Hist. Man. Com., Amer. MSS. in Royal Inst., ii, 156, 209 (Massey to Howe,
November 26, 1777, March 15, 1778)
General Howe took possession of Philadelphia September 26, 1777, and Admiral
Howe, who had brought the British fleet around from the Head of Chesapeake
Bay after landing the army, arrived in Delaware Bay October 4, an advancesquadron of his fleet having preceded him. The Americans, however, still held
the defenses of the river, which prevented the British fleet from approaching the
city and establishing the communications necessary for supplying the British
army. These defenses consisted of forts, obstructions, and vessels. On a small
island near the west bank of the river just below the month of the Schuylkill was
situated Fort Mifflin, and opposite, at Redbank, New Jersey, was Fort Mercer,
while three or four miles below this, at Billingsport, New Jersey, was another fort;
and halfway between these last two was a battery. The obstructions were planted
opposite this lower fort and also between Forts Mifflin and Mercer. They were
heavy frames of timber or chevaux-de-frise sunk in the bottom of the river, from
which projected beams sharpened and shod with iron, pointing downstream. Of
the floating defenses the Continental navy furnished the new frigate Delaware, of
twenty-four guns, and the Andrew Doria, Hornet, Wasp, Fly and Racehorse, with
possibly the Mosquito and Sachem; also the xebecs Repulse and Champion.
The Pennsylvania navy contributed to the cause its whole fleet: the ship
Montgomery and over forty smaller craft, including galleys, armed boats, floating
batteries, and fireships. The frigates Washington and Effingham were up the
river, above Philadelphia, were still unfinished, and could be of no service. The
combined Continental and state fleet was under the command of Commodore
105
John Hazelwood, of the Pennsylvania navy. The British fleet engaged comprised
two ships of sixty-four guns each, one of fifty guns, one forty-four, two frigates,
and a number of smaller vessels, including a ship which carried sixteen twentyfour-pounders. Howe's flagship, the Eagle, of sixty-four guns, remained below,
opposite Chester.
Immediately upon occupying Philadelphia the British erected batteries along the
river-front for the defense of the city. The frigate Delaware, Captain Alexander,
and a number of smaller vessels promptly advanced and opened fire on the
batteries before they were finished. The Delaware anchored within five hundred
yards, and unfortunately, on the ebb tide, she got aground and was exposed to
such a heavy fire from British field artillery that Alexander was induced to strike
his flag and the frigate fell into the enemy's hands; by far the strongest American
ship in the river was thus lost at the very outset. The advance-squadron of the
British fleet, led by the Roebuck, 44, came up the river as far as the lower
obstructions soon after October 1. On that day the fort at Billingsport, being
weakly garrisoned, was abandoned by the Americans on the approach of a
detachment of the enemy's army. Two days later the fort was taken possession
of by the British under the fire of American galleys. Meanwhile the ships had
been and continued to be attacked night and day by American fire-rafts and
galleys and were forced to drop lower down the river. The log of the frigate
Liverpool for October 1 says: "At 7 P.M. the Rebels sent a Large Fire Raft down
the River to burn us & from their Gallies fir'd Several Shot at us; weigh'd & Dropt
a Little lower Down & fir'd a number of Shot at their Gallies." The same log
mentions nine fire-rafts being sent down the river under cover of galleys on the
night of October 14, and other logs note frequent instances. There seems to
have been little difficulty in grappling these rafts from boats and towing them
ashore. Beset with such impediments the British proceeded to remove the lower
chevaux-de-frise and finally succeeded in cutting away a part of it, affording a
passage for their largest ships. On October 15 this passage was made
seventeen fathoms wide, and on the 19th the channel through the obstruction
was buoyed.
By the 22d the fleet had warped through. Late on that day three battalions of
Hessians under Colonel Donop assaulted Fort Mercer at Redbank, but were
repulsed with heavy loss by the garrison of six hundred men under Colonel
Christopher Greene; Donop was mortally wounded. The British attempted to aid
this assault by sending some of their vessels up to bombard the fort. The
Augusta, 64, the Roebuck, the frigates Pearl and Liverpool, the sloop of war
Merlin, and a galley "work'd up the River in order to engage the Rebel Vessels
and prevent their firing on our Troops, who appear'd to be much gall'd from the
Enemies Shipping; 1/2 past 5 the Rebel Galleys &c. began firing on us, which
was return'd by the Roebuck, Augusta & Cornwallis Galley." (Log of the Pearl.)
The British ships were checked by the American fleet, which also greatly
annoyed the Hessians during their advance and retreat. During the night the
Augusta and Merlin got aground. Early the next morning, October 23, Fort Mifflin
106
was attacked by the British fleet and by batteries thrown up on the Pennsylvania
bank of the river. Aided very effectually by the American fleet, the fort made a
successful resistance. About ten o'clock the Augusta took fire, in what way is not
certainly known; she blew up about noon before all her crew could be saved. The
Merlin was set on fire and was also destroyed. Commodore Hazelwood, in a
report to the president of Pennsylvania, says: "On the 22d, about 4 o'clock, the
attack was made on the Fort at red bank, in which a part of our Galleys was
engaged in flanking the Enemy round the works and was of great use there; the
rest of the Galleys and floating batteries were at Billingsport some time before.
The ships that came was the Augusta, a new 64, the Roebuck, 44, two Frigates,
the Merlin, 18 guns, and one Galley of a 32-pounder, all of which we drove down,
and in going down the Augusta and Merlin ran aground below our upper chevaux
de frise, which we discovered early in the morning of the 23d. I immediately
hoisted the signal to engage them and soon after, the engagement became
general. We had engaged our 12 galleys and the two floating batteries and all
behaved extremely well; the rest of our Fleet could not be brought timely to act
with us. We had against us the Augusta of 64, who had her broadside below and
aloft constantly playing on us, with the Roebuck and two Frigates and their
Galley; and had the Roebuck laid fast, she would have shared the same fate, but
she was drove from her station before the Augusta got on fire." (Sparks MSS., 1,
108, 109 (October 29,1777)
After this repulse the British erected more powerful batteries on the shore
opposite Fort Mifflin and mounted on them heavy guns from the fleet. A second
attack was made November 10. On the 15th the fleet came up for a general
assault, and the armed ship Vigilant, mounting sixteen twenty-four-pounders,
was brought into the narrow western channel within a hundred yards of Fort
Mifflin. This stronghold was nearly destroyed by the tremendous bombardment
that now followed, and during the night was evacuated by the garrison, who
passed over to Fort Mercer at Redbank. Commodore Hazelwood and his officers
were criticized for inefficient naval support given to Fort Mifflin. Lack of cordial
cooperation between the Continental and Pennsylvania forces and between army
and navy was doubtless the cause. A few days later Fort Mercer was also
evacuated. The American fleet was now left entirely without protection. Several
of the galleys and smaller vessels of the Pennsylvania navy ran by the city in the
night and escaped up the river. All the others were destroyed to prevent their
falling into the hands of the enemy, who now completely controlled the bay
(Dawson, ch. xxix, xxx; Clark, i, 55-60; Bradford, chs. xxv, xxviii-xxxvii; Almon, v,
426-430, 499-503; Annual Register, xx (1777),133, 134, 137-139; Penn.
Archives, II, i; Mag. Amer. Hist. March, 1878; United Service, September, 1890;
Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April, 1887, April, 1902; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains'
Logs, Nos. 157, 293, 548, 675, 906, 931, 1100 (lop of the Camilla, Eagle,
Liverpool, Pearl, Somerset, Strombolo, and Zebra), Masters' Logs, No. 1633 (log
of the Camilla); Pickering MSS., v, 60. In Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, ch. v, and in
Bradford, are interesting maps.)
107
In December, David Bushnell made an unsuccessful attempt to destroy some of
the British fleet in the Delaware by means of floating torpedoes. In his account of
the affair Bushnell says: "I fixed several kegs under water, charged with powder
to explode upon touching anything, as they floated along with the tide. I set them
afloat in the Delaware, above the English shipping at Philadelphia, in December
1777. I was unacquainted with the river and obliged to depend upon a gentleman
very imperfectly acquainted with that part of it, as I afterwards found. We went as
near the shipping as we durst venture; I believe the darkness of the night greatly
deceived him, as it did me. We set them adrift to fall with the ebb upon the
shipping. Had we been within sixty rods I believe they must have fallen in with
them immediately, as I designed; but as I afterwards found, they were set adrift
much too far distant and did not arrive until after being detained some time by the
frost. They advanced in the daytime in a dispersed situation and under great
disadvantages. One of them blew up a boat with several persons in it, who
imprudently handled it too freely and thus gave the British that alarm which
brought on the battle of the Kegs." (Amer. Philosophical Transactions, iv, 303,
quoted in Clark, i, 71. See Barry, 60.) It was said that the British were
apprehensive of further attempts of the same kind.
The Continental sloop Providence, Captain Rathburne, which had returned to
New Bedford in August, set sail again in November and cruised off the coast of
South Carolina. On a bright moonlight night a sail was seen and "in a few
minutes," says Lieutenant Trevett, "she run under our lee quarter, gave us a
broadside without any courtesy and run ahead of us. Capt. Rathbone ordered the
boatswain to call all hands to quarters as still as he could and not use his call.
The Privateer, as she proved to be, bore away and coming up again was soon
alongside; we were all ready for them and as soon as they made the first flash,
we gave them a yankee welcome with a handsome broadside. They up helm and
ran to the eastward and not having a man hurt of any consequence, we made
sail after them." The chase showed a lantern and we knew by their throwing out
that signal that there was an enemy not far off and we fired no more cannon at
her, but we continued the chase and found we gained on her every hour. Day
appeared and the look-out man reported a large ship under the land . . . About
sunrise we neared the Privateer so much that the Lieut. from the round house
fired several times at us." His fire was returned, "as he made a fine mark to be
shot at, standing on the round house. We had not fired more than three shot
before we saw him fall and instantly the Privateer got in the wind, and we were
alongside of her in a few minutes, when we boarded her and found it was her
Lieutenant we had shot and he fell on the man steering at the wheel. He had a
handsome brace of pistols at his side when he laid dead on deck. We found five
men badly wounded on board; our shot went into one quarter and out through the
other and she was badly shattered. The ship we saw to windward was a frigate
and the officers of the privateer we captured were on board of her the day before
and were to meet her next day off Charleston Bar. We got so far to the eastward
that we stood for Georgetown." (R.I. Hist. Mag., April, 1886.) There the
Providence remained until January.
108
Almost interminable delay seems to have been the universal experience in fitting
out American men-of-war and enlisting their crews; and the Ranger at
Portsmouth was no exception. Captain Jones frequently reported his ship in most
respects ready for sea, but he says that with all his industry he could not get a
single suit of sails completed until the 20th of October. He had perhaps less than
the usual difficulty in enlisting men, and speaks of them as "an orderly and well
disciplined crew . . . of one hundred and forty odd." (Jones MSS., to Morris,
October 30, 1777. For a list of the crew, see Remick, 211.) He finally set sail for
France November 1. On the voyage he took two prizes which he sent into Nantes
and arrived there himself December 2. In his report to the Marine Committee he
says: "I found the Ranger very Crank, owing to the improper quality of her Ballast
and to her being rather over Masted, to remedy which I purpose to shorten her
lower Masts and Ballast with lead." Her sailing "falls short of the general
expectation for the Above reasons and on account of the foulness of her Bottom,
which, except a partial cleaning in July, hath not been seen since she came off
the Stocks." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 137 (Jones to Marine Committee, December
10, 1777)) Jones communicated at once with the American Commissioners,
Franklin, Deane, and Lee, and forwarded the dispatches of the Secret Committee
of Congress (Sands, 70, 71; Jones MSS., August 17, 24, October 30, 1777,
letters to Morris and Hewes; Pap. Cont. Congr., 58, 133, 137, (December 5, 10,
1777, Jones to American Commissioners and to Marine Committee)
In 1777, Congress, through its Committee of Foreign Affairs, had begun to
interest itself in the question of extending the activities of the navy into distant
seas. The hopelessness of coping with the British navy was becoming more
apparent, and visions of the wealth that might be secured from unprotected
commerce appealed to the imagination. In December, 1777, the Committee of
Foreign Affairs suggested to the American Commissioners in Paris that they
send some of the Continental frigates from France to the Indian Ocean, with the
hope of intercepting England's China trade. This project was considered
impracticable by the Commissioners, who had, however, already advised and
continued to urge an attack upon the British whale fishery off the coast of Brazil
and in the Arctic Ocean. The whaling fleet was not only unprotected, but was
manned by Americans, chiefly prisoners who had been given the choice of
serving on these ships or on men-of-war. Notwithstanding these and other
schemes, it does not appear that either public or private ships of war during the
Revolution, with perhaps one or two unimportant exceptions, ever cruised farther
from home than the West Indies and the coast of Europe (Wharton, ii, 325, 440,
673, 818, iii, 385; Archives de la Marine, B1 87, 269.)
109
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER VIII
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1777
From the beginning of the Revolution the eyes of America and of France were
directed towards one another across the sea. With instructions dated March 3,
1776, Silas Deane was sent to France, where he was to seek an audience of the
Comte de Vergennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and attempt to
obtain military supplies for the American army, to be paid for by Congress
(Wharton, ii, 78.) In the very same month Vergennes reminded Louis XVI and his
ministers of the advantages which France might derive from the quarrel between
England and her colonies, and suggested the expediency of encouraging the
Americans even to the extent of advancing secret loans of money and supplies.
This advice on the part of Vergennes was prompted by the report of a secret
agent who had been sent to America in 1775. A paper addressed to the King by
Caron de Beaumarchais, an enthusiast in the American cause, also greatly
influenced French policy at this time. While this policy was plainly dictated by
antipathy towards England and fear of her growing power, it is nevertheless true
that there was in France, more or less widespread, a warm sympathy with the
cause of American freedom (Wharton, i, ch. iv; Narr. and Crit. Hist., vii, ch. i;
Doniol's Participation de la France, i, chs. vii, viii; Hart's American Nation, ix, ch.
xii.)
The aid advanced to the Continental Congress by the French government was
sent through Beaumarchais, and to make the transactions still more secret a
fictitious mercantile house, under the name of Hortalez and Company, was
reputed to carry on the business. In the summer of 1776 Beaumarchais received
from the French government a million francs and another million from Spain, to
be employed in aid of the Americans. Ships were purchased or chartered for the
transportation of military stores. Some of these vessels sailed directly for the
United States and others to the West Indies, where their cargoes were
discharged and exchanged for American produce, which was taken back to
France. Martinique and St. Eustatius were the principal depots for this exchange
in the West Indies. The chief staple in this traffic was tobacco, brought to the
islands in Continental vessels which returned to the United States with the
warlike supplies. A number of French officers also took passage in these ships,
to volunteer in the American service. Some of the vessels were ready to sail in
December, 1776, but were delayed by unforeseen obstacles. Of several ships
that sailed early in 1777 the Amphitrite was perhaps the first and arrived at
Portsmouth in April with a valuable cargo and several officers. Nearly all these
vessels seem to have crossed the ocean safely, but one of the earlier ones was
captured by the British on her return voyage. First and last, large amounts of
110
clothing, artillery, including field pieces from the royal arsenals of France, and
other stores of all kinds found their way to America through the medium of
Hortalez and Company (Wharton, i, 369, 370, 442, 454, ii, 148, 171, 262, 276,
328; Stevens's Facsimiles, 152, 240, 263, 1445, 1552, 1559, 1752; London
Chronicle, July 17, 1777; Channing, iii, 283, 284, 405-408.)
Silas Deane arrived in Paris in June, 1776, and was well received by Vergennes.
He was the sole American agent in France until Arthur Lee came over from
England in December, closely followed by Franklin, who arrived in the Reprisal
from America. These three had been appointed by Congress commissioners for
the supervision and advancement of American interests in Europe. They were
instructed to purchase or hire eight line of battle ships of seventy-four and sixtyfour guns; also a frigate and two cutters (Jour. Cont. Congr., October 3, 22, 1776;
Wharton, ii, 176, 177.)
About the 1st of October, 1776, the letter of marque schooner Hawke, Captain
John Lee, of Newburyport, arrived at Bilbao in Spain, having captured five
English vessels which she sent back to America, keeping some of the prisoners.
These persons entered a protest through the British consul at Bilbao. Captain
Lee was accused of piracy and with his vessel and crew was detained in port.
Deane having made application in his behalf to Vergennes, the French
government interceded with Spain with the result that the Hawke was released.
(Annual Register, xix (1776), 261; Wharton, ii, 174,175,195, 208, 379; Stevens,
587, 589, 590.) In November, 1776, a French vessel arrived at Alicante in Spain
and reported having met, off the Rock of Lisbon, "a North American armed vessel
which forcibly put on board of her 11 Sailors, part of crews belonging to two
English vessels, which she had seized on 12th Nov. about 25 Leagues W. of said
Rock. This Pirate is a sloop called the Union, belong[ing] to Cape Ann, of 10
Carriage Guns, 8 Swivels & 40 Men. Comd. by Isaac Soams, she had capt. 3
other ships, of which 2 sent to Cape Ann, another in ballast let go." (Brit. Adm.
Rec., Consuls' Letters, No. 3837 (November 26, 1776.)
The commercial house of Joseph Gardoqui and Sons of Bilbao had long had
business connections in the American colonies, and during the war the
Revolutionists had a firm friend in Diego Gardoqui, the head of the house, who at
the same time had influence with the Spanish court. His aid was apparent in
obtaining loans from Spain and even more so in extending a helping hand to
American ships of war and privateers cruising in European waters. He secured
their friendly reception and the disposal of their prizes in Bilbao and other
Spanish ports, generally with success during the earlier years of the war at least,
in spite of the strenuous protests of the British ambassador at Madrid. His
services were especially important and valuable at a time when the Americans
most needed friends in Europe, that is, before the French alliance. No doubt he
took an interest and, though keeping himself in the background, an active part in
procuring the release of the privateer Hawke, detained at Bilbao (Wharton, i, 442,
ii, 292, 308, 315, 405, 424, 533; Channing, iii, 283,284.)
111
The Reprisal, Captain Wickes, was the first vessel of the Continental navy to
arrive in European waters, although probably several privateers besides the
Hawke and Union had preceded her. The prizes taken by the Reprisal on the
passage over and brought into Nantes were probably the first American captures
sent into French ports. The Committee of Secret Correspondence had written to
the American Commissioners in Paris: "We desire you to make immediate
application to the court of France to grant the protection of their ports to
American men-of-war and their prizes. Show them that British men-of-war, under
sanction of an act of Parliament, are daily capturing American ships and cargoes;
show them the resolves of Congress for making reprisals on British and West
India property, and that our continental men-of-war and numerous private ships
of war are most successfully employed in executing these resolutions of the
Congress; show them the justice and equity of this proceeding and surely they
can not, they will not refuse the protection of their ports to American ships of war,
privateers and prizes." They were also, if possible, "to obtain leave to make sale
of those prizes and their cargoes." If successful in these applications, they were
to "appoint some person to act as judge of the admiralty, who should give the
bond prescribed for those judges, to determine in all cases agreeable to the rules
and regulations of Congress." (Wharton, ii, 179.)
The arrival at Nantes of these first American prizes brought forth from Lord
Stormont, the British ambassador, a vehement protest. In an interview with
Vergennes, December 17, 1776, Stormont said he expected that the Reprisal's
prizes would "be immediately restored to their owners; . . . that it was a clear and
indisputable Principle [of the law of nations] that no Prize can be a lawful one that
is not made by a ship who has either a Commission or Lettre de Marque from
some sovereign Power." Vergennes replied that France must be cautious about
exposing her trade to the resentment of the Americans, but that treaties with
England would be observed. The Treaty of Utrecht, concluded between France
and England in 1713, expressly closed the ports of either power to the enemies
of the other. Stormont said that England might have to issue letters of marque,
because it was "next to impossible for our Frigates alone to get the better of the
numberless small American vessels with which the seas swarmed and which
greatly distressed our Trade. [He] added that the Difficulty was considerably
encreased by France and Spain receiving these Armateurs into their Ports, which
was a step . . . never expected, as it was the General Interest of all civilized
Nations to give no Refuge or Assistance to Pirates." (Stevens, 1392 (Stormont to
Weymouth, December 18, 1776.) On a later occasion Vergennes asked if such
letters of marque would be authorized to search neutrals, as to which Stormont
was without the information necessary for a definite answer. Vergennes was
apprehensive of results that might follow to French Commerce, especially the
shipment of supplies to America, from the inquisitorial zeal of British privateers. A
number of British agents were employed in France to collect intelligence for their
government, and through them Stormont was kept advised of much that was
going on. The transactions of Hortalez and Company were known to him, and the
connection of the French government with that establishment was doubtless
112
surmised. The delay in shipping stores to America was chiefly due to the
ambassador's protests and to efforts to elude his vigilance. In reply to his
complaints, January 28, 1777, about the sailing of the Amphitrite and other
French vessels for America, Vergennes professed complete ignorance and
promised to bring the matter to the attention of the King and his Prime Minister,
the Comte de Maurepas. Soon after this Maurepas declared to Stormont that,
while he had heard that some French merchants were intending to send cloth to
San Domingo which Americans might perhaps purchase there, he did not believe
any military stores were being shipped. It was impossible, he said, to prevent
private trade, but an inquiry into the alleged transactions had been ordered
(Stevens, 1418, 1427 (Stormont to Weymouth, January 29, February 5, 1777) ;
Proc. U. S. Naval Institute, xxxvii (September, 1911), 937, 938.)
As soon as she could refit, after her arrival in France, the Reprisal sailed on a
cruise in the Bay of Biscay and returned to L'Orient in February. On the 14th,
Wickes reported to the commissioners: "This will inform you of my safe arrival
after a tolerable successful cruise, having captured 3 sail of Brigs, one snow and
one ship. The Snow is a Falmouth Packet bound from thence to Lisbon. She is
mounted with 16 guns and had near 50 men on board. She engaged near an
hour before she struck. I had one man killed. My first Lieut. had his left arm shot
off above the elbow and the Lieut. of Marines had a musquet ball lodged in his
wrist. They had several men wounded, but none killed . . . Three of our prizes are
arrived and I expect the other two in to-morrow." (Hale's Franklin in France, i,
114.) In due time Stormont was informed of these proceedings and, February 25,
he called upon Vergennes, intending to demand "the Delivery of these Ships with
their Crews, Cargoes, &c."; but the French minister said "that immediately upon
the Receipt of this News, a Resolution was taken to order the American Ship and
her Prizes instantly to put to Sea and that orders were given in Consequence,"
and added that these directions had probably already been carried out.
Vergennes also said that instructions had been issued "not to suffer any
American Vessel to cruise near the Coast of France." (Stevens, 14, 38 (Stormont
to Weymouth, February 26, 1777.) On March 4, Stormont complained that the
Reprisal was still at L'Orient and that two of the prizes had been sold. Vergennes
doubted the sale of these vessels and declared that the Reprisal had been
ordered to sail immediately, although Captain Wickes had asked to be allowed to
make necessary repairs first (lbid., 1442 (March 5, 1777.) Two weeks later
Stormont sent a memorandum to Vergennes setting forth that the orders of the
French government had been disregarded, that the Reprisal was still at L'Orient,
careened and undergoing repairs, and that all five of the prizes had been sold
and must have been sold with the knowledge and consent of the French
commissary at L'Orient. The immediate departure of the Reprisal and the
restoration of the prizes, which had all been sold to Frenchmen, was demanded
(lbid., 1483 (Stormont to Vergennes, March 18, 1777.) Vergennes admitted that if
these prizes, sailing under French colors and manned by French crews, should
fall in with British cruisers, they might rightfully be taken. "Property cannot be
altered by such sales; you would restore us the sailors." (Stevens, 1484
113
(Stormont to Weymouth, March 19, 1777.) Through M. de Sartine, the Minister of
Marine, an investigation of the affair was made, but no satisfactory explanation of
the condemnation and sale of the prizes could be furnished (lbid., 1536 (Sartine
to Vergennes, May 22, 1777.) Meanwhile the American Commissioners had at
the outset disclaimed responsibility. February 20 they wrote: "We have ordered
no Prizes into the Ports of France, nor do we know of any that have entered for
any other purpose than to provide themselves with necessaries, untill they could
sail for America or some Port in Europe for a Market . . . The Reprisal had orders
to cruise in the open Sea and by no means near the Coast of France." If she "has
taken a Station offensive to the Commerce of France, it is without our Orders or
Knowledge and we shall advise the Captain of his Error." They had been
informed, they said, that the cruise had been on the coast of Spain and Portugal
(lbid., 644.) In April they wrote to the Committee of Secret Correspondence of
Congress that bringing the prizes "into France has given some trouble and
uneasiness to the court and must not be too frequently practiced." (Wharton, ii,
287. See Wickes's letters in Hale, i, 115, 119, 120.)
An early move in the direction of American expansion and the acquisition of
territory beyond the seas was taken by the commissioners in Paris when in
January, 1777, the following warrant was issued by them to the Baron de
Rullecourt: "We the undersigned Commissioners Plenipotentiary of the United
States of North America do in their Name & by their Authority take you into the
Service of the sd States as Chief of a Corps which you are to raise & Command
agreeable to the Plan by you delivered, respecting the Islands of the Zaffarines,
understood to be disowned & deserted." The Zaffarines were off the coast of
Morocco. Rullecourt was authorized to fortify and defend the islands and to raise
the American flag and fight under it. He and his officers were to be naturalized as
American citizens. To defeat this scheme it was proposed to the British
government to induce Morocco to seize the islands, when Spain would probably
interfere and they would be occupied by one or the other power. Apparently the
enterprise was soon abandoned (Stevens, 4 (warrant), 54, 144 (P. Wentworth to
Earl of Suffolk, March, 3, 5, 1777), 651 (map.)
Among the seafaring men who found their way from America to Europe during
the Revolution and entered the service of the commissioners was Samuel
Nicholson, a brother of Captain James Nicholson. He received the commission of
lieutenant in the Continental navy, and later that of captain. Nicholson was
directed by Franklin, January 26, 1777, "to proceed to Boulogne and there
purchase, on as good terms as possible, a cutter suitable for the purpose of
being sent to America. . . . Should you miss of one at Boulogne, proceed to
Calais and pursue the same directions. If you fail there, pass to Dover or Deal
and employ a person there to make the purchase." (Wharton, ii, 254.) In
pursuance of these instructions Nicholson got to England before meeting with
success. Being in London he wrote to Captain Joseph Hynson, February 9, 1777:
"I came to town 12 OClock last Night, my Business are of such a nature wont
bare puttg to Paper. Shall say nothing more, but expect to see you Immediately. I
114
shall leave Town early the Morrow Morning, therefore begg You will not loose A
Minutes time in Coming here, as I have business of Importance for you, wch
must be transacted this Day." (Stevens, 9.) A week later Nicholson and Hynson
were in Dover together and there evidently purchased a cutter, which was called
the Dolphin and was to be used as a packet. February 17, Nicholson sailed her
over to Calais. Hynson still remained in Dover, but went over to France a few
days later, apparently in a sloop which sailed the 22d. Lord North was promptly
advised by one of his agents of the presence in England of these two Americans.
Hynson was a brother-in-law of Captain Wickes, and was employed by Silas
Deane in the mercantile affairs of the commissioners. His zeal for the American
cause was unquestioned, but all the while he was secretly in the service of the
British government. Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, an Englishman, was intimate with
Hynson and drew much information from him, which from time to time he
forwarded to London. A number of agents were employed who watched the
movements of Wickes, Nicholson, and other captains, as well as of the American
Commissioners in Paris, and reported the doings of Hortalez and Company, the
arrival of American vessels, and other items of news. The Massachusetts state
cruisers Freedom and Massachusetts, which arrived in the spring of 1777, were
kept under observation, but as they had sent their prizes back to America, they
did not so much disturb the Englishmen in France (Stevens, 9.)
William Hodge, a Philadelphia merchant who had come to France by way of
Martinique with dispatches from Congress, was employed by the commissioners
in the purchase of vessels for the naval service. On this errand he proceeded to
Dunkirk, where in April a lugger was bought which was called the Surprise
(Wharton, ii, 162, 181, 261, 283, 287, 380. Deane says the Surprise was bought
in Dover; Conyngham says in Dunkirk. An socount in Nav. Inst., xxxvii, 938,
based on the archives at Dunkirk, differs slightly but not essentially from the
above.) Meanwhile Gustavus Conyngham, an American mariner of Irish birth,
who had been sent out from Philadelphia to procure military supplies, had come
to Dunkirk from Holland, having also visited London. He seems to have been
recommended to the commissioners by Hodge as a capable man to take
command of the Surprise. They accordingly filled out for him one of the blank
commissions they had received for that purpose, signed by the President of
Congress and dated March 1, 1777. The Surprise was fitted out, armed with ten
guns, and got to sea about the 1st of May. In a few days she returned to Dunkirk
with two prizes, one of them an English mail packet from Harwich. The British
ambassador saw Vergennes and Maurepas, May 8, and they were obliged to
yield to his demands. The Surprise was seized, her captain and most of his crew
were put in prison, and the prizes released. Conyngham's commission was sent
to Versailles and was not returned to him; it was alleged that the French ministry
endeavored to persuade the American Commissioners to repudiate this
document. Apparently the French were willing in this way to sacrifice
Conyngham's good name in aid of their policy, which was to avoid a rupture with
England until the time was ripe for it. However, they refused to deliver him in
person to his enemies. Stormont recorded with satisfaction: "The Success of my
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application with regard to the Dunkirk Pirate has been highly displeasing to
Franklin and Deane. They made strong Remonstrances, but were given to
understand that there are some things too glaring to be winked at." (Stevens,
1533 (to Weymouth, May 14, 1777.) Vergennes wrote to the Marquis de Noailles,
the French ambassador at London, that Conyngham's prizes had been restored
to the British, not "for love of them, but only to do homage to the principles of
justice and equity"; and that gratitude on the part of England was not to be
expected (Ibid., 1546 (June 7, 1777.)) It was not long before the American
Commissioners procured an order for the release of Conyngham and his crew,
but so far as concerned the latter it was not at once executed for fear that the
crew would disperse, and they were needed to man a cutter which Hodge had
purchased at Dunkirk. This vessel was named the Revenge and carried fourteen
guns. Meanwhile Stormont continued to complain that both in France and in the
French West Indies vessels were fitted out and manned with French sailors
under American captains, given American commissions, and then cruised
against British commerce. If boarded by a British man-of-war, the crews would all
talk French and show French papers and nothing could be proved against them.
Vergennes promised to have these abuses corrected, and Sartine, the Minister of
Marine, issued orders to prevent the fltting-out of vessels with American
commissions in the French West Indies. Vergennes thought Stormont showed
want of consideration in keeping spies in French ports (lbid., 159, 245, 690,
1529, 1530, 1531, 1543, 1548, 1551, 1552, 1553, 1555; Nav. Inst., xxxvii, 938941; Almon, v, 143, 146,176; Williams, 200, 201; Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biog.,
January, 1899; Outlook, January 3, 1903.)
The Continental brig Lexington, Captain Henry Johnson, sailed from Baltimore,
February 27, 1777, and arrived in France early in April. Johnson had been
captured the year before in the privateer Yankee and had escaped from a prison
ship. Upon his return to America he had been given a Continental commission.
The American Commissioners in Paris now planned to send the Reprisal,
Lexington, and Dolphin on a cruise along the shores of the British Isles. George
Lupton, one of the Englishmen in France engaged in watching the course of
events, wrote May 13 to William Eden of the foreign office in London: "I have at
last with some certainty discovered the intended voyage of Nicholson, Weakes &
Johnson; they have all sail'd from Nantes and mean if possiable to intercept
some of your transports with foreign troops, but in what place or latitude cannot
say." (Stevens, 158.) It is probable that the squadron did not sail quite as early as
this. The orders for the cruise issued by Wickes, who was senior officer, to
Johnson and Nicholson were dated May 23. The ships were not to separate
"unless we should be Chased by a Vessel of Superior Force & it should be
Necessary so to do for our own preservation." In such an event "you may
continue your Cruize through the Irish Channel or to the North West of Ireland, as
you may Judge Safest and best, untill you Arrive off the Isles Orkney and there
Cruize 5 or 6 Days for the Fleet to Come up & join you. If they do not appear in
that time You may make the best of your Way back for Bilboa or St Sebastian &
there Refit as fast as possible for Another Cruize, informing the Honourable
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Commissioners of your Safe Arrival and the Success of your Cruize." Prizes were
to be sent into Spanish or French ports, all the prisoners having been taken out.
"The Prize Master must not Report or Enter her as Prize, but as An American
Vessel from a port that will be most likely to gain Credit according to the Cargo
she may have on board . . . Be Very Attentive to your Signals and if you should
be taken, you must take Care to Distroy them . . . Take care to have all the
Prisoners properly Secured, to prevent their Rising & taking your Vessel, & if you
meet a Dutch, French, Dean, Sweed, or Spainish Vessel, when you have a
Number of Prisoners on board, I think it would do well to put them on board any
of those Vessels, giving as much provision and Water as will serve them into
Port. If any of your prizes should be Chased or in danger, they may Run into the
first or most Convenient Port they Can reach in France or Spain, prefering
Bilboa, St Sebastians, L'Orient, or Nantz. . . . If you take a prize that you think
worth Sending to America, you may dispatch her for Some of the Northern Ports
in the Massechusets States." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 41, 7, 145.)
The squadron cruised a month, and while they missed the linen ships which they
had hoped to capture, several prizes were made in the Irish Sea, and the Dolphin
took a Scotch armed brig after a half-hour's engagement. Upon his return to
France Wickes wrote to the Commissioners from St. Malo, June 28, informing
them of his "safe arrival at this port yesterday, in company with Capt. Samuel
Nicholson of the sloop Dolphin. We parted from Capt. Johnson the day before
yesterday, a little to the east of Ushant. Now for the History of our late cruise. We
sailed in company with Captains Johnson and Nicholson from St Nazaire May
28th, 1777. The 30th fell in with The Fudrion [Foudroyant, 84,] about 40 leagues
to the west of Bellisle, who chased us, fired several guns at the Lexington, but we
got clear of her very soon and pursued our course to the No West in order to
proceed round into the North Sea." The squadron fell in with several French,
Portuguese, and Dutch vessels, and on the 19th of June, off the north of Ireland,
they took their first prizes - two brigs and two sloops. During the following week
they cruised in the Irish Sea and made fourteen additional captures, comprising
two ships, seven brigs, and five other vessels. Of these eighteen prizes eight
were sent into port, three were released, and seven were sunk, three of them
within sight of the enemy's ports. June 27 "at 6 a. m. saw a large ship off Ushant;
stood for her at 10 a.m. [and] discovered her to be a large ship of war standing
for us; bore away and made sail from her. She chased us till 9 p. m. and
continued firing at us from 4 till 6 at night; she was almost within musket shot and
we escaped by heaving our guns overboard and lightening the ship. They pay
very little regard to the laws of neutrality, as they chased me and fired as long as
they dared stand in, for fear of running ashore." (Hale, i, 122.) One of the prizes,
taken in the Irish Sea and released, had been sent into Whitehaven full of
prisoners, including a hundred and ten seamen besides a number of women and
children. During the exciting chase described by Wickes the Dolphin sprung her
mast, but also got safely into St. Malo, and the Lexington into Morlaix. Lupton
wrote to Eden, July 9: "These three fellows have three of the fastest Sailing
Vessell in the employ of the Colonies and its impossiable to take them unless it
117
Blows hard." (Stevens, 179.) The squadron required refitting and the Reprisal a
new battery (Hale, i, 120-124; Almon, v, 174,175; Wharton, ii, 379, 380; Boston
Gazette, October 6, 1777; Stevens, 61, 154, 175, 178, 680, 703, 1437, 1521,
1539.)
An earlier visit of American cruisers to the coast of Ireland was reported in a
letter from Galway: "Two American privateers [the Rover and Montgomery],
mounting 14 guns each and as many swivels, put in here to procure some fresh
provisions and water. On being supplied with such necessaries as they wanted,
for which they paid in dollars, they weighed anchor and sailed, after being in the
bay Only 24 hours. During the short time the Captains were on shore they
behaved with the greatest politeness . . . The crews that came on shore with
them were dressed in blue uniforms with cockades and made a genteel
appearance, but were all armed with pistols, &c. They had been out from
Philadelphia ten weeks and had taken only four prizes, which they had sent to
America." (Boston Gazette, June 2, 1777; London Chronicle, March 29, 1777.)
Another letter, from Kinsale, says: "Two fishing boats, who came in here
yesterday, brought on shore the crew of a ship taken by an American privateer
off Bristol Channel. The privateer made a signal to the fishing boats, which they
thought signified their want of a pilot . . . and accordingly went on board them,
having sent the vessel the day before for France. The privateers' people behaved
very well to the fishermen, paid them for what fish they took, and the Captain
gave them a cask of brandy for their trouble in coming on board. She was called
the Resolution, mounted fourteen guns and had one hundred and ten men when
she left New England, but at that time not above eighty, on account of the
number they had put on board their prizes, having taken five already." (Almon, v,
174.)
The presence of American armed vessels in British waters caused apprehension
among the English. In April, while Wickes's squadron was fitting out, Stormont
had information, which he believed reliable, that eight or ten French ships under
American commanders were preparing for descent upon Great Britain and that
Glasgow was likely to be attacked (Stevens, 1519.) "It is true," says a
contemporary chronicler, "that the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland were
insulted by the American privateers in a manner which our hardiest enemies had
never ventured in our most arduous contentions with foreigners. Thus were the
inmost and most domestic recesses of our trade rendered insecure, and a
convoy for the protection of the linen ships from Dublin and Newry was now for
the first time seen. The Thames also presented the unusual and melancholy
spectacle of numbers of foreign ships, particularly French, taking in cargoes of
English commodities for various parts of Europe, the property of our own
merchants, who were thus seduced to seek that protection, under the colours of
other nations, which the British flag used to afford to all the world." (Annual
Register, xxi (1778), 36.) Insurance rose very high, which of course was one
inducement for English merchants to ship their goods in foreign bottoms. In July,
1777, the British Admiralty stationed four ships in the Irish Sea for the protection
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of the coasts of England and Ireland (Wharton, ii, 168, 254, 391; Williams, 209.
For rates of in. surance, see Channing, iii, 389, note.)
The British ambassador in France was fully informed of the purchase and fittingout of the Revenge at Dunkirk and made strenuous efforts to have the
proceeding stopped. It was necessary, therefore, to use circumspection in
managing the affair, and this Hodge did by making a fictitious sale of the vessel
to an Englishman, who guaranteed that she would go to Norway on a trading
voyage. Nevertheless Captain Conyngham and his crew of a hundred and six
men, including sixty-six French, and, according to English report, "composed of
all the most desperate fellows which could be procured in so blessed a port as
Dunkirk," (Almon, v, 173.) were put on board. The Revenge then hastily put to
sea, before she could be detained in port or stopped off the harbor by an English
captain who had threatened to seize and burn her. Conyngham had been given a
new commission, dated May 2, 1777, and instructions "not to attack, but if
attacked, at Liberty to retaliate in every manner in our power - Burn, Sink &
destroy the Enemy." The Revenge sailed July 16, and the next day, the captain
says, was "attackd, fired on, chased by several british frigatts, sloops of War &
Cutters." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biog., January, 1899, Conyngham's narrative.)
She escaped, however, and made a cruise in the North Sea, Irish Sea, and
Atlantic, taking many prizes. One of these was recaptured by the British, who
found on her a prize crew of twenty-one, including sixteen Frenchmen.
Conyngham landed on the coast of Ireland for water and sailed for the Bay of
Biscay, putting into Ferrol. From here and from Coruna he cruised successfully
the rest of the year, sending his prizes into Spanish ports (Penn. Mag., January,
1899; Outlook, January 3, 1903; Nav. Inst., xxxvii, 941, 942; Stevens, 200, 274,
1556, 1560, 1569, 1575, 1582,1589,1593,1594.)
The cruises of the Reprisal, Lexington and Dolphin, and of the Revenge, brought
forth renewed protests from Stormont and more or less lame excuses and
promises of increased vigilance from Vergennes. The latter reproached the
American Commissioners for failure to keep their cruisers away from French
ports. They expressed concern at the continued presence of these vessels in
forbidden waters, and explained that they had been driven in by the enemy's
men-of-war. Hodge was arrested and thrown into the Bastile, where he was
confined several weeks. He was well treated, however, and finally released at the
solicitation of the Commissioners. The Reprisal, Lexington, and Dolphin were
ordered to be sequestered and detained until sufficient security could be
obtained that they would return directly to America. But in regard to captures
Vergennes was indisposed to yield too far, and represented to the King that if he
should consent "to compel the surrender, without examination, of the prizes that
American privateers may bring into his ports, to the owners who may have been
despoiled of them, it will have the effect of declaring them and their countrymen
to be pirates and sea-robbers." (Stevens, 706 (August 23, 1777.) The account of
England against France was to a slight degree offset by the case of an American
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sea captain in Cherbourg who was enticed on board a British vessel in the
harbor. and then seized and carried off a prisoner (Ibid., 180, 701, 1562, 1574,
1578, 1588, 1591, 1594, 1596, 1597, 1646, 1654, 1694; Wharton, ii, 364, 365,
375, 377, 381, 406; Nav. Inst., xxxvii, 942-947; Adams MSS., William McCreery
to Adams, Nantes, September 29, 1777. See Almon, ix, 201-241.)
After being driven into port at the end of their cruise around Ireland, Captains
Wickes and Johnson were employed several weeks in refitting their damaged
vessels, the Reprisal at St. Malo and the Lexington at Morlaix. The Dolphin was
converted into a packet, for which service she had been purchased in the first
place. Stormont's demands became too insistent to be longer evaded, and in July
the commissioners issued peremptory orders for the Reprisal and Lexington to
proceed directly to America and to cruise no longer in European waters (See
Wickes's letters in Hale, i, 125-128.) In September the ships were ready for sea.
Wickes wished to make the voyage in company with Johnson, but they did not
meet, and each sailed forth alone, marked out for disaster. The Reprisal,
homeward bound, was lost on the Banks of Newfoundland and all on board,
except the cook, it is said, went down with her. Wickes was one of the best
officers in the Continental navy and his loss was irreparable. The Lexington, on
September 19, two days out of Morlaix, fell in with the British ten-gun cutter Alert,
Lieutenant Bazeley, who says in his report: "I gave chace at five in the Morning
and came up with him at half past seven, had a close Engagement till ten, when
He bore up and made Sail; as soon as I got my Rigging to rights, again gave
Chace and came up with him at half past one, renewed the Action till half past
two, when he Struck." (Stevens, 1695.) The Lexington lost seven killed and
eleven wounded; the Alert, two killed and three wounded, one of them mortally.
According to the log of the Alert, the Lexington carried fourteen four-pounders,
two sixes, twelve swivels, and eighty-four men. The Alert carried ten fourpounders, ten swivels, and sixty men. Apparently on the authority of Richard
Dale, an officer on the Lexington, it is said that she was short of ammunition,
which would account for her striking to an inferior force. Several letters were
captured on the Lexington, but the most important papers, including dispatches
to Congress, were thrown overboard before the surrender. A report, fortunately
untrue, that Captain Johnson had been killed in the action, added to the
depressing effect of the ship's loss upon Franklin and other Americans in France
(lbid., 181, 703, 1572,1583, 1654,1677,1685, 1686, 1699,1708; Almon, v, 362;
Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 51 (log of Alert); Boston Gazette, January
12,1778; Port Folio, June 1814.
Captain Hynson's service in the American cause came to an end in the fall of
1777. During several previous months various plans for sending him to America
with cargoes of stores and dispatches had been made by Deane, and plots for
intercepting him and turning his employment to the advantage of the British had
been laid by Colonel Smith. Hynson was to have sailed as a passenger in March,
and Smith made arrangements to have his vessel captured soon after leaving
port. Stormont feared that Hynson was too much under Deane's influence to be
120
trusted. Owing to various circumstances the different plans made during the
spring and summer fell through. In October, Deane sent to Hynson a packet
containing dispatches for Congress which were to be conveyed to America by a
vessel commanded by Captain John Folger of Nantucket, about to sail from
Havre. Hynson delivered the parcel to Folger as instructed, having first, however,
removed the dispatches, which were turned over to British agents. In due time
this transaction became known to Deane, who expressed his opinion of it in
appropriate terms in a letter to Hynson. Upon his arrival in America, Folger was
suspected of the theft, which was then first discovered, and he was kept in prison
about six months. Deane was suspected by Arthur Lee, and this circumstance
may have served to protect Hynson. These intercepted letters, together with
those captured on the Lexington, gave the British a good deal of information
about the American Commissioners' plans. Shortly before this another vessel
with dispatches from Congress to the commissioners had narrowly escaped
capture and the dispatches had been thrown overboard (Stevens, 51, 52, 53, 64,
165, 166, 167, 181, 193, 203, 205, 208, 269, 472; Wharton. ii, 468; Lee MSS.,
October 7, 1777, January 5,12,17, April 18,1778.)
The Continental sloop Independence, Captain Young, arrived at L'Orient late in
September and disposed of two prizes before the English had time to interfere.
She was followed shortly after by the Raleigh and Alfred. The Randolph came in
December. These vessels do not seem to have cruised in European waters,
presumably on account of the necessity, which the French government felt, of
pacifying England. Stormont protested against their remaining in port, and they
sailed for home early in the following year. The Ranger also arrived in December.
Captain Jones had hoped to be the first to bear the glorious tidings of Burgoyne's
surrender, but he was forestalled by a special messenger in a swift packet
(Stevens, 204, 274, 1708, 1799, 1808 Wharton, ii, 428.)
American privateers were very active in foreign waters during the year 1777, and
displayed boldness and enterprise in pursuing the enemy close to his own
shores. They cruised all about the British Isles, in the North Sea and the Bay of
Biscay, and in the West Indies. The British stationed men-of-war in the English
Channel for the protection of commerce (Stevens, 47; Almon, v, 144.) The
Americans were well rewarded for their activity and sent in many a rich prize.
Captain Lee of Newburyport, who had been charged with piracy at Bilbao the
year before, sent safely into port a vessel which was said to be the most valuable
prize taken during the war up to that time (Boston Gazette, September 8, 1777.)
On the other hand, the risks were great, and many of these predatory American
cruisers were captured by the British (lbid., August 18, 1777; London Chronicle,
April 12, 22, July 22, 26, 31, August 5, 1777; Almon, v, 168.) The Republic, 24,
was wrecked on the Orkney Islands and all hands were lost (Boston Gazette,
December 22, 1777; Continental Journal, December 25, 1777.) Until summer
probably all the American privateers in European seas came out from home with
commissions. In December, 1776, the Committee of Secret Correspondence had
written to the commissioners in Paris that "Congress approve of armed vessels
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being fitted out by you on continental account, provided the court of France
dislike not the measure, and blank commissions for this purpose will be sent you
by the next opportunity. Private ships of war or privateers cannot be admitted
where you are, because the securities necessary in such cases to prevent
irregular practices cannot be given by the owners and commanders of such
privateers." (Wharton, ii, 231.) But by the following May the views of Congress in
this regard had undergone a change, and in response to a request of Franklin
and his associates, "commissions for fitting out privateers in France" were sent
(Wharton, ii, 249, 314. )
Every visit of an American armed vessel to a port of France was brought to the
attention of the French government by the British ambassador. A letter from
Guernsey, June 5, says: "An American privateer of twelve guns came into this
road yesterday morning, tacked about on the firing of the guns from the Castle,
and just off the Island took a large brig bound for this port, which they have since
carried into Cherburgh. She had the impudence to send her boat in the dusk of
the evening to a little island off here . . . and unluckily carried off [two officers]
who were shooting rabbits for their diversion. Two gentlemen of consequence
are gone to Cherburgh to demand them." (Almon, v, 143.) The prize, being
ordered away on her arrival at Cherbourg, was sold outside the harbor (Stevens,
1599.) In July the General Mifflin, a twenty-gun ship from Boston commanded by
Captain Daniel McNeill, sailed into the harbor of Brest and saluted the French
admiral. After a consultation of the admiral with his officers, this salute was
returned and naturally became the subject of complaint and international
correspondenee (Almon, v, 203; Stevens, 1599; Wharton, ii, 381.) Vergennes
wrote to Noailles, August 16, that the General Mifflin had been allowed to put into
Brest on account of a leak and that he had not heard of the salute; and he added
that French cruisers were employed in keeping "off all privateers from our
latitudes and . . . we have at the mouth of the Garonne a frigate whose only duty
is to protect there English commerce." (Stevens, 1651.) Stormont also
complained of the General Mercer and Fanny, which had brought two
Jamaicamen into Nantes; these prizes were afterwards given up for having been
falsely declared as American vessels (lbid., 1661, 1664, 1801; Wharton, ii, 381,
496.) The privateer Civil Usage took a French ship from England with a Spanish
cargo, for which the commissioners apologized to the King of Spain, and in other
instances, such as the seizure of a Dutch vessel, irritation was caused (Stevens,
1745; Wharton, ii, 429, 430, 431, 435; Lee MSS., Gardoqui to Lee, October 27,
1777.) Consequently the commissioners sent a circular letter, dated November
21, to the captains of American armed vessels: "Complaints having been brought
to us of violences offered by American vessels armed in neutral nations, in
seizing vessels belonging to their subjects and carrying their flag and in taking
those of the enemy while they were under the protection of the coasts of neutral
countries, contrary to the usage and custom of civilized nations; these presents
are to request you not to commit any such violations contrary to the right of
nations, but to conform yourselves to the express powers in your commissions,
which is to limit yourselves to the capture of such vessels at such times as they
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shall not be under the protection of a port, river, or neutral coast, and confine
yourselves only to seizing such ships as shall have on board soldiers,
ammunition, provisions, or other contraband merchandizes destined for the
British armies and vessels employed against the United States. In all other cases
you will respect the rights of neutrality as you would yourselves expect
protection, and treat all neutral vessels with the greatest regard and friendship,
for the honour of your country and that of yourselves." (Almon, v, 509. See
Appendix IV.)
The privateer brig Oliver Cromwell, Captain William Cole, of Beverly, carried
sixteen guns and a hundred men and cruised in the Bay of Biscay. August 4,
1777, and again on the 6th, she was chased by a sixty-gun ship, and not only
escaped, but during the chase captured two brigs, one of which "was formerly an
American Privateer called the Montgomery, mounting 18 Guns, taken & carried
into Gibralter, Capt. Fibby Commander. She had Several Laidys on Board boun
to Lisbon, whom we determined to take on Board us &, together with all our other
Prisoners, land them (as they were effectionately desireous of it) on the British
Shore. But at 3 P.M. saw 2 Brigs which we bore away for, and not knowing what
they might prove to be, ordered Capt. Gray to keep away from us on a westward
Course. Out Oars (being a small Breeze) & rowed towards them. They kept near
each other & hove too and formed in a Posture of Battle to receive us. Every
Thing being prepared for Battle, we advanced; one of them gave several Sho[t],
which we took no Notice of till we came nigh enough to give her 2 Broad Sides,
She continuing her Fire. By our well directed Fire She was compelled to strike to
us & earnestly beg of us to desist our Fire on her. Our Capt. then ordered to bear
away for the other Brig, which orders were immediately complyed with. We then
charged the other with an incessant Fire for almost 3 Glasses. She returned our
Fire for some Time with Spirit, but being disanabled, wore off. The other which
fell a Stern & notwithstanding she had fairly struck to us, yet seeing her Partners
Fire, she worried us with her Bow Chacers, but did us no Damage. But now our
Officers began to think of the Man of War, which had been in Chace all Day &
was now reasonably expected to be near up with us; therefore being dark, they
rightly judged it best to give over the Assault for this Night, least falling in
between three of them we must be obliged to submit, & so altered our Course."
Two days later the Oliver Cromwell fell in with a fleet of British transports
convoyed by three men-of-war. August 16 she took three prizes, and a week
later was at Bilbao, where she found the Civil Usage and another American
privateer. The Cromwell returned to America by a southerly route, and by the
middle of October was not far from the Canary Islands. On the 16th she saw a
sail which gave chase. "Discovered her to be a Frigate. Now she began to fire at
us; many of her Shot went over us. Several struck our Hull & Sails. We hove our
Guns overboard & stove some Water & by that means got a little from her." The
next day, "the Man of War in Chace hard by. We Rowed & kept at a Distance."
October 18, "lost sight of the Man of War." (Essex Inst. Coll., July, 1909; Boston
Gazette, December 15, 1777; London Chronicle, September 2, 1777. See
further, for movements of American privateers in foreign waters, Boston Gazette,
123
October 6, 13, 1777; London Chronicle, July 24, August 5, 1777; Almon, v, 171,
176; Stevens, 1551, 1650.)
The American Commissioners in Paris endeavored to carry out the instructions of
Congress, which called for ships of the line and other vessels to be built,
purchased, or hired in France, but met with difficulties. The French government
positively refused to sell or loan eight ships of the line, on the ground that they
could not be spared from their navy, as the possibility of trouble with England
made any reduction of their defensive force inadmissible at that time. This was a
great disappointment, as it had been confidently believed that the British
blockade of the American coast could be successfully broken by these heavy
ships together with the thirteen Continental frigates, all of which it was hoped
would soon be at sea. The project was formed of procuring three ships in
Sweden, of fifty or sixty guns each, but no move appears to have been made to
carry it through. In addition to purchasing and fitting out the Dolphin and Surprise,
whose service was very temporary, and the Revenge, the commissioners
provided for three larger vessels during the year 1777. A frigate was built at
Nantes, of five hundred and fifty tons and designed to carry twenty-four twelvepounders, eight fours, and two sixes. This vessel was called the Deane, and
when finished was commanded by Captain Samuel Nicholson. While she was
under construction the Dolphin was kept at Paimboeuf, according to information
furnished to Stormont, serving as a receiving ship, on board of which Nicholson
held about seventy men, including a number of Englishmen, ready to be
transferred to the Deane when finished; but this was denied by Sartine. Another
vessel, somewhat smaller, was purchased, fitted out as a twenty-eight-gun
frigate, and called the Queen of France. The commissioners also began the
construction in Holland of a forty-gun ship called the Indien, but owing to
international complications she was sold to the King of France (Wharton, ii, 176,
177, 230, 277, 284, 285, 433; Stevens, 187, 493, 683, 1658, 1766, 1826; Lee
MSS., January 21, 1778, May 2, 1779.)
Attempts were made to interest other European nations in the American cause
and to obtain the privilege of entering their ports, refitting armed vessels in them
and disposing of prizes. Arthur Lee visited Spain and Prussia with hopes of
securing concessions of this sort, but he found both these powers very desirous
of maintaining amicable relations with England. The same cautious attitude
marked the policy of Holland. In Spain, however, owing largely to the influence of
Gardoqui, powerful though unobserved, the Americans found less difficulty, for a
time at least, in refitting their cruisers and disposing of their prizes than in France.
The disposition of Spain is indicated in a letter, dated October 17, 1777, from
Count Florida Blanca, the Prime Minister, to the French ambassador at Madrid, in
which he says that a long duration of the American war would be "highly useful"
to Spain and France. "We should sustain the Colonists, both with effectual aid in
money and supplies," and with "prudent advice"; at the same time England
should be kept pacified (Stevens, 1725.)
124
The situation of the United States from a naval point of view at the end of 1777
was not altogether encouraging. The bright hopes of the year before were in
large degree unrealized. Of the thirteen frigates which were to dispute the naval
supremacy of England in American waters, or at least to keep open some of the
principal harbors and bays, only four, the Hancock, Boston, Raleigh, and
Randolph had yet got to sea; and one of these, the Hancock, had been taken by
the enemy. Of the remaining nine, the Delaware, together with several smaller
vessels, had been lost in the unsuccessful defense of the Delaware River.
Philadelphia in addition to New York had fallen into the hands of the enemy,
whose occupation of these two cities made impossible the escape of four other
frigates; in consequence of which, two of these vessels, the Congress and
Montgomery in the Hudson, had already been destroyed in October, while the
Washington and Effingham in the Delaware were awaiting the same fate. This
still leaves four, of which the Warren and Providence were blockaded in
Narragansett Bay and the Virginia in the Chesapeake, while the Trumbull
continued to lie in the Connecticut River, unable to pass over the bar. Of the
more important smaller Continental vessels, the Andrew Doria had been
destroyed in the Delaware River, the Cabot and Lexington had been captured by
the enemy, and the Reprisal had been lost at sea. The only naval vessel
captured during the year, the frigate Fox, had been retaken by the British.
To offset, though only partially, these heavy losses, the navy had made a few
acquisitions. In addition to the frigates just mentioned and the vessels procured
in Europe, the Ranger and sloop Surprise (Not to be confounded with
Conyngham's lugger Surprise) were in active service, and a brigantine called the
Resistance went into commission about the end of the year. Of two of the three
ships of the line authorized by Congress in 1776, something is learned from
information furnished to Admiral Howe by a prisoner at Boston, who says "that he
saw the Keel and Floor-Timbers laid for a 74 Gun Ship, building at North End in
Boston, The Scantlings whereof appeared scarce sufficient for a Frigate; And
only 12 Men were at work upon her. He was informed another Ship of the same
Class [the America] was building at Portsmouth in New Hampshire, but did not
hear any further particulars concerning her. By another person released from
Portsmouth and arrived about the same time at New York, this last Ship is said to
be covered in as high as the Lower Deck and proposed to be finished in next
May." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488. Intelligence received December 25,1777.)
Work on the Boston seventy-four was probably soon abandoned, and the third
ship of this class, which was to have been built at Philadelphia, may never have
been begun. Sixty-nine letters of marque were issued to private vessels of war by
the Continental Congress in 1777 and probably a still larger number of privateers
were commissioned by the individual states; and many were fitted out in the
West Indies.
In 1777 the British navy had in commission two hundred and fourteen vessels,
besides ships in ordinary and under repair, the whole manned by forty-five
thousand seamen and marines. It is difficult to state the exact force in American
125
waters. The figures furnished by Admiral Howe's returns and by other authorities
vary slightly and of course the number of ships was changing from time to time.
There were about eighty vessels of all classes on the North American Station in
1777. About half the fleet consisted of frigates and rather less than a quarter of
ships mounting sixty-four, fifty or forty-four guns, the rest being sloops of war and
smaller vessels. There was also a squadron at Newfoundland and a fleet of
nearly twenty in the West Indies. Altogether, therefore, more than a hundred
vessels were stationed in American waters. Many privateers were sent out of
New York (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 487, January 15, No. 4, June 8, 1777, No. 30:
Disposition of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in North America; Schomberg, i,
436, iv, 324-331; Beatson, iv, 291.)
Although the Americans inflicted so little injury upon the British navy, the activity
of some of the smaller Continental cruisers and of the state navies and numerous
privateers had dealt a heavy blow at English commerce. Four hundred and sixtyfour vessels were taken from the British during the year 1777, of which seventytwo were recaptured, twelve destroyed, and nine released (Almon, v, 76, 108,
405, 513, vi, 39; Clark, i, 62, ii, 169. These lists are doubtless inaccurate and
incomplete.) The Continental navy alone made over sixty captures of
merchantmen (Neeser, ii, 286.) The British may have made about as many
captures as the Americans, but doubtless a large proportion of their prizes were
small coasting vessels of little value (Almon, v, 168, 231; London Chronicle, July
15, 1777; Annual Register, xxi (1778), 36. The lists cover only a part of the year,
See table of captures in Clowes, iii, 396, evidently based on incomplete data.) It
is impossible from available data to make a correct statement of actual or
comparative losses by capture.
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER IX
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1778
Notwithstanding the reverses of the Americans on land and sea during the
previous year, it is evident that the British, about the beginning of 1778, were
finding the subjugation of their revolted colonies a serious undertaking, and were
apprehending a still more stubborn resistance on the part of the rebels
encouraged by their one notable success at Saratoga. The French alliance with
the United States, which soon followed, must have increased this feeling and
have emphasized the need of energetic measures. A little later Lord George
Germain, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, sent to General Clinton,
who had succeeded Howe, these secret instructions, dated March 8, 1778: "If
you shall find it impracticable to bring Mr. Washington to a general & decisive
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Action early in the Campaign, you will relinquish the Idea of carrying on offensive
Operations within Land & as soon as the Season will permit, embark such a
Body of Troops as can be spared from the Defence of the Posts you may think
necessary to maintain, on Board of Transports under the Conduct of a proper
Number of the King's Ships, with Orders to attack the ports on the Coast from
New York to Nova Scotia," and to destroy all ships and other property alongshore
wherever practicable, "so as to incapacitate the Rebels from raising a Marine or
continuing their Depredations upon the Trade of this Kingdom." Two armaments
were recommended, one from New York, the other from Halifax, to attack
Connecticut and New Hampshire and then unite against Boston (Stevens, 396,
1062; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 96; Sparks's Washington, v, 549.) The services
of the army seem to have been required on land, and the commerce and
privateering of New England were spared the annihilation which a rigorous
prosecution of this plan must have entailed. The project plainly indicates a keen
appreciation on the part of the British ministry of the telling effect upon their
commercial interests of American privateering. About the middle of March, as
soon as the British government had been officially notified of the treaty of
alliance, Lord Stormont was recalled from Paris and war with France became
inevitable, although it was delayed a few months and then began without formal
declaration. Orders were sent to the British army to evacuate Philadelphia and
fall back on New York.
Meanwhile the Americans were striving to make the most of their slender
resources upon the sea. Another expedition to New Providence was undertaken
early in 1778, this time by a single ship, the sloop Providence, which had visited
the place two years earlier as one of Commodore Hopkins's squadron. The
Providence was now commanded by Captain John P. Rathburne and carried a
crew of about fifty men. About the middle of January she sailed from
Georgetown, South Carolina, where she had put in early in the winter. The next
morning after getting to sea, says Lieutenant Trevett, "at daylight saw a sail to
the eastward and then saw two more; they proved to be British, a ship, brig and
sloop. They gave chase and the ship gained on us fast; by two P.M. we could
see her tier of guns. Night coming on and very dark, we took in all sail and put
out our lights and in a few hours, being lighter, we could see her and she passed
us and when she was out of sight we altered our course and in the morning could
not discover a single sail. We had hove over so much of our wood, water, &c., in
order to lighten ship, that we concluded to make all sail for Abaco. We had a
short passage, came to anchor and went to work making a scaling ladder. In two
days after, we stood over to New Providence, having sent down our topmast and
topsail yard and housed our guns ; we also kept all our men out of sight. About
midnight we got abreast of the harbor with a light air of wind off the land." A force
of twenty-eight men under Trevett's command was sent ashore. "We took
nothing with us to eat or drink, but filled our pockets with ball cartridges. We
landed about a mile from the Fort and got our scaling ladder and all things
ready." The sentinels having been taken by surprise, the landing party soon had
possession of Fort Nassau. Several guns were found loaded, with matches
127
burning by them. Two British ships were in the harbor. "We employed the
remainder of the night in placing some of the heavy pieces of cannon to point on
the different streets of the town and on the ships. When daylight appeared we set
our thirteen stripes flying at the fort." (R.I. Hist. Mag., July, 1886.) Upon
requisition a breakfast was provided for the party and an officer and two men
were sent to take possession of Fort Montague at the eastern end of the town,
four miles distant. This was accomplished and the guns were spiked. A
midshipman and four men were then sent in a boat, seized for the purpose, to
one of the English vessels, a sixteen-gun ship, and to this small force the officer
in command, seeing the American flag on the fort and the guns pointing at him,
surrendered with his crew of forty-five. Five other vessels in the harbor, prizes
brought in by the British, were recaptured. The report had been concocted for the
occasion and disseminated among the inhabitants that the Providence was
merely one of an American fleet at Abaco, and the number landed was also
greatly exaggerated; this made easier the exploits of the very small detachments
sent out by Trevett. An armed force of about two hundred of the inhabitants
collected with the purpose of attacking the fort, but they were induced to desist
by the threat of the Americans to burn the town.
A British sloop of war appeared off the harbor, but being warned away by signals
and fired upon by the fort, she stood out again to sea, remaining in the offing. On
the morning of January 30 the prizes were manned and the expedition sailed
away, taking off thirty Americans released from prison and valuable military
stores, including sixteen hundred pounds of powder. In this affair no blood was
shed and no private property on the island was disturbed. Two of the prizes,
being of little value, were burned; the others were sent into port. The ships sailed
north and soon became separated. Having joined company again, the
Providence and the armed prize ship went into New Bedford together early in
March (R. I. Hist. Mag., July, October, 1886; Clark, i, 74; Almon, vi, 99; Boston
Gazette, March 9, 1778; Pap. Cont. Congr., 44, 10, 17, 21, 23 (January 29,
February 21, May 11, 1778); Mar. Com. Letter Book, 143 (April 22, 1778).)
The frigate Randolph, after a very short stay in France, returned to America
about the first of the year, apparently sailing directly for South Carolina, whence
she had so recently come. A squadron was organized at Charleston, with
Captain Biddle in command, composed of the Randolph and four vessels of the
South Carolina navy, three of them being privateers taken temporarily into the
state service. These four vessels were the ship General Moultrie, 18, and the
brigs Notre Dame, 16, Polly, 16, and Fair American, 14. One hundred and fifty
South Carolina troops served on the squadron as marines. According to the
statements of British prisoners in Charleston the Randolph carried twenty-six
twelve-pounders, six six-pounders, four coehorns in each top, and upwards of
three hundred men, one third of them tolerable seamen; the General Moultrie
carried twelve short and six long six-pounders, and eighty men; the Notre Dame,
sixteen sixes and a hundred and twenty men; the Fair American, twenty guns
and a hundred and twenty men (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, February 13,1778;
128
Stevens, 811; Paullin, 430.) This armament put to sea February 12, 1778, in
search of a number of British vessels that had been cruising along the coast, but
it was soon found that the enemy had departed. The squadron then sailed for the
West Indies and cruised several days to the eastward of Barbadoes, taking one
small schooner. On the 7th of March, in the afternoon, the Randolph, in company
with her consorts and prize, sighted a large man-of-war to windward, which
turned out to be the British sixty-four-gun ship Yarmouth. This vessel came down
before the wind and when within hail, about eight P.M., was first discovered to be
a two-decker. The Randolph in reply to her hail hoisted her colors and gave the
Yarmouth a broadside. Early in the engagement Captain Biddle was wounded in
the thigh, but continued in command, seated in a chair on deck. The General
Moultrie took part in the action, but being to leeward and near the Randolph, fired
into her by mistake, and it was thought possible that Biddle was wounded by one
of her shot. The other vessels were not engaged. The Randoph's fire was rapid
and accurate. According to a letter of Captain Hall of the Notre Dame, she
handled the Yarmouth "so roughly for 12 or 15 minutes that the British ship must
shortly have struck, having lost her bowsprit and topmasts and being otherwise
greatly shattered, while the Randolph had suffered very little; but in this moment
of glory, as the Randolph was wearing to get on her quarter, she unfortunately
blew up." (Independent Chronicle, August 13, 1778.) Captain Vincent of the
Yarmouth reported March 17 to Admiral Young, at Barbadoes, that "on the 7th
instant at half past five P.M. discovered six sail in the S.W. quarter, on a wind
standing to the northward; two of them ships, three brigs and a schooner. We
were then 50 leagues due east of this island. We immediately bore down upon
them and about nine got close to the weather quarter of the largest and
headmost ship. They had no colours hoisted and as ours were then up, I hailed
her to hoist hers or I would fire into her; on which she hoisted American and
immediately gave us her broadside, which we returned, and in about a quarter of
an hour she blew up. It was fortunate for us that we were to windward of her; as it
was, our ship was in a manner covered with parts of her. A great piece of a top
timber, six feet long, fell on our poop; another large piece of timber stuck in our
fore top-gallant sail, then upon the cap. An American ensign, rolled up, blown in
upon the forecastle, not so much as singed. Immediately on her blowing up, the
other four dispersed different ways. We chased a little while two that stood to the
southward and afterwards another that bore away right before the wind, but they
were soon out of sight, our sails being torn all to pieces in a most surprising
manner. We had five men killed and twelve wounded. But what I am now going
to mention is something very remarkable. The 12th following, being then in chase
of a ship steering west, we discovered a piece of wreck with four men on it
waving; we hauled up to it, got a boat out, and brought them on board. They
proved to be four men who had been in the ship which blew up and who had
nothing to subsist on from that time but by sucking the rain water that fell on a
piece of blanket which they luckily had picked up." (London Chronicle, May
26,1778; Almon, vi, 143; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 1091 (log of the
Yarmouth) ; Port Folio, October, 1809.) The rest of the squadron with the prize
arrived safely in port. The loss of another frigate was a severe blow to the
129
Continental navy and to the country, but the loss of Captain Biddle was far more
serious. While only in his twenty-eighth year, he had given strong indications of
ability as a seaman and officer, and of character as a man. Having served as a
midshipman in the British navy in his youth, he had the military and naval training
which was lacking in nearly all the American seamen of that period. With the
exception of John Paul Jones, it is probable that Biddle had no superior in the
service. If four men as good as these two and Wickes and Conyngham had been
given constant employment throughout the war in ships like the Randolph or
Hancock, perhaps the history of the Continental navy might have been different.
The frigates Raleigh and Alfred, having made the voyage to France together in
the fall of 1777, set sail in company December 29, homeward bound. When it
had become evident to the American Commissioners at Paris that the times were
not propitious for the cruising of Continental ships in European waters, they had
addressed a letter of advice, dated November 25, 1777, to Captain Thompson of
the Raleigh, suggesting a circuitous passage back to America. "As it is by no
means safe to return into the ports of France, you will calculate your stores so as
to have a sufficiency for your cruise, which we cannot indeed be particular in the
direction of. It has been suggested that one or more of the India ships returning
may be intercepted, that part of the West India homeward-bound ships may be
expected about this time, as well as transports returning from New York and
elsewhere in America, and that by cruising in the proper latitudes you may meet
with them; that the British factories and commerce on the African coast at this
time lie without any force sufficient to protect them, and that by running along that
coast you may greatly annoy and distress the enemy in that quarter and
afterwards go for the West Indies. As you and Captain Hinman have already
considered these several plans for a cruise, we leave with you to determine
which to prefer and the manner in prosecuting either, or any other that may
appear more likely to answer the design of your commission. We are happy in
observing the harmony and confidence which subsists between you and Captain
Hinman and hope the same prevails between your officers and men, which we
are certain you will cultivate through the whole of your expedition, in which we
recommend to you to avoid giving any offense to the flags of neutral powers and
to show them proper marks of respect and friendship . . . Whenever you judge it
prudent to dismiss prisoners subjects of his Britannic Majesty, we advise you to
take from them in writing an acknowledgment of their having been your
prisoners, their quality, place of residence, and that they are dismissed by you in
confidence that an equal number of the subjects of the thirteen United States of
the same rank, that now are or may hereafter be prisoners to his said Britannic
Majesty, will be set at liberty. You are also to deliver a copy of such writing to the
prisoners, enjoining them to deliver the same on their arrival in Britain to the lords
of the British admiralty, and by the first opportunity enclose a duplicate to the
committee or board of marine in Boston and another to us, with an account of
your proceedings." (Wharton, ii, 428; Lee MSS., November 25, 1777;
Independent Chronicle, April 9,1778.) The commissioners' hopes in regard to the
exchange of prisoners were doomed to disappointment.
