Marist
Sam
Afghan Poppies Aff
Frontline
page 1 of 23
Strategy summary ............................................................................................................................................................................. 2
INC .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
1NC ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1NC ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
1NC ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
1NC ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
1NC ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
2NC OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................................................................... 9
SOLVENCY TAKEOUT ................................................................................................................................................................... 11
SOLVENCY TAKEOUT ................................................................................................................................................................... 12
BE CAREFUL IF RUNNING A CP .................................................................................................................................................. 12
SOLVENCY TURN – MICRO CREDIT ........................................................................................................................................... 13
AFGHAN STABILITY ADV .............................................................................................................................................................. 13
SOLVENCY TURN MICRO CREDIT .............................................................................................................................................. 14
AFGHAN STABILITY ADV .............................................................................................................................................................. 14
SOLVENCY EXT. TERROR TURN................................................................................................................................................. 16
TERROR ADV ................................................................................................................................................................................. 16
SOLVENCY TAKEOUT ................................................................................................................................................................... 17
NATO ADV ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 17
SOLVENCY TURN- ......................................................................................................................................................................... 18
NATO ADV. ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 18
NO LINK .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 20
TERROR ADV ................................................................................................................................................................................. 20
NO LINK .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
AFGHAN STABILITY ADV .............................................................................................................................................................. 21
NO IMPACT ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
INTELLIGENCE ADV. ..................................................................................................................................................................... 22
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Marist
Afghan Poppies Aff
Frontline
page 2 of 23
Sam
Strategy summary
This Aff is going to argue: 1. US should stop its eradication policies in Afghanistan.
2. We need to legalize poppy production.
3. This will allow for an improvement of the situation on the ground (no more poisoning,
farmers start trusting us, etc.)
A NATO advantage may come up on this Aff. It is going to say that if we do plan it will ensure NATO that we
are committed to finishing the job in Afghanistan. You should read the two NATO cards there’s a Take out
(Paul 01) and a turn (Chen) these will let you argue that expanding of NATO is a bad idea because it will kill
democratic institutions and will further destabilize any area or situation it is involved in.
A stability advantage will say, this idea of micro credit (making tiny loans at high interest) can solve for
poverty on the ground. There are specific cards (Ahmad 07, Beck and Ogden 07) these will allow you to turn
the use of micro credit against the Aff. By arguing he that the use of micro credit will increase poverty and
decrease overall stability.
An aerial eradication advantage will say that they will be stopping aerial eradication of poppy crops and this
has the benefit of ending continued poverty and poisoning of people on the ground. To counter this use the
(Van Ham and Kamminga 06) card from the 1NC, this will allow you to argue that singular actions such as the
Plan have no great affect on the future based on the fact that development takes a long time to occur.
A terror advantage will say that legalizing poppy will allow farmers to use other markets besides the drug
trade to sell their poppy and the farmers will stop pumping poppy into the drug trade; terrorist groups will
lose the funding they get from the drug trade. Your (DOP 07) card from the 1NC turns their terror advantage
against them you will be able to argue that less drug law or less attacks on drug producers lead to increased
funding for the terrorists.
Finally, the Aff may try to use an intelligence advantage, it is going to say, that if we kill the poppy fields you
push the people into the arms of war lords for protection from the “oppressive” US invaders and the new
government. Next, allowing the war lords to come to power weakens the government of Afghanistan and allows
the warlords to back opposition to the Pakistani government. Leading to Pakistan’s collapse. The answer you
have to this is the (Gannon 04) evidence that will allow you to argue the war lords are already in control so
there is no impact to this advantage.
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Afghan Poppies Aff
Frontline
page 3 of 23
Sam
INC
1.
The Aff’s claims of improving the political sphere in Afghanistan are false. If you
legalize poppy production corruption in the Afghan political world will spread like wild
fire.
Turn- Even limited Legalization of drug production allows drug dealers to buy their
way into political power. Destroying democracy and guaranteeing corruption.
Felbab- Brown 2006
Vanda Felbab-Brown, PhD. Candidate in Political Science @ Harvard University, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines
Counterterrorism.” Spring 2006.
Burgeoning drug production also threatens Afghanistan politically by providing an
avenue for criminal organizations and corrupt politicians to enter the political space,
undermining the democratic process. These actors, who enjoy the financial resources and
political capital generated by sponsoring the illicit economy, frequently experience great
success in the political process and are able to secure official positions of power as well
as wield influence from behind the scenes. Consequently, the legitimacy of the political
process is subverted. The problem perpetuates itself as successful politicians bankrolled
with drug money make it more difficult for other actors to resist participating in the illicit
economy, leading to endemic corruption both at the local and national levels. [End Page
58]
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Afghan Poppies Aff
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Sam
1NC
2. Legalizing Poppy production will only increase funding to terrorist groups.
TURN: Legalizing poppies would increase terrorism.
