Ethical pluralism, pragmatism, and sustainability in conservation

Biological Conservation 144 (2011) 958–965
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Biological Conservation
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/biocon
Ethical pluralism, pragmatism, and sustainability in conservation practice
John G. Robinson *
Wildlife Conservation Society, 2300 Southern Boulevard, Bronx, New York 10460, USA
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 18 October 2009
Received in revised form 8 April 2010
Accepted 11 April 2010
Available online 6 May 2010
Keywords:
Biodiversity
Ethics
Pluralism
Pragmatism
Sustainability
a b s t r a c t
Conservation organizations are asked to be responsive to a number of ethical obligations beyond that of
the conservation of biodiversity: the reduction of poverty, the imperative of social justice and cultural
integrity, and the improvement in human livelihoods. Yet how a conservation project is designed and
structured can negatively impact people’s access to resources, privilege one group of people over another,
or protect some species at a cost to others. Ideological conflict among nature protectionists, advocates for
indigenous people, those promoting a pro-poor agenda, and those seeking to move conservation into the
economic mainstream has characterized the conservation debate. I argue that in practice, most conservation programs should adopt a pluralistic and pragmatic approach, adopting multiple goals and making
decisions on the basis of what works. Choosing among approaches requires an appreciation of trade-offs,
and consideration of biological, social, and cultural values. Ultimately conservation approaches must be
sustainable – ecologically, culturally, socially, economically and politically – otherwise they will fail both
practically and ethically.
Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Ethical values and obligations provide reasons and justification
for action. Many conservationists believe that we have an ethical
obligation to act as stewards for the other species with which we
share this planet. This obligation is captured, for instance, in the
World Charter for Nature (United Nations, 1982), which states:
‘‘Nature shall be respected”, ‘‘the population levels of all life forms,
wild and domesticated, must be sufficient for their survival”, and
‘‘ecosystems and organisms . . . shall be managed to achieve and
maintain optimum sustainable productivity, but . . . in such a way
as [not] to endanger the integrity of those other ecosystems or species with which they coexist”.
Responding to this ethical obligation, conservationists have historically followed two general approaches: (1) establishing parks
and other protected areas to protect wild species and natural systems, and (2) promoting restraint in the harvest and consumption
of wild species and their products. Both approaches affect people’s
access to natural resources, either by denying them the opportunity to use certain areas (as in protected areas), or by reducing
their harvest levels.
In so doing, conservation actions can conflict with other ethical
obligations, by curtailing, for instance, the ability of some people to
make a living, an obligation and a core right recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948):
‘‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for [their]
* Tel.: +1 718 220 7165; fax: +1 718 220 1389.
E-mail address: jrobinson@wcs.org
0006-3207/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2010.04.017
health and well being”. If conservation activities have a negative
impact on the autonomy and rights of indigenous peoples, then
it might conflict with yet another ethical obligation, as identified
in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (United
Nations, 2007), which states that indigenous people have rights
‘‘to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied, or otherwise used or acquired”.
This conflict among ethical obligations poses a conundrum to
conservationists (termed the ‘‘new conservation debate”, Miller
et al., 2011). Conservationists, and conservation organizations,
are being asked to justify ethically the choices they make. Are conservation actions ethically defensible if they ignore immediate
livelihood and well-being issues? Indeed, should they actually be
designed to reduce poverty of local people, improve human livelihoods, and promote social justice and cultural integrity? In other
words, conservationists are being challenged to examine whether
their actions and choices are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.
Seeking to resolve this conundrum, some have sought to define
and defend the ethical values that provide a rationale for conservation action, and favoring certain sets of values over others has led
to the elaboration of vigorously defended ideologies. For instance,
some have argued for intrinsic right of all species to exist, while
others have argued that biodiversity conservation can only be justified if it contributes to the well-being of people.
In this paper, I review some of the dominant ideologies in conservation and examine their underlying ethical values. I then consider the ethical dilemmas arising out of the conflict between
ideologies, and conclude that ideological arguments provide little
help in choosing among different conservation objectives (such
J.G. Robinson / Biological Conservation 144 (2011) 958–965
as deciding whether to protect or promote the use of wild species),
or deciding between conservation approaches (such as relying on
government regulations or promoting community-based initiatives). Instead, I argue that in practice, ideology must be replaced
by pluralism in the choice of objectives and approaches. This pluralism recognizes that different stakeholders have different values,
and the choice among conservation objectives and approaches depend on the specific context. In the specific context, which is defined by the institutional and political power among those
stakeholders and their rights, only certain approaches are likely
to be successful over the long term. I argue that choosing among
different conservation objectives and approaches ultimately must
be pragmatic, and respond to the long term potential for
sustainability.
