The steering and control of central government NonDepartmental Public Bodies in Italy
Dario Barbieri, Paolo Fedele, Davide Galli, Edoardo Ongaro1
1. Introduction
Governments in many countries have established semi-autonomous single-purpose
organisations (OECD, 2002); ministries and other departmental bodies have been split
up into several entities and these entities, disaggregated from a leaner core
government (in principle focused only on the formulation, the monitoring and – though
not in all instances - the evaluation of public policies), enjoy some degree of
autonomy. As an effect of these transformations of the public sector, we can observe a
landscape characterised by a highly differentiated public sector with several ‘satellites’
which operate in a relatively autonomous way from the core government, and quite
often only loosely coupled with their ‘parent’ administration.
Within this broad (‘global’) trend, Italy is no exception: the number of agencies has
increased over the last decade and a half. Recent publications on the phenomenon of
executive agencies and Non-Departmental Public Bodies (hereafter: NDPBs2) in Italy
have examined the modalities of the disaggregation from the core government (Fedele
et al, 2007; Ongaro, 2006) and the nature of the autonomy of such bodies (Barbieri et
al, 2008). The 1990s were a period of profound transformations of the public sector of
Italy (for an overview of the events, Ongaro, 2008, Ongaro and Valotti, 2008). In
particular, the period 1996-99 was characterised by a significant production of norms
and other authoritative decisions in the public management policy domain (the period
started with the first Prodi government and ended with the first D’Alema government Franco Bassanini was minister of the public function, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi minister of
the economy). Main policy decisions include: the reforms in expenditure planning and
financial management (legislative decree 279/97 for the State budget, followed by the
1
The authors are all at Università Bocconi and SDA Bocconi School of Management.
Though the term ‘agency’ and ‘Non-Departmental Public Body’ refer to partly different
phenomena, we will use them interchangeably in this work.
2
regional budget and accounting reform of 2000); the new regulation of the system of
controls in the public sector (legislative decree 286/99); the introduction of a
framework for administrative simplification.
In 1999, a major reform of the central government was enacted (legislative
decrees 300/99 and 303/99). It was probably the first attempt to introduce a
comprehensive reform of the organisation of the central administration in the Italian
administrative history (Sepe et al., 2003). The reform package included, on one hand,
the merger of some ministries and the re-organisation of their internal lines of control
along the so-called ‘departmental’ model. On the other hand, the reform of the central
government introduced a number of executive agencies (Fedele, Galli and Ongaro,
2007; Ongaro, 2006), to be steered by performance contracts according to an
organisational model explicitly ‘inspired’ by the UK ‘Next Steps’ experience (Greer 1992
and 1994). In particular, four fiscal agencies were established, all operating in the
policy field of the former finance ministry (in turn merged with the economy ministry to
form the ministry of the economy and finance). This major reform of the central
government can be deemed to be ‘watershed event’. In fact, in the administrative
history of Italy, it is difficult to find attempts at reforming so profoundly the public
sector (Sepe et al., 2003, provide an overview of the administrative history of Italy
since the unification in the 19th century: the emerging picture is one of continuity of
the organisational models of public sector organisations – the major changes having
occurred to the size of the public sector and its role in the economy of the country, but
not to its internal organisational structure). The reform encompassed various aspects
of the organisation of the state: a divisional model (in the sense outlined by Mintzberg,
1983) became the general pattern for all ministries but a few; the territorially
deconcentrated services of the state (prefect’s offices) were reshaped; and a number
of new ‘executive’ agencies explicitly patterned according to the British Next steps
were established (all these provisions are included in the legislative decrees n. 300/99
and n. 303/99). This reform was the first organic attempt at reforming the Italian
state. But was such an attempt actually a breakthrough event also in practice? Or were
great expectations in Rome dashed in the various Italian ‘Oaklands’ (to paraphrase the
most cited Pressman and Wildavsky’s seminal work - Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973)?
A central issue in the study on executive agencies and NDPBs is the governance
and ‘steering and control’ of these bodies (Wettenhall, 2005). Drawing on a survey
(Ongaro, 2008) carried out on a population of Italian agencies at the central level, this
work aims at providing an overall description of the forms of steering and control in the
Italian context.