U.S. Department of State 2007, (bureau of international narcotics and law enforcement affairs) U.S. Opposes Efforts to Legalize
Opium in Afghanistan: The Rationale Against Legalization, February 20, 2007, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rpt/80734.htm
As demonstrated in this report, the lack of demand for licit opium and Afghanistan's inability to monitor and control cultivation
would only increase the number of Afghans participating in the illicit drug trade. It would also increase the level of violence by
further expanding and entrenching opium as an illicit source of income for anti-government groups. The Taliban and poppy
cultivation geographically overlap in Southern Afghanistan and evidence of insurgent ties to the drug trade is mounting. Elements of
the Taliban tax poppy cultivation and trafficking, as well as finance anti-government activities with drug proceeds. During last year's
opium planting season, Taliban in Southern Afghanistan intimidated farmers to plant poppy by distributing threatening letters in the
middle of the night. Elements of the Taliban promote poppy planting and the opium trade to demonstrate the limits of the central
government's authority. Insurgents have also been known to employ drug traffickers to funnel fighters, money, and weapons in and
out of Afghanistan. Increasing Afghanistan's reliance on poppy cultivation by legalizing opium without the necessary control
mechanisms would have the exact opposite effect of what the Senlis Council claims. Given the convergence of the drug trade and
insurgent groups, it is even more important that we continue to vigorously attack the drug trade and eradicate illegal crops, not foster
them. Otherwise, drugs will continue to finance violence against innocent people, international forces, and the Government of
Afghanistan.
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Afghan Poppies Aff
Frontline
page 5 of 23
Sam
1NC
3. THE AFF’S can not stabilize the Middle East by legalizing poppy production. THEY WILL
ONLY FLOOD THE REGION WITH MORE DRUGS.
TURN- LEGALIZING POPPY WOULD CREATE ADDICTION RATES UNSEEN IN
HISTORY.
BBC MONITORING, August 18, 2006. Afghan daily says "greatest crime" if government legalizes poppy cultivation” lexusnexus
Approximately 65 per cent of the drugs produced in Afghanistan are used in the region so there can be no solution to
this problem unless the region and the whole world stand together to prevent poppy cultivation in the long term.The fall
in poppy cultivation should run in tandem with a fall in the number of drug addicts in the region, which itself requires
more assistance at a regional level.If poppy cultivation is legalized in Afghanistan, it will spread to all parts of the
country in no time and the farmers who grow other crops will also start growing poppy. Then no one will refrain from
cultivating poppy and the increase in the number of drug addicts will accelerate.There is no positive effect on the
economy in countries where poppy cultivation is legal. This governs all morals among young people and then young
boys and girls will know no limits even though the police and army control security in those countries and the situation
in those countries is not the same as in Afghanistan.If poppy cultivation is legalized in a country hit by anarchy, like
Afghanistan, the situation will deteriorate in a disastrous way. Turning Afghanistan into a legal producer of poppy, the
drug mafias and traffickers find their way into our country and we will legally play host to smugglers, criminals and
killers. Then we will see the effect of this on the young people of our country and will face disastrous cases of drug
addiction.
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Afghan Poppies Aff
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Sam
1NC
4. THE AFF can’t STABILIZE THE REGION BY ATTACKING ONLY ECONOMIC
ISSUES. THERE ARE MANY OTHER ISSUES THAT CAUSE INSTABILITY.
INSTABILITY WILL CONTINUE EVEN IF PLAN IS PASSED.
OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS POVERTY, FAMINE, DROUGHT AND
MISPLACED RESOURCES ARE CAUSES OF UNREST AND REGIONAL
INSTABILITY.
CORNELL AND SPECTOR – 2002
[Svante E., editor of the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and Regine A., researcher in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the
Brookings Institution] “Central Asia: More Than Islamic Extremists.” The Washington Quarterly. 2002. Project Muse.
sl
Although Afghanistan has undoubtedly contributed to the destabilization of Central Asia through drug trafficking and
the harboring of terrorists, ascribing all crime and Islamic militancy in the region to Afghanistan would be erroneous.
In fact, many of Central Asia's problems are homegrown. Islamic sentiment in the Ferghana Valley region had already
expressed itself in the early 1990s, long before the Taliban movement even existed. During the past decade in Central
Asia, opposition figures and journalists have been arrested and sometimes beaten, press freedoms have been
significantly curbed, and basic human rights such as freedom of religion and freedom of speech have been violated. 15
By limiting the number of available channels for opposition and expression, these crackdowns have exacerbated the
situation.
