USAFSAM (Sep 10)
WVA Checklist Master Listing
CHECKLIST
OPR/SME1
1
2
AT/Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP) Review for Water
Off-Base Water Supplier
3
Base Potable Water System Overview
ATO and CIP Manager
Non-AF System Owner/Operator
CEO*, CEC, CEAN, CEF and
CEP
NO.
General Questionnaires2
Program Review Criteria3
4
Water System Design and Integrity
5
6
7
8
Water System Operations & Maintenance
Water System Security Operations (owner/operator)
Electronic Monitoring and Control System Operations4
Water Contingency Response
CEO*, CEC, CEAN, CEF and
CEP
CEO, CEF
CEO
CEO
CEO, CEX
Physical Assessment Criteria3
9
10
11
12
13
14
Surface Water
Wells
Water Storage
Water Treatment
Water Pumps & Miscellaneous Assets/Facilities
Water Supply Mains
15
Aircraft Potable Water
16
17
Bottled Water
Deployment Water Assets5
1
CEO
Fleet Services/Operations and/or
Flight Kitchen
SVS, LRS, or CE
CEO
Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR)/Subject Matter Expert (SME): Agency, office symbols, or functions
may vary. Multiple checklists may apply to a single OPR/SME, particularly at ANG, AFRES, or small operating
locations. Stakeholder functions may also be assigned to a contractor, other DoD component, or military ally.
2
General Questionnaires are designed to gather background information to provide a perspective of the system
and how it’s operated, potential problem areas, and details that can aid in the risk analysis process.
3
Program Review & Physical Assessment Criteria Checklists are used to identify observations; one or more
deficient criteria indicate an observation. Some checklists may not be applicable. Checklists may be used to
assess non-AF water systems (if AF/DoD requirements do not apply, criteria may be applied as best practices
[BPs]). For privatized systems, AF/DoD requirements may be considered requirements or BPs, based on contract
provisions and contractor obligations.
4
For water system Electronic Monitoring and Control Systems that are computer-based, the system security
manager/administrator may also need to be interviewed along with CEO using Checklist #7.
5
Checklist (#17) consolidates criteria for those assets & access points that may be found in the deployed
environment, including field (or “tactical”) assets, assets that are permanent (or “fixed”), and bottled/bulk water.
This checklist may be used in deployment locations in lieu of Checklists #9–#16.
QUESTIONNAIRE
USAFSAM #1 (May 14)
AT & Critical Infrastructure Program Review for Water
DISCUSSION POINTS
NOTES
1. Previously Identified Observations: Are any water-related
observations (vulnerabilities or concerns) loaded in Core Vulnerability
Assessment and Management Program (CVAMP)? What is the status of
these observations?
 Briefly review the status of observations from past WVAs. For
observations (deficiencies and recommendations) :
 What observations/deficiencies are considered active?
 What observations/deficiencies have commanders (ATWG chair)
accepted risk such that recommendations will not be acted on?
Discuss how these observations/deficiencies are/should be tracked
and accounted for.
 What observations/deficiencies are considered closed
(recommendations implemented)?
 What observations are no longer considered current (e.g. asset no
longer in use/operation, etc.)?
(Note: Do not describe specifics that could make this working paper classified.)
2. WVA Observations: BE briefly discuss observations, especially:
 Observations of significance related to physical security or access
points for intentional introduction of contaminants (and if any may
be considered “vulnerabilities”).
 Any deficiencies that BE is uncertain whether the deficiency should
be considered an AT deficiency.
3. Water Asset Threats: Are there any known threats that may concern
the base water supply, or have there been any incidents or suspicious
activities involving base water assets since the previous WVA?
4. Contractors and Vendors: What are the current requirements for
background checks and procedures to screen contractors and vendors for
on-base access (e.g., construction workers and individuals delivering water
treatment chemicals or bottled water)?