130
The Raleigh and Alfred sailed for the West Indies by way of the coast of Africa,
and captured a British vessel off Senegal. By March 9, 1778, according to
Captain Thompson's report, they had reached latitude 16° 31' north, longitude
55° 40' west, and at Six A.M. two Sail to the west northwest were seen from the
Raleigh. At half-past seven she hove to for the Alfred; the strange ships were
then standing to the north, close-hauled. Captain Thompson directed Captain
Hinman to run down and observe the sternmost ship. At ten o'clock, being within
five or six miles, it was plainly seen that the strangers were armed. The Raleigh
and Alfred then hauled on the wind on the same tack with the other ships, which
were to leeward. Thompson thought that this manoeuvre would give him more
time to discover their force and rate of sailing. The strange ships then tacked,
,trying to work up and get our wakes." The Raleigh sailed as well as they, while
the Alfred fell off to leeward and astern. "As the weathermost ship pass'd under
the Alfred's lee, standing to the Southward on the third tack, Capt. Hinman
hoisted his colours and fired several shot, which were returned under English
colours. They were then two miles apart and the other ship four miles to leeward
of her consort; the Alfred was about three miles astern of us." The Raleigh was
about to tack and stand towards the Alfred, so as to attack the weathermost ship
in company with her, before the other could get up; but just then, half-past
twelve, the Alfred stood off before the wind, which was light from the east
northeast, and set all her light sails in the effort to escape. The Raleigh had an
equal chance to attack one or to escape from both ships, but "the Alfred was
neither able to engage one nor to escape by sailing." Thompson regretted that
the Alfred attempted to escape, as it was evident that the leeward ship, then
bearing southwest, would cut her off before she could pass her or the Raleigh
give assistance. The Raleigh did not go about, but hauled up her courses,
thinking the windward ship would stand for her; but "they both made towards the
Alfred. I then ordered the master to veer and make sail towards the Alfred and
run between her and the other ship, to take off her fire and give the Alfred an
opportunity to escape." The Alfred at first seemed to gain on the British, "but in a
few minutes the two got up and began a furious fire, which was return'd by the
Alfred as fast as they could. Just as we had got studdingsails hoisted we had the
mortification to see the Alfred haul down her colours. It was then one o'clock; the
firing lasted about ten minutes. We were then within three miles of the ships."
There was nothing then left for the Raleigh, in the captain's opinion, but to
escape from a superior force, and she hauled to the north. The sea being smooth
the British soon finished taking possession of the Alfred and began to chase the
Raleigh, and gained on her. When night came she edged away and set all her
light sails. The British chased all night by a bright moon. At daylight they were
four or five miles away and at seven o'clock seemed to be gaining. The Raleigh,
by throwing overboard all she could spare and starting her water, was lightened
about thirty-five tons and began to gain. At ten o'clock the British gave up the
chase, after nineteen hours. One of them sailed faster than the other, but would
not come up alone, often heaving to and waiting for her consort (Continental
Journal, April 30, 1778.)
131
These British ships were the Ariadne, 20, and the Ceres, 16. Captain Pringle of
the Ariadne reported to Admiral Young: "The two strangers at first shewed a
disposition to attack us, but in consequence of the King's ships having brought
the stern-most to close action about noon, the other made off. The ship in action,
after having given to and received from the Ariadne and Ceres some broadsides,
struck; and proved to be the rebel ship Alfred, of 20 nine-pounders and 180 men.
Her consort was the Raleigh of 82 guns." (London Chronicle, May 26,1778;
Almon, vi, 144; Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 4141 (log of the Ceres.)
The Raleigh arrived at Portsmouth early in April. Captain Thompson's report no
doubt put his conduct in the most favorable light, but did not save him from
severe censure. By proper management it was believed that not only should the
Alfred have been saved from capture, but both the British vessels, so inferior in
force, should have been taken. Captain Hinman's judgment might reasonably be
questioned on two points: first, his running off to leeward in a vain attempt to
escape, thereby removing himself from the support of the Raleigh; second, his
surrender after such a very brief resistance, while there was a chance of the
Raleigh's coming to the rescue. As to the subsequent conduct of the Raleigh, it is
not inspiring to think of her precipitate flight from two small ships mounting about
the same number of guns that she did and probably lighter ones. Captain
Thompson was doubtless a good seaman, not lacking in physical courage, and
zealous in the cause; but without military sense and unequal to the
responsibilities of the situation.
Early in March the Frigate Warren, Captain John B. Hopkins, blockaded in the
Providence River, escaped through the British fleet in Narragansett Bay. John
Deshon, of the Eastern Navy Board, wrote to the other members of the board,
March 9: "Respecting the Ship Warren I am happy She so well Succeeded in
geting out of this river. Every Circumstance Combined in her Favour that She
might Clear of the Enemy; the night was Exceeding Dark, and there was but little
wind untill the Crittecal time of Passing the Greatest Danger, when the wind
Shifted very Suddenly into the N.W. and blowd Exceeding hard, so that the
Enemy Could not without the Greatest Difficulty Get under Sail and Persue. I was
at Warrick Neck and up the Most part of the Night when the Warren Passed and
am Very Sure it was Imposable for Captn Hopkins to gain the Port of N. London,
there being So much wind and the weather so Severe Cold. There [were] on
board the Warren abt 170 men, manny of which had not a Second Shift of
Cloaths, therefore it will be Very Difficult as well as Teadius for Captn Hopkins to
beat this Courst at this Severe Season; the Orders Given him by me you have
with you, which Gives him not the least Encouragement to Cruise. Nevertheless
Should the Ship Keep out this three weeks, I Shall not be in the least uneasy abt
her; well Knowin the men in no Condission to Beat a Winters Courst, we have
Succeeded beyound Expectation in Geting her out and I have not the least Doubt
but She will in due time Return with honor to the Commander and his Compy."
After a short cruise the Warren put into Boston, March 23. Two days later William
Vernon wrote from Providence: "This moment several of the Ship Warrens Men
132
came to Town from Boston, who inform me they Arrived There last Monday; and
in passing the Enemys Ships in this River . . . they sustained some damage, their
Mizen Yard shot away, Main yard wounded, several shot passed through their
Hull, one Man only sleightly wounded. The Wind blowing and continueing fresh at
N.W., the Crew badly Clothed and Weather extreem Cold, were under the
Necessity of standing to the Southward in warmer Weather under easie sail far
as the Latt. 24°, where they fell in with the Ship Neptune, Capt. Smallwood, from
Whitehaven bound to Phila., Loaded with Salt and dry Goods." This ship and
another prize were taken and the Warren then sailed for Boston. The Columbus
also tried to escape from Narragansett Bay, but was chased ashore on Point
Judith and burned (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 214 (March 9, 1778), 215, 229
(March 25, 1778), 230, 231, 233; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, Nos. 55, 57, March
16, April 23, 1778; Continental Journal, March 26, 1778; Independent Chronicle,
April 9, 16, 1778.)
The next vessel to attempt the perilous feat of blockade-running was the frigate
Providence, and she succeeded. William Vernon wrote to John Adams: "The
30th of April we sent down the Providence, Capt. Whipple, having on board
about 170 men, who was ordered to the flrst Port in France he cou'd make, to be
under the direction of the Commissioners, where we hope she is safe Arrived. No
dispatches was sent by this ship, as she was to pass a dangerous passage;
however, in a brisk Wind & dark Night she got out safe, receiveing a heavy fire
from the Lark, wch was the uppermost ship, who's Fires he returned with Spirit &
good effect, Kill'd a Number & Wounded many Men, much disabled the Ship; the
lower-most Ship by this alarm was prepared to receive the Providence, who was
obliged to pass her very near, gave her their Fire, that was returned with good
success." (Adams MSS., May 20, 1778.) Having reached the open sea, the
Providence sailed for France. The frigate Trumbull, unable to pass over the bar
at the mouth of the Connecticut River, remained in the river during the whole
year. William Vernon wrote, March 25, 1778, that "she must be intirely stript of
her Yards and Top Mast and all her Story, even to a Swept Hole, that if possible
to bring her to 9 or 10 feet Water." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 212, 214, 229, 230,
231, 232; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 136, 147, 148 (April 6, May 8, 9, 1778)
The frigate Virginia, Captain James Nicholson, which had been repeatedly
ordered to sea, and had been waiting nearly a year for a chance to run the
blockade in Chesapeake Bay, finally got away from Annapolis, Maryland, March
30, in company with a brig which had on board a pilot in whom Nicholson had
confidence. At three o'clock the next morning, however, the frigate ran on a
shoal. She was forced over, but lost her rudder and was thereupon anchored,
leaking badly. At daylight two British men-of-war were discovered, one of them
only two gun-shots distant. Nicholson and nine men, with the ship's papers, went
ashore in a boat and the Virginia was then surrendered to the enemy. Nicholson
afterwards went aboard one of the British vessels in order to parole his officers.
He was not court-martialed for the loss of his ship, but Congress instituted an
inquiry and acquitted him of blame (Penn. Packet, April 15, 1778; Mar. Com.
133
Letter Book, 124, 129, 138, 150 (January 28, March 4, April 8, May 16, 1778)
Barney, 65, 66.)
Captains John Barry and Thomas Read had in 1776 been appointed to
command the frigates Effingham and Washington, which since the occupation of
Philadelphia by the British had been bottled up in the Delaware River above the
city. The officers and men, therefore, unable to get to sea, had been employed
on shore and on the river in cooperation with the army and in the defense of
Delaware Bay in the fall of 1777. January 29, 1778, Barry was ordered by the
Marine Committee to command a boat expedition down the river and bay, for the
purpose of annoying the enemy, capturing or destroying their transports if
possible, and cutting off their supplies and diverting them to the use of the
Continental army, then in desperate straits at Valley Forge. Owing to a quarrel
between Barry and the Navy Board of the Middle District, his selection for this
duty was opposed, but finally, after nearly a month's delay, the matter was
arranged. Towards the end of February, Barry, having manned four of the
frigates' boats, it is said with only twenty-seven men, ran down the river and past
the city at night; below he was joined by five other boats, half-manned. He then
occupied himself with destroying everything along the banks of the river that
could be of use to the enemy and that could not be conveyed to the American
army. On March 7, while at Port Penn on the Delaware shore of the bay, he
captured two ships, one of them armed with six four-pounders, and a schooner
"mounting Eight double fortified four Pounders & Twelve four Pound" howitzers;
the schooner was acting as convoy. The ships were transports, each with a crew
of fourteen men, bringing forage and supplies from Rhode Island to the British
army in Philadelphia; the schooner was manned by a crew of thirty-three. A day
or two later a number of British vessels came up the bay and Barry was obliged
to burn the transports to prevent recapture. He attempted to take the schooner
into Christiana Creek, but being hard-pressed was compelled to run her ashore
and scuttle her. The Marine Committee had hoped to take her into the naval
service, and had given orders for her equipment and employment as a lookout
vessel off the capes. Most of the cargoes of all the vessels were saved and were
purchased for the army, yielding a good amount of prize money. Barry reported
his exploit to General Washington and received a congratulatory letter in reply.
He continued to harass the enemy on the river for another month (Barry, ch. vii;
Boston Gazette, April 6, 1778; Hist. Mag., July, 1859; Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii,
223; Amer. Cath. Hist. Res., April, 1904; Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, app., 197
(December 19, 1777), 152, 2, 367 (March 9, 1778) ; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 125,
126 (January 29, 1778), 134, 135 (March 11, 26, 1778), 143 (April 24, 1778.)
In addition to the frigates Washington and Effingham, a large number of smaller
vessels, including several galleys of the Pennsylvania navy, were blockaded in
the Delaware River above Philadelphia. It had long been feared that the British
would come up the river and capture or destroy these vessels, and General
Washington advised that they be stripped and sunk. The two frigates had already
been sunk and raised again and a number of the smaller vessels were prepared
134
for sinking at short notice. On May 7 the expected British expedition, of seven
hundred men, came up the river, and apparently only a part of the galleys were
sunk in time to be saved. The British force, under Captain Henry, came up in a
brig, a schooner, four galleys, four gun-boats, and eighteen flatboats carrying the
soldiers of the party. Captain Henry says in his report: "At noon we were abreast
of White-hill, where the gallies, armed vessels and gun-boats were placed to
cover the landing of the troops, which was performed without opposition. At this
place the Washington and Effingham rebel frigates, the former pierced for thirtytwo and the latter for twenty-eight guns, were set on fire and consumed, together
with a brig and sloop. The troops then marched, took possession of Borden-town
and destroyed a battery of 3 six-pounders; whereupon the gallies, armed
vessels, &c. proceeded to that place, where they burnt two new ships, one of
which was pierced for 18 guns, one privateer sloop for 10 guns, with ten sail of
brigs, schooners and sloops." (Almon, vi, 149.) Farther up the river many other
vessels were burned as well as a large amount of public property on shore. "The
whole number of vessels destroyed was forty-four sail." The expedition returned
to Philadelphia May 9. Fifty-eight guns of these sunken and destroyed vessels
were afterwards raised by the Americans (Ibid., 148-150; Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D.
488, May 10, 1778; Hist. Mag., July, 1859; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878,
Matthewman's Narrative; Barry, ch. viii.)
Thus a series of misfortunes befell the Continental navy during the early months
of 1778, the effect of which must have been depressing and naturally caused
some loss of confidence in the commanding officers. Colonel Timothy Pickering
wrote to his brother, April 26, from York, Pennsylvania, the temporary seat of the
Continental Congress: "Our naval affairs have been conducted shockingly. You
will see by the papers how foolishly the Virginia was lost. The Randolph, Capt.
Biddle, has been blown up in an engagement with a large ship in the West
Indies. This misfortune is deeply to be regretted, for Biddle was an excellent &
amiable man and accomplished naval commander. From all that I can learn the
conduct of the other commanders of our frigates has been generally shamefully
bad." (Pickering MSS., v, 76.) One of Pickering's correspondents, in
recommending Captain Fisk of the Massachusetts navy for the command of a
Continental frigate, wrote: "I am confident he wd. not give her away like a Coward
as perhaps has been the case with some others, nor lose her like a blockhead as
M ... did his." (lbid, xvii, 128 (March 30, 1778). Doubtless Manley is meant.)
Another says: "All the men that is got home from the Alfred sayes if Capt.
Thomson had come down they would have Taken ye Two English Ships in one
hours engagement." (lbid., xvii, 147 (May 4,1778.) William Ellery wrote from York,
April 25, to William Vernon: "The Enemies ships do indeed swarm in the Seas of
America and Europe; but hitherto only one of our Frigates hath been captured on
the Ocean. Two have been burned in North River, two sunk in Delaware, one
captured there, and one in Chesapeak. The Alfred we are just informed was
taken on her passage home by two frigates in sight of the Rawleigh. The
particulars of this capture and why she was not supported by the Rawleigh we
are ignorant of. I hope Capt. Thompson is not culpable. I entertain a high opinion
135
of him. The Columbus is a trifling Loss and I should not much lament the Loss of
the Alfred, if her brave Captain, Officers and men were not in the hands of a cruel
enemy. Our little fleet is very much thinned. We must contrive some plan for
catching some of the Enemy's Frigates to supply our Losses; but we must take
care not to catch tartars. It is reported that Capt. Biddle of the Randolph, in an
engagement with a sixty-gun ship, was blown up. We have been so unfortunate
that I am apt to believe almost any bad news; but this report I cannot believe."
(Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 237.) William Story, clerk of the Navy Board at Boston,
wrote to Vernon, April 29: "The doctr. of the Alfred has been at the Board and
gives a particular Accot. of Capt. Thompson's behaviour; he is Condemned by
every One and they are Crying out why don't your board turn him out and hang
him, &c, &c. I am Sorry the Service Suffers by the Misconduct of the officers in
the navy. I want the board should be together to determine concerning Capt.
Thompson." (lbid., 240.) Captain Manley, who had been a prisoner in New York
since his arrival there after the capture of the Hancock in July, 1777, was finally
released and returned to Boston April 21. He was tried by a court-martial in June
for the loss of his ship, and acquitted. Captain McNeill of the Boston was tried for
not properly supporting the Hancock, and was dismissed from the navy. Captain
Thompson was court-martialed and was also dismissed (lbid., 246, 247;
Massachusetts Spy, April 30, 1778; Penn. Packet, July 14,1778; Clark, i, 53;
Mar. Com. Letter Book, 143, 147, 165 (April 28, May 8, July 24, 1778); Pap.
Cont. Congr., 37, 163 (January 15, 1779) ; Jones MSS., September 4, November
15, 17, 1778; Wolcott MSS., June 16, 1778.)
The Continental brigantine Resistance was purchased for the navy in 1777, and
was fitted out at New London. Captain Samuel Chew was given command of her
in June of that year, but she seems first to have got to sea early in 1778. She
mounted ten four-pounder guns, and while cruising in the West Indies, fell in with
a twenty-gun British letter of marque, March 4. After a hard-fought battle, in
which Chew and one of his lieutenants were killed, the vessels parted and the
Resistance returned to Boston. The new sloop of war General Gates got to sea
during the summer and captured two prizes; in the action with one of them,
Captain Skimmer of the Gates was killed (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 92, 93, 94
(June 17,1777), 143 (April 28,1778); New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 9; Adams
MSS., October 2, 1778, Vernon to Adams; Jour. Cont. Congr., September 14,
1778.)
Captain Barry was appointed, May 30, 1778, to command the frigate Raleigh,
Captain Thompson having been relieved. Barry was ordered, August 24 and
again on the 28th, to sail to the southward in the Raleigh in company with the
brigantine Resistance, now commanded by Captain William Burke, formerly in
command of the schooner Warren, of Washington's fleet at Boston in 1776. The
Raleigh and Resistance were at Boston. The Marine Committee apparently had
in mind two other frigates for service in southern waters, with these vessels or
independently. These were the Warren, at Boston, and the Deane, which, after
her completion at Nantes, had come over to Portsmouth under the command of
136
Captain Samuel Nicholson, arriving in May. The instructions sent to Barry
provided for a cruise on the southern coast of the United States, but they were
not carried out; other orders to Barry, issued after he had sailed, also related to a
southern cruise. The Resistance must have sailed before the orders of August 24
reached Boston. She was sent out to look for the fleet of Admiral D'Estaing,
which was expected to arrive soon, but missed it; and then cruising to the
southward she ran into Admiral Howe's fleet and was captured (Mar. Com. Letter
Book, 131 (March 6, 1778), 147, 148, 153, 154 (May 8, 9, 30, 1778), 173, 174
(August 24, 28, 1778), 175, 179a (September 14, 28, 1778); Independent
Chronicle, May 7, 1778; Almon, vi, 195; Amer. Cath. Hist. Res., April, 1904; Publ.
R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 255; Adams MSS., October 2, 1778.)
The Raleigh sailed from Boston September 25 alone, except for two vessels
under her convoy, which apparently soon dropped astern. The wind was fresh
from the northwest, but seems to have died down before night; the Raleigh's first
course was east by south. At noon two sail were sighted at a distance of fifteen
miles to the southeast. The Raleigh hauled to the north, and the strange vessels,
which were the British fifty-gun ship Experiment and the Unicorn of twenty-two
guns, followed in pursuit. The chase continued nearly sixty hours before a shot
was fired, off the coast of Maine. On the morning of September 27 the ships were
not in sight, but reappeared about half-past nine in the forenoon. The wind blew
fresh from the west, and the Raleigh, running off at a speed of eleven knots,
drew away from her pursuers, but in the afternoon, the wind having diminished
again, the Unicorn gained on her. The narrative of two of the Raleigh's officers
says: "At half past four P.M. tacked and stood to the S. westward in order to
discover the headmost ship's force; at the same time saw several islands, but
could not tell the name of either. Our ship being cleared for action and men at
their quarters, about five P.M. coursed the headmost ship [the Unicorn], to
windward athwart her fore foot, on which we hoisted our colours, hauled up the
mizzen sail and took in the stay sails; and immediately the enemy hoisted St.
George's ensign. She appearing to be pierced for twenty-eight guns, we gave her
a broadside, which she returned; the enemy then tacked and came up under our
lee quarter and the second broadside she gave us, to our unspeakable grief,
carried away our fore top-mast and mizzen top-gallant-mast. He renewed the
action with fresh vigor and we, notwithstanding our misfortune, having in a great
measure lost command of our ship, were determined for victory. He then shot
ahead of us and bore away to leeward. By this time we had our ship cleared of
the wreck. The enemy plied his broadsides briskly, which we returned as brisk;
we perceiving that his intentions were to thwart us, we bore away to prevent his
raking us, and if possible, to lay him aboard, which he doubtless perceived and
having the full command of his ship, prevented us by sheering off and dropping
astern, keeping his station on our weather quarter. Night coming on we perceived
the sternmost ship gaining on us very fast, and being much disabled in our sails,
masts and rigging and having no possible view of escaping, Capt. Barry thought
it most prudent, with the advice of his officers, to wear ship and stand for the
shore, if possible to prevent the ship's falling into the enemy's hands by running
137
her on shore. The engagement continuing very warm, about twelve midnight saw
the land bearing N.N.E. two points under our bow. The enemy, after an
engagement of seven hours, thought proper to sheer off and wait for his consort,
they showing and answering false fires to each other." (Pennsylvania Post,
October 19, 1778, quoted in Barry, 94, 95.)
The Experiment soon came up and joined in the fire, and the British tried to cut
off the Raleigh from the shore. "Encouraged by our brave commander, we were
determined not to strike. After receiving three broadsides from the large ship and
the fire of the frigate on our lee quarter, our ship struck the shore, which the large
ship perceiving poured in two broadsides, which was returned by us; she then
hove in stays, our guns being loaded gave us a good opportunity of raking her,
which we did with our whole broadside and after that she bore away and raked
us likewise, and both kept up a heavy fire on each quarter, in order to make us
strike to them, which we never did. After continuing their fire some time they
ceased and came to anchor about a mile distant." (Barry, 96.)
According to the Experiment's log, at quarter before six P.M. on the 27th, the
"Unicorn came to close Action with the Chace, the first Broadside carried away
the Enemys foretopmast and Main top-gallant Mast, at 7 a violent fireing on
board both Ships, 1/2 past 9 the fireing ceased 1/2 an Hour, on which we fired
several Signal Guns & was answered by the Unicorn with Lights & false Fires
bearing N 1/2 E 3 miles, at 10 the Unicorn still in Action, at 11 spoke her & found
the chace close by her, soon after got alongside the Chace, she gave us a
Broadside & we riturned it, she then run upon the Shore, we being close to the
Rocks, tacked & Anchored about 1/2 a Gun Shott from her, as did the Unicorn in
20 fathoms Water; at 5 A.M. the Enemy still on shore on a small barren Island
called Seal Island, the Rebel Colours still hoisted, at 7 weighed and Anchored
near her, fired several Guns & hoisted out all our Boats, Manned & Armed, sent a
Boat ahead with a Flag of Truce to offer them Quarters, on discovering which she
hawled down her Colours, her first Lieutenant and One Hundred & thirty-three
Men were got ashore on the Island, but surrendered on a Summons by Truce."
(Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, No. 331; also No. 1017 (log of the Unicorn).)
The Raleigh had run on a rocky island in or near Penobscot Bay, the identity of
which seems not to have been perfectly established. Barry had at once
proceeded to land his crew, intending to destroy his ship, and before morning he
and eighty-five of his men had escaped in boats to the mainland; but through
negligence or treachery the combustibles prepared for firing the ship were not
ignited. The British soon took possession of the frigate and made prisoners of
those of her crew who had not yet left her. The Raleigh lost twenty-five killed and
wounded. The Unicorn had ten killed and many wounded, and was much injured
in her hull and rigging. Captain Barry with those of his crew who escaped found
their way back to Boston, where they arrived in about two weeks. The British
hauled the Raleigh off the rocks and took her into their service. Barry's reputation
did not suffer from this mishap and he was held blameless by a court of inquiry.
138
In November he was appointed to command a fleet of galleys to be employed in
an expedition against East Florida, but this project was never carried out (Barry,
ch. ix; Dawson, ch. xlii; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 184, 191 (October 25, November
20, 1778); Boston Gazette, October 5,1778; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, October
28,1778.)
The Massachusetts state brigs Tyrannicide, Captain Hamden, and Hazard,
Captain Sampson, sailed late in 1777 on a cruise in the West Indies. Early in
their voyage they took three prizes, but after arriving upon their cruising ground
they had little success. One of the few vessels they saw, wrote Sampson from
Martinique, March 5, 1778, was "a Frigate that we fell in with a few days before
we Arrived here, wch after we boar away for her and discovered her to be a Six &
thirty Gun Frigate and we not thinking proper to engage her, Sheard from her,
wch shee Perseving, gave us Chase, but we soon Run her out of sight ... The
Hazard proves to be a very good Sea-boat & is as Excellent Sailor and works
kindly every way." (Massachusetts Mag., July 1908.) They sailed home March
30, and arrived in May. The brig Massachusetts, Captain Lambert, was ordered
on a cruise to the coasts of England, Spain, and Portugal. In June, Captain Fisk
was appointed to command the Hazard, which Sampson had given up on
account of ill health. Fisk declined the appointment, saying that he would not "go
to sea untill I can git a ship that is able to make some defence against a British
frigate." (Mass. Archives, cliii, 73.) The Hazard was then given to Captain
Williams and he was ordered to cruise for West Indiamen. In August, Captain
Hallet, who succeeded Haraden in the Tyrannicide, was ordered to cruise off
Long Island, but owing to the proximity of the English fleet after the French fleet
had gone to Boston, he "stood away to the Northwd." He fell in with and cruised a
few days with the Continental frigate Warren. Hallet says that on September 25
he saw a sail standing towards him, which "hove out an English Ensign. I gave
her a Bow Chace and English Colours; hail'd her, was answered from St
George's Bay bound to Jersey. I order her to heave out her boat & come on
board me, which she did. I sent a Prize Master who sent the Capt. with his
Papers on board me. I then hoisted an American Jack & ordered her to strike to
the United States, which was complied with." (Mass. Archives, cliii, 110.) The
prize was a British letter of marque brig called the Juno. Early in the year 1778 a
moderate building programme had been planned for the Massachusetts navy,
but was only partially carried out (Mass. Court Rec., January 17, April 21, June
23, 1778; Mass. Archives, cli, 440, 442, 449, cliii, 73, 110,114; Massachusetts
Mag., April, July, October, 1908.)
In Boston Harbor March 23, 1778, were the ships Defence and Oliver Cromwell
of the Connecticut navy; the former, which had previously been rigged as a brig,
carried eighteen six-pounders; the Cromwell, twenty nine-pounders. There were
also in port at the same time three privateer ships, the General Mifflin and
Minerva, of twenty guns each, and the Hancock, of eighteen guns (Brit. Adm.
Rec., A. D. 488, No. 57, April 23, 1778, intelligence collected for Admiral Howe.)
139
Late in March the Defence, Captain Samuel Smedley, and. the Oliver Cromwell,
Captain Timothy Parker, sailed from Boston on a cruise. Near the Bahamas, April
15, they fell in with and captured the British ships Admiral Keppel, 18, and
Cygnus, 16. A seaman on the Oliver Cromwell wrote in his journal: "We gave
chase under a moderate sail. At 9 o'clock came up with them. They at first shew
French colors to decoy us. When we came in about half a mile, they ups with the
English colors. We had Continental colors flying. We engaged the ship Admiral
Kepple as follows: When we came in about twenty rods of her, we gave her a
bow gun. She soon returned us a stern chase and then a broadside of grape and
round shot. Captain orders not to fire till we can see the white of their eyes. We
get close under their larboard quarter. They began another broadside and then
we began and held tuff and tuff for about two glasses, and then she struck to us.
At the same time the Defence engaged the Cyrus, who as the Keppel struck,
wore round under our stern. We wore ship and gave her a stern chase, at which
she immediately struck. The loss on our side was one killed and six wounded,
one mortally, who soon died. Our ship was hulled nine times with six-pound
shott, three of which went through our berth, one of which wounded the
boatswain's yeoman. The loss on their side was two killed and six wounded.
Their larboard quarter was well filled with shott. One nine-pounder went through
her main-mast. Employed in the afternoon taking out the men and manning the
prize." (New London Hist. Soc., II, i, 50, IV, i, 38, 41. The quotation is from the
logbook of Timothy Boardman.) In May the Defence had small pox on board and
put into Charleston, South Carolina. A letter from that place, dated June 26, says:
"On receiving intelligence of several of the Enemy's privateers being on our coast
& annoying our trade with impunity, Capt. Smedley (notwithstanding he was at
the time performing quarantine for the small pox), on an application from His
Excellency our President, fitted out the Defence immediately, being assisted by
Commodore Gillon [and other officers of the South Carolina navy], and last friday
sailed over our Bar in quest of them, having in Company with him a French
Armed Sloop called the Volant, commanded by Capt. Daniel, who voluntarily
offered his service on the occasion. Before night they fell in with Three privateer
Sloops, two of which they took" (Trumbull MSS., viii, 149) and brought into
Charleston. The third sloop escaped. These vessels were from St. Augustine, a
place much frequented by British privateers. The Defence, in company with the
Volant, returned to Boston in August, and in December was sent on another
cruise with the Oliver Cromwell (lbid., xx, 182, xxvi, 42, 46; Independent
Chronicle, August 6, 1778.)
In January, 1778, the American privateer brig General Sullivan, carrying fourteen
guns and a hundred and thirty-five men, had an engagement in the West Indies
with the sixteen-gun Liverpool privateer Isabella, said to have had a crew of only
fifty. They fought two hours and a half yardarm and yardarm and then separated.
The British report says: "The engagement was hot and I believe fatal to them, for
we could see them falling out of the tops and hear their shrieks and groans. It
falling dark and our rigging cut to pieces, we could not work our ship and so lost
our prize." The Sullivan seems to have suffered most severely, having eleven
140
killed and twenty-three wounded, many of them dangerously. The Isabella lost
two killed and ten wounded, one mortally (Williams, 214, 215.)
On the morning of May 26, some distance off the Delaware capes, the British
ship Minerva, carrying sixteen six-pounders, ten coehorns, and forty men, fell in
with an American brigantine mounting fourteen guns, sixes and fours, six
coehorns, and twenty-four swivels. The British account says: "At eight o'clock he
came up with us, it blowing then easy; he kept his head toward us, so that we
could not see his whole force, and we suspected his attempting to board, on
which we fired a cohorn and hoisted our colours. He still keeping his station, we
fired on board of him and opened our stern ports; on seeing this he run up
abreast and gave us a broadside, hoisting the 13 stripes. We returned his
broadside and the action continued for one hour and 57 minutes, having obliged
him to sheer off at ten o'clock. We were in no condition to follow him, 16 of our
crew being killed and wounded, our scuppers on both sides running with blood, I
may say, of as brave men as ever faced an enemy, our sails and rigging being
mostly cut and destroyed and all our masts very severely wounded. Our greatest
distance from the privateer during the engagement did not exceed the length of
our ship and we were often yard arm and yard arm, scarce clearing one another's
rigging. Our topmast stay-sail, which continued set during the action, had 180
shot through it, 9 great shot besides small ones through our ensign, 1 through
our pendant, 13 shot in our mizen-mast, our main-mast shot through and our
fore-mast greatly damaged. I believe that the rebel was as much damaged in
rigging as ourselves and his loss of men must have been very considerable, be
being quite crowded with them; he carried six swivels in his tops and great
quantities of their shot consisted of old iron cut square, old pots, old bolts, &c.
About the middle of the engagement an alarm was raised that our ship was
beginning to sink; on this a number of the men deserted their quarters, and
among them the person who was at the helm. The captain rallied them instantly,
took the helm himself, and while standing there a ball went through his hat." The
report that the ship was sinking "arose from some of the enemy's shot having
gone through and through, which staved 14 puncheons of rum between decks."
"Such resolution was then shewn that had the ship been in a sinking condition, I
am convinced she would have gone to the bottom with the colours standing,
every one on board being determined to sell his life as dear as he could. The
rebel hailed us to strike, but we could spare no time to answer him." The Minerva
lost seven killed and nine wounded. She was much crippled, and with the help of
a British frigate got into New York four days later (London Chronicle, October 8,
1778, reprinted in Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April 1889.)
Four Connecticut fishermen were captured by the British at sea in September,
1778, and taken to Jamaica, where they were impressed on board the sloop
Active, bound to New York. During the voyage the four Americans rose upon the
crew of the Active, fourteen in number, and confined them below. Although the
British were armed and made many desperate attempts to regain possession of
the sloop, they were finally subdued after a two days' struggle. The Active was
141
then headed for port, but was seized by a Pennsylvania state cruiser and a
privateer, who claimed her as a prize and took her into Philadelphia. The
conflicting claims of the Connecticut fishermen and the last captors, for prize
money, led to long and important litigation, involving the question of state
sovereignty (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1893; Jameson's Essays in
Constitutional History U. S., 17.)
The twenty-gun ship General Hancock, Captain Hardy, a privateer of Boston, on
the 19th of September fell in with the British letter of marque Levant, of thirty-two
guns, and they fought three hours, beginning at one o'clock in the afternoon.
Both ships hoisted their colors and after firing a few shot the Levant came
alongside the General Hancock; then the action began. At half-past two Captain
Hardy received a severe wound, which proved fatal. The ships exchanged
broadsides at short range until four o'clock, when the Levant blew up, part of the
wreck falling on board the American ship. The Hancock's boats were immediately
lowered and eighteen of the Levant's crew of about a hundred were saved. The
American loss included four killed, besides the captain (Almon, vii, 168;
Continental Journal, September 24, 1778. The Levant is called a frigate in the
account of the affair. Further accounts of privateers and prizes in 1778 are given
in N. E. Hist. and Gen. Reg., xxiii (1869), 47, 181, 289; London Chronicle,
January 15, February 24, June 16, August 29, September 29, 1778; Royal Amer.
Gazette (New York), March 19, 1778; Boston Post, October 7, December 5,
1778; Penn. Packet, July 24, 1778; Boston Gazette, August 24, September 14,
21, October 12, 1778; Massachusetts Spy, June 25, November 5, 1778;
Independent Chronicle, December 24, 1778.)
The recall of the British ambassador from France in March, 1778, was followed
by preparations for war between the two nations. The French collected a fleet at
Brest under the command of the Comte d'Orvilliers and another at Toulon under
the Comte d'Estaing. The Brest fleet fought an indecisive engagement off Ushant
in July with the British fleet of Admiral Keppel. It was intended that the Toulon
fleet should cross the Atlantic and blockade Admiral Howe in Delaware Bay. The
overwhelming preponderance of sea power on the side of the British had hitherto
given them nearly complete control of the American coast; and they had been
free to move their troops and supplies from place to place with little hindrance,
except the occasional loss of a transport which had become separated from its
convoy. There was now a prospect of the Americans being able, with the help of
French fleets, to dispute the naval supremacy of England, at least along their
own shores. Disappointments were in store for them, however, and began with
the dilatoriness which marked the preparation of this Toulon fleet from the
beginning, and all its subsequent movements. D'Estaing sailed from Toulon April
13, taking with him as passengers M. Gerard, the first minister plenipotentiary of
France to the United States, and Silas Deane, who had been recalled by
Congress and was returning home to explain his transactions in France. The fleet
passed Gibraltar more than a month later and appeared off the Delaware capes
July 7. It was said that this exceptionally long voyage was due to time spent in
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drills and to unnecessary delays, but D'Estaing himself says it was caused by the
extreme slowness of some of his vessels and the necessity of keeping his fleet
together. At any rate, he was too late to accomplish the first great object of the
expedition, which was to close the Delaware before the British left it. Howe had
sailed June 22, passed out of the bay on the 28th, and arrived off Sandy Hook
two days later. The evacuation of Philadelphia by the British had been ordered
early in the spring and was carried out June 18. Howe's fleet had on board all the
stores and baggage of the army, which marched overland through New Jersey. If
the British fleet had been caught in the Delaware, it is possible that a victory as
decisive as that of Yorktown three years later might have been the result; for the
British army, without their fleet to transport them from the lower bay of New York
to the city, might have fared badly. D'Estaing, moreover, having captured Howe's
fleet, could have taken New York. Howe on July 12 had six ships of sixty-four or
more guns, three fifties, two forty-fours, and four frigates. Another British fleet
under Admiral Byron was coming to reinforce him. D'Estaing had eight ships of
seventy-four or more guns, three sixty-fours, one fifty, and five frigates (Almon,
vi, 122; Schomberg, iv, 331, 338; Sands, 75, 311; Mahan, 350, 359, 360; United
Service, October, 1905, "D'Estaing's campaign"; Stopford- Sackville MSS., 110;
Channing, iii, 288,298.)
D'Estaing soon sailed for New York with the intention of entering the harbor and
attacking Howe. He arrived off Sandy Hook July 11, but did not go inside. He was
told by all the pilots he consulted that his heavier ships could not pass over the
bar. He offered a hundred and fifty thousand francs to any pilot who would take
him inside, but no one volunteered. Thus a second opportunity to annihilate the
British fleet was lost. The French policy perhaps did not favor an early and
decisive triumph of the American cause, and possibly D'Estaing was less
strenuous in his efforts than he would have been if he had been fighting for his
own country alone. This would have been reasonable from the French point of
view and consistent with the admiral's instructions, which called for the
performance of some "action beneficial to the Americans, glorious for the arms of
the king, fit to manifest immediately the protection that His Majesty accorded to
his allies." (United Service, October, 1905.)
D'Estaing remained off Sandy Hook eleven days, and is said to have captured
during that time twenty British vessels bound into New York. July 22 he sailed for
Newport, having been requested by Washington to cooperate with General
Sullivan in an attack on that town. On the 29th the French fleet appeared off
Newport and a few days later occupied the eastern and western channels of
Narragansett Bay. Four British frigates and two sloops of war were destroyed,
either by the French or by the English themselves, to prevent capture.
Unfortunately Sullivan did not get ready for the movement against Newport until
August 8. D'Estaing then ran into the central channel of the bay, under fire from
the batteries at the entrance, and anchored the main body of his fleet north of the
harbor. The attack was planned for the 10th. On the 9th the British fleet appeared
off Point Judith, where it anchored. Howe had sailed from New York August 1,
143
having been reinforced by several ships of Admiral Byron's fleet, which had been
scattered by a storm on its passage from England. Howe now had with him one
seventy-four, seven sixty-fours, five fifties, two forty-fours, six frigates, and
several small vessels. Although his force was thus considerably increased, he
was still somewhat weaker than his adversary, and seems to have had no
intention of attacking. Under the circumstances, however, D'Estaing preferred the
open sea, and early the next morning, August 10, the wind having shifted to the
north during the night, he cut his cables and ran out of the bay. Upon observing
this movement of the French, Howe got under way, and the two fleets spent the
next twenty-four hours manoeuvring for the weather-gauge, or, according to
D'Estaing's account, the British fleet fled before the wind, attempting to get back
to New York, with the French in pursuit. This continued until late on the afternoon
of the 11th, and the leading French ships were just overhauling the British rear,
when the wind, which had been increasing, became a violent gale, which soon
scattered the vessels of both fleets, each ship being engaged in a struggle with
the elements. "At half-past three in the morning" of the 12th, says D'Estaing in his
report, "the bowsprit broke, then the foremast, then the main-top, then the
mizzenmast; finally the mainmast fell. Our rudder broke next. This last misfortune
was the greatest of all. We were now only a floating mass with nothing to steady
us and nothing to guide us." (United Service, October, 1905.) This was the plight
of the admiral's flag-ship, the Languedoc, of ninety guns. The storm continued
unabated until the afternoon of the 13th, when it subsided. Before night the
Languedoc and another dismasted French ship were attacked by two British
ships, but darkness put an end to the encounter. The next day most of the
French fleet came together and anchored for temporary repairs. The British
made their way back to New York. D'Estaing, having completed necessary
repairs, bore away for Rhode Island August 17, and appeared again before
Newport on the 20th. It was then decided that the fleet could be thoroughly
refitted at no place nearer than Boston, and D'Estaing therefore sailed again on
the 22d, to the great disappointment of Sullivan, who was forced to abandon his
campaign against Newport. The French arrived in the lower harbor of Boston
August 28, and four days later Howe's fleet, having refitted at New York,
appeared in sight. On his way to Boston, Howe had captured the Continental brig
Resistance, which had been sent out to look for the French fleet. Finding
D'Estaing's position too strong to be attacked, Howe soon departed, returning to
New York. D'Estaing remained at Boston over two months, finally sailing for the
West Indies November 4. He arrived at Martinique December 9 (Mahan, 359365; Clowes, iii, 397-411; United Service, October, 1905; Almon, vii, 27-50,106112; Doniol, iii, ch. vii; Chevalier's Marine Francaise, ch. iii; Clark, i, 83, 84;
Schomberg, iv, 338, 339 ; Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 255. For Dr. Samuel Cooper's
account of D'Estaing, see Hale, i, 183.)
Shortly after the final departure of D'Estaing from Rhode Island, the British frigate
Carysfort, Captain Fanshawe, with a considerable fleet and a detachment of the
army under General Grey, made a raid, September 4, upon American shipping in
Buzzard's Bay and at Martha's Vineyard. The expedition was sent by Admiral
144
Gambier, who about this time succeeded Howe in command of the North
American station. At New Bedford, Fair Haven, and Holmes's Hole about twenty
vessels of some size, besides seventy smaller ones and many boats, were
destroyed; also twenty-six storehouses and other public property. Major Silas
Talbot of the Continental army reported to General Sullivan that the British fleet
comprised forty-five sail, great and small, bringing four thousand troops, to
oppose whom the Americans mustered one thousand militia. Talbot said that
besides destroying nearly all the shipping at New Bedford, they burned twenty
shops and twenty-two houses in the town. A few weeks later Gambier sent out
another marauding expedition, to Egg Harbor, New Jersey (Almon, vii, 36-38, 4749,154-156; Stevens, 1157; Sparks MSS., September 7, 1778, Talbot to
Sullivan.) These transactions were in line with the policy advocated earlier in the
year by Germain, whose under-secretary, William Knox, wrote October 31: "What
a proof is the Bedford enterprize of the propriety of the orders so repeatedly
given for attacking the rebel sea ports, and what a reflection is it upon Lord
Howe's character that Gambier, in his short absence, has done more to subdue
the Rebellion than his lordship during the whole of his command. It was always
clear in speculation that the Militia would never stay with Washington or quit their
homes, if the coast was kept in alarm, but the experiment having now been
made, the effect is reduced to a certainty. Surely somebody will ask
Lord Howe why he has never attempted any thing of the kind." "I much fear
[D'Estaing] will go to the West Indies, . . . but perhaps Byron's enterprizing turn
may discover the practicability of burning his fleet and the town of Boston
together, and then everything will succeed with
us." (Hist. Manuscripts Com., Various Collections, vi, 153. For other
contemporary opinions of Howe, see Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc., November, 1910.)
General Sullivan evacuated Rhode Island by passing over to the mainland at
Tiverton August 29. The British fortified the eastern channel of Narragansett Bay,
or Sakonnet River, by batteries on the shore and by a two-hundred-ton schooner
named the Pigot, armed with eight twelve-pounders, manned by a crew of fortyflve men and moored near the mouth of the river. Major Talbot fitted out at
Providence a small sloop called the Hawke with two three-pounders and manned
her with a detachment from the army afterwards reinforced, it is said, to the
number of sixty in all. Talbot proceeded to Mount Hope Bay where he waited for
a favorable wind. On the night of October 28 he dropped down the river and
passed the batteries unseen, drifting downstream under bare poles. "At half-past
one," he says in his report, "got sight of the schooner Pigot, but a small distance
from her was hailed by her and fired upon by her marines from the quarter-deck,
but reserved our fire till we had run our jibb boom through her fore shrouds, then
threw in such a volley of musketry loaded with bullets and buckshot and some
cannon, that the seamen that were on deck immediately ran below begging for
quarters and them that were below never made their appearance upon deck, the
consequence of which was, my men run out upon our jibb boom and boarded her
without the loss of a man. We came to sail. with her and run into this harbor
[Stonington], where my men are all landed and on their march to Providence."
145
(Almon, vii, 337.) For this exploit Major Talbot was promoted to the rank of
lieutenant-colonel in the Continental army and was afterwards made a captain in
the navy (Continental Journal, November 19, 1778; Boston Post, November 28,
1778; Tuckerman's Life of Talbot, ch. iii.)
In Boston Harbor about the middle of December were the Continental frigates
Warren, Providence, Boston, Deane, and Queen of France. All except the first of
these vessels had come from France during the year. There was likewise in port
the new frigate Alliance, built at Salisbury on the Merrimac River and fitting out
for her first voyage. One or two state cruisers and about ten large privateers were
also lying in Boston Harbor at this time. Of the frigates the Deane was fully
manned and ready for sea: the others would have been nearly so, if privateering
had not made it practically impossible, without great delay, to get men for their
crews (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 255, 256; Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 489, No. 19,
December 20, 1778, intelligence collected for Admiral Gambier.) These six
frigates represented almost the entire strength of the Continental navy in
commission in American waters at the end of 1778.
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER X
EUROPEAN WATERS IN 1778
Captain John Paul Jones brought the Ranger to France in December, 1777,
eager to carry the war upon the enemy's shores. He wrote to the Marine
Committee: "It is my hearts first and favorite wish to be employed in Active and
enterprizing Services where there is a prospect of Rendering such Services
Useful and Acceptable to America. The Singular Honor which Congress hath
done me by their generous approbation of my past Conduct hath inspired me
with Sentiments of Gratitude which I shall carry with me to my Grave; and if a life
of Services devoted to America can be made instrumental in securing its
Independence, I shall regard the Continuance of such approbation as an honor
far Superiour to the Empty Peagentry which Kings ever did or can bestow." (Pap.
Cont. Congr., 58, 137 (December 10, 1777).
During the first two months after his arrival, Jones spent much time in Paris,
conferring with the American Commissioners. While there he suggested the
cruise of a French fleet to America, which a little later was carried out by
D'Estaing. As to his own plans, the command of the Indien, building at
Amsterdam, had been intended for him, but this vessel had been transferred to
the French government for political reasons. In being deprived of this fine ship,
Jones met with one of the most trying of his many disappointments. A cruise in
146
the Ranger was then proposed. Jones had already stated to the commissioners
(In his letter of December 5, 1777) his views of sound American policy, which
was to attack defenseless seaports of the enemy and to cruise, in squadrons if
possible, against his commerce in his own waters, where it was concentrated,
rather than attempt to cope with an overwhelming naval power; to destroy the
greatest amount of property in the shortest time, striking quickly and
unexpectedly, rather than attempt to send in prizes at too great risk of recapture.
This policy was less pleasing to those under him, whose first thought was of prize
money (Sands, 72-76, 311.)
Early in February, 1778, Jones returned to his ship, which, having been
thoroughly refitted, dropped down the Loire to Quiberon Bay, where lay a French
fleet under Admiral La Motte Picquet. The Continental brig Independence,
Captain Young, was also in the bay. Jones negotiated with the admiral through
William Carmichael, secretary to Silas Deane, in regard to a salute of thirteen
guns which he proposed to give to the French flag. He afterwards wrote to the
Marine Committee: "I am happy in having it in my power to congratulate you on
my having seen the American flag for the first time recognised in the fullest and
completest manner by the flag of France. I was off their bay the 13th and sent my
boat in the next day to know if the Admiral would return my salute. He answered
that he would return to me, as the senior American continental officer in Europe,
the same salute which he was authorized by his court to return to an Admiral of
Holland or of any other Republic, which was four guns less than the salute given.
I hesitated at this, for I had demanded gun for gun. Therefore I anchored in the
entrance of the bay, at a distance from the French fleet; but after a very particular
inquiry on the 14th, finding that he had really told the truth, I was induced to
accept his offer, the more so as it was in fact an acknowledgment of American
Independence. The wind being contrary and blowing hard, it was after sunset
before the Ranger got near enough to salute La Motte Picquet with thirteen guns,
which he returned with nine. However, to put the matter beyond a doubt, I did not
suffer the Independence to salute till the next morning, when I sent the Admiral
word that I should sail through his fleet in the brig and would salute him in open
day. He was exceedingly pleased and returned the compliment also with nine
guns." (Sands, 77 (February 22, 1778.)
This was the most authoritative salute up to that time given to the American flag
by a foreign power. Although Jones says that neither he nor La Motte Picquet
knew of the alliance that had been concluded a week before, it is probable that
the admiral had received some intimation of the propriety of returning an
American salute. The acknowledgment of the Andrew Doria's salute at St.
Eustatius in 1776, the first notice taken of a Continental vessel, was disavowed
by the Dutch government, and the response to that of the privateer General
Mifflin at Brest in 1777 was not admitted by the French government. The salute
to the Ranger's flag was, as Jones says, a formal recognition of American
independence and was a natural sequence of the treaties of commerce and of
alliance which had been signed February 6 by representatives of the United
147
States and France (Sands, 76-78; Sherburne, 216; Memoires de Paul Zones, 24;
Dr. Green's Diary, February 13,14,15, 1778; Jones MSS., letters of Carmichael
and Picquet, February 13,14,1778; Sparks MSS., xlix, 12 (Jones to Deane,
February 26,1778); Log of Ranger, February 14, 1778 ; Stopford-Sackville MSS.,
100.)
An outcome, presumably, of this episode in Quiberon Bay was a discussion
some weeks later of the general subject of international salutes among high
naval officials of France and on board D'Estaing's fleet. On his voyage to
America the admiral conferred with his distinguished passenger Gerard, minister
to the United States, and in June a council of officers was held on the flagship at
which the project of an agreement between the United States and France,
relating to this subject, was drawn up. It provided that ships of either power
entering ports of the other should salute first, in recognition of territorial
sovereignty; that between ships commanded by officers of equal rank, the
American should salute first, thereby acknowledging the precedence of the
French crown, but in other cases the inferior should fire the first salute; and
finally, that all salutes should be returned by an equal number of guns (Archives
de la Marine, B4 141, 303-313.)
The brig Independence sailed for America in the spring. By Jones's advice
Captain Young attempted to get into Ocracoke Inlet, North Carolina, but
unfortunately his ship was wrecked on the bar (Jones MSS., Capt. Bell to Jones
(November 3, 1778), Jones to Bell (November 15, 1778), and to Young
(November 18,1778); Mar. Com. Letter Book, 146, 157, 158 (to Young and to
Navy Board, May 6, June 18, 1778).)
From Quiberon Bay the Ranger proceeded to Brest, arriving below the town
March 8. The fleet of Admiral d'Orvilliers was at that time lying in the harbor of
Brest. In this vicinity the Ranger remained a month and again saluted the French
flag, receiving eleven guns in return for thirteen. April 10 she sailed on a cruise in
British waters. On the 14th, between Scilly and Cape Clear, a brigantine was
taken and sunk, and on the 17th, off Dublin, a ship was captured which Jones
sent back to Brest. The events of the following week, during which the Ranger
cruised about the Isle of Man and the adjacent shores of England, Scotland, and
Ireland, the neighborhood of Jones's early life, added much to his naval
reputation (For this cruise of the Ranger, see Sands, 79-98; Sherburne, 44-64;
Green's Diary; Scribner's Mag., July, 1898; Jones MSS.; Log of Ranger.)
Towards evening of April 17, Jones "stood over from the Isle of Man, with an
intention to make a descent at Whitehaven. At 10 o'clock," he says in his report
to the commissioners, "I was off the harbor with a party of volunteers and had
everything in readiness to land, but before eleven the wind greatly increased and
shifted, so as to blow directly upon the shore ; the sea increased of course, and it
became impossible to effect a landing. This obliged me to carry all possible sail
148
so as to clear the land and to await a more favorable opportunity." (Sherburne,
45 (Jones to American Commissioners, May 27, 1778)
During the next few days a revenue cutter was chased and a schooner and sloop
were sunk. Adverse winds prevented an attempt being made to destroy a
number of vessels at anchor in a bay on the Scotch coast. "The 21st, being near
Carrickfergus, a fishing boat came off, which I detained. I saw a ship at anchor in
the road which I was informed by the fisherman was the British ship-of-war
Drake, of 20 guns. I determined to attack her in the night. My plan was to overlay
her cable and to fall upon her bow, so as to have all her decks open and exposed
to our musketry, &c.; at the same time it was my intention to have secured the
enemy by graplings, so that had they cut their cables they would not thereby
have attained an advantage. The wind was high and unfortunately the anchor
was not let go so soon as the order was given, so that the Ranger was brought
up on the enemy's quarter at the distance of half a cable's length. We had made
no warlike appearance, of course had given no alarm; this determined me to cut
immediately, which might appear as if the cable had parted and at the same time
enable me, after making a tack out of the Lough, to return with the same
prospect of advantage which I had at the first. I was, however, prevented from
returning, as I with difficulty weathered the lighthouse on the lee side of the
Lough, and as the gale increased. The weather now became so very stormy and
severe and the sea so high that I was obliged to take shelter under the south
shore of Scotland (Sherburne, 46; Sands, 80.)
"The 22d introduced fair weather, though the three kingdoms as far as the eye
could reach were covered with snow. I now resolved once more to attempt
Whitehaven, but the wind became very light, so that the ship could not in proper
time approach so near as I had intended. At midnight I left the ship with two
boats and thirty-one volunteers. When we reached the outer pier the day began
to dawn. I would not, however, abandon my enterprise, but despatched one boat
under the direction of Mr. Hill and Lieutenant Wallingsford, with the necessary
combustibles, to set fire to the shipping on the north side of the harbor, while I
went with the other party to attempt the south side. I was successful in scaling
the walls and spiking up all the cannon in the first fort. Finding the sentinels shut
up in the guard house, they were secured without being hurt. Having fixed
sentinels, I now took with me one man only (Mr. Green), and spiked up all the
cannon on the southern fort, distant from the other a quarter of a mile. On my
return from this business I naturally expected to see the fire of the ships on the
north side, as well as to find my own party with everything in readiness to set fire
to the shipping in the south. Instead of this, I found the boat under the direction of
Mr. Hill and Mr. Wallingsford returned and the party in some confusion, their light
having burnt out at the instant when it became necessary. By the strangest
fatality my own party were in the same situation, the candles being all burnt out.
The day too came on apace, yet I would by no means retreat while any hopes of
success remained. Having again placed sentinels, a light was obtained at a
house disjoined from the town and fire was kindled in the steerage of a large ship
149
which was surrounded by at least an hundred and fifty others, chiefly from two to
four hundred tons burthen and laying side by side aground, unsurrounded by the
water. There were besides from seventy to an hundred large ships in the north
arm of the harbor aground, clear of the water, and divided from the rest only by a
stone pier of a ship's height. I should have kindled fires in other places if the time
had permitted. As it did not, our care was to prevent the one kindled from being
easily extinguished. After some search a barrel of tar was found and poured into
the flames, which now ascended from all the hatchways. The inhabitants began
to appear in thousands and individuals ran hastily towards us. I stood between
them and the ship on fire with a pistol in my hand and ordered them to retire,
which they did with precipitation. The flames had already caught the rigging and
began to ascend the mainmast. The sun was a full hour's march above the
horizon and as sleep no longer ruled the world, it was time to retire. We reembarked without opposition, having released a number of prisoners, as our
boats could not carry them. After all my people had embarked I stood upon the
pier for a considerable time, yet no persons advanced. I saw all the eminences
around the town covered with the amazed inhabitants (Sherburne, 47.)
"When we had rowed a considerable distance from the shore, the English began
to run in vast numbers to their forts. Their disappointment may easily be
imagined, when they found at least thirty heavy cannon, the instruments of their
vengeance, rendered useless. At length, however, they began to fire, having, as I
apprehend, either brought down ship guns or used one or two cannon which lay
on the beach at the foot of the walls dismounted, and which had not been spiked.
They fired with no direction and the shot falling short of the boats, instead of
doing us any damage, afforded some diversion, which my people could not help
showing by discharging their pistols, &c. in return of the salute. Had it been
possible to have landed a few hours sooner, my success would have been
complete. Not a single ship out of more than two hundred could possibly have
escaped, and all the world would not have been able to save the town. What was
done, however, is sufficient to show that not all their boasted navy can protect
their own coasts, and that the scenes of distress which they have occasioned in
America may be soon brought home to their own door." (Sherburne, 48.)
An English account says: "Att 4 o'Clock a Privateer of Eighteen Guns & one
hundred & twenty Men landed about thirty Men in our Harbour & set a Vessel on
Fire & distributed Combustibles in several Others; the Privateer is yet standing
on & off & as we just now hear is stretching with Wind at East to the W.N.W."
(Whitehaven Customs Letter Book, 96.) According to another letter from
Whitehaven, "the privateer's people who landed here this morning were all armed
with pistols and cutlasses. and retired to their boats about four o'clock . . . They
had on their first landing spiked up several of the cannon, in order to secure their
retreat. A number of people flocking to the fort, some shot were fired at the boats,
but without doing any execution. After the boats reached the privateer, she stood
over to the Scotch side, and as large columns of smoke have been seen on the
150
Scotch shore this afternoon, it is feared he has done some mischief there."
(London Chronicle, April 30, 1778.)
Having reached the Scotch shore, Jones landed about noon on St. Mary's Isle,
"with one boat only and a very small party." Here was the estate of the Earl of
Selkirk, very near Jones's birthplace. The plan was to seize the earl and carry
him to France, to serve as a hostage for the better treatment of American
prisoners in England or to secure the release of a number of them in exchange.
Unfortunately for the success of the project, Selkirk was absent. The officers and
men with Jones, who thus far had had little prospect of prize money, now
demanded the privilege of bringing away some booty from the estate. The raids
of the British in America, in which private property was not respected, were fresh
in their minds. Jones unwillingly consented that they might demand and take
such of the family plate as might be delivered to them. This was done, the men
behaving in an orderly manner and not entering the house. Jones afterwards
purchased this plate, worth several hundred pounds, at his own expense, and
restored it to Selkirk, from whom he received full acknowledgment (Sherburne,
48, 51-58.)
The week's cruise in the Irish Sea ended with a notable event in our early naval
history, which Jones relates in his letter to the commissioners at Paris. "On the
morning of the 24th I was again off Carrickfergus and would have gone in had I
not seen the Drake preparing to come out. It was very moderate and the Drake's
boat was sent out to reconnoitre the Ranger. As the boat advanced I kept the
ship's stern directly towards her and, though they had a spy glass in the boat,
they came on within hail and alongside. When the officer came on the quarterdeck he was greatly surprised to find himself a prisoner, although an express had
arrived from Whitehaven the night before. I now understood what I had before
imagined, that the Drake came out, in consequence of this information, with
volunteers against the Ranger. The officer told me also that they had taken up
the Ranger's anchor. The Drake was attended by five small vessels full of people
who were led by curiosity to see an engagement. But when they saw the Drake's
boat at the Ranger's stern they wisely put back. Alarm smokes now appeared in
great abundance, extending along on both sides of the channel. The tide was
unfavorable, so that the Drake worked out but slowly. This obliged me to run
down several times and to lay with courses up and main-topsail to the mast. At
length the Drake weathered the point and, having led her out to about midchannel, I suffered her to come within hail. The Drake hoisted English colors and
at the same instant the American stars were displayed on board the Ranger. I
expected that preface had been now at an end, but the enemy soon after hailed,
demanding what ship it was? I directed the master to answer, 'the American
Continental ship Ranger, that we waited for them and desired that they would
come on; the sun was now little more than an hour from setting, it was therefore
time to begin.' The Drake being astern of the Ranger, I ordered the helm up and
gave her the flrst broadside. The action was warm, close, and obstinate. It lasted
an hour and four minutes, when the enemy called for quarters, her fore and
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main- topsail yards being both cut away and down on the cap, the top-gallant
yard and mizengaff both hanging up and down along the mast, the second
ensign which they had hoisted shot away and hanging on the quarter-gallery in
the water, the jib shot away and hanging in the water, her sails and rigging
entirely cut to pieces, her masts and yards all wounded, and her hull also very
much galled. I lost only Lieutenant Wallingsford and one seaman, John Dougall,
killed, and six wounded, among whom are the gunner, Mr. Falls, and Mr. Powers,
a midshipman, who lost his arm. One of the wounded, Nathaniel Wills, is since
dead; the rest will recover." (Sherburne, 48, 49.) Jones estimated the British loss
at forty-two killed and wounded, but it was probably less; the captain was killed
and the lieutenant mortally wounded.
The Drake's armament consisted of twenty four-pounders, the Ranger's of
eighteen six-pounders. According to different accounts, the Drake's crew
numbered one hundred and fifty to one hundred and ninety and was probably
little in excess of the lower figure. It consisted partly of volunteers and raw
recruits and the ship had only one lieutenant. On the whole she does not appear
to have been well prepared for battle. The Ranger also was at a disadvantage,
her crew of one hundred and twenty-three being at this time in a dissatisfied and
even mutinous state of mind, under the influence of the first lieutenant, Thomas
Simpson (Sherburne, 49; Sands, 95; Scribner's Mag., July, 1898.) While the
Ranger's capture of a vessel of inferior force could hardly be regarded as a
remarkable achievement, it was still highly satisfactory to have taken a regular
man-of-war of the enemy in his own waters.
The day after the battle both ships were employed in repairing injuries. A
brigantine was captured at this time. When ready to sail, the Ranger and Drake
passed out to sea by the North Channel, owing to a shift of the wind, and
returned to Brest by way of the west coast of Ireland. May 6, Lieutenant
Simpson, in command of the Drake, having disregarded the Ranger's signals,
was put under arrest by Jones for disobedience of orders. Both vessels arrived
safely at Brest May 8. An American at that place, writing home, says: "It was a
pleasure to see the English flag flying under the American stars and stripes."
(Boston Gazette, July 6, 1778.) About two hundred British prisoners were
confined on the Drake, awaiting exchange. Meanwhile six British men-of-war had
been ordered to cruise for the Ranger in St. George's Channel, and it was
reported in England that both she and the Drake had been captured by a British
frigate (Wharton, ii, 581, 582; Sherburne, 63; London Chronicle, May 2, 5, 9, 14,
1778.)
The arrest of Simpson was the outcome of an unfortunate state of affairs on
board the Ranger. For a number of reasons there had been discontent among
the crew, which had been encouraged by Simpson, who, it was charged by
Jones, had gone so far as to incite mutiny before the battle with the Drake, when
Jones had intended to go in and attack that vessel, if she had not come out.
According to Jones, Simpson on that occasion "held up to the crew that being
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Americans fighting for liberty, the voice of the people should be taken before the
Captain's orders were obeyed" (Sands, 95); and the captain says that if the
capture of the Drake's boat had not brought about a change in the men's temper,
a dangerous mutiny might have been the result. Jones also held Simpson in
some degree responsible for the failure of his plans at Whitehaven. Simpson
having come out from America in the Ranger, with the expectation of taking
command upon Jones being given a larger ship, was dissatisfied. He was
popular with the crew; whereas Jones, owing to his severe discipline, to his
violent temper, and perhaps to other personal traits, and partly to his indifference
to prize money, was disliked by his men. This was particularly unfortunate
because undeserved, for in his letters he shows constant solicitude for their
interests. The American Commissioners in Paris, lacking authority, were obliged
to refuse payment on Jones's drafts for the daily support and sustenance of his
crew, which caused him great annoyance. They also regretted Simpson's arrest,
especially as there were not enough American officers in Europe to convene a
court-martial, and it would be necessary to send him to America for trial. The
result was that, with the approval of Jones, though he afterwards repented it,
Simpson was released from custody and put in command of the Ranger.
Surgeon Green says in his diary, July 27: "This day Thomas Simpson, Esqr.
came on board with orders to take command of the Ranger, to the joy and
satisfaction of the whole Ships company." Not long after this the Ranger sailed
for America (Sherburne, 60-62; Sands, 94-96, 99-104, 117, 118, 123-126;
Wharton, ii, 597.)
The frigate Boston, Captain Samuel Tucker, early in February, 1778, was
anchored in Nantasket Roads. William Jennison, lieutenant of marines, records
in his journal, February 13, that "Capt. Tucker went to Braintree in his Barge and
brought the Honble John Adams and suite on board." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and
Biogr., April, 1891.) This distinguished passenger had been appointed
commissioner to France in place of Silas Deane; he had with him his son John
Quincy Adams, then eleven years old. February 15 the frigate sailed with a wind
from the west southwest; on the 20th it began to blow. "A clap of thunder with
sharp lightning broke upon the mainmast just above the upper moulding, which
burnt several of the men on deck. A most terrible night. The captain of the
mainmast was struck with the lightning, which burnt a place on the top of his
head about the bigness of a Quarter Dollar - he lived three days and died raving
mad." (Ibid. This casualty is not mentioned in the ship's log.) Meanwhile the
Boston was being chased by a British thirty-six-gun frigate, but fortunately
escaped. "Capt. Tucker had instructions not to risque the ship in any way that
might endanger Mr. Adams, and was ordered to land him safe in France or
Spain." (Ibid.) Moreover the ship was short-handed. March 10, "at 11 A.M.
discovered a vessel to windward; gave chase and came alongside at noon. She
fired three guns at us, one of which carried away our mizen yard. We returned a
few shots and hoisted American colors, upon which she struck her colors. Our
boats were got out immediately, but a heavy squall prevented them getting to the
ship before they had thrown overboard the mail, which sunk not more than a
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boat's hook length before our boats reached the ship. She was named the
Martha, carried 16 nine-pounders and was . . . bound from the Thames for New
York." (Penn. Mag., April, 1891.) Hezekiah Welch, one of the frigate's
lieutenants, was put on board the Martha as prize-master and she was sent back
to Boston. According to the invoice her cargo was worth ninety-seven thousand
pounds sterling. Tucker wrote to the Navy Board of the Eastern District: "I hope
to pay for the Boston, as I told your honnours before Sailing. I am but Poorly
mand to my Sorrow; I dare not attack a 20 gun Ship." (Tucker MSS., March 11,
1778.) A few days after the capture of the Martha, the first lieutenant of the
Boston, William Barron, was fatally injured by the bursting of a gun. After a very
stormy passage the frigate anchored in the Garonne River, March 31, and the
next day went up to within three miles of Bordeaux (Life of Tucker, ch. iv, and
appendix, log of the Boston; Archives de la Marine, B8 14.)
After careening and thoroughly refitting his ship and enlisting a number of
Frenchmen for his crew, which required several weeks, Captain Tucker dropped
down the river. On June 6, the Boston sailed in company with a French frigate
and a fleet of merchantmen. She then made a short cruise in the Bay of Biscay
and along the French coast, during which four prizes were taken. The Boston
went into L'Orient July 3 and remained nearly a month. Tucker had trouble with
his crew; June 19 he wrote to the Navy Board that the situation with respect to
his people was very disagreeable and had been since he left Boston, and that
there had been "a Consparicy carried to a great Length, but fortunately
discovered it the day before sailing from Bourdeaux, which I wrote the Honble
Commissioners at Paris. I had the Confederates of Bourdeaux imprisoned and
believe they will be Banished if not hung." (Tucker MSS.) A spirit of
insubordination persisted to some extent, and July 28, Tucker ordered one of the
crew "to be brought to the gangway and receive twelve stripes on his naked
back. His crime was talking among the people and making them believe that the
officers on board had embezzled some part of the prizes, cargo, and other
abuse." (Tucker, 303, log of the Boston.) Meanwhile forty-seven of the French
sailors enlisted at Bordeaux had been arbitrarily taken out of the ship by a French
general at L'Orient. The prisoners taken in the prizes also became restless, and
on learning that an uprising among them was being planned, Tucker ordered
twenty-three of them to be put in irons. The first of these recent prizes of the
Boston having been sent to America, the other three were sold at L'Orient.
August 1 the Boston sailed, and on the 3d anchored at St. Nazaire (Tucker, ch. v,
and appendix; Adams MSS., April 10, 11, 22, 1778; Tucker MSS., July 3, 7, 12,
13, 1778.)
The frigate Providence, Captain Whipple, was then at Paimboeuf, and a few days
later came down the river and joined the Boston. The Providence, after escaping
from the blockade of Narragansett Bay May 1, sailed directly for France, arriving
at Paimboeuf on the 30th; she was to procure guns for Continental vessels under
construction. On the voyage she captured a prize which was recaptured and then
again taken by a French ship. August 8 the Providence and Boston with a small
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convoy, with Whipple in command, sailed for Brest, where they arrived in six
days and found the Ranger. There was also a large French fleet at Brest. August
22 the Providence, Boston, and Ranger sailed for America. September 26 they
were on the Banks of Newfoundland, and on the 15th of October they arrived at
Portsmouth, having taken three prizes on the passage from France (Tucker, ch.
v, and appendix; Archives de la Marine, B7 459 (letter of Whipple, May 31,
1778); Mar. Com. Letter Book, 157, 159 (June 10, 19,1778); Tucker MSS.,
August 24, September 15, 1778; Granite Monthty, November, 1881, log of the
Ranger; Boston Gazette October 5, November 2,1778; Boston Post, October 24,
1778.)
The Continental cutter Revenge, Captain Conyngham, cruised with success
during 1778, usually out of Spanish ports. The Spanish people were generally
friendly to the American cause and treated with hospitality the vessels which
visited their ports. Early in the year the Revenge sailed from Bilbao and cruised
to the Straits of Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, taking several prizes. Her
arrival in Cadiz is mentioned by an officer on the British ship Monarch, who
complains of the unfriendly feeling of the Spaniards towards the English. The
Monarch sent a boat ashore "to get what is termed product," but was
unsuccessful; it was refused many times. "Judge of the situation of our spirited
commander, who is a true British seaman, when during the time we lay there seven days being detained by the wind - we had the mortification to see the
usual honours paid to two Dutch frigates and above all to the Revenge, American
privateer commanded by Cunningham, who came swaggering in with his thirteen
stripes, saluted the Spanish Admiral, had it returned and immediately got
product, the Spaniards themselves carrying on board wood, water, fruit and fresh
provisions; all which we were eye witnesses of, as she anchored directly under
our stern, within two cables length." (London Chronicle, May 7, 1778; Boston
Gazette, October 12, 1778.) There were eleven other American vessels lying in
Cadiz at this time. Conyngham relates an incident not mentioned in the English
officer's letter. "An English ship of the Line & two frigatts were laying in Cadiz on
our arrival; in their usual & diabolick mode of Warfare had determined in the
Night by their boats to set the revenge on fire. A Good french man on board one
of them Gave notice to the french Consul of their designe, who advised us of.
Consequently was prepared for them, they did appeare in the dead of the night,
but took Care to Keep their distance; the spanish admirall had thiss notice & he
politely offered a 74 Gun ship to protect us. We acknowledge the favor, but was
noways apprehensive of any danger; to the Contrary it was our wish they would
make the Attempt." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899, Conynghams
narrative.)
The Revenge returned to the north of Spain and went into Ferrol. She fitted out
there and then cruised among the Azores and Canary Islands, taking several
prizes, some of which were destroyed and others sent to American or to
European ports. "Those seas covered by British Cruzers of every description and
[with] orders from their Govermt to follow the revenge into any harbour she might
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be in & destroy her." Conyngham then returned to Coruna, but found the Spanish
less hospitable; the protection of the government had been withdrawn. This,
Conyngham says, was due to British influence at court. He was allowed to refit at
a small neighboring port, however, and then sailed for the West Indies (Ibid.)