The region's catastrophic economic condition is another primary cause of societal discontent. Despite a marginal
increase in gross domestic product in the past few years, overall living standards and production outputs remain far
below 1991 levels in all of the Central Asian republics; only Kazakhstan is doing better economically. 16 Endemic
corruption and a lack of governmental and economic reform have compounded the situation; large portions of the
population live below the poverty line and sustain their existence through the informal economy and shuttle-trading
across borders. 17
Since 1999, drought in the region has severely exacerbated an already fragile economic situation. In October 2001,
international aid agencies warned that more than seven million people in Central Asia were vulnerable to famine in the
coming winter. The drought is particularly damaging because much of the population in Central Asia lives in rural
areas and depends on agriculture to survive. Only Kazakhstan had a majority of its population in urban areas as of
1990, while more than two-thirds of both Kyrgyzstan's and Tajikistan's populations live in rural areas. 18
Due to security concerns and the threat of extremist incursions, governments have been diverting funds that could be
used for social programs and [End Page 199] development projects to purchase military equipment and to train their
border guards in order to bolster security. Regional governments, including those of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, have
also begun to mine parts of their borders to prevent the infiltration of unwanted extremists. This precaution has
negatively affected both local civilians who have fallen victim to unmarked landmines and the large portions of the
population who rely on shuttle trading. The increasing obstacles for the local population to sustain their livelihoods,
coupled with rapid population growth in the region, serves as a breeding ground for extremist groups to curry favor
with disenchanted and poverty-stricken segments of society.
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Afghan Poppies Aff
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Sam
1NC
5. SOLVENCY DEFICIT: THE AFF CAN NOT STABLIZE THE REGION
THROUGH SINGLUAR ACTIONS. WITHOUT FURTHER ACTION AND
MORE TIME, AFGHANISTAN WILL JUST FALL BACK INTO CHAOS.
SOLVENCY TAKEOUT: Development takes a long time and has a limited impact on
drug control, giving Afghanistan the time to tumble back into instability.
Van Ham and Kamminga 2006
Peter Van Ham, Director of Global Governance Research Program at the Clingendael Institute, Jorrit Kamminga, Head of Policy Research
for the Senlis Council, “Poppies for Peace” Washington Quarterly Winter 2006/07 pg. PM//wdcT.
This economics-based approach has enormous potential, but it suffers from two main weaknesses. First and foremost,
alternative development takes many years to become self-supporting, profitable, and sustainable. In the meantime,
Afghanistan risks tumbling back into lawlessness and instability. Second, past experiences have shown that alternative
development has very limited impact on drug control. It does not drastically reduce poppy cultivation but instead
indirectly benefits the country by reducing economic risk for transitioning farming communities and lending political
stability to drug-affected areas. Alternative development for Afghanistan's poppy farmers is necessary but not sufficient
in and of itself. Afghanistan's democracy is simply too fragile to rely solely on long-term measures.
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Afghan Poppies Aff
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Sam
1NC
6. THE AFF’S PLAN INCREASES THE POWER OF DRUG LORDS BY FATTENING
THEIR WALLETS. THEIR MONEY IS KEPT IN WESTERN BANKS AWAY FROM THE
AFGHAN PEOPLE.
TURN -DRUG PROFITS ARE BEING DEPOSITED INTO COMMERCIAL WESTERN
BANKING SYSTEMS AND INCREASE THE POWER OF THE WEST.
CHOSSUDOVSKY, 2005
[Michael, Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa] “The Spoils of War: Afghanistan’s Multibillion Dollar Heroin Trade”. Global
Research; WDCTTT
The proceeds of the drug trade are deposited in the banking system. Drug money is laundered in the numerous offshore
banking havens in Switzerland, Luxembourg, the British Channel Islands, the Cayman Islands and some 50 other
locations around the globe. It is here that the criminal syndicates involved in the drug trade and the representatives of
the world's largest commercial banks interact. Dirty money is deposited in these offshore havens, which are controlled
by the major Western commercial banks. The latter have a vested interest in maintaining and sustaining the drug trade.
(For further details, see Michel Chossudovsky, The Crimes of Business and the Business of Crimes, Covert Action
Quarterly, Fall 1996)
Once the money has been laundered, it can be recycled into bona fide investments not only in real estate, hotels, etc,
but also in other areas such as the services economy and manufacturing. Dirty and covert money is also funneled into
various financial instruments including the trade in derivatives, primary commodities, stocks, and government bonds.
Concluding Remarks: Criminalization of US Foreign Policy
US foreign policy supports the workings of a thriving criminal economy in which the demarcation between organized
capital and organized crime has become increasingly blurred.
The heroin business is not "filling the coffers of the Taliban" as claimed by US government and the international
community: quite the opposite! The proceeds of this illegal trade are the source of wealth formation, largely reaped by
powerful business/criminal interests within the Western countries. These interests are sustained by US foreign policy.
Decision-making in the US State Department, the CIA and the Pentagon is instrumental in supporting this highly
profitable multibillion dollar trade, third in commodity value after oil and the arms trade.