More specifically, the first research question has been formulated as follows: what
are the modalities of the steering and control of Non-Departmental Public Bodies in
Italy?
In order to provide an accurate description of the phenomenon under analysis,
time has to be taken into account as a relevant factor. The second purpose of this
work is to investigate what has occurred to a specific but crucial component of such
reform, i.e. the actual form taken by the executive agencies established as a follow up
of the 1999 reform. What has happened along the way from the level of the
formulation of decisions to the level of the actual implementation? We will address this
question by focusing a specific but qualifying dimension of agencies/NDPBs, i.e. the
modalities of steering and control, and we will investigate whether the characteristics
of the steering and control of NDPBs established on the basis of the 1999 reform are
substantially different from the systems of steering and control in place for NDPBs
established before the 1999 reform.
The second research question has been formulated as follows3: are the systems of
steering and control of NDPBs in Italy established before 1999 substantially different
from those of NDPBs established as a consequence of the 1999 reform? And if so,
what are the qualifying differences?
2. Major methodological choices
From a methodological point of view, the analysis has focused on agencies at the
central (national) level of government. The units of analysis have been only those
bodies having the feature of being single organisations in the landscape of the Italian
public sector. In other words, we have identified the population only in those bodies
that present the characteristic of being the only ones in the public landscape to
3
It should be noticed that both research questions are descriptive. We would argue, however,
that the structuring of empirical evidence according to categories of analysis that are employed
in broad-scope research agendas is in itself a ‘finding’ that is worth considering – though
obviously it is to be interpreted as an intermediate step within a larger research programme.
exercise a given (range of) public function(s); so, for example, the inland revenue
agency or the government property agency are included, while national parks, of which
there are twenty-three, or state universities (more than seventy) are not. The
procedure for identifying the list of bodies to be included has been as follows: on the
one hand, we have considered the list of public bodies included in the ‘consolidated’
state budget, and excluded all those that are not single entities. The web page of all
ministries (and some related links) have been surveyed, in order to identify other
bodies that, though not included in the consolidated state budget, have been detected
as ‘exercising a public function at arm’s length’ from the ministry. It should be added
that no juridical classification has been adopted: the list includes departmental bodies,
public law agencies, as well as private law entities like state-owned companies.
Institutional-organisational features have formed the basis for the definition of the
subject of analysis. The final list included 57 entities; the ‘narrow’ definition of NonDeprtmental Public Body here adopted allows the analysis of the whole population of
organisations featuring the above characteristics. In the end, respondents were 41, out
of the identified population of 57, which constitutes a response rate of 71%. The list of
investigated bodies and responding organisations is detailed in Appendix 1.
Data have been collected through a survey conducted over the period October to
December 2006. Data have been collected through a questionnaire, featuring two sets
of closed-ended questions, as follows:

first set: basic features and environment, including 17 questions on
institutional and organizational features of the agencies4;

second set: steering and control of the agencies, including 25
questions5.
4
Items of the questions: 1. Age of the organization, 2. Year of adoption of later regulation document, 3. Number of
TFE, 4. Size of budget, 5. Sources and types of incomes, 6. Legal framework, 7. Kind of affiliation, 8. Parent
Department/ministry (open answer), 9. Policy filed 10. Tasks of the organization, 11. Way of establishment and link to
predecessor organizations, 12. Target groups, 13. Presence of other bodies performing the same task, 14. Networks,
15. Task of organization with respect to the phases in the policy cycle, 16. Companies controlled by the organizations,
17. Influence of UE normative.
5
Items of questions: 1. Document in which goals of the organization are specified, 2. Parent ministry steering
document, 3. Involvement of organization in the setting of goals, 4. Reporting of attainment of goals and results 5. Who
evaluates results, 6.Sanctions and rewards, 7. Regular internal or external audit, actors and focus, 8. Ad hoc audits and
specific inquiries, 9. Use of indicators measured, 10. Kind of indicators measured, 11. Who takes initiative of reporting,
12. Presence of database, 13. Presence of governing board, 14. Appointment of governing board members, 15.
Composition of board, 16. Appointment of CEO, 17. Type of contract of CEO, 18. Process of CEO evaluation, 19. Basis
of accountability of CEO, 20. Basis of accountability of President, 21. Frequency of formal contact between the
organization and parent ministry, 22. Content and focus of formal contact, 23. Frequency of informal contact, 24. Type
of budget, 25. Type of accounting system.