About the end of September, which was perhaps a little before Conyngham
returned to Coruna after his cruise among the Western Islands, the privateer
Vengeance arrived at that place. The Vengeance was a twenty-gun brig from
Newburyport commanded by Captain Newman; she sailed from Cape Ann
August 16. About two weeks after leaving port the Vengeance ran into a West
India fleet and was chased out again by two frigates. "On the 17th of
September," says Captain Newman, "in Latt. 49 N. and Long. 20 West, fell in
with the Ship Harriot Packet, of sixteen guns and forty-five men, Capt. Sampson
Sprague, from Falmouth bound to New York, which, after a small resistance,
struck. I man'd her and ordered her for Newbury-Port. And on the 21st of the
same month fell in with the Snow Eagle Packet, from New York bound to
Falmouth, Commanded by Edward Spence, mounting fourteen carriage guns
and sixty men including some officers of the British army, which, after an
engagement of about twenty minutes, was obliged to strike to us, which I likewise
ordered for Newbury-Port. Col. Howard of the 1st Regiment of Guards was killed
and several other officers, and a number wounded. Lucky for me, not one man
killed or wounded except myself, by a musket ball in my thigh . . . Among the
passengers was four Colonels, three Majors, one Cornet of dragoons . . . I have
delivered my prisoners to the British Commissary residing here, taking his receipt
for the same, obligating him to return a like number of American prisoners of
equal rank." (Boston Post, January 9, 1779.) This letter was dated October 4 at
Coruna. Possibly the feeling aroused over the arrival of these prisoners of rank in
the British army and protests made to the Spanish government may have had
something to do with Conyngham's inhospitable reception about the time (Boston
Gazette, January 11, 1779; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 227 (August 16, 1779); Hist.
Man. Com., Amer. MSS. in Royal Inst., i, 807 (October 1, 1778, declaration of
British consul at Coruna as to Newman's prisoners.)
Up to the time of her arrival in the West Indies, the Revenge, according to a letter
from Martinique dated December 10, had captured sixty British vessels, twentyseven of which were sent into port and thirty-three sunk or burned. She cruised
several weeks out of Martinique among the Windward Islands. Conyngham
received instructions, October 26, from William Bingham, the American naval
agent in the West Indies. A month later Bingham wrote to Conyngham: "As the
defensive Alliance entered into between France & the United States of America
will point out to you one Common Object as the Motive that our Conduct is
mutually to be regulated by that of annoying and circumventing the Designs of
the Enemy, I must seriously recommend to you not to lose sight of it." He was to
be on the lookout for D'Estaing, expected soon to arrive in the West Indies from
America; and also for "a Frigate with Transports under her Convoy of a great
Number of Troops from France," and acquaint them, as far as possible, with the
156
movements of the British fleet. A set of French signals was furnished him.
"Another grand object that must attract your attention is the endeavouring to
capture some of the Transports that have sailed from New York bound for the
English West India Islands. It appears that they have suffered by a Gale of wind
& have lost their Convoy, so that perhaps they will fall an easy Prey. No
recompense could requite the services you would render your Country by
capturing some of those that have Troops on board, as it might perhaps hinder
the success of any of their operations in these Seas." (MS. Letter, November
29,1778.) The Revenge made several prizes in the West Indies, including two
British privateers, and had an engagement with a twenty-eight-gun cutter. This
cruise continued until midwinter (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899;
Boston Gazette, February 15,1779.)
The Continental navy, already greatly reduced, was further depleted in the year
1778 by the loss of the frigates Washington, Effingham, Randolph, Virginia, and
Raleigh, and the Alfred, Columbus, Independence, and Resistance. Of the
original thirteen frigates there now remained only the Boston, Warren,
Providence, and Trumbull. Among the ships lost before they had ever been in
service mus be counted the fine large frigate Indien, which passed from the
American to the French flag. To replace these severe losses the frigates Deane
and Queen of France, the sloop of war General Gates, and the prize schooner
Pigot had been added to the navy; also a brigantine called the Retaliation, whose
service seems to have been brief and uneventful. The frigate Alliance might be
included in the list, but she did not cruise until the following year. The frigates
Warren and Providence had begun their active careers during the year 1778, and
concerning two frigates built in Connecticut a letter of William Vernon, written
December 17 to John Adams, says: "The ship building at Norwich is given to
Capt. Seth Harding and call'd the Confederacy, near ready to sail; she is a fine
Frigate, it is said exceeds the Alliance if possible. The Trumbul remains in
Connecticut River, perhaps may never be got out, unless Camels are built to
carry her out." In regard to the America, Admiral Howe had written in March:
"According to the latest Information obtained from some of the well-affected
Inhabitants in the New England Provinces, the Two-decked Ship building at
Portsmouth is not expected to be finished before the Autumn." The America had
to wait much longer than that for her completion. If to the vessels here mentioned
as ready for service we add the sloop Providence, the Ranger and the Revenge,
the list of the Continental navy in commission at the end of 1778 is full. The prize
sloop of war Drake would have been a valuable cruiser and might have been
acquired for the Continental service, but was not, probably owing to lack of
available funds and of authority on the part of the American Commissioners at
Paris (Paullin, 516, 517; Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc.. viii, 256; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488,
No. 55, March 16, 1778.)
The navy therefore showed a gradual falling away, and its condition at the end of
the year 1778 was by no means satisfactory. The state navies also seemed to be
steadily dwindling. Privateering, however, continued active, and British
157
commerce suffered severely from American enterprise of this kind. The
Continental Congress issued one hundred and twenty-nine commissions to
privateers in 1778, an increase of sixty over the previous year, and doubtless
large numbers continued to be commissioned by the different states (Naval
Records (calendar), 217-495, list of Continental letters of marque.)
At the beginning of 1778 the British navy comprised three hundred and ninetynine vessels of all classes, of which two hundred and seventy-four were in
commission; a year later the figures were four hundred and thirty-two and three
hundred and seventeen respectively (Hannay, ii, 211.) Eighty-nine vessels were
on the North American station in January, and the same number in September,
but the fleets on these two dates were differently constituted. Nearly half the first
were frigates and fifteen were ships mounting sixty-four, fifty, or forty-four guns;
the September fleet, which included Byron's squadron, contained fewer frigates,
but seven seventy-fours, six sixty-fours, five fifties, and three forty-fours (Brit.
Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, January 5, September 11, 1778, Disposition of His
Majesty's Ships and Vessels in North America.) There were also about fifteen
vessels at Newfoundland and thirty or forty in the West Indies. The total force of
the navy in men was sixty thousand (Hannay, ii, 212; Schomberg, i, 440, iv, 5659; Almon, vii, 249.) A list of New York privateers, September 8, 1778, to March
8,1779, contains one hundred and twenty. one names (Trumbull MSS., xxiii,
116.)
Information in regard to captures and losses is scanty and unsatisfactory, and the
few available lists and figures are doubtless inaccurate and incomplete; and
estimates are perhaps sometimes exaggerated. The Continental navy made
fewer captures than in the previous year, while presumably the privateers made
more. According to one calculation, made in February, 1778, they had then taken
seven hundred and thirty-nine British vessels since the beginning of the war.
Another estimate places the British loss for the year at three hundred and sixtyfour, of which eighty-seven were recaptured or ransomed; but this list includes
captures by the French. According to the same authority the British took two
hundred and forty-eight vessels from their enemies. A contemporary newspaper
gives a list of two hundred and twenty-two American vessels captured on the
West Indian station within a few weeks. Another list, that of American vessels
taken on the North American station between October, 1777, and April, 1778,
contains only five names; while between May, 1778, and February, 1779,
seventy-nine prizes were brought in by New York privateers (Hannay, ii, 220;
Clowes, iii, 396; London Chronicle, September 17, November 7, 1778; Almon, vii,
190; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 488, No. 57, April 23, 1778, list of vessels seized or
destroyed since October 25, 1777; A. D. 489, No. 27, February 27, 1779.
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A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER XI
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1779
Taking into account the heavy losses of the last two years, the Continental navy
still showed vigor at the opening of 1779 and rendered valuable service during
the year. The British, in spite of their naval superiority, were not free from
solicitude as to the possibilities of the American sea forces. Admiral Gambier
reported that there were at Boston December 6, 1778, fifteen vessels of war,
including five Continental frigates, and January 10, 1779, he wrote: "A Report
prevails that one 40, four 32, one 28, and two 20 Gun Ships of the Rebels sailed
about ten days ago from Boston; this Circumstance if true is very alarming, not
only on Account of the probability of their falling in with our victuallers, but on
Account of the present reduced numbers of our Ships, and they much divided,
the Coppered Frigates could not without the greatest danger from Ice have been
kept on this part of the Coast during the Winter Season." He wrote later, on the
authority of a privateer, that three frigates had sailed from Boston January 18, "in
order to Cruise off the Chesepeak," and that they had been seen ten days later,
off the Delaware capes (Brit. Adm. Rec., A.D. 489, Nos. 19, 22, 25, December
20, 1778, January 10, February 3, 1779.) His information in regard to both these
sailings was obviously incorrect.
A few new Continental vessels went into commission or into active service, the
most important of which were the frigates Alliance and Confederacy, of thirty-two
guns each; the first was built in Massachusetts, the other in Connecticut. The
Confederacy was a hundred and thirty-three feet long, with an extreme breadth
of thirty-five feet, six inches, and was designed to carry twenty-eight guns on the
main deck, six on the quarter deck, and two on the forecastle. These ships,
which had been authorized by Congress two years or more before, encountered
the usual difficulties and delays in getting ready for sea. The Marine Committee
in their efforts to expedite matters issued many orders which, owing to slow
communication and uncertainty as to the condition of vessels and the state of
affairs in distant ports, were frequently modified or changed. On February 10th it
was arranged that the Confederacy, Captain Harding, then at New London,
should make a short cruise in Long Island Sound with two vessels of the
Connecticut navy. Later she was to join the Queen of France in a cruise along
the Atlantic coast, in which the Ranger was to take part. Captain Olney of the
Queen of France, the senior officer, was ordered to "sweep in the first place this
coast from the Southward of Cape May to the Bar of Charles Town and
afterwards to Cruize in such Latitudes and Longitudes which are best calculated
to give the greatest aid and protection to the Trade of Delaware, Chesapeake
and Charles Town, and as often as circumstances and the safety of your Ships
will admit of it, you are to enter the mouths of Delaware and Chesapeake for the
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purpose of destroying the small Armed Vessels from New York that lurk about
the Capes to the certain destruction of almost every Merchantman that sails; you
are at the same time to be extreamly cautious in continuing in any of these
places so long as to render yourself a certain Object for the pursuit of the enemy.
If in the Course of this Cruize you should meet with the Deane or the
Confederacy or both of them, it is our orders that you and they proceed on this
Cruize in Company, under the command of the Superior Officer, to execute these
Orders; and least you should be seperated by Storms or other circumstances, it
would be advisable to establish such Private Signals that when the Ships meet
again they may be known to each other as friends. The great delay, expence and
trouble in manning the Ships for Sea has induced this committee to direct and
Order you to continue this Cruize as long as your Provisions and other
circumstances will admit . . . The superiority of the Naval force of the enemy on
this Coast and the misfortunes that have heretofore happened to some of our
Ships will, we trust, make you extreamly vigilant and active; the confidence we
repose in your fidility, courage and good conduct gives us every reason to hope
for a successful Cruize. Most of the Armed Vessels from New York are inferior in
force to yourself, which will put it in your power to aid the Trade of the Southern
States by destroying many of them and thereby to render not only essential
service to the Public, but to add to the honor and reputation of your own
character. You are to keep these Instructions a profound secret and when the
state of your Provisions requires, you will return into the Port of Philadelphia or
some convenient one in the Bay of Chesapeake." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 195,
196, 197 (to Olney, to Governor Trumbull, to Harding, and to Navy Board,
Boston, all dated February 10, 1779). The measurements of the Confederacy are
taken from Wolcott MSS., February 12,1777.)
A little later, orders were sent to the Navy Board at Boston to get the frigate
Providence ready for sea immediately and again for her to cruise on the Atlantic
coast. Then these orders were transferred to the Warren, and later still the
committee decided to hold the Warren in port and fit out the Providence for a four
months' cruise; and then to send the Boston to the southern coast. Apparently in
accordance with this last order, the Navy Board at Boston instructed Captain
Tucker, April 6, to proceed with his ship, the frigate Boston, in company with the
sloop Providence, on a ten days' cruise in Massachusetts Bay and along the
Maine shore and then to go south. It does not appear that any of these
instructions were, at the time at least, carried out precisely according to the
intentions of the Marine Committee. The delay in fitting out the Confederacy was
so great that the committee determined to relieve Captain Harding from
command, should he be found responsible. That frigate did not get to sea until
the end of April (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 200, 201, 204, 206, 210 (February 21,
26, March 9, 21, 26, April 27, 1779, to Navy Board, Boston), 207 (April 17, 1779,
to Harding), 211 (April 27, 1779, to Deshon); Tucker MSS., April 6,1779; Boston
Post, May 8,1779.)
160
Meanwhile the frigates Deane, Captain Nicholson, and Alliance, Captain Landais,
sailed together from Boston January 14. Pierre Landais was a French naval
officer of experience, having sailed around the world with the famous navigator
Bougainville; he had embarked in the American cause and on the
recommendation of Silas Deane had been appointed a captain in the Continental
navy. The Alliance was bound to France and parted with her consort on the third
day out (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 258; Wharton, ii, 387; Stevens, 1552.) The
Deane soon captured an armed ship of the enemy which was sent back to
Boston. "Last Thursday," February 4, a newspaper announces, "arrived in this
Harbour the ship Viper, taken by Capt. Samuel Nicholson, in the Continental
Frigate Deane; she is a letter of Marque fitted out at Liverpool, mounting 16 Guns
and 75 Men . . . Capt. Nicholson took and burnt a ship belonging to London in
ballast from New York to Cadiz." The Deane cruised about four months, most of
the time in the West Indies. While there she fell in with the Continental ship
General Gates, which had sailed from Boston in December and had taken
several prizes. The Deane returned to the United States and went into
Philadelphia April 17 (Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 258, 259; Boston Post, February
6, May 1, 1779; Adams MSS., April 10, 1779, Vernon to Adams.)
The Ranger sailed from Portsmouth for Boston
February 24 and the same evening anchored in Nantasket Roads. The frigates
Warren, Commodore John B. Hopkins, and Queen of France, Captain Olney,
and the Ranger, Captain Simpson, having finally got ready for sea, sailed from
Boston March 13. The log of the Ranger, under date of April 6, says: "At 6 A.M.,"
being sixteen miles east of Cape Henry, "saw 2 sails, gave Chase to one of
them; at 1/2 past 6 the Warren and Queen of France hois'd English Colours and
fired a gun to Leeward, as did we, which she answered and bro't too at 7. We
brought too, found her to be the Hibernia, a Schooner of 10 guns, a british
Privatier; sent 2 of Our People on Board to help man her and now She remains in
Concord with us." The next morning, ,at 1/2 past 5 saw a Fleet of 9 sails to the N.
E., at 6 made sail and gave Chase, at 8 Tack'd Ship [by] Signal and made all the
Sail we could, alow and aloft; found we gained on the Fleet, our Consort the
Warren out sailing us all." In the afternoon: "Pleasant gales and fair weather. The
Warren, Queen of France & Our Selves in Chase of the Fleet; at 4 P.M. came up
with" them. Hopkins reported to the Marine Committee April 18 that on the 6th
"we fell in with the armed schooner Hibernia from New York, with 45 men, which
we took; and on the 7th at 4 o'clock A.M. in latitude 36.40 discovered two fleets,
one to leeward consisting of ten sail, the other to windward, of nine sail. We gave
chace to the windward-most, and at about two o'clock took seven sail, consisting
of the following vessels, viz.: Ship Jason, Capt. Porterfield, mounting 20 nine and
six pounders, 150 men, convoy to the fleet bound from N. York to Georgia,
having passengers on board as per the enclosed list; Ship Meriah, a letter of
marque mounting 16 six pounders, 84 men, very richly laden with provisions, dry
goods and accoutrements for a regiment of horse; Brig Patriot, brig Prince
Ferdinand, brig John, brig Batchelor, schooner Chance, laden with provisions
and goods for the army, to a very large amount. As soon as they were manned
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we thought best to stand to the eastward, having had intelligence of a large
number of armed vessels being off Chesapeak and Delaware Bays." Among the
passengers on board the Jason were a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, two
captains and two lieutenants. The Ranger's log for the 9th says: "Jogging under
easy sail, to keep our little Fleet together." April 10: "The Patriot being a heavy
Sailer, the Warren at 7 took her in tow." Hopkins's report continues: "On the 16th
instant I arrived in this port [Boston], having parted with the fleet on the 11th in a
thick fog. The next day the Jason arrived, which is a very fine ship; also the
schooner at Portsmouth, which is a very valuable vessel. Several vessels are
now in sight, which I hope is some of the fleet. By the activity of Captains Olney
and Simpson we manned the fleet in four hours." (Penn. Gazette, April 28,1779.)
The Queen of France arrived in Boston several days after the Warren and Jason,
bringing in with her the Maria, Hibernia, and three brigs. The other two prizes
were taken into Portsmouth April 21 by the Ranger. The Jason and Hibernia
were afterwards fitted out as privateers and made successful cruisers. The
Ranger returned to Boston harbor in June and anchored again in Nantasket
Roads (Boston Gazette, April 19, 26, 1779; Boston Post, May 22, July 31, 1779;
Log of the Ranger.)
The Marine Committee were greatly pleased with the results of this cruise, sent a
congratulatory letter to Hopkins, and proposed to purchase the Jason and
Hibernia and take them into the naval service; but a more thorough knowledge of
all the circumstances caused a change of sentiment. May 20, the committee
wrote to the Navy Board at Boston: "Since ours of the 4th instant we are favoured
with yours of the 28th Ultimo, whereby we find there is reason to conclude that
Captain Hopkins has violated his Orders by returning into Port when he should
have continued to Cruize and by not sending the Prizes he took into the nearest
Port; and we find also that Captain Olney has acted contradictory to your Orders
by comeing up to Boston when you had expressly required him to remain with his
Ship in [Nantasket] road. We now direct that you immediately order a Court of
Inquiry to inquire into the Conduct of those Two commanders during their late
Cruize, and afterward if necessary a Court Martial. lf you find the prosecution of
that business will produce any delay in getting the Ships again to Sea, it is our
desire that you suspend the said Commanders and put in others, and in that
case we recommend Captain Saltonstal and Captain Rathbourne to be appointed
in their room. We deem it highly necessary for the good of the service that the
orders of your Board should be obeyed by all Officers of the Navy under your
direction, and we desire that you will cause Courts of enquiry to be held, when it
is your Opinion the good of the service requires it, on the conduct of such
Officers as may disobey your Orders or in any other manner may misbehave. We
highly disaprove of Captain Hopkins sending an Officer to this place with a Letter
contrary to the Orders of your Board, which disobedience of Orders in this as well
as in other instances were unknown to us when we wrote him a Letter of
approbation; and we consider it very injurious to the service for the Officers to get
themselves appointed Agents for their men as well as dishonorable to such
Officers." As a result of this exercise of discipline Captains Hopkins and Olney
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were suspended from the navy and they seem never again to have held any
command in the Continental service. Captains Saltonstall and Rathburne were
appointed to command the frigates Warren and Queen of France. The sequel will
suggest a doubt as to whether the change in the case of the Warren was to the
advantage of the country (Mar. Com. letter Book, 213 (to Hopkins, May 4, 1779),
210, 213, 215, 216, 222 (to Navy Board, Boston, April 27, 30, May 20, 26, June
21, 1779); Adams MSS., May 25, 1779, Vernon to Adams.)
After a successful cruise in the West Indies the Continental cutter Revenge,
Captain Conyngham, sailed north and arrived at Philadelphia February 21, 1779.
Here the Revenge was sold, but the purchaser fitted her out as a privateer and
Conyngham was put in command again, under his Continental commission of
May 2,1777. In April the Revenge was captured by the British frigate Galatea and
taken into New York. Conyngham was sent to England in irons and treated with
great severity. He was accused of piracy on the ground that his cruise in the
Surprise in the spring of 1777 preceded the date of his commission. His first
commission, dated March 1, 1777, had been taken from him at Dunkirk and sent
to Versailles. Search was made for this earlier commission, but without success
(This commission has come to light within a few years and is in the possession of
James Barnes, Esq., of New York.) Franklin's assurance, however, that it had
existed apparently resulted in some amelioration of Conyngham's treatment. He
was removed to Plymouth and in November, 1779, after several unsuccessful
attempts, he escaped from Mill Prison with about fifty others. He proceeded first
to London and thence found his way to Holland (Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr.,
January, 1899; Outlook, January 3, 1903; Hale, i, 342-350; Almon, viii, 340;
Maryland Journal, March 2, 1779; Penn. Gazette, August 4, 1779; Mar. Com.
Letter Book, 201, 217 (March 10, June 2, 1779); Archives de la Marine B8 16
(Avril, Novembre, 1779)
About the first of the year the sloop Providence, Captain Rathburne, took five
prizes, all of which seem to have arrived safely in port. One of these was a ship
from Glasgow which had been taken by an American privateer, retaken by the
British, and then captured again by the Providence. Early in April the Providence
was ordered to make a short cruise in Massachusetts Bay and along the coast of
Maine in company with the frigate Boston. Later she was sent south of Cape
Cod. May 7, at nine o'clock in the morning, while cruising off Sandy Hook, the
Providence, now commanded by Captain Hacker, was seen from the British brig
Diligent, whose captain, testifying at his court martial, says that about noon, "as
soon as I had taken measures for fighting him on the Larboard side, the side his
Boom was of, he Gibed & luffed across." The Diligent luffed and received two
broadsides and two volleys of musketry before returning the fire of the
Providence. "Not an officer except myself unhurt, being deserted by the remains
of my Crew except seven, five of them wounded . . . Masts, Rigging & Hull cut all
to pieces," was forced to surrender to the Providence. The Diligent carried twelve
three- pounders and fifty-four men; the Providence, according to this English
captain, six six-pounders, six fours, two twos, and eighty-three men. The
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Americans lost four killed and ten wounded; the British, eleven killed and
nineteen wounded. The Diligent was taken into the Continental naval service
(Boston Post, January 16, 1779; Independent Chronicle, January 21, 1779 ;
Penn. Packet, May 25, 1779; Maryland Journal, June 1, 1779; Adams MSS. April
10, May 25,1779; Tucker MSS., April 6, 1779; Brit, Adm. Rec., Courts Martial,
No. 5311 (August 21, 1779)
In the spring the frigate Boston, Captain Tacker, in response to the instructions of
March 26, came south to Chesapeake Bay and on April 27 was ordered to
Delaware Bay. The Confederacy, after long delay, sailed from New London April
29, and a month later was in Delaware Bay. Meanwhile the Deane had arrived at
Philadelphia from the West Indies April 17. The plans of the Marine Committee,
which required frequent modification to suit the exigencies of changing
circumstances, were defined for the moment in their letter of May 20 to the Navy
Board at Boston. "We have lately had sufficient reason to lay asside the
expedition intended against the enemys force on the Coast of Georgia, and the
service the frigate Providence was intended for, is supplied by another Ship;
therefore it is now our intention to place our collected Naval force in such a
manner as to accomplish the double purpose of intercepting the enemies
outward bound Transports for New York from Great Britain and Ireland & the
homeward bound West India Ships. But if the Providence & Ranger should be
ready for Sea more than a fortnight before the other Ships, that then you order
those Ships to proceed to Cruize for the above purpose, marking out to them
their Cruizing ground in such a manner as there may be the greatest possible
certainty of being joined by the other Ships as soon as they shall be ready." (Mar.
Com. Letter Book, 206,215 (to Navy Board, Boston, March 26, May 20, 1779),
209 (April 21, 1779), 211 (to Tucker, April 27, 1779); Boston Post, May 8, 1779.)
The Deane, Boston, and Confederacy being all in Delaware Bay by the end of
May, a cruise along the Atlantic coast was planned for them by the Marine
Committee. Instructions for the Boston and Confederacy were dated June 2. To
Tucker the committee wrote: "The Ship Boston which you command and the
Frigate Confederacy, Captain Harding, being now ready for Sea, they are
directed to Sail in company with each other on a Cruize upon this Coast from the
Latitude of Forty to thirty-five degrees and to take, burn, sink or destroy as many
of the enemys Ships or Vessels of every Kind as may be in their power. The
Prizes you will Order into the nearest and safest Ports, addressed to the
Continental Agents in those Ports. And as this Committee have received
authentic intelligence that a number of the enemys Privateers are Cruizing near
the Latitude of 36, in expectation of falling in with a fleet of Merchant Vessels
bound from the West Indies . . . it is their first Object to frustrate the designs of
the enemy by Capturing or destroying their Vessels and to afford every aid and
assistance in their power to the inward bound Merchantmen." They were also to
give their attention to two British frigates said to have been sent out from New
York "to cruize upon this Coast . . . and we need not remind you how greatly it
would redound to your reputation and the honor of the American flag to capture
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or destroy these ships. You are to continue cruizing for the space of three weeks
from your Departure from the Capes of Delaware," and then return to Delaware
Bay for further orders. "As the Object of this Cruise is to take or destroy the
enemys Privateers or small ships of war and give every aid and assistance to the
Merchant men, the Committee direct you to confine yourself strictly to the
Latitudes above mentioned and to such Longitudes as are best calculated to
answer that purpose. But if from circumstances it should happen that the Public
Service necessarily requires you to exceed those Limits, then you are at liberty to
do it. The Ship General Greene, Captain Montgomery, belonging to the State of
Pennsylvania, now in this Bay, will have Orders from His Excellency President
Reed to act in conjunction with you during this Cruize. Captain Harding will be
furnished with a Copy of these Instructions and will be directed to Obey your
Orders as Senior Officer. It is expected that before you put to Sea you will fix with
him a proper System of Signals for the Ships under your command. The
Confidence we repose in your Courage and good Conduct gives us every reason
to hope for a Successful Cruize." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 218 (to Tucker), 219
(to Harding, June 2, 1779) Ten days later, the frigate Deane being ready for sea,
essentially the same orders were sent to Captain Nicholson. In case he should
fall in with the Boston and Confederacy, he was to cruise in company with them,
returning to the Delaware capes by July 1. "When joined to those Ships, you,
being the Senior Officer, will have under your direction three fine frigates, which
we doubt not will be judiciously managed and we recommend to you to cultivate
strict harmony with the Commanders of those Ships as being essentially
necessary for the Public good." (lbid., 221 (to Nicholson, June 12,1779) Few
details of this short cruise have been preserved. A number of captures seem to
have been made, the most important of which was the British privateer ship Pole
of twenty-four guns, taken by the Boston (Tucker, ch. vi; Penn. Gazette, June 16,
1779; Boston Gazette, July 5, 1779; Tucker MSS., June 28,1779, Nicholson to
Tucker.)
On the 18th of June the frigates Providence, Commodore Whipple, and Queen of
France, Captain Rathburne, and the Ranger, Captain Simpson, sailed from
Boston on a cruise to the eastward. The log of the Ranger records the capture of
a vessel July 20 and another the next day; they were both from Jamaica. A
midshipman on the Queen of France gives an account of falling in with a Jamaica
fleet of a hundred and fifty sail one morning about the middle of July near the
Banks of Newfoundland in a dense fog. Nothing could be seen, but the sound of
signal guns and ships' bells indicated the presence of a fleet. When the fog lifted,
about eleven o'clock, the Queen of France found herself close by a large
merchant ship from whom it was learned that the fleet was under convoy of a
seventy-four and several frigates and sloops of war. Under the pretense of being
a British frigate the Queen of France sent a boat to the English ship and quietly
took possession of her, and then took another ship in the same manner.
Commodore Whipple at first feared discovery and capture by the convoy, but
was induced to remain in the fleet all day with his squadron. No alarm was
excited among the Englishmen, and eleven ships were taken in this way by the
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Americans. They succeeded in getting away at nightfall without arousing any
suspicion. Andrew Sherburne, a seaman on the Ranger, gives a somewhat
different account of this affair. He says: "Our little squadron was in the rear of the
fleet and we had reason to fear that some of their heaviest armed ships were
there also ... No time was to be lost. Our commodore soon brought to one of their
ships, manned and sent her off. Being to windward, he edged away and spoke to
our Captain. We were at this time in pursuit of a large ship. The Commodore
hauled his wind again and in the course of an hour we came up with the ship,
which proved to be the Holderness, a three decker mounting 22 guns. She
struck, after giving her several broadsides. Although she had more guns and
those of heavier metal than ourselves, her crew was not sufficiently large to
manage her guns and at the same time work the ship. She was loaded with
cotton, coffee, sugar, rum and alspice. While we were employed in manning her,
our Commodore captured another and gave her up to us to man also. When this
was accomplished it was nearly night; we were, however, unwilling to abandon
the opportunity of enriching ourselves, therefore kept along under easy sail.
Some time in the night we found ourselves surrounded with ships and supposed
we were discovered. We could distinctly hear their bells, on which they frequently
struck a few strokes, that their ships might not approach too near each other
during the night. We were close on board one Of their largest armed ships and
from the multitude of lights which had appeared, supposed that they had called to
quarters. It being necessary to avoid their convoy, we fell to leeward and in an
hour lost sight of them all. The next day the sky was overcast and at times we
had a thick fog. In the afternoon the sun shone for a short time and enabled us to
see a numerous fleet a few miles to windward, in such compact order that we
thought it not best to approach them. We were however in hopes that we might
pick up some single ship. We knew nothing of our consorts, but were entirely
alone. Towards night we took and manned out a brig. On the third morning we
gained sight of three ships, to which we gave chase and called all hands to
quarters. When they discovered us in chase, they huddled together, intending as
we supposed to fight us. They however soon made sail and ran from us; after a
short lapse of time we overhauled and took one of them, which we soon found to
be a dull sailer. Another, while we were manning our prize, attempted to escape,
but we soon found that we gained upon her. While in chase a circumstance
occurred which excited some alarm. Two large ships hove in sight to windward
running directly for us under a press of sail. One of them shaped her course for
the prize we had just manned. We were unwilling to give up our chase, as we
had ascertained from our prize that the two other ships were ... unarmed. We
soon came up with the hindmost, brought her to and ordered her to keep under
our stern, while we might pursue the other, as our situation was too critical to
allow us to heave to and get out our boat. The stranger in chase of us was under
English colors; we however soon ascertained by her signal that she was the
Providence frigate, on board of which was our commodore. This joyful
intelligence relieved us from all fear of the enemy and we soon came up with our
chase . . . We now ascertained that the strange ship, which was in chase of our
first prize, was another of our consorts, the Queen of France." Three of the
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eleven prizes taken from the Jamaica fleet were afterwards recaptured, but the
other eight, worth with their cargoes over a million dollars, were brought safely
into port when the squadron returned to Boston about a month later. Whipple
received the congratulations of the Marine Committee (Clark, i, 94; Memoirs of
Andrew Sherburne, 21-23; Boston Gazette, September 27, 1779; Log of the
Ranger; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 229, 233, 234 (August 24, September 7, 1779),
238 (to Whipple, September 19,1779)
The Massachusetts brigs Tyrannicide, Captain Hallet, and Hazard, Captain
Williams, did most of the cruising on behalf of their state in 1779, and with some
success. The Hazard was in the West Indies early in the year, and on March 12
sailed from Martinique in company with the Continental ship General Gates,
Captain Waters. On the 16th, off St. Thomas, the Hazard captured the privateer
brigantine Active, from Antigua, after a "smart action for 35 minutes, yard arm
and yard arm." (Independent Chronicle, April 8, 1779.) The Active carried
eighteen four-pounders and ninety-five men; she lost thirteen killed and twenty
wounded. The American loss was three killed and eight wounded. The prize
arrived safely in port. The Hazard also fought with a British ship of fourteen guns
and eighty men, but did not succeed in capturing her. After having taken several
prizes in all, Captain Williams returned to Boston in April. The General Gates
returned about the same time and soon afterwards was sold out of the
Continental service (Mass. Archives, cli, 271, cliii, 133, 150, 167, 208; Boston
Gazette, February 22, April 12, 1779; Clark, i, 90; Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 259;
Massachusetts Mag., July, 1908; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 208, 219 (April 19,
June 7, 1779)
Meanwhile the Tyrannicide had sailed from Nantasket Roads, March 9, for
Martha's Vineyard, but encountered a gale off Cape Cod and ran off to the
southward. March 29, in latitude 28° 30' north, longitude 68° 25' west, the British
privateer brig Revenge of Grenada, carrying fourteen carriage guns, six- and
four-pounders, four swivels and two coehorns, and sixty men, was seen "at 4
o'clock P.M. about 4 leagues to windward coming down upon us. Upon which,"
says Captain Hallet, "I cleared ship and got all hands to their quarters ready for
action, then stood close upon the wind, waiting for her till about half past six
P.M., when she came up and hailing me, asked where I was from. I told them
from Boston. I asked them where they were from and was answered, they were a
British cruiser from Jamaica. I immediately reply'd that I was an American cruiser,
upon which they ordered me to strike, but finding me not disposed to gratify their
desires, they run up under my lee and saluted me with a broadside. Without loss
of time I returned the compliment and dropping astern got under their lee, where
our fires were so warm from below and from our tops and the shots so well
directed, we dismounted two of their guns, drove the men from their quarters,
and compelled them to strike to the American flag. The engagement lasted one
hour and a quarter, during which we were not half pistol shot distant and some
part of the time our yards were locked in with theirs." (Boston Gazette, April 19,
1779.) "I had Eight men wounded, only two of which are Bad; amongst the
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wounded are my first Lieut. & Master. I intended to man her and keep her as a
Consort during the Cruise, but having twenty wounded Men on board, of my own
men & prisoners, I thought it Best to send her home, with all the wounded men
on board under the Care of the Sergeon's Mate." (Massachusetts Mag., April,
1908.) The Revenge lost eight killed and fourteen wounded. She arrived safely in
Boston and the Tyrannicide followed April 25, having captured two other vessels,
one of them a fourteen-gun ship (Mass. Rev. Rolls, xliv, 408; Boston Gazette,
April 19, 26,1779; Roston Post, May 1, 1779; Clark, i, 91.)
Captain Williams, on his return to Boston in the Hazard, was met with certain
charges brought against him by the Board of War, the nature of which is not
stated. He was exonerated, however, by a joint committee of the General Court,
and a few days later that body passed a resolve renouncing all claim on the part
of the state to the privateers Active and Revenge "in testimony of their
approbation of the spirit and good conduct of the said" Williams and Hallet and
their officers and men. The Active was purchased by order of the General Court
and taken into the Massachusetts navy. She was put under the command of
Captain Hallet and in June was ordered on a cruise (Mass. Court Rec., April 20,
23, June 11, 1779; Boston Gazette, April 26, 1779; Massachusetts Mag.,
October, 1909.)
In May the Hazard and the Tyrannicide, now commanded by Captain John
Cathcart, were ordered to cruise in company alongshore, "first in the Vineyard
Sound, then round the Island of Nantucket . . . to clear the Coast of the
Picaroons that infest them." (Mass. Archives, cli, 467, 468.) A party of British and
tories had recently raided along the south shore of Cape Cod, and Martha's
Vineyard and Nantucket; in September a proclamation was issued by British
officers threatening the people of Nantucket with hostilities if they did not observe
strict neutrality. In the Sound the Massachusetts vessels fell in with the
Continental sloop Providence and brig Diligent and early in June, in Buzzard's
Bay, were joined by the Continental sloop Argo, Captain Talbot. June 15,
Cathcart wrote to the Board of War that at half past eight that morning the
Tyrannicide and Hazard chased a ship and brig, which "hove too for us & hauld
up their Courses, upon which I spoke Capt. Williams & we agreed to Engage
them, he to take the Ship & I the Brig, upon which I pass'd the Ship & gave her
two Broadsides & then ran along side the Brig & after exchanging 6 or 7
Broadsides she struck, the Ship in the mean time having struck to Captain
Williams." (Mass. Archives, cliii, 229.) The brig was a letter of marque mounting
twelve six-pounders; she got safely into New Bedford. The ship was a recapture,
having been taken by two British privateers. Meanwhile, in order to insure
continuous protection, the General Court had, on June 11, directed the Board of
War to arrange a series of cruises in rotation by the different vessels of the state
navy along the eastern and southern shores of the state (Mass. Court Rec., April
15, June 11, 1779; Mass. Archives, cliii, 219, 224, 229, 230; Boston Post, April
10, 1779; Independent Chronicle, April 15, 1779; Boston Gazette, October 11,
1779; Almon, viii, 268-271; Clark, i, 92.)
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The Connecticut navy lost its two most important vessels in 1779. In March the
Defence was wrecked on the shore of her native state. The Oliver Cromwell,
Captain Parker, sailed from New London June 3. On the morning of the 6th,
Parker saw a sail and gave chase. Half an hour later he saw four other sail, three
of them large ships. He then hauled close and one of the ships chased the
Cromwell, the others soon joining in on signal from the first. They showed
English colors and gained fast. "We found," says Parker's report, "that Fighting
would be Inevitable. Therefore ordered the Ship to be Cleared and all hands to
Quarters in good Season. Att about half after Ten A.M. we Began to play upon
the Enemy with our Stern Chases and as She Closed up with us verry fast, in
order the better to make use of our lee guns, we Shortened Sail by halling Down
the Stay Sails and keeping before the wind. A pretty warm Action Ensued for
about the Space of one hour, in which we had two men killed and one Mortally
wounded, Two Slightly wounded. The Consequence of our keeping before the
wind while Engaging (a Circumstance that could not be avoided) Brought the
Enemies other Ships Close up with us verry fast; and as we found we had
Considerably Disabled our Antagonist By Shooting away his main Topmast, we
again halled our wind to the Northward, Thinking thereby to out sail him so much,
before he could Repair his Damages, as to bring on night and if we could not
avoid him, we hoped at least to have Seperated him from his other Consorts."
The Cromwell drew away from her antagonist, but by half-past two in the
afternoon the English ship had repaired damages and renewed the chase. She
gained fast and soon came up under the Cromwell's lee quarter. Meanwhile the
other ships had also gained. "We were under the Necessity of Shortening our
Sail and keeping before the wind again, in order to Enable us to fight our lee
guns. The Action began again about 3 P.M. and Continued till a little after 4 Do.
In this last action we had two men wounded; one had his Right arm and Collar
bone broke by a Splinter, the other a flesh wound in the thigh by a nine pound
shot. The Damages Done to the Ships Hull were Inconsiderable. She had her
main and fore Stays Shott away, with one or two of her main & Mizen Shrouds,
her main and fore Braces, and a nine pound shot through the head of her Mizen
mast. By which time the Delewar Frigate and Union Privateer were closing up
with us so fast, we found no Possibility of avoiding a Contest with Treble our
force. Both officers and men appeared to be Brave and undaunted. I had a short
Consultation with my Principal Officers. We hoped we had Done our Duty, we
hoped we had Done Enough to Convince our Enemies as well as Others that we
Dare oppose them and, as we then thought, with Spirit too, though on
Disadvantageous Terms." (Trumbull MSS., ix, 237.) The Oliver Cromwell then
lowered her colors. She was taken into the British service and her name was
changed to Restoration (Trumbull MSS., ix, 93, 95, 237; Papers New London
Hist. Soc., IV, i, 39, 41, 42; Boston Gazette, September 20, 1779.)
Lieutenant-Colonel Silas Talbot, after his capture of the Pigot in 1778, was
employed in protecting the Rhode Island coast from the ravages of the enemy's
privateers, which did great damage along shore. The Pigot was taken into the
Continental service and seems to have sailed in company with Talbot, who
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commanded a sloop called the Argo, mounting twelve six-pounders. He captured
six privateers, some of them of superior force to the Argo, and a number of
merchantmen. One of his prizes was taken from him by three brigantines from
Philadelphia. A letter from Providence, dated August 10, says: "This moment an
express arrived from New London with an account of the gallant, intrepid Talbot's
taking [the] infamous villain Stanton Hazard, in a Brig of 14 guns out of Newport,
after a short action. Talbot was in a small sloop [the Argo] of 12 guns, and had an
inferior number of men on board to the Tory privateer, which was fitted out on
purpose to attack & take Talbot's sloop." (Boston Gazette, August, 16, 1779.)
Hazard was a loyalist, a native of Rhode Island, who had made himself
obnoxious to the people of that vicinity. September 17, Congress made Talbot a
captain in the Continental navy (lbid., September 6, 20, 1779; Boston Post,
October 2, 1779; Talbot, ch. iv; Pap. Cont. Congr., 37,193,197, 201, 209
(November 4, 11, 1779, February 28,1780) ; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 256
(January 25, 1779)
Oliver Pollock, the commercial agent of Congress at New Orleans, had
supervision of naval affairs on the Mississippi River and was authorized to
commission both vessels and officers for the Continental service and for
privateers. In commissioning and fitting out vessels and in otherwise executing
the orders of Congress, Pollock was encouraged and assisted by the Spanish
governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Galvez, who was very friendly to American
interests. In 1778, Pollock purchased the ship Rebecca, one of several prizes
taken on the Mississippi by a party of Americans under Captain James Willing,
who had come down the river from Ohio. A year later this vessel, renamed the
Morris, had been armed with twenty-four guns, fully manned, under the
command of Captain William Pickles, and ready for sea, when she was
unfortunately destroyed by a hurricane, August 18, 1779, and eleven of her crew
were lost. Governor Galvez then provided an armed schooner for the use of the
Americans; this vessel seems also to have been called the Morris, or Morris's
tender. Pickles cruised in this schooner and "Captur'd in Septr. a Vessell of very
superior force in Lake Ponchetrain, after a very severe conflict." (Pap. Cont.
Congr., 50, 9 (September 18, 1782) ; Sparks MSS., xli, 42.) The prize was a
British sloop called the West Florida. She was fitted out by Pollock and under the
command of Pickles cruised on Lake Pontchartrain during the fall and captured a
British settlement. The surrender of the British posts on the Mississippi to Galvez
soon followed. Later the West Florida assisted the governor in the capture of
Mobile and then proceeded to Philadelphia, where she was sold out of the
service (Pap. Cont. Congr., 19, 5, 193 (July 10, 1780), 37, 251, 535, 537, 541
(January 20, June 7, November 20, December 5, 1780), 50, 1-13, 66, 77-81, 97,
120-125; Jour. Cont. Congr., July 10, December 8,1780; Sparks MSS., xli, 7, 10,
16, 22, 23, 36, 41, 42; Penn. Gazette, June 7, 1780; Almon, ix, 359-365;
Stopford-Sackville MSS., 122; Paullin, 307-311.)
Through Commodore Collier, commanding a squadron in Chesapeake Bay in the
spring of 1779, came the intelligence that "Capt. Henry, R. N., Senior Officer in
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Georgia, reports in letter dated April 16, 1779, from Savannah, Ga., that 2 Rebel
Galleys, Called Congress and Lee, former of 1 18 Pounder and one 12 in her
Prow, two 9 pdr and 2 Sixes in her Waste & manned with 100 Men; the other with
130 French & carrying one 12 and one 9 Pdr. in her Prow, 2 fours and 2 one
Pounders besides swivels in her Waste, attacked H. M. S. Greenwich & Galleys
Comet, Thunder & Hornet off Yamasee Bluff, & that action ended with Capture of
Rebel galleys." This was a death-blow to the Georgia navy, and its revival was
made impossible by British control of the waters of that state until the end of the
war (Brit. Adm. Rec., Captains' Letters, No. 1612, 2 (May 22,1779); Almon, viii,
298; Paullin, 461.)
Admiral Gambier sailed for England April 5, and the day before his departure,
Collier "received a commission as Commodore and Commander-in-Chief of the
King's fleet in America." Of the condition of this fleet he complained, saying that
"the weak enfeebled state of the ships, both in point of numbers and of men, give
me the most painful sensations. I ardently wish to prove myself deserving of the
great trust I am honoured with, by the most spirited exertions." These exertions
were first directed towards Virginia, "the province which of all others gives sinews
to the rebellion from its extensive traffick. (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 125, 126
(Collier to Germain.) The British fleet, which sailed May 5 from New York for
Chesapeake Bay under Collier's command, consisted of the sixty-four gun ship
Raisonable, the Rainbow of forty-four guns, "the Otter, Diligent and Haerlem,
sloops, and Cornwallis galley, together with several private ships of war and
twenty-two transports having on board" about two thousand troops under
General Mathew. The Diligent must have been captured before the squadron
arrived in Chesapeake Bay. "At sunrise" on the 10th, says Collier, ,we saw some
rebel ships and vessels in Hampton Road with their sails loose, who, as soon as
the tide admitted of it, got under weigh and ran up Elizabeth and James rivers;
our fleet also weighed and the Raisonable anchored shortly after in Hampton
Road, her great draught of water not admitting of her going further with
conveniency. I immediately shifted my broad pendant to the Rainbow and
proceeded with the fleet up Elizabeth river, till a contrary wind and the ebb tide
obliged us to anchor. The next morning being calm prevented the ships from
moving with the flood, on account of the narrowness and intricacy of the
channel." The troops advanced, however, nearly to Portsmouth, supported by a
galley and two gunboats; and a breeze springing up, the ships soon followed.
The American fort on the river was evacuated. Much property was destroyed and
many vessels were seized by the British, others being saved from the same fate
by destruction at the hands of the Americans. The Otter and a number of other
small vessels were sent up the Chesapeake. "The movements of this little
squadron were so judicious that the enemy were much harrassed and distressed;
they destroyed many vessels and captured others." (Almon, viii, 290, 291, 293
(Collier to Clinton, May 16, and to Stephens, May 17, 1779) In a later report
Collier says: "The fort was raz'd, the season'd timber for ship building burnt, the
buildings and storehouses of the finest yard on this continent underwent the
same fate; the sufferings of individuals I endeavoured to prevent all in my power
171
and in general happily succeeded, and by it I hope have procured many friends
to the royal cause." (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 129.) Collier wished to remain
longer and to keep possession of this valuable naval station, but General Mathew
insisted that their orders required their return to New York. The two large men-ofwar and the transports thereupon sailed out of the bay, leaving the others to
continue their depredations. A hundred and thirty American vessels were
destroyed or taken as well as a vast amount of property on shore (Almon, viii,
289-295; Penn. Gazette, June 9, 1779; Town's Detail of Particular Services in
America, 76-87.) Richard Henry Lee, writing June 26 to William Whipple of the
Marine Committee, says of the operations of these smaller vessels, left in the
bay: "They have already burnt several private houses and one public warehouse
with between 2 & 300 hhds of Tobo. and carried off much plunder & many
negroes. Soon as they see the Militia gathering they embark and go to another
unguarded place. They have 6 Vessels: Otter, 16, Harlem, 12 Guns, King's
Vessels; Dunmore, 16, Schooner Hammond, 14, Lord North, 12 Guns, & Fin
Castle, 2 three pounders. The 4 last are [Goodrich's] Pirates. They say the orders
are to burn and destroy all before them; an Eastern Man whom they had
captured . . . escaped from them when they were burning the Warehouse and
gave us the above account of their force, which is confirmed by others. They land
between 60 & 70 men when they mean to do mischief." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and
Biogr., January, 1899.) Lee requests the Marine Committee to send two frigates
into the bay, a force sufficient, he says, to destroy the enemy's fleet. The Marine
Committee had already issued orders for the purpose. As early as the previous
November and again in January they had expressed a desire to capture or
destroy "the infamous Goodrich," and June 25, Captain Nicholson of the Deane
was "directed to proceed in company with the Frigate Boston from the Capes of
Delaware into Chesapeake Bay and on your arrival there, at Hampton or any
Other way, endeavour to Obtain the best intelligence if any of the enemies Ships
of war or Privateers are in the Bay, and if you find there are and of such force as
you are able to encounter, you are to proceed up and attack them . . . taking or
destroying as many of the said Vessels as may be in your power." (Mar. Com.
Letter Book, 223.) The Confederacy was ordered up to Chester to prepare for
other service, but on July 2 was directed to cruise ten days longer with the Deane
and Boston. Accounts of this service in Chesapeake Bay are lacking, but that it
was performed may be inferred from Lee's letter of August 8 to Whipple, saying:
"We are much obliged to the Marine Committee for their attention. I see the
frigates have taken and sent in two prizes, vessels of war." (Penn. Mag. Hist. and
Biogr., January, 1899; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 187, 193 (to Navy Board, Boston,
November 16, 1778, January 9, 1779), 223, 224, 225 (to Nicholson and to
Harding, June 25, July 2, 1779); Penn. Gazette, August 4, 1779.)
Upon the return to New York, May 29, of the British fleet from Chesapeake Bay,
says Collier, "I found Sir Henry Clinton on the point of setting off on an expedition
up the North River and I immediately determin'd on assisting in it, carrying with
me the Raisonable, Camilla, Vulture, three row galleys and two gunboats with the
transports and troops." This excursion up the Hudson resulted in the capture of
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Stony Point and other successes, which induced Collier to observe: "I hope I may
now say with some confidence that rebellion is thrown on its back and that this
campaign will be the last of this unnatural civil war." (Stopford-Sackville MSS.,
129 (Collier to Germain, June 15, 1779) Stony Point, however, was very soon
recaptured by the Americans. About this time also the British sloop Haerlem was
captured by an American privateer. The attention of the British was next directed
towards Connecticut, where their trade in Long Island Sound was harassed by
small privateers and armed boats. "The land forces," says Collier's report of his
expedition against them, "consisting of 2600 men commanded by Major-general
Tryon, I caused to be embarked in transports, and sending the Renown, Thames,
Otter and two armed vessels to block up New-London and the East entrance of
the Sound, I proceeded on the 3d [of July] from New York by the way of Hell
Gates with his Majesty's ships Camilla, Scorpion, Halifax brig and Hussar galley,
together with the transports, and on the 5th landed the army in two divisions at
the town of Newhaven, which after an irregular resistance from the rebels, was
taken possession of by us together with a small fort at the entrance of the
harbour, which latter we destroyed, after spiking up the guns, as also many
warehouses filled with stores &c. together with several vessels and whale boats.
The number of killed, wounded and missing on our side amounted to fifty-six; that
of the rebels we are unacquainted with, but suppose the numbers considerable.
We embarked the troops without loss and two days afterwards our flat boats,
covered by the galley and gun boats, landed near Fairfield, though opposed by
the militia and some continental troops; the rebels firing from the windows and
tops of houses occasioned the band of loyal refugees to set several of them on
fire, which communicating to others, burnt the whole town and also several whale
boats. The troops embarked from thence without molestation and the third day
following they were landed again in three divisions at the town of Norwalk, which,
for the treacherous conduct of the rebels in murdering the troops from windows
of houses after safeguards were granted them, was destroyed, together with five
large vessels, two privateer brigs on the stocks and twenty whale boats." The
small town of Greenfield was treated in the same manner (Almon, viii, 295, 296,
299, 355, 356; Town, 90-98; Clark, i, 110.)
The instructions of the Marine Committee, of June 25, required Nicholson, after
disposing of the enemy in Chesapeake Bay, to sail at once with the Deane and
Boston "on a Cruize in which you are to Choose such Station as you think will be
best to Accomplish the double purpose of intercepting the enemies outward
bound Transports for New York from Great Britain and Ireland and the homeward
bound West India Ships. We are of Opinion that between the Latitudes of 36 and
41, and 100 Leagues to the Eastward of the Island of Bermuda will be your best
Cruizing ground, but in this we do not mean to restrict you, leaving you to
exercise your own Judgment, which probably may be assisted by information
Obtained in your Cruise." This was to continue until the middle of September, or
longer if their provisions lasted, and then they were to return to Boston. "We have
ordered the Continental frigates at the Eastward to Cruise for the same purposes
you are now going on and we think it very probable that you will fall in with them.
173
In that case you or they or any of them are hereby directed to Cruise in Company
under the command of the Senior officer, and should you be joined by any of
those frigates and find by any intelligence you may Receive of the situation of the
enemys Sea force at Bermuda that it will be adviseable to make an attempt on
their Shipping, we recommend your undertaking it . . . We now wish to draw your
attention to the execution of the business before you. The great Expence and
dificulty that attends the fitting and manning of our Ships must make you and
every Commander in Our service fully sensible how much they Should exert
themselves to employ them usefully while at Sea. This consideration we hope will
have due weight in your mind and will call forth such active and prudent behavior
as will be of Essential Service to your Country and add to your own reputation
and the honor of our Flag." (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 223.)
The Deane and Boston sailed out of Chesapeake Bay, July 29, in company with
two ships of the Virginia navy and a convoy of merchantmen, from whom they
soon parted. A successful cruise of about five weeks was made by the two
frigates, during which they captured eight prizes, including four New York
privateers; but the most important were the ships Sandwich and Thorn, each of
sixteen guns. The former was a packet carrying as passengers a number of army
officers; the Thorn was a sloop of war. The frigates arrived at Boston, September
6, with two hundred and fifty prisoners, including a lieutenant-colonel, a major,
and three naval captains. Nicholson received the congratulations of the Marine
Committee (Boston Post, September 11, 1779; Boston Gazette, September 13,
1779; Penn. Gazette, September 22, 1779; Tucker, 119-121 ; Mar. Com. Letter
Book, 237, 238 (to Navy Board, Boston, and to Nicholson, September, 18, 19,
1779)
On September 21 and 22, the Marine Committee instructed the Navy Board at
Boston to fit out the Deane, Boston, and Queen of France as quickly as possible
for important service at Charleston, South Carolina. Shortly afterwards Admiral
Arbuthnot at New York received information from Boston which led him to believe
that these vessels were fitting out for an attack on the British post in Penobscot
Bay (Stopford-Sackville MSS., 147 (Arbuthnot to Germain, October 10,1779)
November 10, orders were sent for the frigates to sail at once. The Deane,
perhaps because she could not be made ready in time, was subsequently
detached from this duty, and the squadron, as finally made up under the orders
of the Eastern Navy Board, November 20, consisted of the frigates Providence,
Boston and Queen of France, and the Ranger, with Commodore Whipple in
command. They set sail from Nantasket Roads, November 23, and cruised to the
eastward of Bermuda. An officer on board the Providence wrote home that three
days out from Boston they "met with a severe gale of wind, which lasted about 30
hours, in which time we sprang our mizen-mast; the Ranger shared the same
fate and the Boston sprang the head of her mainmast. On the 5th [of December]
we took a privateer brig of 12 guns called the Dolphin." (Independent Chronicle,
February 24, 1780.) The destination of the squadron was not made known until
they had passed Bermuda. They finally arrived at Charleston December 23 (Mar.
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Com. Letter Book, 239, 245 (to Navy Board, Boston, September 21, 22,
November 10, 1779); Tucker MSS., November 20, 1779; Log of Ranger; Penn.
Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April 1891, journal of Lieutenant Jennison; Tucker, ch. vii.)
On August 24 the frigate Confederacy was ordered on a short Cruise off the
Delaware capes, keeping a lookout for the privateer Eagle of Philadelphia,
expected from St. Eustatius. September 3 the Confederacy was again ordered
up to Chester, and on the 17th received instructions for a voyage to France,
taking as passenger the French minister, Gerard. The Eagle was a ten-gun
brigantine sailing under a Continental commission in the West Indies. Whether or
not she returned to Philadelphia at this time is perhaps uncertain, but she was in
the West Indies in November and on attempting to get into St. Eustatius was
headed off and chased by six British privateers. She took refuge under a fort on
the Dutch island of Saba, but was cut out and captured by the privateers, taken
to Nevis and condemned by a British admiralty court, in violation of the neutrality
of Saba (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 230, 231, 235 (to Harding, August 24,
September 3, 17, 1779) ; Pap. Cont. Congr., 44, 325-397 (June 12, November
13, 16, 25, 30, December 14, 1779, January 18, 20, March 21, 23, 1780);
Massachusetts Spy, February 10, 1780.)
In the orders of September 17, sending the Confederacy to France, Captain
Harding was instructed to make the best of his "way to any Port which the
Minister may think proper to direct and on your passage you are carefully to
avoid coming to action with any vessel of equal or superior force. Your Ship
being entirely designed for the Accomodation of the Minister, yon are in all
things, as far as may be, to comply with his wishes and to treat him with the
respect due to his character." On his arrival in France he was to report to "his
Excellency Benjamin Franklin, Esqr., Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States
at the Court of Versailles." After refitting his ship, he was to take on board "such
Stores for the use of these States as may be offered by the Agents in France, so
as not to incommode your vessel as a Ship of war, and when you have received
the Orders of our Minister, you are immediately to make the best of your way
back to this port or into Chesapeake Bay . . . If you can procure A Set of good 18
Pounders when in France and you are of Opinion that the Confederacy can bear
them, you are at liberty to mount them and put those you have now on Deck into
your hold. We desire you will be careful of the Confederacy, her Materials and
Stores and that you will not delay any time unnecessarily in France, but be
diligent for dispatch." Under the same date the committee wrote to Franklin of the
expected visit of the Confederacy to France (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 235, 236.)
October 17, the Confederacy still lying at Chester, Harding received orders to
take on board another distinguished passenger, John Jay, with his family. Jay
had been appointed minister to Spain (lbid., 242.)
The Confederacy sailed soon after this and cleared the Delaware capes October
26. In relating the story of this eventful voyage, Harding says that on November 7
at five o'clock in the morning, in latitude 41° 3' longitude 50° 39', "the ship
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unfortunately lost her Bow Sprit, Fore Mast, Main Mast and Mizen Mast," in a
gale. Six hours were passed in cutting away the wreck of spars, sails, and
rigging, "after which all hands were imployed in clearing the Ship and preparing
to get up Jury Masts, which would have been done with the Assistance of my
Officers, who behaved themselves exceedingly well on the Occasion, in a Very
short time, but the next day about 7 Oclock A.M. in addition to our misfortune
found the Rudder to be gone, at least the head of it Wrung in such a manner that
rendered it entirely useless, in which situation we lay Tossing and Drifting with
the Wind and Current, making use of every Opportunity to secure the Rudder
and Refit the Ship in order to proceed on her intended Passage till the 23d
November." During this time the ship had drifted eastward to longitude 48° 28'. "I,
with the advice of Mr. Jay and Mr. Gerard, Call'd a Council of my Officers
Relative to the Ship's proceeding on her intended passage, who unanimously
agreed that it would be very imprudent to approach the Coast of Europe in the
situation she was then in; that it would be impossible for the Rudder to survive a
hard Gale of wind without increasing the Leake very much, which was
Occationed by the Rudder's Striking against her Stern post; that if we should be
Necessitated to part with it, should undoubtedly be thrown into Various
Difficultys, in Consequence of which the Ship might Founder; that if we should be
attacked by a Gale of Wind inshore, we must inevetably be Cast on Shore, and
perhaps the greater part of us if not the whole fall a sacrifice to our own folly; and
that if we should loose any of Sparrs or Rigging we had none to Replace them;
that in the situation the ship was then in, thought it most prudent to proceed to
the West Indias. After which I Consulted Mr. Jay & Mr. Gerard the latter declining
to give any Opinion on the Subject, the former gave his Opinion that the
sentiments of the Officers Corresponded with his and that their advice ought in
his opinion to be followed." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 11, 487 (Harding to President
of Congress, December 30, 1779)) Thereupon the ship was brought to
Martinique, arriving at St. Pierre December 18. The two ministers continued their
passage to France in a French frigate (Boston Post, February 19, 1780; Boston
Gazette, February 21, 1780; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 61.)
In the fall of 1779 a change was made in the administration of Continental naval
affairs by placing them in charge of a smaller executive board. John Brown,
secretary of this new body, in a letter to the Navy Board at Boston says:
"Congress having dissolved their Marine Committee did by A Resolve bearing
date the 28th of October ... Constitute a Board of Admiralty and Appointed three
Commissioners not members of Congress, together with two Members of
Congress and A Secretary, to whose management All Affairs Relative to the
Continental Navy are committed, subject nevertheless to the controul of
Congress." Instructions and suggestions concerning various matters are given in
the letter. "As to the Continental Armed Vessels still remaining at Boston, you are
hereby authorized and directed to send them out on a cruize in such Latitudes as
you may think will be most likely to annoy the enemy by Captures." (Mar. Com.
Letter Book, 249 (December 10, 1779)
176
Captain Manley, after his release from imprisonment and acquittal by court
martial for the loss of the frigate Hancock, took command of a Boston privateer,
the twenty-gun ship Cumberland. In December, 1778, he sailed for the West
Indies, but after a short cruise was captured by a British frigate and taken into
Barbadoes. With other prisoners he soon escaped, seized a sloop, got to
Martinique and thence to Boston in April, 1779. In June he took command of the
ship Jason, recently captured by a Continental squadron and fitted out as a
privateer with eighteen six-pounders and a hundred and twenty men. The Jason
sailed June 19 and off the Isles of Shoals was chased and nearly captured by a
British frigate and brig. She was saved by a violent thunder squall, which,
although it dismasted her, drove the British vessels out to sea. A seaman on the
Jason wrote in his journal: "When the squall struck us it hove us all aback, when
we clued down. In ten seconds the wind shifted on our starboard beam and
shivered our sails. In a few seconds more the wind shifted on the starboard
quarter and struck us with such force that hove us on our beam ends and carried
away our three masts and bowsprit. She immediately righted and the squall went
over." (Narrative of Joshua Davis, 4.) The crew then insisted upon going into port
to repair damages, but Manley, having quelled the mutinous, succeeded in
having masts stepped and the ship completely re-rigged at sea in thirty-six hours;
the new masts he procured at Portsmouth. He then continued his cruise. Off
Sandy Hook, July 23, he fell in with two British privateer brigs of sixteen and
eighteen guns. "The enemy hove upon the wind with his larboard tacks on board,
run up his courses, hoisted his colours and gave us a broadside. Our Captain
ordered the sailing master to get the best bower anchor out, so that the bill of it
should take into the fore shrouds of the enemy. It was quickly done. The Captain
ordered the helm hard a-port, which brought us along side. The anchor caught
their fore rigging. Our Captain then said: 'fire away, my boys.' We then gave them
a broadside which tore her off side very much and killed and wounded some of
them. The rest all ran below, except their captain who stood on the deck like a
man amazed." The brig was then boarded and quickly captured. "When we got
disentangled we bore away for the other privateer, that began to run from us. We
gave her a few shot from our bow chasers and she hove too." (Narrative of
Joshua Davis, 6, 7.) The second brig then also surrendered. The British lost thirty
killed and wounded; the Jason three wounded, one of them mortally. The prizes
were brought safely into Boston Harbor. Fearing that his men would desert if he
went up to the town, Manley procured stores at Hull and then continued his
cruise. After escaping a British frigate off Nantucket Shoals with a large fleet of
merchantmen under convoy, which he ran into in a fog, Manley cruised to the
eastward. Off Newfoundland he captured an English brig. Here the Jason was
chased by the British frigate Surprise, of twenty-eight guns and two hundred and
thirty men. The frigate overhauled the Jason about eleven o'clock in the evening
of September 30 and fired a broadside. "Our captain would not let us fire until
they got abreast of us. They gave us another broadside, which cut away some of
our running rigging and drove some of our men from the tops. We gave them a
broadside which silenced two of her bow guns. The next we gave her cut away
her maintopsail and drove her maintop-men out of it. Both sides continued the
177
fire until one o'clock. Our studding sails and booms, our sails, rigging, yards, &c.
were so cut away that they were useless. Lanterns were hung at the ship's side,
between the guns, on nails, but they soon fell on deck at the shaking of the guns;
which made it so dark that the men could not see to load the guns. They broke
the fore hatches open and ran below. Our captain sent the sailing master forward
to see why the bow guns did not keep the fire up, but he never returned. The
captain then sent the master's mate on the same errand and he never returned. It
was therefore thought needless to stand it any longer and the captain took the
trumpet and called out for quarters." (Davis, 11, 12.) The Surprise lost fifteen
killed and thirty wounded, the Jason five killed and a few wounded. Manley was
taken to St. John's, Newfoundland, and afterwards sent to Mill Prison, England,
where he remained more than two years (Independent Chronicle, March 4, 1779;
Boston Gazette, March 8, November 29,1779; Boston Post, July 31, 1779; Essex
Inst. Coll., January, 1909.)
The private armed ship Hampden, of twenty-two guns, Captain Thomas
Pickering, of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in the early spring of 1779 was
returning from a cruise in European waters, having sent four prizes into France,
when on March 7, at ten o'clock in the morning, in latitude 47° 15' north,
longitude 28° 31' west, a sail was sighted. The Hampden gave chase. At five in
the afternoon both vessels showed their colors. The stranger was a large ship
carrying twenty-six nine-pounders and eight fours; at dusk she was lost sight of,
but at daylight was seen again. "At 7 A.M. came under her lee quarter within hail,
hoisted continental colours and gave her a broadside. She kept all her guns
hous'd till just before we fired, altho' we could tell her ports thirteen of a side, a
very great distance apart; she return'd the broadside without any damage, with
twenty-four nine pounders and eight four pounders and had the advantage of a
spar deck to cover her men. Being a beautiful large ship with two tier of cabin
windows we knew her to be an East Indianian and of much superior force, but
supposing they were badly mann'd, were determined to fight her as long as we
could. The engagement continued till half past Ten, close alongside, when
finding our three masts and bowsprit very badly wounded, our starboard main
shrouds totally gone, our rigging and sails cut to pieces, our double headed shott
expended, and near twenty of our men killed and wounded, were obliged to our
grief to leave her a mere wreck, her masts, yards, sails and rigging cut to pieces.
Having ourselves only the foresail which we could set to get off with, the sheets
being cut away, were obliged to use our tacks. During the action our brave and
worthy commander, Capt. Pickering, was killed." One other man was killed and
seventeen wounded, two of them mortally. The Hampden arrived at Portsmouth
April 20 (Continental Journal, April 20, 1779; Independent Chronicle, April
22,1779.)
The ship General Mifflin, Captain McNeill, after cruising more than a year in
European waters, returned in February to Boston, having taken thirteen prizes.
She was also successful in home waters during the year and fought an
engagement with a sloop of war (Boston Gazette, February 15, October 25,
178
1779; Boston Post, February 20, 1779.) The sixteen-gun ship General Pickering,
Captain Haraden, of Salem, cruised successfully all the year, many of her prizes
being armed vessels; among them a fourteen-gun brig named the Hope. In a
letter to Timothy Pickering, dated Cape Henlopen, October 1, 1779, Haraden
says: "I left the Capes at Sundown on Tuesday last and at Sunrising on
Wednesday Morning I discovered Two sail to the windward. The Winds being
light I hove out two Draggs to keep my Ship from going ahead and made all the
Sail I could, as though I was running from them. They both gave Chace and at 5
p.m. they got nigh enough to discover that I was a Cruising Vessel. They both
hove about and haul'd their Wind, I immediately hove about after them, they
crowded all the Sail they could and Rowed at the same time. At sundown the
Wind breezed up a little and as Night came on, I kept Sight of them with my Night
Glass; at 8 P.M. they parted, one stood to the Northward & the other to the
Southward. I kept in chace of the largest and at 9 P.M. She Hove about, being to
the Windward; as she past me I hail'd her, but had no answer. Then I gave her a
Broadside, but without any effect that I could perceive; then I Tackt Ship and
gave her another Broadside and hail'd her. She answered from N. York. I Order'd
her to haul down the Colours, which they Obey'd instantly; very peaceable
people, like the Hope, though they Had 14 6 & 4 pounders and 38 Men. She
proves to be the Royal George Cutter, a Letter of Marque out of New York last
Tuesday Morning bound to the West Indies and was in Company with a Sloop of
8 Carriage Guns from the same place, she being Clean & a Fast Sailor got off
clear, while I was in Chase of the Cutter." (Pickering MSS., xxxix, 179.) In
October, off Sandy Hook, the Pickering engaged three letters of marque at once a fourteen-gun ship, a ten-gun brig, and an eight-gun sloop. After an action of an
hour and a half she captured all three and took them into port (Penn. Gazette,
September 29,1779; Maryland Journal, December 7, 1779; Boston Post,
December 18, 1779; Boston Gazette, December 20, 1779.)
The sloop Eagle of New London with other privateers captured three vessels
early in the year and in May she took several more. Having manned these prizes,
the prisoners on board the Eagle outnumbered her crew and took possession of
her. They then murdered all the crew, except two boys, and took her into
Newport (Boston Gazette, May 17, 31, 1779; Boston Post, May 22, 1779; Papers
New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 10.)
The British sloop of war Thorn, brought into Boston as a prize by the frigates
Deane and Boston in September, was fitted out as a privateer; she was ship
rigged and carried eighteen six-pounders. Captain Daniel Waters of the
Continental navy, who had served in Washington's fleet in 1776, was put in
command of the Thorn; there were too few regular ships to give employment to
all the Continental officers and it was common for them to sail in privateers. The
Thorn sailed on a cruise in December. The journal of the first lieutenant relates
that on the 24th at four o'clock in the afternoon, the wind being light, two armed
brigantines were seen about four miles to windward. The Thorn stood off "in
order to draw them within shot. At 7 P.M. almost calm, our ship in order, men at
179
their quarters and in high spirits for engaging. Calm all night. The next morning,
December 25, at 6 A.M. the two brigs were on our larboard beam about two
miles distant, light breezes from the west; they, to appearance, were making
preparations for engaging. At 9 A.M. the wind sprung up from the S. W.; made
sail for them in as good order as circumstances would admit. At 10 A.M. Came
up with the sternmost, as she was the heaviest, and he hailed: From White Hall,
and ask'd Capt. Waters what right he had to wear the 13 stars in his pendant.
Capt. Waters answered: I'll let you know presently; then shifted our ensign and
gave her a broadside within pistol shot, which she returned, as did the other brig
on our weather bow. A warm engagement commenced on both sides for about
two glasses, when the largest brig laid us on board on our weather quarter, whilst
the other amused us on our weather bow, who kept up a regular fire; but she
upon our quarter was soon convinced of her error, receiving such a warm and
well directed fire from our marines and seeing his men running about deck with
pikes in their backs instead of their hands, were undoubtedly glad to get off
again. But soon shot alongside again and renew'd his cannonade with surprising
spirit, but after two or three broadsides, was obliged to haul down what remained
of his colours. There must have been great slaughter, as the blood was seen to
run out of the scuppers. The other brig seeing her consort had struck, made what
sail she could to make her escape, but they found us as ready to follow as she
was to run, after Capt. Waters had ordered the captured brig to follow. This
engagement lasted about four glasses. Capt. Waters received a wound in his
right knee about one glass before the first struck. At 3 P.M. came up with the
other, after firing several chace shot thro' her quarter, when with reluctance they
hauled down their colours. Capt. Waters ordered me on board to send the
officers on board the Thorn & immediately make sail for the other brig, which was
making from us. Fresh breezes and cloudy weather. At 8 P.M. the Thorn hove to,
losing sight of the chace." (Boston Gazette, February 21, 1780.) The next
morning she was nowhere to be seen, but many oars, spars, and other wreckage
were discovered floating and it was supposed that she had sunk. Subsequently it
was learned that under cover of the night she had managed to escape. These
two brigs were privateers from New York; one, the Governor Tryon, which
escaped, carried sixteen guns - twelves, sixes, and fours - and eighty-six men;
the other, the Sir William Erskine, carried eighteen six- and four-pounders, and
eighty-five men. The Thorn lost eighteen killed and wounded, the Erskine twenty.
Upon learning of this exploit, John Adams, then in Paris, sent to the French
"minister a Boston Gazette of 21st February, in which is a relation of a glorious
combat and cruise of my countryman Captain Waters, of the Thorn . . . There has
not been a more memorable action this war, and the feats of our American
frigates and privateers have not been sufficiently published in Europe. It would
answer valuable purposes, both by encouraging their honest and brave hearts
and by exciting emulations elsewhere, to give them a little more than they have
had of the fame they have deserved. Some of the most skillful, determined,
persevering and successful engagements that have ever happened upon the
seas have been performed by American privateers against the privateers from
New York, and have seldom been properly described and published even there."