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Afghan Poppies Aff
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Sam
2NC OVERVIEW
1. EXTEND THE BROWN CARD FROM THE 1NC. THE BROWN card talks about
HOW WHEN YOU LEGALIZE POPPY PRODUCTION YOU ENABLE DRUG
LORDS TO EXPAND THEIR POWER. THESE drug lords WILL ACT ONLY IN
THEIR OWN SELF INTEREST ENSURING THE PEOPLE’S Needs ARE NEVER
met. This means that brown turns the claims of the Aff to help the people of
Afghanistan escape poverty by indighting a different cause of poverty in Afghanistan.
2. EXTEND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN 07 CARD. IT TALKS ABOUT
HOW TERRORIST MOVEMENTS SEEK Drug TRADE MONEY AS A MEANS OF
SUPPORTING THEIR MOVEMENTS. LEGALIZING THE PRODUCTION OF
POPPY FOR DRUG PRODUCTION WILL JUST MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE
TERRORISTS TO GATHER FUNDING. THIS IS YET ANOTHER REASON TO
VOTE DOWN THE AFF PLAN. Vote down the Aff to avoid fattening terrorist
wallets.
3. EXTEND THE CORNELL AND SPECTOR CARD IT Talks about THE MANY
CAUSES OF INSTABILITY; THE AFF CAN ONLY ACCESS THE ECONOMIC
causes of instability. This IS BUT ONE OF MANY causes SO THE Aff CAN NEVER
FULLY STABILIZE CENTRAL ASIA OR AFGHANISTAN. THIS IS A HUGE
SOLVENCY DEFICIT TO PLAN.
4. EXTEND THE BBC 06 CARD IT talks ABOUT HOW WHEN you MAKE POPPY
PRODUCTION LEGAL YOU WILL FLOOD THE AREA WITH HUGE AMOUNTS
OF DRUGS. This will PUSH THE POPULATION FUTHER UNDER THE THUMB
OF ADDICTION DESTALIZING THE REGION further. VOTE DOWN THE AFF
TO PREVENT FURTHER DESTABILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA.
5. EXTEND THE VAN HAM CARD IT TALKS ABOUT HOW DEVELOPMENT
CAN’T OCCUR INSTANTANIOUSLY. THE AFF CLAIMS TO solve FOR HUGE
SOCAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS are misguided. THEIR
SINGULAR ACTION CAN’T ACHIEVE stability. WITH OUT FURTHER ACTION
PLAN CAN NEVER STOP AFGHANISTAN FROM FALLING INTO CHAOS
AGAIN.
6. EXTEND THE CHOSSUDOVSKY CARD IT TALKS ABOUT HOW DRUG
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LORDS TAKE IN MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF MONEY AND DEPOSIT IT INTO
WESTERN BANKS, PUMPING UP THE POWER OF THE WEST. WHILE
AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA SUFFER. THE DRUG DEALERS WILL
GAIN THE MOST FROM INCREASED POPPY PRODUCTUON while THE
PEOPLE WILL ONLY suffer.
7. ALL OF 1NC PROVES THAT THE AFF PLAN WILL ONLY MAKE THE SQ
WORSE. IT WILL PUSH THE PEOPLE FURTHER INTO POVERTY, INCREASE
CORRUPTION, INCREASE THE FINANCIAL POWER OF THE WEST, AND
WILL NOT EVEN MAKE ANY SHORT TERM IMPROVEMENT. ALL OF THESE
ARE REASONS TO VOTE DOWN THE AFF.
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SOLVENCY TAKEOUT
SOLVECNY TAKEOUT: PRESIDENT KARZAI HAS LONG BEEN
FUNNELING AID TO TALIBAN
CHOSSUDOVSKY, MAY 5, 2005
[Michael, Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa] “The Spoils of War: Afghanistan’s Multibillion Dollar Heroin Trade”.
Global Research; WDCTTT
In 2001, under the Taliban opiate production stood at 185 tons, increasing to 3400 tons in 2002 under the US sponsored
puppet regime of President Hamid Karzai.
