University of Turku
Centre for Parliamentary Studies
POPULIST PARTIES IN SELECTED
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
David Đukanović
Turku 2014
SUMMARY
It is hard to open a newspaper nowadays without being confronted by populism. In relation to
the European Parliament elections in May 2014, it is reasonable to write a few words about
populist parties in Europe and take a deeper look at their historical backgrounds. The
influence of populist parties is growing. They are mobilising the masses who are concerned
about the European financial and fiscal crisis, which has created insecurity and doubt about
the existing political systems and social organizations. These are usually presented as
corrupted and elitist without any sense to listen to the wishes of the common people. The EU
is seen as an open window for immigrants who are threatening national cultures and safety.
The most important point was balancing the literature; some authors see populists as a threat
to democratic states and others describe them as a challenge to the existing political structures
and systems. Here, the focus is on relevant, actively participating, populist political parties
that are involved in political developments and events in selected countries: France-National
Front, Netherlands-Party for Freedom and Socialist Party, United Kingdom-UK
Independence Party, Sweden-Sweden Democrats, Finland-The Finns, Denmark-Danish
People’s Party and Norway-Progress Party.
First of all, we must bear in mind that the definitions of populism vary among authors.
Accordingly, it is necessary to adjust the concept in a manner that will be useful for
understanding the discussion about populist parties in Europe. The next step is to explain the
differences among populist parties. Then it will be possible to begin with the core part of the
seminar paper where we illustrate the situation in seven European countries. It is interesting
to see the role that the EU plays in the links between voters and populist parties and their
political agendas. In this seminar paper, we are also trying to answer the question of how the
other parties react to the populist party and whether they try to exclude the party or accept it
as a legitimate party that represents a challenge to some extent. All in all, the most important
and interesting part for everyone is the ability of populist parties to influence decision
making. Finally, we offer a comparative view on selected populist parties.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
2 THE CONCEPT OF POPULISM AND ITS APPLICATION .......................................................................................................................... 4
POPULIST PARTIES AND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVISION ..................................................................................................................... 5
THE IMPACT OF POPULIST PARTIES ................................................................................................................................................... 6
3 POPULIST PARTIES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ................................................................................................................. 8
France
THE FRENCH NATIONAL FRONT ......................................................................................................................................................... 8
Presence on the French political scene .................................................................................................................................................. 9
Programme and strategic changes in message over time, voter profile ................................................................................................ 10
The impact of the FN on French political life and the reaction of the parties ...................................................................................... 11
Netherlands
GEERT WILDERS AND THE PARTY FOR FREEDOM IN THE NETHERLANDS ............................................................................ 12
Electorate and supporters..................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Programme and mobilisation strategies ............................................................................................................................................... 14
Membership and intra-party dynamics ................................................................................................................................................ 15
THE SOCIALIST PARTY – THE DUTCH LEFT-WING POPULIST GROUP ...................................................................................... 16
Strategies and development of the party .............................................................................................................................................. 16
Programme and cooperation with other groups ................................................................................................................................... 17
Voters and members’ profile ............................................................................................................................................................... 18
Norway
THE PROGRESS PARTY ........................................................................................................................................................................ 18
Electoral history and key figures ......................................................................................................................................................... 19
Voter characteristics ............................................................................................................................................................................ 20
Cooperation with other parties ............................................................................................................................................................. 20
Programmes, topics and strategies ....................................................................................................................................................... 21
Denmark
THE RIGHT-WING POPULIST DANISH PEOPLE’S PARTY .............................................................................................................. 22
Electorate............................................................................................................................................................................................. 23
Anti-immigration and anti-EU rhetoric, demands for the welfare state ............................................................................................... 24
Legitimacy and dealing with the Danish People's Party ...................................................................................................................... 25
Sweden
THE RISE OF THE SWEDEN DEMOCRATS ........................................................................................................................................ 25
Fertile grounds but still very hard to make a breakthrough .................................................................................................................. 26
Elections and supporters ...................................................................................................................................................................... 27
Ideology and programme ..................................................................................................................................................................... 28
United Kingdom
THE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY AND THEIR NICHE STRATEGY ............................................................................................... 29
Programme and supporters .................................................................................................................................................................. 29
Further development and “battle for ownership of the EU issue” ........................................................................................................ 30
Finland
THE FINNS AND THE LARGEST EVER INCREASE IN SUPPORT ................................................................................................... 31
Programmes and mobilisation strategies .............................................................................................................................................. 32
Leadership, strategy and cooperation................................................................................................................................................... 33
4 COMPARISON OF POPULIST PARTIES ................................................................................................................................................... 33
PARTY’S CORE ISSUES AND OPPOSITIONAL IMAGE .................................................................................................................... 33
(NON)COOPERATION WITH OTHER PARTIES ................................................................................................................................. 35
ELECTORATE AND THE POWER OF SELECTED POPULIST PARTIES.......................................................................................... 36
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 36
2
1 INTRODUCTION
The European financial and fiscal crisis created insecurity and doubt about the existing
political systems and social organizations, which are closely connected to existing political
and state structures. These concerns are being exploited by nationalistic parties and the
virulent media. Prejudices against European neighbours and also against our citizens are
increasing: southern Europeans are usually presented as lazy people averse to work and
unwilling to reform, northern Europeans as lacking solidarity. These problems are a huge
challenge to the pillars of the EU. We must take into consideration the fact that populist
rhetoric and the presented programmes are gaining more and more support from the citizens
who are dissatisfied (Grabow and Hartleb 2013, 3-4).
It is hard to open a newspaper nowadays without being confronted by populism and debate
about the rising influence of populist parties. In strictly numerical terms, the influence of
populist Members of the European Parliament is highly likely to increase after the elections
in May 2014, which would be the logical result in terms of the mistrust that surrounds the EU
today (Bertoncini and Kreilinger 2013, 13).
In relation to the European Parliament elections in May 2014, it is reasonable to write a few
words about populist parties in Europe and take a deeper look at their historical backgrounds.
It would be interesting to see the role that the EU plays in the links between voters and
populist parties and their political agendas. In this seminar paper, we are also trying to answer
the question of how the other parties react to the populist party and whether they try to
exclude the party or accept it as a legitimate party that represents a challenge to some extent.
All in all, the most important and interesting part for everyone is the ability of populist parties
to influence decision making.
The seminar paper proceeds as follows. First of all, we must bear in mind that the definitions
of populism vary among authors. This relates to the ambiguity about whether populism is
seen as a type of discourse that can be expressed by any political actor or an ideological
characteristic of an exclusive category of political parties. Accordingly, it is necessary to
adjust the concept in a manner that will be useful for understanding the discussion about
populist parties in Europe. The next step is explaining the differences among populist parties.
Then it will be possible to begin with the core part of the seminar paper where we illustrate
the situation in seven European countries (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
3
Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway). Finally, we offer a comparative view on selected
parties.
2 THE CONCEPT OF POPULISM AND ITS APPLICATION
It is undeniably true that the rise of populism is a clear indicator that democratically elected
representatives are not responsive to the requirements of a certain segment of the citizens. On
the other hand, it is hard to find a clear definition of the term and understand the conditions
under which the concept is used. As Stijn Van Kessel (2014, 101) highlighted, populist
speech can be used to various extents and it is unclear when a political party can be classified
as an instance of “full” populism. Moreover, the author also sees difficulties in the
classification process; he briefly showed that populist discourse can be added and removed
from the repertoire of the political actors. For this reason, the potential group of populist
parties can become rather changeable over time.
Ben Stanley (2008, 102) noticed four core components of populism:
- The existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: “the people” and “the elite”.
- The antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite.
- The idea of popular sovereignty.
- The positive valorisation of “the people” and denigration of “the elite”.
The crucial component of populism as an ideology is to separate society into two
homogeneous and antagonistic groups: “the common people” versus “the corrupt elite”.
Politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. In populist democracy,
nothing is more important than the “general will” of the people (Mudde 2004, 543).
As we mentioned previously, it is unclear to what extent a political actor should use populist
expressions to be classified as an instance of “full” populism. Political parties may use
populist terminology to varying degrees (across time) in their speeches intended for voters or
in their agendas. However, populism can be a current and temporary core characteristic of
political parties and this reality makes it difficult to talk about an exclusive category of
“populist parties” (Van Kessel 2014, 105).
The author (Van Kessel 2014, 111-112) offers a solution to this ambiguity, which is based on
Satori’s idea of the ladder of abstraction.
4
Concepts which are positioned higher on the ladder have fewer properties and are
applicable to more cases. In other words, they have a low intension and a high extension.
Concepts lower on the ladder have a higher intension (i.e. more properties) and a lower
extension (i.e. they are applicable to fewer cases).