180
(Wharton, iii, 650, Adams to Genet, May 3,1780.) January 13, 1780, the Thorn
fell in with the British ship Sparlin of eighteen guns, bound from Liverpool to New
York, and captured her after an action of forty minutes. The American loss was
one killed and two wounded, the British lost three killed and ten wounded. The
Thorn brought the Erskine and Sparlin safely into Boston, arriving in Nantasket
Roads February 17, 1780 (Boston Post, February 19,1780; Boston Gazette,
February 21, 1780. For further information about privateers and their prizes in
1779, see Boston Gazette, January 18, February 15, March 8, 22, April 26, June
14, August 2, September 27, October 4, 18, November 29, December 13, 20,
1779; Boston Post, February 6, April 10, May 1, 22, July 3, 10, October 2, 1779;
Independent Ledger, May 10, October 11, 1779; Penn. Gazette, May 12,
September 29, October 6, 1779 ; Penn. Packet, May 20, August 10, October 14,
December 25, 1779 ; Maryland Journal, January 12, 1779; New York Packet,
October 21, 1770 ; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 9-16; Proc. U. S. Nav.
Inst., June, 1911; Maclay's Moses Brown, chs. vi, vii, viii ; Barney, 77-80 ; Clark,
i, ch. vii; Williams, 245; Pickering MSS., xvii, 267. For cruise of a Now York
privateer, see Amer. Hist. Rev., January, 1902.)
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER XII
THE PENOBSCOT EXPEDITION, 1779
For the third time within a century a military expedition of importance and
magnitude, considering the resources of the community, was fitted out at Boston
for service against a foreign enemy. In 1690 the forces of the colony under Phips
attempted the conquest of Quebec; in 1745, led by Pepperell, they captured
Louisburg (Expeditions against Acadia under. Colonels Church and March in
1704 and 1707 might also be mentioned.); and now in 1779 the citizens of
Massachusetts assumed, practically alone, the burden of a new enterprise, an
effort to repel an invasion of their territory. About the middle of June eight
hundred or more British troops from Halifax, convoyed by three sloops of war
under the command of Captain Mowatt, entered Penobscot Bay and took
possession of the peninsula of Maja-bagaduce or Bagaduce, now called Castine.
The object of this move was the establishment of a new province, furnishing a
home for many of the numerous loyalists under British protection in Nova Scotia
and elsewhere and at the same time serving as a bulwark for British possessions
farther east and as an advanced military post convenient for operating against
New England (Hist. Man. Com., Amer. MSS. in Royal Inst., i, 284 (Germain to
Clinton, September 2, 1778), 381 (Clinton to General McLean, February 11,
1779), 393, 415, 436, 440 (correspondence relating to proposed seizure of
181
Penobscot), 452-462 (letters of McLean, Mowatt, etc., from Penobscot, June,
1779)
When the news of the British occupation reached Boston the General Court was
in session, and it was soon determined to drive out the enemy, if possible, before
he had had time to strengthen his position. Preparations were made with energy
and a military and naval force was soon organized, although the full number of
militia called for could not be obtained. Application was made to the Continental
Congress for the services of three national vessels at that time in Boston Harbor
and they accompanied the expedition. New Hampshire contributed one vessel.
All the rest of the force was made up and the expense borne by Massachusetts
(The principal original authorities for the Penobscot Expedition are: Mass.
Archives and Rev. Rolls; General Lovell's Journal, published by Weymouth Hist.
Soc., 1881; Journal of the Privateer Ship Hunter, printed in Hist. Mag., February,
1864; various papers in Wheeler's History of Castine; letters published by the
State of Massachusetts in Proceedings of the General Assembly relating to the
Penobscot Expedition, 1780; contemporary newspapers, e.g., Boston Gazette,
August 9, September 27, December 27, 1779, March 18, 25, April 1, 8, 15, 1782;
Boston Post, July 10, 1779; Continental Journal, January 6, 1780; London
Chronicle, September 25, 28, 1779; Brit. Adm. Records, Captains' Letters and
Cptains' Logs; Almon, viii, 352-359. See also Town, 102-115.)
The fleet organized for this enterprise consisted of nineteen armed vessels and
twenty or more transports. The Continental vessels were the frigate Warren, 32,
Commodore Saltonstall, the brig Diligent, 14, Captain Brown, and the sloop
Providence, 12, Captain Hacker. The state navy furnished the brigs Hazard,
Active and Tyrannicide of fourteen guns each, commanded by Captains Williams,
Hallet, and Cathcart. The Diligent and the Active had recently been taken from
the British. In addition to these six vessels, twelve privateers were taken into the
service of the state, the owners being guaranteed against loss. Four of these
privateers carried twenty guns each and four others eighteen guns, while of the
remaining four there was one sixteen, two fourteens, and one eight. Eight of the
privateers were ship-rigged. One vessel was furnished by New Hampshire, the
twenty-gun ship Hampden, a privateer temporarily taken into the service of that
state. The fleet carried over two hundred guns, a large proportion of them
probably light ones, and more than two thousand men; Saltonstall was in
command. The military force on board the transports it had been intended to
recruit to the number of fifteen hundred men, but owing to hurried preparations,
less than a thousand apparently embarked on the fleet; and they, according to
the testimony of the officers, were a very inferior set of men, even for militia.
These troops were under the orders of General Solomon Lovell, with General
Peleg Wadsworth second in command and Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Revere in
charge of the artillery (Court Records, June 24, 1779.)
On June 25, the General Court made provision for "Nine tons of Flour or Bread,
Nine Tons of Rice, Eighteen Tons of Salt Beef, six hundred Gallons of Rum, six
182
hundred Gallons of Molasses, Five hundred stand of Fire Arms." (Court
Records.) On July 13, Commodore Saltonstall was instructed by the Board of
War "to take every measure & use your utmost Endeavours, to Captivate, Kill or
destroy the Enemies whole Force both by Sea & Land, & the more effectually to
answer that purpose, you are to Consult measures & preserve the greatest
harmony with the Commander of the Land Forces, that the navy & army may
Cooperate & assist each other." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 39.) It would have been
well if this injunction had been strictly heeded. Lack of cooperation between army
and navy, a cause that has brought disaster upon many a joint expedition, was to
have its baleful effect on this. Another source of weakness was Saltonstall's
incompetency. It was also unfortunate that the necessity for prompt action, with a
view to forestalling reinforcements of the enemy, made it impracticable to enlist
the number of men that had been considered essential for the success of the
enterprise. Moreover, for the important and difficult work in prospect, that of
assaulting fortifications, a fair proportion at least of regular troops should have
been incorporated with the force. The fleet sailed from Boston July 19. They
proceeded first to Townsend (Boothbay Harbor), the appointed rendezvous,
where it had been expected that the full complement of men would be made up,
but the general was disappointed. Unwilling to delay, he set sail again on the
24th (Weymouth Hist. Soc., 1881, Sketch of Lovell, ch. vii.)
Information of the departure of this expedition reached English ears no earlier
perhaps than might have been expected. Commodore Collier wrote from New
York July 28: "I received this morning certain intelligence that an armament
sailed from Boston on the 21st instant to attack his Majesty's new settlement in
Penobscot River . . . I intend putting to sea at daylight tomorrow," (Almon, viii,
356.) in pursuit. While the sloop Providence was fitting out at Boston, Lieutenant
Trevett, who had long served on board that vessel, decided to remain at home
and attend to his private business, saying that he had "no particular inclination to
go to Penobscot, for I think the British will get information either at New York or
Newport before our fleet can get ready to sail and if they do, I know that three or
four large British ships can block them in and that will be the last of all our
shipping." (R. I. Hist. Mag., October, 1886.) The fleet arrived in Penobscot Bay
July 25, in the afternoon. There were three British sloops of war in the harbor, the
North, of twenty, and the Albany and Nautilus of eighteen guns each. Nine of the
American ships, in three divisions, stood towards these vessels, hove to and
engaged them. There was a brisk fire for two hours without much effect. In a
report to the President of the Massachusetts Council, dated three days later,
General Lovell says: "I the same evening attempted to make a lodgment on
Majorbagaduce, but the wind springing up very strong, I was obliged to desist,
lest the first division might suffer before they could be supported by the second.
On the 26th I took possession with the marines, supported by General
Wadsworth's division, of an island in the harbour, beat them off, took 4 pieces of
artillery and some ammunition." (Boston Gazette, August 9, 1779.) The landing
was made on Nautilus Island, also known as Banks Island. Captain Cathcart of
the Tyrannicide says of this affair that "on the 26th July a Council was held on
183
board the Warren, where it was agreed that each Ship or Armed Vessel should
furnish such a Number of Marines to take possession of Banks's Island on the
South side of the Entrance of Bagaduce River under cover of the Sloop
Providence, Brig Pallas & Defence." (Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 113.) An officer on board
the ordnance brig, presumably Revere, gives another account of this episode,
dated July 29, saying that "the marines attacked an island where the enemy had
a battery of 2 guns; they were commanded by Captain Welsh of the Warren. I
sent one field piece to support them; they landed under cover of three vessels.
The enemy quitted it with precipitation, left their colours flying and four pieces of
cannon, two of them not mounted. We immediately built a battery there and
mounted two 18 and one 12 pounder. This island is directly opposite to the
enemy and commands the mouth of the harbour." (Boston Gazette, August 9,
1779.) This battery forced the British ships to shift their anchorage further up the
harbor (Hist. Mag., February, 1864; Wheeler, 293, Journal of John Calef; Brit.
Adm. Rec., Captains' Logs, Nos. 23 and 630, logs of the Albany and Nautilus.)
On the 27th there seems to have been lack of harmony between the military and
naval commanders and a misunderstanding about the landing of the marines in
an attack on the peninsula of Bagaduce. The importance of prompt and energetic
action was appreciated by some of the subordinate naval officers, who presented
to the commodore on that day a petition in which they "Would Represent to your
Honour that the most spedy Exertions should be used to accomplish the design
we came upon. We think Delays in the present Case are extremely dangerous,
as our Enemies are daily Fortifying and Strengthening themselves & are
stimulated so to do, being in daily Expectation of Reinforcement"; they did not
wish to advise or censure, but only "to express our desire of improving the
present Opportunity to go Immediately into the Harbour & Attack the Enemy's
Ships." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 50.) It was the opinion of these officers that the
capture of the British post at Bagaduce would be greatly facilitated and hastened
by removing the ships which supported it. By evening arrangements had been
made for landing the marines on the peninsula. At three the next morning the
commodore ordered Cathcart "to begin to fire into the Woods with an Intent to
scower them of the Enemy, which was Immediately obey'd." (Rev. Rolls, xxxix,
113.)
Early on July 28 the attack was made on Bagaduce. The Warren engaged the
British ships at long range and they moved still farther up the harbor, to escape
the fire of the battery on Nautilus Island. Lovell says: "This morning I have made
my landing good on the S. W. head of a Peninsula which is 100 feet high and
almost perpendicular, very thickly covered with bush and trees. The men
ascended the precipice with alacrity and after a very smart conflict we put them
to the rout. They left in the woods a number killed and wounded and we took a
few prisoners; our loss is about 30 killed and wounded. We are within 100 rods of
the enemies main fort, on a commanding piece of ground. I hope soon to have
the satisfaction of informing you of the capture of the whole army." (Boston
Gazette, August 9, 1779.) "We landed in three divisions," says Colonel Revere,
184
"the marines on the right, Col. Mitchell on the left, and Col. Mc. Cobb, the
volunteers and my corps in the centre. The land being so mountainous and full of
wood that our cannon could not play, I landed with my small arms, the whole
force under cover of two ships and three brigs, who drew near the shore and kept
up a constant fire into the woods till we began to land. The enemy's greatest
strength lay upon our right, where the marines landed; they had three hundred in
the woods. As soon as the right landed they were briskly attacked. The enemy
had the most advantageous place I ever saw; it is a bank above three hundred
feet high and so steep that no person can get up it but by pushing himself up by
bushes and trees, with which it is covered. In less than 20 minutes the enemy
gave way and we pursued them. They left twelve dead on the spot, 8 wounded
and about 10 prisoners. We lost about 35 killed and wounded. We took
possession of a height near their fort and are now building a battery to play upon
them. I expect to put two 18 pounders, one 12, two 4, and a howitz on shore this
day. I am in hopes that if the ships go into the harbour today [July 29], as it is
said they will, and take their ships, we shall have an easy conquest. In the
afternoon we took another battery of three 6 pounders, upon which they
abandoned it and went into their fortress." (Boston Gazette, August 9, 1779.)
Another officer puts the American loss at ten killed and twenty wounded (lbid.;
Wheeler, 295 ; Hist. Mag., February, 1864.)
On the 29th, according to Cathcart, it was agreed that the ships should go in and
attack the enemy's squadron, but the next day, at a council of war on board the
Warren, Saltonstall said there was no sufficient reason for the ships' going in. At
this time, July 30, a galley arrived from Boston and three days later was sent
back with Lovell's dispatches. Frequent councils were held on the Warren, but
with little result. The marines gave some assistance to the army, but with this
exception the navy was of little service. The commodore, upheld by the privateer
captains, remained inactive day after day, apparently incapable of coming to a
decision. He seems to have feared the exposure of his ships to the fire of the fort
while attacking the enemy's ships and to have insisted that the fort should be
captured first; whereas Lovell's force was insufficient to justify an assault on the
stronghold supported as it was by the British ships. Meanwhile the army erected
batteries at different points for the reduction of the fort, if possible, and for the
annoyance of the little squadron, which it would seem might easily have been
captured, destroyed, or driven away at the outset of operations by the vastly
superior American fleet. August 6, Lovell notes in his journal: "I wrote a Letter to
the Commodore desiring an answer whether he wou'd or whether he wou'd not
go in with his Ships & destroy the Shipping of the Enemy, which consist only of
three Sloops of war, when he returned for answer, if I wou'd storm the fort he
wou'd go in with his Ships, upon which I called a Council, the result of which was
that in our present situation it was impracticable, with any prospect of Success."
A simultaneous attack by army and navy might have succeeded. Lovell. himself,
perhaps, was moved by excess of prudence; but he lacked confidence in his
men.
185
Notwithstanding the steadiness with which the militia, with the help of the
marines, carried the precipitous heights of Bagaduce on July 28, part of their
subsequent behavior convinced the general of their unreliable character. He
continued to urge more naval activity and wrote to the commodore August 11:
"The destruction of the Enemy's ships must be effected at any rate, although it
might cost us half our own." (Wheeler, 310; Lovells Journal; Rev. Rolls, xxxix, ,
113; Hist. Mag., February, 1864.)
Meanwhile the commodore had had a somewhat ridiculous adventure August 7,
described in Lovell's journal: "A Boat from the Hazard with Comr Saltonstall,
Capts Waters, Williams, Salter, Holmes & Burke were a reconnoitering up a
Cove nigh the Enemy's Ships; on their discovering them they immediately sent 8
Boats armed, to hem them in. They so far succeeded that they made a prize of
the Boat, but the Gentlemen took to the Bush and escaped being made
prisoners." After a circuitous tramp through the woods the naval officers rejoined
their friends.
Immediately after the council of war on August 6 another express had been sent
to Boston with dispatches from the general, but with no report from the
commodore. The Navy Board of the Eastern District noticed this omission in a
letter to Saltonstall dated August 12, in which they went on to say: "We have for
sometime been at a loss to know why the enemy's ships have not been attacked,
nor does the result of this Council give us any satisfaction on that head; it is
agreed on all hands that they are at all times in your power. If, therefore, your
own security or the more advantageous operations of the army did not require it,
why should any business be delayed to another day, that may as well be done
this? Our apprehensions of your danger have ever been from a reinforcement to
the enemy; you can't expect to remain much longer without one. Whatever,
therefore, is to be done, should be done immediately, both to prevent advantages
to the enemy and delays if you are obliged to retreat. As we presume you would
avoid having these ships in your rear while a reinforcement appears in front, or
the necessity of leaving them behind when you retire yourself; with these
sentiments we think it our duty to direct you to attack and take or destroy them
without delay, in doing which no time is to be lost, as a reinforcement are
probably on their passage at this time. It is therefore our orders that as soon as
you receive this you take the most effectual measures for the capture or
destruction of the enemy's ships, and with the greatest dispatch the nature and
situation of things will admit of." (Proc. of Gen. Assembly, 26.) These urgent
instructions, signed by William Vernon and James Warren, might possibly have
produced some effect, had they been issued and forwarded several days earlier;
but it was too late, as was also an application to General Gates for aid, which
had recently been made by the Massachusetts Council.
By the time the American forces had been in Penobscot Bay between two and
three weeks the fort on Bagaduce peninsula, which at first had been a mere
breastwork, was becoming stronger every day and was already a formidable
186
structure. At last, August 13, when General Lovell, hoping for succor from
Boston, was still besieging this work and preparing for a possible assault, the
enemy's reinforcements appeared. The Active and Diligent since July 30 had
been cruising off "the Mouth of the Bay in order to make the earliest Discoveries
of an Enemy's Approach," when "on the 13th Inst. 2 P.M. Discovered five Sail
Standing into the Bay." (Mass. Archives, cxlv, 207.) Two others came in sight,
making a force of one ship of the line, five frigates and a sloop of war. The
Diligent ran in at once to notify the commodore and the Active joined the fleet the
next day. There was a disposition at first, no doubt encouraged by the more
resolute commanders, to make a stand with the fleet, and the ships were drawn
up in the form of a crescent, but at another council it was decided that the British
fleet was too strong to engage and that the only alternative must be adopted,
which was to run up the river. The captains evidently had no confidence in their
leader and little hope of his making a determined resistance.
Meanwhile, upon first receiving information of the approach of British
reinforcements, the army had hastily embarked on the transports and the whole
fleet made every effort to get as far up the river as possible. All but two of the
vessels escaped capture, yet only to be destroyed by their crews after landing, to
prevent their falling into the enemy's hands. The New Hampshire privateer
Hampden and the ship Hunter, one of the largest and best of the Massachusetts
privateers, were taken by the British. The Hunter was run ashore and her crew
escaped before capture. Captain Salter of the Hampden says that when the fleet
got under way the enemy was a league and a half astern and that he set all sail,
but "my Ship Sailing heavey the enemy Soon came up With me, three frigetes,
and fiered upon [me] one after ye outher, & cutt away my rigen & Stages &c, and
huld me Sundrey times & wounded Sum of my men. I found it Emposable to
Joyane our fleet again; was obliged to Strik, all thou Contray to my well." (Mass.
Archives, cxlv, 44; Wheeler, 302 (Calef's journal)
The British squadron that caused this reverse of fortune for the American arms
consisted of the sixty-four-gun ship Raisonable, two thirty-two-gun frigates, the
Blonde and Virginia, the Greyhound of twenty-eight guns, and the Camilla and
Galatea of twenty guns each, and the fourteen-gun sloop Otter, and was under
the command of Commodore Collier. He received information of the expedition
July 28, and sailed from Sandy Hook August 3. According to the log of the
Blonde, at half-past twelve in the afternoon of August 15, "the Rebel fleet got
under weigh & formed a Line of Battle, we, the Galatea & Virginia being the
Headmost ships, the Reisonable, Greyhound & Camilla about 6 or 7 miles a
starn." At half-past one "saw the Rebels forming a Line of Battle; us together with
the Virginia & Galatea pursued the 21 sail of Rebels & Drove them before us
without the Return of a single shot. At 3 two Ships & a Brigg hauld round to the
S. W., trying to get Down the western passage of Long Island; us & the Galatea
hauld close to the North End & cut off their Retrait. They then wore & stood after
the Body of the fleet; the Galatea Pursued the Brigg & Drove her on shore, we
then standing after the Ships & fired several shot at them. At 4 one of the Ships
187
run on shore, ye Galatea sent her 2 Boats to Board her, but finding the Rebels to
be armed on the Beach, returned on bd & made sail after us, leaveing them to
the Command of our Rere, the Albany, Nautilus & North Just Coming out of
Magebacduce River. At 1/2 past 4 fired several shot at the other ship & Huld Her,
as did the Virginia. At 5 she struck to us; sent a Boat with an Officer to board Her,
which she did, & made sail after us. At 6 upewards of 20 sail of small Vessels run
on shore, the most of them they set fire to, which Oblig'd us to anchor." At seven
o'clock the Greyhound got into shoal water and anchored. About the same time
the Americans set fire to a sloop and sent her down the river. "Sent 2 Boats man
& armed, Cut her Loose & twod Her on shore; sent 3 Boats to Board a schooner
& bring her to Anchor, she proved to be Laden with provisions. At 10 saw the
Skyrocket on fire, at 1/2 pst saw the Greyhound afloat again; Virginia anchord
with the Greyhd 1/2 a mile below us. At 8 Discovered Numbr of small boats
passing to & fro from the small Craft to the shore Forts; a Broadside of Round &
Grape shot at them. At 9 the Boats returned from ye prize Hamdon of 22 Guns.
At 5 A.M. made sigI for all Lieuts that the Boats mand & armed to attack the
small Vessels. At 11 made the Signal & weighd, But the wind falling cam, . . .
sent the pinnace to Reconnitre the Enemys Vessels." The next day the Blonde
with other British vessels continued the pursuit up the river; they saw the Warren
on fire two miles above, "heard the Explosation & saw the smoke of several
Vessels on fire above her." The loss on board the Albany, North, and Nautilus
during the siege was trifling: four killed, nine wounded, and eight missing (Brit.
Adm. Rec., Captains' Letters, No. 1612, 2 (Collier, August 20,1779), No. 2121,
16 (Mowatt, September 19, 1779), Captains' Logs, Nos. 23, 118, 157, 420, 630
(logs of the Albany, Blonde, Camilla, Greyhound and Nautilus)
The British fleet, although carrying fewer men and fewer but doubtless much
heavier guns than the American, was far too powerful for an irregular,
heterogeneous armament, made up mostly of undisciplined privateers to engage,
with any hope of success. Unity of action and mutual support in an emergency
could not be expected of such a force. The committee of the Massachusetts
General Court, which inquired into the affair, reported, October 7, that the total
destruction of the fleet was occasioned principally by "the Commodore's not
exerting himself at all at the time of the retreat in opposing the enemy's foremost
ships in pursuit." With the pursuing British extended over a long line, a resolute
and skillful commander, backed by disciplined and subordinate captains, might
have struck a blow of some effect at the enemy; but probably under the
circumstances the best course was followed in depriving them of a number of
valuable prizes. The fault lay in the earlier, inexcusable inaction. Collier sailed
from Sandy Hook August 3. Before that date, if the small British squadron in the
bay had been disposed of at the outset and if proper support had been given to
the army, General Lovell should have been able to carry the half-finished fort and
would probably have been in possession of the whole region, even with his
inadequate force. The legislative committee of inquiry expressed the opinion that
if Lovell had "been furnished with all the men ordered for the service or been
properly supported by the Commodore, he would probably have reduced the
188
enemy"; and added that the naval commanders in the service of the state
"behaved like brave, experienced, good officers throughout the whole
expedition." (Boston Gazette, December 27,1779; Proc. of Gen. Assembly, 2729.)
The need of reinforcing Lovell had been appreciated and when the
Massachusetts Council applied to General Gates, August 8, a regiment of the
Continental army, of four hundred men, was detailed for this service. They did
not get away from Boston, however, until after the disaster at Penobscot. Upon
receiving information of this, August 19, they at once put into Portsmouth in the
fear of falling in with some of Collier's ships (lbid., 21; Thacher's Military Journal,
166-168.) If the inadequacy of Lovell's force had been realized in the beginning
and the reinforcement had been asked for at once, it would have reached the
Penobscot in time. The whole affair is a record of blunders and lack of foresight.
Leaving the wrecks of their fleet strewn along the banks of the river, the unhappy
soldiers and sailors of the Penobscot expedition found their way back to Boston
through the wilderness. The disaster had a depressing effect in Massachusetts.
A heavy debt, estimated at seven million dollars, was imposed upon the state,
but the humiliation of the affair was felt even more keenly. As General Sullivan
said of it, the expense was "not so distressing as the disgrace." (Sparks MSS.,
xx, 2.) It has been held that this enterprise was not only mismanaged and
doomed to failure, but was ill-conceived and would have been comparatively
useless, at least not justifying the cost, even if successful; but another view may
perhaps with some reason be entertained. In the first place the establishment of
a hostile post within striking distance of Boston naturally caused apprehension
and its removal was an object worth considering. Moreover, success justifies
much, and more than material advantage is to be considered. In this case victory
would have brought prestige to the American arms and would in some degree
have inspired confidence in the ultimate happy conclusion of the war, with
animating effect on the supporters of the patriotic cause, who had met with much
discouragement.
The end of Saltonstall's career in the Continental service was near. The
committee of inquiry reported that the principal reason for the disaster was "want
of proper spirit and energy on the part of the Commodore." (Boston Gazette,
December 27, 1779.) It is an interesting question for speculation whether a more
"proper spirit and energy " would have been displayed by Captain Hopkins, who
had recently been displaced by Saltonstall in command of the frigate Warren,
and who otherwise would doubtless have led the American fleet into Penobscot
Bay. A few weeks after the report of the committee, Saltonstall was tried by court
martial on board the frigate Deane in Boston Harbor and was dismissed from the
navy.
The British held Bagaduce until the end of the war, but they were not entirely
unmolested. Just within a year the sting of defeat was in a slight measure
189
alleviated, according to the following account of a small but successful
expedition: "A few days ago a detachment from the troops under General
Wadsworth went up Penobscot-river, having pass'd the fort in whale-boats in the
night, and took two sloops which had been weighing up some of the cannon
lately belonging to our privateers which were burnt there. They had got 8 cannon
on board and were coming down the river, little expecting to be conducted by our
people; but Capt. Mowat had the mortification to see them passing down by the
fort, out of his reach however, in triumph. They fired at the fort to vex the enemy
and got safe away. Mowat followed them to Campden, but General Wadsworth
having drawn up his men and made a breastwork to frighten the enemy, he and
his ship were obliged to meach back again, and we are in full possession of the
vessels which were intended to invest our coasts. General Wadsworth has taken
40 prisoners, including the men who were on board these vessels." (Boston
Gazette, July 10, 1780; Almon, x, 227.)
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER XIII
A CRUISE AROUND THE BRITISH ISLES, 1779
The frigate Alliance, Captain Landais, with Lafayette on board, arrived at Brest
February 6, 1779, after a passage of twenty-three days from Boston. The voyage
had not been without incident. Two vessels were captured and the frigate lost her
main topmast in a storm. February 2 a mutiny was discovered among the English
and Irish sailors on board. The difficulty of recruiting ships' crews for the regular
naval service, chiefly due to the superior attractions of privateering, had led to the
practice in some cases of enlisting British prisoners, who were willing in this
manner to escape confinement. In the case of the Alliance the disinclination of
Americans to sail under a French captain had increased the difficulty and
accordingly many British subjects were taken. The unreliable character of such
crews is illustrated in this instance. Among the ringleaders of the conspiracy were
John Savage, master-at-arms, and William Murray, sergeant of marines. Murray
confessed, saying "that Savage and he, with 70 more, had agreed to take the
ship and carry her into some part of England or Ireland, and force one of the
Lieutenants to take command of her. He said the plan they had laid to take her
was, that they were to divide themselves into four divisions, the first to take the
magazine, the other three at the same time to force the cabbin, wardroom, and
quarter deck, then to take command of the arm-chests, and in case of opposition,
they were to point the fore-castle guns aft and fire them, the guns being 9
pounders and all loaded. The party that was to go to the magazine were to kill
the Gunner, Carpenter and Boat-swain; the other punishments for the other
officers and French gentlemen were thus: Captain Landais was to be put in irons
190
and sent in the cutter, without victuals or drink; the Lieutenants were to walk
overboard on a plank from the ship side, unless they would take charge of her
and navigate the ship into England; the marine officers and the Doctor were to be
hanged, quartered, and hove overboard; the sailing Master was to be tied up to
the mizzen-mast, scarrified all over, cut to pieces, and hove overboard."
(Independent Chronicle, April 29, 1779, Murray's testimony under oath, vouched
for by an officer of the ship.) Lafayette was to be put in irons and sent to England.
Thirty-eight of the mutineers were confined in irons on shore to await trial. The
disposition of these prisoners caused embarrassment, for there were not enough
American naval captains in France to organize a court martial for their trial and it
would be inconvenient and expensive to send them back to America. Franklin
suggested exchanging them for Americans as prisoners of war. The Marine
Committee, however, could "think of no better method of disposing of them than
Sending them out to this Continent by different Vessels, proportioning the
number to each Vessel, so as not to render it dangerous or inconvenient: and
upon their Arrival, if Sufficient evidence can be had, it is our intention to bring
them to trial by Court Martial (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 236 (September 17, 1779,
letter to Franklin); Wharton, iii, 188; Boston Gazette, April 19, 26,1770;
Independent Chronicle, April 22, 29, 1779 ; Archives de la Marine, B8 16
(Fevrier, 1779.)
After his return to Brest in May, 1778, with his prize the Drake, Captain Jones
spent more than a year on shore, perhaps the most trying year of his life, beset
with every sort of vexation and disappointment. To begin with, his drafts on the
American Commissioners, for the support of his crew and prisoners and the
refitting of his ship, were dishonored for lack of funds. Jones had never received
any pay for his own services and he now made himself personally responsible for
these necessary expenses. There was great and apparently unnecessary delay
in disposing of the Ranger's prizes, so that the officers and men were kept
waiting indefinitely for their prize money. At this time, too, began the long and
weary wait for another and larger ship. There still seemed a chance that through
the French Minister of Marine, de Sartine, Jones would get the Indien after all,
and it was proposed by Franklin that he should man her partly with French and
partly with American prisoners received in exchange for those he had taken on
his cruise. But on account of the outbreak of hostilities between France and
England, which soon followed, the Dutch government, anxious to maintain
neutrality, would not allow the Indien to leave Holland. Other schemes were
proposed, among them the command of a squadron of French ships under the
American flag to cruise in the Baltic, but owing to the natural jealousy of French
officers, and other causes, every plan fell through. After nearly endless
correspondence without result, Jones determined to go himself to Versailles and
personally urge his claims, taking the advice, it is said, given in "Poor Richard's
Almanac," and hoping that by direct solicitation something might be
accomplished. This hope was realized, for Sartine took more interest in his affairs
and the result was the purchase, in January, 1779, of an East Indiaman called
191
the Duc de Duras (Sands, 96-149; Sherburne, 66-86; Archives de la Marine, B1
89, 179, 183, 185, 203, 207.)
This vessel was fourteen years old, unsound, and a dull sailer, but though Jones
had insisted on the necessity for his purpose of a fast-sailing ship, he accepted
the Duras and at once entered upon the work of converting her into a man-ofwar. With the consent of Sartine and in honor of Poor Richard and of his faithful
friend and benefactor, Franklin, Jones called his ship the Bonhomme Richard.
She was at L'Orient and several American seamen were enlisted there. Months
were spent in preparation for a cruise against the enemy. The Alliance, which
was to have returned directly to America, was detained by Franklin and put under
Jones's orders; and three French vessels also, making in all a respectable
squadron. The agent of the French government in the arrangements was M. de
Chaumont, a zealous adherent of the American cause who had given his house
at Passy free of rent to the American Commissioners. It was intended that
Lafayette should accompany the expedition with a considerable military force and
an attack on Liverpool, Lancaster, Bristol, Bath, and Whitehaven was
contemplated; it was proposed to take nearly fifteen hundred infantry besides a
small body of cavalry and six pieces of light artillery. This project, however, was
abandoned and Lafayette did not go. Later, an invasion of England was planned,
for which a large French and Spanish fleet was collected, and Jones was to
make a diversion in the north, but the main part of this scheme also was given
up. It remained now for the American squadron to cruise independently. The
ships were finally ready for sea about the middle of June, 1779. There was
trouble on board the Alliance which caused Jones annoyance and perplexity, not
knowing at first where to place the blame. It was owing to lack of harmony
between the captain of the frigate and his officers and crew. Landais had a
temperament which made impossible anything like efficient cooperation between
himself and either superiors or inferiors (Sands, 149-158; Sherburne, 86-94;
Archives de la Marine, B4 172, 99-102, 128.)
The Bonhomme Richard was not well adapted for purposes of war, being
clumsily built, slow-sailing, and structurally weak. There was discussion as to the
number and weight of guns she should carry. Jones wished a main battery of
twenty-eight eighteen-pounders and they were ordered to be cast, but the ship
was not strong enough to bear the strain and lighter guns were deemed
necessary. The only ones that could be obtained in time for the cruise were old
French guns, many of which had been condemned. On the gun-deck were
mounted twenty-eight twelve-pounders, and on the forecastle and quarter deck
six or eight nines, while in the gun-room on the after part of the deck under the
main battery six eighteen-pounders were placed, ports having been cut for them,
too close to the surface of the water to be of use in a moderately rough sea.
Jones had as first lieutenant, at the outset, Robert Robinson, who was soon
succeeded, however, by Richard Dale, an excellent officer who had served in the
Virginia navy and the Continental navy and had twice escaped from Mill Prison.
The crew of the ship was heterogeneous. Out of two hundred and twenty-seven
192
officers and men (This list of 227 in Sherburne is of a later date and evidently
incomplete, some of the French officers and all the marines being omitted. A
reprint of the original muster-roll, dated July 26, 1779, is contained in The Logs of
the Serapis, Alliance, Ariel, edited by Captain John S. Barnes, New York, 1911;
this list, comprising 254 names, differs considerably from Sherburne's, which is
accounted for by many changes soon afterwards made in the personnel.) there
were seventy-nine Americans, mostly exchanged prisoners, eighty-three English,
Irish, and Scotch, including Jones himself, a few Scandinavians, and nearly thirty
Portuguese; the nationality of most of the others is not stated. Besides these
there were a hundred and thirty-seven French soldiers acting as marines. The
Alliance, by far the best ship in the squadron, carried twenty-eight twelvepounders and eight nines, and rather more than two hundred men. The Pallas,
Captain Cottineau, was a merchantman or privateer fitted out as a thirty-two-gun
frigate; her battery consisted of twenty-six nines and six fours, and her crew of
about two hundred and fifty men. The Cerf, Captain Varage, was an eighteengun cutter and a fine vessel of her class. The Vengeance, Captain Ricot, was a
twelve-gun brigantine (Sherburne, 95, 100, 133-144, 221; Sands, 156,157;
Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 215, 225-239, B1 91, 51, B4 158, 143, 184, B4
172,128.)
Jones's ideas about the kind of service he was now to enter upon are expressed
in a memorandum he had drawn up January 21, 1779, while waiting for the
orders of the minister to take command of the Bonhomme Richard. "I am but a
young Student in the Science of Arms and therefore wish to receive instruction
from Men of riper Judgement and greater experience, but to me the grand Object
of Partizan War is, when a fair opening presents itself, to strike an unexpected
Blow, which being well directed must in the nature of things be severly felt. The
Man who is to be entrusted with the Chief Command of such enterprizes, ought
to be worthy of confidence, and if he is, too much cannot be shown him. It seems
to be his province to adopt such enterprizes as circumstances may throw him in
the way of, with a prospect of success, and which being effected will tend the
most to distress and distract the Enemy. A principal object or Enterprize may with
propriety be thought of long before it is executed, but ought not to be committed
to writing nor communicated to any person other than the commander in chief,
and by him only to his Officers and Men at a proper time and Place. To effect
anything of consequence, it may be necessary to embark a Body of 400 heigh
Spirited and well disciplined Troops exclusive of the compliment of Seamen and
Marines. Five Ships may be of infinite Service. I would recommend two small
ones rather than one larger size, as more objects than one may present
themselves. But Tho' in some cases large Vessels may not be necessary for Five
Ships, yet the small ones ought to sail very fast, that they may hold way with the
Principal Ship or Ships on which they are to attend. The passage will thus be
performed in the shortest space of time that is possible and these five Ships may
be made useful as light Cruizers, should a Variety of the Enemies Ships be met
with at any one time on the Passage. One fast sailing Cutter or other Vessel of
Eight or Ten Guns might be of much Utility, as well in a Partizan War to cover the
193
Troops in landing and in retreat as in Cruizing against the Enemies Commerce
on the Ocean. No Cruizing Frigate with unlimited orders ought to be sent to Sea
without being attended by one of these Vessels, and the Bottoms should be
sheathed with Copper. If I have the Ministers Authority, I will send a trusty person
or two to enquire into on the spot and view the exact strength & Situation of a
place or two of great Importance. It will be proper to be provided with Two light
Field pieces and a number of Scaling Ladders, &ca . . . But the Commanding
Officer of the Troops will be better able to Judge of the Articles necessary for any
land Operation, and his Opinion may easily be obtained without telling him why it
is Asked. It will be a necessary caution to Suffer no person concerned in the
preparation of the Five Ships to know for what services they are prepared and
with which Ships they are to act. Some false Idea may be whispered to them as a
Secret." (Jones MSS.)
Jones had general instructions from Franklin, who was always moved by humane
considerations. The concluding passages are: "As many of your officers and
people have lately escaped from English prisons, either in Europe or America,
you are to be particularly attentive to their conduct towards the prisoners which
the fortune of war may throw into your hands, lest the resentment of the more
than barbarous usage by the English in many places towards the Americans
should occasion a retaliation and imitation of what ought rather to be detested
and avoided for the sake of humanity and for the honour of our country. In the
same view, although the English have wantonly burnt many defenceless towns in
America, you are not to follow this example, unless when a reasonable ransom is
refused, in which case your own generous feelings as well as this instruction will
induce you to give timely notice of your intention, that sick and ancient persons,
women and children may be first removed." (Sands, 152-154 (April 27,1779)
Shortly before sailing, de Chaumont, who seems not always to have been
discreet, required Jones and the other captains to sign an agreement or
concordat, which gave the subordinate commanders a degree of independence
and freedom of action incompatible with strict discipline and efficient cooperation
(lbid., 165; Sherburne, 94; Mackenzie's Life of Paul Jones, i, 153. For the
Concordat, see Archives de la Marine, B4 158, 144, Sherburne, 200, and
Appendix VIII.)
The squadron sailed, June 19, from Groix Roads, near L'Orient, with a convoy,
which was escorted to Bordeaux and other ports. On the night of the 20th the
Bonhomme Richard and Alliance fouled each other, carrying away the Richard's
jib-boom and the Alliance's mizzen-mast. Jones considered Landais responsible
for this accident, but Lieutenant Robinson of the Richard was court-martialed and
dismissed (Jones MSS., August 8,1779.) The next evening the Cerf captured a
fourteen-gun sloop, but was obliged to abandon the prize on the approach of a
superior force. June 29, the Bonhomme Richard fell in with two frigates. Jones
says: "They appeared at first earnest to engage, but their courage failed and they
fled with precipitation, and to my mortification outsailed the Bon homme Richard
and got clear. I had, however, a flattering proof of the martial spirit of my crew
194
and am confident that had I been able to get between the two, which was my
intention, we should have beaten them both together." (Sherburne, 96.) In spite
of Jones's good opinion of his crew, serious mischief on board his ship was
brewing at this time. An incipient mutiny among the British sailors was
discovered, the design being to take possession of the ship and send Jones a
prisoner to England. Many of these undesirable persons were discharged early in
August and forty-three Americans, who had recently arrived in a cartel from
English prisons, were recruited. The Portuguese contingent in the crew was also
enlisted at this period. Most of the month of July seems to have been spent in
preparing for an extended cruise. According to the instructions of Franklin, dated
June 30, 1779, which had been virtually dictated by Sartine, the squadron was to
cruise to the north of the British Isles and at the end of about six weeks put into
the Texel, whence it was to convoy vessels from Holland to France (Sands, 158163; Sherburne, 94-102; Jones MSS., July 28, 29, 1779, Jones to Gourlade &
Moylan and to Lieutenant Lunt, and courts martial of Robert Towers and others;
Archives de la Marine, B1 89, 270, B1 91, 178, B4 158, 132, 184.)
A few days before sailing, Commodore Jones issued instructions to his captains
requiring careful attention to his signals and obedience to his orders. They were
to keep their stations and "never to chase so as to lose company with the
squadron." Sealed orders were given them appointing rendezvous at different
places in case of separation. The squadron sailed from Groix Roads August 14,
1779, on a cruise which became famous. Two French privateers, Le Monsieur,
38, and La Grandville, 12, had joined the expedition, but they soon dropped out.
On the 23d, the squadron was off Cape Clear. Two prizes had been taken since
leaving port and sent back to L'Orient. A third was now taken by boats, there
being no wind. In the evening, as it was still calm, Jones sent his barge ahead to
tow the Bonhomme Richard, fearing she might be swept by the tide into a
dangerous position. "Soon after sunset," says the commodore, "the villains who
towed the ship, cut the tow rope and decamped with my barge. Sundry shots
were fired to bring them to without effect; in the meantime the master of the Bon
homme Richard, without orders, manned one of the ships boats and with four
soldiers pursued the barge, in order to stop the deserters. The evening was clear
and serene, but the zeal of that officer, Mr. Cutting Lunt, induced him to pursue
too far, and a fog which came on soon afterwards prevented the boats from
rejoining the ship, although I caused signal guns to be frequently fired. The fog
and calm continued the next day till towards evening. In the afternoon Capt.
Landais came on board the Bon homme Richard and behaved towards me with
great disrespect, affirming in the most indelicate manner and language that I had
lost my boats and people through my imprudence in sending boats to take a
prize. He persisted in his reproaches, though he was assured . . . that the barge
was towing the ship at the time of elopement and that she had not been sent in
pursuit of the prize. He was affronted because I would not the day before suffer
him to chase without my orders and to approach the dangerous shore I have
already mentioned, where he was an entire stranger and when there was not
sufficient wind to govern a ship. He told me he was the only American in the
195
squadron and was determined to follow his own opinion in chasing when and
where he thought proper, and in every other matter that concerned the service,
and that if I continued in that situation three days longer, the squadron would be
taken." (Sherburne, 109, 110; Sands, 166-168.)
The Cerf was sent in to look for the lost boats, but she too disappeared. She was
unable to overtake the boats, lost sight of the squadron, sprung her mainmast in
a gale a few days later, was chased by a vessel of superior force, and finally
returned to France, arriving at Paimboeuf September 4. Meanwhile the
Bonhomme Richard remained a short time near the place where these
occurrences had taken place. It was afterwards learned that Lunt was taken
prisoner. Besides him the Richard lost by this mishap another officer and twenty
of her best seamen. A gale on the night of the 26th compelled the flagship to
stand off and the next morning only the Vengeance was in sight. Jones thought
that Landais purposely kept out of the way. The Bonhomme Richard and
Vengeance kept to the northward and on September 1 were off Cape Wrath,
where they fell in with the Alliance and a prize she had taken. The same day a
British letter of marque was captured. Contrary to Jones's orders these two
prizes were sent by Landais to Bergen in Norway, where they were given up to
the British consul by the Danish authorities; they became a loss to the captors for
which Denmark refused to make restitution. Landais continued to behave in an
insubordinate manner. September 2, the Pallas appeared. The squadron cruised
a few days between the Orkney and Shetland Islands and some unimportant
prizes were taken. September 5, a gale came on which blew four days and was
followed by contrary winds, so that land was not again seen until the 13th, when
the Cheviot Hills were sighted. Jones had with him the Pallas and Vengeance,
the Alliance having again disappeared. Two colliers were taken on the 14th
(Sands, 169-171, 245-247; Sherburne, 110-112; Archives de la Marine, B1 89,
274, B4 158, 150, 186, B8 16 (Aout, Septembre, 1779)
Jones now planned an important enterprise. In his report to Franklin, dated
October 3, 1779, he says: "Knowing that there lay at anchor in Leith road an
armed ship of 20 guns, with two or three fine cutters, I formed an expedition
against Leith, which I purposed to lay under a large contribution, or otherwise to
reduce it to ashes." (Sherburne, 112.) He prepared a summons addressed to the
magistrates of Leith, in which he tells them: "I do not wish to distress the poor
inhabitants; my intention is only to demand your contribution towards the
reimbursement which Britain owes to the much injured citizens of America."
(lbid., 106.) This is an allusion to the depredations committed by the British in
Chesapeake Bay, Long Island Sound, and elsewhere.
His report continues: "Had I been alone, the wind being favorable, I would have
proceeded directly up the Firth and must have succeeded, as they lay there in a
state of perfect indolence and security, which would have proved their ruin.
Unfortunately for me, the Pallas and Vengeance were both at a considerable
distance in the offing, they having chased to the southward; this obliged us to
196
steer out of the Firth again to meet them. The captains of the Pallas and
Vengeance being come on board the Bon homme Richard, I communicated to
them my project, to which many difficulties and objections were made by them; at
last, however, they appeared to think better of the design, after I had assured
them that I hoped to raise a contribution of 200000 pounds sterling on Leith, and
that there was no battery of cannon there to oppose our landing. So much time,
however, was unavoidably spent in pointed remarks and sage deliberation that
night, that the wind became contrary in the morning. We continued working to
windward up the Firth without being able to reach the road of Leith, till on the
morning of the 17th, when being almost within cannon shot of the town, having
everything in readiness for a descent, a very severe gale of wind came on, and
being directly contrary, obliged us to bear away, after having in vain endeavored
for some time to withstand its violence. The gale was so severe that one of the
prizes that had been taken on the 14th sunk to the bottom, the crew being with
difficulty saved. As the alarm by this time had reached Leith by means of a cutter
that had watched our motions that morning, and as the wind continued contrary
(though more moderate in the evening), I thought it impossible to pursue the
enterprise with a good prospect of success, especially as Edinburgh, where there
is always a number of troops, is only a mile distant from Leith; therefore I gave up
the project." (Sherburne, 112; Sands, 171-175.)
The cutter spoken of by Jones as having watched his motions was one of several
revenue cutters specially fitted out and armed for service against the American
squadron, some of them having been placed under the orders of the admirals
commanding various naval stations. As early as August 19 the alarm excited by
the approach of Jones had caused orders for hasty preparations to watch his
movements and to check them as far as possible. This particular cutter, having
been sent out to reconnoitre, sailed at daybreak, September 17. The captain
reported that he "found himself within Pistol Shot of the fifty Gun French Ship,
upon which he tacked about and afterwards retook a prize they had taken in the
Mouth of the Firth, but a French twenty four Gun Frigate immediately made up
and obliged him to abandon the Prize . . . The French Squadron consists of a fifty
Gun Ship, a twenty four Gun Frigate and a Brig mounting ten Guns. The Ships
sail ill and they say they are determined to come up to Leith Road. The
Commander of the fifty Gun Ship is said to be acquainted with the Coast. Both
the fifty Gun Ship and Frigate are painted Black. The fifty Gun Ship has a White
Bottom and very clumsy mast head." (Minutes of the Scottish Board of Customs,
197.) This information was immediately sent to the Commissioners of the
Treasury (Minutes of the Scottish Board of Customs, 191-198, 205, 206; Minutes
of the Irish Board of Customs, 23, 24, 33, 36. See also Sands, 173, 174, notes;
London Chronicle, September 14, 18, 1779; British Admiralty Records, Captains'
Letters, No. 2305, 1 (September 20, 23,1779)
Jones could not excite the interest of his French captains in other plans. They
were getting uneasy at his remaining so long on the coast and threatened to
desert him. Therefore the squadron sailed south and in the course of a few days
197
several prizes were taken. September 21, they were off Flamborough Head. Two
brigs were captured and a fleet of vessels was chased, one of which ran ashore,
but night put an end to operations. The next day a fleet appeared coming up from
the south, but put back upon seeing the Bonhomme Richard. On signal two pilots
came aboard the Richard and informed Jones that 'a king's frigate lay there in
sight, at anchor within the Humber, waiting to take under convoy a number of
merchant ships bound to the northward. The pilots imagined the Bon homme
Richard to be an English ship of war and consequently communicated to me the
private signal which they had been required to make. I endeavored by this means
to decoy the ships out of the port, but the wind then changing and with the tide
becoming unfavorable for them, the deception had not the desired effect and
they wisely put back. The entrance of the Humber is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous and, as the Pallas was not in sight, I thought it not prudent to remain
off the entrance; I therefore steered out again to join the Pallas off Flamborough
Head. In the night we saw and chased two ships until three O'clock in the
morning, when being at a very small distance from them, I made the private
signal of recognizance which I had given to each captain before I sailed from
Groaix; one half of the answer only was returned. In this position both sides lay to
till daylight, when the ships proved to be the Alliance and the Pallas." (Sherburne,
113, 114; Sands, 176-180. For another account of the cruise up to this time, see
Life of Nathaniel Panning, 33-43.)
The events of the memorable day that followed are best told in the words of
Jones himself: "On the morning of that day, the 23d . . . we chased a brigantine
that appeared laying to to windward. About noon we saw and chased a large ship
that appeared coming round Flamborough Head from the northward, and at the
same time I manned and armed one of the pilot boats to send in pursuit of the
brigantine, which now appeared to be the vessel that I had forced ashore. Soon
after this a fleet of forty-one sail appeared off Flamborough Head, bearing N. N.
E. This induced me to abandon the single ship, which had then anchored in
[Bridlington] Bay; I also called back the pilot boat and hoisted a signal for a
general chase. When the fleet discovered us bearing down, all the merchant
ships crowded sail towards the shore. The two ships of war that protected the
fleet, at the same time steered from the land and made the disposition for the
battle. In approaching the enemy I crowded every possible sail and made the
signal for the line of battle, to which the Alliance showed no attention. Earnest as
I was for the action, I could not reach the commodore's ship until seven in the
evening, being then within pistol shot, when he hailed the Bon homme Richard;
we answered him by firing a whole broadside." The English ships were the
Serapis and Countess of Scarborough. Jones says that at dusk they had tacked
with a view to running under Scarborough Castle, but that he had headed them
off. The pilot boat, which had been sent away and then recalled, contained
sixteen of the Richard's best men under the second lieutenant, Henry Lunt. The
boat was unable to get back before dark and Lunt then deemed it imprudent to
go alongside. So the ship lost the services of these men when they were most
needed (Sherburne, 114; Sands, 180, 181. Jones's report to Franklin, dated
198
October 3, 1779, is supplemented by the journal of his campaigns presented to
Louis XVI, Jones MSS., January 1, 1786 (quoted in Sands)
Jones took his station on the quarter-deck, while on the poop was a French
volunteer officer with twenty marines. Richard Dale, first lieutenant, was in
charge of the gun-deck. The tops, commanded by midshipmen, were manned by
marines and sailors, twenty in the main, fourteen in the fore, and nine in the
mizzen-top. They were armed with swivels, coehorns, and muskets and were
ordered to clear the enemy's tops before turning their fire upon his decks
(Fanning, 43, 45.)
The report goes on: "The battle being thus begun was continued with unremitting
fury. Every method was practised on both sides to gain an advantage and rake
each other, and I must confess that the enemy's ship, being much more
manageable than the Bon homme Richard, gained thereby several times an
advantageous situation, in spite of my best endeavors to prevent it. As I had to
deal with an enemy of greatly superior force, I was under the necessity of closing
with him, to prevent the advantage which he had over me in point of manoeuvre.
It was my intention to lay the Bon homme Richard athwart the enemy's bow, but
as that operation required great dexterity in the management of both sails and
helm and some of our braces being shot away, it did not exactly succeed to my
wishes. The enemy's bowsprit, however, came over the Bon homme Richard's
poop by the mizen mast and I made both ships fast together in that situation,
which by the action of the wind on the enemy's sails, forced her stern close to the
Bon homme Richard's bow, so that the ships lay square alongside of each other,
the yards being all entangled and the cannon of each ship touching the
opponent's side.
"When this position took place it was eight o'clock, previous to which the Bon
homme Richard had received sundry eighteen pounds shot below the water and
leaked very much. My battery of 12-pounders, on which I had placed my chief
dependance, being commanded by Lieut. Dale and Col. Weibert and manned
principally with American seamen and French volunteers, were entirely silenced
and abandoned. As to the six old 18-pounders that formed the battery of the
lower gun-deck, they did no service whatever; two out of three of them burst at
the first fire and killed almost all the men who were stationed to manage them.
Before this time too, Col. De Chamillard, who commanded a party of twenty
soldiers on the poop, had abandoned that station after having lost some of his
men; these men deserted their quarters. I had now only two pieces of cannon, 9pounders on the quarter deck, that were not silenced, and not one of the heavier
cannon was fired during the rest of the action. The purser, Mr. Mease, who
commanded the guns on the quarter deck, being dangerously wounded in the
head, I was obliged to fill his place and with great difficulty rallied a few men and
shifted over one of the lee quarter-deck guns, so that we afterwards played three
pieces of 9-pounders upon the enemy. The tops alone seconded the fire of this
little battery and held out bravely during the whole of the action, especially the
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main top where Lieut. Stack commanded. I directed the fire of one of the three
cannon against the main-mast with doubleheaded shot, while the other two were
exceedingly well served with grape and canister-shot to silence the enemy's
musketry and clear her decks, which was at last effected.
"The enemy were, as I have since understood, on the instant of calling for
quarters, when the cowardice or treachery of three of my under officers induced
them to call to the enemy. The English commodore asked me if I demanded
quarters and, I having answered him in the most determined negative, they
renewed the battle with double fury. They were unable to stand the deck, but the
fire of their cannon, especially the lower battery, which was entirely formed of 18pounders, was incessant. Both ships were set on fire in various places and the
scene was dreadful beyond the reach of language. To account for the timidity of
my three under officers, I mean the gunner, the carpenter, and the master-atarms, I must observe that the two first were slightly wounded, and as the ship
had received various shots under water, and one of the pumps being shot away,
the carpenter expressed his fear that she would sink and the other two concluded
that she was sinking, which occasioned the gunner to run aft on the poop,
without my knowledge, to strike the colors. Fortunately for me, a cannon ball had
done that before by carrying away the ensignstaff ; he was therefore reduced to
the necessity of sinking, as he supposed, or of calling for quarter and he
preferred the latter.
"All this time the Bon homme Richard had sustained the action alone and the
enemy, though much superior in force, would have been very glad to have got
clear, as appears by their own acknowledgments and their having let go an
anchor the instant that I laid them on board, by which means they would have
escaped, had I not made them well fast to the Bon homme Richard. At last, at
half past nine o'clock, the Alliance appeared and I now thought the battle at an
end, but to my utter astonishment he discharged a broadside full into the stern of
the Bon homme Richard. We called to him for God's sake to forbear firing into the
Bon homme Richard, yet he passed along the off side of the ship and continued
firing. There was no possibility of his mistaking the enemy's ship for the Bon
homme Richard, there being the most essential difference in their appearance
and construction; besides, it was then full moonlight and the sides of the Bon
homme Richard were all black, while the sides of the prizes were yellow. Yet, for
the greater security, I showed the signal of our reconnoissance by putting out
three lanthorns, one at the head (bow), another at the stern (quarter), and the
third in the middle, in a, horizontal line. Every tongue cried that he was firing into
the wrong ship, but nothing availed; he passed round firing into the Bon homme
Richard's head, stern, and broadside, and by one of his vollies killed several of
my best men and mortally wounded a good officer on the forecastle.
"My situation was really deplorable. The Bon homme Richard received various
shots under water from the Alliance, the leak gained on the pumps, and the fire
increased much on board both ships. Some officers persuaded me to strike, of
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whose courage and good sense I entertain a high opinion. My treacherous
master-at-arms let loose all my prisoners without my knowledge and my prospect
became gloomy indeed." The prisoners were much frightened, believing that the
ship was sinking, and were at once put to work at the pumps; otherwise, by
reinforcing the enemy, they would surely have turned the scale in his favor. "I
would not, however, give up the point. The enemy's main-mast began to shake,
their firing decreased, ours rather increased, and the British colors were struck at
half an hour past ten o'clock." (Sherburne, 115-117; Sands, 181-186; Memoires,
de Paul Jones, 76-104, which differs in details from the report of October 3;
MacKenzie, i, ch. viii; Scribner's Magazine, August, 1898, article by Captain
Mahan; Jones MSS., September 24, 1779; Log of Bonhomme Richard;
Independent Chronicle, February 17, 1780.)
Lieutenant Dale, who was in command of the gun-deck, gives further details. He
says that the Bonhomme Richard's first broadside was instantly returned by the
Serapis. "Our position being to windward of the Serapis, we passed ahead of her
and the Serapis coming up on our larboard [starboard ?] quarter, the action
commenced abreast of each other. The Serapis soon passed ahead of the Bon
homme Richard and when he thought he had gained a distance sufficient to go
down athwart the fore foot to rake us, found he had not enough distance and that
the Bon homme Richard would be aboard him, put his helm a-lee, which brought
the two ships on a line, and the Bon homme Richard having headway, ran her
bows into the stern of the Serapis. . . . As we were unable to bring a single gun to
bear upon the Serapis, our topsails were backed, while those of the Serapis
being filled, the ships separated. The Serapis wore short round upon her heel
and her jibboom ran into the mizen rigging of the Bon homme Richard; in this
situation the ships were made fast together with a hawser, the bowsprit of the
Serapis to the mizenmast of the Bon homme Richard, and the action
recommenced from the starboard sides of the two ships. With a view of
separating the ships, the Serapis let go her anchor, which manoeuvre brought
her head and the stern of the Bon homme Richard to the wind, while the ships
lay closely pressed against each other. A novelty in naval combats was now
presented to many witnesses, but to few admirers. The rammers were run into
the respective ships to enable the men to load, after the lower ports of the
Serapis had been blown away to make room for running out their guns . . .
Neither the repeated broadsides of the Alliance, given with the view of sinking or
disabling the Bon homme Richard, the frequent necessity of suspending the
combat to extinguish the flames which several times were within a few inches of
the magazine, nor the liberation by the master-at-arms of nearly 500 prisoners
(As there were but four hundred and seventy-two prisoners altogether, after the
cruise (Pap. Cont., Congr., 193, 211, December 16, 1779), there were probably
less than two hundred on board the Bonhomme Richard at the time of the battle),
could change or weaken the purpose of the American commander. At the
moment of the liberation of the prisoners, one of them, a commander of a 20 gun
ship taken a few days before, passed through the ports on board the Serapis and
informed Captain Pearson that if he would hold out only a little while longer, the
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ship alongside would either strike or sink, and that all the prisoners had been
released to save their lives." (Sherburne, 121, 122; Sands, 190-194. See also
Fanning, 46-56.)
Nathaniel Fanning, a midshipman on the Bon homme Richard stationed in the
maintop, says that the enemy's tops had been silenced within an hour, and it was
not long after that before "the topmen in our tops had taken possession of the
enemy's tops, which was done by reason of the Serapis's yards being locked
together with ours, that we could with ease go from our main top into the enemy's
fore top; and so on, from our fore top into the Serapis's main top. Having
knowledge of this, we transported from our own into the enemy's tops, . . . hand
granadoes, &c, which we threw in among the enemy whenever they made their
appearance." (Fanning, 50.) In the course of time the quarter-deck of the Serapis
was entirely cleared, largely by this fire from the tops; and their execution
extended below decks. In serving the main battery of the Serapis, many
eighteen-pounder cartridges had accumulated on the gun-deck, which led to a
catastrophe. Fanning says: "A single hand granado having been thrown by one
of our men out of the main top of the enemy, designing it to go among the enemy
who were huddled together between her gun decks, it on its way struck on one
side of the combings of her upper hatch-way and rebounding from that, it took a
direction and fell between their decks, where it communicated to a quantity of
loose powder scattered about the enemy's cannon." The hand grenade, upon
bursting, ignited the powder and the cartridges, the fire running from one to
another, and "made a dreadful explosion." (Fanning, 53.) "The effect," says Dale,
"was tremendous; more than twenty of the enemy were blown to pieces, and
many stood with only the collars of their shirts upon their bodies." (Sherburne,
122.) This disaster doubtless hastened the end of the battle.
In his report of October 6, 1779, to the British Admiralty, Captain Pearson of the
Serapis says, "that on the 23d. ult. being close in with Scarborough, about eleven
o'clock, a boat came on board with a letter from the Bailiffs of that corporation,
giving information of a flying squadron of the enemy's ships being on the coast
and of a part of the said squadron having been seen from thence the day before,
standing to the southward. As soon as I received this intelligence I made the
signal for the convoy to bear down under my lee and repeated it with two guns;
notwithstanding which, the van of the convoy kept their wind, with all sail
stretching out to the southward from under Flamborough head, till between
twelve and one, when the headmost of them got sight of the enemy's ships,
which were then in chace of them. They then tacked and made the best of their
way under shore for Scarborough &c., letting fly their top-gallant sheets and firing
guns; upon which I made all the sail I could to windward, to get between the
enemy's ships and the convoy, which I soon effected. At one o'clock we got sight
of the enemy's ships from the masthead and about four we made them plain from
the deck to be three large ships and a brig; upon which I made the Countess of
Scarborough's signal to join me, she being in shore with the convoy. At the same
time I made the signal for the convoy to make the best of their way. . . .
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"At half past five, the Countess of Scarborough joined me, the enemy's ships
then bearing down upon us with a light breeze at S. S. W. At six, tacked and laid
our head in shore, in order to keep our ground the better between the enemy's
ships and the convoy, soon after which we perceived the ships bearing down
upon us to be a two-decked ship and two frigates, but from their keeping end on
upon us, on bearing down, we could not discern what colours they were under.
At about 20 minutes past seven, the largest ship of the three brought to on our
larboard bow, within musket shot. I hailed him and asked what ship it was; they
answered in English, the Princess Royal. I then asked where they belonged to;
they answered evasively, on which I told them, if they did not answer directly I
would fire into them. They then answered with a shot which was instantly
returned with a broadside, and after exchanging two or three broadsides, he
backed his topsails and dropped upon our quarter within pistol shot, then filled
again, put his helm a-weather, and run us on board upon our weather quarter
and attempted to board us, but being repulsed he sheered off; upon which I
backed our topsails in order to get square with him again, which as soon as he
observed, he then filled, put his helm a-weather and laid us athwart hawse. His
mizen shrouds took our jib boom, which hung him for some time, till at last gave
way and we dropt along side of each other head and stern, when the fluke of our
spare anchor hooking his quarter, we became so close fore and aft, that the
muzzles of our guns touched each others sides. In this position we engaged from
half past eight till half past ten, during which time, from the quantity and variety of
combustible matters which they threw in upon our decks, chains, and in short into
every part of the ship, we were on fire not less than ten or twelve times in
different parts of the ship and it was with the greatest difficulty and exertion
imaginable at times that we were able to get it extinguished. At the same time the
largest of the two frigates kept sailing round us the whole action and [raking] us
fore and aft, by which means she killed or wounded almost every man on the
quarter and main decks.
"About half past nine, either from a hand grenade being thrown in at one of our
lower deck ports, or from some other accident, a cartridge of powder was set on
fire, the flames of which running from cartridge to cartridge all the way aft, blew
up the whole of the people and officers that were quartered abaft the main-mast,
from which unfortunate circumstance all those guns were rendered useless for
the remainder of the action, and I fear the greatest part of the people will lose
their lives. At ten o'clock, they called for quarters from the ship alongside and
said they had struck. Hearing this, I called upon the Captain to know if they had
struck, or if he asked for quarters, but no answer being made, after repeating my
words two or three times, I called for the boarders and ordered them to board,
which they did; but the moment they were on board her, they discovered a
superior number laying under cover with pikes in their hands, ready to receive
them; on which our people instantly retreated into our own ship and returned to
their guns again until half past ten, when the frigate coming across our stern and
pouring her broadside into us again, without our being able to bring a gun to bear
on her, I found it in vain and in short impracticable, from the situation we were in,
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to stand out any longer with the least prospect of success. I therefore struck."
(Almon, ix, 46; Sherburne, 124; British Admiralty Records, Captains' Letters, No.
2305.1 (October 6,1779)
The Bonhomme Richard carried eight nine-pounders on her quarter-deck and
forecastle, twenty-eight twelve- pounders on the gun-deck and six eighteens on
the lower deck. Her broadside weight of metal, therefore, was two hundred and
fifty-eight pounds. The loss of her eighteens at the very outset at once reduced
this to two hundred and four pounds. The Serapis was a fine, new, double
decked ship, rated a forty-four, but carrying fifty guns: twenty eighteens on the
lower gun-deck, twenty nines above, and ten sixes on the quarter-deck and
forecastle, giving her a broadside of three hundred pounds to the Richard's two
hundred and four. This statement, however, does not fully express her
superiority, as heavy guns are far more effective in proportion than light ones;
that is to say, two eighteens can do much more execution than three twelves.
The number of men on board the Bonhomme Richard at the time of the battle,
allowing for desertions and those absent in prizes and in the two boats of Henry
and Cutting Lunt, was probably not much over three hundred; Jones makes it
three hundred and twenty-two and thinks that a further deduction should be
made on account of the men blown up by the bursting of the eighteen-pounders
at the first fire (Mem. de Paul Jones, 97.) The crew of the Serapis appears to
have been of very nearly the same size, but more homogeneous and reliable in
character. The number of casualties was very large in both ships. Jones
estimates his loss at a hundred and fifty killed and wounded, without specifying
the proportion of each (Sherburne, 174.) Pearson states that the Serapis had
forty-nine killed and sixty-eight wounded, but that the list is incomplete (Almon, ix,
48.) Both ships suffered severely. "With respect to the situation of the Bon
homme Richard," says her commander, "the rudder was cut entirely off the stern
frame and the transums were almost entirely cut away; the timbers, by the lower
deck especially, from, the mainmast to the stern, being greatly decayed with age,
were mangled beyond my power of description." Both sides of the ship for a great
distance were wholly shot away, leaving little support for the upper deck, and
projectiles passed through without hitting anything. Dead and wounded were
lying in heaps. "A person must have been an eyewitness to form a just idea of
the tremendous scene of carnage, wreck and ruin that everywhere appeared.
Humanity cannot but recoil from the prospect of such finished horror and lament
that war should produce such fatal consequences." (Sherburne, 117.) The
mainmast and mizzen-topmast of the Serapis fell overboard immediately after
her surrender and she was otherwise much injured.
It was Jones's indomitable determination not to yield that won this battle.
Pearson, in surrendering to what he considered a superior force, did so before
that force, through the added weight of the Alliance, had become more than a
merely potential one. That the Serapis, moreover, so greatly superior in sailing
qualities, so much more manageable, even with the disadvantage of her leeward
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position, should have allowed the clumsy Bonhomme Richard to get alongside
and grapple her, does not indicate the best seamanship.
There seems to have been a prevalent belief in England just after the battle,
expressed in a letter of Lord North, that the Serapis succeeded in beating off the
Bonhomme Richard and was then obliged to strike to the Alliance (StopfordSackville MSS., 145.) It is certain that Pearson greatly exaggerated the part
taken by Landais in the engagement. It is established by the overwhelming
weight of testimony that the Alliance fired just three broadsides, all of them after
the two chief contestants were lashed together; and that these broad-sides
damaged the Bonhomme Richard more than they did the Serapis. Many shotholes found on the port side of the Richard must have been made by the fire of
the Alliance, for that side was never turned towards the Serapis. Many officers of
the squadron, both American and French, suspected Landais of treachery, and
according to their testimony he admitted that he would have been well pleased at
the surrender of the Richard, which would have given him an opportunity to enter
the contest, capture both ships and reap the glory (Sherburne, 156-171.)
Meanwhile the Pallas and the Countess of Scarborough had fought an
engagement. It was supposed on board the Bonhomme Richard at the time that
it was the Alliance that engaged the Scarborough ( Log of the Bonhomme
Richard.) Of this action Jones says in his report of October 3: "Captain Cottineau
engaged the Countess of Scarborough and took her after an hour's action, while
the Bon homme Richard engaged the Serapis. The Countess of Scarborough is
an armed ship of 20 six-pounders and was commanded by a King's officer. In the
action the Countess of Scarborough and the Serapis were at a considerable
distance asunder, and the Alliance, as I am informed, fired into the Pallas and
killed some men. If it should be asked why the convoy was suffered to escape, I
must answer that I was myself in no condition to pursue and that none of the rest
showed any inclination, not even Mr. Ricot [in the Vengeance], who had held off
at a distance to windward during the whole action ... The Alliance too was in a
state to pursue the fleet, not having had a single man wounded or a single shot
fired at her from the Serapis, and only three that did execution from the Countess
of Scarborough at such a distance that one stuck in the side and the other two
just touched and then dropped into the water. The Alliance killed one man only
on board the Serapis. As Captain de Cottineau charged himself with manning
and securing the prisoners of the Countess of Scarborough, I think the escape of
the Baltic fleet cannot so well be charged to his account." (Sherburne, 119.)
Captain Piercy of the Countess of Scarborough, in his report to Captain Pearson,
has left the only detailed account of the fight between his ship and the Pallas.
"About two minutes," he says, "after you began to engage with the largest ships
of the enemy's squadron, I received a broadside from one of the frigates, which I
instantly returned and continued engaging her for about twenty minutes, when
she dropt astern. I then made sail up to the Serapis, to see if I could give you any
assistance, but upon coming near you I found you and the enemy so close
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together and covered with smoke that I could not distinguish one ship from the
other; and for fear I might fire into the Serapis instead of the enemy, I backed the
main-top-sail in order to engage the attention of one of the frigates that was then
coming up. When she got on my starboard quarter she gave me her broadside,
which, as soon as I could get my guns to bear (which was very soon done), I
returned and continued engaging her for near two hours, when I was so
unfortunate as to have all my braces, great part of the running rigging, main and
mizen top-sail sheets shot away, seven of the guns dismounted, four men killed
and twenty wounded, and another frigate coming up on my larboard quarter."
Piercy then surrendered (Almon, ix, 48.)
Captains Pearson and Piercy were subsequently tried by a court martial, the
verdict of which was that they and their officers and men "have not only acquitted
themselves of their duty to their country, but have in the execution of such duty
done infinite credit to themselves by a very obstinate defence against a superior
force." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Courts Martial, No. 5315 (March 10, 1780).
These contests attracted much attention on shore and many spectators viewed
the scene from Flamborough Head and Scarborough. Bright moonlight made
objects visible at a distance and the spectacle must have been impressive. A
letter from Scarborough says: "Soon after our arrival on Thursday evening we
were told there was an engagement at sea; I immediately threw up the sash of
the room I was in and we had a fair view of the engagement, which appeared
very severe, for the firing was frequently so quick that we could scarce count the
shots." (London Chronicle, September 30, 1779. See also Hist. Man. Com.,
Report xiv, App. i, 21.)
After the battle the Bonhomme Richard was on fire in several places and was
leaking rapidly. There was five feet of water in the hold, one pump had been shot
away, and the three others were barely able to keep the water from gaining, in a
smooth sea. "The fire broke out in various parts of the ship," says Jones, "in spite
of all the water that could be thrown to quench it and at length broke out as low
as the powder magazine and within a few inches of the powder. In that dilemma I
took out the powder upon deck, ready to be thrown overboard at the last
extremity, and it was 10 o'clock the next day, the 24th, before the fire was entirely
extinguished . . . After the carpenters, as well as Capt. de Cottineau and other
men of sense, had well examined and surveyed the ship (which was not finished
before five in the evening), I found every person to be convinced that it was
impossible to keep the Bon homme Richard afloat so as to reach a port if the
wind should increase, it being then only a moderate breeze. I had but little time to
remove my wounded, which now became unavoidable and which was effected in
the course of the night and next morning. I was determined to keep the Bon
homme Richard afloat and if possible to bring her into port. For that purpose the
first lieutenant of the Pallas continued on board with a party of men to attend the
pumps, with boats in waiting ready to take them on board in case the water
should gain on them too fast. The wind augmented in the night and the next day,
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on the 25th, so that it was impossible to prevent the good old ship from sinking.