While highlighting Karzai's patriotic struggle against the Taliban, the media fails to mention that Karzai collaborated
with the Taliban. He had also been on the payroll of a major US oil company, UNOCAL. In fact, since the mid-1990s,
Hamid Karzai had acted as a consultant and lobbyist for UNOCAL in negotiations with the Taliban. According to the
Saudi newspaper Al-Watan:
"Karzai has been a Central Intelligence Agency covert operator since the 1980s. He collaborated with the CIA in
funneling U.S. aid to the Taliban as of 1994 when the Americans had secretly and through the Pakistanis [specifically
the ISI] supported the Taliban's assumption of power." (quoted in Karen Talbot, U.S. Energy Giant Unocal Appoints
Interim Government in Kabul, Global Outlook, No. 1, Spring 2002. p. 70. See also BBC Monitoring Service, 15
December 2001)
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SOLVENCY TAKEOUT
BE CAREFUL IF RUNNING A CP
SOLVENCY TAKEOUT: WASHINGTON’S HIDDEN AGENDA IS TO RESTORE CIA
SPONSORED DRUG TRADE IN AFGHANISTAN
CHOSSUDOVSKY, MAY 5, 2005 [Michael, Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa] “The
Spoils of War: Afghanistan’s Multibillion Dollar Heroin Trade”. Global Research; WDCTTT
In the wake of the 2001 US bombing of Afghanistan, the British government of Tony Blair was entrusted by the G-8 Group of
leading industrial nations to carry out a drug eradication program, which would, in theory, allow Afghan farmers to switch out of
poppy cultivation into alternative crops. The British were working out of Kabul in close liaison with the US DEA's "Operation
Containment". The UK sponsored crop eradication program is an obvious smokescreen. Since October 2001, opium poppy
cultivation has skyrocketed. The presence of occupation forces in Afghanistan did not result in the eradication of poppy
cultivation. Quite the opposite. The Taliban prohibition had indeed caused "the beginning of a heroin shortage in Europe by the
end of 2001", as acknowledged by the UNODC. Heroin is a multibillion dollar business supported by powerful interests, which
requires a steady and secure commodity flow. One of the "hidden" objectives of the war was precisely to restore the CIA
sponsored drug trade to its historical levels and exert direct control over the drug routes. Immediately following the October 2001
invasion, opium markets were restored. Opium prices spiraled. By early 2002, the opium price (in dollars/kg) was almost 10
times higher than in 2000.
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SOLVENCY TURN – MICRO CREDIT
AFGHAN STABILITY ADV
TURN- Micro finance in the Middle East is bad. Puts the lives of those working for the
lenders in danger and increases murders committed by insurgent groups.
Sardar Ahmad September
16, 2007 Sunday 9:53 AM GMT Bangladesh man kidnapped in Afghanistan KABUL,
Agence France Presse -- English
http://www.lexisnexis.com.online.library.marist.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?risb=21_T21073268
58&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T2107326861&cisb=22_T2107326860&t
reeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10903&docNo=1
BRAC has been in Afghanistan since 2002 and works on development projects, including building schools, roads and clinics. Its
microfinance programmes in Afghanistan work largely with poor and disadvantaged women.
Several of its Afghan staff have been killed.
In May 2005, suspected Islamic militants beat to death a mother and her two daughters who were working for BRAC.
A letter left with their bodies and attributed to a wing of the radical Hizb-i-Islami faction, which operates separately
from the Taliban, said they were killed for working for the NGO, a Western official said at the time.
The first Bangladeshi staff member to die in the country was shot dead on Wednesday while travelling by motorbike
in remote Badakshan province to accept loan repayments, BRAC said.
Two men arrested for the murder said they had planned to pose as the Bangladeshi and his Afghan colleague to collect the
money, provincial police commander Aqa Noor Kendoz told AFP Sunday
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SOLVENCY TURN MICRO CREDIT
AFGHAN STABILITY ADV
TURN- Micro credit borrowers do not escape poverty in fact micro credit can make the
problem worse
Steve Beck and Tim Ogden September 2007 Beware of Bad Microcredit [Steve Beck is the chief executive officer
of Geneva Global, a philanthropy advisory firm with offices in London, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC. Tim
Ogden is Geneva Global’s chief knowledge]
officer. http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/hbsp/hbr/articles/article.jsp?ml_action=getarticle&articleID=F0709C&ml_issueid=BR0709&ml_subscriber=true&pageNumber=1&_requestid=60071
Companies are racing to add poverty-reducing microcredit initiatives to their corporate social responsibility (CSR)
activities. Their hearts may be in the right place, but these well-intentioned efforts can backfire.
Don’t misunderstand: Microcredit can raise borrowers’ standard of living and help reduce poverty. In the past three
years we’ve brokered investments in more than 150 carefully selected microcredit programs and have seen positive
effects firsthand, including improved school enrollment, women’s empowerment, better nutrition, and increases in
household incomes.
Yet little evidence exists that microcredit borrowers, on average, commonly, directly, and quickly escape poverty, as
many assume. Poverty, as always, is resistant to silver bullets, no matter how popular and appealing to donors they
are. And if a company supports the wrong microcredit program, it may not only fail to reduce poverty but also tarnish
its own good name.
Consider these facts: Many heads of microfinance programs now privately acknowledge what John Hatch, the
founder of FINCA International (one of the largest microfinance institutions), has said publicly: 90% of microloans
are used to finance current consumption rather than to fuel enterprise. Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, of MIT’s
Poverty Action Lab, recently evaluated dozens of rigorous studies on the economic lives of the poor, finding that
regardless of country or continent, very little of each additional dollar of disposable income is spent on any form of
investment, or even on food and shelter. In Bangladesh, where in 2001 approximately one out of four households had
at least one microloan, microcredit seems to have had little impact on the country’s relative development
performance. In 1991, for example, Bangladesh ranked 136th on the UN Development Programme’s Human
Development Index (a measure of societal well-being); 15 years later it ranked 137th. And aside from the shortage of
data showing benefits, there is evidence that some microcredit programs may actually be harmful, plunging the poor
deeper into debt.
