CONCLUSION
Conclusion
This concluding chapter evaluates the implications of this research project through
five sections. First, a postscript briefly recalls the process of US-North Korean
interaction from the transition to the Administration of George W. Bush in 2001 to
Pyongyang’s June 2008 demolition of the cooling tower at the Yongbyon nuclear
facility. Secondly, and based on the findings of my empirical case study in Chapters
Four and Five, I comparatively examine the strength of offensive realism, defensive
realism and constructivism in explaining the extent to which US-North Korean
security competition was mitigated from 1993 to 2000. The third section considers the
implications of this research project’s findings for the ability of policymakers to
exercise security dilemma sensibility. The fourth section concludes this PhD thesis by
laying out a proposed research agenda that builds on the findings of this research
project.
1.
Postscript: Transition to George W. Bush
George W. Bush succeeded to the US presidency in early 2001 on a political platform
that pointed to elements of ideological fundamentalism and assumptions of inherent
bad faith in Pyongyang. Robert Woodward argued that the Bush Administration’s
outlook was based on moral absolutism that cast the US as a crusader against the
‘evil’ North Korean leadership. 1 Similarly, Charles L. Pritchard, who served as
National Security Council Director for Asian Affairs under the Clinton
Administration, and the US Representative to Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) under the Bush Administration, reflected that the transition to
Bush marked
a hundred percent fundamental change. The Bush Administration
brought with it a whole different set of assumptions on North
Korean intentions and how to deal with the North Koreans, they
1
Robert Woodward, Bush At War (New York; London: Simon & Schuster, 2002), pp.239-40; Chungin Moon and Jong-Yun Bae, ‘The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean nuclear crisis’, in Mel Gurtov
and Peter Van Ness (ed.), Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific (New
York: Routledge, 2005), pp.45-47.
217
CONCLUSION
[the Bush Administration] viewed the Agreed Framework as
fundamentally flawed, something to be reversed.2
The ideological fundamentalism of the Bush Administration and its opposition
to the Clinton Administration’s willingness to engage so-called ‘rogue states’ led to
the Bush Administration’s formulation of an ‘Anything But Clinton’ policy (dubbed
‘ABC’ by political commentators).3 This political posture assumed that ‘rogue states’
could be expected to renege on international agreements because of their antagonistic
identity. Bush’s position was illustrated when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung
visited Washington in March 2001. In spite of Pyongyang’s moratorium on missile
testing the previous year, Bush voiced his suspicion
about the fact that the North Koreans are shipping weapons around
the world. And any agreement that would convince them not to do
so would be beneficial, but we want to make sure that their ability
to develop and spread weapons of mass destruction was, in fact,
stopped – they're willing to stop it – and that we can verify that, in
fact, they had stopped it.4
Faced with these suspicions of Pyongyang, Bush chose not to resume talks to
with Pyongyang over its missile program, and instead ordered a review of US policy
toward North Korea. 5 Yet, it should be noted that this statement was made in the
aftermath of significant North Korean concessions to US security concerns the
previous year. As Leon Sigal noted, during Albright’s talks with Kim Jong Il the
previous October, the North Korean leader ‘offered not only to halt all missile exports,
2
Interview with Charles L. Pritchard, 27 March 2007, Washington DC; Pritchard, Failed diplomacy:
the Tragic Story of how North Korea got the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2007), pp.46-47, 64.
3
Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘N. Korea, 6, and Bush, 0’, New York Times, 26 April, 2005.
4
Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea’, White House Press
Release, 7 March 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010307-6.html, accessed
7 July 2006.
5
David E. Sanger, ‘Bush Tells Seoul Talks With North Won’t Resume Now’, New York Times, 8
March 2001.
218
CONCLUSION
but also to freeze all testing, production, and deployment of his No-Dong and TaepoDong missiles and eventually eliminate them.’6
The Bush Administration’s rhetoric of suspicion and hostility led to an
antagonistic response from Pyongyang. On 15 March 2001, Pyongyang accused the
Bush administration of ‘escalating its provocative and reckless diatribe.’ 7 These
patterns of antagonism were further illustrated the following year during Bush’s State
of the Union Address, when he declared that Washington’s goal
is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America
or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some
of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the
11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime
arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while
starving its citizens … States like these, and their terrorist allies,
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the
world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes
pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms
to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.8
Given that this was the first State of the Union Address following the terrorist
attacks of 11th September 2001, Bush’s reference to the DPRK as part of an ‘Axis of
Evil’ (alongside Iran and Iraq) with links to ‘terrorists’ gave increasing meaning to a
hostile relationship between Washington and Pyongyang. This was similarly
illustrated in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review that listed North Korea as a potential
target for US nuclear weapons. 9 Although the Bush Administration continued to
implement the Agreed Framework, it interpreted DPRK intentions through an inherent
bad faith model, and expected Pyongyang to renege on the agreement at some point.
For the Bush Administration, there was no dilemma of interpretation, and hence no
Leon V. Sigal, ‘Six Myths About Dealing With Pyongyang’, Nautilus Institute, 20 February 2001,
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0102C_Sigal.html, accessed 25 July 2006.
7
Don Kirk, ‘North Korea Turns Up the Heat; Calls U.S. a Nation of Cannibals’, New York Times, 15
March 2001.
8
George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html, accessed 10 July 2006
9
Moon and Bae, ‘The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean nuclear crisis’, pp.50-51.
6
219
CONCLUSION
dilemma of response. The North Korean leadership, by virtue of its ‘evil’ ideology,
was seen by Bush as a strategic challenge to the US. Cooperation with North Korea
was thus seen as nothing more than a temporary arrangement that was expected to
collapse as a result of anticipated violations of the Agreed Framework by the DPRK.10
These dynamics set the backdrop for Washington’s confrontational policy
response following Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s October 2002
allegation that Pyongyang had pursued a clandestine Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
program. Guided by a benign self-image, the Bush Administration failed to appreciate
that slow implementation of the Agreed Framework had contributed to Pyongyang’s
fears. Furthermore, the Bush Administration’s ideological fundamentalism and its
assumption that the North Korean leadership was ‘evil’11 meant that neoconservative
policymakers saw no security dilemma in dealing with North Korea. Rather, North
Korea was seen as a strategic challenge to US security.12 Reassurance was ruled out in
favour of deterrence and coercive diplomacy to signal US resolve. Moreover,
Pyongyang’s intentions were interpreted through worst-case assumptions. As Sigal
noted, neoconservative policymakers in Washington
claimed that the North Korean had confessed to having an HEU
program, by which they insinuated it was already enriching large
quantities of uranium to 90 percent levels, which was not true. The
term ‘HEU program’ ... was misleading.13
Believing that firmness was necessary to demonstrate US resolve against
North Korea, the Bush Administration terminated supplies of HFO to North Korea
and suspended the LWR project.14
Desaix Anderson, ‘Crisis in North Korea: The US Strategic Future in East Asia’, Speech at the Croft
Institute of International Studies University of Mississippi Oxford, 27 March 2003,
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0325A_Anderson.html, accessed 20 May 2007; Gavan
McCormack, ‘Criminal States: Soprano vs. Baritone’, Paper presented for the 50th Anniversary
Conference of Korean Association of International Studies, Seoul, 12-13 May 2006, revised 25 May
2006.
11
Interview with Sigal, 6 March 2007, New York.
12
McCormack, Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe (New
York: Avalon Publishing Group, 2004), pp.159-68.
13
Interview with Sigal, 6 March 2007, New York.
14
Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, pp.40-43.
10
220
CONCLUSION
Pyongyang’s benign self-image meant that the North Korean leadership failed
to enter into the Bush Administration’s fears of the proliferation of nuclear material.
Furthermore, the Bush Administration’s hostile position toward Pyongyang and the
run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq led to increased fears in the North Korean
leadership that Washington sought to bring about the collapse of the Pyongyang
regime, either through economic pressure or war.15 Believing that the US now posed a
strategic challenge, Pyongyang attempted to demonstrate firmness, and the following
year withdrew from the NPT and unfroze the gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon. 16
Both Washington and Pyongyang thus contributed to the growing fears of the other
side, leading to an escalating security competition, whilst failing to see how their own
actions had contributed to the re-emergence of security competition.