Responses have been systematically codified in such a way to allow the
quantitative treatment of data. The questionnaire has been sent to the CEO/General
director of all the agencies included in the population with an invitation letter provided
by the Italian Department of Public Function, sponsor of the project. Each agency has
been requested to give indication of the function of the respondent, if different by the
CEO/General director. It has been given the option to fill in the questionnaire both in
paper version and via a web-based process.
3. Modes of steering and control of Italian NDPBs
The issue of how to control an organisation is far from being a novelty in organisation
and management studies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and there are many ways of
keeping an organisation controlled, each of them relying on different theoretical
assumptions. However, the present work has a much more limited scope than
providing any theoretical explanation of the phenomena: its purpose is the
categorisation and description of the main data and evidence on the steering and
control of a specific subset of organisation, namely Italian central government NDPBs
having the above illustrated characteristics.
Consequently, the presentation of empirical evidence is built around two poles, i.e.
two recurrent ways of keeping under control an organisation at arm’s length. First, the
‘parent’ administration can steer and control ‘its’ NDPBs by setting the goals they are
expected to pursue and controlling ex post their achievements. This first perspective
largely refers to the management control and performance management literature
(Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). The second one is based on the assumption that an
arm’s length organisation can be steered and controlled through the appointment of
the CEO and the board’s members. This perspective refers both to the formal
bureaucratic aspects of the ministry-agency deal (Egeberg, 2003) and to other forms
of control, that can be read (also) through the lens of the theory of clans (Ouchi,
1980), pursued through the selection and appointments of top position. The data
reported in this paragraph are summarised in Scheme 1.
Scheme 1. Overview of the structure of data collection

Steering and control through
planning and control
Who set the goals?
Steering and control through the
governance structure
 Is there a board on the top of the

Who evaluate the results?
agency?

Are there rewards and incentives in 
Who appoints the agency board?

Who appoints the agency’s head?
case of positive results? What type?

Are
there
sanctions
in
case
of 
How long is the term?
negative results? What type?

How are performance indicators used
in the process?

What type of performance indicators
are used in the process?
Data are reported so as to single out the NDPBs established after the 1999 reform. In
the following tables, the first column(s) refer to the whole of the respondents, the
second cluster refers only to NDPBs established after 1999.
3.1 Steering and control through planning and control
The first descriptive question addressed concerns how agencies set their own goals
and objectives. The majority of agencies decides autonomously on the definition of
yearly objectives. In many other cases, the process is based on a kind of interaction
between the agency and the supervisory ministry: 18% of agencies set priorities after
a negotiation with the ministry or (18%) decide after consulting the ministry. In some
agencies, goal-setting is rather top-down since the ministry is responsible for setting
agency’s goals, even though after a consultation. Finally, in one case (3%) the process
is totally top-down.
After 1999, the picture partly changes, since the influence of the supervising
ministry becomes stronger: only 25% of agencies can autonomously set their goals
and overall objectives, while negotiation is the most recurrent figure.
Table 1: Goal-setting process
Is your organization involved in the setting of
these goals (other than purely financial goals)
and to what extent (one answer)?:
N.
We set the goals ourselves
16
42%
3
25%
7
18%
1
8%
7
18%
4
33%
7
18%
3
25%
1
3%
1
8%
We set them after having consulted a political (e.g.
minister) or an administrative (e.g. parent ministry)
senior unit
We set them together with a political (e.g. minister)
or an administrative (e.g. parent ministry) senior
unit (as equal partners) by a process of negotiation
or concertation
A political (e.g. minister) or an administrative (e.g.
parent ministry) senior unit does it after having
consulted our organization
A political (e.g. minister) or an administrative (e.g.
parent ministry) senior unit does it alone without
consulting our organization
% after 99
%
The description turns to the evaluation of the results of agencies. As illustrated in Table
2, the majority of agencies performs the evaluation of their own results without
external intervention. The 1999 reform, on the other side, represents a relevant shift:
the supervising ministry is, as regards this cluster, the actor that more often carries out
the evaluation of results. The finding is explained by the contents of 1999 reform
package, that explicitly draws the notion and instrument of the ‘performance contract’
from the Next-Steps reform. In very few cases, the results evaluation process is carried
out by external third parts, which are outside the ministry-agency deal, but operate on
behalf of the two parties involved.