If we follow this idea, then we can see in Figure 2.1 that positioned expressions of a
discourse are at the top of the ladder. In this sense, populism is nothing more than a rhetorical
strategy that can be used by any political actor. Populism can also be used as a descriptive
feature of a particular group of parties. Then it is necessary to take a further step down to the
level of “populist parties”. These parties have populism as a lasting defining feature and do
not use populist rhetoric only sporadically or for a short period of time. If we speak about the
populist parties in the European context, it makes sense to take one further step down by
distinguishing various party families (e.g. “neoliberal populism”, “social populism”,
“populist radical right”, etc.). They still have populism as a defining feature and it is still an
important core component of these ideological variations.
Figure 2.1: Ladder of abstraction of populist manifestations
Populist discourse
Populist parties
Party families with a populist component
Source: Van Kessel (2014, 112)
POPULIST PARTIES AND THE LEFT-RIGHT DIVISION
The first thing that needs to be said is that the political science literature has mainly focused
on the success of radical right-wing populist parties, but we must not forget that there has
also been a growth of those that are left-wing. In general, there are many obstacles to
researching and comparing the left-wing populists, but somewhere they play a significant role
in national political arenas. For instance, the Dutch parliament is an ideal case to examine the
parliamentary behaviour of two populist parties that are positioned differently on the political
spectrum.
First of all, let us consider the differences among populist parties. The most important
distinction is the relationship between the elite and the people. Who belongs to the elite or the
people depends on the orientation of the populist party (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 2). While
anti-immigrant stances are a feature of radical right-wing populism, left-wing populists, on
5
the other hand, are concerned with socioeconomic injustice. They often claim that the
interests of the common working population are ignored by the political elite. Moreover, the
left wants to overcome the key inequalities between people by active state involvement,
whereas the right believes the main inequalities between people are natural and outside the
purview of the state. Populist radical right parties are imbued by nativism. The idea of
nativism is that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the
nation”). Non-native elements (persons and ideas) represent a kind of threat and danger. The
nativist dimension includes a combination of nationalism and xenophobia (Mudde 2007, 2226).
Otjes and Louwerse (2013, 3) underlined differences among surveys on populist parties and
emphasized that some of them put left-wing and right-wing populists on opposite sides of the
political spectrum, while they are positioned closely together in other studies. A possible
explanation could be that voter surveys, manifesto analysis and expert surveys all measure
something different. Pre-electoral promises in manifestos are not necessarily the same as
perceptions, and it may be that left-wing and right-wing populists share, to a large degree,
their electoral rhetoric, but act differently in parliamentary procedures and elsewhere.
According to the findings of a study done by Otjes and Louwerse (2013, 16), where they
compared the voting behaviour of two populist parties in the Dutch parliament, the voting
behaviour of the left-wing populist SP and the right-wing populist PVV was more motivated
by the left/right position than their shared populism. It can be said that their populist pillar
vanishes after elections. Only on one core populist component, opposition to supranational
institutions, was similarity in their voting behaviour found. Taggart (2004, 281) noticed that
left-wing Eurosceptics see the EU as an elitist capitalist project not devoted to the efforts of
the common working man, while right-wing Eurosceptics see the EU as a challenge to
national sovereignty.
THE IMPACT OF POPULIST PARTIES
I would like to make a few remarks concerning the impact of populist parties. On the one
hand, both academia and the media warn of the growing influence of populist radical right
parties, but on the other hand, few provide empirical evidence of it. As Mudde (2013, 1)
concluded, the effects are largely limited to the broader immigration issue, and even here
populist radical right parties are rarely initiators. In the current section, I cite analyses and
6
findings from an article written by Cas Mudde, where he challenges statements about the
impacts on the people, parties, policies and polities of Western Europe.
Populist radical right parties might have affected the position and salience of criminal issues
and corruptive elites, Euroscepticism and the immigration issue for some parts of the
population, but they have rarely changed more long-term attitudes. According to the
Eurobarometer, the public attitudes of many Europeans were already in line with the basic
tenets of the populist radical right ideology and parties did not need to change people’s minds
(Mudde 2013, 6-7).
Some academics argue that mainstream parties become more nativist, authoritarian and
populist because of competition for electoral success with populist parties. But Alonso and
Claro da Fonseca (2012) analysed election manifestos and showed that between 1975 and
2005, almost all mainstream parties increased the salience of immigration and became stricter
on the issue. Furthermore, in countries without successful populist radical right parties, the
mainstream right will also adopt a strict policy as regards immigration. In general, most
parties use populist themes in their political discourse, even in countries without any
important populist party (Mudde 2013, 9).
What is quite certain is that we can find similar trends in the sphere of policies. The authors
noted the limited influence of populist radical right parties within governments and also
detected the implementation of legislation on issues like immigration, law and order and
integration in countries without such parties in government. To sum up, it is not surprising
that populist parties have not affected the type of polity in Western Europe, which means that
the populist radical right is not a significant threat to the existing political system (Mudde
2013, 9-10).
It is debatable whether populist parties can influence the aforementioned issues. Here are
some reasons for the limited impact of populist radical right parties. They just endeavour to
bring policy changes on existing issues and not for new ones. It is clear that populist parties
gain relatively modest electoral support in parliamentary elections. Few of them are major
players but they are promising a lot and implement a small amount of issues. Political parties
are not monopolistic players in the process of policy making and populist parties are
relatively new actors with a lack of strong connections in the major policy networks. They
have no experience in parliamentary actions; their periodic nominal control of policy fields is
not enough for real direct influence. And finally, populist parties prefer to keep their
7
oppositional image, by using radical rhetoric, rather than being perceived as a part of “the
corrupt elite” (Mudde 2013, 13-14).
3 POPULIST PARTIES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
In this section, we illustrate the presence of populist parties in the political playground in
seven European countries (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland,
Denmark and Norway). The most important point was balancing the literature; some authors
see populists as a threat to democratic states and others describe them as a challenge to the
existing political structures and systems. Here, the focus is on relevant, actively participating
political parties that are involved in political developments and events in selected countries.
France
This section presents Europe’s most well-known populist party: the National Front (Front
National, FN), which has a long and rich history.
THE FRENCH NATIONAL FRONT
The French National Front was founded on 5th of October 1972 by a small activist group
called the New Order (Ordre Nouveau). It had periods of electoral failure and weak
popularity, but the most recent French local elections of March 2014 are a very important
sign of a successful presence. If we go further back in time, it managed to secure two seats in
the National Assembly in the French parliamentary elections of June 2012, while in April its
president, Marine Le Pen, achieved the party’s best-ever result in a presidential election
(17.9% of the vote) (Grabow and Hartleb 2014, 12-13; Willsher 2014).
As Magali Balent (2013, 161) highlighted, this longevity shows that the FN is not an anomaly
in the French political landscape or even the product of a protest vote in the context of a
major economic crisis. Rather, it is the manifestation of a French political tradition that has
roots in the perception and formulation of nationalism. They extract the political programme
from an “open” nationalism (demanding openness to other countries so as to perpetuate
French influence in the world) and a “closed” nationalism (advocating withdrawal into
oneself as the ultimate condition for national survival). Furthermore, it is no longer a volatile
party; their electoral base is well-defined and stable. It consists primarily of male (despite a
recent increase in female support), low-skilled and largely working-class people.
8
The FN is undeniably part of the far-right family and the most visible political form today is
anti-immigrant xenophobia, as well as a constant rejection of elites. The arrival of Marine Le
Pen as president of the party means a new era best described by the term “dédiabolisation
(detoxification)”, which means the strategy of adopting more measured rhetoric and offering
credible proposals with the aim of presenting the FN as a party fit to govern. FN’s core
themes are more closely linked to the fears relating to globalisation, European integration and
mass immigration related to the Islamisation of Europe. These issues formed the basis of the
FN’s campaign and it is clear that today the party’s concerns are more closely related to
identity and they are now prioritising cultural issues (Balent 2013, 162; Cross 2012).
Presence on the French political scene
The history of the FN shows that the party has become a long-term player on the French
electoral scene. The party experienced repeated setbacks during the 1970s (the FN won
0.76% of the vote in the 1974 presidential election, 0.3% in the parliamentary elections of
1978 and 0.18% in those of 1981); the 1980s were the years of its political rise. This was
confirmed by its breakthrough at the European Parliament elections in June 1984 (where it
won 11% of the valid votes and gained 10 MEPs). The 1990s were a decade of consolidation,
during which the party continued to win around 10–15% of the vote, but it was also a time of
internal divisions with a split in the party in December 1998, due to the departure of the
supporters of Bruno Mégret. Despite this division and weak voters support at the European
Parliament elections in June 1999 (in which it won just 5.86% of the vote), the party
successfully started the new millennium with preserved political credibility by qualifying for
the second round of the 2002 presidential election with 16.8% of the vote. It came fourth in
the 2007 presidential election (10.44%), and five years later, the party achieved its best-ever
result in a presidential election with Marine Le Pen in the first row (17.9% of the vote)
(Balent 2013, 163; Grabow and Hartleb 2014; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000; Ministère de
l'intérieur; Willsher 2014; Veugelers 2000).