A similar pattern of interactions occurred from 2005 to 2006. Following the
fourth round of the Six Party Talks, the resulting Joint Statement of September 2005
laid out Pyongyang’s agreement to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility and to
return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).17 In spite of this development,
the Bush Administration continued to interpret North Korea through the inherent bad
faith model. Following the release of the Joint Statement, the US Treasury
Department introduced the North Korea Illicit Activities Initiative, forcing the Macaubased Banco Delta Asia (BDA) to freeze all North Korean assets on suspicion of
Pyongyang’s money-laundering activities. 18 The North Korean leadership evidently
saw this as evidence that Washington remained intent on bringing about the collapse
of North Korea through economic strangulation, 19 and adopted a confrontational
response in the form of the missile and nuclear tests of July and October 2006
respectively.20
Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy, pp.36-44; ‘US urged to accept DPRK's proposal’, KCNA, 25 November
2002; ‘US termed arch nuclear war criminal’, KCNA, 27 November 2002.
16
David E. Sanger, ‘Threats and Responses: Nuclear Standoff; Reactor Started In North Korea, U.S.
Concludes’, New York Times, 27 February 2003.
17
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm; J.J Suh, ‘Producing Security Dilemma out of
Uncertainty: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis’, Mario Einaudi Centre for International Studies,
Cornell University (2006), p.8.
18
Gavan McCormack, ‘North Korea and the Birth Pangs of a New Northeast Asian Order’, Japan
Focus, 5 November 2007, http://www.japanfocus.org/_Gavan_McCormackNorth_Korea_and_the_Birth_Pangs_of_a_New_Northeast_Asian_Order/, accessed 5 May 2008
19
McCormack, ‘Criminal States’.
20
Sigal, ‘North Korea: Negotiations Work’, MIT Center for International Studies, February 2007,
web.mit.edu/CIS/pdf/Audit_02_07_Sigal.pdf, accessed 18 May 2007.
15
221
CONCLUSION
Conversely, the ideological fundamentalism of the Bush Administration meant
that Washington saw these developments as further confirming its assumption that
Pyongyang remained hostile to the US. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
referred to the July 2006 missile tests as ‘clearly something that's in violation ... of the
moratorium on missile tests’. 21 Similarly, following North Korea’s alleged nuclear
test on 3 October 2006,22 Bush pushed for a UN Security Council resolution imposing
sanctions on Pyongyang.23 It was only from November 2006 onwards that the Bush
Administration was forced to acknowledge the impracticality of coercive diplomacy
against North Korea. 24 The Republican defeats in Congress in 2006 underlined to
Bush the growing domestic unpopularity over the war in Iraq. This, and the looming
prospect of another nuclear crisis with Iran, forced the Bush Administration to
acknowledge that it did not have the capacity to push for coercive diplomacy in
seeking the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. 25 More recently, and facing
increasing domestic criticism as well as the possibility of a Republican defeat in the
2008 Presidential race, the Bush Administration has adopted a more pragmatic
approach toward the DPRK. In June 2008, Pyongyang demolished the cooling tower
at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, and released to the US key documents relating to its
nuclear program. Although uncertainty remained over the status of the DPRK’s
plutonium fuel rods, Bush lifted sanctions on North Korea.26
2.
Comparative Assessment of Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism and
Constructivism
In analysing and evaluating this empirical case study, it is necessary to acknowledge
the difficulties of research on US-North Korean interactions. As the North Korean
Embassy in Canberra and the North Korean Mission to the United Nations in New
York both declined the author’s request research interviews, it was necessary to
hypothesise Pyongyang’s intentions based on a variety of other sources. It was thus
21
White House Press Briefing, 4 July 2006,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060704-1.html, accessed 20 May 2008.
22
White House Press Release, 3 October 2007,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061003-10.html, accessed 20 May 2008.
23
‘President's Remarks on United Nations Security Council Resolution on North Korea’, White House
Press Release, 14 October 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061014-1.html,
accessed 20 May 2008.
24
Helene Cooper, ‘Past Deals by N. Korea May Face Less Study’, New York Times, 18 April 2008 .
25
Glenn Kessler, ‘Democrats Blast Bush Policy on N. Korea’, Washington Post, 16 November 2006.
26
Stephen Lee Myers, ‘A Diplomatic Success That Defies the Critics’, New York Times, 27 June 2008.
222
CONCLUSION
necessary to cite media coverage from the Pyongyang-based Korean Central News
Agency (KCNA) as well as Marxist scholars such as Gavan McCormack and Bruce
Cummings, as well as more conservative scholars in the US and UK. The element of
bias from these sources, and their resulting implications for this case study, has to be
acknowledged. The author has sought to address this issue by triangulation of
differing sources of material. This has enabled the author to compare differing
perspectives and opinions surrounding the various developments in US-North Korean
interaction from the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 to the transition to the Bush
Administration in 2001. In so doing, the author has sought to present US-North
Korean interaction as a process of security dilemma dynamics, in line with the
definition of the phenomenon outlined in Chapter One. Based on this interpretation of
US-North Korean interaction, 27 this case study suggests the following conclusions on
the explanatory strength of the offensive realist, defensive realist and critical
constructivist perspectives on the US-North Korean security dilemma.
The offensive realist perspective would claim that it was never possible to
mitigate US-North Korean security dilemma dynamics, and that episodes such as the
Agreed Framework, the Inter-Korean Summit of June 2000, the exchange of highlevel envoys between Washington and Pyongyang, and the Joint Communiqué of
October 2000 were temporary periods of cooperation. Given John Mearsheimer’s
27
This interpretation of US-North Korean interaction may, or may not, be correct, however. As Ken
Booth and Nicholas Wheeler note, ‘often history fails to give definite answers, for what history tells us
are the things over which historians agree or disagree, not what actually happened. The past (including
the motives and intentions of actors) can never be objectively recreated: we can never really know ...
historians remain as divided in their interpretations as were contemporary observers.’ (emphasis in the
original) See Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear Cooperation and Trust in World
Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p10. Given the difficulty of clearly ascertaining the
intentions of the DPRK, it is possible that Pyongyang may still be a hostile power intent on reunifying
the peninsula by force and / or threatening the US and Japan with nuclear weapons. The argument that
US-North Korean interaction may be seen as a security dilemma is the author’s analysis, based on the
reading of the historical background to US-North Korean interaction in Chapter Three. As with much
research in international politics, however, it is necessary to acknowledge that there are perspectives
that challenge this interpretation. Thus, for instance, Chuck Downs, currently the executive director of
the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, argued that cooperative actions by the DPRK,
such as the demolition of the cooling tower at Yongbyon, are nothing more than ‘publicity stunts’, as
Pyongyang remains a ‘terrible tyranny’; see PBS Interview with Chuck Downs and Selig Harrison, 26
June 2008, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june08/northkorea_06-26.html, accessed 10
November 2008, and Downs, Over The Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (Washington DC:
American Enterprise Institute, 1998). Similarly, Nicholas Eberstadt argued that ‘the record actually
suggests we already know North Korea's nuclear intentions fairly well. Pyongyang pushes its nuclear
weapons project overtly when it can-and covertly when it must.’ See Eberstadt, ‘Diplomatic
Fantasyland: The Illusion of a Negotiated Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis’, Nautilus
Institute, 23 September 2003, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0342_Eberstadt.html, accessed 13
November 2008.