2. Values and Ideologies
We value some things for ethical reasons, and the conservation
of biodiversity has been strongly justified on ethical and moral
grounds. Ethical values, which reflect ethical history, cultural
norms and personal values, influence how we weight biological,
social, cultural and economic considerations, and it is these considerations that form the justification for conservation action. How
these values are combined together defines ideologies. Norton
(2005) describes ideologies as ‘‘based on pre-experiential principles and moral commitments” (p. 56). He states that ‘‘traditional
ideologies interpret value differences in polarized terms, based
on opposed systems of value” (p. 130). He defines ideology as commitments that are held, and which affect people’s understanding,
but these commitments cannot be refuted by appeal to empirical
evidence.
Today, there is a set of dominant ideologies in conservation, and
for clarity of exposition I will focus on four: intrinsic value, proindigenous conservation, pro-poor conservation, and economism.
The ideology of intrinsic value advocates conserving biodiversity for its own sake. All the components of biodiversity are valuable because they contribute to the ecological whole. The three
other ideologies follow the philosopher Immanuel Kant, and assume a sharp distinction between humans on one hand, who as ‘rational beings’ are therefore ‘rights holders’, and other species on
the other, which have no rights and can be considered to be resources for human ends. Biodiversity and nature are valued in
these ideologies because of their capacity to deliver some other
valued end.
2.1. Intrinsic value and holistic approaches to conservation
The idea that ecological wholes (e.g., species, biotic communities, ecosystems) exist and are systematically related and integrated with one another, and are valued both for their own sake
and for their contribution to the whole, has powerfully informed
conservation action. The argument is that people, as part of that
whole, have an ethical and moral responsibility to protect and
act as stewards for biodiversity writ large (species, biological communities, ecosystems), regardless of whether such action has usefulness or benefit to humans. In other words, biodiversity and
nature can be considered to have ‘intrinsic value’. The first principle of the Earth Charter (2000) leads with: ‘‘Respect Earth and life
in all its diversity, recognize that all beings are interdependent and
every form of life has value regardless of its worth to human
beings . . . ”. In this ideology, conservation is frequently seen as giving ‘a voice to the voiceless’.
Intrinsic value approaches thus seek to maintain the ecological
system in its entirety. Aldo Leopold’s famous statement ‘‘A thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty
959
of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” captures the essence of holistic approaches to conservation (Callicott,
1989, but see Norton, 2005). The integrity and wholeness is valued,
and if human action results in the ‘commoditization’ of elements of
nature through the acquisition of individual goods from nature,
then it is to be resisted (Callicott, 1989).
The non-anthropocentric quality of intrinsic value generates
philosophical controversy (e.g., Callicott, 1985; Norton, 1987;
Minteer, 2001; Sarkar and Montoya, 2011), and some are more
comfortable with the argument for existence value, an anthropocentric but non-utilitarian alternative. Existence value accepts that
certain components of biodiversity can have no known or contemplated use, but still can be valued because people value the knowledge that that biodiversity exists (Norton, 1987).
Conservationists who depend on the argument for intrinsic value have further differentiated attributes of biodiversity that are
of higher priority for action. Recognizing that ‘‘extinction is forever”,
conservationists have tended to value protecting those species that
are vulnerable, whether or not they are culturally or economically
important – a value codified in the 1973 Endangered Species Act
in the United States, and the IUCN Red Listing process. Other species
of concern include those that are phylogenetically and biologically
unique (Isaac et al., 2007). In addition to species, such conservationists have prioritized the preservation of ‘‘unique higher taxonomic
groups, such as endemic genera and families; extraordinary adaptive species radiations; assemblages of intact vertebrate populations that fluctuate within natural ranges; large vertebrate
migrations; mass spawning phenomena; globally rare habitat
types; and examples of large intact ecosystems” (Wikramanayake
et al., 2002). Areas of high species endemism and diversity (Myers,
1988; Brooks et al., 2006), and areas of high ecological integrity
(Sanderson et al., 2002; Mittermeier et al., 2003) are valued.