5. SUPPORT FOR CRITICAL ASSETS
 Are any water system deficiencies specific to especially critical
assets?
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Note: Identification of Task Critical Assets (TCAs), as designated under
the Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM) is classified as Secret. While
water system assets will not be TCAs, water system deficiencies may be
specific to support for TCAs.
 Is water service to a TCA or other critical asset considered
inadequate or unreliable such that related deficiencies justify
special attention or categorization as vulnerabilities rather than
concerns?
Example: Computer rooms at a TCA require uninterrupted water supply
for cooling and the single service connection/line is unreliable and in need
of replacement.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
QUESTIONNAIRE
6. Water System Security and Access Controls:
 Has the water system been evaluated for inclusion on Security
Forces’ (SFs’) Critical Facilities list?
 If so, are any water system assets/facilities designated as Critical
Facilities?
 Does SF conduct security checks, or any type of random AT
measures (RAM) for water assets (on or off base)? If yes, what
assets?
USAFSAM #1 (May 14)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
(Note: If not on the SF’s Critical Facilities list, the system depends on
owner/operator security checks.)
 Are SF personnel aware connections to the water (other than Water
Utilities and Fire) are restricted to authorized access points
(designated fill-points or hydrants protected by backflow
preventers)?
 Is awareness included in SF introductory tours and/or other
training?
 Have there been other efforts (e.g. articles in the base paper) to
increase awareness and reporting of unauthorized connection to
the water system? (optional)
 Are any water system assets (e.g. wells, treatment, storage, bottled
water, etc.) located in controlled areas?
 If water system assets are located in controlled areas, is one of
purposes of the controlled area(s) specifically to protect the water
system assets?
 Briefly discuss whether any additional security “enhancements”
(beyond basic security, e.g. IDS, cameras, DoD high security locks,
electronic access control, door/window alarms, motion sensors,
etc.) are needed/justifiable?
7. WVA Outbriefing: Discuss details as necessary:
A) Appropriate Stakeholders for Outbriefing
B) Best Forum (i.e., FPWG, ATWG, other)
C) Classification Issues
(Note: A common approach is to use unclassified slides (or point paper), which
may include photos, but leaves out specifics of deficiencies, hazards, &
locations—i.e., the Outbrief is classified due to verbal discussion of observation
specifics, but slides (or paper) will be unclassified and FOUO.)
8. WVA Report:
A) Discuss details of the classified WVA report as necessary.
B) Classification issues, including releasable to (example REL TO USA,
GBR) for OCONUS installations allows release to cleared host nation
personnel with need to knowb
(Note: Reference AFI 31-401, para 4.10 for requirements for REL TO
marking. BE does not have a Disclosure Officer, so release to authorized
foreign nationals with need to know should be left to the ATO, ATWG or
commanders.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
QUESTIONNAIRE
USAFSAM #1 (May 14)
C) Discuss the possibility of providing a simple, unclassified List of
Recommendations (without reference to the WVA or classified
observations) to allow communication to HN personnel and workers
who do not have security clearance and facilitate implementation of
recommended fixes.
(Note: This method has been successfully implemented at a number of bases,
and ATOs are typically receptive. The List should include recommendations
under a single type of facility, e.g., “storage”—without facility #s, locations,
base, or other specific identifiers. The responsible agency, e.g., CE can then
assess what fixes apply to which facilities.)
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.;
otherwise, working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section
4.1.2.1 for additional information).
2) Checklist Applicability: This questionnaire is not a criteria checklist and is not intended to identify deficiencies. Except
for evaluation of the water system assets for inclusion in the Critical Infrastructure Program and Critical Facilities Lists
(AT/CE and SF requirements, a “NO” answer does not necessarily identify a deficiency. This checkilst is designed to: A)
Follow-up on the status of previous observations, B) Determine current water-related threats and accessibility (which can
impact risk estimates and control recommendations for observations), C) Verify/gather information relevant to other
program checklists E) Assist the assessor in determining what, if any, enhanced security measures should be
recommended D) Establish a consensus with the ATO & CIP Manager on how best to communicate WVA results and
avoid classification problems, and E) Add visibility and cultivate support from these stakeholders for addressing waterrelated observations.