223
CONCLUSION
argument that suspicion between states can never be reduced,28 it may be argued that
the fear of ‘future uncertainty’ identified by Dale Copeland has driven the overall
pattern of US-North Korean interaction.29 Based on this logic, US and North Korean
policymakers were inescapably driven by worst-case thinking due to their fears that
the other would re-emerge as a security threat at some stage in the future. Furthermore,
it was never possible for either side to consider the possibility of defensive intentions
behind the ambiguous symbolism of their respective military postures, nor was it
possible for either side to signal its peaceful intent. Such a perspective would suggest
that the 1993-94 nuclear crisis, the 1998 missile test, the DPRK’s HEU program and
the missile and nuclear tests of 2006 provide a more accurate picture of the overall
patterns of US-North Korean interaction. Conversely, the Agreed Framework, the USDPRK Joint Communiqué of 2000, and the 2000 and 2007 Inter-Korean Summits and
the June 2008 demolition of the cooling tower at the Yongbyon nuclear facility were
temporary periods of cooperation that did not mark any fundamental move away from
the overall patterns of confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang.30
The offensive realist perspective, however, is open to challenge on four
grounds. First, the circumstances that led to escalating tensions in US-North Korean
interactions have to be qualified. The authors of Going Critical speculate that
Pyongyang was fearful of what they refer to as ‘the 1992 trap’. In 1991, the North
Korean leadership had signed its IAEA safeguards agreement, but this cooperative
gesture was not reciprocated by Washington.31 Seen in this light, it is possible that
Pyongyang believed that it was necessary to demonstrate resolve to avoid being
pushed into making further unreciprocated concessions. Similarly, although North
Korea’s alleged HEU program and its missile tests have to be acknowledged as
provocative actions, the wider background to these developments has to be considered
as well. Most observers believe that the DPRK undertook its HEU program only from
late 1997 or early 1998 onwards, three years after the signing of the Agreed
Framework.32 It may thus be argued that Pyongyang undertook its HEU program as a
28
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp.30-35
Dale Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism’, International Security, 25/2
(2000), pp.200-03.
30
See also interview with Gary Samore, 8 March 2007, New York.
31
Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman and Robert Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear
Crisis (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004), pp.89-90.
32
Interview with Michael Mazarr, 13 March 2007, Washington DC.
29
224
CONCLUSION
hedge against the possibility that the Clinton Administration would fail to implement
the Agreed Framework. Leon Sigal, for instance, argued that ‘after North Korea
warned of retaliation for what it called US failure to live up to the Agreed Framework
in 1997, it decided to shop for gas centrifuges for enriching uranium.’33 Similarly, it is
possible to view the 1998 missile test as an attempt by Pyongyang to demonstrate
resolve against the Clinton Administration’s attempt to delay implementation of the
Agreed Framework.34 Given this background, it may be argued that the renewal of
US-North Korean tensions in 1998 and 2002 was not the result of an irreducible
uncertainty in international politics, but rather the difficulties faced by policymakers
on either side in addressing the other’s fears.
Second, although uncertainty did lead to an environment where worst-case
scenario thinking was possible, it was not inevitable that policymakers on either side
would have subscribed to this. Rather, policymakers in the Clinton Administration,
such as General Gary Luck, William Perry and Wendy Sherman, were able at times to
enter into the security fears of the North Korean leadership.35 This suggests that the
meaning of uncertainty could be reinterpreted. Governments could look past their
benign self-images and consider the possibility that their military postures may be
seen as provocative by the other side. Even under the condition of uncertainty in
international politics, policymakers can acknowledge the possibility that other states
acquire armaments for defensive, not offensive, purposes. Furthermore, such
policymakers may also formulate appropriate policy responses that seek to reassure
other states.
Third, it may be argued that domestic audience cost theory offers a stronger
explanation for the Clinton Administration’s slow implementation of the Agreed
Framework, rather than irreducible uncertainty. Critics such as Gavan McCormack
have claimed that the Clinton Administration deliberately delayed implementation of
Leon Sigal, ‘North Korea is No Iraq: Pyongyang’s Negotiating Strategy’, Arms Control Today, 2002,
http://publications.ssrc.org/employees/KellyACT.pdf, accessed 6 July 2007; Interview with Sigal, 6
March 207, New York.
34
Interview with Ken Quinones, 1 March 2007, Chicago.
35
Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p.314; William J. Perry, ‘Testimony Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee’, 12 October 1999,
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1999_h/991012_perry_nkorea.html, accessed on 14 August
2007; Wendy Sherman, White House Press Briefing, 10 October 2000,
http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/2000/dprk-001010-12.htm, accessed 15 August 2007.
33
225
CONCLUSION
the Agreed Framework in the hope that the North Korean regime would collapse of its
own accord. This perspective has been challenged by former KEDO officials. Desaix
Anderson, KEDO Director from 1997 to 2001, reflected that he was ‘not aware of any
cheating by our side’. 36 Similarly, Mitchell Reiss, Chief US Negotiator to KEDO,
argued that, because ‘there was no domestic constituency arguing for better relations
with North Korea ... I object to [McCormack’s] suggestion that the Agreed
Framework collapsed solely because of the Clinton Administration’s neglect.’37 The
fact that Clinton chose to continue the process of engagement with Pyongyang, even
in the face of increasing Congressional criticism, from 1999 to 2000, may be seen as
evidence that policymakers may be willing to risk domestic controversy and face high
audience costs in attempting to reassure other states. Had the Clinton Administration
chosen to risk domestic political controversy and undertaken full implementation of
the Agreed Framework between 1995 and 1997, it is may be speculated that
Pyongyang would have had no reason to develop its HEU program.38
Fourth, and as detailed under the discussion of the defensive realist
perspective, scrutiny of the policy documents and various agreements between North
Korea on the one hand, and South Korea and the US on the other, acknowledged the
possibility of long-term security cooperation in reducing uncertainty and building
trust. The terms of the Agreed Framework, for instance, envisaged reciprocal actions
between Washington and Pyongyang in the gradual dismantling of the Yongbyon gasgraphite reactor and the construction of the Light Water Reactor (LWR) project for
North Korea.39 Similarly, in his review of US policy to North Korea, Perry argued that
normalisation of relations with the DPRK was a possibility, but only after Pyongyang
had directly addressed US concerns over its nuclear and missile programs and stopped
threatening South Korea. Such perspectives clearly acknowledged that long-term
security cooperation between the US and North Korea was possible.
36
Interview with Desaix Anderson, 9 March 2007, New York.
Email Interview with Mitchell Reiss, 14 and 30 July 2007. See also Joel Wit, ‘Clinton and North
Korea: Past, Present and Future’, Nautilus Institute, 1 March 2000,
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0002A_Wit.html, accessed 24 January 2007.
38
This perspective assumes that Pyongyang’s alleged HEU program was Pyongyang’s response to the
Clinton Administration’s slow implementation of the Agreed Framework, and not a nuclear weapons
program that the North Korean leadership is intent on developing at all cost.
39
Interview with Sigal, 6 March 2007, New York.
37
226
CONCLUSION
Defensive Realism
The defensive realist perspective would argue that the patterns of US-North Korean
interactions from 1994 onwards pointed towards an emerging security regime. As
underlined by Robert Jervis, security regimes are cooperative security arrangements
based on the assumption that both sides are rational egoists that will derive long-term
benefits from its implementation.40
The Agreed Framework may be seen as an example of a security regime. The
terms of the agreement were based on expectations of long-term security cooperation
between Washington and Pyongyang. As Sigal noted,
the North Koreans knew that they would receive the completed
LWRs only after full and verifiable compliance with the IAEA
safeguards agreement … The Agreed Framework, had it been fully
implemented, would have eliminated North Korea’s existing
nuclear programs, before giving them completed light water
reactors.41
In other words, the US could expect to achieve a full accounting for
Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities only after a given period of cooperation with the
DPRK. Similarly, the North Korean leadership could expect to receive a pair of fully
functional LWRs only in the long term. Similarly, the Perry Report, by urging the
Clinton Administration to show restraint in the face of provocative North Korean
actions in order to reduce tensions in order to build trust, was based on the notion that
long-term compatibility between the security interests of Washington and Pyongyang
was possible. The notion of long-term normalisation of relations between the US and
North Korea was further underlined in the Joint Communiqué of October 2000 and
the exchange of high-level envoys between Washington and Pyongyang. 42 By
agreeing to undertake talks aimed at replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with a
permanent peace arrangement, the emerging pattern of US-North Korean interaction
Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, 36/2 (1982), pp.185-87.