Table 2. Results evaluation
By whom are the results or goal attainment
(other than purely financial goals) of the
organization evaluated (more answers
possible)?
N.
Organisation itself
26
67%
4
33%
Parent department and/or minister
19
49%
8
67%
Third parties by order of the organization
1
3%
Third parties by order of the parent
ministry/minister
Others
2
5%
2
17%
4
10%
1
8%
% after 99
%
Positive results and good performance are related to incentives and reward for 63% of
agencies (table 3). The figure dramatically increases when agencies created after 1999
are considered: 90% of them are steered through some type of incentive. This is
consistent with the 1999 reform package, which prescribes that agencies are mainly
steered through a performance contract, which sets the goals, the performance targets
and the related incentives. In these cases, incentives are at the heart of the
contractualised deal with the ministry.
Table 3. Presence of rewards and incentives in case of positive results
Are there rewards in case of good results or
the achievement of the goals or targets for
the organization?
N.
Yes
24
63%
9
90%
No
14
37%
1
10%
% After 99
%
Incentives related to positive results and performance can be of different kinds. The
most common type of incentive consists of monetary rewards for the agencies’
managers and the staff, in both clusters. For some agencies, extra-funding for the
organisation (i.e. not only for the individual managers) is achieved in case of good
performance. As regards the agencies created through the 1999 reform, the latter type
of incentive is more relevant than in the other group of organisation. In very few
cases, for both clusters, well performing agencies are transferred more decisionmaking power as a consequence of their achievements.
Table 4: Types of rewards and incentives
Are these rewards (more answers possible):
N.
% After 99
%
Wage increase or bonus for manager or other
personnel member(s)
Increased resource allocation (financial means for
organization)
Greater autonomy for the organization in relation
to senior politico-administrative units
22
92%
8
89%
9
38%
2
22%
1
4%
1
11%
In case of negative results and bad performance, the two clusters under analysis are
very different. If the whole population of respondents is considered, only 42% of
agencies will suffer consequences in case of bad performance. The picture strongly
changes in the cluster of agencies established after 1999, where 80% of agencies is
subject to sanctions in case of under-performance (Table 5).
Table 5. Sanctions in case of negative results
Are there sanctions in case of bad results or
the failure to achieve the goals or targets?
N.
Yes
16
42%
8
80%
No
22
58%
2
20%
% After 99
%
As regards the sanctions, they are of different types. The most common type of
sanction is consistent with the nature of the incentives above described. In both
clusters of agencies, managers and staff may receive a decreased amount of money, if
goals are not achieved (69% and 50%). After 1999, the second type of sanction (i.e.
a smaller budget for the whole agency, not only for individual employees) is more
recurrent (38%) then in the first cluster (25%). Finally, as Table 6 illustrates, there are
no consequences for underperformers other than on the funding.
Table 6. Type of sanctions in case of negative results
Are these sanctions (more answers possible):
N.
% After 99
%
Wage decrease or bonus reduction for manager or
other personnel member(s)
Decreased resource allocation
11
69%
4
50%
4
25%
3
38%
2
13%
1
13%
Less autonomy for the organization in relation to
senior politico-administrative units
Restructuring or abolishment of the organization
Other (please specify …)
In the process of goal setting and evaluation, performance indicators can be used in
many different ways. In both the analysed clusters, performance indicators (PI) are
more often used for ex post evaluation purposes, rather than for programming and
planning. In fact, in few cases (17%, and 18% in post-1999) indicators are used to set
the strategic goals of the agency; only 7% of agencies of the first cluster and 8% of
the second use PIs to allocate budgetary resources. In a large majority of cases,
performance indicators are use for ex post appraisal of the performance and results of
agencies (88% in the first group, 91 for the second group of agency – Table 7).
Table 7. Use of performance indicators
If indicators are used (to a large or some
extent) in the relation between the
organisation and the parent ministry, how are
they used?