2.2. Traditional values and indigenous people as conservationists
Another ethical argument for the conservation of species and
ecosystems is that they provide a cultural non-substitutable (or
constitutive) value for people. This argument values the contribution of nature to attributes such as a cultural group’s identity with
a sacred place, a traditional set of practices, or familiar or cherished
ways of doing things. Levi-Strauss (1966) pioneered inquiry into
how traditional or indigenous peoples define themselves in relation to nature, and this remains a fertile area of investigation
(West, 2005). Some conservationists have valued biodiversity because of its value to traditional cultures and traditional people
(though others have used the same argument against the interests
of traditional people by labeling them as not ‘sufficiently’ traditional or not ‘really authentic’, see West, 2006).
Valuing nature in this way leads to an ideological argument that
indigenous people, in addition to being primary beneficiaries of
conservation, are the appropriate stewards of nature for three
important reasons. The first is that traditional, indigenous people
are inherently conservationists. There is a strand of anthropological thinking (derived from optimal foraging theory) that leads to
this conclusion (e.g., Winterhalder, 1986; Winterhalder and Lu,
1997). This idea entered the conservation discussion in documents
like the 1989 Declaration of the Coordinadora del las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica (Redford and Stearman,
1993). This declaration develops the argument that indigenous
people are historical caretakers of the Amazon basin, and support
for indigenous peoples is a necessary condition for effective conservation. The idea of indigenous people as being natural conservationists has provoked a lively debate (Redford, 1991; Hames,
2007).
The second reason for indigenous people to act as stewards for
nature is that the traditional or indigenous knowledge is essential
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J.G. Robinson / Biological Conservation 144 (2011) 958–965
to manage natural resources in many contexts. This idea is consistent with the extensive literature that indigenous people have historically managed and modified their natural landscapes (e.g.,
Balée, 1994; Adams and McShane, 1996; Fairhead and Leach,
1996). As distinct from western scientific knowledge, the argument
is that indigenous knowledge is more firmly grounded in the local
context, more responsive to cultural imperatives, more pragmatic
and relevant, and more likely to lead to actions that will sustain
natural resources (Warren, 1991; Agrawal, 1995). This ideology
therefore values applied, local knowledge, and the institutions, often indigenous, that promote that knowledge.
The third reason is that traditional indigenous people are considered to have unique rights and priority of access to specific land
and resources. This is captured in Article 26.1. of UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted in 2007), which recognizes that indigenous peoples have a distinct set of rights which
‘‘derives from their political, economic and social structures and
from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories, and philosophies,
especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources”. The
declaration goes on to state that ‘‘Indigenous people have the right
to the lands, territories, and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired”.
2.3. Pro-poor conservation
Another ethical argument for conserving biodiversity is that
people depend on natural resources, and thus through its utilitarian value, biodiversity can directly contribute to the alleviation of
global poverty. The ethical consideration is that people should
not live in poverty, which is generally characterized as being poor
in more ways than just of income (e.g., Hulme et al., 2001). A standard is suggested in the first of the Millennium Development
Goals, which advocates halving, by the year 2015, the proportion
of people living on less than $1 a day and the proportion of people
suffering from hunger.
This ethical argument can be extended to include the future
generations of people. Fundamental conservation documents like
the World Conservation Strategy (1980) or the World Commission
of Environment and Development Report (1987) make an argument of intergenerational equity: the World Conservation Strategy,
for instance, defines conservation as activities that ‘‘yield the greatest sustainable development to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future
generations”. In other words, any loss to people today will be compensated by gains in the future (an argument that can undercut the
immediate needs of today’s people). Nevertheless, this ethical
argument values equity, legitimacy, the freedom to give and receive, and the concept of sustainable livelihoods.