They did not abandon her till after 9 o'clock; the water was then up to the lower
deck and a little after ten I saw with inexpressible grief the last glimpse of the Bon
homme Richard. No lives were lost with the ship, but it was impossible to save
the stores of any sort whatever. I lost even the best part of my clothes, books and
papers; and several of my officers lost all their clothes and effects." (Sherburne,
117,118; Sands, 186-189. See Fanning, 61, for a description of the sinking of the
Bonhomme Richard.)
Just after the action seven Englishmen of the Richard's crew stole a boat from
the Serapis and escaped ashore, where they gave an account of the cruise and
battle and of Jones's intentions as they understood them (London Chronicle,
September, 28, 30, 1779; Boston Gazette, January 3, 1780.) The eye-witness at
Scarborough says that the day after the engagement "six sail were seen about
two leagues off at sea, much shattered, one of which, a large ship, had lost her
mainmast; they kept their station all that day. Yesterday morning [September 25]
they were gone to the northward, as is supposed, for the wind would not suit for
any other quarter." (London Chronicle, September 30, 1779.) They had
apparently drifted off before the wind, as they were not yet in a condition to make
sail.
The situation of the squadron on the British coast was becoming dangerous, and
yet before flight was possible a vast amount of work was to be done in repairing
the injuries to the Serapis sufficiently to make her seaworthy. Jones took
command of her when the Bonhomme Richard sank and after strenuous
exertions, at 1 A.M. September 28, according to her journal, "Gott up a Jury Main
Mast." By evening the squadron was ready to sail and the commodore signalled
to stand to the westward, and a few hours later, to the eastward. Meanwhile on
the very day of the battle Admiral Hardy, commanding the Channel fleet, who
had received orders to send a strong force in search of the American squadron,
dispatched five ships on that duty (Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 95, September
23,1779.) A letter from Bridlington, September 24, says that in the opinion of the
sailors who had escaped ashore "Jones's plan was to destroy Scarborough,
Bridlington and Hull, with some other places; and that he intended landing at
Flamborough yesterday morning, but the sea ran too high." (London Chronicle,
September 30, 1779.) It was reported from Hull, September 26, that the
squadron was still visible from Flamborough Head that morning steering north,
and that it was scarcely out of sight when four British vessels appeared in pursuit
(London Chronicle, September 30, 1779.) The correspondent who had been
watching events from Scarborough says that on the same morning "eight of our
ships of war appeared in sight, and which are gone in search of Jones."
The state of mind along the east coast of England at the time is reflected in a
letter of the Marquis of Rockingham, written to Lord Weymouth September 28.
Speaking of the defenses of Hull he says: "I shall not hesitate to say that from an
Attack by Frigates or Ships of War it was entirely without defence; the Artillery in
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the Fort - its only defence - were unserviceable both from the Carriages being
entirely rotten and also from most of the Guns which carried any Weight of Metal
being honeycombed and dangerous to Use . . . A ship of 60 Guns can lay, even
at low Water, within less than 400 Yards of the Town. In Paul Jones's Squadron
the largest Vessel was a 40 Gun Ship, so that whatever Force he had could have
come up. It appeared to me that not only from the Information of a Man who had
been put by Paul Jones into a prize and who had assisted very principally in
securing the men and bringing her in with the Assistance of a Hull Pilot, but also
from the Size and Number of Ships in Paul Jones's Squadron, that there could
not be any Number of Soldiers or Marines on Board," or that any force could be
landed which could not be repelled by the militia of the neighborhood, insuring
the safety of Hull and its shipping. "I conceived very differently in regard to an
attempt being made by the Squadron coming up Humber. I therefore pressed as
much as I possibly could that every Effort should be made to prepare Batteries
and get what Artillery could be had . . . At the Meeting on Friday Morning
Intelligence came that the Serapis and Countess of Scarborough had been seen
shortening sail, covering the Baltic Fleet and waiting for Paul Jones "; and later
"that the Engagement was begun, but it growing dark, the Event of a very Warm
Action was not known . . . The Unfortunate Event of their being Captured after a
most Severe Engagement came to our Knowledge at Hull on Friday Evening,
when the Mayor immediately called a Meeting, and at which the Proposition of
preparing Batteries was unanimously adopted." (Amer. Hist. Review, April, 1910.)
The British ships in search of Jones did not find him, although he was "tossing
about to and fro in the North Sea for ten days in contrary winds and bad weather,
in order to gain the port of Dunkirk, on account of the prisoners." Notwithstanding
the instructions governing the cruise named the Texel as the port of destination,
Jones wished to put into Dunkirk, so as to place his prizes and prisoners at once
under French jurisdiction, and it would have saved him much annoyance had this
been possible. The other captains, however, insisted upon carrying out the letter
of the instructions and bore away for the Texel. Jones was forced to follow or to
proceed alone to Dunkirk and he chose the former alternative. The squadron
anchored off the Texel October 3, 1779 (Sands, 200; Sherburne, 120. Fanning,
64-66, says they were chased into the Texel by a British squadron, which
remained outside the bar.)
The commodore spent nearly three months at the Texel refitting his ships and
then waiting for an opportunity to get away, being blockaded by a British
squadron cruising outside. The purpose of the French Minister of Marine in
making the Texel the objective point of the cruise was that a convoy might be
furnished for a number of vessels loaded with naval and military stores which it
was desired to bring to France. Also it was hoped that the Indien might be taken
into a French port, and the French ambassador to Holland, to whom Jones
reported on his arrival, wished to obtain from the Dutch government authority for
the sale of the ship to some merchant who could place her under a neutral flag.
Nothing of this sort, however, was accomplished, and the only useful purpose
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served by the presence of the squadron in neutral waters was increasing the
estrangement between England and Holland which ultimately led to war,
manifestly to the advantage of the United States. If Jones could have gone
directly to the French port of Dunkirk, much vexation and embarrassment would
have been saved and he could readily have disposed of his prizes and prisoners.
The British ambassador at the Hague, upon the arrival of the squadron, made a
vehement protest to the Dutch government, and demanded ,that these ships and
their crews may be stopped and delivered up, which the pirate Paul Jones of
Scotland, who is a rebel subject and criminal of the state, has taken."
(Sherburne, 129.) The Dutch, however, moved slowly in the matter and refused
to commit themselves as to the legality of the captures. Jones was allowed time
to refit his ships and was permitted to land his wounded, so that they might be
cared for in a fort which was placed at his disposal. He entered into an
agreement with Captain Pearson, according to which the wounded prisoners
were to be guarded and cared for at the expense of the United States and later
exchanged for Americans (lbid., 128-133,174; Sands, 200-218; Wharton, iii, 356,
397; Archives de la Marine, B1 91, 188, B4 158, 175.)
In consequence of the charges against him Captain Landais was ordered back to
Paris by Franklin, October 15. With respect to these charges, twenty-five in
number, and formally drawn up October 30, there was a practical unanimity of
opinion among the officers of the squadron as to the reprehensible conduct of
Landais during the cruise. Four officers of the Alliance, including the first
lieutenant, attested that several people on board that ship "told Captain Landais
at different times that he fired upon the wrong ship; others refused to fire."
(Sherburne, 156-171.) Sometime after the departure of Landais, Jones took
command of the Alliance, all the other vessels having been put under the French
flag to avoid complications with Holland. Arrangements were made for the
exchange of prisoners and the disposal of prizes. The squadron had taken more
than enough prisoners to procure the release by exchange of all the Americans
confined in England. The plan adopted was to exchange Jones's prisoners for
French at the Texel, France agreeing to give the same number of English in
France for the Americans in England. Jones was offered a French commission,
which would further have facilitated matters, but he resolutely refused it and
saved the Alliance from being also placed under the French flag. His situation
was daily growing more uncomfortable, as the Dutch were unwilling longer to
disregard the importunity of the British ambassador. He was at last peremptorily
ordered by the Dutch admiral to depart with the first favorable wind. He was
ready to sail December 1, and then waited nearly four weeks for an opportunity.
On the 13th, he wrote to Franklin: "We hear that the enemy still keeps a
squadron cruising off here, but this shall not prevent my attempts to depart
whenever the wind will permit. I hope we have recovered the trim of this ship,
which was entirely lost during the last cruise, and I do not much fear the enemy
in the long and dark nights of this season. The ship is well manned and shall not
be given away. I need not tell you I will do my utmost to take prisoners and prizes
in my way from hence." (Sands, 239; Wharton, iii, 425.) About this time Captain
209
Conyngham, who had escaped from prison in England and had crossed over to
Holland, came aboard the Alliance. At last, with a favoring east wind, the ship got
away from the Texel December 27, 1779, and succeeded in running the
blockade of the British squadron outside (Sands, 218-243; Sherburne, 145-152,
174-184, 219; Wharton, iii, 378, 379, 424, 425, 430, 431, 535; Archives de la
Marine, B4 172,140.)
With her best American colors flying, the Alliance "passed along the Flemish
banks and getting to windward of the enemy's fleets of observation in the North
Sea," ran through the Straits of Dover in full view of the British fleet in the Downs.
During the night of December 28 several vessels were seen and the next
morning the frigate passed "the Isle of Wight, in view of the enemy's fleet at
Spithead, and in two days more got safe through the channel, having passed by
windward in sight of several of the enemy's large two-decked cruising ships."
(Sands, 243, 244.) Jones then cruised a week or more to the southward and off
Cape Finisterre. January 8, 1780, he captured a brig which he sent to America.
He went into Coruna January 16, where he was well received by the Spanish.
Conyngham left the Alliance here and joined a ship bound to America. Jones
sailed again, January 28, for another cruise off Cape Finisterre, but meeting with
no success, put into Groix Roads February 10. At L'Orient, Jones found the
Serapis awaiting condemnation. She and the Countess of Scarborough and
Pallas had gone from the Texel to Dunkirk, whence the Serapis had proceeded
to L'Orient. She was eventually sold there, and the Countess of Scarborough at
Dunkirk (Sherburne, 184-190, 219; Fanning, 76-79; Log of the Alliance; Penn.
Mag. Hist. and Biogr., January, 1899; Jones MSS., February 10, 12, 1780, Jones
to Gourlade & Moylan and to Franklin; Archives de la Marine, B1 93, 33, 36, 97,
99, B4 172, 145, 152, B8 16 (Janvier, 1780)
The situation of the United States respecting naval conditions at the end of 1779
was relatively better than in the two previous years; the falling off was
proportionately less. The heavy annual loss in frigates was less heavy; there
were fewer frigates to lose, and the Warren was the only one dropped from the
list. The loss of the sloop Providence was keenly felt because of her very useful
and successful career. Other small vessels that passed away were the sloop of
war General Gates, the brig Diligent, the cutter Revenge and the sloop Argo. Of
the original thirteen frigates there still remained the Providence, Trumbull, and
Boston; the Trumbull had at last made her escape from the Connecticut River,
but was not yet ready for sea. The Deane, Queen of France, and Ranger also
remained; and two prime thirty-two-gun frigates, the Alliance and Confederacy,
first went into active service in 1779. Vessels still under construction were slowly
progressing towards completion. The four vessels fitted out in France to cruise
under the American flag were for temporary service only. Unfortunately the prize
ship Serapis was not procured for the Continental navy; no money was available
for her purchase. The achievements of the navy during the year were gratifying.
The several successful cruises in American waters and the brilliant exploits of
Jones added reputation to the service. The Penobscot expedition was chiefly a
210
local affair and the gloom produced by the disaster did not, in its full intensity at
least, overspread the whole country.
In 1779, privateering played a still more important part in naval warfare than
before. Two hundred and nine commissions were granted by the Continental
Congress to private armed vessels, eighty more than the number of the previous
year. The enterprise of the separate states also in this mode of sea-service
continued to develop and increase. Greater activity was likewise displayed by the
English. From August, 1778, to April, 1779, one hundred privateers were fitted
out in Liverpool, aggregating more than twenty-four thousand tons, mounting
sixteen hundred and fifty guns and with crews numbering more than seventy-four
hundred men. A list of British privateers fitted out at New York, published in April,
comprised one hundred and twenty-one vessels, including two of thirty-six guns
each, one thirty, one twenty-eight, and thirty others of twenty or more guns, the
whole manned by about ninety-six hundred men. Another list, compiled for
Admiral Gambier, February 27, "of Private Ships and Vessels of War belonging
to the Port of New York, now at Sea," contains sixty-nine names. Many American
vessels were taken by these privateers, of which, however, many in turn were
captured (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495, list of Continental letters of
marque; London Chronicle, April 1, 29, 1779; Massachusetts Spy, April 29, June
3, 1779; Boston Post, March 13, 27, 1779; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, February
27, 1779.)
During the year 1779, the British navy increased, in the total number of ships,
from four hundred and thirty-two to four hundred and eighty-one; ships in
commission, from three hundred and seventeen to three hundred and sixty-four.
Seventy thousand men manned the navy. On the North American station a
smaller fleet was maintained than during the two preceding years. With enemies
on the continent of Europe to provide against, a larger part of the naval force was
kept at home or employed in other seas. Only about sixty vessels were stationed
in North America and less than half of these were frigates or larger ships. A
powerful fleet was held in the West Indies (Hannay, 211; Schomberg, i, 453;
Almon, viii, 314, 315, Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 489, April 3, A. D. 486, August 30,
1779, lists of ships employed under Admirals Gambier and Arbuthnot.)
It is stated that in 1779, five hundred and sixteen vessels, of which twenty-nine
were privateers and the others merchantmen, were captured from the British by
their enemies; how many of them by Americans does not appear. One hundred
and eleven of these were retaken or ransomed. During the same time the British
took two hundred and sixty-nine vessels from their enemies, of which thirty-one
were privateers, and five were recaptured (Clowes, iii, 396.) Other lists cover too
short a period of time to be of value and presumably have been included in the
above compilation (Almon, ix, 343, 350, 351, 3540 358.) The Continental navy
captured forty-four vessels, including three regular men-of-war and several
privateers, letters of marque, and armed transports (Neeser, ii, 28, 30, 288.)
211
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER XIV
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1780
South Carolina and Georgia, far from the seat of the Continental government and
from the headquarters of the army, were peculiarly exposed to attack, yet for
more than two years after the unsuccessful attempt of the British to take
Charleston in 1776, they were not seriously menaced. In December, 1778,
however, the English got possession of Savannah, and during the next year they
determined upon another effort to capture the whole lower South. Admiral
D'Estaing spent more than half of 1779 in the West Indies, where, with the
exception of the conquest of Grenada, he reaped little glory in his encounters
with the British. Up to this time the actual assistance he had rendered to the
American cause was slight and there was general dissatisfaction with the meagre
results thus far derived from the French alliance. D'Estaing's aid being now
requested in frustrating the British designs on the South, he appeared off the
coast of Georgia, September 1, 1779, with a powerful fleet, although he had
been ordered back to France, and joined General Lincoln in an attempt to
recapture Savannah. Through delay, however, the opportunity was lost and their
assault when made was unsuccessful. D'Estaing then sailed for France and
Lincoln fell back on Charleston. General Clinton sailed from New York for South
Carolina late in December, 1779 (Mahan, 365-376; Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, 519524; Stevens, 1203, 1238, 1246, 1247, 2010, 2011, 2023; Almon, vii, 244-248,
viii, 182, 298, ix, 65; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 146-149; Channing, iii, 300.)
The full extent of the benefit derived from the French alliance was not
appreciated at that early day in America. Its effect on the British imagination and
the potential weight of the French fleet, its mere presence on the ocean, were not
inconsiderable. An intercepted letter from General Clinton to Lord George
Germain, dated Savannah, January 30, 1780, captured on a British packet by an
American privateer, gives a view of the military situation as seen by English eyes
and discloses a state of mind not free from apprehension. Clinton seems to have
been impressed by the strength of Washington's army and of its position and
devoted his energies before going South to strengthening the defenses of New
York. "The violent demonstrations of the rebels," he wrote, "which threatened a
determined attack on the post at New York in conjunction with a large naval and
land armament under Count d'Estaing, then directing itself against the garrison at
Savannah, necessarily turned our whole endeavours to defeat so alarming a
combina tion.... Not a moment was to be lost in such a critical conjuncture, for
every moment was important and expected to come with the account of
d'Estaing's appearance before our harbour." Washington not only had a superior
position in the Highlands, but likewise along the shore to the east, where "every
advantage of water was also in his power by the Sound and, under protection of
212
the French fleet, exposed us to the most perplexing embarrassments. Assailable
in so many points and every instant expecting d'Estaing, we had but time to look
towards and take measures for our own defence and the occasion required us to
put forward our best exertions. I do not reckon among the lesser misfortunes of
the last year the operations of d'Estaing on the American coast, the vast relief
thereby given to the Rebel trade and the injury which it brought upon our's, the
impression it carried home to the minds of the people, of our lost dominion of the
sea, and the disposition of the French to give them every assistance
reconcileable with the general objects of the war, to compleat our ruin on the
Continent." (Almon, x, 36, 37, reprinted from Pennsylvania Journal, April 8, 1780.
See Channing, iii, 300, 301.)
Commodore Whipple's squadron, consisting of the frigates Providence, Boston,
and Queen of France, and the Ranger, arrived at Charleston December 23,
1779. An officer of the Providence wrote home: "On our arrival here we found our
designs against the enemy frustrated, as they had not attempted nor is it
probable they will attempt any thing against this town this season." This was
written January 8, 1780. Three days later he added: "Since writing the above, we
have received an account that the enemy are building flat boats and making
preparations for another expedition against this town, which they say is to
commence as soon as their reinforcement arrives from New York. If they should
attempt it, I believe it will terminate as much to their dishonour as their cause and
actions deserve, as the town and river are well fortified." (Independent Chronicle,
February 24, 1780.) January 24, the Providence and Ranger went to sea for a
short cruise. The same officer says: "On our way to Tybee in Georgia we
captured 3 transports, a brig of 14 guns and two armed sloops, which were
loaded with cloathing, some military stores, a few infantry, about forty light
dragoons of Lord Cathcart's legion, 7 or 8 officers, as many passengers, two
horses, and military furniture for forty others, which they were obliged to throw
overboard in some heavy gales on their passage. By these vessels we learn that
140 sail left New-York about 4 weeks before, under convoy of 6 or 7 ships of the
line and several frigates, with troops destined for Savannah. Then we proceeded
to Tybee, at the bar of which we saw a very considerable number of ships at
anchor (five of them appeared to be above 36 guns) and a variety of smaller
vessels, &c. The object of our voyage was to take some of their transports, that
we might gain intelligence of their strength and make what discoveries we could
with respect to their situation at Tybee; this being done we returned on Thursday
[January 27]. The force of the enemy must be great, considering the number of
vessels employed to transport them. Some say that Sir Henry Clinton commands
in person, others Lord Cornwallis. Let it be who it may, I believe we shall have a
pretty serious affair of it. There can be no doubt but their intention is to carry this
town." (Independent Chronicle, April 6, 1780.) General Lincoln had about four
thousand men at Charleston and the defenses of the city were strengthened as
far as possible. General Clinton landed, February 11, south of the town and
advanced upon it and invested it on the land side with ten thousand troops, while
a British fleet under Admiral Arbuthnot, consisting of one fifty-gun ship, two forty-
213
fours, and four thirty-twos, with smaller vessels, lay outside. On account of
shallow water inside the bar, there was no practicable anchorage from which the
American vessels could operate to advantage in defense of the channel and
dispute the passage of the bar by the British. To inquiries of General Lincoln on
this point a board of three naval captains and five pilots replied, February 27, that
there was no anchorage within three miles of the bar. "In the place where the
ships can be anchored, the bar cannot be covered or annoyed . . . Our opinion is
that the ships can do most effectual service for the defence and security of the
town, to act in conjunction with Fort Moultrie, which we think will best answer the
purpose of the ships being sent here . . . Our reasons are that the channel is so
narrow between the fort and the middle ground, that they may be moored so as
to rake the channel and prevent the enemy's troops being landed to annoy the
fort." (Tucker, 132-134.) The sinking of hulks or other obstructions in this narrow
part of the channel was apparently not attempted. The Americans destroyed the
lighthouse and ranges; also Fort Johnson, on the south side of the harbor, to
prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. This work was done by Captain
Tucker of the Boston. In addition to the Continental ships the South Carolina
navy furnished four vessels for the defense of Charleston, two of which, the
Bricole, 44, and the Truite, 26, had been purchased from France; the other two
were the General Moultrie, 20, and the Notre Dame, 16. Two French ships in the
harbor, L'Aventure, 26, and Polacre, 16, also took part.
In his report of May 14 to the British Admiralty, after telling of landing the army,
Admiral Arbuthnot says: "Preparations were next made for passing the squadron
over Charles-town bar, where [at] high water spring tides there is only nineteen
feet water. The guns, provision and water were taken out of the Renown,
Roebuck, and Romulus, to lighten them, and we lay in that situation on the open
coast in the winter season of the year, exposed to the insults of the enemy for
sixteen days, before an opportunity offered of going into the harbour, which was
effected without any accident on the 20th of March, notwithstanding the enemy's
galleys continually attempted to prevent our boats from sounding the channel . . .
The rebel naval force . . . made an appearance of disputing the passage up the
river at the narrow pass between Sullivan's island and the middle ground, having
moored their ships and galleys in a position to make a raking fire as we
approached Fort Moultrie, but on the squadron arriving near the bar and
anchoring on the inside, they abandoned that idea, retired to the town, and
changed their plan of defence. The Bricole, Notre Dame, Queen of France, Truite
and General Moultrie frigates, with several merchant ships, fitted with chevaux de
frize on their decks, were sunk in the channel [of the Cooper River] between the
town and Shute's Folly; a boom was extended across, composed of cables,
chains and spars, secured by the ship's masts, and defended from the town by
strong batteries of pimento logs, in which were mounted upwards of forty pieces
of heavy cannon. . . . As soon as the army began to erect their batteries against
the town I took the first favourable opportunity to pass Sullivan's Island, upon
which there is a strong fort and batteries, the chief defence of the harbour;
accordingly I weighed at one o'clock on the 9th [of April] with the Roebuck,
214
Richmond, Romulus, Blonde, Virginia, Raleigh, and Sandwich armed ship, the
Renown bringing up the rear, and passing through a severe fire, anchored in
about two hours under James Island, with the loss of twenty- seven seamen
killed and wounded." The total loss of the British fleet during the operations about
Charleston was twenty-three killed and twenty-eight wounded. "The Richmond's
foretop-mast was shot away and the ships in general sustained damage in their
masts and rigging; however, not materially in their hulls. But the Acetus transport,
having on board a few naval stores, grounded within gun-shot of Sullivan's Island
and received so much damage that she was obliged to be abandoned and burnt."
(Almon, x, 45, 46.)
To prevent the British passing up the Cooper River the Americans sunk eleven
vessels, including those mentioned in Arbuthnot's report. Possibly these vessels,
or others less valuable than some of them, might have been sunk to better
advantage in the channel below Fort Moultrie, before the British crossed the bar.
It might also with some reason be maintained that the squadron should have
made a more vigorous defense of the channel at that point in conjunction with the
fort; when by a lucky chance a few broadsides might have been able to cripple
one or more of the British ships while they were passing through the narrowest
places under a raking fire and in a disadvantageous position. Instead of that, the
Americans retired up the river, which they attempted to block. The Ranger and
two galleys were stationed above the obstructions while the guns and crews of
the other naval vessels were sent ashore to reinforce the batteries. The British
lines gradually drew closer to the town and American batteries on the north side
of the Cooper River were taken. A bombardment began April 12. A few entries in
the log of the Ranger tell the story of the closing days of the siege. April 15:
"Enemy Kept up A Constant Cannonading." May 7: "At 6 A.M. we could plainly
discover that Our people had Evacuated Fort Moultrie & that the enemy had
taken Possession of it; at 7 they hoisted their flag on it." May 8: "This morning the
Enemy sent in a Flag of truce, Which Caused a Total cessation of arms." May 9:
"At 9 P.M. the enemy began A most Desperate Cannonading, Throwing Shells,
and firing of small arms, [which] Continued all night, with very little loss on our
side." May 10: "The enemy still Keeping A constant firing of Cannon, Throwing of
Shells, Carcases, &c." Here the record abruptly ends. Lincoln capitulated May 11
and Whipple's squadron fell into the hands of the enemy. The Providence,
Boston, and Ranger were taken into the British service, the two latter under the
names Charlestown and Halifax. The officers were paroled and sent to
Philadelphia (Tucker, ch. vii; Almon, x, 38-53; Andrew Sherburne, 26-29; Log of
the Ranger; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 162 (Arbuthnot to Germain, May 15, 1780)
; Penn. Mag. Hist. and Biogr., April, 1891, Journal of Lieutenant Jennison; Mar.
Com. Letter Book, 263, 264 (February 22, 1780); Boston Gazette, April 17, July
10, 1780 ; Independent Chronicle, May 11, 1780; Dawson, ch. lix; Narr. and Crit.
Hist., vi, 524-527; Channing, iii, 317, 318.)
The frigate Trumbull, which was launched in 1776, remained in the Connecticut
River where she was built until 1779, unable to pass over the bar at the mouth of
215
the river. It is said that at the suggestion of Captain Hinman she was finally
floated over by means of a number of casks full of water placed along her sides,
held together by ropes passing under the keel and then pumped out, which lifted
the ship sufficiently to carry her over the bar. She was taken to New London and
fitted for sea. Meanwhile another frigate, the Bourbon, was being built on the
Connecticut River. It was hoped that she would soon be at sea and Captain
Thomas Read was ordered to command her, but for lack of money it was
necessary to suspend work on her and she was not finished in time to take part
in the war. Captain James Nicholson was appointed to command the Trumbull,
September 20, 1779, but it was not until April 17, 1780, that cruising orders were
sent to him. The Board of Admiralty, which had succeeded the Marine Committee
in the administration of naval affairs, intended that the Trumbull should cruise in
company with other Continental ships, but not with privateers; of such joint
expeditions the board disapproved. Meanwhile, apparently awaiting an
opportunity to get a number of vessels together, the orders of April 17 were
repeated May 22 ; they prescribed a cruise for the Trumbull alone until the end of
June (Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 47; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 238, 240,
241, 243, 252, 274, 276, 280, 285, 288 (September 20, October 6, 12, 21,
December 18, 1779, April 7, 11, 17, May, 12, 22, 23, 1780)
The Trumbull sailed from New London late in May and had not been long at sea
when she fell in with the British letter of marque Watt and was soon engaged in
one of the hardest-fought naval actions of the war. In Nicholson's account of the
battle he says: "At half past ten in the morning of June [1st], lat. 35. N. long. 64
W. we discovered a sail from the mast-head and immediately handed all our
sails, in order to keep ourselves undiscovered until she came nearer to us, she
being to windward. At eleven we made her to be a large ship from the deck,
coming down about three points upon our quarter; at half past eleven we thought
she hauled a point more astern of us. We therefore made sail and hauled upon a
wind towards her, upon which she came right down upon our beams; we then
took in our small sails, hauled the courses up, hove the maintop-sail to the mast,
got all clear for action, and waited for her.
"At half past eleven we filled the main-top (the ship being then about gun-shot to
windward of us) in order to try her sailing, also that by her hauling up after us we
might have an opportunity of discovering her broadside. She immediately got her
main tack out and stood after us; we then observed she had thirteen ports of a
side, exclusive of her briddle ports, and eight or ten on her quarter deck and
forecastle. After a very short exhortation to my people they most chearfully
agreed to fight her; at twelve we found we greatly outsailed her and got to
windward of her; we therefore determined to take that advantage. Upon her
observing our intention she edged away, fired three shot at us and hoisted British
colours as a challenge; we immediately wore after her and hoisted British colours
also. This we did in order to get peaceably alongside of her, upon which she
made us a private signal and upon our not answering it she gave us the first
broadside, we then being under British colours and about one hundred yards
216
distant. We immediately hoisted the Continental colours and returned her a
broadside, then about eighty yards distance, when a furious and close action
commenced and continued for five glasses, no time of which we were more than
eighty yards asunder and the greater part of the time not above fifty; at one time
our yard-arms were almost enlocked. She set us twice on fire with her wads, as
we did her once; she had difficulty in extinguishing her's, being obliged to cut all
her larboard quarter nettings away.
"At the expiration of the above time my first Lieutenant, after consulting and
agreeing with the second, came aft to me and desired I would observe the
situation of our masts and rigging, which were going over the side; therefore
begged I would quit her before that happened, otherwise we should certainly be
taken. I therefore most unwillingly left her, by standing on the same course we
engaged on; I say unwillingly, as I am confident if our masts would have admitted
of our laying half an hour longer alongside of her, she would have struck to us,
her fire having almost ceased and her pumps both going. Upon our going ahead
of her she steered about four points away from us. When about musquet shot
asunder, we lost our main and mizen topmast and in spite of all our efforts we
continued losing our masts until we had not one left but the foremast and that
very badly wounded and sprung. Before night shut in we saw her lose her
maintopmast. I was in hopes when I left her of being able to renew the action
after securing my mast, but upon inquiry found so many of my people killed and
wounded and my ship so much of a wreck in her masts and rigging, that it was
impossible. We lost eight killed and thirty one wounded; amongst the former was
one lieutenant, one midshipman, one serjeant of marines, and one quarter
gunner; amongst the latter was one lieutenant, since dead, the captain of
marines, the purser, the boatswain, two midshipmen, the cockswain, and my
clerk, the rest were common men, nine of which in the whole are since dead. No
people shewed more true spirit and gallantry than mine did; I had but one
hundred and ninety-nine men when the action commenced, almost the whole of
which, exclusive of the officers, were green country lads, many of them not clear
of their sea-sickness, and I am well persuaded they suffered more in seeing the
masts carried away than they did in the engagement.
"We plainly perceived the enemy throw many of his men overboard in the action,
two in particular which were not quite dead; from the frequent cries of his
wounded and the appearance of his hull, I am convinced he must have lost many
more men than we did and suffered more in his hull. Our damage was most
remarkable and unfortunate in our masts and rigging, which I must again say
alone saved him; for the last half hour of the action I momently expected to see
his colours down, but am of opinion he persevered from the appearance of our
masts. You will perhaps conclude from the above that she was a British man of
war, but I beg leave to assure you that it was not then, nor is it now my opinion;
she appeared to me like a French East-Indiaman cut down. She fought a greater
number of marines and more men in her tops than we did, the whole of which we
either killed or drove below. She dismounted two of our guns and silenced two
217
more; she fought four or six and thirty twelve pounders, we fought twenty-four
twelve and six sixes. I beg leave to assure you that let her be what she would,
either letter of marque or privateer, I give you my honour that was I to have my
choice tomorrow, I would sooner fight any two-and-thirty gun frigate they have on
the coast of America, than to fight that ship over again; not that I mean to
degrade the British men of war, far be it from me, but I think she was more
formidable and was better manned than they are in general." (Almon, x, 225227.)
Some further details are given in a letter of Gilbert Saltonstall, captain of marines
on the Trumbull. "As soon as she discovered us she bore down for us. We got
ready for action, at one o'clock began to engage, and continued without the least
intermission for five glasses, within pistol shot. It is beyond my power to give an
adequate idea of the carnage, slaughter, havock and destruction that ensued. Let
your imagination do its best, it will fall short. We were literally cut all to pieces; not
a shroud, stay, brace, bowling or any other of our rigging standing. Our main topmast shot away, our fore, main, mizen, and jigger masts gone by the board, two
of our quarter-deck guns disabled, thro' our ensign 62 shot, our mizen 157, mainsail 560, foresail 180, our other sails in proportion. Not a yard in the ship but
received one or more shot, six shot through her quarter above the quarter deck,
four in the waste, our quarter, stern, and nettings full of langrage, grape and
musket ball. We suffered more than we otherwise should on account of the ship
that engaged us being a very dull sailer. Our ship being out of command, she
kept on our starboard quarter the latter part of the engagement. After two and a
half hours action she hauld her wind, her pumps going; we edged away, so that it
fairly may be called a drawn battle." (Independent Chronicle, July 6, 1780.)
In another letter, of June 19, Saltonstall says: "Our troubles ceased not with the
engagement. The next day, the 2nd, it blew a heavy gale of wind, which soon
carried away our main and mizen masts by the board, the fore topmast followed
them and had it not been for the greatest exertions, our foremast must have gone
also, it being wounded in many places, but by fishing and propping it was saved.
. . . We remained in this situation till the next day, the 3rd, our men having got a
little over the fatigue of the engagement and the duty of the ship; the gale abating
we got up jury masts and made the best shift. In the night the gale increased
again and continued from that time till we got soundings on George's Banks in 45
fathoms of water the 11th instant. We got into Nantasket the 14th, the day
following into the harbor." (Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 55.)
The Watt, greatly shattered, got into New York June 11. The accounts of her
force vary somewhat. She seems to have mounted twenty-six twelve-pounders
and from six to ten sixes. Her crew was reported to number two hundred and
fifty, but one New York paper made it one hundred and sixty-four. Her
commander, Captain Coulthard, describing the action, says: " Saw a large ship
under the lee bow, bearing N. W. by W., distant about three or four miles;
supposed her to be a rebel vessel bound to France and immediately bore down
218
upon her. When she perceived we were standing for her she hauled up her
courses and hove too. We then found her to be a frigate of 34 or 36 guns and full
of men and immediately hoisted our colours and fired a gun; she at the same
time hoisted Saint George's colours and fired a gun to leeward. We then took her
for one of his Majesty's cruizing frigates and intended speaking to her, but as
soon as she saw we were getting on her weather quarter, they filled their topsails
and stood to the eastward. We then fired five guns to bring her to, but she having
a clean bottom and we foul and a cargo in, could not come up with her.
Therefore, finding it a folly to chace, fired two guns into her and wore ship to the
westward; at the same time she fired one gun at us, loaded with grape shot and
round, and wore after us. Perceiving this, we immediately hauled up our courses
and hove too for her.
"She still kept English colours flying till she came within pistol shot on our
weather quarter; she then hauled down English colours and hoisted rebel
colours, upon which we instantly gave her three cheers and a broadside. She
returned it and we came alongside one another and for above seven glasses
engaged yard arm and yard arm; my officers and men behaved like true sons of
Old England. While our braces were not shot away, we box-hauled our ship four
different times and raked her through the stern, shot away her main topmast and
main yard and shattered her hull, rigging and sails very much. At last all our
braces and rigging were shot away and the two ships lay along-side of one
another, right before the wind; she then shot a little ahead of us, got her foresail
set and run. We gave her t'other broadside and stood after her; she could only
return us two guns. Not having a standing shroud, stay or back- stay, our masts
wounded through and through, our hull, rigging and sails cut to pieces, and being
very leaky from a number of shot under water, only one pump fit to work, the
other having been torn to pieces by a twelve pound shot, after chasing her for
eight hours, lost sight and made the best of our way to this port. We had eleven
men killed, two more died the next day, and seventy-nine wounded." (Almon, x,
142, 143; Massachussetts Spy, August 17, 1780; Boston Gazette, June 5, 19,
July 24, August 28, 1780; Independent Chronicle, July 6, September 7, 1780;
Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 51-56; Williams, 273.)
The Board of Admiralty continued to develop plans for a cruise by a squadron
under Nicholson, who was the senior captain of the navy. The Confederacy,
Captain Harding, which had been temporarily repaired at Martinique after her
dismasting and had returned to Philadelphia about May 1, the Deane, Captain
Samuel Nicholson, brother of the commodore, and the Saratoga, a new
eighteen-gun sloop of war commanded by Captain Young, were, with the
Trumbull, to make up the squadron. These ships were all that remained of the
Continental navy, in commission at this time, except the Alliance. The Deane had
made a successful cruise early in the year, taking a number of prizes. She and
the Saratoga were ready for sea in June, but the Confederacy and Trumbull were
in need of extensive repairs. Nicholson received a Letter from the Board of
Admiralty, dated June 30, congratulating him upon "the gallantry displayed in the
219
Defence" of his ship in his recent action with the Watt and urging "exertions in
Speedily refitting" her. The long-looked-for reinforcement from France, consisting
of five thousand troops under General Rochambeau, sailed from Brest May 1,
convoyed by seven ships of the line commanded by Admiral de Ternay, and
arrived at Newport July 12; this place had been evacuated by the British in
October, 1779. It was intended by Congress that the Continental squadron
should keep a lookout for an expected second division of the French fleet from
Brest and warn them of the situation of the British fleet, and should also
cooperate with De Ternay; this was in accordance with the wish of General
Washington, but no union of these forces took place. All the French ships were
blockaded by the British - the second division in Brest, and De Ternay in Newport
by a superior force under Arbuthnot, who had returned from Charleston (Mar.
Com. Letter Book, 259, 262, 266, 281, 284, 285, 298, 312, 815, 322 (January 31,
February 15, 28, May 2, 12, June 30, August 11, 14, 28, 1780) ; Pap. Cont.
Congr., 78, 12, 5 (February 4, 1780), 37, 223, 287, 311 (April 11, August 1, 6,
1780); Boston Post, April 20, 1780; Boston Gazette, May 1, 1780; Mahan, 382,
383.)
The Mercury, a packet in the employ of Congress which had been stationed in
Delaware Bay, set sail in August for Holland under the command of Captain
Pickles, having on board as passenger Henry Laurens, who was sent on an
important mission to the Dutch government. The Mercury was convoyed for a
short distance by the Saratoga and early in September was captured by a British
frigate off the Banks of Newfoundland. The dispatches, including a draft of a
treaty with Holland, were thrown overboard, but unfortunately did not sink and
were recovered by the British. Laurens was confined about a year in the Tower of
London (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 295, 311, 315 (June 19, August 11, 14,1780);
Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 431 (July 18,1780); Stevens, 930, 931.)
Many instructions were issued for the movements of the Continental squadron.
August 11, the Trumbull was ordered on a two weeks' cruise off the coast, in a
letter which required of Commodore Nicholson that "all such prizes as you may
take and send into this port are to be directed to the care of the Board of
Admiralty, the prizes which you may be Obliged through necessity to send into
Other Ports you are to direct to the care of the Continental Agent of the district.
You are always to Observe that you are to give the preference to this port as a
place to which you are to direct your prizes when winds, weather and Other
circumstances will admit of it without being more hazardous than elsewhere. The
Deane and Saratoga will Sail in Company with you and under your Orders; you
will therefore prepare and give to the Captains or commanding Officer of each of
those Ships such instructions as may be necessary for regulating the Cruize . . .
You will also when at the Capes employ some of your Crew in catching Fish,
which will Afford a healthful variety of food to them and save your flesh
Provisions. You are to see that the Ships company of the little fleet under your
command frequently are disciplined in the exercise of the great Guns and Small
Arms, to render them more expert in time of Battle, and that OEconomy, frugality,
220
neatness and good Order are punctually Observed." (Mar. Com. Letter Book,
312.) August 19, the Saratoga was ordered to sea with sealed instructions "of a
Secret Committee of Conferrence with the Minister of France," which the Board
of Admiralty surmised might take her to the West Indies. On the 29th the
Trumbull was ordered on a three weeks' cruise on the Atlantic coast with the
Deane, and two weeks later this cruise was extended and the Saratoga was to
endeavor to join them. Renewed instructions as to cooperation with the French
were included in nearly all the board's letters. As late as August 31, the
Confederacy was still unfit for active service, being "the only Continental frigate
now within Harbour, but neither manned Or victualed for the Sea." The Deane
made a three weeks' cruise off the coast of South Carolina in September, but
"without taking anything worth naming," according to Richard Langdon, son of
the president of Harvard College, who was on board. This caused
disappointment, for success had been depended upon "to equip three quarters of
our navy, which is now in this river, viz: the Confederacy, Trumbull and Deane
frigates." (Independent Chronicle, January 25, 1781.) The Saratoga took four
valuable prizes, at least one of which was more heavily armed than herself ; they
were all recaptured, however. The ships were in port a large part of the time
preparing for sea under difficulties which caused endless delay. These difficulties
as might be expected were mostly financial and not only hindered repairs on the
vessels in commission, but prevented the completion of those under
construction, the frigate Bourbon in the Connecticut River and the seventy-fourgun ship America still on the stocks at Portsmouth. The Board of Admiralty
appealed to the governors of the New England States and to other persons of
influence for help, but at this period of the war money had become the scarcest
of all commodities. William Vernon, of the Eastern Navy Board, writing,
November 10, about naval matters to William Ellery, then a member of the Board
of Admiralty, says that Captain Samuel Nicholson had recently "arrived from
Phila. having leave of absence . . . to come to Boston, his younger Brother John
Nicholson being appointed to the Command of his ship the Deane Frigate, which
he is to resume the Command of at the end of her present Cruise; he further
informs that all the Continental Ships were to sail from the Delaware in
consequence. That it was reported, when their Cruise was up, they were to go
into the Chesapeake to recruit their Stores and Men; this message he verily
believes was agreed upon. Which if true we are extreem sorry to hear, not that
we as a Board can receive any injury, on the contrary shall get clear of a great
deal of Trouble and Fatigue, but are fearful the Public are in much danger of
Looseing the small remains of their Navy, at least of their being rendered useless
for a Time, as it certainly cannot be difficult for British ships of superior Force to
block up if not Capture them; moreover if this should not be the case, can stores
of every kind be supplied in Virginia or Maryland, can Men be obtained to Mann
the Deane and Trumbul, whose Time must be expired at their Arrival in the
Chesapeake ? Indeed we think they were entitled to their discharge upon their
Arrival in the Delaware from their last Cruise; they certainly were shiped for a
Cruise only, upon no other Terms have we at any Time been able to Mann our
ships. If we do not keep faith with the Seamen, our expectations are at an end of
221
even Manning the Ships. I speak in regard to the Trumbul and Deane; perhaps it
may be otherwise with the Confederacy and Saratoga, they may be shiped upon
the New invitation of Entering for 12 Months. I have given you these hints not
officially, meerly as my private opinion and that of my Colleage and make no
doubt they will have their proper weight with you and that upon your joining the
board of Admiralty at Phila., will suggest to them what shall in your judgment
appear consonant to the benefit and Interest of the Public." (Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc.,
viii, 268.) Another matter taken up by the Board of Admiralty in 1780 was the
systematic attempt to obtain, through navy boards and other agents, all the
information possible as to the numbers, character, and movements of the British
naval forces at all points between Newfoundland and the West Indies (Mar. Com.
Letter Book, 265, 289, 290, 291, 294, 300, 303, 304, 308, 310, 312, 313, 314,
315, 317, 318, 319, 321, 322, 331 (February 22, May 30, June 16, July 7, 21,
August 4, 11, 14, 19, 22, 29, 31, September 14,1780); Pap. Cont. Congr., 37,
265, 269, 273, 517 (July 21, November 6, 1780); Penn. Packet, October 24,
1780; Publ. R. I. Hist. Soc., viii, 264-269; Barney, 84-86.)
The Massachusetts navy, which had lost all of its vessels in commission in the illfated Penobscot expedition, was about this time reinforced by the largest and
most powerful ship in the state service during the Revolution. This was the
twenty-six-gun frigate Protector, which was built on the Merrimac River and
launched in 1779, but not ready for sea until the spring of 1780. In December,
1779, she narrowly escaped destruction by a fire at the wharf where she was
moored. March 21, 1780, the following action was taken by the Massachusetts
General Court: "Whereas it is absolutely necessary to increase the Naval Force
of this State to defend the Trade and Sea Coasts thereof, Therefore Resolved,
that the Board of War be and they are hereby directed to procure and fit for the
Sea with all possible dispatch Two Armed Vessels to carry from Twelve to
Sixteen Guns each." Under this and supplementary acts a ship called the Mars
was purchased in April and another was built and named the Tartar; the latter,
however, was not finished until 1782. Captain Williams was put in command of
the Protector; among her midshipmen was Edward Preble, who afterwards
became famous. In January it had been intended to send her to Europe, but in
May, after having made a short cruise, Williams was ordered by the Board of War
on another, as far east as the Banks of Newfoundland and south to the thirtyeighth parallel and to the track of vessels from the West Indies, meanwhile
making occasional visits to the coast of Maine. Captain Sampson was appointed
to command the Mars, and in June was ordered to Nantes for goods needed by
the army; he sailed early in August. On June 22, the General Court expressed
disapproval of robberies said to have been committed along the Nova Scotia
shore by Massachusetts privateers and resolved that in the future privateers
must give bonds for the abolition of such evils (Mass. Court Rec., March 15, 21,
April 20, May 5, June 22; Mass. Archives, cli, 506, cliii, 320, 345; Massachusetts
Mag., July, October, 1910; Amer. Hist. Rev., x, 69; Boston Post, April 20, 1780.)
222
On her cruise to the eastward the Protector fought a hard battle on the Banks of
Newfoundland of which the captain gives an account in his journal. "Friday, June
9, 1780, wind W. S. W. At 7 A.M. saw a large ship to windward bearing down for
us under English colours; she hauled up her courses in order for action. At 11
A.M. we came along-side of her under English colours, hail'd her; she answered
from Jamaica. I shifted my colours & gave her a broadside. She soon returned us
another. The action was heavy for near 3 glasses, when unfortunately she took
fire and soon after blew up; got out our boats to save the men, took up 55 of
them. Among them was the 3d mate and the only officer sav'd; the greatest part
of them very much wounded and burnt. She was called the Admiral Duff, a large
ship of 32 guns, commanded by Richard Stranger, from St. Kitts and St. Eustatia
laden with sugar and tobacco, bound to London." (Boston Gazette, July 24,
1780.) The Protector lost one killed and five wounded out of her complement of
two hundred.
This event was narrated in greater detail many years later by Luther Little, a
midshipman on the Protector and brother of the first lieutenant, George Little.
The midshipman says that on the morning of the battle there was a fog and when
it "lifted, saw large ship to windward under English colors, standing down before
the wind for us, we being to leaward. Looked as large as a 74. Concluded she
was not a frigate. All hands piped to quarters. Hammocks brought up and stuffed
in the nettings, decks wet and sanded &c . . . We stood on under cruising sail.
She tried to go ahead of us and then hove to under fighting sail. We showed
English flag. She was preparing for action. We steered down across her stern &
hauled up under her lee quarter, breeching our guns aft to bring them to bear.
Our first It. hailed from the gangboard . . . Our capt. ordered broadside and colors
changed. She replied with 3 cheers and a broadside. Being higher, they overshot
us, cutting our rigging. A regular fight within pistol range. In a hf hour a cannon
shot came thro' our side, killing Mr. Scollay, a midshipman who commanded the
4th 12-pounder from the stem. His brains flew over my face and my gun, which
was the third from the stern. In an hour all their topmen were kld by our marines,
60 in no. and all Americans. Our marines kld the man at their wheel & the ship
came down on us, her cat-head staving in our quarter galley. We lashed their jibboom to our main shrouds. Our marines firing into their port holes kept them from
charging. We were ordered to board, but the lashing broke & we were ordered
back. Their ship shooting alongside nearly locked our guns & we gave a
broadside, wh. cut away her mizen mast and made gt havoc. Saw her sinking
and her maintopgallantsail on fire, wh run down her rigging and caught a
hogshead of cartridges under her quarter deck and blew it off. A charge of grape
entered my port hole. One passed between my backbone and windpipe and one
thro' my jaw, lodging in the roof of my mouth & taking off a piece of my tongue,
the other thro' my upper lip, taking away part, and all my upper teeth. Was
carried to cockpit; my gun was fired only once after. I had fired it 19 times.
Thinking I was mortally wounded they dressed first those likelier to live. Heard
the surgeon say 'he will die.' The Duff sunk, on fire, colors flying. Our boats had
been injured, but were repaired as well as possible & sent to pick up the
223
swimmers; saved 55, one half wounded. Then first It confided to me that many
were drowned rather than be made captives. Some tried to jump from the boats.
Our surgeons amputated limbs of 5 of them. One was sick with W. India fever
and had floated out of his hammock between decks. The weather was warm and
in less than 10 days 60 of our men had it. Among those saved were 2 American
captains & their crews, prisoners on board the Duff. One of the Am. captains told
us that Capt. Strang had hoped we were a Continental frigate, when he first saw
us." (Manuscript in Harvard College Library.) While cruising off Nova Scotia with
a great deal of sickness on board, the Protector fell in with the Thames, a British
frigate of thirty-two guns. After a running fight of several hours the Protector
escaped. She returned to Boston August 15. In the fall she made another cruise,
first running to the eastward and then to the West Indies (Mass. Archives, cliii,
385; Boston Gazette, July 17, 24, August 21, 1780; Adventures of Ebenezer Fox,
ch. iv, v; Clark, i, 102,103; Sabine's Life of Preble, ch. i.)
Captain Elisha Hart, of the private armed sloop Retaliation, ten guns and fifty
men, wrote from New London, September 29, 1780, to Governor Trumbull of
Connecticut, that he had sailed on the 22d along the south side of Long Island to
Sandy Hook and towards the Narrows, in New York Harbor. Several sloops were
seen coming down from New York. The Retaliation chased them and overhauled
one that was standing for Staten Island. "I discovered She Had no Guns," says
Hart, "but appeared full of Men Elligantly Dressed. I then Supposed her to be a
Pleasure Boat from the fleet, which I then Saw Lying In the Narrows and was
within One League of them and in full View of the City and More than a League
within the Guard Ships." Captain Hart got out sweeps, came up fast on the chase
and hailed her, but her commander was very suspicious and refused to come on
board the Retaliation. "I then ordered Down my English Colours, Ran out my Bow
Guns and Told him if He did not Come on Board I would Sink Him Immediately.
He then Hove out his Boat and Come on Board. I Immediately Man'd the Prize
and Took out the Prisoners." They were forty-seven in number, including a
captain, a lieutenant, and two sergeants; they were a captain's guard, sent to
relieve guard at the lighthouse. An armed sloop from near the guardship
approached, but bore away upon the Retaliation's heaving to for her. The prize
was brought safely into New London (Trumbull MSS., xiii, 41 ; Continental
Journal, October 5, 1780; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 18.)
Alexander Murray, who was afterwards a lieutenant in the Continental navy,
commanded the letter of marque Revenge in 1780; she carried eighteen sixpounders and fifty men and was fitted out at Baltimore for a voyage to Holland.
Having collected a convoy of fifty sail in Chesapeake Bay, some of them armed,
Murray attempted to get to sea, but upon the appearance of a squadron of British
privateers, consisting of an eighteen-gun ship, a sixteen-gun brig, and three
schooners, his convoy, with the exception of two vessels, deserted him and fled.
The Revenge alone engaged the ship and brig with both broadsides, lying
between them, and beat them both off after a hard-fought action of more than an
hour. The two vessels with him kept the three schooners occupied until the
224
convoy had time to escape into Hampton Roads. Murray returned to port to
repair damages and then once more set sail. On the Banks of Newfoundland he
captured a letter of marque brig. He pursued his voyage, but unluckily fell in with
a large British fleet of men-of-war and transports, was chased by a frigate and
captured. Not long afterwards Murray was exchanged (Clark, i, 117; Port Folio,
May, 1814. For further accounts of privateering and prizes in 1780, see Boston
Gazette, March 6, 20, May 1, July 3, 24, 31, September 4, November 6, 1780;
Massachusetts Spy, August 17, 1780; Continental Journal, October 19, 1780;
Penn. Gazette, July 19, 1780; London Post, May 1, August 4, 1780; Pickering
MSS., xxxiii, 280; Almon, x, 55, 60, 265-267; Clark, i, 116,119; Virginia Hist.
Register, July, 1853; Tucker, ch. viii; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 16; R.
I. Hist. Mag., July, 1884.)
A source of embarrassment to British naval administration during the war was
jealousy and ill feeling among the officers of the navy. One instance was a bitter
quarrel between Admirals Keppel and Palliser in 1778. Admiral Rodney came out
to the West Indies early in 1780 and remained there most of the time until 1782.
His relations with other officers seem seldom to have been pleasant, and lust of
prize money interfered at times with the discharge of duty. His first exploit was an
encounter with a French fleet under the Comte de Guichen, which led to
contentions with his captains due to misunderstanding about signals. In
September, Rodney went to New York for a short stay, arriving just in time to fall
into a large amount of prize money, which came to him as senior officer on the
station and would otherwise have gone to Admiral Arbuthnot. This occasioned a
disagreeable quarrel between them. In a letter dated October 19, 1780, Rodney
says to Arbuthnot: "I am honoured with your letter of the 16th Instant and am
sorry that my Conduct has given you offence; none was intended on my part ... It
was not inclination or Choice that brought me to America; it was the Duty I owed
my King and Country. I had flattered myself it would have met with your
approbation. I am sorry it has not, but I own I have the vanity to think it will meet
with His approbation whose it is the greatest Honor a Subject can receive. Your
Anger at my partial interfering (as you term it) with the American War not a little
surprises me. I came to Interfere in the American War, to Command by Sea in it
and do my best Endeavours towards the putting an end thereto. I knew the
Dignity of my own Rank and the power invested in me by the Commission I bear
entitled me to take the supreme Command, which I ever shall do on every
Station . . . unless I meet a Superior Officer ... Your having detached the
Raisonable to England without my knowledge, after you had received my orders
to put your self under my command, is I believe unprecidented in the Annals of
the British Navy." (Brit. Adm m. Rec., A. D. Leeward Islands, vii.)
On October 30, Rodney wrote to the Admiralty: Vice Admiral Arbuthnot having
taken it into his head to be highly Offended at me for doing what I thought my
duty to His Majesty and the Public and acquainting me by letter dated the 16th
Instant that he would remonstrate to their Lordships against my Conduct, I think it
a duty I owe myself to transmit to the Admiralty Board Copies of My Orders and
225
Letters to Mr. Arbuthnot with his answers to Me (His Superior officer), that their
Lordships may Judge which of us has most cause to trouble them with
Complaints. . . . That I have been extremely tender in issuing Orders to Vice
Admiral Arbuthnot and been attentive towards paying him every respect due to
his Rank, the inclos'd letters I am sure will convince their Lordships. If in his
Answers to me his letters have not been penn'd with that Cordiality which ought
to pass between Officers acting in the Public Service, I am sorry for him, they
effect not Me. I am ashamed to mention what appears to Me the real cause and
from whence Mr. Arbuthnot's chagrene proceeds, but the proofs are so plain that
Prize Money is the Occasion that I am under the necessity of transmitting them . .
. On my arrival at New York I found it necessary . . . to give Mr. Arbuthnot Orders
to put himself under My Command, not only for the better carrying on the Public
Service, but likewise to prevent any Litigious Suits relative to Prize Money, which
Mr. Arbuthnot had given me but too much reason to expect . . . I can solemnly
assure their Lordships that I had not the least conception of any other Prize
Money on the Coast of America but that which would be most honourably
obtain'd by the destruction of the Enemy's Ships of War and Privateers, but when
Prize Money appear'd predominant in the mind of my Brother Officer, I was
determin'd to have my Share of that Bounty so graciously bestow'd by His
Majesty and the Public . . . I flatter'd myself I should have had the honour even of
Mr. Arbuthnot's approbation of my Conduct. I am sorry I have not, but if I am so
happy as to meet with that of their Lordships, it will more than fully compensate."
(Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. Leeward Ids., vii; Mahan, 377-382; Hannay, ii, 226-229,
244-251; Belcher, i, 293, 301, 302; Channing, iii, 824; Nav. Rec. Soc., iii, 1, 2.
For Arbuthnot's complaints against Rodney, see Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 486,
September 30, October 29, 1780.) Rodney returned to the West Indies in
December.
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER XV
EUROPEAN WATERS IN 1780
After his arrival at L'Orient in February, 1780, Captain Jones had to endure
another long period of waiting on shore, but was occupied for some time in giving
the Alliance a thorough overhauling; for lack of money this was less complete
than he had hoped. In the first place the ship had been put out of trim by the
arrangement of the ballast, which, Jones says, "Captain Landais has extended
along the ceiling from the stern-post to the stem; an idea that I believe he may
without vanity call his own." Besides correcting this, repairs were necessary and
Jones proposed to have the ship coppered. Another object of his desire was the
purchase of the Serapis, and he says in the same letter, which was written to
Franklin, February 13 : "I wish she could be made the property of America."
(Sherburne, 186.) He seems to have had an idea that the French government
226
would bear the cost of repairs on the Alliance. Franklin wrote to him, February
19: "As to refitting your ship at the expense of this court, I must acquaint you that
there is not the least probability of obtaining it, and therefore I cannot ask it. I
hear too much already of the extraordinary expense you made in Holland to think
of proposing an addition to it, especially as you seem to impute the damage she
has sustained more to Capt. Landais's negligence than to accidents of the cruize.
The whole expense will therefore fall upon me and I am ill provided to bear it,
having so many unexpected calls upon me from all quarters. I therefore beg you
would have mercy upon me, put me to as little charge as possible and take
nothing that you can possibly do without. As to sheathing with copper, it is totally
out of the question. I am not authorised to do it, if I had money; and I have not
money for it, if I had orders. The purchase of the Serapis is in the same
predicament . . . Let me repeat it, for God's sake be sparing, unless you mean to
make me a bankrupt or have your drafts dishonored for want of money in my
hands to pay them." (Sherburne, 189, 190.) In spite of difficulties, however, the
ship was in fine condition by the middle of April. Jones took on board of her
twenty-eight eighteen-pounders and twelve nines, the guns that had been made
for the Bonhomme Richard, but were not ready in time; besides which it had
been decided that eighteens were too heavy (lbid., 221; Archives de la Marine,
B1 89, 225. Probably these guns were to be transported to America, not mounted
on the Alliance.) Jones expected to return to America in the Alliance, but wished
before he left France to settle his own and his men's affairs. His prizes had not
yet been sold and his crew were without wages, without prize money, and
without clothes. In order to expedite matters, Jones made another trip to Paris
and obtained the promise of an early sale. Franklin advanced a sum of money to
supply the immediate needs of officers and men. The French government loaned
the ship Ariel of twenty guns to accompany the Alliance to America and assist in
transporting a large amount of clothing and military supplies for the Continental
army. Many exchanged American prisoners arrived from England who would be
available for her crew. Jones was received in Paris with marked distinction and
was presented by the King with a gold-hilted sword and the cross of the Order of
Military Merit; the latter in the following year, after having obtained the approval
of Congress (Sands, 247-262; Sherburne, 185-197; Archives de la Marine, B1
93, 45, 283, 285, B4 172, 176.)
About this time the project of another cruise to the north, under the command of
Commodore Jones, was formed. It is outlined in the following paper drawn up by
Jones and dated June 10: "It is understood that a considerable Number of the
King's Frigates are likely to remain unarmed and unemployed in the Ports,
through the Scarcity of French Seamen. To Man these the Government might
ask of Congress the Services of Commodore Jones and of a sufficient Number of
American Officers and Sailors, of which there are about 500 now Prisoners in
England, whose exchange will naturally take place in two or three Months and
who being arrived here might easily be engaged and retained for that purpose.
Commodore Jones is now bound for America, from whence with the permission
of Congress he might return in about four Months with the Alliance and probably
227
with one or two other American Frigates, on board of which and of such
Merchant Ships as would gladly put themselves under his Convoy he could
embark and bring over a considerable number of chosen Supernumerary officers
and Seamen to be joined with those expected from England and to such others
as might be collected in France, and the whole employed in manning the French
Frigates in Question, which during Commodore Jones's absence might be put in
some degree of readiness. Should the Serapis be bought by the King, it would be
advisable to employ her in this Service. In this way a squadron of Frigates from
America and of fast sailing French Frigates, sloops &c. manned by Americans
might be easily formed, capable of rendering very essential services to the
Common Cause, by destroying the Enemies Commerce, alarming their Coasts,
taking their Towns &c. &c. It would be expedient to embark a few hundred of
good French Troops on board the different Vessels of War, to serve as Marines
and to assist in making descents &c. Commodore Jones can and at any time will
point out to Government many desirable undertakings for the Armament in
Question, but as the utmost secrecy is necessary to render them successful and
as changes of Winds and a variety of circumstances may render it expedient to
change the operations of this Force, he would desire and expect to be left at full
Liberty to act according as situations and circumstances may in his own opinion
appear for the best." This proposition was favorably received by the French
Ministry, but apparently owing to the inability of Congress to take the necessary
steps on their part and to other circumstances, it came to nothing (Archives do la
Marine, B4 172, 188, 199; Sherburne, 208-211.)
During Jones's absence from L'Orient, Landais, instigated by Arthur Lee,
encouraged a spirit of discontent almost amounting to mutiny among the crew of
the Alliance. The men were led to believe that Jones was responsible for their not
receiving the prize money due them, and they demanded the restoration of
Landais to the command of the ship. Apparently Jones here again, as on the
Ranger, suffered from the lack of a warm personal regard for him on the part of
his men, who, repelled by his demeanor, never understood his devotion to their
interests. The former officers and men of the Bonhomme Richard, however,
stood by him. Lee expressed the opinion that as Landais's commission had not
been revoked, nor had he been relieved by order of Congress, he was still legally
in command of the Alliance. Jones wrote to Robert Morris: "I am convinced that
Mr. Lee has acted in this matter merely because I would not become the enemy
of the venerable, the wise and good Franklin, whose heart as well as head does
and will always do honor to human nature." (Wharton, iii, 821; Sands, 278.) In
regard to the legality of Landais's commission, the Board of Admiralty in a report
to Congress a few months later observed that "Captain Landais regained
command of the Alliance by the advice of Mr. Lee, notwithstanding his
suspension by Dr. Franklin, who by the direction of the Marine Committee had
the sole management of our marine affairs in Europe." (Sands, 321.) John
Adams, however, believed that the Marine Committee lacked authority to confer
upon Franklin the power to remove the commander of a ship. Commodore Gillon
of South Carolina, at that time in France, also took the part of Landais. The
228
French ministry declined to take sides in the controversy. June 13, after Jones's
return from Paris but during his temporary absence from the ship, Landais went
on board and took command. To avoid trouble which might be serious and lead
to bloodshed, Jones relinquished his claim to the command (Ibid., 262-280;
Sherburne, 197-207; Hale, ch. xvii; Archives de la Marine, B4 172, 166, 197, 198,
204-210, 231, 237-242, 244, 245, 248, 255, 261.)
About the 1st of July the Alliance sailed for America with Arthur Lee on board as
passenger, but without the clothing so much needed by the army. The conduct of
Captain Landais became so erratic during the voyage that the safety of the ship,
crew, and passengers seemed imperiled. After vain appeals to him it became
necessary to relieve him forcibly of the command, which devolved upon the first
lieutenant. This was on August 10, in latitude 41° 30' north, longitude 59° west.
The ship was then taken into Boston, where she arrived, August 16. Captain
Barry was appointed to command the Alliance September 5. She remained in
Boston Harbor during the rest of the year and on board of her was convened the
court martial, of which Barry was president, for the trial of Captain Landais and
his first lieutenant, James Degge. As a result, they were both dismissed from the
navy (Pap. Cont. Congr., 193, 451-595, 597, 599, 631, 639, 655, 679, 705, 757,
773 (August 10, September 22, November 10, 29, 1780, January 5, 6, 25, 1781);
Mar. Com. Letter Book, 328 (September 5, 1780); Lee MSS., August 5, 10,
December 20, 1780; Boston Gazette, August 21, 1780; Archives de la Marine,
B8 16 (Juin, 1780)
After the departure of the Alliance from France, Jones was occupied in getting
ready for his own return to America. "He obtained a crew for the Ariel, that was
ordered by government to be fully armed and equipped. He embarked such a
quantity of arms and powder as with provision for only nine weeks filled the ship
even between decks. He hoped to make the passage in a favourable season of
the year, but was detained by contrary and stormy winds in the road of Groix
from the 4th of September till the 8th of October. He then sailed with a fair wind
and pleasant weather, but the next night the Ariel was driven by a violent tempest
close to the rocks of the Penmarque, a terrible ledge between L'Orient and Brest.
The ship could show no sail, but was almost buried under the water, not having
room to run before the wind and having several feet water in the hold. Finding the
depth of water diminish fast, Captain Jones in the last extremity cast anchor, but
could not bring the ship's head to the wind. Sometimes the lower yard-arms
touched the water. Captain Jones now had no remedy left but to cut away the
foremast. This had the desired effect and the ship immediately came head to the
wind. The main-mast had got out of the step and now reeled about like a drunken
man. Foreseeing the danger of its either breaking off below the gundeck or going
through the ship's bottom, Captain Jones ordered it to be cut away. But before
this could be done, the chain-plates gave way and the main-mast breaking off by
the gun- deck carried with it the mizen-mast; and the mizen-mast carried away
the quarter-gallery. In that situation the Ariel rode in the open ocean to windward
of perhaps the most dangerous ledge of rocks in the world for two days and near
229
three nights, in a tempest that covered the shore with wrecks and dead bodies
and that drove ships ashore from their anchors even in the port of L'Orient. It was
perhaps fortunate that the Ariel lost her masts, since no anchors could have held
her so long had the masts stood. By the help of jury-masts, erected after the
gale, the Ariel returned to L'Orient." (Sands, 294, journal prepared for the King.) It
then took several weeks to refit the Ariel, and Jones made an unsuccessful effort
to obtain a better ship. During this time he made further arrangements in regard
to the prize money due himself and officers and men, which had not yet been
paid. Franklin wrote to him, December 4: "I shall strongly solicit the payment of
the prize money, which I understand is not yet received from the king. I hope
soon to see an end of that affair, which has met with so many unaccountable
obstructions. I enclose despatches for Congress, which are to be sunk in case of
danger. I wish you to make the best of your way to America and that you may
have a prosperous voyage." (Sands, 299.) The Ariel sailed December 18 (lbid.,
294-300; Sherburne, 211-213; Archives do la Marine, B4 172, 271-274, 277.)
The account of this voyage is given in Jones's journal. "After a variety of
rencounters he, in the latitude 26° north and longitude of Barbadoes, met with a
remarkably fast sailing frigate belonging to the enemy's navy. Captain Jones
endeavoured to avoid speaking with that ship and as night approached, he
hoped to succeed, notwithstanding her superior sailing. He was, however,
mistaken, for the next morning the ships were at a less distance asunder than
they had been the evening before, although during the night the officers of the
watch had always informed Captain Jones the sail continued out of sight. An
action now became unavoidable and the Ariel was prepared for it. Every thing
was thrown overboard that interfered with the defence and safety of the ship.
Captain Jones took particular care, by the management of sails and helm, to
prevent the enemy from discovering the force of the Ariel, and worked her so well
as not to discover any warlike appearance or preparation. In the afternoon the
Ariel fired now and then a light stern-chaser at the enemy from the quarterdeck
and continued to crowd sail as if very much alarmed. This had the desired effect
and the enemy pursued with the greater eagerness. Captain Jones did not suffer
the enemy to come close up till the approach of night, when having well
examined his force, he shortened sail to meet his approach.
"When the two ships came within hail of each other they both hoisted English
Colours. The person whose duty it was to hoist the pendant on board the Ariel
had not taken care to make the other end of the halliards fast, to haul it down
again to change the Colours. This prevented Jones from an advantageous
manoeuvre he had intended and obliged him to let the enemy range up along the
lee-side of the Ariel, where he saw a battery lighted for action. A conversation
now took place between the two ships, which lasted near an hour, by which
Captain Jones learned the situation of the enemy's affairs in America. The
captain of the enemy's ship said his name was John Pindar. His ship had been
constructed by the famous Mr. Peck of Boston, built at Newburyport, owned by
Mr. Tracy of that place, Commanded by Captain Hopkins, the son of the late
230
Commodore Hopkins, and had been taken and fitted out at New York and named
the Triumph by Admiral Rodney. Captain Jones told him he must put out his boat
and come on board and show his commission, to prove whether or not he really
did belong to the British navy. To this he made some excuses, because Captain
Jones had not told him who he was, and his boat he said was very leaky. Captain
Jones told him to consider the danger of refusing. Captain Pindar said be would
answer for twenty guns and that he himself and every one of his people had
shown themselves Englishmen. Captain Jones said he would allow him five
minutes only to make his reflection. That time being elapsed, Captain Jones
backed a little in the weather-quarter of the enemy, ran close under her stern,
hoisted American Colours, and being within short pistol shot on the lee-beam of
the enemy, began to engage.
"It was past seven o'clock and as no equal force ever exceeded the vigorous and
regular fire of the Ariel's battery and tops, the action while it lasted made a
glorious appearance. The enemy made a feeble resistance for about ten
minutes. He then struck his Colours. The enemy then begged for quarter and
said half his men were killed. The Ariel's fire ceased and the crew, as usual after
a victory, gave cries of joy. To 'show themselves Englishmen,' the enemy filled
their sails and got on the Ariel's weather-bow, before the cries of joy had ended
on board the Ariel. Captain Jones, suspecting the base design of the enemy,
immediately set every sail he could to prevent her escape, but the enemy had so
much advantage in sailing that the Ariel could not keep up and they soon got out
of gun shot. The English captain may properly be called a knave, because after
he surrendered his ship, begged for and obtained quarter, he basely ran away,
contrary to the laws of naval war and the practice of civilized nations. A
conspiracy was discovered among the English part of the Ariel's crew
immediately after sailing from France. During the voyage every officer and even
the passengers had been constantly armed and kept a regular watch, besides a
constant guard with fixed bayonets. After the action with the Triumph the plot was
so far discovered that Captain Jones confined twenty of the ringleaders in irons
till his arrival. Captain Jones arrived at Philadelphia on the 18th February, 1781,
having been absent from America three years, three months and eighteen days."
(Sands, 300-302; Sherburne, 213, 214; Boston Gazette, March 12,1781.)
Among the American privateers in France commissioned by Franklin was one
owned by Frenchmen in Dunkirk named the Black Prince, a small cutter armed
with sixteen three- and four-pounders and thirty-two swivels, which proved such
a prizetaker that the owners obtained from the American minister a commission
for another, which they called the Black Princess. The latter at first carried
eighteen two-, three-, and four-pounders and twenty-four swivels, but later a
much heavier armament. These two vessels, manned chiefly by English and Irish
smugglers with a few Americans, cruised with remarkable success during 1779
and 1780. There were disadvantages in giving commissions to vessels owned by
foreigners and likely to be manned by the refuse of the seafaring population, but
as Franklin said, "The prisoners brought in serve to exchange our countrymen,
231
which makes me more willing to encourage such armaments, though they
occasion a good deal of trouble." (Wharton, iii, 364.) The Black Prince was
commanded, for a time, at least, by Captain Stephen Merchant, who, after
leaving her, returned to America, arriving in Boston about March 1, 1780.
According to Merchant, "this ship was fitted out at Dunkirk under a Continental
commission and colours . . . She went round the coasts of Britain and Ireland and
in less than three months took 37 prizes; three of them were retaken, 4 burnt
after taking out what was valuable, all the rest were either ransomed or arrived
safe in port, by which the lowest men have made a little fortune. By instructions
from Dr. Franklin the Captain was prohibited doing mischief above high water
mark. This generous prohibition he punctually observed, though he had it
frequently in his power to land and distress the inhabitants of Britain on their
remotest coasts. He had not heard of their burning Fairfield in Connecticut, of
which State he is a native, or he would have been strongly tempted to have
transgressed his orders by a just retaliation. Being once in want of water and
some refreshments on the coast of Scotland, he sent his boat to a small town
and demanded a supply, promising security to the inhabitants and their property
in case his demand was complied with. It was refused; upon which he
approached the town with his ship and saluted it with a broadside. A white flag
was immediately displayed by the inhabitants and the Black Prince was not only
supplied with water, but with cattle, sheep, poultry and every refreshment the
place could afford and the commander chose to receive." (Independent
Chronicle, March 9, 1780.)