FOOTNOTES
aIntegrated,
tamper-resistant locking mechanisms (e.g., tamper-resistant dead-bolts) or high-security padlocks and hasps (that
are securely anchored) IAW AFCESA ETL 04-5. Typically considered for assets that are especially critical or are located offbase or in a remote area. High-security padlocks and hasps are only as effective as doors or barriers the locks secure.
bDoD Manual 5200. 01, Volume 2, February 24, 2012 (Incorporating Change 1, March 21, 2012)
DoD Information Security Program: Marking of Classified Information specifies use of ISO 3166 trigraphic country codes.
The manual also provides directions for marking of classified information.
ADDITIONAL NOTES
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
INTERVIEW GUIDE
USAFSAM #2 (Oct 12)
a
Off-Base Water Supplier
DISCUSSION POINTS
1. Meeting Purpose: To help base leadership understand the
capabilities and limitations of the water supply the base depends on.
2. Supply Restrictions: Is there a known or estimated maximum supply
rate for the base due to pump capacities, line size, or other factors?
3. Water Source: What is the primary water source?
4. Treatment: How is the water treated (i.e., treatment process)?
5. Base-Dedicated Facilities:b
A) Which water source(s), treatment, storage or pumping facilities
provide support to the installation?
B) Are any of these sources, treatment, storage or pumping facilities
mostly or largely dedicated to supporting the base?
(Obtain additional information including locations and consider asking
the utility rep whether it’s possible to visit them.)
6. System Monitoring: Are there online monitors that alert operators to
problems with water quality, physical parameters, or operations?
7. Redundancies: What system redundancies support the base supply?
• Emergency/Back-up Water Source(s) (including interconnections
w/other water systems)
• Looping of Mains in the area of the base
• Redundant means to Pressurize the system
• Backup Treatment Process or Facility
• Emergency Power
• Other
(Note: Reliability may mitigate lack of redundancies)
8. Projected Changes That May Impact the Base: Are there any
projected changes may impact the supply of water to the installation,
either positively or negatively:
A) Changes in the source capacity or quality
B) Increasing water demands by other users
C) Infrastructure changes
D) Other changes?
(If yes, explain what they are and likely impacts.)
9. Threats: What threats likely pose the greatest risk to water supplied
to the base (natural disasters, accidents, & intentional incidents)?
10. System Security:b
A) How does the water utility feel about the security of the water
system? (Note: this open question is designed to prompt feedback on
the utility’s measures, e.g., fences, facility hardening, intrusion
detection, patrols, employee background checks, etc.).
B) Have there been any confirmed or suspected incidents of malicious
activity involving the system in recent years?
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
INTERVIEW GUIDE
USAFSAM #2 (Oct 12)
11. Base-Dedicated Water Line(s):b
A) At what point in the utilities system are transmission and/or
distribution line(s) supplying the installation dedicated exclusively (or
almost exclusively) to the installation? (If so, how long is the line and
what is the line diameter?
B) Are there access points that may be exploited for contaminant
introduction?
(Note: Unkown or varying direction of flow in a looped line makes any
contaminant introduction points more difficult to exploit.)
12. System Drawing: Is it possible to obtain a drawing of the water
supply lines near the base?
13. Services Agreement: What type of agreement does the installation
have with the Water Supplier? A) utility account, B) contract, C) services
agreement or D) other?
14. Notifications: How will the base be notified: A) if contamination of
the supply is suspected, or B) for scheduled or unscheduled disruptions in
water service?
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking & Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.1.2.1).