In general, the FN always achieved significant results on the national level, but on the other
hand, the number of FN elected representatives has always remained small. The voting
system in which candidates are elected on a majority basis reduced the significance of the
votes gained and it does not work in the FN’s favour. In contrast with the national level
situation, it is better represented in municipal councils (20 councillors elected in 2008),
regional councils (118 councillors since 2010) and the European Parliament (three seats since
2009), which all use proportional representation systems. As for the National Assembly,
9
where one member is elected for each constituency in a two-round contest, the party has only
managed to win seats on three occasions: in 1986 (30 MPs), in 1997 (one MP) and in 2012
(two MPs) (Balent 2013, 163; Grabow and Hartleb 2014; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000;
Ministère de l'intérieur; Willsher 2014; Veugelers 2000).
Maybe it is the right time to say some more words about the results achieved by the FN in the
local elections, which were held in the second half of March 2014. In many points, they were
different than previous ones. France experienced its lowest turnout in 50 years. Marine Le
Pen’s populist National Front added ten others to Hénin-Beaumont municipality in a secondround vote from a first-round vote. Although the complete result gave the National Front only
7% of the votes on a national level, it was a historic result for a party. They also secured over
1,200 municipal-council seats. It was a great opportunity to prepare National Front officials
for future electoral contests. In this condition, the FN could reach a significant result in the
European Parliament elections in May (The Economist 2014a, 31st of March; RFI 2014, 30th
of March).
Programme and strategic changes in message over time, voter profile
France’s national rebirth and the survival of French identity are the ultimate purposes of FN’s
political programme. National survival is the cornerstone of the FN’s programme. In the
1970s and 1980s, the FN believed that the national identity was threatened by international
Communism because of the negation of Western civilisation and European liberties. Ten
years later, immigration and identity themes became more important in the context of
multiculturalism. The European Union, the US and French leaders were seen as driving
forces of globalisation processes. Many enemies were identified, both within the national
borders—immigrants, the Jews, political elites, the media—and beyond—international
Communism during the Cold War, the US and globalisation since 1990, the European Union,
and Islam (Balent 2013, 164-165; Grabow and Hartleb 2014; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000;
Veugelers 2000).
Due to such a view of the situation, the FN’s political programme is based on three areas.
First, the FN wants to restore France’s economic and social fortunes by imposing
protectionist measures to combat unfair competition and relocations. Second, the FN
programme promotes the restoration of the authority of the state and the state apparatus that
forms the basis for its sovereignty. They see the state as the authority that can adopt the
legislation on immigration in order to reverse the flows of immigrants. Third, the country’s
10
future is ensured by promoting a pro-birth policy. The FN’s vision of the future also involves
placing more emphasis on national historical and geographical heritage through selective
courses, and preserving national integrity with overseas territories (Balent 2013, 165-166;
Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000; Veugelers 2000).
There have been significant changes in the message. The previously mentioned identified
enemies were the platform for the FN’s rhetoric and programme. In the early 1990s, the party
replaced its ultra-liberal economic principles (they opposed the Socialist-Communist
coalition) with support for state interventionism. Disappointment among the working classes
by the left and their worry about globalisation appeared as a great opportunity for the FN. It
appealed more to that group and the FN became the defender of social rights and of public
authority dedicated to the French people. In the context of the economic crisis, the party gave
the most important role to the state to protect domestic producers and workers. The FN linked
the EU to a non-democratic structure that undermines identity-based values and forces
cosmopolitanism. Marine Le Pen decided to keep step with current issues and highlighted
Islam as a rival culture on French territory. However, the FN is striving to form a credible
alternative to government by toning down its rhetoric. Some surveys and authors claim that a
vote for the FN is no longer a protest vote. People who voted for the FN agreed with the ideas
advocated by the party. The FN gains votes by people who are concerned about identity
threats such as Islam. Marine Le Pen adjusted the rhetoric to match the needs and concerns of
voters who are struggling with globalisation and tough competition (Balent 2013, 166-169;
Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000; Veugelers 2000). A large variance exists in FN support
between regions, which is explained partly by the number of immigrants present, but only
indirectly by the unemployment level (Lubbers and Scheepers 2002).
The impact of the FN on French political life and the reaction of the parties
The FN became an electoral force from the 1980s. The emergence of a new national and
international context legitimised the party’s core issues. The FN gradually became the third
largest political force in France at the expense of the traditional political groupings. The FN
successes of the 1980s are connected with an overly moderate response by the traditional
right to the ruling left on security and immigration issues. In the 1990s, the FN started to
recruit from the working class. These people were disappointed by the left. In recent
elections, the FN achieved some significant increases in its electorate and more than ever
before, the FN has become a cross-class party that has won support from all social and
political backgrounds (Balent 2013, 176-178; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000).
11
Today, the extremist nature of the FN has vanished. A huge part of the French population
agree with the opinion that there are too many immigrants in France. In the 1980s, the
traditional right concluded local pacts with the FN to prevent a Social-Communist win, but
the next decade in the 1990s was not in the same “colours”. Right-wing parties implemented
a “strategy of isolation” and tried to prevent the spread of the FN’s ideology (Balent 2013,
178-179). Parties are reluctant to accept the FN as a relevant member of the French political
arena, as is also seen in the latest calls of some politicians within the frame of the 2014 local
elections (Willsher 2014; Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000).
Netherlands
I would like to make a few remarks concerning the historical administrative and political
regulation and organization of society in the Netherlands. Lucardie and Voerman (2013, 187188) began their chapter with the pillarization of the Dutch society and state organization,
which was perhaps the most important element preventing the rise of populist movements
until the last decade of the twentieth century. Pillarization means segregation of society,
which is divided and organized along ideological and religious lines. For instance, Catholics
attend Catholic schools, read Catholic newspapers, join Catholic trade unions, listen to
Catholic radio and watch Catholic television, and most importantly, they vote for the Catholic
party, while Calvinists and Social democrats do the same. So the concept of a homogenous
people or nation cannot be applied to any populist movements and we know that a
homogenous nation is a defining characteristic of populist movements. Towards the end of
the twentieth century, the ties between the pillarized organizations weakened and the political
sphere as well as the Dutch society became more homogeneous, which can be seen as a
potential for populist movements. In the 1990s, the potential was realised with the
establishment of some parties. In 1994, the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP), which
belongs to the left-wing populist group, entered parliament with two seats. It will be
presented in the next pages after Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (Partij Voor de
Vrijheid, PVV), which was founded in 2005.
GEERT WILDERS AND THE PARTY FOR FREEDOM IN THE NETHERLANDS
Geert Wilders, a parliamentarian for the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy
(Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) since 1998, was arguing that Dutch parties
do not succeed in limiting immigration and promoting integration. On 2nd of September 2004,
Wilders left the VVD after a few disagreements, and in the next few months, he became an
12
important actor in the campaign against the European Constitutional Treaty, which was
rejected by the Dutch population in a referendum. Having gained political momentum in the
summer of 2005, Wilders founded his own party, the Party for Freedom (De Lange and Art
2011, 1235).
The party participated in the 2006 elections and entered parliament with nine seats gained by
5.9% of the vote. The 2009 elections for the European Parliament demonstrated that the
electoral potential of the party was substantial. It gained 17.0% of the votes and obtained four
seats in the European Parliament. In the local elections held in Almere and Den Haag in
2010, PVV got 21.6% and 16.8%, respectively. The electoral growth of the party slowed in
the 2010 national elections, when it won 15.5% of the vote and 24 seats in parliament. The
PVV became one of the most important actors in a coalition formation process (De Lange
and Art 2011, 1235). Wilders’ party concluded a parliamentary support agreement with the
VVD and the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl, CDA), but the
economic crisis complicated this cooperation because of the refusal of cutbacks in welfare,
pensions or healthcare. They also refused to support diktats of Brussels. In the provincial
elections, they lost some support and gained 12% of the vote, and also in the 2012 general
elections, the share of the vote declined to 10% (Lucardie and Voerman 2013, 190).
Figure 3.2: Share of seats in the Dutch House of Representatives occupied by the PVV and
the SP
share of seats*
0%
PVV-12 seats
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
share of seats*
8%
SP-15 seats
10%
Other parliamentary
parties-44 seats**
29,30%
Government (VVD and
PvdA)-79 seats
52,70%
*Total number of seats: 150.
**Christian Democratic Appeal, Democrats 66, Christian Union, Green Left, Reformed Political Party, Party for
the Animals, 50PLUS, Van Vliet
Source: The Dutch House of Representatives
The last Dutch local elections were held on 19th of March this year. The PVV led by Geert
Wilders only put up candidates in two municipalities (as was done some years before):
13
Almere and The Hague. The party finished second in The Hague with seven seats out of a
total of 45 seats in the municipal council. In Almere is the biggest party altogether with PvdA
with eight seats out of a total of 39 (Municipality of Almere 2014; Kroet 2014). Those two
cities together have approximately 700,000 inhabitants, which is around 4% of the entire
Dutch population. In a post-election speech in The Hague, Mr Wilders asked the crowd: “In
this city and in the Netherlands, do you want more or fewer Moroccans?”, and the crowd
roared back: “Fewer! Fewer! Fewer!” After this, he finished with: “Then we’ll arrange that.”