The Black Prince was afterwards commanded by Captain Dowlin, and in April,
1780, captured a Dutch ship called the Flora with an English cargo. Franklin at
once ordered the removal and condemnation of the cargo and the release of the
vessel with payment of damages, giving his reasons in a letter to Vergennes,
dated June 18. It was just at this time that Russia and other maritime powers
were forming the Armed Neutrality for the protection of their commerce from the
interference of belligerents by enforcing the doctrine that "free ships make free
goods," always most obnoxious to England. This principle had been incorporated
in a treaty which the United States was trying to negotiate with Holland, but which
the Dutch had hitherto failed to accept. Franklin, therefore, felt justified in acting
under the old law of nations, although he was well known to be a strong advocate
of the principles of the Armed Neutrality.
In his letter to Vergennes he explains his position on the subject of privateering
and especially of vessels fitted out by Frenchmen under the American flag. ,I beg
leave to observe," he says, "that by the express words of the commission
granted to them they are directed to submit the prizes they shall carry into any
port in the dominions of a foreign state to the judgment of the admiralty courts
established in such ports or states, and according to the usages there in force.
Several of our first prizes brought into France were, if I mistake not, so judged;
and it was not upon any request of mine that such causes were afterwards
referred to me, nor am I desirous of continuing to exercise that jurisdiction. If
232
therefore the judgment I have given in the case of the Flora is not approved and
the Council of Prizes will take the trouble of re-examining and trying that cause
and those of all other prizes to be brought in hereafter by American cruisers, it
will be very agreeable to me and, from the very terms above mentioned of the
commission, I think it will also be agreeable to the Congress. Nor do I desire to
encourage the fitting out of privateers in France by the King's subjects with
American commissions. I have had many applications of the kind which I have
refused, advising the owners to apply for the commissions of his majesty. The
case of the Black Prince was particular. She had been an old smuggler on the
coasts of England and Ireland, was taken as such and carried into Dublin, where
her crew found means to break prison, cut their vessel out of the harbor and
escaped with her to Dunkerque. It was represented to me that the people, being
all English and Irish, were afraid to continue their smuggling business, lest if they
should be again taken they might be punished as British subjects for their crime
at Dublin, and that they were willing to go a privateering against the English; but
speaking no other language, they imagined they might, if taken, better pass as
Americans if they had an American commission than as Frenchmen if under a
French commission. On these grounds I was applied to for a commission, which I
granted believing that such a swift vessel with a crew that knew so well all parts
of the enemy's coasts might greatly molest their coasting trade. Her first success
occasioned adding the Black Princess by the same owners, and between them
they have taken and sent in or ransomed or destroyed an amazing number of
vessels; I think near eighty. But I shall continue to refuse granting any more
commissions except to American vessels; and if, under the circumstances above
represented, it is thought nevertheless inconvenient that the commissions of the
Black Prince and Princess should continue, I will immediately recall them."
(Wharton, iii, 802.)
Franklin wrote to the President of Congress, August 10, that these two vessels
had taken in eighteen months nearly a hundred and twenty prizes. In the summer
of 1780 the Black Prince was wrecked on the French coast, but the Princess,
under the command of Captain Edward Macatter, continued cruising, and
between June 20 and July 10 made twenty-eight captures. Vergennes advised
the recall of these privateers' commissions. Franklin replied, August 15, that he
had already recalled them and added: "I have had no other interest in those
armaments than the advantage of some prisoners to exchange for my
countrymen." (lbid., iv, 33.) These two vessels were the only ones owned and
fitted out in France that had been granted commissions by Franklin. In August it
was ordered by the King that the prizes of American privateers should be judged
by the French Council of Prizes (lbid., iii, 364, 682, 801-803, iv, 26, 33;
Continental Journal, March 9, 1780; London Post, July 21, 1780; Proc. U. S.
Naval Inst., xxxvii (September, 1911), 954-960; Hale, ch. xvi; Williams, 278.)
The ship Mars of the Massachusetts navy sailed from Boston for Nantes about
the 1st of August. On September 13, Captain Sampson reported to the Board of
War: "I have the pleasure of informing you of my safe arrival at the Entrance of
233
the River Loyer in the Ship Mars the 10th Inst., after a Passage of Forty-four
days, and embrace the earliest opportunity to acquaint you of the same. During
my Passage I had favourable Winds untill abt the Twentieth of Augt, when I had
got as far to the Eastwd as the Long. 20.0 W., then taking the Winds to the
Southd & Eastwd & having a very Strong Northwardly Current and my ship very
foul and after trying her trim everyway, found her to sail very Indifferently; was
drove to the northward of Ushant, wch greatly Retarded my Passage. During my
passage I gave Chase to several Vessels wch I had every reason to believe
them to be English, but to my great mortiflcation could not speak with any of
them. On the 7th Augt I spoke a Dutch Ship from Curiso bound to Amsterdam
and on the 11th with a Dean from St. Croix bound to Copenhagen. On the 31st,
in Latt. 49.40 N., Long. 11. W., I gave chase to a Brig, who seeing me in Chase
of her, hove too. She proved to be ... from St. Jube bound to Cork loaded with
Salt, Commanded by a Portugue. The Capt. came on board with his Portugue
papers and told me his cargo belonged to himself. I sent an Officer on board him
to search for more papers, who found concealed in the Captain's State Room a
number of Letters directed to Merchants in Cork [containing] Sufficient Papers to
prove her Cargo was Consigned to [one of these merchants]; upon which I took
the Captain & Seven Portugue out and sent [a prize master in her] to proceed for
Boston. My Reasons for sending her to America was that her Cargo would not
have been Valuable in Europe but would be in Great Demand in America ... On
the 8th Inst. at 25 Leagues to the Westward of Belle Isle at 10 A.M. I saw several
Sail to the S. W. and a Ship and a Sloop under my Lee; I kept on my Cruise to
the S. E. The ship & sloop Standing by the wind in order to speak to me, I
perseved the Sloop to come up with me very fast. At 5 p.m. the Sloop, which was
an English Cutter mounting twenty-two Guns, came along side of me and at 5
minutes past 5 P.M. the action began wch lasted One hour & 5 minutes, but my
Ship being very foul and very heavy to work and not more than half Mand & a
very large Swell running, gave the Cutter every advantage possible during the
action, as she could sail round me at her pleasure, but after her engaging me
rather better than an hour she thot proper to shear of to the Ship, & I having my
Crotchet yard shot away and imagining her consort the ship to be an English
Privateer and knowing it Impossible to come up with the Cutter, did not think
proper to give her chase. During the Action my Officers and men behaved with
great Spirit; my loss during the action was two men killed, viz. Mr. Nathan
Haskell, Lt. Marines, and Thoms Ransford." (Massachusetts Mag., October,
1910; Mass. Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 215; Mass. Archives, cliii, 400.) The Mars returned
to Boston later in the year.
The Portuguese ambassador at Paris having complained of the seizure by the
Mars of the vessel belonging to one of his countrymen and of alleged ill
treatment, Franklin advised sending the claim to America, and wrote to the
President of Congress, December 3, saying: "I hope the Congress may think flt to
take some notice of this affair and not only forward a speedy decision, but give
orders to our cruisers not to meddle with neutral ships for the future, it being a
practice apt to produce ill blood and contrary to the spirit of the new league,
234
which is approved by all Europe; and the English property found in such vessels
will hardly pay the damages brought on us by the irregular proceedings of our
captains in endeavoring to get at such property." (Wharton, iv, 180.) Congress
had already, on October 5, "Resolved, That the board of admiralty prepare and
report instructions for the commanders of armed vessels commanded by the
United States conformable to the principles contained in the declaration of the
Empress of all the Russias on the rights of neutral vessels. That the ministers
plenipotentiary from the United States, if invited thereto, be and hereby are
respectively empowered to accede to such regulations conformable to the spirit
of the said declaration as may be agreed upon by the Congress expected to
assemble in pursuance of the invitation of her Imperial majesty." (Wharton, iv,
81.)
The privateer General Pickering of Salem, a ship of a hundred and eighty tons
commanded by Captain Haraden, carrying sixteen six-pounders and forty-seven
men, on a voyage to Spain fell in with a twenty-gun British cutter, May 29, 1780,
and beat her off after an action of an hour and three quarters. Three days later, in
the Bay of Biscay, the Pickering captured a schooner called the Golden Eagle
with fourteen nine-pounders, eight fours, and fifty-seven men. June 4, while
proceeding towards Bilbao, she fell in with the British privateer Achilles armed
with twenty-two nine-pounders and eighteen other guns and with a crew of a
hundred and thirty men. She was a very much larger ship than the Pickering.
They fought nearly three hours at close range and the Achilles then sheered off
and sailed away, the Pickering being unable to follow. This battle was fought
close to the Spanish coast and was watched by a multitude of people
(Independent Chronicle, August, 10, 17, 1780; Hunt's Merchants, Mag.,
February, 1857; Clark, i, 114.)
During the year 1780 the Continental navy suffered the loss of nearly half its fleet
at the fall of Charleston: the Providence, Boston, Queen of France, and Ranger.
Of the thirteen frigates provided for in 1775, the Trumbull alone remained at the
end of the year, and this ship with the frigates Alliance, Confederacy, and Deane
and the sloop of war Saratoga comprised the whole navy in commission, except
the Ariel loaned by France and only temporarily on the list. The America and
Bourbon were still far from completed and were destined never to go to sea in
the Continental service. Little had been accomplished by the navy during the
year; few prizes of any considerable value or importance had been taken. The
hotly contested action of the Trumbull with the Watt enhanced somewhat the
reputation of a service that had suffered from the shortcomings of zealous and
brave but untrained officers.
As the navy dwindled, privateering continued to thrive and grow. The number of
private armed vessels commissioned by the different states doubtless increased
considerably, though figures are not accessible. The Continental Congress
issued three hundred and one letters of marque in 1780, ninety-two more than in
1779 (Naval Records (calendar), 217-495.) Although it is evident that privateers
235
were increasing in numbers, there seem to be fewer accounts of their cruises
than in previous years.
The increase in the total number of ships of the British navy during 1780 was
from four hundred and eighty-one to five hundred and thirty-eight; of these, three
hundred and ninety-six were in commission at the end of the year, as compared
with three hundred and sixty-four twelve months earlier. The navy employed
eighty-five thousand seamen and marines, an increase of fifteen thousand. In the
fall there were fifty-nine vessels of all classes on the North American station,
including two of ninety guns each, eleven seventy-fours, five sixty-fours, three
forty-fours, and fourteen frigates. Earlier in the year the number seems to have
been considerably smaller. There were eleven vessels at Newfoundland and a
strong fleet in the West Indies (Hannay, ii, 211 ; Schomberg, ii, 1, iv, 353-364;
Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 486, September 30, 1780, List of Ships and Vessels
Employed under the orders of Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot.)
According to the table of losses and captures, already cited for previous years,
the enemies of England in 1780 took five hundred and ninety-six of her vessels,
of which fifteen were privateers and the rest merchantmen; of these, two hundred
and sixty-two were retaken or ransomed. During the same time the British
captured from their enemies two hundred and thirty-seven vessels including
thirty-four privateers; of this total only four were recaptured (Clowes, iii, 390.)
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER XVI
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1781
The frigate Alliance, Captain Barry, was made ready at Boston for another
voyage to France as soon as the court martial of Captain Landais was over.
There was the usual delay and difficulty in recruiting a crew for the ship and
application was made to the state government for authority to impress seamen
and to enlist soldiers. The former request was denied, but permission was
obtained to enroll volunteers from the guard at the castle and it was again
necessary to take a considerable number of British prisoners. A turbulent ship's
company was the consequence and a sanguinary brawl on Long Wharf with the
crews of two French frigates was an early result. Some distinguished passengers
were taken, including Colonel John Laurens and Thomas Paine. Several others
obtained passage on condition that if necessary they should serve against the
enemy or in quelling mutiny. Laurens was a son of Henry Laurens, still a prisoner
in England, and was bound on an important mission to France. He was the
bearer of a letter, dated January 15, 1781, from General Washington, addressed
to himself (Laurens), discoursing on the objects of his mission; it was afterwards
submitted to Vergennes. In this letter, first of all, the imperative need of money to
236
carry on the approaching campaign was urged. Washington then says: "Next to a
loan of money, a constant naval superiority on these coasts is the object most
interesting. This would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive and, by
removing all prospect of extending their acquisitions, would take away the
motives for prosecuting the war. Indeed, it is not to be conceived how they could
subsist a large force in this country, if we had the command of the seas to
interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This superiority, with
an aid in money, would enable us to convert the war into a vigorous offensive. I
say nothing of the advantages to the trade of both nations, nor how infinitely it
would facilitate our supplies. With respect to us, it seems to be one of two
deciding points, and it appears too to be the interest of our allies, abstracted from
the immediate benefits to this country, to transfer the naval war to America. The
number of ports friendly to them, hostile to the British, the materials for repairing
their disabled ships, the extensive supplies towards the subsistence of their fleet,
are circumstances which would give them a palpable advantage in the contest of
these seas." (Washington, ix, 106.) The Alliance sailed from Boston, February
11, 1781. On the voyage a small British privateer was taken and her prize, a
Venetian ship, was released. The frigate arrived at L'Orient March 9 (Barry, ch.
xii; Wharton, iv, 249, 250, 252, 279, 826; Has,. Court Rec., January 29,1781;
Mass. Acts and Resolves, February 6, 1781; Boston Gazette, January 1, 1781.)
The two main objects of Washington's desire, indispensable at this critical period,
were realized. Money was obtained and a French fleet soon set sail for America.
March 29, the Alliance got under way for her return voyage in company with a
large French letter of marque called the Marquis de Lafayette, loaded with
military stores. Soon after sailing, a mutiny was discovered on the Alliance. John
Kessler, mate of the frigate, who wrote a narrative of her voyages, says that "on
March 30th an Indian, one of the forecastle men, gave Captain Barry information
of a combination among the crew for the purpose of taking the ship, and pointing
out three who had strove to prevail on him to be concerned therein. The three
men were immediately put in irons and all the officers, with such of the crew as
could be confided in, were armed and required to remain all night on deck. On
the next morning all hands were called and placed on the forecastle, booms, and
gangways, excepting the officers and such part of the crew in whom Captain
Barry confided, who, armed, strongly guarded the quarter deck, the steerage,
and the main deck, to keep the remainder of the crew together on the forecastle
and boom. The three designated men were brought out of their irons on the
quarter and, being stripped and hoisted by the thumbs to the mizzen stay,
underwent a very severe whipping before either would make any confession. The
names of 25 of their accomplices were obtained from them before the whipping
was discontinued. As their accomplices were disclosed, they were called to the
quarter deck, stripped and tied to the ridge-rope of the netting and the whipping
continued until it was thought all were disclosed that could possibly be obtained,
which proved to be. That it was intended to take the ship on her passage out by
killing all the officers in the middle watch of the night, except the second
Lieutenant, P. Fletcher, who was to navigate her to some port in Ireland, or on
237
failure, to be destroyed. A quartermaster, one of the mutineers, was to have
command. They had all been bound by an oath on the Bible administered by the
Captain's assistant cabin steward, and had also signed their names in a round
robin so-called, but that they found no good opportunity on the outward passage
and intended to accomplish the taking of the ship as aforesaid immediately on
leaving France. But on coming out of L'Orient we lost a man overboard who was
one of the chief ringleaders and they considering that as a bad omen, threw the
round robin overboard and relinquished their designs. The three principles were
placed securely in irons and the remainder, after being admonished by Captain
Barry and on their solemn declaration to conduct themselves well, were
permitted to return to ship's duty." (Barry, 133.) The three principals were
afterwards tried and sentenced to death, but this penalty was not exacted.
Kessler further relates that "on April 2nd, 1781, two brigs gave us chase and
were permitted to come up. One ran close on board of us and without any hail
fired the whole broadside at us and immediately every one run off her deck. We
had commenced firing, but on discovering their retreat the firing ceased and we
boarded them. She proved to be a brig with flush deck and 20 twelve pounders,
two six pounders and 14 [four-pound coehorns], with 112 men, called the Mars
and belonging to the Guernsey. The crew were taken aboard the Alliance and all
put in irons without distinction, Captain Barry considering them as not meriting
other treatment in consequence of their firing on us with no intention of bravely
fighting. The other brig was a Jersey called the Minerva, of 10 guns and 55 men.
She was taken possession of and manned by the Marquis de Lafayette, our
consort. Soon after, in a gale of wind, we parted with our consort and the prizes."
(Barry, 134.) A month later two other prizes were taken. May 16, the Alliance was
struck by lightning, which shattered her main topmast and burned several men.
An action was fought, May 29, with the British ship Atalanta and brig Trepassey
in about north latitude 40° and west longitude 63°, which is described by Kessler.
"Towards evening [of the 28th] discovered two sail on the weather bow standing
for us and which after coming near enough to be kept in sight, hauled to wind
and stood on our course. Towards day it became quite calm. After it became light
it appeared that they were an armed ship and brig, about a league distant. At
sunrise they hoisted the English colors and beat drum . At the same time the
American colors were displayed by the Alliance. By little puffs of wind we were
enabled to get within short hailing distance." At eleven o'clock the ships hailed
each other. "The firing then began, but unfortunately there was not wind enough
for our steerage way and they being lighter vessels, by using sweeps got and
kept athwart our stern and on our quarters, so that we could not bring one-half
our guns, nay, oft time only one gun out astern to bear on them, and thus laying
like a log the greatest part of the time. About two o'clock Captain Barry received
a wound by a grape shot in the shoulder. He remained, however, on the quarter
deck until by the much loss of blood he was obliged to be helped to the cock-pit.
Some time after, our colors were shot away and it so happened that at the same
time such guns as would bear on them had been fired and were then loading,
238
and which led the enemy to think we had struck the colors, and manned their
shrouds and gave three cheers; by that time the colors were hoisted by a mizen
brail and our firing again began. A quartermaster went to the wheel in place of
one just killed there. At the moment a small breeze of wind happening, a
broadside was brought to bear and fired on the ship and then one on the brig,
when they struck their colors at three o'clock." (Barry, 135, 136.)
Captain Edwards of the Atalanta, testifying at his court martial, said of the
Alliance that when "about two cables lengths to leeward she hoisted Rebel
colours and fir'd a Shot across us. I immediately hoisted our colours, when she
fired her broadside, wore, and as soon as on the other tack and her Guns woud
bear, kept a constant Fire on us; our Firing began on her, but being at too great a
distance, I ceast our Fire and endeavour'd to get nearer to her, which having
effected she haild us, said she was the Alliance continental Frigate and desired
we would strike." Edwards tried to keep up a conversation until the Trepassey
could get up, but the Alliance began the action again. The Trepassey was so
anxious to get up that she passed under the stern of the Alliance "with too much
way and in hauling under her Quarter, shot abreast of her; in this situation she
received two broadsides." The Atalanta was then brought under the frigate's
stern and got between her and the Trepassey. The Atalanta continued the action
an hour and a half longer, nearly three hours in all; she was then so greatly
disabled in masts, yards, sails, and rigging as to be unmanageable. It was
accordingly necessary to strike and the Trepassey, unable to get away, struck
also. The Atalanta's mainmast soon went over the side."(Brit. Adm. Rec., Courts
Martial, No. 5319 (October 15,1781) The master of the Trepassey, describing the
battle, says that the Alliance, at a distance of half a mile to leeward, "hoisted
rebel colours and gave the Atalanta and us a broadside, we being then very nigh
to each other; we then 'bore up close alongside of her, the Atalanta on the
starboard and the Trepassey on the larboard quarter, and began to engage.
About an hour after the action began Capt. Smith of the Trepassey was killed."
(Almon, xii, 160.)
The Atalanta, which carried sixteen guns and a hundred and twenty-five men,
lost six killed and eighteen wounded ; the Trepassey, with fourteen guns and
eighty men, lost six killed, including the captain, and eleven wounded. The
Alliance mounted twenty-eight twelve-pounders and eight nines; her crew was
reduced by manning prizes and weakened by disaffection and sickness. Her loss
was five killed, including the lieutenant of marines, and twenty-two wounded,
three of them mortally. Captain Edwards and a few other officers were sent on
board the Alliance; also some of the wounded. Captain Barry agreed with the
British to send the Trepassey as a cartel to Halifax with all his other prisoners,
about two hundred and fifty in number, to be exchanged for Americans; before
entering upon this service the Trepassey's guns were thrown overboard. She
arrived in due time at Halifax. The Atalanta, which had been dismasted in the
engagement, was fitted with jury masts and put in charge of Hezekiah Welch,
second lieutenant of the Alliance as prize master. Some weeks later, in the Vice-
239
Admiralty Court at Halifax, Welch testified that he was ordered by Captain Barry
"to take possession of the Atalanta and proceed with her to Boston, New
England; that on their passage thither the 7th June last, being near Cape Cod,
they fell in with His Majesty's ships of War the Assurance, Charlestown,
Amphitrite and Vulture, which retook the said sloop Atalanta, put a British officer
& Seamen on board her & sent her safe into this Port of Halifax." (Essex Inst.
Coll., January, 1909.) The Marquis de Lafayette, letter of marque, which parted
from the Alliance in April, was also unlucky. She fell in with the enemy's Jamaica
fleet under a strong convoy and after a hard fight of three hours was captured by
a greatly superior force. The Alliance arrived at Boston, June 6. During the
summer she was sheathed with copper on Barry's recommendation (Barry, chs.
xiii, xiv; Almon, xii, 158-160; Boston Gazette, June 11, July 9, 1781; London
Chronicle, August 7, 1781; Lee MSS., July 15, 1782, report on loss of the
Lafayette.)
The presence in Massachusetts Bay of the British squadron which recaptured the
Atalanta, and which the Alliance had the good fortune not to meet with, is
explained in a letter of Admiral Arbuthnot to the Admiralty, dated off Sandy Hook,
July 4, 1781 : "The rumours that had been abroad for a considerable time past,
that a reinforcement of troops was daily expected from France, induced me to
send a squadron into Boston Bay of superior force, as the enemy's guard was
reported to be only two frigates; the Assurance, Charles-Town, Amphitrite,
Vulture, and Savage are employed on this service, and the Royal Oak, on her
way to Halifax, was directed to take that route. I have since, by the channel of the
Rebels, received intelligence that a few recruits and some storeships have
notwithstanding got into Boston, with a French fifty gun ship and two frigates; but
Captain Duncan of the Medea, which arrived from Halifax on the 30th ult.,
informs me that his Majesty's sloop the Atalanta, which had been taken after a
very gallant action by the rebel Frigate Alliance, of 40 guns, was retaken by that
detachment in Boston Bay, and that he took a store-ship of near 800 tons, also a
prize, on her entrance into the port of Halifax as he came out. It is believed that
they have been much more successful, but I have no authentic advices of their
operations . . . The Medea on her return captured two privateers from Salem, the
ship Rover, of 18 six pounders and 140 men, and the sloop Revenge of 10
guns." (Almon, xii, 158,159.)
The frigate Trumbull, Captain James Nicholson, spent the first half of the year
1781 fitting out at Philadelphia for a cruise, under the accustomed difficulties
imposed by lack of money and scarcity of seamen. The Deane, Captain Samuel
Nicholson, the Confederacy, Captain Harding, and the Saratoga, Captain Young,
cruised in the West Indies during the winter and early spring. They sailed, March
20, from Cape Francois bound north in company with a French frigate and a
large convoy of American and French merchantmen. The Deane arrived at
Boston about the middle of April. The Confederacy, on April 15, fell in with the
British ships Roebuck, 44, and Orpheus, 32. In the face of so superior a force,
and with the working of his ship hindered by a large cargo of military supplies,
240
Captain Harding considered resistance useless and promptly struck his flag.
Thus ended the brief and unlucky career in the Continental service of this fine
frigate. She was taken into the British navy under the name of Confederate.
Several of the convoy were also taken. It would appear that the Saratoga, after
parting from her consorts, was lost at sea, for she was never heard of again
(Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 355, 411, 471, 475, 505 (February 7, April 28, May 5,
June 6, 1781) ; Boston Gazette, January 29, March 19, April 16, 30, May 14,
1781; Continental Journal, March 22, April 19, 26, 1781; Independent Chronicle,
May 4, 10, 1781; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 62; Navy Rec. Soc., vi,
109; Barney, 86.)
The Trumbull got to sea at last and took her departure from the Delaware capes
August 8; among her lieutenants were Richard Dale and Alexander Murray, a
volunteer. She sailed in company with a twenty-four-gun privateer, a fourteengun letter of marque and a convoy of twenty-eight merchantmen. The same day
three sail were discovered to the eastward, two of which gave chase to the
convoy. Night came on rainy and squally and the Trumbull carried away her foretopmast and main-topgallantmast. She was obliged to run before the wind and
the rest of the fleet left her. Captain Nicholson reported: "The wreck of the
topmast with the yard and rigging laying aback of the foresail and over the bows,
the topsail yard arm came through the foresail and on the forecastle, so that with
our utmost exertion we could not clear ourselves of the wreck until one of the
ships came alongside and the other in sight. Immediately all hands were called to
quarters; instead of coming, three quarters of them ran below, put out the lights,
matches, &c. With the remainder and a few brave officers we commenced an
action with the Iris for one hour and thirty-five minutes, at the end of which the
other ship came up and fired into us. Seeing no prospect of escaping in this
unequal contest, I struck, having my first and third lieuts. and Capt. Murray, a
volunteer, with eight others wounded and 5 killed. My crew consisted of 180 men,
45 of whom were taken out of the new gaol - prisoners of war; they through
treachery and others from cowardice betrayed me, or at least prevented my
making the resistance I would have done. At no time of the engagement had I
more than 40 men upon deck." (Continental Journal, September 13, 1781.) The
British thirty-two-gun frigate Iris had formerly been the American frigate Hancock,
captured by the Rainbow in 1777. Her consort was the eighteen-gun ship
General Monk, also a prize, having been originally an American privateer called
the General Washington. The Trumbull was almost a wreck and was towed into
New York by the Iris. She was not taken into the British service. A few weeks
after this the Iris and another British frigate were captured by the French (Port
Folio, May, 1814; Clark, i, 124; Almon, xii, 259, 260; Independent Ledger,
October 8,1781; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 57, 58.)
In the summer of 1781 the Board of Admiralty ceased to exist and the
management of naval affairs passed under the control of Robert Morris as Agent
of Marine. He issued orders for a cruise together of the Alliance and Deane,
which were now the only Continental vessels in commission. He wrote to Captain
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Barry, September 21: "When these ships are ready you will proceed to sea. The
Ships are both under your command, the Captain of the Deane being instructed
to obey your orders, wherefore you had best to furnish him a copy of these
instructions, giving such in addition as you shall judge necessary for Keeping
Company, respecting Signals, Places of Rendevous in case of Separation and all
other things that tend to promote Success and Glory or secure Safety against
superior force. It is my intention that you should go upon a cruize and therefore
you will be ready to sail from the Harbour of Boston and use your best Efforts to
disturb the Enemy. Such prizes as you may take you will send into the Port which
you will find endorsed, a list of Persons in several Ports to whom to apply in Case
you go yourselves or send your Prizes thither . . . I do not fix your cruizing ground
nor limit the length of your cruize, because I expect you will know the most likely
course and will be anxious to meet such events as will do honor to the American
flag and promote the general interest. When you want provisions, I think it will be
best that you should enter the Delaware and send up as far as New Castle, to
which place they can best be sent in shallops. The latitude I have given
precludes both the necessity and propriety of more particular instructions. Let me
hear from you by every convenient opportunity and don't fail to transmit to His
Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of our Army, as well as to me, any
intelligence that you may obtain which you think may in any wise affect his
operations." (Barry, 151.) October 17, the Deane not being ready, Morris sent
orders to Barry to cruise alone in the Alliance, but the fall of Yorktown soon after
this caused a change of plans and both ships remained in port (lbid., 150-154;
Publ. R.I. Hist. Soc., viii, 273.)
The quarrels of Jones and Landais in France in 1780, the failure of the Alliance
to bring over the clothing and stores so much needed by the army, and other
circumstances led to much dissatisfaction in and out of Congress, and in March,
1781, soon after his return to America in the Ariel, Jones was called upon to
explain his conduct. The Board of Admiralty propounded a list of forty-seven
questions covering all his movements since taking command of the Ranger in
1777. Jones answered these questions promptly and fully, and his replies
cleared up all doubts as to his various transactions in Europe, naval, political,
and financial. Influenced by the good impression he made in this matter and by
the honors paid him in Europe, Congress resolved, April 14, 1781, "That the
thanks of the United States in Congress assembled be given to Captain John
Paul Jones, for the zeal, prudence and intrepidity with which he has supported
the honor of the American flag, for his bold and successful enterprises to redeem
from captivity the citizens of these States who had fallen under the power of the
enemy, and in general for the good conduct and eminent services by which he
has added lustre to his character and to the American arms; that the thanks of
the United States in Congress assembled be also given to the officers and men
who have faithfully served under him from time to time for their steady affection
to the cause of their country and the bravery and perseverance they have
manifested therein." (Sherburne, 225.) A few weeks after this a special
committee of Congress recommended Jones's promotion to the rank of rear-
242
admiral, but, owing to the jealousy and opposition of other officers, no action was
taken. The Ariel was sent back to France in the summer or early fall of 1781
(lbid., 214-226; Sands, 321-328; Wharton, iv, 288-297; Logs of Serapis, Alliance,
Ariel, 125; Barry, 149; Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 401, 405; Royal Gazette, July 10,
1782.)
The Massachusetts ship Mars remained in the river Loire about three months
and then returned to Boston, arriving February 28, 1781, with a prize. The frigate
Protector, during the early part of the year, cruised in the West Indies, part of the
time in company with the Continental frigate Deane, and with some success. In
the Massachusetts House of Representatives, March 3, the following action was
taken: "Whereas by recent Advices received by express from the Eastward it
appears that the Enemy with a Number of Armed Vessels are daily committing
the most horrid Depredations and Cruelties on the Inhabitants who reside on or
near the Sea Coasts in the County of Lincoln," it was resolved to request the
French admiral at Newport to send one or two frigates, to fit out the ship Mars
immediately, and to grant bounties to privateers which should capture the
enemy's vessels (Mass. Court Rec.) On May 19, it was resolved to send an
armed vessel with provisions for the relief of the garrison at Machias, and to
reinforce the garrison. Conditions along the Maine coast continued to be a
source of chronic irritation at the seat of the state government in Boston and
strongly worded resolves were from time to time adopted in the General Court.
Notwithstanding the Penobscot disaster of two years before, the possibility of
driving out the British remained, with the more sanguine, a practical question.
The Mars, under the command of Captain Nevins, and apparently
unaccompanied by the French frigates asked for, cruised during the spring and
took two prizes. The new ship Tartar seems to have met with great delay in
building and it was proposed to sell her, but this was not done at the time; she
was not ready for service until the following year. The sale of the Mars was also
considered. In the summer a sloop called the Defence was added to the
Massachusetts navy and made one cruise, after the return to port of the Mars
and under the same captain, James Nevins. Another severe blow came to the
Massachusetts navy in 1781, in the loss of its most powerful vessel, the
Protector, which was captured, May 5, by the British ship Roebuck and frigate
Medea (Boston Gazette, March 5, 19, April 30, May 14, July 2, 1781;
Independent Chronicle, May 4, 1781; Massachusetts Mag., July, October, 1910,
January, 1911, January, 1912; Mass. Court Rec., February 14, March 3, 6, 7,
May 19, 1781 ; Mass. Rev. Rolls, xxxix, 45; Mass. Archives, clviii, 212; Fox, 7988.)
The frigate Indien, which had been built at Amsterdam for the Continental navy
and then sold to the King of France, later became the property of the Chevalier
Luxembourg, who leased her in 1779 or 1780 to Commodore Alexander Gillon of
the South Carolina navy. Gillon had been in Europe since 1778, employed in
furthering the naval and commercial interests of his state. He made enemies and
his reputation has suffered from statements concerning his financial transactions.
243
He changed the name of the Indien to South Carolina, manned her largely with
American sailors from English prisons, and armed her with twenty-eight thirty-sixpounders (Thirty-nine-pounders, according to the British account, Brit. Adm.
Rec., A. D. 490, January 18, 1783.) and twelve twelves. He moved her from
Amsterdam to the Texel during the summer and fall of 1780, the passage being
much obstructed by shoal water. While on the way the South Carolina was joined
by Lieutenant Matthewman, who had been engaged as master. This officer gives
an account in his "Narrative " of conditions on board the frigate during his stay.
"In Rotterdam," he says, "I saw Commodore Gillon, the commander of the ship,
who gave me his directions. On my arrival on board the ship, then laying about
half way between Amsterdam and the Texel, everything was in confusion, three
of the Lieutenants were under arrest, and the ship like a mere wreck, her crew
then about 250 men mostly Americans, who had made their escape and had got
on board under pretence of giving them a passage to America; where they were
near a twelve month . . . and were never allowed the liberty of slipping over the
ship's side. I myself was seven months on board, though master of the ship. On
some disagreement I quit the ship and returned to Amsterdam." (Mag. Amer.
Hist., March, 1878.) The South Carolina remained at the Texel until August,
1781, when she was finally ready for sea. She had a crew of five hundred and
fifty, including three hundred French marines. She cruised first in the North Sea,
and on August 25, captured and burned a prize. September 1, she was off the
Shetland Islands and on the 3d her log records: "Hove the Corps of a French
Mareen over Aboard at 8 P.M." On the 7th, she captured a sixteen-gun Liverpool
privateer; the same day, "Put 2 French Mereens in Irons for Insulting Lieut.
White." By the middle of the month the South Carolina was making a southerly
course, and on the 24th, "Mored att Carone in Spain." October 17, she sailed
from Coruna, and on the 21st, in latitude 37° 52', "Brought Tew A Brigg; She
Pruved to Be A Brigg from Newfound Land Called the Venus." On the 31st, the
South Carolina was off Teneriffe. She made a short cruise in the West Indies,
then sailed north, and, December 31, was off Charleston. The next day, however,
she "Bore Away for the Havannah." (Log of the South Carolina; Paullin, 436-438 ;
Wharton, iv, 546, 547; So. Carolina Hist. and Gen. Mag., January, April, 1900;
Boston Gazette, November 19, 1781; Independent Chronicle, November 22,
1781; Royal Gazette, July 10, 1782; Lee MSS., July 5, 1779, June, 1780; Adams
MSS., March 8, September 26, October 26, 1781.)
In a letter, dated September 23, 1781, Captain Stirling reported the capture of his
ship, a sixteen-gun sloop of war of the British navy, by an American privateer. "It
is," he says, "with the most poignant grief I acquaint your Excellency of the
capture of his Majesty's sloop Savage, late under my command . . . Early in the
morning of the 6th instant, 10 leagues East of Charles-town, we espied a ship
bearing down on us, who when about four miles distant, hauled her wind to the
Eastward, showing by her appearance she was an American cruizer; her force
could not be so easily distinguished. I therefore gave way to the pleasing idea
that she was a privateer carrying 20 nine-pounders, whom I had intelligence was
cruizing off here, and instantly resolved either to bring her to action or oblige her
244
to quit the coast, for which purpose we gave chase, but were prevented
continuing it long by her edging down, seemingly determined to engage us.
Conscious of her superiority in sailing and force, this manoeuvre coinciding with
my wishes, I caused the Savage to lay by till we perceived on her nearer
approach she was far superior to what we imagined and that it was necessary to
attempt making our escape, without some fortunate shot, in the course of a
running fight we saw inevitable, admitted our taking advantages and bring on a
more equal conflict. At half past ten she began firing bow chacers and at eleven,
being close on our quarter, the action commenced with musquetry, which after a
good deal of execution was followed by a heavy cannonade on both sides. In an
hour's time I had the mortification to see our braces and bow-lines shot away and
not a rope left to trim the sail with, notwithstanding every precaution had been
taken; however, our fire was so constant and well-directed that the enemy did not
see our situation, but kept alongside of us till accident obliged him to drop astern.
The Savage was now almost a wreck, her sails, rigging and yard so much cut
that it was with the utmost difficulty we could alter our position time enough to
avoid being raked, the enemy lying directly athwart our stern for some minutes.
This was the only intermission of great guns, but musquetry and pistols still aid
execution and continued till they opened again, which was not till both ships were
almost on board each other, when the battle became more furious than before.
Our quarter-deck and forecastle were soon now nearly cleared, scarce a man
belonging to either not being killed or wounded, with three guns on our maindeck rendered useless. In this situation we fought near an hour with only five sixpounders, the flre from each ship's guns scorching the men who opposed them,
shot and other implements of war thrown by hand doing execution, when our
mizen-mast being shot away by the board, our main-mast tottering with only
three shrouds standing, the ship on fire dangerously, only 40 men on duty to
oppose the foe who was attempting to board us in three places, no succour in
sight or possibility of making further resistance, I was, necessitated at a quarter
before three P.M. to surrender to the Congress, a private ship of war belonging to
Philadelphia, who carried 215 men and mounted 20 twelve pounders on her
main-deck and 4 sixes above, fourteen of which were fought on one side. She
lost during the action eleven men and had near thirty wounded, several of them
mortally; her masts, her sails and rigging were so much damaged that she was
obliged to return to port, which partly answered my wishes prior to the action, as
a great part of the Carolina trade was daily expected on the coast and this
privateer we saw sailed remarkably fast. Three days were employed putting her
in a condition to make sail and five for the Savage, who was exceedingly
shattered. Indeed it is astonishing more damage was not done, as the weather
was fine, the water remarkably smooth, and the ships never 30 yards asunder."
(Almon, xiii, 48, 49; Ann. Reg. (1781), 251.) Stirling reported a loss of eight killed
and twenty-six wounded. The Congress was commanded by Captain Geddes
and her loss was eight killed and thirty wounded. The Savage was recaptured by
the British frigate Solebay (Clark, i, 125; Penn. Gazette, September 19,
November 28, 1781; Brit. Adm. Rec., Instance and Prize Records, 44, 401. See
further on privateering in 1781, Clark, i, 120, 127; Tucker, ch. viii; A. Sherburne,
245
37-49; Mil. and Nav. Mag. U. S., July, 1833; Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i,
20; Massachusetts Mag., January, 1908; Boston Gazette. February 19, April 9,
16, 30, May 7, June 4, 25, July 2, August 6, September 10, 1781; Continental
Journal, February 1, May 24, 1781; Conn. Courant, August 7, 1781; Freeman's
Journal, May 16, 1781; London Chronicle, May 10, 1781.)
In addition to privateering upon the sea, active maritime warfare was carried on
during the Revolution by means of boats alongshore and in harbors, inlets, and
bays. Whaleboats, barges, and other small open craft were employed, with eight
or more oars, sometimes as many as twenty-four, and also carrying sail, and with
a swivel or heavier gun mounted in the bow. Their crews numbered from less
than a dozen to thirty or more. A flotilla of four or five such boats made a
formidable armament. Sometimes by surprise at night and sometimes by direct
attack, they captured merchantmen, transports, and supply ships, and
occasionally armed vessels of considerable force. Nantucket and Vineyard
Sounds, Long Island Sound, Chesapeake Bay, and, most of all, the New Jersey
shore and lower New York Bay were the waters chiefly frequented by these
whaleboat privateersmen. The British and loyalists employed the same sort of
boats in their predatory warfare along the shores of Chesapeake Bay and Long
Island Sound; and boat expeditions were sent out from British men-of-war for the
same kind of work. The most famous of the American flotillamen was Adam Hyler
of New Jersey, who bore a commission from his state. He and others began their
operations after the occupation of New York by the British in 1776. They cruised
between Egg Harbor and Staten Island. Sometimes their boats were destroyed
by parties sent from the British fleet, but new ones were soon built to replace
them. Hyler was most active in 1781 and 1782 (Naval Mag., November, 1836 ;
Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, March, 1882 ; N. Y. Gen. and Biogr. Rec., April,
1891 ; Clark, i, 113, 120; Boston Post, October 17, 1778, January 23, February
6, 1779, May 11, 1782; Penn. Packet, May 2, 1780, May 29, 1781; Independent
Chronicle, May 17, 1781, January 9, 1783; Freeman's Journal, April 25,
December 26, 1781, June 26, 1882 ; Salem Gazette, August 15, 1782; Boston
Gazette, March 31, 1783 ; Pickering MSS., xliv, 162 ; Almon, xiv, 35; N. Y. Eve.
Post, July 18, 1883, quoted in Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc., January, 1884.)
Several marauding expeditions in Chesapeake Bay were conducted by the
British during the Revolution. That of Collier and Mathew in 1779 has been
noticed. In the fall of 1780, General Leslie, with about three thousand men and a
naval force consisting of the Romulus of forty-four guns, the frigate Blonde, and
some smaller vessels, including one of John Goodrich's, seized Portsmouth,
Virginia. December 30, the expedition of Benedict Arnold with sixteen hundred
men, which had sailed from New York on the 12th with several frigates, arrived in
Chesapeake Bay. During the early part of January, 1781, Arnold raided up the
James River as far as Richmond and destroyed much property. Governor
Jefferson of Virginia made strenuous efforts in the defense of his State. Arnold
soon retired to Portsmouth where he remained until spring. Meanwhile, in
February, a French sixty-four-gun ship and two frigates captured the Romulus
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and several small vessels of Arnold's fleet. Another raid was made in April and
May by twenty-five hundred men under Generals Phillips and Arnold. The
expedition left Portsmouth April 18, fell down to Hampton Roads, and thence
proceeded up the James and Chickahominy Rivers. April 27, the British met with
firm resistance on the part of the Virginia navy on the James River; the most
important of these vessels were the ships Tempest and Renown of sixteen guns
each and the fourteen-gun brigantine Jefferson. This force, however, the
invaders finally overcame, capturing a number of vessels that the Americans had
not time to destroy. This nearly put an end to the Virginia navy. Phillips died May
13, leaving Arnold in command. Soon after this, upon the arrival of Cornwallis in
Virginia, Arnold returned to New York (Almon, xi, 157, 322, xii, 60; Jefferson, ii,
391-410; Boston Gazette, March 5, 1781 ; Navy Rec. Soc., vi, 93-102; Dawson,
ch. lxxx; Narr. and Crit. Hist., vi, 546; Virginia Hist. Reg., July, 1848, July, 1849,
October, 1851; So. Lit. Messenger, June, 1839, March, 1857.)
When the American and French armies marched south in August, 1781, General
Clinton sought to divert them from their purpose by sending Arnold on another
marauding expedition, this time to Connecticut. Having collected a force on the
Long Island shore at a point about thirty miles from New London, Arnold weighed
anchor early in the evening of September 5. He had about seventeen hundred
men on board twenty-four vessels. Captain Bazeley was in command of the fleet.
They appeared off New London early the next morning. The force was landed in
two divisions, nine hundred men on the west side of the Thames River and eight
hundred on the east. Arnold led the western division and had little difficulty in
taking New London; the town was burned. Fort Griswold, at Groton, on the east
side of the river, made a strong resistance, but it was finally captured by the
British and loyalists and a massacre of the garrison followed. A very large
amount of property on shore was destroyed; also all the shipping, except a few
vessels that escaped up the river. The expedition then returned to New York
(Almon, xiii, 53,58; Dawson, ch. xcviii; Narr. and Crit. Hist, vi, 562.)
The most important naval event of 1781 was the culmination of the struggle for
naval supremacy in American waters on the part of the French and British, which
decided the outcome of the war. In December, 1780, war between Holland and
England was declared, and in February, 1781, Admiral Rodney, the British naval
commander-in-chief in the West Indies, seized the Dutch island of St. Eustatius,
with a vast amount of property both public and private, thereby breaking up a
depot for the supply and transshipment of goods and military stores, which had
been during the war of great importance to the Americans and an invaluable aid
to their cause. After the capture, through the very questionable expedient of
leaving Dutch colors flying, Rodney was able greatly to increase the amount of
booty by decoying into the roadstead many unsuspecting vessels. He wrote to
Germain, March 26: "I may speak within bounds when I say that since taking this
island upwards of two hundred thousand pounds in value of tobacco has fell into
our hands." The spoils were sent home to England in thirty-four ships, most of
which were fortunately captured by the French in the English Channel. Before the
247
end of the year, St. Eustatius also was captured by the French (Mahan, 382;
Channing, iii, 323-327; Almon, xi, 260, xiii, 119; Amer. Hist. Rev., viii (July, 1903),
699-708; London Chronicle, March 15, 1781; Boston Gazette, April 2, 1781 ;
Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii, 123-126; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 202, 207 (Rodney to
Germain, March 4, 26, 1781); Letters of Lord Rodney. Rodney's letters disclose
the vindictiveness which marked his conduct at St. Eustatius.)
The French fleet in Newport, now commanded by Commodore Destouches,
sailed for Chesapeake Bay early in March, closely followed by Arbuthnot from
Gardiner's Bay, who by superior sailing arrived off the capes in time to head off
the French. A battle followed in which Destouches had the advantage and yet he
ran out to sea, allowing Arbuthnot to enter the bay undisturbed and form a
junction with Arnold. Reinforcements under Phillips were then sent from New
York to the army in Virginia. The operations of these officers on the James River,
already mentioned, then took place. Late in March the Comte de Grasse with a
powerful fleet sailed from Brest for the West Indies. Rodney being still occupied
at St. Eustatius, the French on their arrival late in April had to deal only with
Rear-Admiral Hood, whose force was inferior. If Rodney had been less intent on
prize money he could, perhaps, have given De Grasse a reception that might
possibly have upset French and American plans. He would neither go out himself
to meet the French nor allow Hood to do so. De Grasse did not make full use of
his advantage, however, and beyond releasing four blockaded French ships at
Martinique he accomplished little. He anchored at Cape Francois late in July
(Mahan, 382-387; Almon, xi, 310-315; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 207 (March 28,
1781) ; Navy Rec. Soc, iii (Hood's Letters), 15-18; Rodney's Letters, 58-62.)
Meanwhile Washington and Rochambeau, having united their forces near New
York, were prepared to move on that place or against Cornwallis in Virginia,
according to whether the one or the other movement could most advantageously
be supported by the French fleet. Having been apprised of this situation upon his
arrival at Cape Francois, De Grasse decided on the Chesapeake and promptly
dispatched a frigate to notify the generals. They at once moved the allied army to
the head of Chesapeake Bay and thence by transports to the York Peninsula,
where Cornwallis in his camp at Yorktown was soon invested. De Grasse sailed
north, August 5, and anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just inside the capes of the
Chesapeake, on the 30th. There was no English naval force in the bay at this
time. Arbuthnot had departed long before, returning to England on leave, and a
few days before, Hood, sent north from the West Indies by Rodney, had passed
the capes, and seeing no French had kept on to New York, where he joined
Admiral Graves, now in command of the North American station. August 31,
Graves sailed with the whole force for the Chesapeake, and upon arriving off the
capes, September 5, saw De Grasse inside. The English had nineteen ships of
the line, the French twenty-four. De Grasse got under way and ran out to sea to
meet his adversary, and five days were spent in manoeuvring and desultory
flghting. This gave an opportunity for another French fleet to get into the bay.
This was the Newport fleet, now commanded by Commodore De Barras with a
248
convoy of transports carrying siege artillery for the use of the array before
Yorktown, which it was most important to conduct in safety. Graves,
overmatched, was obliged to return to New York. De Grasse again entered the
bay, where he found De Barras safely anchored. The action of September 5 was
a subject of controversy among British officers. Graves fought the battle under a
new system of instructions, and believed that his want of success was due to the
failure of his captains, bound by tradition to the old system, to interpret his
signals intelligently. Hood sharply criticized the management of the fleet and has
been charged with purposely failing to get into action and with a willingness to
see Graves blunder (Mahan, 387-400; Almon, xii, 283, xiii, 33-48, xiv, 36; Boston
Gazette, October 1, 1781 ; Stopford-Sackville MSS., 212-215; Navy Rec. Soc.,
iii, 24, 28-36, 40, 44, vi, 111-127, xxix, 213, xxxii, 120, 121, 124, 125, 129, xxxv,
53-55, 260, 261; Clowes, iii, 488-502; Channing, iii, 334-339, 345; Doniol, iv, chs.
xiii, xiv; Chevalier, ch. viii. See article on Rochambeau, by J. J. Jusserand in
Harvard Graduates' Mag., December, 1912.)
The naval supremacy of France at the seat of war was now complete, the sea
power so much desired by Washington had been won for the allies. The situation
of Cornwallis seemed hopeless, although if he had held out a few weeks longer,
it is possible that Clinton's efforts to relieve him might have been successful. He
considered his position untenable, however, and surrendered to the allies,
October 19.
Before the end of 1781, the Continental navy was reduced to the lowest point it
reached during the war. Three vessels had been lost within the year: the frigates
Confederacy and Trumbull and the sloop of war Saratoga. The Trumbull was the
last of the original thirteen frigates of 1775. The frigates Alliance and Deane now
constituted the whole strength of the navy in commission. The America of
seventy-four guns and the frigate Bourbon were still on the stocks, with no
likelihood of their being finished for a long time to come. On the list of officers
were twenty-two captains and thirty-nine lieutenants, and of marine officers
twelve captains and twelve lieutenants (Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 473. This list is
dated September, 1781, and is doubtless inaccurate.) The great majority of these
officers were either unemployed or serving on board privateers; several were
prisoners of war. The administration of naval affairs continued to be in charge of
Robert Morris as Agent of Marine until after the end of the war.
Five hundred and fifty letters of marque were issued to private armed vessels by
the Continental Congress in 1781, a much larger number than in any other year
and an increase over the figures for 1780 of two hundred and forty-nine (Naval
Records (calendar), 217-495.) This indicates a decided activity and enterprise on
the part of American privateers. A correspondent of John Adams wrote to him
early in the following year: " It is true that a large number of our private armed
ships to the Eastward have been taken in the course of the last season, but in
every other respect we have been successful. And indeed we have captured a
249
number of valuable ships belonging to the enemy." (Adams MSS., January 18,
1782.)
During the year 1781 the number of vessels of all classes in the British navy
increased from five hundred and thirty-eight to five hundred and fiftyone, a much
smaller growth than in the previous years of the war. The number in commission
reached three hundred and ninety-eight at the end of the year, an increase of
only two over the figures for the first of January. The number on the North
American station seems to have varied considerably and to have been largest in
October, when Graves had forty-five in his fleet; there were about forty in the
West Indies. The total number of seamen and marines in the navy was ninety
thousand (Hannay, ii, 211; Schomberg, ii, 36, iv, 376-384.)
According to the table of losses and captures before referred to, the British lost
six hundred and twenty-five vessels, of which thirty-eight were privateers and the
others merchantmen; of these, two hundred and seventeen were recaptured or
ransomed. England took from her enemies three hundred and seventeen,
including forty privateers, and ten of them were recaptured (Clowes, iii, 396.)
Another correspondent of John Adams, writing from Boston, says: 11 The British
frigates have done more damage to Our trade the last Season than any time
since the Warr; that confounded Penobscot is a handy resort." (Adams MSS.,
January 23, 1782.)
John Paul Jones wrote to Washington, May 7, 1781: "Our Navy has been badly
conducted; it has ever been without a head and is now almost entirely lost . . . I
have pointed out many desirable operations that promised success and would
have taught the barbarous Britains humanity, but my voice has been as a cry in
the desert. The importance and necessity of a marine establishment does not
appear sufficiently impressed on the minds of our Legislature." (Sparks MSS., xii,
247)
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER XVII
THE END OF THE WAR, 1782 AND 1783
Although the surrender of Cornwallis virtually put a stop to military operations on
land, hostilities on the sea continued until the conclusion of peace.
Notwithstanding the fact that the naval resources of the country were nearly
exhausted, cruising was actively carried on by the few Continental and State
ships still remaining, while privateersmen, lured by the hope of prize money, did
not cease fitting out their craft and sending them to sea as long as there were
enemies to pursue.
250
After the victory at Yorktown it was deemed necessary to send the Alliance again
to France with Lafayette, and the cruise which had been planned for her by the
Agent of Marine was accordingly abandoned. Washington wrote to Lafayette,
November 15, 1781, once more strongly urging the importance of sea power. If
De Grasse had remained a few weeks longer on the American coast, the English
forces in the Southern States, in Washington's opinion, would have suffered
"total extirpation." He says: "As you expressed a desire to know my Sentiments
respecting the operations of the next Campaign, before your departure for
France, I will without a tedious display of reasoning declare in one word, that the
advantages of it to America and the honor and glory of it to the allied arms in
these States must depend absolutely upon the naval force which is employed in
these Seas and the time of its appearance next year. No land force can act
decisively unless it is accompanied by a maritime superiority; nor can more than
negative advantages be expected without it . . . It follows then, as certain as that
night succeeds day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing
definitive, and with it everything honorable and glorious. A constant naval
superiority would terminate the war speedily; without it I do not know that it will
ever be terminated honorably." (Washington, ix, 406, 407.) The magnitude of the
advantage gained at Yorktown and the temper of the enemy were evidently not
appreciated in America at this time. As it turned out, the British were in no need
of a further exhibition of force to dispose them to thoughts of peace. In fact they
were so in fear of another great disaster that orders, dated April 4, 1782, were
issued to General Carleton, who was sent to relieve General Clinton, to evacuate
New York at once, or even to capitulate, if beset by a force so formidable as to
render evacuation without heavy loss impracticable. For lack of transports,
however, evacuation was impossible, and the tide soon turned somewhat in
England's favor. The defeat of De Grasse by Rodney in the West Indies, in April,
1782, revived the spirits and restored the confidence of the British. Nevertheless,
efforts to procure transports for removing the troops from New York continued,
but as a sufficient number could not be collected to embark the whole army at
once, the matter rested until at length the cessation of hostilities removed the
supposed hazard of the situation. The British state of mind after Yorktown was of
course unknown in America (Sparks MSS., Iviii, 145-149; Navy Rec. Soc., xxxviii,
73, 77-80.)
Lafayette proceeded to Boston and on board the Alliance. Several other
passengers accompanied him. Morris issued minute instructions, dated
November 27, 1781, in which Captain Barry was directed to give special attention
to the comfort of his passengers. "Let it be done with discretion; remember that
we are not rich enough to be extravagant, nor so poor as to act meanly." The
importance of landing these distinguished persons safely was such that it would
be necessary to avoid all vessels, it being the sole object "to make a quiet and
safe passage to some port in France." The Alliance was to remain in Europe until
about the 1st of March, cruising "where you can promise yourself of the best
chance of Success "; she was then to set sail from L'Orient on her return voyage,
taking as many prizes on the way as possible and finally putting into the most
251
convenient American port, preferably Philadelphia, there to await further
instructions. The frigate's crew was finally made up. A number of French sailors
were obtained through the efforts of the French minister and some of the Deane's
crew were transferred to the Alliance. She sailed December 23, 1781, and in
spite of her orders to avoid all vessels, she made a prize of a large ship from
Jamaica which was sent into Boston. The frigate arrived at L'Orient, January 18,
1782 (Barry, 153-161; Independent Chronicle, January 24, 1782.)
The Alliance made a short and unsuccessful cruise in February, and on March 16
set sail on her homeward voyage. She was again unfortunate in the matter of
taking prizes and fell in with no vessel of the enemy until off the Delaware capes,
May 10, when a British sixty-four-gun ship appeared and gave chase. The
Alliance succeeded in eluding her and ran for New London, where she arrived,
May 13, and remained until August (Barry, ch. xv; Boston Post, May 11, 1782;
Independent Chronicle, May 23, 1782; Independent Ledger, June 10, 1782.)
The General Court of Massachusetts, on February 25, 1782, resolved to allow
Captain Nicholson, who had unwillingly given up some of his crew to the Alliance,
to enlist not more than twelve men from the garrison of the Castle in Boston
Harbor, for the frigate Deane. This ship sailed from Boston in March on a two
months' cruise in the West Indies. She captured two ships, a brig, and a
schooner, three of them armed vessels. She returned to Boston in May with
many prisoners on board, also several cases of fever. She remained in Boston
Harbor four or five months (Mass. Court Rec., February 25, 1782; Boston
Gazette, May 13, July 29, 1782, Independent Chronicle, May 23, 1782.)
The frigate South Carolina, Commodore Gillon, arrived at Havana, January 12,
1782. Here it was learned that the Spaniards were making plans for an
expedition against New Providence, under General Cagigal, the governor of
Cuba. Gillon joined forces with them, taking command of the fleet consisting of
fifty-nine vessels, presumably mostly Spanish. The next three months were spent
in fitting out this armada. April 22, the expedition sailed, and May 5 the whole
fleet lay before New Providence. Several outlets at the north side of the island
were blocked by some of the American vessels, while others were stationed in
the offing. The South Carolina stood off and on until five o'clock, then took a
position as near the bar of the harbor as possible, within gunshot of Fort Nassau,
in order to draw attention that way while the transports prepared to land the
troops. General Cagigal sent a flag to the governor asking on what terms he
would surrender the Bahama Islands to Spain. Meanwhile Gillon directed the
transports to follow a leading vessel, which repeated his signals for anchoring
before the town, that the general might debark when he saw fit. The next day at
nine o'clock the British governor sent proposals on board the South Carolina
which were not accepted. All the American vessels continued as near their
stations as wind, shoals, and circumstances allowed. The Spanish transports,
with armed vessels and galleys, kept anchoring as ordered, and at three o'clock
Cagigal with the Spanish officers on the South Carolina departed in order to
252
make preparations for debarking the troops. At five o'clock another flag was sent
to the governor and returned the next day, having agreed on a capitulation. On
the following day, May 8, Cagigal landed the army and took possession of the
forts and town. This made the third capture of New Providence during the
Revolution. Gillon thought that the success of the expedition was due to the
captains of the American armed vessels, who led the fleet against head winds
through difficult passages among the islands and reefs, a route so unfrequented
and unexpected by the enemy that they had made no preparations to obstruct or
defend it (Royal Gazette, June 19, 1782, Gillon's report to the governor of South
Carolina (May 15, 1782); Penn. Packet, March 5, June 4, October 19, 1782; Log
of the South Carolina; Almon, xiv, 148-151.)
The South Carolina then sailed north and arrived at Philadelphia May 28. Here
she remained nearly six months. Gillon was displaced from the command of the
ship by an agent of the owner, Chevalier Luxembourg, the exact reason for which
does not appear. The command was given to Captain John Joyner of the South
Carolina navy. In November the frigate sailed from Philadelphia having three
vessels under convoy, bound to Europe. Apparently she did not clear the capes
for about a month, as she had not gone far when, on the night of December 19,
she fell in with three British men-of-war, the forty-four-gun ship Diomede and the
frigates Quebec and Astrea of thirty-two guns each. A chase of eighteen hours
ensued, during which two of the convoy were captured by the British and found
to be a ship and brig from Philadelphia; the third, a schooner, got away.
"Prisoners inform'd us," says the Astrea's log "the large Ship was the South
Carolina Frigate, 40 Guns ... At 3 [P.M., December 21] the Carolina fir'd several
stern chace Guns at the Diomede & Quebec ... At 1/2 past 3, the Quebec hauld
up for the South Carolina's Weather Quarter. The Diomede continued standing
on & Fir'd her Bow Chace Guns at the South Carolina; she ret'd her stern Chace
Guns. At 45 Min. past, the Diomede bore up and fir'd her Starbd Guns at the
Chace. At 50 Min. past 4 the Chace struck her Colours & hove too." The prize
was sent into New York. Soon afterwards a survey of the South Carolina was
made which furnishes a description of this interesting ship, which might have
done so much and really did so little for the American cause. Her length on the
upper deck was one hundred and seventy feet, on the keel one hundred and
forty-four feet and one inch; extreme breadth, forty-three feet and three inches.
She measured fourteen hundred and thirty tons burden. "She appears to be
about Five Years Old, Built in Holland; had on board when taken, 28 No. (about)
Thirty-Nine Pounders on the Upper Deck, 10 No. Twelve Pounders on the
Quarter Deck, and 2 No. Nine Pounders on the Fore Castle." (Brit. Adm. Rec., A.
D. 490, January 18, 1783; Captains' Logs, Nos. 23 and 749 (logs of the Astrea
and Quebec); Boston Gazette, September 16, 1782; Independent Chronicle,
November 29, 1782, January 9, 1783; Penn. Packet, December 31, 1782;
Almon, xv, 227; Clowes, iv, 91.)
Two new vessels were added to the Massachusetts navy early in 1782, the
Tartar and the sloop Winthrop. The Tartar had been under construction nearly
253
two years and was only just ready for service; she was a ship of four hundred
tons and carried eighteen nine-pounders and two sixes. These vessels seem to
have cruised together in June for a short time. In a letter, dated July 1, William
Vernon says: "The State Ship Tartar and Sloop of 12 Guns went out the last
Week, in quest of the Bermuda Brigt., but they were soon drove in by the
appearance of a Ship wch they supposed to be of 50 Guns and proved to be only
a Sloop of War of 18, much to the discredit of Capt. Cathcart, I think." (Publ. R.I.
Hist. Soc., viii, 274.) Cathcart, however, apparently retrieved his good name and
later in the season the Tartar took several prizes. She was sold before the end of
the year 1782 and was fitted out as a privateer, still under Cathcart's command.
After cruising a short time in 1783, she was captured by the British frigate
Bellisarius and taken into New York. The Winthrop, Captain George Little with
Edward Preble as lieutenant, was employed on the Maine coast. She came into
Boston, September 16, 1782, after a short cruise in which she took five prizes,
including two privateers and a brig which was cut out of her anchorage under the
fort in Penobscot Bay. "Much Praise is due to the Bravery and good Conduct of
Capt. Little and his Crew for this spirited Enterprise and for the great Service they
have rendered this Commonwealth in captivating the above Privateers, that have
for a long Time infested this Coast and taken many valuable Vessels from us."
(Boston Gazette, September 23, 1782.) In February, 1783, the governor, in a
message relating to the employment of Little and the Winthrop, said: "I
considered that he had most essentially prevented the Depredations on that
coast by Capturing & sending into this Port near the whole of the Arm'd force
they possess'd at Penobscot." (Mass. Archives, clviii, 274.) The Winthrop made
two cruises in 1783, the last one ending in June. She was the last ship of the
Massachusetts navy in commission and was sold soon after her return to port
(Mass. Acts and Resolves, May 2, November 12, 1782, March 26, June 4, 1783;
Mass. Archives, clviii, 238, 274; Boston Post, August 10, October 12, November
23, 1782; Boston Gazette, September 23, October 14, November 11, 1782,
March 17, 1783; Continental Journal, October 3, 1782; Independent Chronicle,
November 7, 1782; Massachusetts Mag., January, April, 1911.)
In the winter and early spring of 1782, Delaware Bay was infested with privateer
barges and other small craft, fitted out by loyalists, which preyed upon the
commerce of Philadelphia and ravaged the shores of the bay. The merchants of
the city applied to the state government for protection and as a result, provision
was made for fitting out a number of armed vessels for the defense of the bay.
This action was taken April 9. On the 29th, the Philadelphia merchants appealed
to the Continental Congress, more especially, however, in behalf of American
shipping in general. Robert Morris reported on this memorial that the Continental
navy was unable to give sufficient protection to commerce and recommended
calling upon the navies of France and Spain for assistance. Meanwhile
conditions in Delaware Bay were too acute to admit of waiting for the slow
progress of legislation and in March the merchants of Philadelphia had
purchased on their own responsibility and fitted out as a privateer under a
Continental commission a ship called the Hyder Ally. She was armed with four
254
nine-pounders and twelve sixes and manned by a crew of a hundred and twenty.
The command was given to Joshua Barney, a lieutenant in the Continental navy,
who had recently returned from a long imprisonment in England (Barney, 303;
Pap. Cont. Congr., 41, 6, 283 (April 29, 1782), 28, 241, 243a (May 2, 4, 1782),
137, 1, 435 (May 4, 1782).)
On April 7, the Hyder Ally with a convoy of merchantmen dropped down the bay
to Cape May Road. Here they were seen towards evening by the British frigate
Quebec and the sloop of war General Monk, formerly the American privateer
General Washington, which anchored outside the capes. At daylight the next
morning the General Monk entered the Cape May Channel in pursuit of the
Americans, while the Quebec stood up the Henlopen Channel to cut off their
retreat to Philadelphia. The General Monk was joined by a New York sixteen-gun
privateer called the Fair American. At noon these two vessels came into Cape
May Road. The American fleet got under way, stood up the bay, and dispersed.
One of them ran ashore and another struck to the General Monk. The Fair
American then got aground, and the Monk continued the chase alone. An English
account says: "We soon came up with the Hyder Ally, notwithstanding she cut
her boat adrift and did everything else to get away. We meant to have run upon
her quarter and board her at once, but after firing two of our bow chaces when at
100 yards distance, she put her helm a-port and stood right athwart us, therefore
we did the same, to prevent being raked, when the action began and we edged
towards her till within close pistol-shot. We with great concern soon found our
short guns (carronades) to become totally unmanageable and that two-thirds of
the shot we fired did not strike the hull of our antagonist. After having sustained
the action for ten minutes with musketry only, the decks full of killed and
wounded (among the former the Lieutenant and Master, two brave Officers), our
rigging so much shot as to render it impossible to haul off, and lastly, seeing no
prospect of assistance from the Fair American, Captain Rogers was under the
mortifying necessity of striking his Majesty's colours to the Hyder Ally, of 18 long
nine and six pounders and between 130 and 140 men, belonging to the state of
Philadelphia." (London Chronicle, September 10, 1782.) The General Monk,
according to the same authority, was armed with eighteen nine-pounder
carronades and two sixes; her crew numbered a hundred and ten. Her loss was
eight killed and thirty-two wounded, four of them mortally; the Hyder Ally lost four
killed and eleven wounded. The time of the action was about half an hour. It is
very doubtful if, as the English asserted, Barney tried to escape at the outset of
the engagement. This impression may have arisen from the fact that he shouted
his orders in a manner intended to deceive the enemy. The capture of the Monk
produced great satisfaction in Philadelphia. A dispatch from that place says:
"Capt. Barney with the officers and men of the State ship Hyder Ally have
received the thanks of the honorable House of Assembly of Pennsylvania as a
mark of the high sense which they entertain of their bravery and intrepid conduct
in the above action; and have also ordered that an elegant sword be presented to
Capt. Barney." (Boston Gazette, May 6, 1782.) Some time after her capture, the
General Monk was purchased by the national government and taken into the
255
Continental navy under her original name of General Washington. Barney was
given command of her and she was used as a packet (Barney, 112-117, 304308; Freeman's Journal, April 10, 1782; Penn. Gazette, April 17, 1782; Boston
Gazette, April 22, May 6, 1782; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, Matthewman's
narrative; Brit. Adm. Rec., A. D. 490, May 10, 1782.)
The brig Holker of Philadelphia was one of the most famous privateers of the
Revolution. She began her career in 1779, and cruised three years or more
under different commanders. In the winter of 1782, a squadron of American
privateers made their rendezvous at Martinique and planned an attack on
Tortola, one of the Virgin Islands. Besides the Holker there were four ships and a
sloop, with about five hundred men; only four vessels, however, finally took part
in the expedition. They left Martinique about March 1, and were seen off Tortola
on the 4th. They intended to anchor off the forts and cover a landing party at
night, but were delayed and the movement was deferred. They were seen
standing into the harbor by moonlight and the alarm was given, so the attack was
postponed until morning. Three brigantines attempting to escape from the harbor
were chased and one of them was captured by the Holker. Several letters of
marque at St. John came out to meet the American squadron and an action of
half an hour's duration followed. A few days later the British sloop of war
Experiment, coming in from a cruise, had an engagement with the Holker and the
Junius Brutus, one of the other American vessels. The Experiment succeeded in
beating them off and went into Antigua. The American squadron then cruised a
few days and captured a rich prize. The attempt on Tortola was abandoned. The
Holker returned to Philadelphia, May 11, having taken fourteen prizes (Boston
Post, September 11, October 2, 1779, May 25, 1782; Penn. Packet, August 21,
1779; Boston Gazette, January 14, 1782, March 10, 1783; Independent
Chronicle, May 30, 1782; Royal Gazette, June 5, 1782; Clark, i, 112, 119, 120,
129.)
Captain Mowatt, the British commander at Penobscot, in March, 1782, sent a
fourteen-gun brig to cruise off Cape Ann. She captured a fishing-boat, put
twenty-five men on her and sent her into Gloucester. There it was found that a
ship with a valuable cargo was about to go to sea. At half-past four the next
morning, April 1, the boat ran in, boarded the ship and brought her out. The ship
Polly, pierced for twenty guns, was on the ways at Gloucester, with her topmasts
struck and otherwise unprepared. Work was began on her at seven o'clock and
at eleven she got to sea with a hundred volunteers on board. She chased the
brig, fishing-boat, and prize ship on their way to Penobscot and at twelve o'clock
recaptured the prize. She then chased Mowatt's brig, but night came on and she
escaped (Salem Gazette, April 11, 1782.)
One hundred and fifty-eight private armed vessels, with about two thousand guns
and six thousand men, were sent out of Salem during the Revolution. They
captured nearly four hundred and fifty vessels, nine tenths of which safely
reached port. One of the most noted of these Salem privateers was the ship
256
Grand Turk, of three hundred tons, built in 1781. She was armed with twenty-two
guns and carried a crew of a hundred and ten men. She was actively and
successfully employed as long as the war continued. She cruised off the coast of
Europe and in the West Indies (Hunt's Mag., February, 1857; Coll. Essex Inst.,
xliv (1908), 214-218; Boston Gazette, October 22, 1781, May 6, 1782;
Independent Chronicle, January 24, 1782; Boston Post, April 5, 1783. A list of
196 Salem privateers is given in Paine's Ships and Sailors of Old Salem.)
The privateer Jack of Salem, a sloop of twelve guns and sixty men, fought a long
and severe engagement off Halifax with the British sloop of war Observer,
carrying twelve guns and a hundred and seventy-three men. At nine in the
evening, May 28, 1782, the Observer came alongside the Jack. William Gray, the
first lieutenant of the privateer, says: "It was our misfortune to have our worthy
commander, Capt. Ropes, mortally wounded by the first broadside. I was slightly
wounded at the same time in my right hand and head, but not so as to disable
me from duty. The action was maintained on both sides, close, severe and
without intermission, for upwards of two hours, in which time we had 7 killed,
several wounded, and many abandoned their quarters. Our rigging was so
destroyed that not having command of our yards, the Jack fell with her larboard
bow foul of the brig's starboard quarter, when the enemy made an attempt to
board us, but they were repulsed by a very small number compared with them.
We were engaged in this position about a quarter of an hour, in which time I
received a wound by a bayonet fixed on a musket and which was hove with such
force as, entering the fore part of my right thigh and passing through close to the
bone, entered the carriage of a bow gun, where I was fastened, and it was out of
my power to get clear till assisted by one of the prize masters. We then fell round
and came with our broadsides to each other, when we renewed the action with
powder and balls, but our match rope, excepting some which was unfit for use,
being all expended and being to leeward, we bore away, making a running fight.
The brig being far superior in her number of men, was able to get soon repaired
and completely ready to renew the action, indeed had constantly kept up a
chasing fire, for we had not been out of reach of her musketry. She was now
close alongside of us again with 50 men picked out for boarding. I therefore
called Mr. Glover and the rest together and found we had but 10 upon deck and
two of them besides myself wounded. I had been repeatedly desired to strike, but
I mentioned the sufferings of a prison ship and made use of every other
argument in my power for continuing the engagement. All the foreigners however
deserted their quarters every opportunity. At 2 o'clock P.M. on the 29th I had the
inexpressible mortification to deliver up the vessel." (Salem Gazette, July 11, 18,
1782; Boston Post, June 15, 1782; Hunt's Mag., February, 1857.)