N.
% After 99
%
Basis for steering signals
4
17%
2
18%
Basis for future resource allocation
2
8%
1
9%
21
88%
10
91%
1
4%
Check organizational accountability and goal
attainment
Other
The two clusters of agencies use indicators for similar purposes. On the other hand,
the types of indicators employed are quite different. The use of indicators in the
second cluster is more intensive and includes a wider range of components of the
organisational performance, as the following table 8 clearly shows.
Table 8. Type of performance indicators
To make goals measurable, indicators are
used. What is measured with the indicators
that are used?
N.
Societal effects
14
36%
5
45%
Quality of service delivery
21
54%
9
82%
Quantitative output
16
41%
7
64%
Use of resources
23
59%
10
91%
Effects, quality or output in relation to resources
19
49%
8
73%
% After 99
%
3.2 Steering and control through governance structure
At the apex of all the agencies included in the population there is a board, not only a
CEO (Table 9). The picture does not change in the two clusters. That shows that,
although 1999 agencies are inspired to the Next Steps executive agencies, their
governance structure is far from being monocratic.
Table 9: Presence of a board
Has your organization a board?
Yes, with solely an advisory function (it advices the
management of the organization and the parent
minister/department)
Yes, with decision making competences and
responsible for overseeing the direction and delivery
of the organization’s performance (its decisions are
binding for the organization)
No
N
% After 99
39
98%
1
3%
12
%
100%
In the majority of agencies, the supervising ministry is in charge for appointing the
board’s members (38% in the first cluster, 42% in the after 1999 cluster). Only in the
8% of organisations in the two clusters, there is a consultation that includes the
agency in the appointment process. The finding shows how the steering and control of
agencies is based on the central role of the supervising ministry. In very few agencies,
members are appointed through an internal process that involves a wider
representative board. Surprisingly, the parliament does not play any role in the
appointment of the boards’ members, as highlighted in Table 10.
Table 10. Appointment of board’s members
In case your organization has a (governing)
board, by whom or which actor is it appointed
(are the members appointed)?
N.
By the government or minister
14
38%
5
42%
3
8%
1
8%
5
14%
2
17%
4
11%
2
17%
11
30%
2
17%
By the government or minister after nomination by
or consultation of the organization (i.e.
management or employees)
By the general council of the organization (in case
of company meeting of shareholders, general
assembly)
By the government or minister after nomination by
or consultation of interest groups and/or
stakeholders of the organization
By the parliament after nomination by minister or
government
By another actor
% After 99
%
The board can appoint the agency’s head in 55% of agencies in the first cluster and in
the 45% of organisations in the second group. On the other hand, the supervising
ministry, as Table 11 shows, appoints the director in 27% of the post 1999 agencies
and only in 18% of the first cluster agencies. This finding confirms that the second
type of agencies is characterised by more hierarchical arrangements and are kept
under a stricter control by the supervising ministry.
Table 11. Appointment of agency head
By whom or what actor is the CEO of the
organization appointed?
N.
By the governing board of the organization
21
55%
5
45%
7
18%
3
27%
3
8%
1
9%
7
18%
2
18%
By the government or minister
By the government or minister after nomination by
or consultation of the board or of the organization
itself (i.e. management or employees)
By the general council of the organization (in case
of company meeting of shareholders, general
assembly)
By the parliament after nomination by minister or
government
By another actor
% After 99
%
Finally, the data provide information on the term of the agency director. Not
surprisingly, in both clusters the term is temporary, more often as regards after 1999
agencies. In both cases, the influence of ‘spoils system logics’ on the nature of these
top positions is quite evident.
Table 12. Agency head’s term
On what type of contract is the CEO appointed?
N.
% After 99
%
Permanent
4
11%
2
18%
Fixed term
34
89%
9
82%
Conclusion
This work describes the characteristics of the systems of steering and control of NDPBs
in Italy. It emerges that, concerning the first research question about the modalities of
the steering and control of Non-Departmental Public Bodies in Italy, the reform process
has strengthened the steering role of the parent ministry through planning and control
instruments having a stronger focus on the evaluation of results and a diffuse presence
of rewards and incentives in case of positive results. The increased use of planning
and control instruments seems to be not related to a more extensive application of
performance indicators, however, even if the agencies created after the 1999 display a
wider range of activities whose performance are to some extent monitored. Regarding
the governance structure of the agencies, most of the agencies present a board at the
apex of the organisation, usually appointed by the parent ministry. In half of the cases,
the board appoints the director/CEO of the agency.