We can notice his anti-immigrant rhetoric on these occasions (Statistics Netherlands 2014;
The Economist 2014b, 20th of March).
Electorate and supporters
According to Lucardie and Voerman (2013, 190-191), the electorate of the PVV was
basically concentrated in peripheral areas in the south-west, south-east and north-east of the
Netherlands and in the commuter towns around Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The supporters
were predominantly secular, as data suggests that three-quarters of the voters in 2006 did not
belong to any religious group. They were predominantly from urban and suburban areas and
consisted of young and male parts of the population, while the income and educational levels
were a little below average. In 2010, the electorate had expanded, mainly at the expense of
the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) and the SP. In 2010, PVV supporters were the
least satisfied with government policy over the previous three years. They had less
confidence in political parties, the parliament and the government. They felt that immigrants
needed to integrate, that the number of refugees should be minimised especially those from
Islamic countries. They also believed that European unification had gone too far and they
were not supporting the idea of Turkish membership in the European Union.
Programme and mobilisation strategies
In the first election platform of the PVV, we can identify the importance of economic
liberalism issues such as tax reduction, and on the other side, conservative issues, which were
related to crime and security issues. The party wanted to reduce government subsidies and
decrease expenses of the civil service. The party exhibited authoritarian attitudes. Controlling
crime and security was planned in the direction of hiring more police officers, nurses and
teachers. It favoured liberalisation in the environmental sector, but not with respect to
immigration policies. The PVV also supported moral issues like gay rights or euthanasia,
which was perceived as liberal behaviour of the party. After 2006, the liberal elements in the
ideology of the PVV receded into the background. The party remained conservative in its
14
position on crime and punishment, but it changed its position in the socioeconomic zone. The
party became strong supporters of the welfare state and a social Netherlands, without
reduction of pensions or social security, without rent increases and without cutbacks in
healthcare (Lucardie and Voerman 2013, 192; Vossen 2011).
Even if the previously mentioned policies gained importance for the PVV, its core effort
became Islam, mass immigration and European integration as factors fostering
multiculturalist processes and migration. According to Wilders, the combination of these
three factors is the main threat to the independence of the Netherlands. The PVV is strongly
nativist. Wilders’ ideologue Martin Bosma argued that Islam is not a religion but a political
ideology that can capture power over the majority because of its fanatical nature. He created a
plan that should be implemented in the fight against Islamisation. The actions of this plan
include: closure of Islamic schools, no more mosques should be built and immigration from
Islamic countries should be prevented, also immigration from non-Islamic countries should
not be encouraged. Immigrants would not be entitled to social security for the first 10 years
of their stay. Dutch language and culture should get more attention in school programmes. In
2012, the party even required an exit from the EU and return to the old national currency
guilder instead of the common currency euro. With its radical anti-European views, the PVV
became more and more isolated in the Dutch party system (Lucardie and Voerman 2013,
193-199; Vossen 2011). The party’s populism became apparent from its 2010 election
manifesto in which it is argued that the elites have lost touch with reality and have done
things that by no means have improved the situation of ordinary people (Rooduijn 2014, 83).
Membership and intra-party dynamics
Wilders learned several lessons from the collapse of the Pim Fortuyn List. The PVV did not
recruit any members because Wilders stated that he knew what could go wrong when you
open up the party to members too quickly. He is scared of infiltration by troublemakers and
financially influential people, who can be disloyal and are potentially able to make changes in
the ideological pillars. Therefore, the PVV does not have any members. Wilders has been
building the PVV slowly and methodically. This antipathy towards political parties seems to
be characteristic of all populists, but few of them go so far as to reject any form of
membership. In financial aspects, the party faced some problems as they cannot receive any
money from membership. The party organization was also weakened by internal secessions
and dissidence (De Lange and Art 2011, 1237; Lucardie and Voerman 2013, 195-200).
15
THE SOCIALIST PARTY – THE DUTCH LEFT-WING POPULIST GROUP
The Socialist Party was formed in 1971 and in the beginning followed a Maoist strategy in
the sense of gathering information. Party members were integrated into the masses to find
what the people wanted. In five consecutive parliamentary elections, they did not succeed in
entering parliament. Gradually, the party abandoned its Maoist strategy and Marxist ideology,
while retaining its populist appeal to the people and its critique of the political elite in the
Netherlands (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 7).
Strategies and development of the party
As we said previously, the SP was formed in 1971 out of a Maoist splinter group of the
Communist Party of the Netherlands, and through transformation processes, it became the
third largest party in the Netherlands in 2006 with over 50,000 members and 25 MPs. Dan
Keith (2013, 2-3) highlighted three main stages in this significant transformation. First, at the
time of the collapse of Communism in Europe, the SP’s leaders abandoned their Maoist
strategy and Marxist ideology in an effort to attract new voters and members. Their strategy
was to establish workers’ councils, implement economic planning and create an oppositional
image of the party. Their activist members were constantly in contact with ordinary people
and elected officials paid a large proportion of their wages to the party, so that they lived on a
normal wage. Those acts can be seen as distancing themselves from the elite way of life.
In 1994, the Socialist Party entered parliament with two seats with the populist slogan “Vote
Against, Vote SP”. It was a sort of protest party at that time. After gaining its first seats in
parliament, a second stage began. The social democratic PvdA broke tradition by pursuing
allegedly neo-liberal policies and SP found an opportunity to modify its agenda. The Socialist
Party made some significant anti-elite statements during the election campaigns and also in
the manifestos. They started to emphasise the principles of human dignity, equality and
solidarity. During the late 1990s, the SP increasingly focused on criticising neo-liberalism,
welfare cuts and privatisations as well as technocratic European decision making. The SP
constantly warns against becoming a powerless province within the undemocratic European
Union. This strategy brought many PvdA and GreenLeft (GroenLinks) supporters to the SP.
The 1998 elections yielded five parliamentary seats. The same year brought the first
participation in ruling groups on local councils, and in 1999 came the first seat in the
European Parliament, completing the party’s representation at all levels (Keith 2013, 2-3;
Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 7-8; SP international).
16
In the general elections of 2002, the SP won nine seats, under its new, positive slogan of
“Vote for, Vote SP”. In 2004, two seats were won in the European Parliament, and a year
later the party took the lead in the campaign against the neoliberal European Constitution.
The SP increased its vote share considerably up to 2006, when it became the third party in
parliament (almost 17% of the seats). In the provincial elections of 2007, the SP gained 54
more provincial legislators than in the provincial elections of 2003, and made it to a total of
83 provincial legislators. In the 2012 Dutch election, the SP took only 15 seats (see Figure
3.2). The latest local election in March 2014 showed the rise of the SP’s power. In 2010, the
SP won 226 seats, this time they came close to doubling that, to 443 seats (NOS 2014; SP
international).
Programme and cooperation with other groups
First of all, we must bear in mind that the leading goals of the party are human dignity,
equality and solidarity. As we can understand, their programmes and actions were also
created according to these goals. A quick overview of their official webpage gave us a clear
picture of how they want to achieve their goals. The party strives to limit the influence of all
international actors, especially the EU’s impact on the domestic market and regulation. They
are convinced that the drive for European unification, as it is currently defined, is above all
inspired by the major multinationals and will have negative consequences for the general
population. Among other activities, it is possible to notice some broader issues such as
healthcare for everyone and also struggling for public ownership. The SP wants to offer the
opportunity for both young and elder people to join them in common actions and political
activities. They cooperate across borders on issues such as war and peace, globalisation and
the unfair division of wealth in the world (SP international).
Keith and McGowan (2013, 7-14) also said that the party has sought to campaign on issues
that deliver more votes. They wanted to ensure that migrant workers are equally treated in the
labour market. This was one of the acts in the vote seeking policies and an attempt to focus
on themes that will bring more support. The SP is in favour of more migration so long as it
does not destabilise the Dutch labour market. However, the immigration issue was not
significant in some of the latest campaigns as it was not seen as a vote winner. All in all, the
SP plays a game of combinations including some restrictions on immigration as well as
policies to combat discrimination against migrants. The SP has links to migrant groups and
prefers to deal with them on class terms. They are an important source in socioeconomic
welfare policies but also hold an important share of the migrant vote.
17
Since its foundation, the Socialist Party has always been in opposition. The SP expresses the
most left-wing views on many issues. Between 1994 and 2002, the PvdA had a strategy to
isolate the SP. Usually, this involved voting against the SP’s proposals. After the disastrous
election result in 2002, the PvdA started to cooperate with the SP and their relationship has
improved significantly since the elections of 2006 when the PvdA joined the government,
whereas the SP did not (Government of the Netherlands; Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 9; The
Dutch House of Representatives; Wroth 2012).
Voters and members’ profile
In the article written by Keith and McGowan (2013, 8), they report some similarities in the
socioeconomic backgrounds of support for the SP and the PVV. The main supporters are
lower educated and from lower income groups—working and lower middle classes.