Valuing nature in this way can lead to an ideological argument
that conservation action must be responsive to human needs. At
the very least, the argument is that conservation should do no
harm to livelihoods, so, for instance, should act ‘‘to ensure that
poor people in developing countries are compensated for the costs
they incur in ‘supplying’ the ‘international public good’ aspect of
wildlife [conservation].” (DFID Wildlife and Poverty, 2002). The
argument can be extended to conservation actively contributing
to improving livelihoods (Kaireva and Marvier, 2007), and conservation can be considered to be a tool to address the problem of
poverty. Pro-poor conservation aims to manage ‘‘landscapes that
include adequate areas to serve as sources of fauna and flora for local people, especially those who are vulnerable and marginalized”
(Kaimowitz and Sheil, 2007). Advocates for pro-poor conservation
typically recognize the goals and outcomes of pro-poor conservation are different from conservation that narrowly focuses on the
preservation of biodiversity.
2.4. Economism
Economism is an ethical argument that biodiversity has value
because it contributes to economic well-being of people. The value
of specific conservation actions can be measured through the economics of individual consumption, and the supposition is that biological, social and cultural values can be captured by consumer
preferences measured by individuals’ ‘‘willingness to pay”. The
ethical argument is captured by Pinchot’s assertion that conservation needs to achieve ‘‘the greatest good for the greatest number
over the longest period of time” (although Pinchot himself does
not strictly relate his utilitarianism to economism).
Economism has deep roots in the conservation movement: at
the inauguration of International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (IUCN), Julian Huxley asserted that ‘‘nature must be considered a resource” (Holdgate, 1999). This was reaffirmed at the IUCN
General Assembly in 1991 that ‘‘properly managed projects for the
sustainable use of wildlife can enhance the conservation of wildlife
populations and their ecosystems because of the economic and
other benefits that such use provides”. ‘‘Caring for the Earth”
(IUCN, UNEP and WWF, 1991) states that people have ‘‘the right to resources needed for a decent standard of living, and hence a
right to derive economic and other benefits from wild species”.
This ideology posits that the ‘‘greatest good” can be achieved
through a comprehensive system to preserve biodiversity, achieve
equity and legitimacy, and protect cultural diversity. But it is worth
noting that economism on its own does not inherently privilege
specific people such as those who are poor, or those who have cultural claims or those that have specific rights. Neither does economism favor any or all components of biodiversity (Robinson, 1993).
3. Ethical dilemmas and the conflict among ideologies
These different ideologies assume different goals for conservation, and when goals are in conflict or do not overlap, this creates
ethical dilemmas (Elder, 2002; Miaoulis, 2002). Is it right to undercut the livelihood needs of Canadian commercial fishermen when
the cod stocks are declining? Is it right to protect elephants while
denying local people the opportunity to protect their crops and exploit a valuable natural resource? Is in right to allocate land and resources to an indigenous group and deny access to poor settlers
from other regions?
These kinds of ethical dilemma are not easily resolvable. While
all conservation efforts should aspire to win–win situations, in
many circumstances they clearly have an impact on people’s access
to resources, retention of traditional or usufruct rights, and the
practice of cultural traditions (e.g., Brockington et al., 2006; Colchester, 2004; West et al., 2006). There is a broad recognition within (e.g., Robinson, 1993; Robinson and Redford, 2004; McShane
et al., 2011; Salafsky, 2011) and outside of the conservation community (e.g., Igoe and Brockington, 2007) that biodiversity conservation does not always foster socioeconomic development, and
socioeconomic development does not always lead to conservation.
Depending on their specific goals, conservation programs can disadvantage people and/or wild species.
How does one resolve these ethical dilemmas? When making
choices, how should conservationists compare and integrate these
different systems of values? One suggested way is to consistently
adopt a single ideological approach. Noss and Cooperrider (1994)
for instance, ‘‘believe that nature and biodiversity possess all the
kinds of value . . . but that intrinsic values offer the least biased
and ultimately most secure arguments for conservation”. Terborgh
(1999) states that ‘‘the need to protect biodiversity is obvious and
basic”. Contrast this with statements that conservation should be
in the service of traditional indigenous people who have the rights
J.G. Robinson / Biological Conservation 144 (2011) 958–965
to the harvest of their natural resources (e.g., Dwyer, 1994; Cernea
and Schmidt-Soltau, 2003; Chapin, 2004; Dowie, 2005). Others
make the ideological case that conservation should be to address
poverty. Clare Short, in 2002 the UK Secretary of State for International Development, for instance, stated that: ‘‘the environmental
movement . . . has focused on conservation of animals and forests
and taken little account of the needs of poor people whose lives depend on those resources”. And still others see conservation as justified only when it fosters economic growth. For instance, Sugg and
Kreuter (1995) argue for freedom of choice, which by definition
‘‘necessitates economic freedom” and express the aspiration that
‘‘resource use will be depoliticized, thus creating incentives to conserve the instrumental value of natural resources”. In other words,
the marketplace should determine what biodiversity is conserved,
and other considerations should be ignored.
