John Stuart Mill
MILL’S
Utilitarianism
With regard to the reading lists that follow, it should be understood that you read
the relevant parts of ‘Utilitarianism’ for each essay (as it’s comparatively short, I
haven’t usually given specific references — you should come to know your way
around it pretty quickly). Don’t read more than two or three additional items from
any reading list. You’re welcome to read other works by Mill, and generally to go
outside the reading lists I give — but not to drift away from the essay topic.
There are various editions of ‘Utilitarianism’, and in general it probably doesn’t
matter which you use. I’d prefer, though, that you get hold of Roger Crisp’s 1998
edition (Oxford Philosophical Texts), which is useful not only for the excellent
introduction and notes, but for the provision of a standard reference apparatus.
General introductions include:
Roger Crisp
Alan Ryan
John Skorupski
William Thomas
Essay Questions &
Reading Lists
Mill on Utilitarianism
J.S. Mill
John Stuart Mill
Mill
All contain at least some discussion of ‘Utilitarianism’, the Crisp being the only one
specifically on ‘Utilitarianism’. The Ryan is short, generally clear, but often very
misleading; The Skorupski is longer, more difficult, and more interesting; the
Thomas is useful only as a very general background account.
I’ll cite papers from the following collections, using only the editors’ names:
Philippa Foot
Jonathan Glover
Samuel Scheffler
J.B. Schneewind
John Skorupski
Theories of Ethics
Utilitarianism and Its Critics
Consequentialism and Its Critics
Mill
The Cambridge Companion to Mill
Although we’re concerned with ‘Utilitarianism’, it would be difficult (and unwise) to
ignore Mill’s other work — especially ‘On Liberty’. The following book contains the
text, plus an introduction and some useful papers:
John Gray & G.W. Smith [edd] J.S. Mill On Liberty in focus
Peter J. King
e-mail: peter.king@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk
WWW: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~worc0337
You might want to read Isaiah Berlin’s and Richard Wollheim’s papers from this
volume — they offer a useful debate concerning Mill’s general approach to ethics.
When thinking about Mill’s ideas, it’s important not to fall into the trap
(common when dealing with ethical and political ideas) of taking one part of his
theory and judging it in isolation from the whole. Remember that Mill is, to a
certain extent, offering an alternative to our ordinary ways of thinking about ethics,
so that pointing out that certain consequences of utilitarianism offend against our
intuitions isn’t sufficient as a criticism. On the other hand, it’s important to be
aware of the extent to which Mill thinks of utilitarianism as a description of what
underlies our moral thinking rather than a prescription of what should underlie it.
Some notes on writing essays
P
HILOSOPHY is like mathematics in that you can’t just set down your answer — you have to
show how you got there. A common fault in philosophy essays is that the writer is in such
a hurry to get her ideas down – to attack a hated position, to state an attractive theory – that
she forgets to argue. Without arguments, all you have is a set of opinions, however
interesting; with arguments, you have philosophy. With good arguments, you have good
philosophy.
TRUCTURE. But perhaps the most common cause of problems with essays (apart from the
amount of work put into them) is poor structure. A badly structured essay doesn’t only
make it difficult for the reader to follow what you’re saying — it can make it difficult for you
to keep track of what you’re saying, leading to repetition, contradiction, and irrelevance.
Make an essay plan before you start writing, and try to stick to it. It shouldn’t be too detailed,
otherwise it’ll be too rigid; most, if not all, plans will fall into three parts, including an
introduction to and explanation of the problems, a discussion of the main arguments, and
some sort of conclusion. Whatever your position, be sure to treat the positions with which
you disagree as fully and sympathetically as possible before you start to criticise them; apart
from anything else this will help you to avoid knocking down straw men. Don’t strive too
hard for originality and new ideas; these will come (if they do) as you think and write about
other people’s ideas and arguments. If you do come up with what you think is an original
idea or argument, don’t be too protective towards it; be at least as critical of it as you would
be of anyone else’s.