The root challenge for CSR leaders is that microcredit, like most other social programs developed in the charity
sector, lacks standardized, readily available, outcome-based measures that would enable good funding decisions.
Repayment rates and other commonly reported measures tell us nothing about the impact of a program on poverty.
There are a number of promising trends in microcredit, including improvements in outcome measurement and
reporting, the influx of capital with rigorous financial and social-benefit requirements, and the growth of commercial
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microfinance organizations with the scale and discipline required to drive down the costs of service delivery. These
trends are nascent, however, and expert due diligence around investment in any program is therefore essential.
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SOLVENCY EXT. TERROR TURN
TERROR ADV
TURN- Highlighting the link between drugs and terrorism destroys peace talks
between FARC guerillas and the Columbian Government, risking military
escalation.
Transnational Institute 2001
Worldwide Fellowship of Committed Scholars, “Afghanistan, Drugs, and, Terrorism.” November 2001
http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?page=reports_drugs_debate3#edit#edit
Cocaine profits have also been exploited by State officials to support the Contra's against the Sandinista Government in
Nicaragua and heroin money to finance the Mujahedeen that fought Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
Today, the two major producers of opium poppy and coca, Afghanistan and Colombia, are in the midst of shifting
counterdrug strategies. In this issue we will look at the case of Afghanistan, analysing the UN International Drug
Control Programme's (UNDCP) ill fated interventions. And while international attention is focused on Afghanistan, the
linkage of drugs and terrorism is endangering the troubled peace talks between the government and the FARC guerrilla
in Colombia.
The US State Department has identified the FARC as a terrorist organisation and as a "narco-guerrilla", because they
control a large part of the coca growing areas and tax coca production. Consequently, Colombians will have less
opportunities to define their armed conflict in political terms and be pressured into redefining it in criminal terms, and
face military escalation.
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SOLVENCY TAKEOUT
NATO ADV
SOLVENCY TAKEOUT- THE NEW NATO PLAYS THE GAME OF INTERVENTION. THE
GROUP USES MILITARY ACTIONS THAT FAIL TO PRODICE PEACE OR INSTABILITY.
---- YUGOSLAVIA PROVES
By Rep. Ron Paul November 13, 2001 Paul Expansion of NATO is a Bad idea M.D., represents the 14th
Congressional District of Texas in the United States House of Representatives.
http://www.counterpunch.org/paul3.html
NATO is an organization that has outlived its usefulness. It was formed as a defensive
military alliance, designed to protect western Europe against the Soviet threat. With the
Soviet collapse in 1991, however, NATO bureaucrats (and the governments backing them)
were forced to reinvent the alliance and justify its continued existence. So the "new NATO"
began to occupy itself with issues totally unrelated to defense, such as economic
development, human rights, territorial disputes, religious conflicts, and ethnic rivalries. In
other words, "nation building." The new game was interventionism, not defense.
The new approach manifested itself in Yugoslavia in the late 1990s. The defensive alliance
became a military aggressor, in direct violation of its own charter. When NATO bombed
Yugoslavia, a country that had neither attacked nor threatened a NATO member state, it
turned its back on its stated purpose and lost any credibility it once had. Predictably, the
NATO strikes failed to produce peace or stability in the former Yugoslavia, and UN occupation
forces likely will remain in the Balkans indefinitely.
Now Congress has endorsed the expansion of this purposeless alliance, of course taking the
opportunity to grant 55 million of your tax dollars to the former Soviet bloc countries that
want to join. This expansion may be profitable for weapons manufacturers and bureaucrats,
but it represents another example of U.S. taxpayers subsidizing foreign governments and big
corporations. It is time for the Europeans to take responsibility for their own military defense.
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SOLVENCY TURNNATO ADV.
TURN- NATO ACTION CREATES GREATER INSTABILITY AND KILLS DEMOCRATIC
MOVEMENTS---- YUGOSLAVIA PROVES
Michelle Z. Chen. no date War Bad, Peace Good: Why NATO Stinks Bombs do not promote human rights,
but acting upon one’s conscience does. http://cainzine.tripod.com/war.htm
President Clinton’s liberal use of the term “ethnic cleansing” tragically misses the point; our bombs, the
primary cause of the massive flow of refugees across war-torn borders, have actually accelerated the
decimation of the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo. The disturbing images of Kosovar refugees shown
on the nightly news would quite possibly not exist if were it not for NATO air raids that have made the
region even more unlivable than before. The recent and questionably accidental bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Yugoslavia is another disgraceful example of just how ruthless and haphazard NATO has been
in carrying out a supposedly peaceful mission.
The American media has labeled Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic “The New Hitler.” But a
closer look at the situation in the Balkans reveals that although Milosevic may be a dictator, to equate his
military efforts against the Kosovo Liberation Army with Hitler’s systematic murder of millions is to
downgrade the widespread atrocities of the Holocaust. The Kosovo conflict is in essence a civil war, and
though certainly horrific, it is not comparable to the Third Reich’s infamous conquest of Europe.