Ethical dilemmas are however difficult to resolve by referring to
contrasting ideological positions. Noss and Cooperrider (1994)
sought to rank ideologies by creating an ‘‘ethical sequence, showing levels of moral concern and obligations increasing from the self
and the immediate family to all other species and the earth as a
whole”. They argue that ‘‘ethical concern for higher levels is an
extension, not a replacement of traditional ethical concern for human beings” (higher levels in this case refer to ethical concerns for
other species and for ecosystems). But resolving dilemmas on the
grounds of ethical value seems destined to fail. Does the possibility
of extinction, given its irreversible nature, trump other considerations? Do natural communities and wild species have moral
standing and rights, and even if they do, are these trumped by human rights? When are the environmental or social costs too great?
These are questions rich with the potential for ethical debate in the
halls of academia, but difficult to answer conclusively in the real
world.
4. Linkage between conservation ideologies, objectives and
approaches
In practice, different conservation approaches are more responsive to the values captured by certain ideologies than others. While
the design of conservation programs often does not explicitly consider ideologies (see Miller et al., 2011), their implementation will
favor different values, and project objectives will be responsive to
different ideologies. In this Section I explore the linkages between
ideologies and three categories of conservation approaches, and in
the following one I examine the contexts and situations in which
the different approaches are most effective and appropriate.
Any conservation approach (how a project is designed and structured), prioritizes certain values over other values, and frequently
one group of people over another group of people. The establishment of parks and conservation areas, typically managed by national government agencies, is one traditional approach that is
very responsive to the intrinsic value of biodiversity. The approach
recognizes that large natural areas without significant human disturbance are necessary to protect many species of conservation
concern (Barlow et al., 2007; Peres, 2005). Today, many of the great
wilderness areas around the world are found in national parks and
protected areas. However, parks frequently had an impact on people in and around protected areas, typically by denying them access
to resources, or greatly restricting such access. To mitigate this impact, regulation of resource extraction has tended to depend on
compensation, substitution and creation of alternative livelihoods.
On occasion, people have been resettled (Colchester, 2004), but in
recent years, with the recognition of traditional and legitimate
rights to land, this is less defensible, and when it occurs has tended
to be voluntary (e.g., Karanth, 2007). Nevertheless, full concurrence
and prior informed consent of local people to management of pro-
961
tected areas is not a sine qua non (e.g., McLean and Straede, 2003).
This approach has been referred to, sometimes pejoratively, as ‘‘fortress conservation” (Brockington, 2002).
Another conservation approach has been to decentralize
authority to the local level, or devolve authority to specified social
or cultural groups, an approach that is more responsive to cultural,
social and economic values (Sarkar and Montoya’s (2011) Social
Ecology (SE) model falls under this approach). In some cases, the
goal is the conservation of culturally or socially important species,
in others it is the conservation of bio-culturally important sites like
sacred sites, and in still others it is a response to local livelihood
concerns. In some cases, an explicit goal is biodiversity conservation, while in others biodiversity conservation might just be a useful consequence of good natural resource management. The
management authority can also vary – sometimes it is the local
government, sometimes local communities, and sometimes traditional authorities. This approach is frequently justified on the
grounds that local control is more efficient, allows greater participation and accountability, and builds on local knowledge, traditional or otherwise (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). Initiatives that
follow this approach have been collectively referred to, often hopefully, as ‘‘respectful partnerships”.
A third conservation approach, one that recognizes the commodity value of biodiversity, is frequently referred to as ‘‘mainstreaming conservation” into the marketplace. This approach
pushes for management outcomes and land use patterns that give
the greatest economic and social return. Economic value has been
assigned to individual species, to different land uses, and to ecosystems and the services that they provide. Underlying all of these is
the assumption that biodiversity can be conserved when conservation is an economically competitive land use (e.g., Naidoo and
Adamowicz, 2005). Initiatives that mainstream conservation into
the marketplace can be managed either through centralized or
decentralized approaches, though the pattern is for specific natural
resources and species to be managed in a decentralized way at the
community level, and ecosystems and ecosystem services to be
managed by national states.