As regards the second research question, the systems of steering and control of
agencies established after 1999 differ to quite a significant degree from those of the
agency established before that date only with reference to the planning and control
systems. For what concerns the governance structure, the model of agency introduced
by the Decree 300/99 does not present substantial differences if compared to the
existing model. Indeed, the 1999 reform was more concerned with the internal
organisation of ministries and with their relationships with executive agencies, that
with the institutional and organisational design of agencies per se. As an effect, the
governance structure of the post 1999 agencies is similar to the governance structure
of the already-in-place NDPBs.
Another question regards whether the 1999 reform actually was a watershed
event, at least with regard to a specific component of the reform (the establishment of
executive agencies inspired by the British 1988 Next Steps reform). Important caveats
apply to this analysis, however. First of all, we have focused only one aspect of
executive agencies, i.e. the steering and control dimension – though obviously a
qualifying aspect, it is not the only one to characterise the ‘agencies’ phenomenon.
Second, from a methodological point of view, it should be observed that many clusters
could be formed other than the [before 1999-after 1999 dichotomy], hence in a strict
sense it has not been tested whether the difference in important properties between
the entire population and the cluster of the NDPBs established following up the 1999
reform is especially significant; nor has it been tested more broadly what are the
causes of the purported differences. With all these caveats in mind, it seems, however,
that there are differences in many important respects between agencies established
before the 1999 reform and those that followed such reform up.
Italian agencies are steered and controlled by the parent Ministries (and other
stakeholders) by means of various tools. Agencies established before 1999 are
characterised by a ‘bureaucratic’ relation with the parent ministry. This relation allows
higher levels of autonomy in the definition of the goals, as well as a strong
proceduralisation (but not extremely binding) in administering the activities. The
administrative and accounting regularity, not performance, is the main element of
evaluation. The role of the parent administration in the appointment and evaluation of
the governing bodies and the other management bodies of the agencies is influential,
but it encounters a number of limitations.
The agencies established after 1999 are characterised by a ‘contractual’
relationship (in the organisational sense) with the parent administration. This means a
more contractual component in the definition of the goals, a significant role of the
parent administration in the evaluation of the activities, an evaluation process based on
indicators monitoring the quality, efficiency and efficacy of the services, developed by
means of a negotiation process. The parent administration is involved in the
appointment and evaluation of the governing bodies of the agencies. There is a
difference between ‘older’ and ‘younger’ agencies, which entails that there is no
uniformity in the steering and control systems in the population of Italian agencies:
whether the ‘new’, more contractualised and managerialised agencies will become a
dominant term of reference, or co-existence between two different types of agencies
will continue for long, is a topic for further, broader-scope and theory-driven
investigation.