Furthermore, the KLA, a terrorist group based right here in the US, has not exactly had a spotless record in
terms of human rights abuses.
It is interesting to note that years ago, before the US got involved with the turmoil in Yugoslavia, the
media’s coverage of the Kosovo crisis was considerably less sympathetic to the KLA. In 1987, the New
York Times reported, with a much more negative slant than is evident in news coverage today, that this
nationalist army was responsible for ethnically motivated rioting, rape, murder, and other acts of anti-Serb
terrorism throughout Yugoslavia. That the mainstream media has since then completely realigned with the
side that best serves government interests should prompt public skepticism, yet many Americans continue
to believe that the US is reacting responsibly to a “Humanitarian Crisis.” History, however, points to a
dangerous pattern in America’s military endeavors: The government acts not out of compassion for
oppressed peoples, but out of its desire to dominate the international political arena. Examples of this
unilateral approach to foreign policy include the senseless bloodshed of the Vietnam War, the military and
economic devastation of Iraqi civilians, and numerous covert government operations to depose democratic
foreign regimes that threatened our superpower status.
Another belief propagated by the media is that Milosevic refused to negotiate over the revocation of
Kosovo’s autonomy and that bombing was a last resort. In fact, the terms of the proposed Rambouillet
accord read more like an ultimatum than an attempt at reconciliation. The Rambouillet text could easily
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be interpreted as an encroachment upon any nation’s sovereignty; they included immunity for NATO
personnel from arrest and government investigation, control over the media of the Yugoslavia, and
unrestricted NATO access throughout the country, “including associated airspace and territorial
waters.” There is also evidence that NATO refused to consider Milosevic’s demand to have the United
Nations oversee the peacekeeping efforts, and deliberately restricted the role of Yugoslav leaders in the
meetings preceding the bombing.
Further proving how detrimental to the peace process foreign intervention has been in the Balkans,
the plan to use military action to oust Milosevic has backfired at the expense of both Kosovars and Serbs.
Ironically, the war intensified hatred for NATO, particularly the US, while strengthening Milosevic’s support
base. The bombings have actually contributed to the decline of the pro-democracy movement in
Yugoslavia.
One of the most harrowing symbols of the hypocrisy and cruelty of this war is the bombing of a staterun television station in Yugoslavia. NATO justified the attack by claiming that the station spread antiNATO propaganda, but even if this were true, the destruction of a nation’s information network by a
foreign power is a gross violation of freedom of speech—a right that Americans fiercely guard. The
public should be appalled that a so-called humanitarian military effort has been reduced to a
propaganda war that attacks the infrastructure upon which millions of Serbian civilians rely.
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NO LINK
TERROR ADV
NO LINK- Drug trade is not large part of terrorist funding
Chouvy, 2004.
(Chouvy, (Pierre-Arnaud, Dr Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy is a research fellow at CNRS, France. He studies the geopolitics of illicit
drugs in Asia) “drugs and the financing of terror,” Terrorism Monitor, October 21 2004. http://www.pa-chouvy.org/terrorismmonitor-afghanistan-drugs_financing_terrorism.html
The argument that the threat of narco-terrorism - whatever its definition - in Afghanistan and elsewhere is hyped by
political and sectional interests rather than originating from hard intelligence is clearly not without foundation.
Moreover while there is little doubt that some proceeds of the illicit drug trade contribute partially to the funding of
some terrorist outfits, drug trafficking is still far from being the main financing source of global terrorism. Indeed, it is
clear that terrorists and drug traffickers have differing long-term goals which should be considered in the methods used
to counter both. Thus, fighting drug trafficking does not necessarily equate to fighting terrorism, even though "narcoterrorism," depicted as a threat by certain sectional interests, arguably legitimates and reinforces a failed global war on
drugs.
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NO LINK
AFGHAN STABILITY ADV
NO LINK - Afghanistan’s instability is rooted in tribal rivalry NOT IN ECONOMIC ISSUES
Zalmay Khalilzad : Summer 1997 Anarchy in Afghanistan. Journal of International Affairs. New York. Vol. 51, Iss. 1; pg. 37, 20 pgs
http://proquest.umi.com.online.library.marist.edu/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=09-20-2012&FMT=7&DID=23198949&RQT=309&cfc=1
Afghanistan's anarchy has two sets of causes: domestic and international. At the domestic level, Afghanistan's ethnic
and tribal politics have long contributed to instability The largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, the Pashtuns, are
divided into many tribal confederations with major inter-tribal rivalries, especially between the Durranis and the
Ghelzais. Some, especially those living in or near Kabul and Herat, were Tajikized (Persianized)-that is, their mother
tongue changed from Pashtun to Dari (Afghan Persian). For much of Afghanistan's recent history, the Pashtuns
produced the Afghan monarchs and dominated the military and the bureaucracy.