However, in the “value scale”, there is little overlap between their voters. Their supporters
constitute two different groups of voters, which are quite steadfast in the sense of switching
between the two ends of the political spectrum.
According to the results of an extensive survey carried out amongst SP members at the end of
2005, the SP members are concerned about global inequality and social rights. The average
level of education of SP members is above the average for the broader Dutch population. The
number of students is rising, while almost half of the members are employed and receive
salaries. Members are very willing to help in civic projects and give their free time to support
the party’s goals (SP international).
Norway
In the next few paragraphs, we will learn some more facts about Norway’s Progress Party
(Fremskrittspartiet, FrP).
THE PROGRESS PARTY
Norway’s Progress Party is an interesting case and many authors describe it as a doubtful or
mild case of a right-wing populist party. However, according to Anders Ravik Jupskås (2013,
205-206) and his perception of the right-wing populist family, we can say that FrP fits the
definition of right-wing populism. The party is by far the most anti-immigrant party in
Norway, and in 2009 about 56% of the FrP’s delegates agreed that immigration represents a
serious threat to national identity. If we turn our focus towards the authoritarian component
of right-wing populism, then the leading role of the FrP is clearly visible with 44% of the
18
parliamentary candidates supporting a prohibition of gay marriages by law. Moreover, 78%
in the FrP agreed that people who break the law should be punished more. The party also
takes a leading role on issues such as disagreement with Norwegian democracy as well as
expressing populist terminology, for instance “FrP: the party for ordinary people”. These acts
and information convince us that the FrP belongs to the right-wing populists.
Electoral history and key figures
Probably, we are not wrong if we say that the history of the FrP is the history of ideological
conflicts, multiple electoral booms and organizational consolidation. Just a few months after
its foundation by Anders Lange, the FrP made its electoral breakthrough in 1973 and gained
four seats in parliament. The party offered a major reduction in taxes as the only alternative
programme against high taxation policies, which were on the political menu at that time (The
Progress Party). This success was followed by a period of internal turbulence, the death of
Lange and less than 2% of the votes after the 1977 election. After that period, Carl I. Hagen
gained power within the FrP and became the chairman in 1978. He held this position until
2006. Under his leadership, the brighter days started. The real breakthrough came in the
municipal and parliamentary elections in 1987, when the FrP gained 10.4% of the vote in the
municipal and 12.3% in the country election. In that year, immigration also featured in the
political debate (Jupskås 2013, 207-208; Widfeldt 2000, 488-489).
In the early 1990s, the FrP once again faced internal tensions with an ideological prefix. This
was probably the main cause for the unclear message about Norwegian membership in the
EU. Many voters were confused by the party’s unclear stance on this issue, and this
ambiguity greatly contributed to the setback in 1993. The crisis resulted in the secession of
the liberal fraction. Gradually, the EU question vanished from the agenda and the FrP focused
its message towards defending the welfare state and promoting a stricter immigration policy.
In the 1997 campaign, their effort in the areas of criminality, immigration and care for the
elderly were apparent. They became the second largest party for the first time and also
repeated this achievement in 2005 and 2009. As we mentioned previously, Hagen stepped
down in 2006 and Siv Jensen became the party leader. She is less confrontational and enjoys
a better relationship with the other non-socialist parties. The party had its best electoral result
but suffered in the 2011 local election after internal scandals and the attack by the right-wing
extremist Breivik, who left the party’s youth branch in 2007 (Jupskås 2013, 208; The
Progress Party; Widfeldt 2000, 488-489). Nowadays, the Progress Party is in the minority
19
government with the Conservative Party and holds 29 out of the 169 parliamentary seats (see
Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Share of seats in the Parliament of Norway occupied by the Progress Party
share of seats*
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
share of seats*
Progress Party
(government)-29 seats
17,20%
Conservative Party
(government)-48 seats
28,40%
Other parliamentary
parties-92 seats**
54,40%
*Total number of seats: 169.
**Labour Party, Christian Democratic Party, Centre Party, Liberal Party, Socialist Left Party, Green Party
Source: Stortinget 2013
Voter characteristics
According to Jupskås’ (2013, 210-212) extracts from some recent analysis, the party’s
electorate in a few recent national elections shows that the FrP is over-represented in the
working class and among white-collar (office) workers in the private sector. Moreover, in
2009 the party was the most popular among unemployed people, and 49% of them voted for
the FrP. If we focus on the gender composition, then it is clear that men represent around
two-thirds of the party’s supporters. The type of area where voters originate coincides with
the overall demographic distribution in Norway, according to this, two-thirds come from
cities and the rest of them are from more rural areas. Jupskås (2013, 228) also said that only
47% of the FrP’s voters in 1997 voted for the party four years later, but the share of loyal
voters has increased in recent elections.
Cooperation with other parties
The FrP has not been exposed to the strong strategy of total boycott from all other parties.
The FrP was invited as a supportive actor in several state budgets, and since the 2013
elections, all of the opposition parties accept the party’s important role in the governmental
coalition. The FrP’s history as an anti-tax movement without fanatic nationalism and its
important nominal share of parliamentary seats make it difficult to exclude the party in
parliamentary discussions and negotiations. If we move on to some specific examples, then it
20
is obvious that FrP was also facing disapprovals about its immigrant policy and sometimes
illogical economic views and plans, for instance fewer taxes and more welfare. The party has
always collaborated with the Conservative Party on local levels, but in recent years it has also
cooperated with left-wing parties in municipalities (Jupskås 2013, 212-213).
In the article, Jupskås (2013, 229-231) also discussed the party’s options as a potential
governmental partner. The calculations showed that the FrP is gradually becoming less
disliked, both among party members and among voters. In 1985, 2001 and 2009, all parties
were asked about their preferences for other parties. From this, it was clear that two left-wing
parties are almost at the same level now as in 1985, but scepticism is eroding in all other
parties. The same pattern of increased acceptance within other parties is also visible among
voters. The party’s plans became more realistic, and thus, it is acceptable for more voters.
Moreover, the party has gained an important portion of voters from other parties. We cannot
conclude this section without mentioning the party’s membership in the government as the
third largest party in the parliament. This can be seen as a consolidation of the party’s role in
the political sphere of Norway.
Programmes, topics and strategies
Immigration and law-and-order issues are the primary focus of the party. The policies of the
Norwegian Progress Party are based on representation of the ordinary man against the
establishment. The party’s efforts are focused on increasing expenditures for the police to
provide more safety to common people. The FrP wants to make it more difficult to appeal
against a judgement and to reduce the waiting time in the court system. Concerning the
European issue, the FrP was in favour of accepting the European Economic Area treaty
between the EU and the EFTA countries but rejecting EU membership. In the 1994
referendum on EU accession, the party shifted towards a positive stance on the EU
membership issue. There is a huge difference compared with other populist parties, but the
party accepted the negative outcome of the referendum, where EU membership was rejected.
The FrP prefers the EU as an economical association, but it is divided about the question of
EU membership and has decided to leave the decision to the people in a national referendum
(Jupskås 2013, 216-218).
The FrP criticises the tax burden and wants to reduce the size of the public sector. It is
economically more liberal than other populist right-wing parties, but it has made leftist turns
in the socioeconomic dimension over the past few years. The FrP has also undertaken a
21
significant centrist move in the economic dimension through more demands for public
spending on welfare, but it still stands behind less state intervention, more privatization and
lower taxes. According to the party’s belief, public investments should be financed by the
Norwegian State Oil fund and not by increased taxation (Jungar and Jupskås 2014, 7-12).
The FrP’s first years were not so much dedicated to the questions linked with immigration
problems. Today, it is unimaginable to avoid xenophobia and anti-immigration as its key
elements. The FrP is more focused on cultural differences and the incompatibility of ethnic
groups. The policy programme suggests sending all refugees back to their home countries as
soon as possible, and limiting the number of resident permits to 1,000 annually (Widfeldt
2000, 491). They advocate that the responsibility is on immigrants to adapt to the host
society’s cultural and legal frameworks. In accordance with this view, the FrP opposes the
provision of mother-tongue education and subsidies for ethnic organizations (Akkerman and
Hagelund 2007, 201-204). Throughout the party’s history, negative attitudes towards
Muslims have been constantly present and they are not the only minority that is demonised
by the FrP. The party has also targeted the Sami people in Norway (Jupskås 2013, 215-216).
Denmark
Here you will be able to find information about the successful right-wing Danish People’s
Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF).
THE RIGHT-WING POPULIST DANISH PEOPLE’S PARTY
The foundation of the right-wing populist party in Denmark is placed in the early 1970s when
the founder of the Progress Party, Mogens Glistrup, mobilized primarily against bureaucracy
and a tax burden, but it was not ethno-nationalist in the beginning. In Denmark, the Progress
Party emerged in the election of 1973 with almost 16% of the vote. Rydgren (2010, 58)
argues that Denmark did not get a pure radical right-wing populist party until the foundation
of the Danish People’s Party in 1995. It was founded after the ideological conflict when Pia
Kjærsgaard left the Progress Party, which disappeared completely from the political
landscape in the years that followed.