Four Massachusetts privateers engaged in an enterprise on the Nova Scotia
coast which is described in the newspapers of the time. "Captains Babcock of the
Hero, Stoddard of the Scammel, Woodbury of the Hope, and Tibbets of the
Swallow, having determined to surprize and possess themselves of Lunenburgh,
an elegantly situated Town, ten Leagues West of Halifax, landed Ninety Men two
257
Miles below it, under the Command of Lieut. Barteman, on Monday the first Day
of July Instant at half after Seven o'Clock A.M. This gallant Corps with amazing
Rapidity reached the Town, and amidst many heavy Discharges of Musquetry
from the Enemy, burnt the commanding Officer's House, a Blockhouse in the
North West Part of the Town, spik'd up two 24 pounders, and forc'd the Enemy
into the South Blockhouse, from whence they kept up a brisk and animating Fire
and declared their Intention to hold out to the last Extremity. But their Animation
subsided upon the Receipt of a few 4-pound Shot from the Hero and they
reluctantly surrendered themselves Prisoners of War. The victorious Party with a
natural and pleasing Vivacity fell to plundering, and quickly emptied the Stores of
a Variety and considerable Quantity of Dry Goods, twenty Puncheons of good
West-India Rum and the King's Beef, Pork and Flour. Upon the near Approach of
the Combined Fleet, two 18 pounders were spiked up and dismounted and the
Royal Magazine was safely deposited in the Hold of the Scammel. The strictest
Decorum was observed towards the Inhabitants and their Wearing Apparel and
Household Furniture inviolably preserv'd for their Use. The Town was ransomed
for a Thousand Pounds Sterling and Colonel Creighton with some of the principal
Inhabitants were shipped on board the Scammel. On the Side of the brave Sons
of Liberty, three were wounded slightly, one dangerously; on the Part of the
Abettors of Oppression and Despotism, the Number of slain and wounded
unknown, only one of their slain being found." (Boston Gazette, July 15, August
5, 1782 ; Massachusetts Spy, August 8, 1782.)
Thomas Truxtun, who afterwards became a famous commodore of the
reestablished navy, was one of the successful privateersmen of the Revolution.
He cruised throughout the whole war, most of the time in West Indian and
European waters. In 1780, at L'Orient, he incurred the displeasure of Paul Jones
by hoisting in his presence a broad pennant, contrary to a rule established by
Congress Sands, 298; Hist. Mag., April, 1857; Jones MSS., Jones to Truxtun
(October 24, 1780).
In 1782, he was in command of the ship Commerce of Philadelphia, in the West
Indies; she carried fourteen guns and fifty men. November 15, she fell in with a
brig of sixteen six-pounders and seventy-five men and a schooner, fourteen sixes
and eighty men. The Commerce engaged these vessels at a distance of thirty
yards for twenty minutes. Her loss was one killed and two wounded; the brig lost
five killed and thirteen wounded and the schooner ten killed and eleven
wounded. The Commerce was then driven off by a British ship and brig which
appeared in time to rescue the thoroughly beaten vessels (Boston Gazette,
January 6, 1783; Port Folio, January, 1809.)
At the end of November, 1782, a desperate battle of barges took place in
Chesapeake Bay off Tangier Islands, near the boundary between Maryland and
Virginia on the eastern shore of the bay. Four Maryland barges and one from
Virginia set out to attack six barges drawn up off the islands, manned by tories,
refugees, and sailors from the British fleet. The Virginia barge got aground and
258
the leading Maryland barge, the Protector, flagship of Commodore Whaley, being
far in advance, engaged the British flotilla unsupported. An explosion took place
on the Protector and in the confusion which ensued the other barges retreated.
Whaley was killed, but the fight was kept up by the Protector alone under Colonel
Cropper of Virginia, a volunteer, until he was forced to surrender. Out of a crew
of sixty-five the Protector lost twenty-five killed or drowned and twenty-nine
wounded, some of them mortally (So. Lit. Messenger, March, 1857.)
The letter of marque brig Iris, eight six-pounders and forty-two men, sailed from
Havana for Virginia, January 23, 1783, and off the capes of the Chesapeake,
February 7, was chased by a British frigate and a New York privateer called the
Admiral Digby, with fifty-four men, fourteen four-pounders and four nines. The Iris
struck on a sand-spit at Cape Charles, and shortly afterwards the Admiral Digby
also grounded within pistol-shot. The two vessels lay parallel to each other and
fought two hours and a half, the American loss being four wounded and the
British four killed and twelve wounded. A high wind and heavy surf came up in
the night and both vessels were lost. The crews got safely ashore (Salem
Gazette, April 17,1783.)
Privateers from the United States continued to cruise in European waters at a
late period of the war, sending their prizes into France (London Chronicle, May 9,
1782; Boston Gazette, January 6, 1783.) Furthermore, the services of American
privateers commissioned and fitted out in France were important and some of
them have already been mentioned. Most of them sailed under the French flag.
Dunkirk seems to have been the home port of many if not of the greater part of
these vessels. During the war seventy-eight Dunkirk privateers were commanded
by Americans, six of them under American commissions; of these six, it would
appear that two only, the Black Prince and Black Princess, were owned by
Frenchmen. These French-American privateers fought many hard engagements;
they greatly annoyed the enemy's shipping in the English Channel and visited the
shores of the British Isles. One of them, a twenty-gun ketch called the Franklin, in
1781 captured two of the vessels sent to England by Admiral Rodney, loaded
with plunder from St. Eustatius. Captain William Fall, in the Sans Peur of
nineteen guns, bombarded the town of Arbroath, which had refused to pay
ransom, and a few days later captured two British privateers of sixteen and eight
guns after a sharp action within close range of batteries on the Scotch coast (U.
S. Nav. Inst. Proc., xxxvii (September, 1911), 935, 964-972.)
The conduct of these privateers fitted out in France seems sometimes to have
been much less orderly than that of American ships in general. The crews were
recruited from the heterogeneous seafaring population of the French ports and
their commanders were not always able to control them. Respect for private
property and for neutral flags was occasionally lacking. The cutter Eclipse was
commanded during the latter part of her career by Nathaniel Fanning, who had
served as a midshipman on board the Bonhomme Richard. The Eclipse was
manned by a crew of a hundred and ten, just half of whom were Americans; the
259
other half was made up of French, English, Irish, Dutch, Flemish, Germans,
Italians, Genoese, Maltese, Turks, Tunisians, and Algerines. She sailed from
Dunkirk under the French flag and cruised in the English Channel and in British
waters. She took many prizes, including several of decidedly superior force,
which were sent into French ports. In the summer of 1782, the Eclipse boarded a
Danish vessel in the English Channel and the personal property of some French
passengers was plundered. Fanning had given special orders to the boarding
officer to respect private property, and that the robbery occurred seems to show
loss of control over his men,, to say the least. As the result of an investigation
and trial at the order of the French Minister of Marine, the judges of the admiralty
sentenced Thomas Potter, the officer of the Eclipse who had boarded the Danish
vessel, "to be hanged to a gallows erected for the purpose on the quay of this
port and strangled by the executioner of high justice until he is dead," and two
other men "to be whipped and flogged naked by said executioner of high justice
and then branded on the right shoulder by a red-hot brand bearing the letters G A
L and then conducted to the gallies of his Majesty, where they shall be made to
serve during three years, their effects to be seized and confiscated "; they also
declared "the aforesaid Nathaniel Fanning duly guilty and convicted of having
failed to maintain subordination among his crew and of not having supervised
that which was done during the search of neutral vessels, which gave rise to the
aforesaid thefts, in punishment for which we declare him incapable during three
years of any command as captain of vessels within the realm, and we enjoin him
to be more circumspect for the future under penalty of the law." The three chief
culprits being absent, "our present judgment will be executed in effigy by the
attachment of figures to the aforesaid gallows and scaffold." (U. S. Nav. Inst.
Proc., xxxvii, 982.) These three men had absconded before the trial, which was
conducted without any defense on their part. In the fall of 1782, before the legal
proceedings just narrated, Fanning cruised in a small cutter called the Ranger, in
which he took one prize and was then himself captured by the British. He very
soon escaped, however, and in a few days was again in Dunkirk (Ibid., 972-983;
Fanning, 132-137, 141-144, 174-181, 197-229, 240-242. Privateering continued
until the spring of 1783 was well advanced and prizes were still being tried as
late as December. See Clark, i, ch. x; A. Sherburne, ch. v; Boston Gazette,
January 28, February 11, 18, 25, March 11, April 8, 22, June 3, July 1, 8, August
5, September 2, 30, December 2, 16, 1782, May 5, Angust 4, December 22,
1783; Independent Chronicle, April 4, June 6, 1782, January 9, 1783; Boston
Post, June 8, 29, July 6, 20, October 26, 1782, March 1, April 5, 1783; Freeman's
Journal, January 23, February 6, 1782; Penn. Packet, May 11, 14, July 30,
August 6, 1782. For privateering throughout the war, see Maclay's American
Privateers; Weeden's New England, ch. xx; Coll. Essex Inst., xlii-xlv, letters of
George Williams to Timothy Pickering.)
The prize ship General Washington, formerly the General Monk, was not
purchased by the Continental government until September, 1782, but in May she
was loaned by the owners to Robert Morris, who sent her to the West Indies in
June under the command of Joshua Barney. She sailed down the bay with a
260
convoy which returned upon seeing a British squadron outside. The General
Washington managed to elude the enemy and got to sea. Upon approaching
Cape Francois she fought an action with a British privateer and captured another
vessel which she sent into port. At Cape Francois, Barney learned of Rodney's
victory over de Grasse and found the remnant of the French fleet under the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, who a little later took his ships to Boston. The letters of
Robert Morris, which Barney had with him, procured for him the escort of a
French sixty-four-gun ship, to insure the safety of his mission, which was the
shipment of a large quantity of specie from Havana to the United States. All this
was accomplished, and the Washington again ran by the British fleet off the
Delaware capes, and, after destroying a number of the enemy's barges in the
bay, returned to Philadelphia, July 17 (Barney, ch. x; Freeman's Journal, July 24,
1782; Independent Chronicle, August 8, 1782; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878,
Matthewman's narrative.) Under orders of Morris, dated October 7, 1782, the
General Washington sailed for France with dispatches for Franklin; after a short
passage she arrived at L'Orient before the end of the month. In January, 1783,
she sailed on the return voyage and arrived at Philadelphia, March 12 (Barney,
ch. xi; Barry, 184; Boston Gazette, March 24, 1783; Adams MSS., December 18,
1782, Barney to Adams.)
The Alliance sailed from New London, August 4, 1782, on a cruise. Soon after
leaving port she recaptured a prize brig. Barry sent home a narrative of this
cruise, dated L'Orient, October 18, saying that he "proceeded as fast as possible
off Bermudas; in my way I took a schooner from that place for Halifax. After
cruizing off there for twelve or fifteen days, I retook a sloop from New London
and sent her for Cape Francois. Finding the prizes I had taken of little value
either to myself or country and in all likelihood should be obliged to return into
port soon for want of men, was determined to alter my cruizing ground. I
therefore thought it best to run off the banks of Newfoundland. In my way there I
fell in with a whaling brigantine with a pass from admiral Digby; I mann'd her and
sent her for Boston. A few days after, off the banks of Newfoundland, I took a
brigantine from Jamaica bound to London, loaded with sugar and rum, and sent
her for Boston; by this vessel I found the Jamaica fleet were to the eastward of
us. I then carried a press of sail for four days; the fifth day I took two ships that
had parted from the fleet. After manning them and having a fresh gale
westwardly, I thought best to order them for France; a day or two after, I took a
snow and a ship belonging to the same fleet. Being short of water and a number
of prisoners on board, the westwardly winds still blowing fresh, and in
expectation of falling in with some more of them, I thought it best to proceed to
France, with a determined view to get those I had already taken in safe, and after
landing the prisoners, to put out immediately; but meeting with blowing weather
and a high sea, I lost the rails of the head and was in great danger of losing the
head, which accident obliged me to put in here where I arrived yesterday with the
above four prizes. After repairing the damages and getting what the ship may
want, I shall put to sea on a cruize. I have likewise to inform you that the
Ramilies, admiral Graves' ship, foundered, but all the crew were saved, several
261
of which were on the prizes I took." (Freeman's Journal, December 18, 1782.)
Some days later the Continental packet General Washington, Captain Barney,
came into L'Orient. Captain Henry Johnson of the Continental navy, who had
been in command of a privateer, was in Bordeaux at the same time. Several
officers of the Alliance, being dissatisfied at not having received their pay,
refused obedience to the captain and Barry ordered them under arrest. He was
unable to obtain others to take their places, and was obliged to sail with
inexperienced lieutenants promoted from the lower grades (Barry, chs. xvi, xvii;
Boston Gazette, August 12, 1782; Mass. Spy, January 2, 1783.)
The Alliance sailed from L'Orient, December 8, on a cruise. January 8, 1783, she
arrived at Martinique, where Barry found orders to proceed to Havana. On the
way thither he was chased by a British fleet and again by a seventy- four and a
frigate. At Havana he found the twenty-gun ship Due de Lauzun, which had been
purchased by Morris for the Continental navy. Barry's orders were to sail at once
for the United States with this vessel in company and with a quantity of specie for
the use of Congress. After a delay of about three weeks, owing to the fact of the
port of Havana being closed by an embargo, the Alliance and the Due de
Lauzun, Captain Green, sailed March 6. On the 10th, they saw three sail, which
gave chase. The strangers turned out to be the British frigates Alarm and Sybil,
and the sloop Tobago. The headmost, which seems to have been the Alarm, got
within gunshot of the Alliance and they exchanged fire, while the other two were
fast coming up with the Lauzun. She was a dull sailer and Barry feared that if he
stood by her, both American ships would be captured. He advised Green to
heave his guns overboard and ran off before the wind, and all but two or three of
them were accordingIy thrown over. Another sail soon appeared which was
recognized as a French ship of fifty guns that had been seen at Havana. Barry
was thereupon encouraged and looked for help from this ship. At this time the
Alliance had dropped astern, nearer the Lauzun, and the Alarm shortened sail
and held off from them. The Sybil got within gunshot of the Lauzun and opened
fire with her bow chasers, which was returned by the Lauzun with stern chasers.
Barry ran between them in order to give Green a chance to get away. The other
two British ships kept at a distance to windward; the French ship also lay to.
Kessler, the mate of the Alliance, says: "Captain Barry went from gun to gun on
the main deck, cautioning against too much haste and not to fire until the enemy
was right abreast. He ordered the main topsail hove to the mast, that the enemy
(who had already fired a Bow gun, the shot of which struck into the cabin of the
Alliance) might come up as soon as he was abrest, when the action began and
before an half hour her guns were silenced and nothing but Musketry was fired
from her. She appeared very much injured in her hull. She was of 32 guns and
appeared very full of men, and after an action of 45 minutes She sheered off."
(Barry, 223.) The Alliance lost ten wounded, one of them mortally; the Sybil, two
killed and six wounded.
The log of the Sybil records that the American vessels were sighted at half-past
five in the morning and the British then gave chase; at eleven the Alliance
262
showed Continental colors. At half-past eleven "the Comr (Commodore, evidently
meaning the Alarm.) fired two or three broadsides at the large ship, who returned
it; we were at this time about 3 miles astern of the Comre. The Tobago was
abreast of us carrying a press of sail to get up." Twenty minutes later the Sybil
got into action with the Alliance and received considerable injury to sails and
rigging. At half-past twelve "a large ship bore down to the ship we Engaged, wch
obliged us to sheer off." (Brit. Adm. Rec., Ships' Logs, No. 875.) Kessler's story
continues: "As soon as the ship which we had engaged hove from us, her
consorts joined her and all made sail, after which the French ship came down to
us and Captain Barry asked them why they did not come down during the action.
They answered that they thought we might have been taken and the signal
known and the action only a sham to decoy him. His foolish idea thus perhaps
lost us the three frigates." (Barry, 224.) They then chased the British, but the
French ship was slow and the pursuit was abandoned. The voyage was then
continued. The Alliance and Due de Lauzun became separated off Cape
Hatteras. Finding two British cruisers off the Delaware capes, the Alliance bore
away for Newport, arriving there March 20. The Lauzun got into Philadelphia on
the 21st. The Alliance a few days later went up to Providence, where in due time
the crew were paid off and discharged (Barry, ch. xviii; Independent Chronicle,
February 27, 1783; Continental Journal, February 27, 1783.)
After the return of the frigate Deane from her cruise in the spring of 1782,
Captain Nicholson was relieved of his command, for what reason is not clear; he
was tried by a court martial in September, 1783, and honorably acquitted.
Meanwhile, in September, 1782, the name of the ship was changed to Hague
and "on Monday 11th instant John Manly, Esq., Captain in the American navy
was appointed to the command of the Continental frigate Hague in this harbour,
agreeable to an order from the Hon. Robert Morris, Esq., principal Agent of
Marine, investing said command in the senior officer resident in the department.
Capt. Manly, at 2 P.M. of the same day, repaired on board, attended by his
principal officers, and was welcomed with united acclamations; 13 guns were
fired in honor of the appointment, the ship beautifully decorated with colours and
every possible demonstration of joy expressed a general satisfaction."
(Independent Chronicle, September 26, 1782.) Manley had recently returned
from a long imprisonment in England. The Hague made a cruise in the West
Indies and took several prizes. In January, 1783, she was chased by a British
ship and ran aground near Guadaloupe. Manley wrote, January 26: "I have
already acquainted you that I have been drove on shore, after a 36 hours chace,
by a 50 gun ship, and lay at the mercy of her incessant fire for two days, who
with the assistance of a 74 and two other sail of the line to back her, were not
very sparing of a heavy and brisk cannonade. However, without a man killed and
only one slightly wounded and my damages repaired in hull, masts, &c. &c., it is
with pleasure I look to the prospect of getting out to-morrow for Martinico, Fort
Royal, for heaving down." (Independent Chronicle, February 27, 1783.) The
Hague returned to Boston not long after and was soon put out of commission
(Boston Post, December 14, 1782, November 8, 1783; Boston Gazette,
263
December 16,1782, January 27, February 3, March 3, 1783; Essex Inst. Coll.,
January, 1909.)
After his return to America in the Ariel, in February, 1781, Captain Jones spent
another long period on shore, waiting for an important command and again
doomed to disappointment. Before be left France, Jones received an intimation
that the America, seventy-four, would be reserved for him (Jones MSS.,
November 8,1780), and June 26, 1781, he was appointed to command her by a
unanimous vote of Congress. In August, he went to Portsmouth to superintend
the completion of the ship. This work had previously been conducted by Captain
Barry. Instead of being nearly ready to launch, as Jones had been led to expect,
he found her only partly built. He calls her the largest seventy-four in the world,
one hundred and eighty-two feet, six inches long on the upper gun deck, a
hundred and fifty feet on the keel, and with an extreme breadth of fifty feet, six
inches; she measured nineteen hundred and eighty-two tons. She was to mount
thirty eighteen-pounder's on the lower gun-deck, thirty-two twelves on the upper
deck, and fourteen nines on the quarter-deck and forecastle, all long guns. Her
full complement would have been six hundred and twenty-six officers and men.
Jones remained in Portsmouth more than a year, scarcity of money causing the
accustomed delay in the construction of the ship. Delay and other difficulties,
however, also resulted from lack of experience, among those employed on the
work, in building so large a ship. In constant fear of parties landing from the
enemy's squadron, for the purpose of destroying the ship, it was necessary to
keep a guard of workmen and citizens at night for her protection. Several times
the enemy's boats appeared in the river at night, and twice, coming close, were
fired upon. August 13, 1782, the Magnifique, a ship of the line belonging to the
French fleet of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, at that time entering Boston Harbor, ran
aground on Lovell's Island and was lost. September 3, the Continental Congress,
being "desirous of testifying on this occasion to his Majesty the sense they
entertain of his generous exertions in behalf of the United States: Resolved, That
the agent of marine be and he is hereby instructed to present the America, a 74
gun ship, in the name of the United States, to the Chevalier de la Luzerne for the
service of His Most Christian Majesty." So Jones again lost a fine ship. He
remained at Portsmouth, however, until after the launch of the America, which
took place November 6, 1782. The ship remained less than four years in the
French service, being condemned as unseaworthy in 1786, and broken up.
Immediately after the launching, Jones returned to Philadelphia. With the consent
of Congress be made a cruise to the West Indies in Vaudreuil's fleet. Upon news
of the conclusion of peace be again returned to Philadelphia, and later was sent
by Congress to France in order to prosecute claims for prize money, still unpaid
and due for the capture of the Serapis and other vessels (Sherburne, 227-238;
Sands, 328-352; Almon, xv, 24; U. S. Nav. Inst. Proc., xxxiv (June, 1908), 573580; Amer. Cath. Hist. Res., April, 1904; Boston Gazette, August 19, November
11, 1782; Independent Chronicle, November 14, 1782; Mar. Com. Letter Book,
244, 245 (November 6, 1779); Archives de la Marine, B4 185, 304-307, 310-316,
264
318, 319. For the prosecution of the prize claims, see Paullin's Diplomatic
Negotiations of American Naval Officers, ch. i.)
One of the latest naval exploits of the war was the capture of a British privateer in
Long Island Sound by a detachment of forty men from the army. Colonel
Tallmadge, in a report to General Washington, dated Greenfield, Connecticut,
February 21, 1783, says: "Yesterday the Enemy's Vessel was discovered near
Stratford Point, when at 2 o'Clock P.M. the troops were embarked in a fast sailing
Vessel prepared for that purpose, which was commanded by Capt. Hubbel, and
at 4 P.M. they came up with her, when she gave a discharge of her Cannon
followed by her Swivels and Musketry (our troops being concealed) till both
Vessels met, when the troops rose, gave the Enemy one discharge of Musketry
and boarded them with fixed Bayonets. The Captain of the Privateer was killed
and only three or four of his Men were wounded, two of them supposed mortally
wounded. Tho' Captain Hubbel's Vessel was much damaged in her Hull, Spars &
Rigging, Yet not a man on board was killed or wounded. Captain Brewster, who
commanded the Troops, as well as the other Officers and Soldiers on board,
deserve Commendation for the Spirit and Zeal with which this Service has been
performed. The Privateer is called the Three Brothers, was commanded by
Captain Johnstone, mounting eleven Carriage Guns, four Swivels and twenty-five
Stand of small Arms, and navigated by twenty-one men." (Pap. Cont. Conqr.,
152, 11, 87.)
The battle between the Alliance and the Sybil was doubtless the last naval action
of the Revolution, with the possible exception of some privateering exploit.
Provisional articles of peace had been signed at Paris, November 30, 1782, and
January 20, 1783, an armistice had been arranged. In compliance with this,
dispatches were sent to belligerents on land and sea proclaiming the cessation of
hostilities. In the newspapers appeared the following order signed by Robert
Morris: "To all Captains, Commanders, Masters and other officers of armed
vessels, commissioned by the United States in Congress assembled, and to all
others whom it shall or may in any wise concern: According to the orders of the
United States in Congress unto me given on the 24th day of this present month
of March, I do hereby recall all armed vessels cruising under commissions from
the United States of America, whereof you will please to take notice. Done in the
Marine Office of the United States of America, this twenty-fifth day of March, in
the Year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three." (Mass.
Spy, April 17, 1783.) The signing of the definitive treaty, September 3, 1783, and
its ratification by Congress, January 14, 1784, were the remaining steps
necessary for the establishment of peace.
In the spring of 1783, there were five vessels remaining of the Continental navy:
the frigates Alliance, Hague, and Bourbon, the first two only in commission, and
the ships General Washington and Duc de Lauzun. In 1782, three hundred and
eighty-three letters of marque were granted by the Continental Congress to
265
private armed vessels; in 1783, the number dropped to twenty-two (Naval
Records (calendar), 217-495.)
The British navy increased during 1782 from five hundred and fifty-one vessels of
all classes to six hundred and eight; vessels in commission from three hundred
and ninety-eight to four hundred and thirty. In 1782, there were seventy vessels
on the North American station, and in January, 1783, there were sixty- two,
besides more than twice as many in the West Indies. The total number of
seamen and marines was one hundred thousand in 1782 and in the following
year there were ten thousand more (Hannay, ii, 211; Schomberg, ii, 68, 124, iv,
418, 420; Clowes, iii, 327, 328.)
In the last two years of the war England lost five hundred and fifteen vessels
taken by her enemies, and recaptured or ransomed a hundred and thirteen of
them; she captured one hundred and eighty-six, of which only three were
retaken. According to the same authority the total number of merchantmen and
privateers captured from the British during the whole war was thirty-one hundred
and seventy-six, eighty-nine of them belonging to the latter class; of this total
eight hundred and ninety-three were retaken or ransomed. From her enemies
England took during the war thirteen hundred and fifty-one, including two
hundred and sixteen privateers; of all these only twenty-eight were recaptured
(Ibid., 396. Unfortunately, in these tables Americans cannot be distinguished
from other enemies, after 1777.) Of the regular navy of England there were
taken, destroyed, burnt, foundered or wrecked daring the war, two hundred and
three vessels; of those captured, eighteen were retaken (Ibid., iv, 109-113. For
other estimates, see Almon, xvi, 190, 191; Schomberg, v, 41-43.)
The ships of the Continental navy were gradually disposed of, their crews
disbanded, and this interesting organization passed into history. The Duc de
Lauzun was loaned to the French minister, converted into a transport, and sent to
France, where she was sold. The Bourbon was launched at Middletown,
Connecticut, July 31, 1783, and in September was advertised for sale.
Meanwhile the Hague had been advertised in August; she was described as
being of five hundred and seventeen tons burden, ninety-six feet long on the keel
and thirty-two feet wide. These two vessels soon passed into private hands. The
General Washington was employed as a packet until the summer of 1784, when
she also was sold. The Alliance was retained a year longer. There was a strong
sentiment in favor of keeping this ship permanently in the national service, and
on January 15, 1784, a committee of Congress reported that the honor of the flag
and the protection of the coast required her repair. Many felt, however, that all
naval expenditure should cease. The question was deliberated from time to time
until May 23, 1785, when considerations of economy prevailed and a committee
of Congress recommended the sale of the frigate. She was accordingly sold in
August, 1785 (Barney, 148; Barry, 258; Independent Chronicle, August 7, 1783;
Boston Post, August 30, September 13, 1783; Pap. Cont. Congr., 26, 441, 443
(April 11, 18, 1783), 28, 213, 221, 225 (January 15, March 30, 1784, May
266
23,1785), 137, 2, 677 (July 22, 1783); Jour. Cont. Congr., April 21, 1783, June 3,
1785.)
Adequate naval protection was needed at the close of the Revolution and has
been ever since, and will be, until international arbitration has taken the place of
war. Even before the sale of the Alliance, the Algerines began their aggressions
upon American commerce. With this frigate as the flagship of a small squadron,
with John Paul Jones in command, the insolence of the Barbary pirates might
have been checked at the outset, saving much blood and money and avoiding
humiliation. It may be affirmed with confidence that with a suitable naval force our
troubles with France and England during the wars of the French Revolution and
Empire might have been prevented. In the summer of 1782 there was published
a newspaper letter "On the Subject of an American Navy"; it was signed
"Leonidas." It pointed out the importance of commerce and naval protection and
recommended a fleet of five ships of the line and ten frigates (Independent
Chronicle, September 5, 1782, from the Penn. Gazette.) In a report on the
condition of the navy, July 31, 1783, Robert Morris urged the need of a fleet, but
advised against taking any steps until funds should be obtained. Lack of money
was necessarily the determining factor (Pap. Cont. Congr., 137, 2, 725. For John
Adams's views of sea power in general and of American needs, see Wharton, iii,
542, 543, 833, 834.)
Captain Jones was a close student of naval science and his opinions, freely
expressed, are of interest and value. In 1777, he prepared "A Plan for the
Regulation and Equipment of the Navy, drawn up at the request of the Honorable
the President of Congress." He proposed to establish a dockyard for building and
fitting out ships in each of three sections of the country, the eastern, middle, and
southern, and to divide the navy into three squadrons, one to rendezvous at each
dockyard. The qualifications and duties of the officers at these yards were set
forth in detail. The chief officers, or Commissioners, one from each yard, were to
hold yearly conferences at Philadelphia with the Board of Admiralty, to whom
they were to report on conditions at the yards. "The Authority of the
Commissioners must by no means extend to the destination of Ships or their
internal Government, it being their Province only to keep the Navy in fit Order for
Sea service and it being the Province of Commanders in the Navy to govern their
Ships according to the Rules and Regulations established by the supreme Power
of Congress and to follow the Instructions which they may Receive from the
board of Admiralty or their deputies, or from Senior or Flag Officers.
Consequently Commanders of Squadrons or of single Ships have a right to call
on the Commissioners or Agents for supplies whenever they are in want of them,
being always accountable to Senior Officers in their division for their Conduct, but
more especially so to the Board of Admiralty. As the extent of the Continent is so
great that the most advantageous Enterprize may be lost before Orders can
arrive within the eastern and Southern districts from the board of Admiralty, it will
perhaps be expedient to appoint deputies for executing the Office of High
Admiral within these extreme districts, to continue in Office only during the
267
Pleasure and at all times accountable to the Board of Admiralty. Perhaps one
deputy to the Eastward and another to the Southward may be found equal to the
Business, but the number in each department ought not to exceed three. They
ought to be Men of inviolable Secrecy, who inherit much discernment and
Segacity and are endowed with consummate Knowledge in Marine Affairs.
Besides pointing out proper Services for single Ships and for Squadrons, it may
be the duty of the deputies, with the assistance of three or more of the most
Judicious commanders of the Fleet who may be named by the board of
Admiralty, to examine the abilities of Men who apply for Commissions, and make
report to the Board, also to examine divers Persons who now bear Commissions
in the Service and whoe's Abilities and accomplishments are very suspicious and
uncertain; the board may do the same within the middle district . . . It may also be
expedient to establish an Academy at each Dockyard under proper masters,
whoe's duty it should be to Instruct the Officers of the Fleet when in Port in the
Principles and Application of the Mathematicks, Drawing, Fencing and other
manly Arts and Accomplishments. It will be requisite that young Men serve a
certain time in Quality of Midshipmen or Master's mate, before they are examined
for Promotion. And the necessity of Establishing an Hospital near each
Dockyard, under the care of Skilful Physicians, is self evident." (Jones MSS.,
April 7, 1777.)
Writing to Robert Morris, September 22, 1782, Jones says: "I have many things
to offer respecting the formation of our navy, but shall here limit myself to one,
which I think a preliminary to the formation and establishment of a naval
constitution suitable to the local situation, resources and prejudices of the
Continent. The constitution adopted for the navy in the year 1775 and by which it
has been governed ever since, and crumbled away I may say to nothing, is so
very defective that I am of opinion it would be difficult to spoil it. Much wisdom
and more knowledge than we possess is, in my humble opinion, necessary to the
formation of such a naval constitution as is absolutely wanting . . . We are a
young people and need not be ashamed to ask advice from nations older and
more experienced in marine affairs than ourselves . . . My plan for forming a
proper corps of sea officers is by teaching them the naval tactics in a fleet of
evolution . . . When in port the young officers should be obliged to attend at the
academies established at each dock-yard, where they should be taught the
principles of every art and science that is necessary to form the character of a
great sea officer; and every commission officer of the navy should have free
access and be entitled to receive instruction gratis at those academies. All this
would be attended with no very great expense and the public advantage resulting
from it would be immense. I am sensible it cannot be immediately adopted and
that we must first look about for ways and means, but the sooner it is adopted the
better . . . In time of peace it is necessary to prepare and be always prepared for
war by sea." (Sherburne, 232, 233.)
268
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER XVIII
NAVAL PRISONERS
The lot of the prisoner of war has always been an unhappy one at best; in early
times put to the sword, at a later day enslaved, and even in modern wars
sometimes unavoidably subjected to most unfavorable conditions in the
exigencies of a campaign. Civilized countries have at times permitted a treatment
of prisoners unnecessarily harsh and even cruel. At the outset of a civil war the
question arises whether or not the rebel shall be dealt with as a traitor and
criminal, but fear of reprisals soon forces the virtual if not explicit recognition of
belligerent rights. Lord George Germain, writing to General Howe, February 1,
1776, in regard to some American officers captured on a privateer by the British,
says: "It is hoped that the possession of these prisoners will enable you to
procure the release of such of his majesty's officers and loyal subjects as are in
the disgraceful situation of being prisoners to the rebels; for although it cannot be
that you should enter into any treaty or agreement with rebels for a regular cartel
for exchange of prisoners, yet I doubt not but your own discretion will suggest to
you the means of effecting such exchange without the king's dignity and honor
being committed or His Majesty's name used in any negotiation for that purpose."
(Hist. Mag., March, 1862.) Here may be noted an intimation of the bitterness
commonly exhibited in civil strife, which is sometimes conveniently visited upon
the helpless prisoner. This should impose upon governments and officers of rank
an increased sense of responsibility for the acts of subordinates. The accounts of
the treatment of prisoners in New York, unquestionably authentic though perhaps
colored by privation, are difficult to reconcile with the undoubted humane
character of some of the British officers in command. The situation of the British
at that place and their resources could hardly have been such as to prevent the
proper care of prisoners.
At New York many buildings were converted into prisons and several prisonships were moored in the harbor, especially in Wallabout Bay, where the Navy
Yard at Brooklyn now is. Most of the prisoners taken at sea were confined in
these hulks. There were probably prison-ships in most British harbors frequented
by cruising vessels, and other ships were at times temporarily used for the
purpose. The best known places in England where Americans were confined
were Mill Prison at Plymonth and Forton Prison at Portsmouth.
The treatment of American prisoners by the British gave rise to much discussion
in Congress and to a voluminous correspondence between commanding officers
and commissaries of prisoners. January 18, 1777, General Washington wrote to
Admiral Howe "on the subject of the cruel treatment which our officers and men
in the naval department, who are unhappy enough to fall into your hands, receive
269
on board the prisonships in the harbour of New York." To General Howe on the
same day he wrote: "Those who have been lately sent out give the most
shocking account of their barbarous usage, which their miserable, emaciated
countenances confirm . . . Most of the prisoners who have returned home [by
exchange] have informed me that they were offered better treatment provided
they would enlist into your service. This I believe is unprecedented; and what, if
true, makes it still more unnecessary for me to apologize for the freedom of
expression which I have used throughout this letter." (Washington, v,
166,169,170.) Washington threatened retaliation. Admiral Howe replied, January
17, that the reports of ill treatment were exaggerated, that some prisoners having
escaped, less liberty was allowed than formerly and crowding made necessary,
that the prisoners had the same ration and medical attendance as British sailors.
May 28, Washington wrote to the President of Congress that many of the
prisoners released by the British were unfit for exchange by reason of the
severity of their treatment and that a deduction should be made on their account.
This was before the Jersey, a dismantled sixty-four-gun ship, was brought to
New York and moored in Wallabout Bay, and became the most notorious of all
the prison- ships. In 1779, there was an improvement on board these ships at
New York, acknowledged by Washington and confirmed by a letter from one of
the prisoners. This was only temporary, however, and a year or two later
conditions were at their worst, although an attempt at reform seems to have been
made by Admiral Graves in 1781 (Jour. Cont. Congr., resolves: December 7,
1776, June 10, 1777, April 21, 1780, September 4, 18, 1781; committee reports:
December 7, 1776, January 7, 9, 1777; Pap. Cont. Congr., 152, 3, 505, 4, 113
(Howe to Washington, January 23, April 21,1777), 5, 221 (Washington to Howe,
November 23, 1777), 10, 233 (Affleck to Washington, August 30, 1781);
Washington, v, 170, 394, 423, vi, 193, viii, 121, 338, ix, 119; Boston Gazette,
September 17,1781.)
In addition to the practice, alluded to by Washington, of tempting prisoners to
enlist in the British service by promises of better treatment, they were sometimes
impressed, and on board cruising ships also, at times, they were forced to bear
arms against their countrymen. In 1776, William Barry, a prisoner on the
Roebuck in Delaware Bay, and Elisha Cole, an American shipmaster on the
frigate Milford, were compelled to do this, and both afterwards made depositions
to the fact. In retaliation Congress authorized Captain Biddle to take British
prisoners from jail to fill his complement. There are several accounts, however, of
humane treatment on board British cruising ships and on prison-ships at Halifax
and elsewhere. Captain Daniel Lunt of Newburyport was well treated on board
the British cruiser Lively, which captured him off Cape Ann in 1776, although
afterwards, when transferred to the Renown, he and other shipmasters were
robbed of their money and put at hard labor. Joshua Barney was treated with
marked kindness on three different cruising ships and with an equal degree of
severity on two others. Nathaniel Fanning, who was several times a prisoner,
was robbed and maltreated on two British vessels, but on other occasions fared
very well. In 1777, Captain Stephen Hills was well treated on a prison-ship at
270
Halifax, and in 1782 eighty-one Americans at the same place, and others in a
hospital there, had the best of care. In 1781, Captain Tucker of the privateer
Thorn escaped from the Island of St. John's (Prince Edward Island) and reported
that he had been very kindly treated there. The same year some prisoners who.
arrived in Salem from Newfoundland acknowledged "the very humane and
benevolent treatment which they received from Admiral Edwards." The next year
nearly three hundred Americans were brought home from there in a cartel (Am.
Arch. IV, v, 759, vi, 809, V, ii, 538; Pap. Cont. Congr., 19, 3, 581 (December 7,
1776) ; Barney, 51, 66, 70, 86; Fanning, 14-18, 144-148, 229-238; A. Sherburne,
49-76; Tucker, 163; Boston Gazette, September 30, 1776, July 28, 1777; Mass.
Spy, September 11, 1776; Independent Chronicle, February 5, 1778 ;
Continental Journal, August 23, 1781; Salem Gazette, November 15, 1781, July
18, October 17, 1782.; Boston Post, July 20, 1782; Hunt's Mag., February, 1857.
Many years after the war Nathaniel Bowditch told the following Revolutionary
anecdote, which had been related to him by his father: "Capt. Tuck of
Manchester in a small privateer was taken by a British vessel of war, & his crew
was carried on board & detained as prisoners. Cruising afterwards on the eastern
shore, the vessel struck on a sunken ledge at some distance from a small island
then in sight and soon bilged. Their situation soon became extremely dangerous,
the greatest confusion prevailed on board, and the British seamen finding that
none of the stores on board the ship could possibly be saved, procured from the
store room considerable quantities of rum & drank so freely that they soon
became incapable of doing their duty, and in getting out the boats bilged & lost
them. Their situation now became desperate, they seemed to have no chance of
saving their lives, as the crew were so disorderly and incompetent of doing their
duty. Capt. Tuck then proposed to the British commander to make a raft out of
the spars, yards, &c. of the ship and offered his services in doing it, provided he
could have it under his own direction, with none to assist except the American
prisoners, most of whom were free from intoxication. This offer was cheerfully
accepted & he made out to get the crew safely ashore without losing a man, but
before anything else could be got from the ship, she went to pieces. The British
Commander on the Halifax Station liberated Capt. T. and his crew without parole
or exchange, on account of his services." (Pickering MSS., xxx, 415.)
In June, 1778, Robert Sheffield, a shipmaster of Stonington, Connecticut, made
his escape from one of the New York prison-ships after a confinement of only six
days. There were three hundred and fifty men on board confined below, although
it is to be presumed that they were allowed on deck in the daytime, as was the
custom. Sheffield says the heat was "so intense that they were all naked . . .
Their sickly countenances and ghastly looks were truly horrible, some swearing
and blaspheming, some crying, praying and wringing their hands and stalking
about like ghosts, others delirious, raving and storming; some groaning and
dying, all panting for breath; some dead and corrupting, air so foul at times that a
lamp could not be kept burning, by reason of which the boys were not missed till
they had been dead ten days." There were five or six deaths a day (Conn.
271
Gazette, July 10, 1778, quoted in Onderdonk's Revolutionary Incidents, 227,
228.) Captain John Chester wrote to General Webb, January 17, 1777: "The
inhuman treatment our prisoners met with while in New York is beyond all
description. Humanity cannot but drop a tear at sight of the poor, miserable,
starved objects. They are mere skeletons, unable to creep or speak in many
instances. One vessel lost 27 in her passage from New York to Milford
[Connecticut], and 7 died the night they were put ashore; and they are dying all
along the road." (Correspondence of General Webb, i, 184.) According to a
report from Boston, February 4, 1779, "a cartel lately brought 136 prisoners from
prison-ships in N.Y. to N. London. Such was the condition in which these poor
creatures were put aboard the cartel, that in this short run 16 died on board and
60, when they landed, were scarcely able to move, and the remainder greatly
emaciated." (Onderdonk, 229.) The most favorable account comes from Daniel
Stanton, who writes from Stonington, August 28, 1779: "I was taken with a
number of others on or about the 5th of June last in the ship Oliver Cromwell,
carried into New York and put on the Prison Ship Jersey. There was nothing
plundered from us, we were kindly used by the Captain and others that belonged
to the ship. Our Sick were attended by Physicians who appeared very Officious
to recover them to health. Our Allowance for Subsistance was wholesome and in
reasonable Plenty, including the Allowance by the Continental Congress sent on
Board. About three or four weeks past we were removed on board the Prison
Ship Good Hope, where we found many sick; there is now a hospital ship
provided, to which they are removed and good Attention paid, and doubt not the
same Hospitality is used towards those of the Enemy, where the Fortune of War
has cast into our hands. On the whole we were as humanely treated as our
Condition and the Enemy's Safety would admit." (Conn. Gazette, September 1,
1779, quoted in Papers New London Hist. Soc., IV, i, 44.) Another good account
is given by Captain Thomas Dring and others who escaped from the Good Hope
(N. J. Gazette, October 12, 1779, quoted in Onderdonk, 230.) According to
Joshua Barney, a prisoner in 1778, Admiral Byron during his short stay on the
station took great pains to improve as far as possible the conditions on New York
prison-ships (Barney, 74.) These conditions probably varied from time to time
according to the characters of different officers and subordinates in charge, and
according to the weather and other circumstances, especially the number of
prisoners on board. The Continental Congress provided the means for supplying
the prisoners at New York with extra food and appointed a merchant named
Pintard as agent to look after them (Pap. Cont. Congr., 37, 322 (October 6,
1780).)
Philip Freneau, the poet, was a passenger on the armed ship Aurora of
Philadelphia, which was captured after an hour's engagement by the British
frigate Iris, May 26, 1780, and taken to New York. Freneau was sent on board
the prison-ship Scorpion in the North River, where he was "almost suffocated
with the heat and stench." He relates that on the night of June 4 "about thirty-five
of our people formed a design of making their escape, in which they were
favored by a large schooner accidentally alongside of us . . . We were then
272
suffered to continue upon deck, if we chose, till nine o'clock. We were all below
by that time except the insurgents, who rushed upon the sentries and disarmed
them in a moment," and drove them into the cabin. "When the sentries were all
silent they manned the ship's boat and boarded the schooner, though the people
on board attempted to keep them off with hand-spikes. The wind blowing fresh at
south and the flood of tide being made, they hoisted sail and were out of sight in
a few minutes . . . As soon as the sentries got possession of the vessel again,
which they had no difficulty in doing, as there was no resistance made, they
posted themselves at each hatchway and most basely and cowardly fired fore
and aft among us, pistols and musquets, for a full quarter of an hour without
intermission. By the mercy of God they touched but four, one mortally." The next
morning "all that were found wounded were put in irons and ordered to lie upon
deck, exposed to the burning sun. About four o'clock P.M., one of the poor
fellows who had been wounded the night before died. They then took him out of
irons, sent him on shore, and buried him. After this no usage seemed to them
severe enough for us. We had water given us to drink that a dog could scarcely
relish; it was thick and clammy and had a dismal smell. They withdrew our
allowance of rum and drove us down every night strictly at sunset, where we
suffered inexpressibly till seven. o'clock in the morning, the gratings being rarely
opened before that time. Thus did I live with my miserable companions till the
22d of June. When finding myself taken with a fever, I procured myself to be put
on the sick list, and the same day was sent with a number of others to the Hunter
hospital-ship, lying in the East River. Here was a new scene opened. The Hunter
had been very newly put to the use of a hospital-ship. She was miserably dirty
and cluttered. Her decks leaked to such a degree that the sick were deluged with
every shower of rain. Between decks they lay along, struggling in the agonies of
death, dying with putrid and bilious fevers, lamenting their hard fate to die at such
a fatal distance from their friends; others totally insensible and yielding their last
breath in all the horrors of light-headed frenzy." (Freneau's Capture of the
Aurora, 15-41.)
In the fall of 1780, Captain Silas Talbot was confined on the Jersey. There were
then about eleven hundred prisoners on board, with no berths to lie in nor
benches to sit on; many were almost without clothes. Dysentery and fever
prevailed. The scantiness and bad quality of the provisions, the brutality of the
guards, and the sick pining for comforts they could not obtain, altogether
furnished one of the greatest scenes of human distress ever beheld. The weather
was cool and dry, with frosty nights, so that the number of deaths was reduced to
an average of ten a day, which was small compared with the mortality for three
months before. The human bones and skulls still bleaching on the shore of Long
Island as late as 1803, and daily exposed by the falling of the high bank on which
the prisoners were buried, was a shocking sight (Historical Sketch of Silas
Talbot, 106-109.) A few years after that these bones were collected and buried
and a monument erected over them.
273
Ebenezer Fox, describing the Jersey as she was in 1781, says: "Her external
appearance was forbidding and gloomy. She was dismantled; her only spars
were the bowsprit, a derrick that looked like a gallows, for hoisting supplies on
board, and a flagstaff at the stern. The port-holes were closed and secured. Two
tiers of holes were cut through her sides, about two feet square and about ten
feet apart, strongly guarded by a grating of iron bars." (Fox, 96.) Fox and his
shipmates upon their arrival "were ordered to ascend to the upper deck of the
prison ship. Here our names were registered . . . Each of us was permitted to
retain whatever clothing and bedding we had brought, after having been
examined" for weapons and money; "and then we were directed to pass through
a strong door on the starboard side, down a ladder leading to the main hatchway.
I now found myself in a loathsome prison, among a collection of the most
wretched and disgusting looking objects that I ever beheld in human form. Here
was a motley crew, covered with rags and filth, visages pallid with disease,
emaciated with hunger and anxiety, and retaining hardly a trace of their original
appearance." (Fox, 99.) "The various messes of the prisoners [of six men each]
were numbered, and nine in the morning was the hour when the steward would
deliver from the window in his room, at the after part of the ship, the allowance
granted . . . Each mess received daily what was equivalent in weight or measure,
but not in quality, to the rations of four men at full allowance; that is, each
prisoner received two thirds as much as was allowed to a seaman in the British
navy. Our bill of fare was as follows: on Sunday, one pound of biscuit, one pound
of pork and half a pint of peas; Monday, one pound of biscuit, one pint of oatmeal
and two ounces of butter; Tuesday, one pound of biscuit and two pounds of salt
beef; Wednesday, one and a half pounds of flour and two ounces of suet.
Thursday was a repetition of Sunday's fare, Friday of Monday's and Saturday of
Tuesday's. If this food had been of a good quality and properly cooked, as we
had no labor to perform, it would have kept us comfortable, at least from
suffering. But this was not the case. All our food appeared to be damaged." (Fox,
101-102.) "The cooking for the prisoners was done in a great copper vessel that
contained between two and three hogsheads of water, set in brick work. The
form of it was square and it was divided into two compartments by a partition. In
one of these the peas and oatmeal were boiled; this was done in fresh water. In
the other the meat was boiled in salt water taken up from alongside the ship. The
Jersey, from her size and lying near the shore, was imbedded in the mud . . . All
the filth that accumulated among upwards of a thousand men was daily thrown
overboard and would remain there till carried away by the tide. The impurity of
the water may be easily conceived; and in this water our meat was boiled." (Fox,
105-106.)
"In the morning the prisoners were permitted to ascend the upper deck, to spend
the day till ordered below at sunset. A certain number, who were for the time
called the 'working party,' performed in rotation the duty of bringing up hammocks
and bedding for airing, likewise the sick and infirm and the bodies of those who
had died during the night; of these there were generally a number every morning.
After these services it was their duty to wash the decks. . . . About two hours
274
before sunset, orders were given to the prisoners to carry all their things below,
but we were permitted to remain above till we retired for the night. . . . At sunset
our ears were saluted with the insulting and hateful sound from our keepers, of
'Down, rebels, down,' and we were hurried below, the hatchways fastened over
us and we were left to pass the night amid the accumulated horrors of sighs and
groans, of foul vapor, a nauseous and putrid atmosphere, in a stifled and almost
suffocating heat. The tiers of holes through the sides of the ship were strongly
grated, but not provided with glass, and it was considered a privilege to sleep
near one of these apertures in hot weather ... But little sleep, however, could be
enjoyed even there, for the vermin were so horribly abundant that all the personal
cleanliness we could practise would not protect us from their attacks." When the
dead, sewn in blankets, were taken ashore, some of the prisoners went with
them, "under a guard, to perform the labor of interment . . . Here in a bank near
the Wallabout a hole was excavated in the sand, in which the body was put and
then slightly covered, the guard not giving time sufficient to perform this
melancholy service in a faithful manner. Many bodies would, in a few days after
this mockery of a burial, be exposed nearly bare by the action of the elements."
(Fox, 109-111.)
Thomas Andros was also on the Jersey in 1781, and says: "When I first became
an inmate of this abode of suffering, despair and death, there were about four
hundred prisoners on board, but in a short time they amounted to twelve
hundred. And in proportion to our numbers the mortality increased." (Andros, Old
Jersey Captive, 12.) Dysentery, smallpox, and yellow fever were prevalent. "Now
and then an American physician was brought in as a captive, but if he could
obtain his parole he left the ship, nor could we much blame him for this. For his
own death was next to certain and his success in saving others by medicine in
our situation was small. I remember only two American physicians who tarried on
board a few days. No English physician or any one from the city ever to my
knowledge came near us." (Andros, 15.) "Our water was good, could we have
had enough of it; our bread was bad in the superlative degree. I do not recollect
seeing any which was not full of living vermin; but eat it, worms and all, we must
or starve." (Andros, 17.) Andros eventually escaped. Attempts to escape from the
prison-ships were frequent and not uncommonly successful. The crew of the
Jersey consisted of a captain, two mates, a steward, a cook, and about a dozen
sailors, besides a guard of ten or twelve invalid marines and about thirty soldiers.
By eluding the vigilance of these guards, or perhaps bribing a sentry, it was
sometimes possible to get away from the ship in a boat or by swimming. Upon
reaching shore, however, fugitives had many difficulties to encounter, especially
the unfriendliness of the tory population of Long Island (lbid., 24 et seq.; Fox, ch.
viii. For other experiences of prisoners, see Dring's Recollections of Jersey
Prison Ship; Taylor's Martyrs in the Prison-Ships; A. Sherburne, ch. v; Hist. Mag.,
July, 1866 (Suppl.); Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, Matthewman's narrative.)
The method of exchange for the relief of the prisoners' sufferings was not as
generally applicable as could have been wished, partly because the supply of
275
British in the hands of the Americans was inadequate. British prisoners were
released in large numbers by their American captors, especially privateersmen,
because they had no means of supporting them, often, apparently, neglecting to
take their paroles. Washington stated his views on the subject in a letter to the
President of Congress, February 18, 1782, saying: "Mr. Sproat's proposition of
the exchange of British soldiers for American seamen, if acceded to, will
immediately give the enemy a very considerable reinforcement and will be a
constant draft hereafter upon the prisoners of war in our hands. It ought also to
be considered that few or none of the naval prisoners in New York and
elsewhere belong to the Continental service. I however feel for the situation of
these unfortunate people and wish to see them released by any mode which will
not materially affect the public good. In some former letters upon this subject I
have mentioned a plan by which I am certain they might be liberated nearly as
fast as captured. It is by obliging the captains of all armed vessels, both public
and private, to throw their prisoners into common stock, under the direction of the
commissary-general of prisoners. By these means they would be taken care of
and regularly applied to the exchange of those in the hands of the enemy. Now
the greater part are dissipated and the few that remain are applied partially."
(Washington, ix, 444. See negotiations for a general cartel for the exchange of
prisoners, in Webb, ii, 19-85.) Washington corresponded with various British
naval commanders during the last two years of the war and received replies from
Admiral Arbuthnot, Captain Affleck, and Admiral Digby, expressing concern at
the prisoners' plight and a purpose to apply remedies. General Carleton also
made plans in 1782 to correct abuses. The American and British commissaries of
prisoners, Abraham Skinner and David Sproat, also corresponded freely on the
subjects of treatment and exchange of prisoners. Whether or not as a result of
these efforts, conditions seem to have improved in June, 1782, according to the
report of six American shipmasters on parole, "that they had been on board the
prison and hospital ships to inspect the state of the American naval prisoners and
found them in as comfortable situation as it is possible for prisoners to be on
board ships and much better than they had an idea of." This report was published
about two weeks after a letter from Washington to Digby on the subject (Almon,
xiv, 262, 263; Onderdonk, 233-235, 240-244; Mar. Com. Letter Book, 261, 262;
Mass. Spy, August 8, 1782.)
The Americans captured in European waters and many also from this side of the
ocean were sent to prisons in England. The American Commissioners in Paris
began early to interest themselves in the welfare of these prisoners, and Franklin
especially, until the end of the war, was untiring in his efforts to mitigate their
hardships. February 23, 1777, began a correspondence of the commissioners
with Stormont, the British ambassador, in regard to the exchange of prisoners,
which defined the positions of the two nations on the subject at that time. They
wrote: "Captain Wickes of the Reprisal frigate, belonging to the United States of
America, has now in his hands near one hundred British seamen, prisoners. He
desires to know whether an exchange may be made for an equal number of
American seamen now prisoners in England? We take the liberty of proposing
276
this matter to your Lordship and of requesting your opinion (if there be no
impropriety in your giving it) whether such an exchange will probably be agreed
to by your Court. If your people cannot be soon exchanged here, they will be sent
to America." (Sparks's Franklin, ix, 166.)
No reply was received to this and on April 2 they wrote again: "We did ourselves
the Honour of writing some time since to your Lordship on the Subject of
Exchanging Prisoners. You did not condescend to give us any Answer and
therefore we expect none to this. We however take the Liberty of sending you
Copies of certain Depositions, which we shall transmit to Congress, whereby it
will be known to your Court that the United States are not unacquainted with the
barbarous Treatment their People receive, when they have the Misfortune of
being your Prisoners here in Europe. And that if your Conduct towards us is not
altered, it is not unlikely that severe Reprisals may be thought justifiable, from the
Necessity of putting some Check to such abominable Practices. For the sake of
Humanity it is to be wish'd that Men would endeavour to alleviate as much as
possible the unavoidable Misseries attending a State of War. It has been said
that among the civilized Nations of Europe the ancient Horrors of that State are
much diminished, but the Compelling Men by Chains, Stripes & Famine, to fight
against their Friends and Relations, is a new Mode of Barbarity which your
Nation alone has the Honour of inventing. And the sending American Prisoners
of War to Africa and Asia, remote from all Probability of Exchange and where
they can scarce hope ever to hear from their Families, even if the
Unwholesomeness of the Climate does not put a speedy End to their Lives, is a
manner of treating Captives that you can justify by no Precedent or Custom,
except that of the black Savages of Guinea." (Smyth's Franklin, vii, 36.) The
following message, unsigned and undated, was received in reply: "The King's
Ambassador receives no applications from rebels but when they come to implore
His Majesty's Mercy." The commissioners then closed the correspondence: "In
answer to a letter which concerns some of the most material interests of
humanity and of the two nations, Great Britain and the United States of America,
now at war, we received the inclosed indecent paper as coming from your
Lordship, which we return for your Lordship's, more mature consideration."
(Sparks, ix, 167.)
Stormont sent copies of the letter of April 2 and his unsigned reply to Lord
Weymouth and with them the following: "I send your Lordship a Copy of a very
Extraordinary and Insolent Letter, that has just been left at my House by a
Person who called himself an English Gentleman; I thought it by no means
Proper to appear to have received and kept such a Letter, and therefore, My
Lord, instantly sent it Back by a Savoyard, seemingly unopened, under Cover to
Mr. Carmichel, who I discovered to be the Person that had brought the Letter."
(Stevens, 1507; Smyth, vii, 36.) Weymouth wrote to Stormont April 11: "I entirely
approve of the note Your Excellency sent to Mr. Carmichael with the Letter you
returned to him. The Style and Subject deserved no other treatment." (Stevens,
1503, 1507, 1515; Almon, v, 371, 372, 511; Hale, i, 194-198.)
277
The brig Dalton of Newburyport was taken in December, 1776, by the sixty-fourgun ship Raisonable. The crew were sent to Plymouth, England, where after a
while they were transferred to the Burford of seventy guns, Captain George
Bowyer. Here their fortunes, which had been hard, made a great change for the
better. Each man was given an outfit of clothes and bedding, provided by the
captain at his own expense. They were well fed and kindly treated. This was also
the case in the hospital on shore, where the sick had the best care. After several
weeks on the Burford they were transferred to another ship and early in June,
1777, to Mill Prison, near Plymouth, which had been prepared for them. They
were committed on the charge of high treason, to await trial, and could only be
released on receiving the King's pardon. Two members of the Dalton's crew,
Charles Herbert and Samuel Cutler, kept journals in prison. Cutler says the ration
"is 3/4 lb. beef, 1 lb. bread, 1 qt. very ordinary beer, and a few greens per man
for 24 hours. The beef when boiled weighs about 6 oz. This is our allowance
daily, except Saturday, when we have 6 oz. cheese instead of the beef. To sleep
upon, we have a hammock, straw bed and one very thin rug . . . We are allowed
every day to walk in the airing ground from 10 to 12, then locked in till 3 o'clock,
then we are let out again till 7 o'clock, then in and locked up for the night." (N. E.
Hist. and Gen. Reg., April, 1878.)
Herbert wrote, August 31: "Many are strongly tempted to pick up the grass in the
yard and eat it and some pick up old bones in the yard that have been laying in
the dirt a week or ten days and pound them to pieces and suck them. Some will
pick up snails out of the holes in the wall and from among the grass and weeds in
the yard, boil them and eat them and drink the broth . . . Our meat is very poor in
general; we scarcely see a good piece once in a month. Many are driven to such
necessity by want of provisions that they have sold most of the clothes off their
backs for the sake of getting a little money to buy them some bread." (Livesey's
Prisoners of 1776, 65, 66.) Some of the prisoners were able occasionally to earn
a few shillings with which to buy extra food and other necessities. Andrew
Sherburne, who was in Mill Prison in 1782, says there were between eight
hundred and a thousand men confined there at that time (A. Sherburne, 85. For
an English account, see Annual Register, xxi (1778), 78.)
In September, 1777, an improvement began and continued for more than a year.
This was due to outside causes and did not indicate any relaxation of severity on
the part of the government or prison authorities. The sympathies of charitable
people in London and elsewhere had been aroused and a fund was subscribed
which furnished extra food and clothing (Livesey, 68, 70, 91, 92, 96.) Jonathan
Archer wrote to his parents from Mill Prison, September 25, 1778: "The time
seems long and teagous to me; I shall embrace every opportunity of writing. We
have plenty of provisions; the gentlemen have raised a large sum of money for
the relief of the Americans." (Essex Inst. Coll., June, 1864.) Letters of Franklin to
correspondents in England also did much to excite interest in the prisoners
(Wharton, ii, 409, 410, 448, 492.) When the money that had been raised for their
benefit had become exhausted, about the end of 1778, the old conditions
278
returned. The prisoners hunted for rats, and if a dog strayed in, he was
immediately killed and eaten. To be put upon half allowance, as many frequently
were for punishment, was to be reduced nearly to the last extremity.
Nevertheless, the health of the prisoners as a rule was good, and the death rate,
at least for the first two years, compared with that of the New York prison-ships,
was very low. Early in 1782, however, there was much sickness (Livesey, 109,
123, 166, 175, 186, 196, 201, 203, 207, 216, 218; A. Sherburne, 91.)
After France, Spain, and Holland had become involved in the war, the prisoners
from those countries were better treated than the Americans, whose allowance of
bread was a third less than theirs. In the House of Lords, July 2, 1781, an effort
was made to place the Americans on an equality in this respect with the French,
Spanish, and Dutch, but the proposal was defeated by a vote of forty-seven to
fourteen. In the course of the debate on the question it was argued "that the diet
of prisoners, as persons in a state of inactivity, ought to be sparing, and that just
enough to sustain life ought to be the measure of it; for that if more than enough
was allowed, it would render the prisoners unhealthy by producing gross
humours if they eat it, or if they sold what was superabundant, it was probable
they would buy spirits with it and thereby render themselves unhealthy and
unhappy." (Almon, xii, 222, 223; Mag. Amer. Hist., June, 1882.) Very touching
was this solicitude of the Lords for the health of the American prisoners. Their old
enemies, the French and Spanish, might be encouraged to ruin their digestions
by overeating, but in the case of their kinsmen from across the sea, it was not to
be thought of.
Captain Conyngham's experiences in captivity have been alluded to. After his
escape he wrote to Franklin from the Texel, December 1, 1779: "I shall acquaint
you of the many favours I received since I became a captive. 1st, in New York,
that Sir George Collier ordered irons on my legs, with a centry on board the ship.
Mr. Collier going on an expedition ordered me to jaole, there put me into the
condemned room. The first night a cold plank my bed a stone for a pillow. 2d
night allowed a something to lay on; in this horrid room was kept for eight days
without the least morsel of bread, or anything but water, from the keeper of the
prison ... After expostulating of the impropriety of such treatment, [the jailer] told
me he had such orders, but would take it upon himself to release me on my
giving him my strongest assurances I would not make my escape. I readily
consented, it not being in the power of man to get out of the condemned room . .
. In the prison of New York I continued till that tyrant Collier returned ... Then I
was told to get ready to go on board the prison-ship . . . Then a pair of criminal
irons put on my legs, weight 50 pounds; at the door, put into the hangman's cart,
all in form as if bound to the gallows. I was then put into a boat and took
alongside the Raisonable . . . to be sent to England in the packet. In those Irons I
was brought to Pendennis Castle. Then not contented, they manacled my hands
with a new fashioned pair of ruffels fitted very tite. In this condition I was kept
there 15 or 16 days, then brought to Plymouth and lodged in the black hole for
eight days, before they would do me the honour of committing me on suspicion of
279
high treason on his majesties high seas; then put into Mill prison, where we
committed treason through his earth and made our escape. This, Sir, is an
account of their favors, insults excepted. I must acquaint your excellency that the
poor unfortunate prisoners in Plymouth are in a most distressed situation." (Hale,
i, 349; Almon, viii, 340.)
Attempts to escape from Mill Prison were numerous, sometimes by climbing over
the walls, sometimes by burrowing under them, and sometimes by bribing
sentries, the last generally by officers who had money. Among the officers
confined at this place were Captains Manley, Talbot, Johnson, and O'Brien, and
Lieutenants Dale and Barney. Of these the last four escaped, besides
Conyngham; Manley and Talbot made several attempts. Most prisoners' efforts in
this direction failed, but in the aggregate a large number got off and made their
way to Holland and France. At Paris they found a good friend in Franklin, who
gave them money and assistance to the extent of his ability. Those who were
caught after escaping were brought back, confined forty days in a dungeon called
the "black hole," and put upon half allowance of food (Livesey, 56-60, passim,
209-213; Barney, 87-102; O'Brien, 180-183; Port Folio, June, 1814; N. E. Hist.
and Gen. Reg., October, 1878; Essex Inst. Coll., January, 1909; Lee MSS.,
February 28, 1778; Adams MSS., July 16, 1780, June 5, 1781.) Some escaped
by entering the British service, yielding to inducements constantly held out to
them. Those doing so were comparatively few in number, and most of them were
foreigners who had served on American ships. In December, 1778, over a
hundred men in Mill Prison signed an agreement to remain loyal to their country
and under no circumstances to enter the British service (Livesey, 161, 163, 177,
183, 208, 221.) In June, 1778, rumors of exchange began to be heard, which for
many months seemed only to hold out false hopes. In September, the American
Commissioners in Paris wrote to their countrymen in English prisons that they
had at last "obtained assurances from England that an exchange shall take
place." They added: "We have now obtained permission of this government to
put all British prisoners - whether taken by continental frigates or by privateers into the king's prisons, and we are determined to treat such prisoners precisely
as our countrymen are treated in England, to give them the same allowance of
provisions and accommodations and no other. We therefore request you to
inform us with exactness what your allowance is from the government, that we
may govern ourselves accordingly." (Wharton, ii, 729, 730.) It was not until March
15, 1779, that hopes of release were realized and ninety-seven of the inmates of
Mill Prison embarked on a cartel bound for France (Livesey, 139, 141, 179, 182,
199, 200, 219, 223, 224, 233; Wharton, iii, 188. For another account of conditions
on board a receiving-ship in Plymouth Harbor and in Mill Prison, see A.
Sherburne, 76-100; see also journal of William Russell in Ships and Sailors of
Old Salem, chs. vii, viii.)
The brigantine Rising States sailed from Boston, January 26, 1777, and on April
15 was captured in the English Channel by the Terrible, 74, though only after a
spirited resistance. Two weeks later the Terrible arrived at Spithead and the
280
prisoners remained on board until June 14, harshly treated and on three quarters
allowance. They were then removed to Forton Prison, near Portsmouth, being
the first Americans to occupy it. Their experiences are told in the journal of
Timothy Connor, one of the crew of the Rising States. The prison ration was
three quarters of a pound of beef, a pound of bread, and a quart of small beer for
twenty-four hours, and some cabbage every other day. Prisoners in the black
hole, for trying to escape or other misdemeanor, had six ounces of beef, half a
pound of bread, and a pint of beer. Five days after entrance the prisoners "made
a large hole through the wall of the prison and eleven made their escape," two of
whom were caught and brought back. During the first six months more than sixty
escaped, about half of whom were retaken. December 25, Connor says: "Now
the people begin to use humanity throughout England . . . They begin to use us
better. There are subscription books opened in many parts of England for our
relief." (N. E. Hist. and Gen. Reg., July, 1876.) The officers were given five
shillings a week each and the men two shillings. The Reverend Thomas Wren of
Portsmouth took a great interest in the prisoners and visited them daily. David
Hartley, M.P., one of Franklin's English correspondents and an old friend of his,
also visited the prison. Besides the fund raised in England, Franklin sent over
what money he could spare, to be used for the benefit of the prisoners. Much of
this was entrusted to an American merchant in London named Digges, who a few
years later turned out to be a British spy and a defaulter and who embezzled
nearly all the money he had received for the use of the prisoners (Wharton, ii,
492, iii, 523, iv, 623, 645; Hale, i, ch. xi; Adams MSS., July 10, 1778.) May 12,
1778, Connor wrote in his journal: "Nothing to eat these two days but stinking
beef. All the men in the prison, or at least best part of them, carried their beef
back and threw it into the cook's window, and left and went without any." The
next day the bad meat was served again, "but by the Agent's orders it was sent
back again and we got a little cheese in the room of it." (N.E. Hist and Gen. Reg.,
July 1876) Captain Hinman of the Alfred and his officers were brought to Forton
Prison in July, 1778, and in less than a week he and several other officers
escaped. September 8, fifty-eight prisoners escaped. In March, 1779, there were
two hundred and fifty-one Americans at Forton. July 2, one hundred and twenty
of them were released by exchange (lbid., April, 1876, to July, 1878; Essex Inst.
Coll., April, 1889; Mag. Amer. Hist., March, 1878, Matthewman's narrative;
Wharton, iii, 363. For another account of Forton Prison, see Fanning, 20-28.)
John Howard, the English prison reformer, wrote of Forton: "At my visit, Nov. 6,
1782, I found there was no separation of the Americans from other prisoners of
war, and they had the same allowance of bread, viz: one pound and a half each.
There were 154 French, 83 Dutch and 133 Americans. Of these, 12 French, 25
Dutch and 9 Americans were in the hospital. The wards were not clean. No
regulations hung up. I weighed several of the 6 lb. loaves and they all wanted
some ounces in weight." (Essex Inst. Coll., April, 1889, quoting from Howard's
History of Prisons.)
281
In the West Indies the unhealthfulness of the climate doubtless added to the
tribulations of prisoners and increased the death rate. In 1782, the privateer brig
New Broom of New London was captured by a British sloop of war and taken into
Antigua. One of the brig's crew, in a narrative of the cruise, says: "We were all
put on board of a prison-ship, which lay in a cove on one side of the harbor,
where the heat was so severe as to be almost insupportable. We were allowed
here but barely enough to sustain nature, and the water they gave us was taken
out of a pond a little back of the town, in which the cattle and negroes
commingled every sort of impurity, and which was rendered, on this account and
from the effect of the heat upon it, so nauseous that it was impossible to drink it
without holding the nostrils. I soon found that life was to be supported but for a
short time here and set myself therefore about contriving some way to effect my
escape from this floating place of misery and torment. The doctor came on board
every morning to examine the sick, and three negro sextons every night, to bury
the dead. Early one morning I swallowed tobacco juice and was so sick by the
time the doctor came, that I obtained without difficulty a permit from him to go on
shore to the hospital. I was soon ready to disembark, for I had been previously
robbed of everything except what I had on. After arriving at the hospital, I was
conducted into a long room where lay more than two hundred of the most
miserable objects imaginable, covered with rags and vermin. I threw myself down
on a bunk and after suffering extremely for some time from the effects of the
tobacco, went to sleep, but was soon waked by a man-nurse, who told me that
there was physic for me and immediately went off to another. I contrived
unperceived to throw my dose out of the window and was not again disturbed,
except during the following night, when I was waked several times by the
carrying out of the dead. The sickness occasioned by the tobacco having now
ceased, it was still necessary to keep up the deception, and accordingly the next
morning I feigned lameness." A few days later this prisoner escaped with two
others; getting possession of a boat they found their way to Guadeloupe (Hist.
Mag., November, 1860.) In 1779, the Marine Committee had called attention to
the harsh treatment of prisoners at Antigua and urged efforts for their exchange
(Mar. Com. Letter Book, 243 (October 26,1779).)
There appears to be less available material for a study of the treatment of British
prisoners by the Americans. Before France became involved in the war the
disposal of prisoners taken by American cruisers in European waters was
attended with difficulties, because the French government would not allow them
to be brought into the ports of that country, regarding it as a violation of neutrality
to receive them. It was, therefore, often necessary to release them. Franklin and
Deane advised the commanders of American ships to take from their prisoners,
before letting them go, a signed acknowledgment of the fact that they had been
captured. They hoped to secure in return the release of an equal number of
American prisoners, but the British government would not admit any obligation in
such cases, and indeed refused to honor formal paroles, except under certain
circumstances. After France had begun hostilities, American vessels could bring
their prisoners into port, but there was no provision for their reception until, after
282
long delay, they were admitted into French prisons. Meanwhile it was necessary
to keep them on shipboard under conditions of great discomfort, if not of actual
suffering. The prisoners brought into Brest by the Ranger in May, 1778, were
confined many months on one of her prizes and made bitter complaints of their
situation. Captain Jones exerted himself as far as possible for their welfare, but
was very unwilling to release them without exchange. Franklin supplied as well
as he could the wants of the British prisoners in France. In February, 1780, he
wrote to one of his English correspondents, enclosing the account of his agent at
L'Orient, "for clothing one hundred and thirteen English prisoners last April," and
adding: "Not that I expect anything from your government on that account
towards clothing such of our people with you as may be in want of it. The refusal
of compliance with the paroles of prisoners set at liberty have taught me to flatter
myself no more with expectations that a thing may be done because it is humane
or equitable, and reasonable that it should be done. I only desire it may be
considered as a small but grateful acknowledgment, all hitherto in my power, for
the kindness shown by your charitable subscriptions to our poor people. It may
perhaps be some satisfaction to those subscribers to know that, while they
thought only of relieving Americans, they were at the same time occasioning
some relief to distressed Englishmen." (Wharton, iii, 522.) When the exchange of
prisoners had become an established procedure, the number of English in
France must have been comparatively small and their stay short, for the British
policy was to keep many American prisoners in England, bringing them from New
York 9lbid., ii, 428, 581, 724, iii, 73, 488, 491, 535, 536, iv, 410; Hale, i, 351-362;
Sands, 104, 105, 148; Mass. Spy, January 4, 1781.)