Among Afghanistan's other main ethnic groups, the Tajiks participated more in running the country than the Uzbeks
or Hazaras. The Hazaras in particular were disenfranchised and impoverished. They were forcefully brought under
central control in the 1880s and 1890s.1
Afghanistan has also been the scene of great power rivalry In fact, the borders of what is now Afghanistan came about
as result of the rivalry between the Russian and British empires. These two empires decided that Afghanistan should
become a buffer separating them from each other.
The origins of the current war can be traced back to 1978, when the pro-Soviet Communist Party took over
Afghanistan. The Communist takeover was the culmination of decades of wrenching change, which strained the
country's political and social fabric. Road-building and other infrastructure projects extended the central government's
reach to more parts of the country and ended the isolation of many areas. The armed forces had grown significantly,
increasing the center's military capability compared with that of the armed tribes. These developments and the
extension of centrally-controlled education to all parts of the country spread Afghan national consciousness, but also
disrupted traditional ways of life.2
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NO IMPACT
INTELLIGENCE ADV.
No impact War-lords are already impeding US action in Afghanistan and are already
working against the US and the new Afghan government.
Kathy Gannon Afghanistan Unbound; Foreign Affairs. New York: May/Jun 2004. Vol. 83, Iss. 3; pg. 35
http://proquest.umi.com.online.library.marist.edu/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=09-20-2012&FMT=7&DID=629305041&RQT=309
How exactly did things get so bad so quickly? How did the fall of the Taliban -- a great victory for Washington, and
one that seemed to herald a new dawn for this battered country -- lead to the return of the old status quo? The answer
dates back to September 2001. Soon after al Qaeda staged its attacks against New York City and Washington, D.C.,
from its Afghan bases, the Northern Alliance teamed up with the United States to rout the terrorists and their Taliban
sponsors. America's new allies, however, included some of the same men who had wreaked havoc in Afghanistan
before the Taliban came to power, and many of them were almost as radical in their ideology as the Taliban
themselves (Rabbani, while president from 1992 to 1996, even granted more than 600 Arab militants Afghan
passports). In addition, their alliance with Washington seems to have been a tactical one at best. According to Milton
Bearden, who was the CIA's main liaison to the mujahideen during the 1980s, "they never thought they couldn't
manage us."
Problems began even before the negotiation of the Bonn accord, signed in December 2001 under UN auspices. That
agreement was supposed to serve as a road map for post-Taliban Afghanistan, leading to the development of a new,
stable, democratic nation. The parties agreed that two Loya Jirgas would be held, one to elect an interim president and
cabinet, and one to pass a constitution and set a timeline for national elections. But in the horse-trading for cabinet
positions that accompanied the agreement, three top posts -- the foreign, defense, and interior ministerships -- were
given to members of Jamiat-e-Islami, an Islamist, ethnic-Tajik faction of the Northern Alliance led by Rabbani.
The leaders of the Northern Alliance agreed to the appointment of Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun, as interim president, but
only because he did not have a militia of his own. In practice, this has meant that Karzai can do little to impose his
will on those who retain private armies. Karzai took office as a nationalist, a believer in an Afghanistan for all
Afghans, regardless of ethnicity. But few of his colleagues share this view. The new government is composed of
militarily strong Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara factions, and a weak Pashtun majority, governed by exiles who have
recently returned to Afghanistan after decades elsewhere -- mostly in the United States.
The United States and the UN presumably thought that Karzai would get the strength he needed to rule Afghanistan
from the ongoing presence of Western soldiers in the country, who sometimes serve to enforce his writ. Yet even as
Washington claims to support Karzai, it has continued to rely on the independent warlords for help hunting down
remnant units of the Taliban and al Qaeda. This dual strategy has served only to strengthen the former Northern
Alliance, by giving it U.S.-supplied guns, money, and prestige, while eroding Karzai's already weak central authority.
Even in Kabul, the limits of Karzai's power and the perfidy of the warlords have become clear. The Bonn agreement
set clear timetables for the decommissioning of private militias. Even before they disbanded, these armies were to
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withdraw from Kabul. The Bonn agreement was unequivocal on this point: the warlord's troops were supposed to be
out of the city by the time the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed there in late December 2001.
The warlords never planned to honor these agreements, however. On November 11, two days before the Taliban fled
town, when Sayyaf was asked by satellite telephone about U.S. requests that his militia remain outside Kabul, he
laughed and said, "Our brothers will be [there]." Fahim, who would later become defense minister, took a similar
position. Shortly after the Taliban were routed, I asked him whether he was going to remove his troops from Kabul
before the peacekeepers entered the city. His answer was an unequivocal no. I replied that the Bonn agreement was
very specific on this point, that all militia had to be housed outside the capital by the time the peacekeepers came to
Kabul. Again, his answer was no. Fahim's troops remain in the city to this day; U.S. and UN envoys are still trying to
get rid of them.
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