In their first election, in 1998, the party received 7.4% of the vote, and in 2001 the share of
the votes increased to 12%, when the party became the third largest player. This success was
achieved with the strategy of distancing itself from the anarchist elements and positioning
itself as a credible political alternative. In the parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2007, the
22
DF even increased its share of the vote at around 13%, winning 24 seats in 2005 and 25 seats
in 2007. In the period from 2001 until 2011, the DF played a supporting role to the minority
Conservative-Liberal coalition. This proved to be a very clever idea, which gave the party a
special position to assert its will and ideas. The party has proved longevity within the Danish
party system with repeated success in the 2011 elections, when it won 12.3% and 22
parliamentary seats (see Figure 3.4) (Klein 2013, 108).
Figure 3.4: Share of seats in the Parliament of Denmark occupied by the DF
share of seats*
0%
20%
DF-22 seats
40%
60%
80%
100%
share of seats*
12,30%
Other parliamentary
parties-93 seats**
51,90%
Government-64 seats***
35,80%
*Total number of seats: 179.
**Liberal Party, Socialist People’s Party, Unity List – the Red-Green Alliance, Liberal Alliance, Conservative
Party, Inuit Ataqatigiit, Siumut, Sambandsflokkurin, Javnaðarflokkurin, Uffe Elbæk
***Social Democratic Party, Social Liberal Party
Source: Folketinget 2011
Electorate
Klein (2013, 109) claims that according to recent analyses, the DF’s obtaining of the voters
over the past 10 years has mostly been at the expense of the Social Democrats. In the 2001,
2005 and 2007 elections, the share of the DF vote from the working-class milieu increased.
Rydgren (2010, 60-61) mentioned, for instance, that the proportion of workers among the
Danish People’s Party’s voters was 56% in 2001. Since the 2001 election, there has been a
growth in support in all age groups, but support for the party is particularly prevalent among
male workers. As Denmark became wealthier and socioeconomic issues lost the significance
as society’s preference leader, new issues such as immigration, preservation of culture and
also questions of European integration took a more central position in political and social
debates. Fertile grounds for the DF’s policies have been opened and according to these
frames, social problems should largely be interpreted in ethnic terms.
23
Anti-immigration and anti-EU rhetoric, demands for the welfare state
According to the party, Denmark and Danish culture is threatened by immigration and
supranational entities like the EU. Immigration in Denmark has been politicized since the
mid-1980s and was canalized by the Progress Party and some other actors. At this time,
Denmark faced a dramatic increase in asylum-seekers, which made it easier to shift towards
an ethnic interpretation of social problems. The press and state television presented
immigration to the audience as a problem, and in the 1990s, it became the dominant topic in
newspapers, political discourses and public debates. A key role in this process has been
played by the Danish People’s Party as well as by the Danish Association, a far-right circle of
intellectuals. We should bear in mind that some of the established parties joined the
discourse, and thus, recognized the legitimacy of the party and its issues. Moreover,
information from 2001 shows that almost 20% of voters mentioned immigration as the most
important problem for politicians to address (Rydgren 2010, 63-65).
In the first elections in 1995, the party campaigned for stricter legislation on asylum and
immigration. The party also had plans to combat forced marriages and introduce more
selective processes for family reunification for immigrants and a quicker deportation for
foreigners with criminal backgrounds. The party presents itself as defenders of the welfare
state, but their effort for more social help vanishes when the debate turns to benefits for
immigrants and refugees (Klein 2013, 110-111).
The DF’s political programme also encompasses Danish independence and freedom. The
primary objectives of Danish foreign policy and the Danish People’s Party have been able to
benefit from an EU-sceptical niche. They support friendly and dynamic cooperation with all
democratic countries, but they will not allow Denmark to surrender its sovereignty. As a
consequence, the Danish People’s Party opposes the European Union. They warned of
uncontrolled immigration from Eastern Europe (Skidmore-Hess 2003; Danish People’s Party
2002).
In terms of economic and social policies, it has adopted a more leftist protectionist stance.
We were able to see a clear evolution from a tax-protest party to a welfare party, which
decreased demands for lower taxes and replaced them with the expansion of the welfare state.
The DF demanded that expenditure on education, health and care services especially for the
elderly population should be increased (Klein 2013, 112).
24
Legitimacy and dealing with the Danish People's Party
As mentioned previously, there was no formation of “cordon sanitaire” around the DF; the
political environment has put practically no constraints on the Danish People’s Party. The
movement was tolerated at a very early stage of its existence by the centre-right. Such a
situation was also possible due to the low 2%-threshold to get into the Danish parliament,
which is probably the main reason for its fragmentation and the necessity of forming multiparty coalitions. We could see that the DF supported the Conservative-Liberal coalition
minority government. It was obvious that the supportive role was an advantage in the sense
that the DF enjoyed more freedom. For example, it was able to distance itself from the proEuropean government. There were also many points when approval of the DF’s efforts for a
stricter immigration policy was seen. For instance, in 1997, the Social Democrats Prime
Minister replaced his Interior Minister, who opposed stricter immigration. The Social
Democrats also faced a loss of working-class supporters, which has led to a change in its
rhetoric towards DF’s communication patterns in the hope of regaining its lost share. The
effect was increased legitimacy not only for the party per se, but also for this kind of political
rhetoric (Klein 2013, 113-115; Rydgren 2007, 496).
Sweden
The Swedish case of populism is slightly different from others. There were potentially fertile
grounds in the sense of immigrants, but still, it was very hard to make a breakthrough. This
was due to the mainstream parties’ strong rejection of cooperating with right-wing populists
and some other reasons. In the following lines, we present the right-wing populist Sweden
Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) and its breakthrough into the Riksdag (Swedish
parliament) in September 2010.
THE RISE OF THE SWEDEN DEMOCRATS
The Sweden Democrats is the largest anti-immigrant party in Sweden. The SD arose in 1988
as a continuation of the Sweden Party, which in turn was founded in 1986 from the merging
of the Progress Party and the nationalistic and xenophobic organization Keep Sweden
Swedish. Some of the members also have roots in the neo-Nazi Nordic National Party.
However, in the 1990s, the party succeeded in distancing itself from the far-right neo-Nazi
connections (Rydgren 2002, 34).
25
Fertile grounds but still very hard to make a breakthrough
Immigration has always been a pressing issue in Sweden. Today, around 11% of the Swedish
population consists of people born abroad. The perceived importance of the immigration
issue increased in 1993, when 25% of the voters perceived immigration as one of the three
most urgent issues facing the country, and then it receded into the background for a decade.
After an election in 2002, immigration and citizenship again became one of the most
important political topics (Rydgren 2002, 37-39; Rydgren 2010, 65-67).
Some authors claimed that referendum circumstances can contribute to the emergence of
populist parties. However, if we look carefully at the Swedish EU referendum in 1994, it did
not create favourable conditions for the emergence of a populist party. We can find reasons in
the fact that the Swedish political environment had already established mainstream parties,
which were representing negative feelings towards the EU, and thus, they were able to
capture most of the voters with negative attitudes. Some other reasons can be found in the
relatively silent campaign and the topic’s lack of popularity for the media at that time, for
instance there were practically no major TV debates. Moreover, political debates somehow
avoided the immigrant issue in connection with the EU and made just a few linkages
regarding environmental and nuclear topics, which were included in political programmes by
some other parties (Rydgren 2002, 39-41; Rydgren 2010, 65-67). Despite the high proportion
of the immigrant population as well as opponents to EU membership, and thus fertile grounds
for anti-immigrant policies, it was still very hard to make a breakthrough because of some
other reasons, as presented in the next few lines.
As we mentioned previously, all radical right-wing populist parties had been relatively
marginalized for a long time. They were boycotted by the mainstream parties, which refused
any kind of cooperation. Sweden is known for its strong class voting, especially among the
working classes, which are traditional supporters of the Social Democrats or the Left Party.
This and the fact that union membership in Sweden is higher than in any other EU country
suggest that there is still a relatively strong sense of class affinity in Sweden. Such conditions
are not in favour of populist parties, and thus, it is very hard to convince people to give their
vote to the other party. The economic crisis during the 1990s increased the relative
importance of political economy and welfare state issues in Sweden rather than those of a
socio-cultural nature, such as immigration and law and order. The proportion of voters who
claimed to be “very or fairly pleased with democracy in Sweden” increased to 81% in 2006.
This suggests that in recent years the possibility for the mobilization of dissatisfied voters has
26
been minimized (Rydgren 2002, 35-46; Rydgren 2010, 61-63). The SD also faced difficulties
when it tried to buy advertising space in the media. Some companies refused to cooperate
with the party, which was criticised by free speech organizations (BHHRG 2002).