Interview with Sigal, 6 March 2007, New York.
42
‘Text of the US-DPRK Joint Communiqué’, US State Department, 12 October 2000,
http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2000/001012/epf407.htm, accessed 2 November 2006.
40
41
227
CONCLUSION
at the end of 2000 indicated growing acknowledgement that it was possible for North
Korea and the US to achieve compatibility in their security interests.
Furthermore, it is possible to view two specific North Korean concessions
during this period as costly signals. As noted in Chapter Four, the concessions offered
by the North Koreans during the second half of 1994 effectively accepted a certain
amount of risk to North Korean security. During the third round of the Gallucci-Kang
talks, the North Korean negotiator, Kang Sok Ju, implicitly accepted that full
disclosure of the extent of the DPRK’s nuclear activities to the IAEA and dismantling
of the gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon had to take place before the completion of the
LWR project.43 It may be argued that this constituted a case of North Korea accepting
a significant measure of nuclear vulnerability vis-à-vis the US. If IAEA inspections
revealed that North Korea had separated weapons-grade plutonium from their 8,000
spent fuel rods, the US would have the information it needed to press for sanctions
against Pyongyang. If, on the other hand, IAEA inspections revealed that no such
diversion of weapons-grade nuclear material had taken place, North Korea would
have no potential nuclear weapons program with which it could defend itself against a
US attack. Either way, such IAEA inspections would take place before the completion
of the LWR project. This meant that the US was in a position to unilaterally terminate
the LWR project as well as the supply of HFO to North Korea if it discovered that
North Korea had separated weapons-grade plutonium. These arrangements were also
reflected in the text of the Agreed Framework. The last paragraph of the agreement
acknowledged that the DPRK was to ‘come into full compliance with its safeguards
agreement with the IAEA’44 after partial completion of the LWR project, but ‘before
delivery of key nuclear components.’ 45 In other words, the concessions offered by
North Korea during the second half of 1994 implicitly accepted some level of North
Korean vulnerability to the US.
A second North Korean concession that may be seen as a costly signal took
place during the exchange of high-level envoys between Washington and Pyongyang
43
Wit, et. al., Going Critical, pp.300-03.
‘Text of the Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’, cited in David Albright and Kevin O’Neill (ed.), Solving the North Korean
Nuclear Puzzle (Washington DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2000), pp.249-51.
45
‘Text of the Agreed Framework’.
44
228
CONCLUSION
in 2000. As noted in Chapter Five, during his talks with Madeleine Albright, Kim
Jong Il agreed to end development of the Taepodong missile program. As Sigal noted,
such a commitment meant an end to production, testing, and sales of the missile.46
The North Korean leader also agreed that a continued US military presence in South
Korea and gradual withdrawal of North Korean conventional forces from the DMZ
was possible if a formal peace treaty was signed between Washington and
Pyongyang. 47 Furthermore, these North Korean concessions took place amidst the
backdrop of growing North Korean conventional force inferiority vis-à-vis South
Korea and the US. Under such circumstances, the development of long-range nuclear
missiles offered Pyongyang the best means of deterring an attack by the US. By
agreeing to end activity that would have led to the development of such an arsenal, the
North Korean leadership indicated its willingness to forego weapons that Washington
saw as threatening.
What the defensive realist perspective does not explain, however, is how and
why the US and North Korea moved away from confrontation in June 1994 and
August 1998, toward cooperation after June 1994, and from 1999 to 2000. As noted in
Chapter Four, there were no costly signals prior to Carter’s talks, as the Clinton
Administration sought to avoid undermining the operational readiness of the US
military presence in South Korea. 48 Similarly, the Republican-controlled Congress
presented the Clinton Administration with high audience costs in relation to the
implementation of the Agreed Framework. The costly signals that were necessary for
the Clinton Administration to reassure North Korea would have been too costly in
domestic terms to implement. Even after Clinton instructed Perry to conduct a review
of US policy on North Korea, there was no costly signalling on either side. The
sanctions that were lifted by the Clinton Administration could have been re-imposed
on Pyongyang at short notice. Conversely, in September 1999, Pyongyang only
agreed to a conditional suspension of missile testing, thereby implying that that it
Sigal, ‘Negotiating an End to North Korea’s Missile-Making’, Arms Control Today, June 2000.
Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p.438.
48
Wit, et. al., Going Critical, pp.122-23.
46
47
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CONCLUSION
would resume work on the Taepodong missile if the Clinton Administration did not
lift sanctions on the DPRK.49
Moreover, as examined in Chapter Four, the US and North Korean military
postures during the 1993-94 nuclear crisis were characterised by high levels of
ambiguous symbolism. At no point was the US-North Korean balance of military
power shaped by Braden Evan Montgomery’s ‘neutral offence-defence balance’.
There was no way the DPRK could reassure Seoul and Washington by reducing the
concentration of its forces on the DMZ as such an action would have meant unilateral
North Korean vulnerability. Conversely, the contingency US plan for war hinged on
its ability to deflect a North Korean attack and deploy substantial reinforcements for a
counter-attack into North Korea. The ambiguous symbolism of their respective
military postures prevented either side from clearly signalling its peaceful intent,
arguably causing the crisis escalate to the brink of war in June 1994. Moreover, it is
difficult to claim that the US and North Korea were able to signal defensive intent to
one another through the adoption of defensive military postures in the period
following the signing of the Agreed Framework. If anything, it is rather more likely
that the North Korean missile test of 1998, alongside growing suspicions concerning
the Kumchangri site, would have been interpreted by the US as evidence of
Pyongyang’s intentions to develop long-range nuclear missiles capable of targeting
the US. This was evident in the form of the Republican-controlled Congress’s
confrontational response to the 1998 missile test. It is thus necessary to consider a
different explanation for the resumption of talks with North Korea after mid-1994 and
the process of broader engagement in 1999-2000 instead.
Constructivism
The constructivist perspective focuses on how the antagonistic images that North
Korea, on the one hand, and South Korea and the US on the other, were gradually
reinterpreted. Social learning through dialogue offered new meaning to a relationship
based on a Lockean logic of anarchy, rather than a Hobbesian one. By introducing
new ideas and identities into their relationship, new possible interpretations of one
It was only from mid-2000 onwards that Pyongyang referred to a ‘moratorium’, rather than a
‘suspension’, of missile testing. See Holly Higgins, ‘The North-South Summit and its Aftermath’, in
Albright and O’Neill (ed.), Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, p.222
49
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CONCLUSION
another’s material capabilities emerged. The constructivist perspective would thus
suggest that US and North Korean policymakers may have acknowledged that the
other side’s military postures were driven by fear, rather than hostility. This
perspective would claim that the US and North Korea thus began to acknowledge that
their antagonistic identities of one another are mutually constituted. Furthermore,
given that ideas and interests are mutually constitutive, the constructivist perspective
would claim that US and North Korean conception of interests changed and
increasingly reflected a relationship based on trust and confidence-building.
An instance of social learning was illustrated during Carter’s talks in
Pyongyang. Carter, as an unofficial emissary, was not in a position to engage in
contractual bargaining, but could only communicate ideas to the North Korean
leadership. This enabled him to communicate to Kim Il Sung the possibility of an
improved relationship with the US as a desirable outcome that could be achieved if
the DPRK acknowledged US concerns over the Yongbyon reactor. Moreover, in
casting the Clinton Administration’s threats of sanctions as the result of
‘misunderstanding’ between Pyongyang and Washington rather than ill-will from
either side, Carter provided the North Korean leadership with a face-saving way out
of the crisis. Although Carter’s talks did not, on its own, resolve the 1993-94 nuclear
crisis, it enabled the North Korean leadership consider the possibility of an improved
relationship with Washington. There was a subtle change in North Korean interests
following Carter’s talks. Prior to June 1994, the North Korean leadership saw the US
as a strategic challenge, hence a conception of DPRK interests as being based on
security and deterrence against the ‘US threat’. Following Carter’s talks, there was a
recognition amongst the North Korean civilian leadership that an improved,
normalised relationship with Washington was possible. Within an improved
relationship, a continued US military presence on the Korean peninsula would not be
seen as a threat to North Korean interests. Furthermore, the extent of North Korean
concessions offered during the third round of the Gallucci-Kang talks indicated
Pyongyang’s acceptance of some level of North Korean vulnerability to the US. In
agreeing to disclose the full extent of the history of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and
opening the site to IAEA inspections before the completion of the LWR project, the
North Korean civilian leadership evidently trusted that the US would not take
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CONCLUSION
advantage of their weakness by terminating the LWR project or seeking sanctions if it
was revealed that Pyongyang had separated weapons-grade plutonium.