RITICAL APPARATUS. All quotations should be given references clear and detailed enough to
allow the reader to go straight to the original source. This will normally involve author,
title, and page number; in the case of historical or translated works, you should be sure to give
the edition you’re using, and if possible use a standard reference system (often found in the
margins or at the top of each page). If you’re unsure, check to see how other authors do it,
or ask me. Never use other writers’ words or even ideas without acknowledgment (see under
plagiarism below). Details should be given in a separate bibliography; the reference in the text
is to author and page.
ANGUAGE. Clarity and precision often depend upon careful use of language — and this
includes spelling and grammar. Don’t underestimate the problems caused by misspelling
(the differences between ‘intention’ and ‘intension’, or ‘ingenious’ and ‘ingenuous’, are more
important than the single letters involved). This is even more true of grammar and
punctuation. Keep your language simple: don’t use three syllables where one will do, or ‘had
it not been written by him’ instead of ‘if he hadn’t written it’. Make sure that quotations fit
into their new contexts (avoid, for example, ‘Descartes said that “I can be certain”’; write
either ‘Descartes said: “I can be certain”’ or ‘Descartes said that he could be certain’).
LAGIARISM. Your essays must be your own work. The reading is there to guide you, to
suggest avenues of thought, to offer explanations of difficult arguments or ideas; it is not
there to be repeated parrot-fashion. If you need to quote from another writer, mark the
quotation clearly (see above, under Critical apparatus) — but again, don’t overdo it.
RACTICAL MATTERS . N.B.: occasionally I give more than one essay question; these are
alternatives, so choose one. Don’t read too much (or, of course, too little); three or four
items from the relevant reading list is usually about right (one introductory or general work,
and two or three others). If you want to (or have to) go outside the reading I suggest, talk to
me about it; too often I find that essays have suffered because students have depended upon
what are frankly bad and misleading books. If you use a word-processor (and I’d advise it), use
the spell-checker, but don’t rely upon it; read through (preferably aloud) what you’ve written,
at least once. Don’t bother with grammar-checkers — I’ve yet to see one that works properly.
S
C
L
P
P
The analysis of ‘pleasure’
i. Is Mill’s way of drawing the distinction between higher and lower
pleasures defensible?
ii. Is what Mill says about the relationship between happiness and pleasure,
and between happiness and content(ment), satisfactory?
Jean Austin
–
‘Pleasure and Happiness’ (Philosophy XLIII, 1968; reprinted in
Schneewind)
Jeremy Bentham
–
The Principles of Morals and Legislation — chapters 1–5
F. H. Bradley
–
Ethical Studies — essay 3
Richard B. Brandt
–
Ethical Theory — chapter 12
Roger Crisp
–
Mill on Utilitarianism — chapters 2 & 3 (see also pp 186–189)
John Gray
–
‘Mill’s Conception of Happiness and the Theory of Individuality’
(in Gray & Smith)
Robert Hoag
–
‘J.S. Mill’s Language of Pleasures’ (Utilitas 4, 1992)
John Hospers
–
Human Conduct — chapter 5
Roderick T. Long
–
‘Mill’s Higher Pleasures and the Choice of Character’ (Utilitas 4,
1992)
John Rawls
–
A Theory of Justice — chapter I, section 5 (reprinted in Scheffler), and chapter IX, sections 83–84
Jonathan Riley
–
‘On Quantities and Qualities of Pleasure’ (Utilitas 5, 1993)
Alan Ryan
–
J.S. Mill — chapter 4, especially pp 109–113
Henry Sidgwick
–
The Methods of Ethics — II chapters 2–3; IV chapter 1
Fred Wilson
–
‘Mill on psychology and the moral sciences’ (in Skorupski; see
also the Donner & Robson papers)
Points to consider
Once you’ve given an account of what Mill says about happiness, pleasure, etc., you’ll need to
think about the consistency of his analyses. Is what he says consistent within itself? Is it
consistent with the general principles that he’s working with?