One example of this commodification of individual species or
specific natural resources is ‘sustainable use’. Proponents (e.g., Allen and Edwards, 1995) have argued that conservation of biodiversity will be achieved only when people recognize the economic
value of biodiversity. In line with the ideology of economism, sustainable use is thought to be more likely to be achieved where ‘‘an
economic value can be attached to a living resource, perverse
incentives removed, and costs and benefits internalized” and
where ‘‘favorable conditions can be created for investment in the
conservation and the sustainable use of the resource, thus reducing
the risk of resource degradation, depletion, and habitat conversion”
(IUCN Sustainable Use Policy Statement, 2000). Another example
of commodification is that of ecosystems and ecosystem services
in which initiatives seek to calculate ‘payment for ecosystem services’ (PES) (Engel et al., 2008). The justification for the PES methodology is compatible with the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,
which categorized ecosystem services, and identified the potential
to value and market such services. ‘‘Valuation translates ecosystem
services into terms that decision-makers and the general public
can readily understand” (Carpenter et al., 2006). PES initiatives
are most clearly applicable when there are benefits of maintaining
ecosystem services but ecosystems are mismanaged and the costs
of managing the ecosystem are poorly distributed.
While different conservation approaches therefore are responsive to different ideologies or sets of values, the relationship between ideologies and conservation approaches is not rigid. Fig. 1
illustrates how these different conservation approaches are
responsive to range of different values. In practice, while certain
values are favored in a given conservation approach, the design
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J.G. Robinson / Biological Conservation 144 (2011) 958–965
Mainstreaming
Conservation
X
X
Respectful
Partnerships
X
XXX
XXX
X
Fortress
Conservation
XXX
XX
X
X
Intrinsic
Value
XX
Traditional Pro-Poor
Cultural
Value
Value
XXX
Economism
Fig. 1. Responsiveness of three different conservation approaches to the four
ideologies discussed here. X indicates that the conservation approach weakly
contributes to the values of that ideology, while XXX indicates that the approach
contributes strongly.
of projects does recognize a plurality of values and objectives. Successful projects recognize that different stakeholders value nature
and wild species in a variety of different ways.
5. Context as a determinant of which conservation approach to
choose
It is the recognition of this plurality of values – biological, social,
cultural and economic values of nature all have validity – that allows the choice of conservation approach to depend on the specific
context and circumstances, and not be determined rigidly by ideology. Norton (2005) argues for ‘‘a more experience-based, adaptive
approach to resource use and environmental protection” and
against the ‘‘unfortunate polarization that has led to ideological
environmentalism”. He goes on to state that ‘‘ideological environmentalism . . . is ineffective because it leaves no room for flexibility
and for learning from experience”.
The particular context defines the range of what is possible, and
to respond, programs must be pragmatic. Norton (2005) defines
‘‘pragmatism”, as that which ‘‘expects to arrive at a justifiable decision in a particular situation”. Weighting of different values will
depend on the specific circumstances and contexts, and indeed, it
is this tying to ‘place’ and a specific context that characterizes
pragmatism. In a particular context, certain values will have greater valence and power than others.
Pragmatism additionally must build on the scientific knowledge
through monitoring and learning (Norton, 2005). This is a hallmark
of adaptive management – a practical methodology that has
increasingly gained acceptance in the implementation of conservation projects. Initially proposed by Holling (1978), adaptive management is not bound by single objectives, and can accept a
plurality of goals. Adaptive management is a methodology that allows the incorporation of a range of different values. Projects are
designed, managed towards a set of objectives, and progress towards those objectives carefully monitored (Salafsky, 2011). The
information acquired through this process is used to better understand the context, learn from mistakes, determine what is not realistic and adapt future conservation action (Lee, 1993; Gunderson
et al., 1995). The adaptive management approach for conservation
projects has been formalized in the ‘Open Standards for the Practice of Conservation’ (Conservation Measures Partnership, 2007;
Salafsky, 2011).