A similar dialogue of reassurance was illustrated in the aftermath of the 1998
missile test. Given that this action demonstrated the DPRK’s material ability to
threaten the US, it was seen by Republican members of Congress as confirmation of
their belief that Pyongyang remained implacably hostile. Yet, the missile test was
interpreted by policymakers in the Kim Dae Jung and Clinton Administrations
differently. Recognising the possibility that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile
programs were driven by fear of regime collapse rather than malice, Kim Dae Jung
underlined that his Sunshine Policy would not seek to bring about the collapse of the
DPRK or seek reunification of the Korean peninsula through socio-economic
absorption of the weaker North. By reflecting Seoul’s recognition of Pyongyang as a
legitimate political entity, the Sunshine Policy made it possible for the DPRK to
reciprocate the gesture during the Inter-Korean Summit. Moreover, the improved
diplomatic atmosphere following the Inter-Korean Summit gave the Clinton
Administration the political momentum to implement the lifting of sanctions on
Pyongyang. In other words, the Sunshine Policy may be seen as a process through
which South Korean policymakers reinterpreted the meaning of their relationship with
Pyongyang, and recognised the possibility that the DPRK’s arming was driven by fear,
rather than hostility.
More importantly, it may be argued that Perry’s review of US policy toward
North Korea could be seen as an attempt to reinterpret the meaning of North Korean
intentions behind its nuclear and missile programs. In undertaking consultations with
policymakers in Tokyo, Seoul and Pyongyang,50 Perry’s review of US policy toward
North Korea reflected a willingness to consider the possibility that fear, rather than
hostility, may have driven North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Perry’s report
thus took note of the North Korean leadership’s sense of vulnerability and its fears
that Seoul or Washington sought regime change. Moreover, the dialogue of
reassurance continued the following year during the exchange of high-level envoys in
October 2000. The text of the Joint Communiqué of October 2000 clearly marked a
50
Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
pp.418-22.
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CONCLUSION
move away from the confrontation of the past and acknowledged the possibility of a
normalised relationship between Washington and Pyongyang.
It may be argued this dialogue of reassurance contributed to the North Korean
leadership’s tentative reinterpretation of the nature of its interests in its relationship
with the US. Given the continued integration of information-warfare doctrine by the
South Korean and US armed forces and Seoul’s purchase of more modern weapons
during this period, Pyongyang faced growing obsolescence in its conventional force
capabilities. Under such circumstances, it may be argued that development of nuclear
warheads and an ICBM capability offered the North Korean leadership the best
prospect for regime survival. Thus, in September 1999, Pyongyang only agreed to a
‘suspension’ of missile testing, thus suggesting that it still distrusted the US. In
contrast, from 2000 onwards, the North Korean leadership began referring to its
‘moratorium’ or ‘ban’ on missile development. This is particularly significant as it
meant an end to production, testing, and sales of the weapon that had aroused US
security fears since 1998. Furthermore, during the 2000 Inter-Korean Summit and
Albright’s visit to Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il indicated that a continued US military
presence in the region would be acceptable if Washington signed a formal peace
treaty with Pyongyang. It may thus be argued that, toward the end of 2000,
Pyongyang may have begun to assign a new meaning to the US nuclear arsenal and its
military presence in Northeast Asia.
At the same time, however, the limits to the constructivist approach also have
to be acknowledged. Although Carter’s talks in June 1994 were crucial in enabling a
resumption of the talks that led to the signing of the Agreed Framework, it is
questionable if this would have led to resolution of the crisis had it not been for the
backdrop of an imminent war. Given that the threat of war had receded by 1995, there
was reduced impetus for the Clinton Administration to risk domestic political
controversy through full implementation of the Agreed Framework. Similarly, had the
1998 missile test not highlighted the danger of Pyongyang reneging on the Agreed
Framework and resuming activity at the Yongbyon reactor, it is possible that the
Clinton Administration would have continued the half-hearted implementation of the
Agreed Framework, rather than face domestic political controversy. Rather, the
success of dialogue in mitigating US-North security competition in June 1994, and
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CONCLUSION
from 1999 to 2000, was due in part to recognition of the consequences of failing to
achieve the peaceful denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.
Seen in this light, the constructivist perspective provides only a partial
explanation for the patterns of US-North Korean interactions from 1992 to 2001. It
offers a plausible interpretation for the DPRK’s move away from confrontation in
mid-1994, and again in 2000. At the same time, however, it is also necessary to
underline the limitations to the constructivist perspective on US-North Korean
interaction during this period. The Clinton Administration remained guided by
rational egoist logic during the entire period even as it sought to enter into the
counter-fears of the North Korean leadership. Whether US interests in its relationship
with North Korea would have changed over time is open to debate.
In assessing the explanatory strength of these three theoretical perspectives, it
is the author’s conclusion that no one single theoretical approach provides a full,
satisfactory account of the US-North Korean security dilemma, or in evaluating the
prospects for its mitigation. The offensive realist perspective offers one possible
interpretation for the collapse of the Agreed Framework and North Korea’s missile
and nuclear programs. However, as argued in Chapters Four and Five, domestic
audience costs in the form of Republican Congressional opposition to the Agreed
Framework and Holsti’s inherent bad faith model offer a more plausible explanation
for the difficulty faced by the Clinton Administration in the implementation of the
agreement. Rather, the defensive realist perspective offers a more plausible
explanation for the moves toward cooperation in the form of the Agreed Framework
of 1994 and the Joint Communiqué of 2000. In envisaging long term reciprocal
security cooperation, these agreements pointed to a nascent security regime between
Washington and Pyongyang. Although this arrangement collapsed, it may be argued
that this was not due to the pressures of anarchy, but rather to a range of factors such
as aggressive North Korean negotiating tactics, Clinton’s reluctance to arouse
domestic controversy over the implementation of the Agreed Framework, and the
ideological fundamentalism of the Bush Administration. Furthermore, a number of
crucial North Korean actions in 1994 and 1999-2000 may be seen as costly signals
that marked Pyongyang’s move away from confrontation. In accepting that
dismantlement of the Yongbyon gas-graphite reactor was to begin before the
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CONCLUSION
completion of the LWR project as well as placing its plutonium stockpile under
storage, Pyongyang accepted significant material restrictions on its ability to develop
nuclear weapons. Similarly, in accepting a moratorium on missile testing, the DPRK
ended development of the only weapon capable of threatening US soil.
What the defensive realist perspective does not explain, however, is how these
cooperative developments in US-North Korean interactions emerged, despite the
increasing tensions of June 1994 and August 1998. Admittedly, fear and the
recognition of an unacceptably costly war were important considerations in
accounting for Washington’s preference for a negotiated resolution of the crises. They
do not, however, fully explain why Washington moved away from the drive for
sanctions in June 1994, nor did they account for the Clinton Administration’s decision
to engage and reassure Pyongyang in 1999-2000. Rather, as argued in Chapter Four,
the dialogue of reassurance in Carter’s talks in Pyongyang was crucial in introducing
to the North Korean leadership the possibility of an improved relationship with
Washington, within which possession of a nuclear weapons program would not be
needed. In other words, the North Korean leadership evidently reinterpreted its
interests following its talks with Carter, and acknowledged the possibility of a future
where it did not have to fear the US. Similarly, the dialogue of reassurance during the
Perry review and the Sunshine Policy may be seen an effort to enter into the counterfears of Pyongyang and thus acknowledge the mutually constitutive nature of the
antagonistic relationship with North Korea. In outlining the possibility of a new,
improved relationship, the Perry review and the Sunshine Policy may be seen as a
communication of reassurance to Pyongyang. This allayed the North Korean
leadership’s suspicion that Washington was insincere in the implementation of the
Agreed Framework or that Seoul sought to absorb North Korea. Thus, following this
the dialogue of reassurance, the North Korean leadership agreed to end missile testing
and acknowledged that the continued US military presence in South Korea would be
acceptable if a formal peace treaty was signed with Washington. Seen in this light,
there are grounds to argue that the dialogue of reassurance was important in enabling
the turnaround in relations in June 1994 and in 1999-2000.