The Continental vessels Reprisal, Lexington, and Dolphin made a cruise in the
English Channel and Irish Sea in 1777 and took several prizes. According to a
dispatch from Whitehaven, June 26, 1777, "the people in general speak in the
warmest terms of the humane treatment they met with from the commanders of
the Reprisal and Lexington, both of whom endeavored to make the situation of
their prisoners as easy as their circumstances would admit." (Boston Gazette,
October 6, 1777.)
Quite different from this was the treatment of Captain Richard Cassedy of the
British ship Priscilla by a prize crew put on board his vessel from the American
privateer General Mifflin, which captured the Priscilla off the Irish coast in July,
1777. All his men having been transferred to the Mifflin, he was left alone at the
mercy of a brutal prize crew. "These sons of freedom seized all the captain's
clothes that were worth anything and £88 in cash." He was "bound hand and foot
and put into confinement. In this miserable situation he remained until the 19th of
July, when his vessel was retook by the Union, letter of marque, of London . . .
Captain Cassedy was in a very poor state of health ... and not able to stand,
through the cruel treatment he received. His remaining so long bound
occasioned his flesh to swell to a shocking degree. All his prayers and intreaties
were in vain; the inhuman tyrants had no compassion." (Liverpool paper quoted
in Williams, 210.)
283
The treatment of British prisoners in America varied according to place and
circumstances. There were prison-ships at Boston, New London, and doubtless
other towns, and jails on shore were used (Boston Post, June 15, 1782; Mass.
Court Rec., January 20, 1778; Mass. Rev. Rolls, viii, ix, xliv.) Captain Henry
Barnes and his crew, captured with his vessel on the passage from Barbadoes to
England by the American privateer Montgomery in 1776 and taken to Rhode
Island, were "treated with the greatest kindness and civility." (Almon, iv,
159,160.) A letter from Boston, in 1777, says: "Hard as my case may appear to
be, I bear it with patience. From the 3d day of my captivity I have, with near
ninety others, been confined a close prisoner in a jail at this place lately erected,
called the New-prison. The Americans treat us very cavalierly. The provisions we
are allowed is barely sufficient to subsist on. My effects, to the amount of
upwards of £300. have been taken from me and the bed I lie on is a bundle of
straw." (London Chronicle, September 2, 1777.) A letter from New London, a few
months later, says: "They behave very well to us." (lbid., January 6, 1778.) A
better reputation is given to Boston by an English shipmaster who had been
exchanged. He writes: "The treatment of the English prisoners there is
exceedingly humane and kind." (lbid., January 8, 1778.)
The situation of British marine prisoners at Philadelphia was possibly not always
what it should have been, though as a rule not bad; their treatment was perhaps
at times, but only in special instances, governed by a spirit of retaliation for the
distress of Americans on the New York prison-ships. Admiral Arbuthnot wrote to
John Jay, President of Congress, August 30, 1779, complaining that two British
officers were "in close and cruel confinement at Philadelphia. I request that you
will assign satisfactory reasons for this treatment, that no improper retaliation
may take place here on our part." (Pap. Cont. Congr., 78, 1, 313 (August 30,
1779) Congress investigated the case of these two officers and found the reports
of their ill-treatment untrue. Just at this time, on account of the barbarous
persecution of Conyngham in New York, the Marine Committee ordered against
another British officer retaliatory measures which had recently been voted in
Congress, after a vain appeal to Commodore Collier (Mar. Com. Letter Book, 230
(August 31, 1779); Almon, viii, 340, 341; Jour. Cont. Congr., July 17, 29,
September 17, 1779.) Arbuthnot wrote to Washington, April 21, 1781, again
complaining of the treatment of British naval prisoners, saying: "Permit me now,
Sir, to request that you will take the proper steps to cause Mr. Bradford, your
commissary, and the jailor at Philadelphia, to abate that inhumanity which they
exercise indiscriminately upon all people, who are so unfortunate as to be carried
into that place. I will not trouble you, Sir, with a catalogue of grievances further
than to request that the unfortunate may feel as little of the severities of war as
the circumstances of the time will permit; that in future they may not be fed in
winter with salted clams and that they may be afforded a sufficiency of fuel."
(Washington, ix, 120, 121. No further information relating to the treatment of
British prisoners has been discovered.)
284
At last, in the spring of 1782, Franklin was able to inform Jay that the British
Parliament had passed "an act for exchanging American prisoners. They have
near eleven hundred in the jails of England and Ireland, all committed as charged
with high treason. The act is to empower the king, notwithstanding such
commitments, to consider them as prisoners of war, according to the law of
nations, and exchange them as such. This seems to be giving up their
pretensions of considering us as rebellious subjects and is a kind of
acknowledgment of our independence. Transports are now taking up to carry
back to their country the poor, brave fellows who have borne for years their cruel
captivity, rather than serve our enemies, and an equal number of English are to
be delivered up in return." (Wharton, v, 326.) The British ministry now ordered the
exchange of all American prisoners. A year later, April, 1783, came
proclamations of the Continental Congress and the British commanders in New
York, the latter a day or two in the lead, for the suspension of hostilities and the
release of all prisoners of war 9lbid., 439, 512, 548, 556, vi, 369, 375, 377.)
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
CHAPTER XIX
NAVAL CONDITIONS OF THE REVOLUTION
In the study of so closely contested a struggle as the American Revolution,
where even a comparatively trivial circumstance might have turned the scale, it is
interesting to examine the factors which may have affected the result. In the
events that took place on the sea perhaps many such factors will be found. Such
conclusions regarding them as may be drawn from the preceding chapters, will
be more clearly brought out if presented in the condensed form of a summary.
Both the Americans and the British, while favored in some ways, were burdened
with encumbrances of various sorts. The preponderance of the British naval
forces in American waters during the early years of the war was so great that for
the colonists in rebellion to overcome it was out of the question; annoyance only
was possible. Their control of the sea was complete until challenged by the
French in 1778. The British had much larger ships than the Americans, which
meant that they not only carried more guns, but far heavier ones; the thirty-twogun frigate was the largest we had in commission. Ship for ship also we were
overmatched by the British with their ships more fully manned and their officers
and men thoroughly trained. The raw material for their crews was certainly no
better and probably not as good as that furnished by the fishermen and seafaring
population of New England and other colonies, but the immense advantage of
organization, of centuries of military discipline, of naval tradition and esprit de
corps, was theirs.
285
The British, however, were embarrassed with difficulties which in large degree
offset their superiority in force. Operating in a hostile country, their naval stations,
even those most securely and permanently held, as New York, were unable to
furnish sufficient stores and supplies; and these necessities had to be brought
from England, subject to capture by American cruisers and privateers and
requiring the diversion of a considerable part of their armed force for convoy.
Owing to the incompetency or indolence of some of the British fleet commanders,
their available offensive force was used with less effect than might have been the
case. Jealousy and quarrels among the admirals also contributed to this result.
Official corruption in British dockyards and naval stations, defective organization,
and the waste of money and supplies interfered seriously with efficient naval
administration. The navy lost large numbers of men through desertion and death
from disease. It will thus be seen that the circumstances surrounding the British
navy during that period were sufficiently complicated. The entry of other powers
into the conflict naturally increased very much the perplexities of England's
situation (See Channing, iii, 279-283, 340-342.)
Turning to our own side, there was little to help out the slender resources of the
Americans beyond the advantage of operating in home waters and along shores
inhabited by a friendly people and of a general aptitude for the sea, no greater,
however, than that of their adversaries. The poverty of the Continental
government, if not of the country, precluded anything like a strong naval
organization, and the weakness of Congress, together with lack of experience,
made efficient administration practically impossible. For want of money and of
available workmen the construction and repair of ships was painfully slow. On
this account they were frequently kept idle in port months at a time, nearly a
whole season, perhaps, while cruises planned for them were prevented,
postponed, or only partially carried out. The obstacles encountered in manning
the Continental ships were equal to those which hindered their fitting out. The
needs of the army and the attractions of privateering, especially the latter, drew
so heavily on the seafaring population that capable men for the regular naval
service were scarce. The result was that after almost interminable delay a ship
would be obliged to go to sea with a crew deficient both in numbers and in
quality, made up of material in large part not only inferior, but sometimes
dangerous, if, as was often the case, it included British prisoners who were
willing to enlist. In such ships' companies a mutinous spirit prevailed, with
occasional serious effects. Furthermore the officers of the navy, while generally
good seamen and not lacking in courage, were without military training, and thus
apt to be deficient in martial qualities and incapable of rising to the occasion at
critical moments. The responsibility of an independent command, even of a
single vessel on an important service, was often too much for such men. It is
hardly necessary to add, however, that there were some notable exceptions.
As a consequence of these impediments the Americans never possessed a
regular naval force capable of acting offensively against the enemy in any
effective way. The Continental navy, therefore, naturally resorted to the readiest
286
means of injuring the enemy, that is, by preying upon his commerce. The state
navies and privateers were of course engaged in the same pursuit; and this, with
convoy duty upon occasion, formed the chief occupation of the entire sea force,
public and private, of the country. Engagements with regular British men-of-war
were exceptional and commonly accidental.
The futility of commerce destroying as a military measure of flrst importance has
been pointed out by naval authorities. "It is doubtless a most important secondary
operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned till war itself shall
cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to
crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion." (Mahan, 539. See also Proc. U. S.
Naval Inst., xxiii (1897), 472.) The injury inflicted upon England, though large in
the aggregate, was not disabling. Part of this predatory warfare consisted in the
interception of the enemy's transports, conveying troops and warlike supplies,
which were a godsend to our army and the loss of which was severely felt by the
British; this perhaps was of too nearly a military nature to be classed as ordinary
commerce destroying. During the early years of the war especially, such
captures were of the utmost value to the American cause.
There were probably more than two thousand American vessels employed in
privateering during the Revolution. Privateers accomplished much independently
in scouring the sea, but were ill adapted for cruising in squadrons and failed in
nearly all attempts at cooperation with regular ships or with each other. One half
the men, money, and energy absorbed in privateering, if it could have been put
into a strong, well-organized Continental navy, would have provided a force able
to act offensively against the British navy to some purpose. The other half,
devoted to privateering, would have been able to accomplish more in destroying
commerce than all the privateers actually did, and would have suffered fewer
losses, because of the protection afforded by a strong, regular navy against
British cruisers. Speculating as to what might have been has a practical interest
and value when a choice of alternatives depends upon an accident or train of
circumstances which might have happened otherwise. In the case under
discussion, however, the fundamental conditions were such as to put any such
rearrangement of naval power as that suggested so entirely out of the question
that there remains no room for regret on the score of mistakes which could have
been rectified. It is necessary to look at the events of the past from the point of
view of the time and the persons concerned. In this case the temperament of the
people, private interests, the sentiment of local independence and fear of
centralized military power, the lack of authority on the part of Congress, the
hopelessness of raising the necessary money, are at once evident to the student
of this period of our history. Privateering, moreover, was thoroughly believed in
as a means of striking at the enemy's vitals. Under the circumstances, therefore,
it is obvious that a small, weak navy was one of the necessary conditions of the
war and that a vigorous offense upon the sea was not in the nature of things.
287
When it is once admitted that an aggressive policy, aimed at the British fleets in
American waters with any reasonable chance of gaining naval supremacy, was
not to be expected, we are better prepared to understand and to accept
philosophically the gradual dwindling of the Continental navy, always in the
presence of a superior force, the loss of ship after ship, the almost inevitable
recurrence of disaster; a dismal record, to be sure, but not discreditable, and
relieved by a few successes and brilliant episodes. At the same time we can
better appreciate what was actually accomplished by the American marine as a
whole, how much it really contributed to the cause of independence. The injury to
British commerce was sufficiently serious to aid materially in rendering the war
unpopular in England; insurance rates rose to an unprecedented figure, and the
available sources from which revenue might be derived by taxation were nearly
exhausted. The shores of the British Isles were harassed as never before or
since by the repeated visits of American naval cruisers and privateers, and the
seacoast population alarmed. An active and regular commerce was carried on
between the United States and continental Europe, providing the latter with
American products and furnishing the new nation with much-needed money and
supplies. Communication was kept open with France, diplomatic correspondence
maintained, and public men of both countries crossed and recrossed the ocean
repeatedly, Henry Laurens being the only one of prominence to be captured. All
this intercourse, moreover, prevented the isolation of America, and kept alive the
interest and sympathy of Europe. Continental ships aided this traffic by furnishing
convoy through the danger zone off the American coast and also by taking an
active part in it. Many a cargo of tobacco from America and of military stores from
France, and many ministers and diplomatic agents, were conveyed in
Continental frigates.
A rigorous blockade of the American coast from the beginning of the war, as was
recommended by Lord Barrington, might have suppressed this commerce, and
would probably have strangled the rebellion of the colonists in its infancy, without
the help of the army. If at any time during the early years the English had been
alert, enterprising, and aggressive in the use of their great naval resources, they
should have been able to crush or at least greatly to cripple this traffic.
Presumably the main reason for its comparative immunity is to be sought in the
supineness of British admirals and in administrative vices of the Admiralty.
Although the fortunes of our American marine chiefly concern us, a glance at the
general naval war of 1778 is essential to the completeness of the subject. With
her control of the sea threatened, the policy for England to adopt was a matter of
vast importance. A foremost naval authority has said: "The key of the situation
was in Europe, and in Europe in the hostile dockyards." England's "one hope was
to find and strike down the enemy's navy. Nowhere was it so certainly to be
found as in its home ports; nowhere so easily met as immediately after leaving
them." (Mahan, 525. For discussion of this subject, see lbid., 416-418, 527-535.)
But the opportunity was lost, and it was necessary for England to pursue her
enemy to distant seas, leaving an inadequate force in home waters. Luckily for
288
England, the European allies failed to take advantage of her mistakes. Instead of
using their superior force for a vigorous offense, they seemed ever bent on a
defensive attitude; justified, perhaps, and certainly so from their point of view, by
ulterior strategic considerations. However that may be, the French and Spanish,
through lack of cooperation, through dilatory tactics, and for various reasons,
either avoided their enemy or failed to seize opportunities as they occurred. Their
plans for the invasion of England came to nothing, and their operations in
America and the West Indies were generally disappointing and abortive, because
of their failure to seek out and strike the enemy (Ibid., 535-539; Proc. U. S. Naval
Inst., xxii (1896), 578; Channing, iii, 297.) Their naval supremacy, therefore, was
most of the time potential only, although by no means for that reason without
effect. It finally became actual and decisive at one critical juncture, when a
fortunate train of circumstances secured the control of Chesapeake Bay.
Fortunate, indeed, was this event for the American cause, for whose success the
temporary possession of sea power was indispensable.
To revert, in conclusion, to the maritime achievements of the Revolutionists, it
would appear that keeping open the intercourse with Continental Europe,
especially France, and the diversion of supplies from the British to the American
army, were the most valuable services performed by the American armed forces
afloat, public and private, during the war; the injury done to the British navy being
almost negligible, and to British commerce far from disabling, to say the least,
although not without effect in the general result. It is certain that the Revolution
would have failed without its sailors. In spite of its shortcomings, the record of the
American marine daring this critical period was an honorable one. Many officers,
through the experience of naval warfare acquired on board regular cruisers and
privateers, were qualified to enter the national service a few years later, upon the
reestablishment of the Navy.
289
A NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
APPENDIX
I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
This list includes most of the authorities consulted. The abbreviations used in the
footnotes are here indicated. Other works, cited only once or twice, are also
referred to in footnotes.
Documents
Journals of the Continental Congress. Edited by Worthington C. Ford and
Galliard Hunt. Washington, 1904-1912. [Jour. Cont. Congr.] Contain much naval
information.
American Archives. Compiled by Peter Force. Series IV, vols. ii to vi, and V, vols.
i to iii. Washington, 1837. [Am. Arch., IV, ii, etc.] A very important source,
containing a vast amount of material for the years 1775 and 1776. In transcribing
documents, occasional errors have crept in.
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Edited by
Francis Wharton. Washington, 1889. [Wharton.] Useful for operations in
European waters.
B. F. Stevens's Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to
America, 1773-1783. London, 1889-1895. [Stevens.] Correspondence of French
and British ministers and others relating to neutrality, American naval cruisers
and privateers, etc.
Extracts Relating to the Origin of the American Navy. Compiled by Henry E.
Waite. Boston, 1890. Documents and letters chiefly relating to Washington's fleet
in Massachusetts Bay.
The Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts in 1774 and 1775,
and of the Committee of Safety. Boston, 1838.
Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1775-1783.
Contemporary print.
The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts
Bay. Vol. v. Boston, 1886.
Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1780-1783. Boston, 1890.
290
Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. Providence,
1856-1865.
Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut. Hartford, 1890.
Public Records of the State of Connecticut. Hartford, 1894.
Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety
and Council of Safety of the State of New York. Albany, 1842.
Pennsylvania Archives, Second Series. Vol. i. Harrisburg, 1874.
Pennsylvania Colonial Records. Philadelphia, 1852.
Maryland Archives. Baltimore, 1883-1901.
The Remembrancer, or Impartial Repository of Public Events. [Annual. Edited by
J. Almon.] London, 1775-1783. [Almon.] Contains many official reports and
letters; a very useful source.
A History of All the Engagements by Sea and Land that happened in America
and Europe and the East and West Indies during the American Revolution.
Manchester, 1787. Made up chiefly of reports of British officers.
Historical Manuscripts Commission. Fourteenth Report, Appendix I, Duke of
Rutland. 1894. American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution. Vol. i. 1904.
Various Collections. Vol. vi. 1909. Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville. Vol. ii.
1910. [Hist. Man. Com.] These British collections of manuscripts, printed in
recent years, contain many references to American naval affairs.
A Calendar of John Paul Jones Manuscripts in the Library of Congress. Compiled
by Charles Henry Lincoln. Washington, 1903. Full outline of letters, with extracts.
Calendar of the Correspondence of George Washington. Prepared from the
Original Manuscripts in the Library of Congress by John C. Fitzpatrick.
Washington, 1906.
Naval Records of the American Revolution [Calendar], prepared from the
Originals in the Library of Congress by Charles Henry Lincoln. Washington,
1906. Contains a list of nearly 1700 letters of marque issued by Congress, giving
the name of each vessel, with other information. These calendars, as an aid in
consulting the manuscripts in the Library of Congress, are indispensable.
Histories
291
Narrative and Critical History of America. Edited by Justin Winsor. Vols. vi and
vii. Boston, 1887, 1888. [Narr. and Crit. Hist.] Contains an extensive bibliography,
with critical discussion of authorities.
The American Nation. Edited by Albert Bushnell Hart. Vol. ix. The American
Revolution. By C. H. Van Tyne. New York, 1905.
A History of the United States. By Edward Channing. Vol. iii. The American
Revolution. New York, 1912. [Channing.] Contains the results of the latest
researches in the Revolutionary period.
Statistical History of the Navy of the United States. By Lieutenant George F.
Emmons, U.S.N. Washington, 1853. Lists of Continental navy, of captures, and
of privateers.
A Contribution to the Bibliography of the History of the United States Navy.
Compiled by Charles T. Harbeck. The Riverside Press, 1906.
Statistical and Chronological History of the United States Navy. 1775-1907. By
Robert Wilden Neeser. New York, 1909. [Neeser.] Contains a most exhaustive
bibliography and lists of captures.
Naval History of the United States. By Thomas Clark. Philadelphia, 1814. [Clark.]
The author derived some of his information directly from actors in the scenes
described.
United States Naval Chronicle. By Charles W. Goldsborough. Washington, 1824.
Gives lists of officers and other data.
Battles of the United States by Sea and Land. By Henry B. Dawson. New York,
1858. [Dawson.] Official reports and very copious references.
History of the Navy of the United States of America. By J. Fenimore Cooper.
London, 1839.
Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution. By Benson J. Lossing. New York, 1850.
The Navy of the American Revolution. By Charles Oscar Paullin. Chicago, 1906.
[Paullin.] Gives an exceedingly valuable account of the organization and
administration of the Continental navy and of the state navies, with full
references. It contains a vast amount of information hitherto practically
inaccessible and is indispensable for the student of this subject.
Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers. By Charles Oscar Paullin.
Baltimore, 1912.
292
The Influence of Sea Power upon History. By Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N.
Boston, 1890. [Mahan.]
Naval Strategy. By Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N. Boston, 1911.
The Annual Register. London, 1775-1783.
The First American Civil War. By Henry Belcher. London, 1911. [Belcher.]
England under the Hanoverians. Ry G. Grant Robertson. New York, 1911.
Naval Chronology. By Isaac Schomberg, R.N. London, 1802. [Schomberg.]
Gives valuable statistics.
Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain. By Robert Beatson. London, 1804.
Naval Battles of Great Britain. By Charles Ekins, Rear Admiral. London, 1828.
Battles of the British Navy. By Joseph Allen, R.N. London, 1868.
The Royal Navy. By William Laird Clowes. Chapter xxxi. By A. T. Mahan.
Chapter xxxii. By H. W. Wilson. Boston and London, 1898. [Clowes.]
A Short History of the Royal Navy. By David Hannay. London, 1909. [Hannay.]
Gives much information respecting British naval administration and conditions in
the navy.
Publications of the Navy Records Society. Vol. iii, Hood's Letters. Vol. vi, Journal
of Rear-Admiral James. Vols. xxix and xxxv, Instructions and Signals. By J. S.
Corbett. Vols. xxxii and xxxviii, Barham Papers. London, 1895-1911. [Nav. Rec.
Soc.) These volumes contain much original material of great value.
Histoire de la Marine Francaise pendant la Guerre de l'Independance
Americaine. Par E. Chevalier. Paris, 1877. [Chevalier.] Contains extracts from
official letters and ships' journals.
Histoire de la participation de Ia France a I'etablissement des Etats-Unis
d'Amerique. Par Henri Doniol. Paris, 1886. [Doniol.]
Franklin in France. By Edward Everett Hale and E. E. Hale, Jr. Boston, 1887.
[Hale.]
A History of American Privateers. By Edgar Stanton Maclay. New York, 1899.
Rhode Island Privateers and Privateersmen. By W. P. Sheffield. Newport, 1883.
293
History of the Liverpool Privateers. By Gomer Williams. Liverpool, 1897.
[Williams.] Contains letters and extracts from contemporary newspapers.
Economic and Social History of New England. By William B. Weeden. Boston,
1890.
Revolutionary Incidents of Suffolk and Kings Counties with an Account of the
British Prisons and Prison Ships at New York. By Henry Onderdonk, Jr. New
York, 1849. [Onderdonk.] Contains extracts from contemporary letters and
newspapers.
Martyrs to the Revolution in the British Prison-Ships in the Wallabout Bay. [By
George Taylor]. New York, 1855.
Some Account of the Capture of the Ship Aurora. By Philip Freneau. New York,
1899.
History of Castine, Penobscot, etc. By George Augustus Wheeler. Bangor, 1875.
[ Wheeler.] Documents relating to the Penobscot Expedition.
Detail of Some Particular Services performed in America, 1776-1779, compiled
from journals kept aboard the Ship Rainbow. By Ithiel Town. New York, 1835.
[Town.]
Biographies
Writings of George Washington. Collected and Edited by Worthington Chauncey
Ford. New York, 1889. [Washington.]
The Works of John Adams. By Charles Francis Adams.
Boston, 1853. [Adams.]
The Writings of Benjamin Franklin. Edited by Albert Henry Smyth. New York,
1905.
Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Collected and Edited by Paul Leicester Ford. New
York, 1892. [Jefferson.]
Life and Correspondence of John Paul Jones. [By
R. Sands.] New York, 1830. [Sands.]
Life and Character of John Paul Jones. By John Henry
Sherburne. New York, 1851. [Sherburne.]
The Life of Paul Jones. By Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, U.S.N. New York, 1846.
[Mackenzie.]
294
Memoire de Paul Jones, ecrits par lui-meme en anglais et traduits sous ses yeux
par Ie citoyen Andre. Paris, 1798.
Paul Jones, Founder of the American Navy. By Augustus C. Buell. New York,
1900. Mentioned only for the purpose of warning the reader of naval history
against it as a fabrication. Made up largely of spurious documents ingeniously
concocted by the author, it has deceived many, although often exposed by
various investigators.
Publications of the Naval History Society. Vol. i. The Logs of the Serapis,
Alliance, Ariel under the Command of John Paul Jones. Edited by John S.
Barnes. New York, 1911. Contains biographical matter. Ile Society's second
volume (1912), under the same editorship, is a reprint of the life of Nathaniel
Fanning, listed below. Vol. iii is the Despatches of Molyneux Shuldham, ViceAdmiral of the Blue and Commander-in-Chief of His Britannic Majesty's Ships in
North America, January - July, 1776. Edited by Robert W. Neeser. New York,
1913.
Memoirs of the Life of Captain Nathaniel Fanning, an American Naval Officer.
New York, 1808. [Fanning.]
Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Navy. By Edward Field.
Providence, 1898. [Hopkins.]
Commodore John Barry. By Martin I. J. Griffin. Philadelphia, 1903. [Barry.]
The Life of Samuel Tucker, Commodore in the American Revolution. By John H.
Sheppard. Boston,1868. [Tucker.]
Life of Silas Talbot. By Henry T. Tuckerman. NewYork, 1850. [Talbot.]
An Historical Sketch to the End of the Revolutionary War of the Life of Silas
Talbot. New York, 1803. Published the same year in London under a different
title.
Life of Captain Jeremiah O'Brien. By Rev. Andrew M.
Sherman. Morristown, 1902. [O'Brien.]
Biographical Memoir of the late Commodore Joshua Barney. By Mary Barney.
Boston, 1832. [Barney.]
Moses Brown, Captain, U.S.N. By Edgar Stanton Maclay. New York, 1904.
The Adventures of Ebenezer Fox in the Revolutionary
War. Boston, 1847. [Fox.]
295
Memoirs of Andrew Sherburne, a Pensioner of the Navy of the Revolution. By
Himself. Providence, 1831. [A. Sherburne.]
The Old Jersey Captive, or a Narrative of the Captivity
of Thomas Andros. Boston, 1833. [Andros.]
The Prisoners of 1776. A Relic of the Revolution. By Rev. R. Livesey. Compiled
from the Journal of Charles Herbert. Boston, 1854. [Livesey.]
Captain Thomas Dring. Recollections of Jersey Prison Ship. Morrisania, 1865.
Narrative of Joshua Davis. Boston, 1811. [Davis.]
The Original Journal of General Solomon Lovell, kept during the Penobscot
Expedition, 1779. Published by the Weymouth Historical Society, 1881.
Diary of Ezra Green, M.D., Surgeon on board the Continental Ship-of-War
Ranger. Edited by Commodore G. H. Preble, U.S.N. Boston, 1875. Reprinted
from the New England Historical and Genealogical Register.
Colonel William Bradford, the Patriot Printer of 1776. By John William Wallace.
Philadelphia, 1884. [Bradford.]
Correspondence and Journals of Samuel Blachley Webb. Edited by Worthington
C. Ford. New York, 1893.
Letters from Sir George Brydges, now Lord Rodney, to His Majesty's Ministers.
London, 1789.
Periodicals
(Some of the more notable articles are mentioned.)
Collections and Proceedings of the Maine Historical Society.
Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society.
Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society. January, 1901. Papers of
William Vernon and the Navy Board.
Rhode Island Historical Magazine. July, 1885 - January, 1887. Journal of John
Trevett, U.S.N.
Historical Collections of the Essex Institute. January, 1909. The Naval Career of
Captain John Manley of Marblehead. By Robert E. Peabody. January-October,
1909. Records of the Vice-Admiralty Court at Halifax, Nova Scotia.
296
Records and Papers of the New London County Historical Society.
New England Historical and Genealogical Register.
New Hampshire Genealogical Record.
Collections of the New York Historical Society.
New York Genealogical and Biographical Record.
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography.
Virginia Historical Register.
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography.
South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine.
The American Historical Review. July, 1903. St. Eustatius in the American
Revolution. By J. Franklin Jameson. October, 1904. Nova Scotia and New
England during the Revolution. By Emily P. Weaver.
Historical Magazine.
American Historical Record.
Magazine of American History.
Magazine of History.
American Catholic Historical Researches.
Military and Naval Magazine of the United States, 1833-1836.
Naval Magazine, 1836.
United States Naval Institute Proceedings. No. 79 (1896) Howe and D'Estaing. A
Study in Coast Defense. By Commander C. F. Goodrich, U.S.N.; No. 83 (1897)
The Sailor in the Revolution. By Commander C. F. Goodrich, U.S.N.; No. 99
(1901) The Coast in Warfare. By Lieutenant-Commander J. H. Sears, U.S.N.;
No. 126 (1908) The True Story of the America. By Robert W. Neeser; No. 139
(1911) American Privateers at Dankerque. By Henri Malo. Translated by Stewart
L. Mims.
The United Service. July, 1895. Letters of Paul Jones. October, 1905. Campaign
of Vice-Admiral D'Estaing. By G. Lacour-Gayet. Translated by Chaplain T. G.
297
Steward, U.S.A. The earlier numbers of this magazine contain several
biographical sketches of naval officers.
The Port Folio. Biographical sketches of naval officers.
Southern Literary Messenger. January - April, 1857. The Virginia Navy of the
Revolution.
Hunt's Merchants' Magazine.
Atlantic Monthly. September and October 1861, Journal of a Privateersman,
1741 [Edited by Charles Eliot Norton]; December, 1887, Paul Jones and the
Armed Neutrality. By John Fiske.
The Century Magazine.
New England Magazine.
Scribner's Magazine. February, July, and August, 1898. Articles by Captain
Mahan on Lake Champlain and John Paul Jones.
Granite Monthly. 1881 and 1882. Log of the Ranger.
The Outlook. January 3. 1903. James Barnes on Conynghams Lost Commission.
Massachusetts Magazine. 1908-1912. The Massachusetts Navy. By F. A.
Gardner.
Newspapers
The Boston Gazette and Country Journal (Watertown and Boston).
The New England Chronicle; name changed in September, 1776, to Independent
Chronicle (Cambridge and Boston; had formerly been the Essex Gazette of
Salem).
The Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser (Boston).
The Independent Ledger and American Advertiser (Boston).
The Evening Post and General Advertiser (Boston).
The Massachusetts Spy, or American Oracle of Liberty (Worcester).
The Salem Gazette.
298
The Connecticut Courant and Hartford Weekly Intelligencer.
The Connecticut Gazette and Universal Intelligencer (New London).
The Royal Gazette (New York).
The Royal American Gazette (New York).
The New York Packet and American Advertiser (Fishkill).
The Pennsylvania Gazette.
Dunlap's Pennsylvania Packet, or the General Advertiser.
The Pennsylvania Evening Post.
The Freeman's Journal, or North American Intelligencer (Philadelphia).
The Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser.
The London Chronicle.
Lloyd's Evening Post and British Chronicle (London).
Manuscript Sources
Navy Department. All the following are copies: Logbooks and journals of the
Ranger, November 26, 1777, to May 18, 1778; of the Bonhomme Richard, May 8
to September 24, 1779; of the Serapis, September 26 to November 21, 1779; of
the Alliance, November 22, 1779, to June 12, 1780; of the Ariel, June 16 to
October 14,1780; of the South Carolina, August 4, 1781, to May 21, 1782; and of
the letter of marque ship Queen of France, August 20 to September 9, 1782.
Letter-book of John Paul Jones, March, 1778, to July, 1779. Miscellaneous
material, including the court martial of Captain Pearson and letters of Admiral
Rodney (1780) criticizing Admiral Arbuthnot.
Library of Congress. Papers of the Continental Congress, containing much
correspondence relating to naval affairs, reports of officers, etc. Marine
Committee Letter Book, containing the instructions of the Marine Committee and
Board of Admiralty to officers of the navy, letters to the navy boards, etc. Letters
to Washington relating to naval affairs. John Paul Jones manuscripts in eleven
volumes. Miscellaneous papers, including a list of officers in the Continental navy
and marine corps. This material in the Library of Congress is of the utmost
importance and is described more in detail in the bibliography of Paullin's Navy of
the American Revolution. The Library has also acquired transcripts of the
Admiralty Records in the British Archives.
299
Massachusetts State Library, Archives Division. Records of the Great and
General Court, beginning July 26, 1775. Records of the Honorable the Council.
Massachusetts Archives and Revolutionary Rolls Collection. In volumes v to ix,
xxviii, xxxv ii to xl, xliv, xlv, Iii, Iiii, cxxxix, cxlv, cxlviii to cliii, clvii, clviii, clix, clxiv to
clxxii a large amount of information will be found, including bonds and
commissions of privateers, correspondence about prisoners, prize cases, letters,
orders and minutes of the Board of War, reports of officers of the state navy,
rolls, documents relating to the Penobscot Expedition, and miscellaneous
papers.
Massachusetts Historical Society. Papers of Colonel Timothy Pickering. Papers
of Governor Trumbull of Connecticut. Papers of Oliver Wolcott of Connecticut.
Essex Institute. Miscellaneous papers. Most letters of interest have been printed
in the society's collections.
Harvard College Library. Sparks Papers. Arthur Lee Papers. Commodore Tucker
Papers. Miscellaneous papers, including Luther Little's narrative of the battle
between the Protector and the Admiral Duff.
Private Collections. Papers of John Adams, deposited in the library of the
Massachusetts Historical Society, examined through the courtesy of Charles
Francis Adams, Esq. Copies of four letters kindly furnished by Charles T.
Harbeck, Esq., viz.. Hopkins's sailing orders to his captains, dated February 14,
1776, two letters of the Marine Committee, and a Jones letter of November 1,
1776. James Barnes, Esq., kindly sent a copy of a letter of William Bingham to
Captain Conyngham. The Log of the Ranger (August 24, 1778, to May 10, 1780)
was sold by the estate of E. P. Jewell, Esq. and an opportunity to copy extracts
from it was obtained. This log, down to March 2, 1779, was published in the
Granite Monthly.
Archives de Ia Marine aux Archives Nationales a Paris. Campagnes; Pays
Etrangers, Commerce et Consulate; Travail du Roi et du Ministre; Ordres et
Depeches; etc.
British Archives. Public Record Office. Admiralty Records: Admirals' Despatches,
Captains' Letters, Consuls' Letters, Courts Martial, Captains' and Masters' Logs.
Transcripts of the British Admiralty Records and of the French papers from the
Archives de Ia Marine, indispensable for a comprehensive study of Revolutionary
naval history, were very kindly furnished by Robert W. Neeser, Esq. Customs
House: Minutes of the Scottish Board of Customs; Irish Minute Books;
Whitehaven Customs Letter- Book. Dr. Charles 0. Paullin kindly allowed the use
of his transcripts of these Custom House papers.
300
In quoting from documents, newspapers, manuscripts, etc., pains have been
taken to avoid changes from the original except in punctuation, which has been
amended when so doing has seemed essential to clearness.
II. RULES FOR THE REGULATION OF THE NAVY OF
THE UNITED COLONIES
The Commanders of all ships and vessels belonging to the thirteen United
Colonies are strictly required to shew in themselves a good example of honor
and virtue to their officers and men, and to be very vigilant in inspecting the
behaviour of all such as are under them, and to discountenance and suppress all
dissolute, immoral, and disorderly practices, and also such as are contrary to the
rules of discipline and obedience, and to correct those who are guilty of the
same, according to the usage of the sea.
The Commanders of the ships of the thirteen United Colonies are to take care
that divine service be performed twice a day on board, and a sermon preached
on Sundays, unless bad weather or other extraordinary accidents prevent it.
If any shall be heard to swear, curse, or blaspheme the name of God, the
Commander is strictly enjoined to punish them for every offense by causing them
to wear a wooden collar, or some other shameful badge of distinction, for so long
time as he shall judge proper. If he be a commissioned officer, he shall forfeit one
shilling for each offense, and a warrant or inferior officer six pence. He who is
guilty of drunkenness, if a seaman, shall be put in irons until he is sober, but if an
officer, he shall forfeit two days' pay.
No Commander shall inflict any punishment upon a seaman beyond twelve
lashes upon his bare back with A cat of nine tails; if the fault shall deserve a
greater punishment, he is to apply to the Commander in chief of the Navy, in
order to the trying of him by a courtmartial, and in the mean time he may put him
under confinement.
The Commander is never by his own authority to discharge a commission or
warrant officer, nor to punish or strike him, but he may suspend or confine them,
and when he comes in the way of a Commander in chief, apply to him for holding
a court-martial.
The Officer who commands by accident of the Captain's or commander's
absence (unless he be absent for a time by leave) shall not order any correction
but confinement, and upon the captain's return on board he shall then give an
account of his reasons for so doing.
The Captain is to cause the articles of war to be hung up in some public places of
the ship, and read to the ship's company once a month.
301
Whenever a Captain shall inlist a seaman, he shall take care to enter on his
books the time and terms of his entering, in order to his being justly paid.
The Captain shall, before he sails, make return to, and leave with the Congress,
or such person or persons as the Congress shall appoint for that purpose, a
compleat list of all his officers and men, with the time and terms of their entering;
and during his cruize shall keep a true account of the desertion or death of any of
them, and of the entering of others, and after his cruize and before any of them
are paid off, he shall make return of a compleat list of the same, including those
who shall remain on board his ship.
The men shall, at their request, be furnished with slops that are necessary by the
Captain or purser, who shall keep an account of the same, and the Captain, in
his return in the last mentioned article directed to be made, shall mention the
amount delivered to each man, in order to its being stopped out of his pay.
As to the term "inferior Officer," the Captain is to take notice that the same does
not include any commission or any warrant officer, except the second master,
surgeon's mate, cook, armourer, gun-smith, master at arms and sail maker.
The Captain is to take care when any inferior officers or volunteer seamen are
turned over into the ship under his command from any other ship, not to rate
them on the ship's books in a worse quality, or lower degree or station, than they
served in the ship they were removed from; and for his guidance he is to demand
from the commander of the ship from which they are turned over, a list, under his
hand, of their names and qualities.
Any officer, seaman, or others, intitled to wages or prize money, may have the
same paid to his assignee, provided the assignment be attested by the Captain
or Commander, the master or purser of the ship, or a chief magistrate of some
county or corporation.
The Captain is to discourage the seamen of his ship from selling any part of their
wages or shares, and never to attest the letter of attorney of any seaman, until he
is fully satisfied that the same is not granted in consideration of money given for
the purchase of his wages or shares.
When an inferior officer or seaman dies, the Captain is forthwith to make out a
ticket for the time of his service, and to send the same by the first safe
conveyance to the Congress, or agents by them for that purpose appointed, in
order to the wages being forthwith paid to the executors or administrators of the
deceased.
A convenient place shall be set apart for sick or hurt men, to which they are to be
removed, with their hammocks and bedding, when the surgeon shall advise the
302
same to be necessary, and some of the crew shall be appointed to attend and
serve them, and to keep the place clean.
The cooper shall make buckets with covers and cradles if necessary, for their
use.
All ships furnished with fishing tackle, being in such places where fish is to be
had, the captain is to employ some of the company in fishing; the fish to be
distributed daily to each persons as are sick or upon recovery, provided the
surgeon recommend it, and the surplus by turns amongst the messes of the
officers and seamen without favour or partiality and gratis, without any deduction
of their allowance of provisions on that account.
It is left to the discretion of Commanders of squadrons to shorten the allowance
of provisions according to the exigencies of the service, taking care that the men
be punctually paid for the same.
The like power is given to Captains of single ships in cases of absolute necessity.
If there should be a want of pork, the Captain is to order three pounds of beef to
be issued to the men, in lieu of two pounds of pork.
One day in every week shall be issued out a proportion of flour and suet, in lieu
of beef, for the seamen, but this is not to extend beyond four months' victualling
at one time, nor shall the purser receive any allowance for flour or suet kept
longer on board than that time, and there shall be supplied, once a year, a
proportion of canvas for pudding-bags, after the rate of one ell for every sixteen
men.
If any ships of the thirteen United Colonies shall happen to come into port in want
of provisions, the warrant of a Commander in chief shall be sufficient to the Agent
or other instrument of the victualling, to supply the quantity wanted, and in urgent
cases, where delay may be hurtful, the warrant of the Captain of the ship shall be
of equal effect.
The Captain is frequently to order the proper officers to inspect into the condition
of the provisions, and if the bread proves damp, to have it aired upon the quarter
deck or poop, and also examine the flesh casks, and if any of the pickle be
leaked out, to have new made and put in, and the casks made tight and secure.
The Captain or purser shall secure the cloaths, bedding, and other things of such
persons as shall die or be killed, to be delivered to their executors or
administrators.
All papers, charter parties, bills of lading, passports, and other writings
whatsoever, found on board any ship or ships, which shall be taken, shall be
303
carefully preserved, and the originals sent to the court of Justice for maritime
affairs, appointed or to be appointed by the legislatures in the respective
colonies, for judging concerning such prize or prizes; and if any person or
persons shall wilfully or negligently destroy or suffer to be destroyed, any such
paper or papers, he or they so offending shall forfeit their share of such prize or
prizes, and suffer such other punishment as they shall be judged by a courtmartial to deserve.
If any person or persons shall embezzle, steal or take away any cables, anchors,
sails, or any of the ship's furniture, or any of the powder, arms, ammunition, or
provisions of any ship belonging to the thirteen United Colonies, he or they shall
suffer such punishment as a court-martial shall order.
When in sight of a ship or ships of the enemy, and at such other times as may
appear to make it necessary to prepare for an engagement, the Captain shall
order all things in his ship in a proper posture for fight, and shall, in his own
person and according to his duty, heart on and encourage the inferior officers
and men to fight courageously, and not to behave themselves faintly or cry for
quarters, on pain of such punishment as the offence shall appear to deserve for
his neglect.
Any Captain or other officer, mariner, or others, who shall basely desert their duty
or station in the ship and run away while the enemy is in sight, or, in time of
action, or shall entice others to do so, shall suffer death, or such other
punishment as a court-martial shall inflict.
Any officer, seaman, or marine, who shall begin, excite, cause, or join in any
mutiny or sedition in the ship to which he belongs, on any pretence whatsoever,
shall
suffer death, or such other punishment as a court-martial shall direct. Any person
in or belonging to the ship, who shall utter any words of sedition and mutiny, or
endeavour to make any mutinous assemblies on any pretence whatsoever, shall
suffer such punishment as a court-martial shall inflict.
None shall presume to quarrel with or strike his superior officer on pain of such
punishment as a courtmartial shall order to be inflicted.
If any person shall apprehend he has just cause of complaint, he shall quietly
and decently make the same known to his superior officer, or to the captain, as
the case may require, who shall take care that justice be done him.
There shall be no quarreling or fighting between shipmates on board any ship
belonging to the thirteen United Colonies, nor shall there be used any reproachful
or provoking speeches, tending to make quarrels and disturbance, on pain of
imprisonment and such other punishment as a court-martial shall think proper to
inflict.
304
If any person shall sleep upon his watch, or negligently perform the duty which
shall be enjoined him to do, or forsake his station, he shall suffer such
punishment as a court-martial shall judge proper to inflict, according to the nature
of his offence.
All murder shall be punished with death.
All robbery and theft shall be punished at the discretion of a court-martial.
Any master at arms who shall refuse to receive such prisoner or prisoners as
shall be committed to his charge, or having received them, shall suffer him or
them to escape, or dismiss them without orders for so doing, shall suffer in his or
their stead, as a court-martial shall order and direct.
The Captain, officers, and others shall use their utmost endeavours to detect,
apprehend, and bring to punishment, all offenders, and shall at all times readily
assist the officers appointed for that purpose in the discharge of their duty, on
pain of being proceeded against and punished by a court-martial at discretion.
All other faults, disorders, and misdemeanours, which shall be committed on
board any ship belonging to the thirteen United Colonies, and which are not
herein mentioned, shall be punished according to the laws and customs in such
cases at sea.
A court-martial shall consist of at least three Captains and three first lieutenants,
with three Captains and three first lieutenants of Marines, if there shall be so
many of the Marines then present, and the eldest Captain shall preside.
All sea officers of the same denomination shall take rank of the officers of the
Marines.
The sentence of a court-martial for any capital offence, shall not be put in
execution, until it be confirmed by the Commander in chief of the fleet; and it
shall be the duty of the president of every court-martial to transmit to the
Commander in chief of the fleet every sentence which shall be given, with a
summary of the evidence and proceedings thereon, by the first opportunity.
The Commander in chief of the fleet for the time being, shall have power to
pardon and remit any sentence of death, that shall be given in consequence of
any of the aforementioned Articles.
There shall be allowed to each man serving on board
the ships in the service of the thirteen United Colonies, a daily proportion of
provisions, according as is expressed in the following table, viz.
Sunday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. beef, 1 lb. potatoes or turnips.
305
Monday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. pork, 1/2 pint peas and four oz. cheese.
Tuesday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. beef, 1 lb. potatoes or turnips, and pudding.
Wednesday, 1 lb. bread, two oz. butter, four oz. cheese and 1/2 pint of rice.
Thursday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. pork, and 1/2 pint of peas.
Friday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. beef, I lb. potatoes or turnips, and pudding.
Saturday, 1 lb. bread, 1 lb. pork, 1/2 pint peas and four oz. cheese.
Half a pint of rum per man every day, and discretionary allowance on extra duty
and in time of engagement.
A pint and half of vinegar for six men per week.
The pay of the officers and men [per calendar month] shall be as follows:
Captain or commander, 32 dollars
Lieutenants, 20 dollars
Master, 20 dollars
Mates, 15 dollars
Boatswain, 15 dollars
Boatswain's first mate, 9 1/2 dollars
Boatswain's second mate, 8 dollars
Gunner, 15 dollars
Gunner's mate, 10 2/3 dollars
Surgeon, 21 1/3 dollars
Surgeon's mate, 13 1/3 dollars
Carpenter, 15 dollars
Carpenter's mate, 10 2/3 dollars.
Cooper, 15 dollars
Captain's or Commander's clerk, 15 dollars
Steward, 13 1/3 dollars
Chaplain, 20 dollars
Able seamen, 6 2/3
Captain of marines, 26 2/3 dollars
Lieutenants, 18 dollars
Serjeants, 8 dollars
Corporals, 7 1/3 dollars
Fifer, 7 1/3 dollars
Drummer, 7 1/3
Privates [of] marines, 6 2/3 dollars
III. INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMANDERS OF PRIVATEERS
306
Continental Congress, April 3, 1776:
I. You may, by force of arms, attack, subdue and take all ships and other vessels
belonging to the inhabitants of Great Britain, on the high seas, or between high
water and low water mark, except ships and vessels bringing persons who intend
to settle and reside in the United Colonies; or bringing arms, ammunition, or warlike stores, to the said colonies, for the use of such inhabitants thereof as are
friends to the American cause, which you shall suffer to pass unmolested, the
commanders thereof permitting a peaceable search and giving satisfactory
information of the contents of the ladings and destinations of voyages.
II. You may, by force of arms, attack, subdue and take all ships and other vessels
whatsoever, carrying soldiers, arms, gunpowder, ammunition, provisions, or any
other contraband goods, to any of the British armies or ships of war employed
against these colonies.
III. You shall bring such ships and vessels, as you shall take, with their guns,
rigging, tackle, apparel, furniture, and ladings to some convenient port or ports of
the United Colonies, that proceedings may thereupon be had in due form, before
the courts which are or shall be appointed to hear and determine causes civil and
maritime.
IV. You, or one of your chief officers, shall bring or send the master and pilot and
one or more principal person or persons of the company of every ship or vessel
by you taken, as soon after the capture as may be, to the judge or judges of such
court as aforesaid, to be examined upon oath, and make answer to the
interrogatories which may be propounded, touching the interest or property of the
ship or vessel and her lading; and, at the same time, you shall deliver, or cause
to be delivered to the judge or judges, all passes, sea-briefs, charter-parties, bills
of lading, cockets, letters and other documents and writings found on board,
proving the said papers by the affidavit of yourself or of some other person
present at the capture, to be produced as they were received, without fraud,
addition, subduction or embezzlement.
V. You shall keep and preserve every ship or vessel and cargo by you taken,
until they shall, by a sentence of a court properly authorized, be adjudged lawful
prizes; not selling, spoiling, wasting, or diminishing the same, or breaking the
bulk thereof, nor suffering any such thing to be done.
VI. If you, or any of your officers or crew, shall, in cold blood, kill or maim, or by
torture or otherwise, cruelly, inhumanly, and contrary to common usage and the
practice of civilized nations in war, treat any person or persons surprized. in the
ship or vessel you shall take, the offender shall be severely punished.
VIII. You shall, by all convenient opportunities, send to Congress written
accounts of the captures you shall make, with the number and names of the
307
captives, copies of your journal from time to time, and intelligence of what may
occur or be discovered concerning the designs of the enemy and the destination,
motions and operations of their fleets and armies.
VIII. One-third, at least, of your whole company shall be landsmen.
IX. You shall not ransom any prisoners or captives, but shall dispose of them in
such manner as the Congress, or, if that be not sitting, in the colony whither they
shall be brought, as the general assembly, convention, or council, or committee
of safety, of such colony shall direct.
X. You shall observe all such further instructions as Congress shall hereafter give
in the premises, when you shall have notice thereof.
XI. If you shall do anything contrary to these instructions, or to others hereafter to
be given, or willingly suffer such thing to be done, you shall not only forfeit your
commission and be liable to an action for breach of the condition of your bond,
but be responsible to the party grieved for damages sustained by such
malversation.
Additional articles, April 7, 1781:
1. You are to pay a sacred regard to the rights of neutral powers and the usage
and customs of civilized
nations; and on no pretence whatever, presume to take or seize any ships or
vessels belonging to the subjects of princes or powers in alliance with these
United States [with certain exceptions] . . . under the pains and penalties
expressed in a proclamation [See Appendix IV] issued by the Congress of the
United States, the ninth day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven
hundred and seventy-eight.
2. You shall permit all neutral vessels freely to navigate on the high seas or
coasts of America except such as are employed in carrying contraband goods or
soldiers to the enemies of these United States.
3. You shall not seize or capture any effects belonging to the subjects of the
belligerent powers on board neutral vessels, excepting contraband goods; and
you are carefully to observe, that the term contraband is confined to those
articles which are expressly declared to be such in the treaty of amity and
commerce, of the sixth day of February, 1778, between these United States and
his most Christian majesty, namely: arms, great guns, bombs, with their fusees
and other things belonging to them, cannon-balls, gun-powder, matches, pikes,
swords, lances, spears, halberts, mortars, petards, grenadoes, salt-petre,
muskets, musket-ball, bucklers, helmets, breast-plates, coats of mail, and the like
kind of arms proper for arming soldiers, musket-rests, belts, horses with their
furniture, and all other warlike instruments whatever.
308
IV. A PROCLAMATION
Whereas Congress have received information and complaints, 'that violences
have been done by American armed vessels to neutral nations, in seizing ships
belonging to their subjects and under their colours, and in making captures of
those of the enemy whilst under the protection of neutral coasts, contrary to the
usage and custom of nations": to the end that such unjustifiable and piratical
acts, which reflect dishonour upon the national character of these states, may be
in future effectually prevented, the said Congress hath thought proper to direct,
enjoin and command, and they do hereby direct, enjoin and command, all
captains, commanders and other officers and seamen belonging to any American
armed vessels, to govern themselves strictly in all things agreeably to the tenor
of their commissions, and the instructions and resolutions of Congress;
particularly that they pay a sacred regard to the rights of neutral powers and the
usage and custom of civilized nations, and on no pretence whatever presume to
take or seize any ships or vessels belonging to the subjects of princes or powers
in alliance with these United States, except they are employed in carrying
contraband goods or soldiers to our enemies, and in such case that they conform
to the stipulations contained in treaties subsisting between such princes or
powers and these states; and that they do not capture, seize or plunder any
ships or vessels of our enemies, being under the protection of neutral coasts,
nations or princes, under the penalty of being condignly punished therefor, and
also of being bound to make satisfaction for all matters of damage and the
interest thereof by reparation, under the pain and obligation of their persons and
goods. And further, the said Congress doth hereby resolve and declare, that
persons wilfully offending in any of the foregoing instances, if taken by any
foreign powers in consequence thereof, will not be considered as having a right
to claim protection from these states, but shall suffer such punishment as by the
usage and custom of nations may be inflicted upon such offenders.
Given in Congress at York, in the state of Pennsylvania, this ninth day of May,
Anno Domini 1778.
V. VESSELS IN THE CONTINENTAL SERVICE
The dates indicate the period of active service, or, where no service was
performed during the war, the date of launching is given. The Serapis is included
for the reason that she served temporarily as Commodore Jones's flagship,
replacing the Bonhomme Richard.
Continental Navy
Alfred, 24, ship, 1775-1778
Columbus, 20, ship,1775-1778
Andrew Doria, 14, brig, 1775-1777
Cabot, 14, brig, 1775-1777
309
Providence, 12, sloop, 1775-1779
Hornet, 10, sloop, 1775-1777
Wasp, 8, schooner, 1775-1777
Fly, 8, schooner, 1775-1777
Lexington, 16, brig, 1776-1777
Reprisal, 16 brig, 1776-1777
Hampden, 14, brig, 1776-1777
Independence,10, sloop, 1776-1778
Sachem, 10 sloop, 1776-1777
Mosquito, 4 sloop, 1776-1777
Raleigh, 32 frigate, 1777-1778
Hancock, 32 frigate,1777
Warren, 32, frigate,1777-1779
Washington, 32, frigate, 1777
Randolph, 32, frigate, 1777-1778
Providence, 28, frigate, 1777-1780
Trumbull, 28 frigate, 1777-1781
Congress, 28, frigate, 1777
Virginia, 28, frigate, 1777-1778
Effingham, 28, frigate, 1777
Boston, 24, frigate, 1777-1780
Montgomery, 24, frigate, 1777
Delaware, 24, frigate, 1777
Ranger, 18, ship, 1777-1780
Resistance, 10, brigantine, 1777-1778
Surprise, sloop, 1777
Racehorse, 10, sloop, 1777
Repulse, 8, xebec, 1777
Champion, 8, xebec, 1777
Indien, 40, ship, 1777
Deane (later Hague), 32, frigate, 1777-1783
Queen of France, 28, frigate, 1777-1780
Dolphin, 10, cutter, 1777
Surprise, 10, lugger, 1777
Revenge, 14, cutter, 1777-1779
Alliance, 32, frigate, 1778-1785
General Gates, 18, ship, 1778-1779
Retaliation, brigantine, 1778
Pigot, 8, schooner, 1778
Confederacy, 32, frigate, 1779-1781
Argo, 12, Sloop, 1779
Diligent, 12, brig, 1779
Bonhomme Richard, 42, ship, 1779
Pallas, 32, frigate, 1779
Cerf, 18, cutter, 1779
Vengeance, 12, brig, 1779
310
Serapis, 44, ship, 1779
Axiel, 20, ship, 1780-1781
Saratoga, 18, ship, 1780-1781
America, 74, ship of the line, 1782
General Washington, 20, ship, 1782-1784
Due de Lauzun, 20, ship, 1782-1783
Bourbon, 36, frigate, 1783
Packets :
Active
Baltimore
Despatch
Enterprise
Fame
Georgia Packet
Horn Snake
Mercury
Phoenix
Washington's Fleet, 1775-1776
Hannah, schooner
Lynch, schooner
Franklin, schooner
Lee, schooner
Harrison, schooner
Warren, schooner
Washington, brigantine
Hancock, schooner
General Schuyler, sloop
General Mifflin, sloop
Lady Washington, galley
Lake Champlain, 1776
Enterprise, 12, sloop
Royal Savage, 12, schooner
Revenge,8, schooner
Liberty, 8, schooner
New Haven, 3, gondola
Providence, 3, gondola
Boston, 3, gondola
Spitfire, 3, gondola
Philadelphia, 3, gondola
Connecticut, 3, gondola
Jersey, 3, gondola
New York, 3, gondola
311
Lee,6, galley
Trumbull,8, galley
Congress, 8, galley
Washington, 8, galley
Gates, 8, galley
Mississippi River, 1778-1779
Morris, ship
West Florida , sloop
Morris, schooner
VI. OFFICERS IN THE CONTINENTAL NAVY AND
MARINE CORPS
A list of Revolutionary officers was compiled in 1794. It is "formed from the
Minutes of the Marine Committee and Navy Boards, and from the Rolls of the
several Vessels; many of the Officers served only for a Cruize" (Miscellaneous
Naval Papers, March 18, 1794, in the Library of Congress). A previous list had
been given out by the Board of Admiralty in September 1781 (Papers of the
Continental Congress, 37, 473), which is an incomplete register of the officers of
that date. The following list has been made up from these two (see also Paullin's
Navy of the Revolution, Appendix B). A very few unimportant attempts at
emendation in spelling, etc., that seemed warranted by other authority, have
been made. The names of captains which are numbered comprise those
appointed October 10, 1776, in the order of rank; the numbered lieutenants were
commissioned October 12, 1776. The same officers generally had earlier
commissions, which are also indicated when known; these commissions were
superseded in October, 1776. A number of other dates of commission, taken
from the 1781 list and other sources, are also given. Annexed to the main list will
be found a number of names, not included in either of the old lists, comprising
officers commissioned in France and others (see Journals of the Continental
Congress, April 17, June 6, 1776, June 14, 1777, September 8, 1779; Calendars
of Naval Records and of Jones Papers - indices; Goldsborough's Naval
Chronicle, p. 8; Field's Life of Hopkins, p. 186); some of them were doubtless
never regularly commissioned. To make a wholly complete and accurate list
would be impossible.
CONTINENTAL NAVY
Captains and Commanders
Esek Hopkins, commander-in-chief, December 22, 1775.
1. James Nicholson, June 6, 1776.
2. John Manley, April 17, 1776.
312
3. Hector McNeill, June 15, 1776.
4. Dudley Saltonstall, December 22, 1775.
5. Nicholas Biddle, December 22, 1775.
6. Thomas Thompson, June 6, 1776.
7. John Barry, June 6, 1776.
8. Thomas Read, June 6, 1776.
9. Thomas Grinnell, June 15, 1776.
10. Charles Alexander, June 6, 1776.
11. Lambert Wickes.
12. Abraham Whipple, December 22,1775.
13. John Burrows Hopkins, December 22, 1775.
14. John Hodge, August 22, 1776.
15. William Hallock.
16. Hoysted Hacker.
17. Isaiah Robinson.
18. John Paul Jones.
19. James Josiah.
20. Elisha, Hinman, August 13, 1776.
21. Joseph Olney.
22. James Robinson.
23. John Young.
24. Elisha Warner.
John Nicholson, November 19, 1776.
Samuel Nicholson, December 10, 1776.
Henry Johnson, February 5, 1777.
John Peck Rathburne, February 15, 1777.
Gustavus Conyngham, March 1, 1777.
Samuel Tucker, March 15, 1777.
Daniel Waters, March 17, 1777.
John Green, February 11, 1778.
William Burke, May 1, 1778.
Pierre Landais, June 18, 1778.
Seth Harding, September 23, 1778.
Silas Talbot, September 17, 1779.
John Ayres.
Peter Brewster.
Samuel Chew.
Benjamin Dann.
John Hazard.
William Pickles.
Thomas Simpson.
John Skimmer.
William Stone.
Lieutenants
313
1. Peter Shores, July 22,1776.
2. Robert Harris.
3. Jonathan Maltbie, August 22, 1776.
4. John Brown, June 15, 1776.
5. Ezekiel Burroughs, December 22, 1775.
6. Luke Matthewman.
7. George House.
8. Thomas Albertson.
9. John Baldwin.
10. Simon Gross.
11. David Phipps, August 22, 1776.
12. John Sleymaker.
13. Joshua Barney.
14. Jonathan Pritchard.
15. Adam W. Thaxter.
16. Benjamin Handy.
17. Joseph Greenway.
18. Benjamin Page.
19. Hopley Yeaton.
Rhodes Arnold, December 22, 1775.
Jonathan Pitcher, December 22, 1775.
Benjamin Seabury, December 22, 1775.
Thomas Weaver, December 22, 1775.
John McDougal, December 22, 1775.
Daniel Vaughan, December 22, 1775.
Joseph Doble, June 6, 1776.
John Wheelwright, July 22, 1776.
Josiah Shackford, July 22, 1776.
William Barnes, August 17, 1776.
Thomas Vaughan, August 17, 1776.
Hezekiah Welch, October 19, 1776.
Patrick Fletcher, November 20, 1776.
Blaney Allison, December 20, 1776.
Elijah Bowen, February 5, 1777.
Robert French, March 25, 1777.
Robert Martin, April 22, 1777.
Elijah Hall, June 14, 1777.
Matthew Tibbs, June 17, 1777.
John Rodez, August 6, 1777.
John Fanning, August 10, 1777.
William Mollison, August 12,1777.
Arthur Dillaway, September 19, 1777.
Joseph Vesey, November 13, 1777.
Silas Devol, January 28, 1778.
Muscoe Livingston, July 27, 1778.
Stephen Gregory, August 4, 1778.
314
Michael Knies, August 7, 1778.
Samuel Cardal, August 15, 1778.
Peter Deville, August 25, 1778.
Benjamin Bates, December 4, 1778.
Richard Dale, August, 1779.
Alexander Murray, July 20, 1781.
Joseph Adams.
Robert Adamson.
John Angus.
James Armitage.
Josiah Audibert.
Benjamin Barron.
William Barron.
Goerge Batson.
Daniel Beam
John Bellenger.
Christopher Bradley.
Jacob Brooks.
Philip Brown.
Isaac Buck.
Charles Bulkley.
Edward Burke.
George Champlin.
John Channing.
Seth Clarke.
David Cullam.
James Degge.
William Dennis.
Marie Sevel Doris.
William Dunlap.
William Dupar.
Joshua Fanning.
Wilford Fisher.
William Gamble.
Nicholas E. Gardner.
William Grinnell.
James Grinwell.
William Ham.
James Handy.
Abraham Hawkins.
John Hennessey.
Stephen Hill.
Christopher Hopkins.
Esek Hopkins, Jr.
William Hopkins.
Robert Hume.
315
Aquilla Johns.
John Kemp.
John Kerr.
Benjamin Knight.
William Leeds.
Edward Leger.
John Lewis.
George Lovie.
Cutting Lunt.
Henry Lunt.
John McIvers.
John Margisson.
Richard Marvin.
John Moran.
William Moran.
William Morrison.
Isaac Olney.
James Pine.
Robert Pomeroy.
David Porter.
William Potts.
Benjamin Reed.
Peter Richards.
James Robertson.
John Robinson.
Peter Rosseau.
Robert Saunders.
John Scott.
Robert Scott.
John Scranton.
Nicholas Scull.
James Sellers.
Daniel Starr.
James Stephens.
John Stevens.
David Welch.
Jacob White.
Richard Wickes.
James Wilson.
Robert Wilson.
Samuel York.
MARINE CORPS
Major
316
Samuel Nicholas, June 25, 1776.
Captains
Matthew Parke, May 26, 1776.
Andrew Porter, June 25, 1776.
Samuel Shaw, June 25, 1776.
Benjamin Deane, June 25, 1776.
Robert Mullen, June 25, 1776.
John Stewart, June 25, 1776.
Gilbert Saltonstall, June, 1776.
Richard Palmer, July 7, 1776.
George Jerry Osborne, July 22, 1776.
Seth Baxter, October 10, 1776.
James Disney, October 22, 1776.
Joseph Hardy, October, 1776.
Dennis Leary, June 21,1777.
William Morris, June, 1777.
William Jones, March 4, 1778.
Edward Arrowsmith, October 20, 1778.
William Nicholson, September 6, 1781.
Abraham Boyce.
Isaac Craig.
John Elliott.
Robert Elliott.
John Hazard.
William Holton.
William Matthewman.
Miles Pennington.
- Rice.
Joseph Shoemaker.
- Spence.
John Trevett.
Elihu Trowbridge.
John Welch.
Lieutenants
Daniel Henderson, June 25, 1776.
David Love, June 25, 1776.
Franklin Reed, June 25, 1776.
Peregrine Brown, June 25, 1776.
James McClure, June 25,1776.
William Gilmore, June 25,1776.
Abel Morgan, June 25, 1776.
Hugh Montgomery, June 25, 1776.
317
Thomas Pownal, June 25,1776.
Richard Harrison, June 25, 1776.
Stephen Meade, July 22, 1776.
Nathaniel Thwing, July 22, 1776.
Benjamin Thompson, July 22,1776.
Alpheus Rice, August 24,1776.
Jacob White, October 16, 1776.
Thomas Plunkett, December 9, 1776.
William Jennison, February, 1777.
William Waterman, March 4,1778.
Thomas Elwood, August 24,1778.
Peter Green, September 25, 1778.
Abraham Vandyke, July 24, 1779.
William Barney.
Henry Becker.
Peter Bedford.
David Bill.
Gurdon Bill.
Benjamin Catlin.
Seth Chapin.
John Chilton.
James Clarke.
James Cokely.
James Connolly.
William Cooper.
David Cullam.
Robert Cummings.
Robert Davis.
Henry Dayton.
John Dimsdell.
Stephen Earle,
Thomas Elting.
Panatier de la Falconier.
Zebadiah Farnham.
William Fielding.
Thomas Fitzgerald.
John Fitzpatrick.
Samuel Gamage.
John Guignace.
Roger Haddock.
James Hamilton.
Jonas Hamilton.
William Hamilton.
John Harris.
Samuel Hempstead.
Samuel Holt.
318
Benjamin Huddle.
William Huddle.
Robert Hunter.
Hugh Kirkpatrick.
Daniel Longstreet.
Eugene McCarthy.
Richard McClure.
Charles McHarron.
Robert McNeal.
Peter Manifold.
Jonathan Mix.
William Morris.
Alexander Neilson.
James Gerald O'Kelly.
Avery Parker.
Samuel Powars.
Samuel Pritchard.
William Radford.
Jerry Reed.
Nathaniel Richards.
Jabez Smith.
Walter Spooner.
Edmund Stack.
Daniel Starr.
I. M. Strobach.
George Trumbull.
Thomas Turner.
Louis de la Valette.
Zebulon Varnam.
- Wadsworth.
Samuel Wallingford.
James Warren.
James H. Wilson.
Jonathan Woodworth.
SUPPLEMENTARY LIST
Captains
Isaac Cazneau, April 17, 1776.
Samuel Tomkins, June 6, 1776.
Christopher Miller, June 6, 1776.
Henry Skinner.
John Roach.
Ralph Moor.
Denis Nicolas Cottineau.
319
Joseph Varage.
Philippe Nicolas Ricot.
Lieutenants
Eli Stansbury, December 22, 1775.
Israel Turner, June 6, 1776.
Mark Dennet, June 6, 1776.
-Plunkett, July 20, 1781.
Peter Amiel.
Robert Robinson.
John Buckley.
James Linda.
Henri le Meignen.
Pierre Magonet.
Beninge Mischateau.
Armand la Coudrais.
Pierre de Nantes.
Nicolas de St.Valery.
Captains of Marines
John Grannis.
Maurice O'Connell.
Antoine Felix Wybert.
Paul de Chamillard.
Lieutenants of Marines
George Stillman.
Barnabas Lothrop.
VII. CONTINENTAL PRIVATEERS
A list of the private armed vessels to which letters of marque were issued by the
Continental Congress has been printed by the Library of Congress in the
Calendar of Naval Records of the American Revolution, published in 1906. With
the name of each vessel are given the state where owned, the rig, the number of
guns and of men, the amount of the bond furnished, and the names of the
commander, the bonders, and the owners. The bonds are contained in sixteen
volumes of the papers of the Continental Congress (No. 196). The most
important of the statistics compiled from them are given below. The numbers of
guns and of men in these tables are smaller than they should be, for the reason
that in several cases (thirty of the former - eighteen of the latter) the numbers are
not stated.
320
By type:
Ships 301
Brigs and brigantines 541
Schooners, sloops, etc. 751
Boats and galleys 104
Total 1697
By State:
New Hampshire 43
Massachusetts 626
Rhode Island 15
Connecticut 218
New York 1,
New Jersey 4
Pennsylvania 500
Maryland 225
Virginia 64
South Carolina 1
Total 1697
By year:
1776 34
1777 69
1778 129
1779 209
1780 301
1781 550
1782 383
1783 22
Total 1697
Number of guns, 14,872.
Number of men, 58,400
VIII. CONCORDAT
Agreement between Messieurs John Paul Jones, captain of the Bonhomme
Richard; Pierre Landais, captain of the Alliance; Denis Nicolas Cottineau, captain
of the Pallas; Joseph Varage, captain of the Stag; and Philippe Nicolas Ricot,
captain of the Vengeance; composing a squadron that shall be commanded by
the oldest officer of the highest grade and so on in succession in case of death or
retreat. None of the said commanders, whilst they are not separated from the
said squadron by order of the minister, shall act but by virtue of the brevet which
they shall have obtained from the United States of America, and it is agreed that
the flag of the United States shall be displayed.
The division of the prizes to the superior officers and crews of the said squadron
321
shall be made agreeable to the American laws, but it is agreed that the
proportion of the whole coming to each vessel in the squadron shall be regulated
by the Minister of the Marine Department of France and the Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States of America.
A copy of the American laws shall be annexed to the present agreement, after
having been certified by the commander of the Bonhomme Richard, but as the
said laws cannot foresee nor determine as to what may concern the vessels and
subjects of other nations, it is expressly agreed that whatever may be contrary to
them should be regulated by the Minister of the French Marine and the Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States of America.
It is likewise agreed that the orders given by the Minister of the French Marine
and the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States shall be executed.
Considering the necessity there is of preserving the interests of each individual,
the prizes that shall be taken shall be remitted to the orders of Monsieur le Ray
de Chaumont, honorary intendant of the Royal Hotel of Invalids, who has
furnished the expenses of the armament of the said squadron.
It has been agreed that M. le Ray de Chaumont be requested not to give up the
part of the prizes coming to all the crews, and to each individual of the said
squadron, but to their order, and to be responsible for the same in his own and
proper name.
Whereas the said squadron has been formed for the purpose of injuring the
common enemies of France and America, it has been agreed that such armed
vessels, whether French or American, may be associated therewith by common
consent, as shall be found suitable for the purpose, and that they shall have such
proportion of the prizes which shall be taken as the laws of their respective
countries allow them.
In case of the death of any of the before mentioned commanders of vessels, he
shall be replaced agreeably to the order of the tariff, with liberty however for the
successor to choose whether he will remain on board his own vessel and give up
to the next in order the command of the vacant ship.
It has moreover been agreed that the commander of the Stag shall be excepted
from the last article of this present agreement, because in case of a disaster to
M. de Varage, it shall be replaced by his second in command and so on by the
other officers of his cutter the Stag.
J. P. JONES.
P. LANDAIS.
DE COTTINEAU.
DE VARAGE.
322
P. RICOT.
Le RAY DE CHAUMONT.
323