2) Checklist Applicability/Use: This questionnaire is designed to solicit key information from non-AF water suppliers to
help assessors understand the configuration of the system, and to help determine the overall reliability and security of the
system that AF operations are dependent on. See the WVA Guide, Appendix A (WVA Tactics for Non-AF Water Systems,
Privatized Systems, and Bottled/Bulk Water) for additional guidance.
3) WVA Benchmarks: Deficiencies
FOOTNOTES
aOff-Base
Water Supplier refers to water supplied from outside the base or AF boundary by a Private or Municipal Water
Utility, another DoD Component, or a Military Ally.
b“Deficiencies” in 5B, 10 and 11 fall under WVA benchmarks for physical security and access points.
ADDITIONAL NOTES
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
QUESTIONNAIRE
USAFSAM #3 (Oct 12)
Base Potable Water System Overviewa
DISCUSSION POINTS
1. Water System(s) Drawings: Review a working copy of the primary
system(s) with CE Utility personnel to:
A) Locate and highlight critical water assets & interconnections,
B) Determine if drawings are current.
2. Additional Water Systems: Do water utility personnel operate or
maintain any other potable or non-potable water systems for Military
Family Housing (MFH), irrigation, recreation areas, GSUs, etc.)?
(If support is provided to GSUs/other units, ask for a copy of HostTenant support or O&M support agreements, and review to determine
specific responsibilities.)
3. Water Source(s): Verify the raw water source(s) for the water
system(s) being assessed.
4. Aquifer Conduits: Are there any wells connected to the drinking
water aquifer that are not used for drinking, i.e., wells abandoned or
projected to be abandoned, monitoring wells, or non-potable wells?
(If yes, identify for random checks to ensure they are watertight &
secured.)
5. Treatment:
A) Describe all current treatment processes and locations (including
treatment provided by a non-AF or off-base supplier, if applicable).
B) How are operators alerted to a treatment failure or overdosing?
C) Are treatment chemicals delivered by a vendor or contractor?
(If yes, what is delivered, who delivers, & where is it delivered?)
6. Storage: (if applicable)
A) How often is stored water turned over (replaced with fresh water),
and what mechanism controls the turnover?
B) When were tank interiors last inspected, cleaned, or repaired?
7. Cathodic Protection: Are storage tanks or any other part of the
system equipped with cathodic protection to reduce metal corrosion
(i.e., tanks, water mains, etc.)?
(If yes, what is equipped, and is it operating effectively?)
8. Pressure (Distribution System):
A) What is the typical pressure (in psi) throughout the system?
B) Are there any areas of concern in the system regarding pressure
(i.e., too low, too high, or problems with water hammer)?
9. System Improvements:
A) Have there been any recent improvements to the system?
(If yes, describe.)
B) Are any projected? (If yes, describe and note status.)
C) Are any improvements needed that have not yet been sufficiently
recognized or addressed? (If yes, what and why necessary?)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
QUESTIONNAIRE
USAFSAM #3 (Oct 12)
DISCUSSION POINTS
NOTES
10. Water Utility Manning: Is the level of manning and proficiency
considered adequate to accomplish O&M responsibilities for the system?
(If not, why?)
11. Outsourcing: What work is outsourced to contractors (i.e.,
equipment repairs, installs, tests, or calibrations), and is the level of
performance adequate?
12. Privatization: Is privatization being considered or projected for the
potable water system(s)? (If yes, ask for details and status, and for a
copy of the Request for Proposals (RFP), if available, to compare
against WVA Checklist #8).
13. Operations Dependent on Uninterrupted Potable Water Supply:
Besides firefighting, what critical operations would be severely impacted
even by a temporary supply interruption (a few hours), e.g., vital
electronic/computer systems, MTF operations, etc.?
(Note: contact HVAC if stakeholders present cannot sufficiently answer.)
14. Water Supply Interruptions: Have there been any supply
interruptions (since the last WVA) that are considered significant?
(If yes, explain the circumstances, duration, and impacts.)