Elections and supporters
Some significant changes in the party contributed in the repeated boosting of support through
elections. For instance, they tripled their national electoral support in the 2002 elections and
doubled it again in the 2006 elections, and finally entered parliament in 2010 when they
exceeded 4% of the electoral threshold with support from 5.7% of voters. They won 20 seats
out of a total of 349 parliamentary seats (see Figure 3.5). A similar story can be seen at the
local level, where they have rapidly increased their support. After the 2006 local elections,
they were represented in almost half of the municipalities (in 140 of 290 municipalities) and
in 2010 they gained representation in 245 municipalities (Dahlström and Esaiasson 2013,
348; Klein 116-118).
Figure 3.5: Share of seats in the Parliament of Sweden occupied by the SD
share of seats*
0%
20%
SD-20 seats
40%
60%
80%
100%
share of seats*
5,70%
Other parliamentary
parties-156 seats**
44,70%
Government-173 seats***
49,60%
*Total number of seats: 349.
**Social Democratic Party, Green Party, Left Party
***Moderate Party, Liberal Party, Centre Party, Christian Democrats
Source: Sveriges Riksdag 2010
In Klein’s (2013, 119) paper, where he used results from two surveys made by the state
broadcaster Sveriges Television and by Rydgren and Ruth, it was highlighted that the
majority of SD voters are young, aged between 18 and 30, with a significant number of those
who are first-time voters aged 18 to 21. The party’s supporters are mainly men from the
working class or currently unemployed and its support among students, women and civil
servants is below average. In other words, the SD enjoys support among marginalised groups
with a lack of education and lower income. Besides unemployment, other important reasons
27
for support in some areas include a higher proportion of immigrants and higher crime rates.
In the southern parts of Sweden, which have quite large communities of immigrants, the SD
gained above-average support.
Ideology and programme
The SD presents itself as a social conservative party with a nationalist ideology. Jungar and
Jupskås (2014, 8-10) describe populist parties by positioning them on a two-dimensional
frame. It consists of the socioeconomic left-right dimension (which includes party positions
on state-market relations, welfare, social justice and free enterprise) and the liberalauthoritarian dimension (issues related to democratic rights (minorities), morality (religion),
authoritarianism (law-and-order) and post-materialism (cosmopolitanism, anti-growth)). They
highlighted that the SD has always held centrist or centre-left positions in the socioeconomic
dimension. Moreover, the party combined that position with an authoritarian approach, which
is not surprising if we remember that the party has roots in right-wing extremism.
Immigration and law-and-order issues are the primary focus of the party. The SD supports
moderate state regulation of the market and tax-based redistributive welfare states. They
claim that the proper people should be prioritized.
Klein (2013, 120-122) concluded that the SD has definitely benefited in recent years from the
economic, financial and euro crisis. The population was confronted with fears about
unemployment and excessive immigration. The SD rejects any external entity such as the EU.
The party is a defender of Swedish national identity and the national state as well as the
protection of society through strengthening the rule of law. They see immigration processes
as a serious threat to the once homogenous Swedish nation. The SD advocates a limitation of
immigration and also the repatriation or assimilation of immigrants. It is noticeable that the
party exclusively focused on Muslim immigrants, but in recent years, it has also positioned
itself on topics such as labour immigration, family reunification among immigrants and abuse
of the asylum system. It has also been arguing that the Swedish government spends too much
on immigrants instead of helping older people.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (UK) is a very special case because they have quite a long tradition of
weighing the advantages of EU membership. They express doubts about the benefits of
integration. They are sceptical about ideological components of the EU and see it more as an
28
economical structure. The United Kingdom has also faced many waves of immigrants
throughout the decades, who have been seeking jobs and other benefits. In this section, we
will see how the Eurosceptic and right-wing populist party, the UK Independence Party
(UKIP), deals with this situation in the country.
THE UK INDEPENDENCE PARTY AND THEIR NICHE STRATEGY
If we start with the development of the party, then the UKIP was established in 1993 when
there was the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty. After the dissolution of the
Referendum Party in 1997, the UKIP became the predominant Eurosceptic voice in the
political environment. They were very successful in 1999 when the party won three seats in
the European Parliament (EP). In the next elections in 2004, they won around 16% of the
vote and finally they came second in the UK in 2009 with 16.5% of the vote and nine seats in
the EP. In general elections, they have never won a seat in the House of Commons, which
was also the case in the last general elections in 2010, when they achieved the result of 3.2%
but failed to win a seat (Lynch et al. 2012, 736). At the 2013 local elections, the party
achieved its best-ever local government result, taking almost 150 of the local council seats.
The majority voting system is not in favour of the UKIP, and this is probably the main reason
why the UKIP has not managed to enter the House of Commons, the UK’s lower house
(Grabow and Hartleb 2014, 8-27).
Niche parties such as the UKIP whose meaning of existence is strongly linked to a single
topic face a dilemma about how to progress. If they move too far beyond their core issue and
try to also participate on other issues, they risk losing their supporters, but if they want to
progress and to expand their representation on all political levels, they need to develop a
wider range of policies. This can cause internal ideological and development problems within
leadership structures. If we continue with the story in this direction, the UKIP also had some
internal conflicts considering issues such as development directions and also changes of
leader. In the first period as leader, Nigel Farage tried to change the party and progress into a
multi-issue organization. The party pushed questions about flat tax, a five-year freeze on
immigration and criticised leading state structures as well as leading parties for ignoring
popular concerns about immigration and the EU (Lynch et al. 2012, 733-736).
Programme and supporters
When we view the UKIP official website, it is easy to find and extract some main topics such
as bringing power back to the UK, border protection, rebuilding prosperity, fighting crime,
29
etc. They are calling for withdrawal from the EU through an immediate referendum and
stopping payments to the EU. By leaving the EU, the UK can regain control over its borders
and control migration as well as implement a new visa system for some countries and also
limit so-called working or economic migrations. State structures will have more power to
prevent foreign criminals entering the UK, and they want to strengthen the budget for
security and police in order to fight crime. Their plan to rebuild prosperity consists of cutting
foreign aid and providing more benefits for British people. Money should be used for local
services, not the EU, foreign aid and foreign wars. They prioritise British workers and
propose no tax on the minimum wage. It is obvious that they have plans that support only
British domestic people and see their future in a more independent and self-regulating
country without any external authority such as the EU. In their manifesto, it is clearly written
that the political class have forgotten they work for citizens; people are too often ignored.
Hence, the UKIP will bring power back to the people (Lynch et al. 2012, 740-742; UKIP
2014a; UKIP 2014b).
An analysis of the UKIP’s support showed higher support in areas with an elder population,
fewer people with degrees and higher numbers of self-employed workers. They got the best
results in south-west or east England. An interesting fact is that the UKIP has a much more
even spread of support across social classes than Labour or the Conservatives (Baggini 2013,
29; Lynch et al. 2012, 748-749).
Further development and “battle for ownership of the EU issue”
Mainstream parties usually limit single-issue parties by ignoring their efforts to discuss the
issue or by taking over ownership of the issue. In this case, the Conservatives have adopted a
softer Euroscepticism and lowered the salience of the EU issue. Labour also participated in
this game and promised referendums on EMU in order to overtake the UKIP. We should not
forget media and their role. For instance, it is well known that the Daily Mail and the Daily
Telegraph tend to give Conservative Eurosceptics more positive coverage than the UKIP
(Lynch et al. 2012, 740).
The UKIP is trying to build future successes on much more widespread discontents and
combining issues into a comprehensive story to attract new supporters. For instance, the
UKIP said that the EU is just a symptom of a big problem, but the real problems are
established structures and leading elites, which are not willing to hear the voices of common
people (Baggini 2013, 57). However, there are still doubts about which issues the UKIP
30
should campaign more about and which are more important than others. Candidates want the
party to campaign on a referendum on EU membership, immigration and the economy
(Lynch et al. 2012, 742). We can read in the Local Manifesto 2014 (UKIP 2014a) that the
party connects EU membership to national and local concerns such as cost of memberships
and other limitations created by EU legislation.
Finland
In the following lines, the Finns (Perussuomalaiset, PS) party is presented, which is an actual
Eurosceptical populist party in opposition with an important share of parliamentary seats.
THE FINNS AND THE LARGEST EVER INCREASE IN SUPPORT
It is hard to ignore the amazing success in the 2011 general elections when the PS won 19.1%
of the vote and experienced an increase of 15% on the 2007 elections. The PS is in the
opposition despite the invitation to cooperate with governmental parties. With its 38 seats out
of a total of 200 seats (see Figure 4.6), it is the third largest party in the parliament of Finland.
It was established in 1995. A significant predecessor was the Finnish Rural Party, which was
founded in the 1950s and disbanded in the early 1990s (Arter 2013; Raunio 2013, 133).
Figure 4.6: Share of seats in the Parliament of Finland occupied by the PS
share of seats*
0%
PS-38 seats
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
share of seats*
19,00%
Other parliamentary
parties-50 seats**
25,00%
Government-112 seats***
56,00%
*Total number of seats: 200.