Pragmatism also depends on establishing a participatory process that involves the stakeholders in a given place, it ‘‘is a method
that . . . promises to gradually move the community towards consensus” (Norton, 2005). In other words, allowing a public dialogue
to define a way forward is pragmatic.
All conservation approaches must seek to incorporate the values of the different stakeholders, and often this will require the
development of partnerships (Vermeulen and Sheil, 2007; Robinson, 2007). Central to an effective partnership is the realization
that different stakeholders value biodiversity in different ways.
Some aspire to the conservation of biodiversity for intrinsic reasons, some for its contribution to cultural integrity and social justice, others for its contribution to economic development. Nature
protection organizations, for instance, often seek to protect natural
systems or highly vulnerable endangered species, but they are not
necessarily insensitive to concerns of social justice or the economic
well-being of residents. The primary interest of local communities
might be to maintain their social and cultural integrity, and to improve their well-being and quality of life, but this does not necessarily negate their respect for the natural world. Thus,
Conservation International, a conservation NGO, established a
partnership with the Kayapó, an indigenous group in Amazonian
Brazil. The goals of the NGO were to protect an area of exceptional
biodiversity, while those of the indigenous group were to protect
their land from invasion (Chernela, 2005). In Bolivia, the Wildlife
Conservation Society partnered with the Capatanía de Alto y Bajo
Izozog, an indigenous organization. While the former’s conservation interest was to create a strategy and capacity to manage the
Gran Chaco, the latter sought to preserve the quality of life of the
Isoceño people (Arambiza and Painter, 2006; Redford and Painter,
2006). Together they found common cause in resisting landscape
transformation arising from commercialized expansion of the agricultural frontier.
Conservation efforts typically involve a multitude of stakeholders and potential partners. For instance, the Mamirauá Project in
Amazonian Brazil has been characterized as the conservation of
flooded forest through a community-based approach that protects
biodiversity and strengthens human livelihoods. In addition to a
Brazilian NGO (the Sociedade Civil Mamirauá) and the ribeirinho
communities themselves, the project incorporates federal and
state agencies, international NGOs, other national NGOs, various
municipalities, extractive industries, and the Catholic Church
(Lima, 1999; Robinson and Queiroz, in press). All stakeholders
were involved in a pragmatic, participatory process that defined
the goals of the project. As the project evolved, it monitored biodiversity and livelihood indicators, and incorporated information in
an adaptive way into the project design.
In the end, conservation programs must be designed by what
works in a particular context (Wells et al., 2004; Norton, 2005),
not on the basis of ideological preference. That poor people depend
on natural resources and are often forced to degrade the natural
environment, forced the recognition that effective conservation often requires that projects address human livelihood issues (Adams
et al., 2004; Roe, 2008). The pragmatic argument is that, in many
situations, unless poverty issues are addressed, conservation efforts will fail. The linkage between poverty reduction and conservation success, while frequently challenged (e.g., Kaimowitz and
Angelsen, 1998), is at the core of the integrated conservation and
development (ICD) approach (Wells and Brandon, 1992; Robinson
and Redford, 2004). Increasingly, there is a pragmatic recognition
that effective conservation must frequently consider the need for
social justice and emancipation, the desire to protect cultural
integrity, and ‘‘what is politically possible in specific times and
places” (Brechin et al., 2003).
Adopting a process of considering the ecological, socio-economic and political contexts does not obviate the need to choose
among different conservation approaches, and ultimately among
different project objectives. Different conservation approaches do
weight values differently, and are responsive to different stakeholders, but no single approach is always effective and successful
in all contexts. McShane et al. (2011) have explored in depth
how the values of different stakeholder groups and the circumstances of a particular context influence the ‘hard choices’ or
J.G. Robinson / Biological Conservation 144 (2011) 958–965
‘tradeoffs’ that need to be made in practice. Values of stakeholders
are influenced by their life and socio-cultural experiences, while
the identity and power of different stakeholders affects the options
for action.
Under what conditions and in what contexts are different conservation approaches more effective and appropriate? ‘Fortress
conservation’, which focuses on wildlife and wild lands, is most
practical and effective where people have no residency or legitimate rights to an area (e.g., Maisels et al., 2007) or where any resident people have attractive options to reduce resource
consumption or leave the land (e.g., Karanth, 2007). This approach,
like others, has challenges of implementation: natural resource or
park agencies, especially in the developing world, have tended to
be politically weak and underfunded, and even when supported
by international and local NGOs, have not been particularly effective custodians of natural areas (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006).