Set against this, two weaknesses may be identified in the constructivist
perspective on the US-North Korean security dilemma. Firstly, although the dialogue
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CONCLUSION
of reassurance was important in enabling the move away from confrontation in June
1994 and in 1999-2000, the executive leadership in Washington (and, arguably,
conservative elements in the North Korean military) remained guided primarily by
rational egoist logic that prioritised self-interest. During the entire period of this case
study, the Clinton Administration’s recognition of long-term security cooperation
with Pyongyang was subordinated to insistence on the DPRK’s acceptance of IAEA
safeguards and inspections of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, and termination of the
North Korean ballistic missile program. It is debatable as to whether this points to an
epistemologically exogenous agent-structure debate (thereby vindicating structural
realist theory over constructivism), or to an exogenous agent-structure relationship
insofar as the perspective of policymakers in Washington is concerned. It is the
author’s intention to further examine this debate in future research. The second area
where the constructivist perspective falls short lies in its downplaying of the element
of fear as a factor in convincing both Washington and Pyongyang that a negotiated
resolution was preferable. Although dialogue was crucial in enabling both sides to
explore the possibility of a peaceful outcome to the crises of June 1994 and August
1998, it is questionable if such dialogue would have been seen as urgent or important
absent the fear of conflict on the Korean peninsula.
3.
Implications for Security Dilemma Sensibility
The results of this case study suggest the following implications for the capacity of
policymakers to exercise security dilemma sensibility and reassure other states.
First, the eclectic methodology that has guided this research project suggests
that it is difficult to adopt any single theoretical approach or international relations
paradigm in a study of US-North Korean security competition during the 1990s.
Offensive realists may claim that the eventual collapse of the Agreed Framework
vindicates their argument that security competition between defensive states can never
be mitigated due to the nature of uncertainty in international politics. As argued in this
thesis, however, there are alternative explanations for the 1998 missile test, the
DPRK’s HEU program and the breakdown of the Agreed Framework. These
alternative explanations reject that the collapse of cooperation between Washington
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CONCLUSION
and Pyongyang had less to do with the ‘certainty of uncertainty’51, and more to do
with other factors, such as domestic audience costs and Holsti’s inherent bad faith
model that complicated the Clinton Administration’s implementation of the Agreed
Framework. 52 Given that these factors were not inevitable results of uncertainty in
international politics, it is thus difficult to claim that worst-case interpretations of
uncertainty caused the breakdown of cooperation between the US and the DPRK.
Furthermore, this eclectic comparative assessment suggests that different, specific
aspects of interaction between Washington and Pyongyang are best explained by
theories of mitigation derived from constructivism and defensive realism. The
importance of the constructivist and defensive realist approaches to explaining USNorth Korean security competition are examined in the following four implications of
this case study.
Second, the success of Carter’s talks in Pyongyang in averting war in June
1994 suggest that dialogue is a means through which alternatives to an antagonistic
relationship may be considered. In the run-up to June 1994, Pyongyang, Seoul and
Washington resolved their dilemmas of interpretation and response in an increasingly
confrontational manner. This arguably caused the crisis to escalate to the brink of war.
In contrast, and as an unofficial emissary, Carter was able to communicate to the
North Korean leadership the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the crisis if
Pyongyang would address South Korean and US security fears. In other words,
unofficial dialogue proved crucial in exploring new possibilities for interaction, thus
breaking the impasse of June 1994. Furthermore, the dialogue of reassurance can also
take place alongside a pragmatic approach to security dilemma sensibility based on
credible deterrence. Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy, for instance, combined the
dialogue of reassurance with affirmation of the US-South Korean alliance relationship
and a willingness to use force in defence of South Korean sovereignty.
Third, it is also necessary to acknowledge the limitations of dialogue.
Although unofficial talks to reassure others may enable both sides to contemplate the
possibility of an improved relationship, policymakers’ fear of an unacceptably costly
51
Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp.37-38.
Curtis Martin, ‘Rewarding North Korea: Theoretical Perspectives on the 1994 Agreed Framework’,
Journal of Peace Research 39/1 (2002), p.56; Wit, ‘Clinton and North Korea: Past, Present and Future’.
52
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CONCLUSION
conflict is another factor that may lead to increased efforts to reassure others. It is
necessary for governments in such a situation to recognise that further confrontational
actions may lead to an increased risk of an conflict. Faced with the prospect of an
unacceptably costly war in June 1994, the Clinton Administration approved of
Carter’s visit to Pyongyang as a last-chance to avert conflict. Similarly, the 1998
missile test indicated to Washington the danger that, if pushed into a corner, the North
Korean leadership would lash out in desperation. Absent the fear of an inadvertent
conflict, policymakers may be less willing to see the dialogue of reassurance as
important in defusing the situation.
Fourth, a further obstacle to dialogue as a means of assurance arises when
policymakers interpret another state’s intentions through an inherent bad faith model.
Under such conditions, it is likely that dialogue will be viewed as ‘cheap talk’. It is
difficult to imagine Carter’s talks leading to a resumption of the talks leading to the
Agreed Framework if the Clinton Administration assumed that Pyongyang was bound
to renege on the agreement. Under such circumstances, it is probable that only a
temporary resolution of the nuclear crisis would have occurred. A more recent
instance of the inherent bad faith model has been illustrated by John Bolton, who
served as US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
from 2001 to 2005. Bolton has consistently referred to all negotiations with
Pyongyang as appeasement for not demanding immediate, complete verified
dismantling of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs. 53 Even after North Korea
demolished the cooling tower at the Yongbyon facility in June 2008, Bolton remained
convinced that Pyongyang remains intent on developing nuclear weapons.54
Fifth, it may be argued that the process of trust-building to mitigate security
dilemma dynamics has to go beyond dialogue. Even after dialogue has led to a
reinterpretation of an antagonistic relationship, high levels of suspicion will remain.
Regional allies are likely to fear alliance abandonment and may oppose deals that risk
compromises to their own security. Domestic conservative political opponents are
“N. Korea deal ‘Important first step’ or ‘charade’”, CNN Interview, 13 February 2007,
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/02/13/koreas.nuclear.ap/index.html
accessed 13 February 2007.
54
‘N Korea demolishes reactor tower’, BBC, 27 June 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/7476755.stm, accessed 28 June 2008.
53
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CONCLUSION
likely to oppose reassurance of others, either because of an inherent bad faith model,
or as a result of their inability to see past their benign self-image. Policymakers must
thus acknowledge that mitigation of security dilemma dynamics has to go beyond
dialogue. The high levels of mistrust held by domestic and regional sceptics of
engagement and reassurance have to be addressed, lest dialogue is dismissed as
‘cheap talk’. In other words, the costly signals envisaged by Kydd is necessary in
ensuring that the dialogue of reassurance leads to further reduction in suspicion and
builds a stronger basis for trust over the long run.