-
15. Water Main Breaks/Leaks: Are main breaks or system leaks and
associated outages or other impacts considered excessive?
(If yes, what are the primary causes and are they a particular problem in
a specific part of the system?)
16. Water Quality Problems: Have there been any treatment or quality
problems (since the last WVA) that are considered significant? (If yes,
explain.)
17. Threats: Besides intentional threats, are there any other credible
threats to the water source or system, i.e., natural disasters, major
accidents, drought, ground movement, HazMat spill or remediation sites,
sewage pits or lines, etc? (If yes, explain.)
18. Non-AF Supplied Water (i.e., for water supplied by municipal or
privately-owned utility, other DoD Component, or military ally):
A) Are there any particular problems with the supplier or water, e.g.,
water quality, treatment consistency, pressure, interruptions, etc.?
B) Are there any known projected changes in supplier operations that
may affect the base?
C) What is the working relationship with the supplier?
(Describe interactions and with whom.)
ADDITIONAL NOTES
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
QUESTIONNAIRE
USAFSAM #3 (Oct 12)
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.1.2.1).
2) Checklist Applicability/Use: This questionnaire is not a criteria checklist and is not intended to identify specific
deficiencies, but is designed to familiarize the assessor with the system(s) and any potential areas of concern prior to
running criteria-based checklists (4-17) and conducting the physical assessment, and to obtain information to update the
system description in the WVA report.
FOOTNOTE
aIncludes
all parts of the system on or off base, owned and/or operated by the AF or AF Privatization contractor/utility. Also
applies to systems not approved for consumption due to AT or other purposes, but still approved for other mission-critical
uses. For AF-operated systems, stakeholders generally include CEAN (Asset Management), CEC (Engineering), CEO
(Operations Flight), CEF (Fire Emergency Services) and CEP (Programs). Stakeholders may also include Maintenance
Engineering (in CEO or CEC). CEO is responsible for water system O&M, and is often the most familiar with the operations of
non-AF water suppliers (off-base municipal or privately-owned water suppliers). For privatized systems, interview personnel
with corresponding responsibilities.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #4 (Oct 12)
Water System Design/Integritya
CRITERIA
STATUS
FIRE FLOWS AND SYSTEM PRESSURE
1. Fire Flow Demands for Facilities/Operations without
Sprinklers (e.g., POL Tanks, Aircraft Refueling Areas, Housing,
etc.): [2(Sec 3-2), 14(Tables 2-11, 2-12, 2-13)]
Have been determined/calculated? (IAW UFC 3-600-01, 3-2)
Are met—as determined by comparing flow demands with flow
tests conducted in the last 5 years?
Hydraulic modeling studies, if available, show that pressure and fire
flow requirements are met during periods of high water demand?
2. System Pressure: [3(Sec 3.3.4.3), 6(Sec 4.4.5), 7]
Static pressures are at least 35 pounds per square inch (psi)?
Residual pressures are at least 20 psi?
High static pressures (e.g., >80 psi) or pressure surges are not
problematic (i.e., causing excessive damage or leaks)?
System pressure is easily monitored?
3. Fire Hydrants: Sufficient hydrants are spaced throughout the
system? [2(3-7.3.2)]
(Example: 300 ft. maximum intervals for aircraft hangars, parking &
servicing aprons, POL areas, & warehouses.)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
Y
N
N
NA
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
4. Water Supply:b
Alternative Water Source: A safe and reliable alternative water
source is readily available to meet the needs for all operational
modes? [1(3.4.2.4), 5(5.2.5.2 , 5.2.5.3)]
Multiple Purveyor Connections: When water is supplied
exclusively through connections with a municipal or privatelyowned water system, there are two or more supply connections?