‘Respectful partnerships’ are a useful alternative to the inefficiencies and inequalities of national government control. These
partnerships depend on decentralization and devolution of authority to local stakeholders, but the approach faces its own challenges
(Ostrom et al., 2007; Bennett, 2008). Local conservation efforts often do not work at a large enough scale to conserve the full range of
biodiversity, management efforts are crimped by lack of human
and financial resources, and authority can be lost to commercial
interests, local elites, and unaccountable local organizations.
Where successful, decentralized conservation efforts often depend
on the active engagement, often associated with significant financial investment, of institutions and organizations that engage with
local authorities: international NGOs, multilateral and bilateral
lending agencies, local organizations, national government agencies, religious institutions, commercial operations, etc. (Berkes,
2007).
‘Mainstreaming conservation’ incorporates the power of the
marketplace into the project design, and its appropriateness varies
with economic conditions (including resource value, economic
incentives and disincentives, and the supply and demand of resources and land (McNeely, 1988; Freese, 1998)) and the way land
and resources are managed and governed (Ostrom et al., 1999; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). The problem is that the commodification
of biodiversity inadequately captures its full value (which means
that only those elements which are of immediate economic value
are targeted for conservation), does not capture the irreplaceable
nature of biodiversity, is not sensitive to cultural minorities and
vulnerable people, and is not responsive to change (e.g., Robinson,
1993; Redford and Richter, 1999; Redford and Adams, in press).
Some have worried (e.g., Brockington, 2004; Mavhunga, 2007;
Sarkar and Montoya, 2011) that the unequal distribution of power
and resources means that stakeholders and partners are rarely
equal, and the hard choices required of conservation programs will
impose western concepts of conservation and/or unequal and unjust choices on local people. However, there is a lot of power in
place and local context. If opposition to a given conservation approach is sustained, if local stakeholders are disenfranchised, and
if the benefits of conservation do not outweigh the costs over the
long term, then that particular conservation approach will ultimately fail. In practice therefore, conservation projects typically
are initiated with stakeholder consultation and participation, a
process that attempts to capture the values of different stakeholders and develop project objectives in a pragmatic way. When interests of different stakeholders diverge, those projects that end up
being successful are those best able to address local resistance
and institute appropriate institutional change (see examples in
Brechin et al., 2003; Wilshusen, 2003).
While project design is frequently contested and involves conflict and compromise, projects rarely fail because of internal divisions about specific goals. When they do fail, typically it is
963
because conservation goals are in conflict with influences external
to the project: national priorities, commercial interests, and the
global forces of homogenization (Redford and Brosius, 2006).
Decisions that are pragmatic ultimately must be responsive to
the long term potential for sustainability. If biodiversity conservation alone is a realistic and feasible goal, then an approach based
narrowly on fortress conservation and protection might be appropriate and sustainable. If people live in the landscape, and if there
are other stakeholders, then an approach depending on the establishment of respectful partnerships is more likely to be appropriate
and sustainable. Under certain circumstances, though not all, such
an approach might protect biological and cultural diversity, maintain the quality of life of resident people, and improve human livelihoods. If the goal is increase or maximize income generation from
the use of natural resources for human society (the ‘‘greatest good
for the greatest number” argument), and if that goal is economically and managerially realistic, then approaches based on mainstreaming conservation might be appropriate and sustainable.
For a given context, and for specific circumstances, the choice of
a conservation approach must consider its long term sustainability.
If conservation initiatives are not sustainable, for local, national
and global stakeholders, over long time periods, by definition they
will fail. And while ideologues might advocate for certain approaches based on ethical considerations, in practice if the initiatives are not sustainable, neither are they ethically appropriate
nor defendable.
Acknowledgements
Thad Miller and Ben Minteer organized the symposium at the
2008 Conservation Biology meeting where this paper was first presented, and diligently edited the various drafts. Bryan Norton,
Steve Zack, Elizabeth Bennett, and especially Peter Wilshusen
and Kent Redford commented on early drafts. To all I give my
thanks. Colleagues at the Wildlife Conservation Society contributed
many of the ideas in this paper as we collectively grappled with the
very real challenges of conservation in practice.
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