A sixth implication concerns the extent to which policymakers may exercise
security dilemma sensibility, and under what conditions. Although policymakers may
be aware that the other side may be driven by fear rather than hostility, their ability to
respond through reassuring the other side may be limited by the exigencies of national
security. This is clearly the difficulty of the dilemma of response facing policymakers
tasked with national security. As noted in the cases of Perry and General Gary Luck,
both men were aware of the possibility that the North Korean leadership was driven
by fear rather, than malice, toward the United States. They were also aware that the
deployment of reinforcements to South Korea ran the risk of provoking Pyongyang
and further escalating the crisis. At the same time, however, and in light of his priority
in readying his forces for the possibility of war, Luck requested the deployment of
reinforcements that increased the ambiguous symbolism of the US military presence
in South Korea. 55 Similarly, although Perry was aware that the deployment of
reinforcements to South Korea ran the risk of a ‘Guns of August’ scenario, he saw this
as an unavoidable risk given the need to safeguard US and South Korean security.56
Furthermore, an interesting contrast may be noted between Perry’s perspective on
North Korea in 1998 and in 2006. His 1998 policy review urged the Clinton
Administration to continue the process of engagement in the face of provocative
actions by Pyongyang. However, in July and October 2006, faced with the DPRK’s
imminent development of weapons capable of targeting the US, Perry called for preemptive strikes to destroy Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear facilities.57
55
Wit, et. al., Going Critical, p.121.
Interview with Gallucci, 21 and 23 March 2007, Washington DC.
57
Ashton Carter and William Perry, ‘If Necessary, Strike and Destroy: North Korea Cannot Be
Allowed to Test This Missile’, Washington Post, 22 June 2006; ‘Former US Sec of Defense suggests
Military action against North Korea’, Korea Times, 19 January 2007.
56
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CONCLUSION
In light of these implications, what are the prospects for mitigation of USNorth Korean security competition for the foreseeable future? Based on this case
study, the following may be speculated. In light of the Bush Administration’s lifting
of sanctions on North Korea in June 2008, it is unlikely that the North Korean
leadership will undertake any further actions that may cause Washington to return to
coercive diplomacy. At the same time, however, and given the escalating antagonisms
between Washington and Pyongyang between 2001 and October 2006, as well as the
conservative outlook of the Lee Myung Bak Administration in Seoul,58 it is unlikely
that the North Korean leadership will be willing to make further significant
concessions in dismantling its nuclear and missile programs during the remaining
months of the Bush Administration.59
This outlook is further complicated by the looming 2008 US Presidential
elections and the sharply different foreign policy agendas of the Democrat and
Republican Presidential candidates, Senators Barack Obama and John McCain. As
noted in Chapter Five, Senator McCain had opposed the negotiations leading to the
signing of the Agreed Framework, but not the implementation of the agreement. More
recently, McCain condemned North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests of July and
October 2006 respectively and called for the imposition of UN Security Council
sanctions on the DPRK.60 At the same time, however, and in light of the increasing
US preoccupation with the war in Iraq, it is likely – though debatable – that McCain,
should he be elected President in 2008, would take a more pragmatic approach and
seek North Korean denuclearisation through talks with Pyongyang. Whether McCain
would be willing to continue the process of engagement with Pyongyang even in the
Norimitsu Onishi, ‘Conservative Wins Vote in South Korea’, New York Times, 20 December 2007;
Associated Press, ‘South Korea's Lee calls for stronger military’, New York Times, 22 August 2008.
59
‘North Korea May Delay Nuclear Treaty Implementation Until 2009’, Council on Foreign Relations
Interview with Gary Samore, 25 January 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15340/samore.html,
accessed 20 August 2007.
60
‘McCain Statement on North Korea’s Missile Launch’, Press Release by Senator John McCain, 5
July 2006,
http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id
=3af6993b-b639-49b8-af18-1f68b7769ea9&Region_id=&Issue_id=, accessed on 18 July 2006;
‘McCain calls for Tough Sanctions by UN Security Council, Rebuts Sen. Clinton’s Criticism, citing
Failure of Clinton Administration Policies on North Korea’, Press Release by McCain, 10 October
2006,
http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id
=78f9296d-61a2-47e0-b445-f1be64b20501&Region_id=&Issue_id=, accessed 26 October 2006
58
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CONCLUSION
face of belligerent North Korean rhetoric, incursions into South Korean territory and
other provocative actions (deliberate or inadvertent) by Pyongyang is debatable.
In contrast, although Senator Obama has acknowledged the prospect of North
Korean nuclear proliferation as a serious security concern for the US, his statements
point to security dilemma sensibility - combining a willingness to talk with the North
Korean leadership without preconditions alongside a continued readiness to seek
sanctions should Pyongyang further violate the NPT. 61 In a 2005 Congressional
hearing, for instance, Obama noted that the Bush Administration,
because of its strong rhetoric, may have boxed itself in to a point
where it may not be sufficient to focus on the nuclear issue because
North Korea is still going to be on the list of evil empires, and
causing the North Koreans to be wary of changing their behavior.62
At the same time, however, in June 2008, Obama warned that ‘if the North
Koreans do not meet their obligations [under the NPT], we should move quickly to reimpose sanctions that have been waived, and consider new restrictions.’63 Based on
these perspectives, it is likely that Obama, should he be elected in November 2008,
would be more likely to engage the North Korean leadership in bringing about the
denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. At the same time, however, whether he
would be able to do so whilst successfully deflecting domestic accusations of
‘appeasement’ and simultaneously assuaging Japanese and South Korean fears of
alliance abandonment is open to debate.
4.
Future Research Agenda
Based on these research findings, I propose a further research agenda focused on five
main themes.
‘Statement of Senator Barack Obama on the North Korean declaration’, International Herald
Tribune, 26 June 2008; see also ‘Obama offers change Kim Jong-Il can believe in’, World Tribune, 20
June 2008.
62
‘North Korea: An Update On Six-Party Talks And Matters Related To The Resolution Of The North
Korean Nuclear Crisis’, Hearing Before the Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
June 14, 2005 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2005).
63
‘Statement of Obama on the North Korean declaration’.
61
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CONCLUSION
First, and with specific reference to this case study, the role of regional powers
has to be acknowledged. South Korean President Kim Young Sam undertook several
confrontational actions during the 1993-94 nuclear crisis that complicated the Clinton
Administration’s efforts at exercising security dilemma sensibility. Similarly,
Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi resolved his dilemma of response in a
confrontational manner following the 1998 North Korean missile test by cutting off
Japanese funding for KEDO. 64 Seen in this light, the ability of policymakers in
regional powers to complicate a state’s attempts to reassure others has to be taken into
account. Conversely, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy was
crucial in promoting engagement with Pyongyang and paving the way for the InterKorean Summit of June 2000.65 This in turn provided the Clinton Administration with
the political momentum to implement the lifting of sanctions on North Korea. Clearly,
the impact of smaller, regional states on security dilemma dynamics has to be
examined. Furthermore, it should also be noted that this case study has focussed on
interaction between a superpower (the US) and a number of regional powers (China,
North Korea, South Korea, and Japan). It may be argued that further research also
needs to examine the ability of policymakers to exercise security dilemma sensibility
and maintain alliance relations within a regional multipolar context. A case study
examining the run-up to the First World War in Europe in 1914 and contemporary
relations between US, Israel, Syria and Iran may form fruitful ground for research on
security dilemma dynamics under these conditions.
Second, a study of specific policymakers may contribute to our understanding
of the conditions that are conducive for their ability to exercise security dilemma
sensibility. This would enable us to address questions such as ‘under what conditions
can they exercise security dilemma sensibility?’ and ‘under what conditions will worst
case scenario thinking dominate?’ 66 As noted in Chapters Four and Five, William
Perry, as Secretary of Defense in 1994, recognised the possibility of a spiral
64
Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pp.304, 410.
Bleiker, Divided Korea, pp.82-84.
66
It is not the purpose of this thesis to suggest that policymakers are guided by structural determinism
that limits their scope for agency during a crisis. Rather, this thesis argues that the empirical case study
underlines the difficulty faced by policymakers in exercising security dilemma sensibility during crises.
The author acknowledges that further research has the potential to offer further insights into the agentstructure debate and its implications for the ability of policymakers to exercising security dilemma
sensibility.