Act vs Rule Utilitarianism
Proof and Fallacy
i. Was Mill clearly either an Act or a Rule Utilitarian? Which should he have
been?
i. What is the structure of Mill’s argument in chapter 4 of ‘Utilitarianism’?
Does it involve a fallacy?
ii. What’s the significance of the distinction between Act and Rule
Utilitarianism?
ii. Of what sort of proof did Mill think that Utilitarianism was capable?
F.H. Bradley
–
Ethical Studies — pp 113–124
Richard B. Brandt
–
Ethical Theory — chapter 15
Roger Crisp
–
Mill on Utilitarianism — chapters 3 & 4
Roger Crisp
–
Mill on Utilitarianism — chapter 5
W.H. Frankena
–
‘The Naturalistic Fallacy’ (Mind XLVIII, 1939; reprinted in Foot)
Wendy Donner
–
‘Mill’s utilitarianism’ (in Skorupski)
Everett W. Hall
–
Brad Hooker
–
‘Rule-Consequentialism’ (Mind XCIX, 1990)
‘The “Proof” of Utility in Bentham and Mill’ (Ethics 60, 1949;
reprinted in Schneewind)
J.D. Mabbott
–
‘Interpretations of Mill’s “Utilitarianism”’ (Philosophical Quarterly 6, 1956; reprinted in Foot and Schneewind)
J.L. Mackie
–
Ethics — chapter 6, section 5
G.E. Moore
–
Principia Ethica — chapter 3 (extract reprinted in Glover)
J.L. Mackie
–
Ethics — chapter 6
D.D. Raphael
--
‘J.S. Mill's proof of the principle of utility’ (Utilitas 6, 1994)
Maurice Mandelbaum
–
‘Two Moot Issues in Mill’s Utilitarianism’ (in Schneewind) —
part I only
Alan Ryan
–
‘Mill and the Naturalistic Fallacy’ (Mind LXXV, 1966)
J.J.C. Smart
–
‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’ (Philosophical Quarterly
6, 1956; reprinted in Foot)
Mary Warnock
–
Ethics since 1900 — chapter 2 (parts of this chapter are
reprinted in Schneewind)
J.O. Urmson
–
‘The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill’
(Philosophical Quarterly 3, 1953; reprinted in Foot and in
Schneewind)
Points to consider
Do Act and Rule Utilitarianism collapse into one? If not, in what circumstances would the Act
Utilitarian behave differently from the Rule Utilitarian? Are there different forms of Rule
Utilitarianism?
Points to consider
On what basis might one decide whether to accept Utilitarianism (or, indeed, any ethical
system)? If the accusation of the naturalistic fallacy is wrong, why should anyone make the
mistake of thinking that Mill committed it?
Separate Persons
Justice
Is it a cogent objection to Utilitarianism that it cannot find a place for the
value of personal integrity?
Is Mill’s analysis of the notion of justice satisfactory? Does he give a
plausible account of its origin?