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Annex 1: list of investigated bodies
Organization
Legal form under
Italian law
ISCOM - Istituto Superiore delle
Comunicazioni e delle ICT
National Institute for Civil Service and
Training in ICT
department
SSAI - Scuola Superiore
dell’Amministrazione dell’Interno
National School of Security
Administration
department
SSEF - Scuola Superiore dell’economia e
delle Finanze
National School of Finance
Administration
department
SSPA - Scuola superiore della Pubblica
Amministrazione
National School of Public Administration
department
Agenzia del Territorio
Land Register National Agency
executive agency
Agenzia delle Dogane
Custom Agency
executive agency
Agenzia delle Entrate
Inland Revenue Agency
executive agency
AID - Agenzia Industrie Difesa
National Agency for Defence Industries
executive agency
AIFA - Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco
Italian Drug Agency
executive agency
APAT - Agenzia Nazionale per la
protezione dell’ambiente e per i servizi
tecnici
ARAN - Agenzia per la Rappresentanza
Negoziale delle PA
Environment Safeguard and Technical
Services Agency
executive agency
Civil Service Contract Negotiation
Agency
executive agency
AAMS - Amministrazione Autonoma dei
Monopoli di Stato
Autonomous Administration of State
Monopolies
public body
ACI - Automobile Club Italia
Automobile Club of Italy
public body
Aero Club d’Italia
Aero Club Italia
Agricultural Funding National Agency
public body
Government Property Agency
National Agency for not-profit
companies
Air Security National Agency
public body
public body
Italian Space Agency
public body
ASSR - Agenzia per i servizi sanitari regionali
National Agency for coordination of Regional
Health Services
public body
CNIPA - Centro Nazionale per
l'Informatica nella PA
Centre for ICT in the Public Sector
public body
CNR - Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche
National Research Centre
public body
CONI - Comitato Olimpico Nazionale
Italiano
CRI - Croce Rossa Italiana
National Olympic Committee
public body
Italian Red Cross
public body
ENAC - Ente Nazionale Aviazioni Civile
ENAM - Ente Nazionale di Assistenza
Magistrale
ENAV - Ente Nazionale Assistenza al Volo
Italian Civil Aviation Authority
National Institute for Bench Social Security
public body
public body
Italian Company for Air Navigation Services
public body
ENEA - Ente per le Nuove tecnologie,
l'Energia e l'Ambiente
Italian National Agency for New
Technologies, Energy and the
Environment
Italian Government Tourism Board
public body
National Institute for Artistic, Cultural and
Sport Sector Social Security
public body
AGEA - Agenzia per le erogazioni in
Agricoltura
Agenzia del Demanio
Agenzia per le Onlus
ANSV - Agenzia Nazionale Sicurezza
Volo
ASI - Agenzia Spaziale Italiana
ENIT - Agenzia Nazionale del Turismo
ENPALS - Ente Nazionale di Previdenza e di
Assistenza per i Lavoratori dello Spettacolo e
dello Sport Professionistico
public body
public body
public body
Formez
National Agency for Civil Service
Training and Education
public body
ICE - Istituto per il commercio estero
National Agency for Export Development
public body
INAIL - Istituto Nazionale di
Assicurazione per gli Infortuni sul
Lavoro
INPDAP - Istituto Nazionale di
Previdenza per i Lavoratori della PA
Italian Workers' Compensation
Authority
public body
National Agency for Civil Service Social
Security
public body
INPS - Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza
Sociale
National Agency for Social Security
System
public body
IPI - Istituto promozione Industriale
Industrial Promotion Agency
public body
IPOST - Istituto Postetelegrafonici
National Institute for Postal Services Social
Security
public body
IPSEMA - Istituto di Previdenzaper il Settore
Marittimo
National Institute for Maritime Sector Social
Security
public body
ISAE - Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica
Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses
public body
ISFOL - Istituto per lo sviluppo della
formazione professionale dei lavoratori
Institute for Workers' Professional
Training
public body
ISPELS - Istituto Superiore per la
Prevenzione e la Sicurezza del Lavoro
National Institute for occupational
safety, health and prevention
public body
ISS - Istituto Superiore di Sanità
Health National Institute
public body
ISTAT - Istituto Nazionale di Statistica
Lega Navale Italiana
National Statistic Centre
Italian Navy League
public body
public body
UNIRE - Unione Nazionale per
l'Incremento delle Razze Equine
National Agency for Horse Races
Protections and Development
public body
Agecontrol S.p.A
Agecontrol SpA (Agency for agricultural
entrepreneurship)
company
ANAS
Highways National Agency
company
Arcus S.p.A - Arte, Cultura e Spettacolo
Arts and Culture Support Company
company
Buonitalia S.p.A.
Public Company for National Production
Promotion
company
Cassa Depositi e prestiti spa
Treasury Agency for Funds and Loans
company
CONSIP SpA
MEF Centre for ICT and provision
company
Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato
S.p.a
SACE S.p.A.
State Printing office and Mint
company
Insurance and Financial Services
Company for Companies operating in
international markets
company
SI - Sviluppo Italia
National Agency for enterprise and
inward investment development
company
SIAE - Società Italiana degli Autori e degli
Editori
SIMEST S.p.A.
Italian Company of Authors and Editors
company
Financial Services Company for Companies
operating in international markets
company
SOGEI S.p.A. - Società Generale
d'Informatica
General Company of Information
Services
company