65
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CONCLUSION
interaction and warned the Clinton Administration of the danger of an inadvertent war
if sanctions were imposed on North Korea or if reinforcements were deployed to
South Korea. At the same, however, and in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, he
was required to prioritise the operational readiness of US forces for war and set aside
the possibility that the deployment of reinforcements to the Korean peninsula
increased the risk of conflict in the first place. Similarly, General Gary Luck,
Commander of US Forces in Korea during the crisis, recognised the danger of a
‘cornered rat’ syndrome of a North Korea launching an invasion of the South out of
desperation. Nonetheless, in his official capacity, he had to prioritise the operational
readiness of US military forces on the Korean peninsula through the deployment of
reinforcements, even if such an action contributed to Pyongyang’s fears. It may thus
be argued that a study focussing on the ability of specific policymakers’ ability to
exercise security dilemma sensibility, and under what conditions they may do so,
would be worthwhile.
A third potential area for further research concerns the role that analogies may
play in the emergence of security dilemma dynamics as well as its mitigation. This
case study has noted Senator John McCain’s accusation that the Clinton
Administration’s signing of the Agreed Framework constituted ‘appeasement.’ 67
Similarly, Charles Krauthammer compared Carter’s talks in Pyongyang to Neville
Chamberlain’s ‘appeasement’ of Hitler during the 1938 Sudetenland Crisis.68 Given
that Chamberlain’s attempt to address what he believed to be Hitler’s defensive
intentions resulted in the loss of British credibility (and, arguably, the outbreak of the
Second World War), the parable for policymakers is that dictators should not be
‘appeased’. Rather, faced with ‘rogue states’ intent on developing nuclear weapons,
policy should be based on the assumptions of deterrence model. Firmness and
willingness to use force should be shown. Yet, it may be argued that this analogy is
misleading. As Thomas J. Christensen noted, it is necessary for policymakers to
distinguish between ‘undeterrable ideologues’ such as Hitler and Osama Bin Laden on
the one hand, and ‘conditional or provisional revisionists’ such as North Korea and
67
Senator John McCain, cited in Wit, et. al., Going Critical, p.339.
Charles Krauthammer, ‘Peace in Our Time’, Washington Post, 17 June 1994, cited in Wit, et. al.,
Going Critical, pp.236-37.
68
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CONCLUSION
the former USSR on the other.69 This distinction is all the more important given that
comparatively few actors in international politics are ‘Hitlers’ and ‘Osama Bin
Ladens’ intent on world conquest.70
It may be argued that a study of analogies and their relation to security
dilemma dynamics may serve two purposes. First, it may contribute to our
understanding of how analogies may cause policymakers to interpret another state’s
arming through the assumptions of the deterrence model, leading to confrontational
resolution of their dilemmas of interpretation and response. Second, it may also be
argued that there is some scope for policymakers attempting to exercise security
dilemma sensibility by way of analogy. As noted in Chapter Four, Perry warned the
Clinton Administration of a ‘Guns of August’ scenario during the 1993-94 nuclear
crisis.71 More recently, Senator Joe Biden recalled
listening to a professor talk about how when the Russian army
mobilized … it never intended that it was going to end up in a war,
and … Germany responded, and how we got very rapidly to a
point of no return very quickly that maybe history could have
avoided, depending on the misreading of one another and our
intentions. And that is my greatest concern with regard to Kim
Jong Il. That is my greatest concern, misreading us here.72
Seen in this light, it may thus be argued that there are grounds for exploring how
‘Guns of August’ scenarios can form analogies through which policymakers can
attempt to exercise security dilemma sensibility.73
Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict’,
Washington Quarterly 25/4 (2004), pp.9-10.
70
Christensen, ‘Deterring a Taiwan Conflict’, pp.9-10.
71
Interview with Gallucci, 21 and 23 March 2007, Washington DC.
72
Senator Joe Biden, ‘WMD Developments on the Korean Peninsula’, Hearing Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 4 February, 2003, (Washington DC: Government Printing
Office, 2003), pp.64-65.
73
It should also be noted that Senator Biden is the Democrat Vice-Presidential nominee for the 2008
Presidential elections. Senator Biden was also an early contender in the US Presidential race. See John
R. Broder, ‘As Running Mate, Biden Offers Foreign Policy Heft but an Insider Image’, New York
Times, 17 August 2008.
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CONCLUSION
A fourth potential area of research may be derived from the eclectic
methodological approach of this thesis. This thesis has highlighted the strengths and
weaknesses of defensive realism and constructivism as theoretical approaches to
understanding security dilemma dynamics and its mitigation. It may be argued that
this thesis has developed the case for a future research project that compares differing
theoretical approaches to explaining the causes for security competition between
states and the possibility for its mitigation. Furthermore, although the offensive realist
approach does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the process of interaction
between Washington and Pyongyang, it should be noted that this thesis does not have
the benefit of hindsight. For all that is known about US-North Korean interaction, it is
plausible to argue that future events and the condition of uncertainty in international
politics may cause Washington and Pyongyang to again develop incompatible
security interests in the future. Under these conditions, it may be argued that future
research is necessary to further test the logic of offensive realism. Such future
research may involve further eclectic comparisons of offensive realist, defensive
realist, and constructivist approaches to explaining security dilemma dynamics in
other strategic contexts.
A fifth potential area of future research examines the literature on nuclear
proliferation dynamics and its relation to the security dilemma. The concept of
proliferation chains developed, by Lewis A. Dunn and William H. Overholt, is
particularly important in this regard. The concept of a proliferation chain examines the
domestic and external factors that may constrain, or contribute to, a state’s nuclear
weapons ambitions. Dunn and Overholt argue that when increased pressure to develop
nuclear weapons coincides with a triggering event such as a crisis, potential nuclearweapons states may find themselves reaching a ‘proliferation turning point’. 74 The
latter marks a ‘point of no return’, the proliferation chain developing a momentum of
its own and leading other states to develop their own nuclear weapons in response.75
Lewis A. Dunn and William H. Overholt, ‘The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research’, in
William H. Overholt (ed.), Asia’s Nuclear Future (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), pp.1620.
75
Dunn and Overholt, ‘The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research’, pp.16-20. More recently,
Etel Solingen has further explored the issue of proliferation chains and examined the domestic factors
that may constrain, or increase, the pressure on states to develop nuclear weapons. See Solingen, “The
Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures Influencing ‘Fence Sitters’ in the Post Cold War Era”, Institute
on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper 9, pp.10-16, October 1994,
74
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CONCLUSION
There are grounds to argue that the literature on proliferation chains offers a potential
avenue for further research on the security dilemma in the twenty-first century.
Writing in 1976, Dunn and Overholt argued that Northeast Asia is particularly prone
to proliferation chains. Yet, in spite of the North Korean missile and nuclear tests of
July and October 2006 respectively, both Seoul and Tokyo ruled out development of
their own nuclear weapons programs in response. 76 Seen in this light, there are
grounds to argue that the literature on proliferation chains, by examining other factors
that affect a state’s nuclear ambitions, may supplement further research on the
security dilemma.
This research project has thus examined the difficulties faced in mitigating
security competition between the US and North Korea. Although this case study has
indicated that long-term security cooperation is possible, it has also underlined the
difficulties in implementing such policies, particularly in the face of domestic political
opposition. With this in mind, further research to explore the conditions under which
the difficult process of trust-building can succeed in reining in security competition is
clearly necessary. Cross-comparative case studies that examine the run-up to the
outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the beginning of the Cold War, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, Gorbachev’s implementation of New Thinking, and interaction
between Israel and her Arab neighbours may form a basis for further research on the
security dilemma and its mitigation.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=igcc, accessed 9 November
2008.
76
Justin McCurry, ‘Abe vows Japan will not go nuclear’, The Guardian, 10 October 2006; Norimitsu
Onishi, ‘Tough Talk From Seoul, if Little Will for a Fight’, New York Times, 10 October 2006.
Admittedly, it may be argued that the continued credibility of the US security commitment to Northeast
Asia and its nuclear umbrella has been one key factor in constraining South Korean and Japanese.
246