Sarah Conly
–
‘Utilitarianism and Integrity’ (Monist 66, 1983)
Brian Barry
–
Roger Crisp
–
Mill on Utilitarianism — chapter 6
‘Justice and the common good’ (Analysis 21, 1960–61; reprinted in A. Quinton [ed.] Political Philosophy)
Philippa Foot
–
‘Utilitarianism and the Virtues’ (Mind XCIV, 1985)
Richard B. Brandt
–
Ethical Theory — chapter 16
John Gray
–
‘Mill’s Conception of Happiness and the Theory of Individuality’
(in Gray & Smith)
Roger Crisp
–
Mill on Utilitarianism — chapter 7
James Griffin
–
Well-Being — Part III
Robert Nozick
–
Anarchy, State, and Utopia — chapters 7 and 8 (an extract is
reprinted in Honderich & Burnyeat [edd] Philosophy As It Is)
D.D. Raphael
–
Problems of Political Philosophy — chapter VII
John Rawls
–
A Theory of Justice — passim (see also Honderich & Burnyeat
[edd] Philosophy As It Is, in which various sections are reprinted)
Nicholas Rescher
–
Distributive Justice — chapters 1 and 2
James Griffin
–
Well-Being — part III passim
J.L. Mackie
–
Ethics — chapter 6, sections 1–4
Derek Parfit
–
Reasons and Persons — chapter 15
John Rawls
–
A Theory of Justice — chapter 1, pp.22–30
Bernard Williams
–
‘A critique of Utilitarianism’ (in Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism, For and Against)
‘Persons, Character, and Morality’ (in A. Rorty [ed.], The Identity
of Persons; reprinted in Williams’ Moral Luck)
‘Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indulgence’ (in H.D. Lewis [ed.],
Contemporary British Philosophy Series 4; reprinted in Williams’
Moral Luck)
—
–
—
–
Points to consider
Why did Mill think that Utilitarianism might have problems in accounting for the ‘sentiment
of justice’? Is his account of the circumstances in which questions of justice and injustice
arise acceptable? Is he right in holding that justice and utility can never conflict?
Points to consider
Is Utilitarianism committed to the absurdity of regarding impartial benevolence as the only
virtue? Can it be fairly accused of not taking seriously the separateness of persons? Could a
consistent Utilitarian find a place in his or her life for friendship and other ties of personal
affection?
Justice: Rights and Utility
Can Mill’s Utilitarianism provide a plausible foundation for rights?
J.S. Mill
—
–
–
Utilitarianism — chapter 5
On Liberty — chapter 2
Roger Crisp
–
Mill on Utilitarianism — chapter 7
David Lyons
–
—
–
—
–
‘Mill’s Theory of Justice’ (in A. Goldman and J. Kim [edd] Values
and Morals)
‘Human Rights and the General Welfare’ (Philosophy and Public
Affairs 6, 1977)
‘Utility and Rights’ (in J. Waldron [ed] Theories of Rights [a
change of view from the two earlier papers])
Robert Nozick
–
Anarchy, State and Utopia — pp 28–35, 48–51
D.D. Raphael
–
Problems of Political Philosophy — chapter VII
Amartya Sen
–
—
–
‘Rights and Agency’ (Philosophy and Public Affairs 11, 1981) —
section 2
‘Mill on Self-regarding Actions’ (Philosophy 1968)
Consequentialism
Should we be dissatisfied with the claim that the morality of an action is
determined simply in virtue of its consequences? Is there a coherent
alternative?
James Cargile
–
‘On Consequentialism’ (Analysis 29, 1969; and in Rachels [ed.]
Ethical Theory vol.II)
Philippa Foot
–
‘Utilitarianism and the Virtues’ (Mind 1984)
James Griffin
–
‘Modern Utilitarianism’ (Revue Internationale de Philosophie
1982)
Peter Railton
–
‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’
(in Rachels [ed.] Ethical Theory vol.II)
S. Scheffler
— [ed.]
–
–
The Rejection of Consequentialism — chaps 3 & 4
Consequentialism and Its Critics
J.J.C. Smart &
Bernard Williams
–
Utilitarianism: For and Against
Points to consider
Points to consider
Must Utilitarianism be hostile to rights? Are Mill’s view in Utilitarianism consistent with his
views in On Liberty? If not, why not, and how should be revise his views to make them
consistent?
Here we’re thinking about rather wider questions: what kind of theory is Utilitarianism, and
what can be said about that kind of theory in general? Bear Mill in mind, and use him as an
anchor-point, but try to think about the issues more broadly.
The consequentialist wants us to discard the distinctions between allowing and initiating
evil and between directly intending evil and intending something else which we know will
occasion evil; is this really possible or desirable?
Can the non-consequentialist deprive consequences of any moral rôle? If not, what rôle
can she allow them?