**Centre Party, Left Faction parliamentary group, Left Alliance, Change 2011
***Christian Democratic Party, Swedish People’s Party (including MP for Åland), Social Democratic Party,
National Coalition Party, Green League
Source: Parliament of Finland 2011, Finish Government 2014
The party defines itself as the natural successor to the populist Finnish Rural Party and the
programmes of The Finns identify the party as a populist movement. They make a clear line
31
between elite and ordinary people. The defence of common people and attacking the corrupt
elite are cornerstones of the party’s ideology (Raunio 2013, 134). The PS is a left-centrist
party on the socioeconomic left-right spectrum, but when we talk about immigration and
protection of national culture, then it is positioned on the authoritarian end of the valuedimension (Jungar and Jupskås 2014, 10-12).
The party finance scandals and the euro crisis were in favour of the PS. During some recent
elections, the party always doubled its results in relation to the previous one. The same
pattern is repeated among observed parties when the focus is on the party’s core voters. The
electorate had primarily been less-educated men, but in the 2011 general elections, the PS got
new supporters from the ranks of the main parties. The PS made significant gains across the
country but especially in the more rural constituencies. Voters wanted societal change and to
reorganize the established patterns of power distribution as well as the public policies
concerning immigration and European integration. To some extent, the rise of the PS can be
explained by both issue and protest voting, but we also cannot forget the mobilisation of nonvoters (Raunio 2013, 137).
Programmes and mobilisation strategies
Their main issue is EU integration and the elite vs. people relationship. Timo Soini, party
leader, did not want immigration to become a key issue. The PS is the only party represented
in the Parliament of Finland that has constantly been against the EU. The third theme is
ethno-nationalism, which also holds an important place among the priorities of the party. The
party constantly blames old traditional parties of government, which are allegedly not
prepared to listen to the people. Their modern way of governance is claimed to be elitist and
corrupt. The PS wants to protect the common people with calls for strong government action
in the economy to fight against uncontrolled market powers. They support a welfare state and
the existing system of progressive taxation. Their programme also includes themes of
corruption and crime; they demand more resources for the police and the army. It is hard to
avoid the strengthening of state authorities in the defence of national democracy and
sovereignty (Raunio 2013, 137-140).
The Finns Party’s EU policy is both constructive and critical. The PS strongly opposes
further development of the EU into a federal state. They see a big problem in bailout and
similar support policies. It is obvious that the party is in favour of economic cooperation
among member states, and in their opinion, the EU’s democratic processes must be
32
strengthened. The PS wants to block any common central EU decision making regarding
immigration and permanent movements. The PS sees border control as a key part of society
and the security and safety of its citizens (The Finns 2014). The party is not against
multiculturalism within Europe, but they oppose mixing cultures within Finland. They are
against compulsory teaching of Swedish, which is the second official language in Finland
(Raunio 2013, 146).
Leadership, strategy and cooperation
The party leader, Timo Soini, is a strong, charismatic figure known for his comments and
anti-elitist rhetoric. The PS is a highly leader-dependent party, which could split if Soini left
the party. This is one of the key questions for the durability and progression of the party. He
made a very good decision to stay in opposition after the 2011 elections. The PS can continue
with its anti-elitist rhetoric and distance itself from corruption and failures. But the other
question is about how long the party can survive if it constantly rejects cooperation within
government. The PS is facing internal division. The anti-immigration faction exploits
xenophobic rhetoric and receives the most media coverage, but it is definitely a minority
within the party (Raunio 2013, 148-156).
Jungar and Jupskås (2014, 6) also mentioned changing the name as a strategy. When parties
change their names, it seems to provide a window of opportunity for strategic and ideological
positioning. In 1995, the party adopted a new name that is associated with the entire Finnish
society and it was translated into True Finns in English. After 2011, the party leadership
decided to adopt The Finns, because the former name was wrongly linked with extreme
nationalism.
4 COMPARISON OF POPULIST PARTIES
Finally, we offer a comparison of selected parties and seek to highlight common features and
differences among them. The main focus is on their power. We will also emphasize core
programme points and find differences or similarities between them. It is also important to
look at their supporting base and their representation in different political levels.
PARTY’S CORE ISSUES AND OPPOSITIONAL IMAGE
In general, all observed parties focused on the radicalisation of the issues of immigration and
tried to present infiltration of foreigners as a threat to the cultural identity and welfare state.
There is one exception in this paper, the SP in the Netherlands sees migrants as a potential
33
elective body and tries to cooperate with migrant communities to some extent. Moreover, the
EU is seen as an external power that imposes some measures that hinder state power and
sovereignty to block immigrant flows and provide security for the domestic economy. All
parties tried to strengthen state security and the power of security organs as well as improve
the legal system. As the Norwegian FrP does not operate within the EU, it does not make
sense to include it in further discussion on the EU issue. But still, it is worth mentioning that
they were pro-EU oriented in the last referendum about Norwegian EU-membership.
It might be possible to distinguish a few variations of plans that were designed to solve the
immigration problem and the EU issue. For instance, the PVV and the UKIP hold the
strongest opinions on the EU issue; they are promoting gradual withdrawal from the EU
treaties. Some of them tried to renegotiate their position in the EU to strengthen their
country’s sovereignty. If we shift our focus to immigrants, then we can say that the FrP
suggested sending all refugees back to their home countries. Other parties proposed limiting
the number of resident permits as well as limiting expenditures for immigrant organizations,
some of them are in favour of deportation of immigrants with criminal backgrounds, etc.
The main core of all parties is also to undermine political elites, who are not prepared to
listen to the basic needs and requirements of citizens. In accordance with this, the majority of
populist parties somehow avoid participating in government as it is perceived as the political
elite. As we can see, there are always some exceptional cases, such as the FrP, which is in
government. The DF and the PVV were playing supportive roles during some periods, but
they officially stayed out of the government, which was somehow to their advantage for
implementing some of their ideas.
The FN has the most protectionist position among the selected parties. It is a strong defender
of the welfare state. The FrP is the most liberal party in socioeconomic terms, which is
expected due to its history as an anti-tax movement. On the other side, we have the SP, which
is a left-wing populist party. This party is not against immigrants, which is why we
positioned it on the other side of the libertarian-authoritarian scale.
SD, PS and DF tend to support moderate state regulation of the market and a tax-based
redistributive welfare state. They are positioned in the socioeconomic centre. Almost all
parties are positioned on the authoritarian side, but their positions differ. The SD has roots in
right-wing extremism, but DF and PS have adopted more critical statements towards
34
immigration and multiculturalism in recent years. They are favourable to the domestic culture
and traditions and support stronger policies against crime.
Figure 4.7: Populists in the political space*
*The chart is based on a combination of sources, and therefore, its methodological regularity is limited.
Opinions and results vary slightly among authors.
Source: Grabow and Hartleb 2013; Grabow and Hartleb 2014; Jungar and Jupskås 2014;
Krouwel 2012; Lynch et al. 2012; Otjes and Louwerse 2013
(NON)COOPERATION WITH OTHER PARTIES
The FN’s ideology is still exposed to a very strong strategy of isolation. Mainstream parties
tried to prevent the spread of the FN’s ideology despite the vanished image of the extremist
FN’s nature achieved by Marine Le Pen’s adoption of more measured rhetoric. The same
situation is present in Sweden where the SD finally entered parliament but cannot obscure the
extremist background of some members. It faces strong rejection by mainstream parties to
cooperate with right-wing populists.
As we mentioned previously, some parties supported minority governments and nowadays
the FrP is in the government. These variations of (non)cooperation depend mostly on the
historical background of the particular party. Some of them, for instance the FrP and the DF,
started as anti-tax movements and through the decades successfully transformed their core
programme issues into more recent topics such as the flow of immigrants and Islamic
influence as well as the issue of sovereignty within the EU. Those parties were more likely to
be accepted as relevant political actors in the political arena and they did not face strong
isolation. The UKIP is the only observed party that is not represented in the parliament or
35
better to say in the House of Commons. That makes it hard to say something essential about
their (non)cooperation. It is possible to see that the mainstream parties adopted a softer
Euroscepticism and lowered the salience of the EU issue, which is the core issue of the
UKIP’s agenda. The PS refused cooperation with the Government after its 2011 electorate
success. To some extent, it is a very good strategy to distance itself from the elite.
ELECTORATE AND THE POWER OF SELECTED POPULIST PARTIES
Basically, there is no significant difference in the socioeconomic composition of supportive
bases. It can be said that the majority of votes come from people with a lower income from
the working class. Of course, there are some variations, for instance the UKIP and the FN
became cross-class parties but still, the majority consists of lower educated workers. And
more important is the loyalty of voters, which has improved in recent years. We cannot say
anymore that they just get protest votes, because they have quite stable support.
In conclusion, we should highlight the positions of some parties within the country. Some of
them appear stronger than others; there are also differences in the representation on the
individual levels. The UKIP is doing very well in the European parliamentary elections, but
on the other side, it still seeks a way to the House of Commons. The best positions are held
by the FrP and the DF; they are well represented on local levels as well as in the national
context—we can say that they are one of the main actors. Sometimes, the real power does not
come because of the number of seats; some parties played a supportive role and that gave
them a special position in the parliament.
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