[2(3-5.1), 5(6.1.3), 6(4.2.5)]
5. Transmission and Distribution Line Integrity:c
Line breaks, leaks, or water quality problems associated with the
condition of transmission and critical distribution system lines and
their connections are not excessive or problematic? [6(4.4.2)]
6. Electrical Power: For mission critical water system assets, e.g.
fire/booster/well pumps, treatment, Supervisory Control And Data
Acquistion (SCADA), etc., power meets at least one of the following
criteria: [2(3-6.4), 5(6.4.1), 11(5.1.6), 13(2.2.3.2)]
Is supported by dedicated emergency power generators?
Has connections to two independent electrical supplies (do not
have common generation, transmission or distribution)?
Electrical supply is highly reliable?d
If short (several hours to a day) disruptions of power can be
tolerated, is equipped with quick connect and supported by
portable generators?
(If supported by portable generators, what priority is assigned to
water system assets?)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PROGRAM REVIEW
CRITERIA
7. Overall Reliability:
The water system is considered highly reliable by owner/operators
and customers?
Lack of reliability of other system components do not have major
adverse impacts system operation?
System is free of choke points (single points of failure) or choke
points are mitigated by redundancy or high reliability?
8. Sustainability Plans: [4(10.3), 5(6.1.1)]
Water supply and infrastructure replacement, rehabilitation, and
modernization needs are identified in a long range Utilities Asset
Master Plan (AMP) or other equivalent to a Capital Improvements
Plan?
The Utilities AMP or equivalent includes major maintenance
projects?
USAFSAM #4 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
9. Flushing and Sampling Appurtenances: Are located on supply
lines entering the installation, to allow sampling and flushing of water
before it enters the distribution system? [1(Sec 3.4.2.3)]
10. System Looping and Bypasses: Are adequate to effectively limit
supply disruption impacts on firefighting and other mission-critical
operations? [2(Sec 3-7.1)]
11. Valve Integrity/Coverage: The number and locations of working
valves are adequate to effectively limit supply disruption impacts on
firefighting and other mission-critical operations? [2(3-7.2)]
SECURITY
12. Water Facility Construction Projects: Antiterrorism (AT) protective
features are included in the planning, design, and execution of minor
water facility renovation and new construction projects? [8(5.15.8),
9(2.17), 10(10), 12(4.9)]
ADDITIONAL NOTES
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #4 (Oct 12)
DESIGN & INTEGRITY CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Stakeholders: For AF-operated systems, stakeholders generally include CEAN (Asset Management), CEC
(Engineering), CEO (Operations Flight), CEF (Fire Emergency Services) and CEP (Programs). ). Stakeholders may also
include Maintenance Engineering (in CEO or CEC). For privatized systems, interview personnel with corresponding
responsibilities.
2) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.1.2.1).
3) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. For more stringent or additional design and integrity criteria
that may apply locally, check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/FGS, as applicable. In overseas areas, if a reference does not
apply, the criteria may still be applied as Best Practices (BPs). For privatized systems, determinations whether criteria
apply as requirements or BPs should be made locally, in conjunction w/utility contract monitor and Legal Office, as
appropriate. In some instances, criteria may not be practical to apply due to local circumstances. Use professional
judgment and if necessary, confer with subject matter experts. (See WVA Guide, Section 4.1.2.1 for additional guidance.)
4) Delineating Observations: Status markings of “No” indicate deficiencies. For efficiency and practicality purposes, some
deficiencies may be rolled up and combined with deficiencies identified on this or other checklists to represent a single
observation, when they apply to a particular functional area (e.g., firefighting) or specific asset (e.g., treatment system or
tank). Other deficiencies may not integrate effectively, and therefore warrant a single observation on their own merit. (See
the WVA Guide, Section 5.1 for additional guidance.)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1AFI
10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 3-600-01, Design: Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities
3UFC 3-230-02, Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems (prev. MIL-HDBK-1164), Jul 01
4AFI 32-1067, Water Systems, Mar 94
5HQ USAF Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA), Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 04-5: Design Recommendations for
Potable Water System Security, Aug 04 (FOUO)
6US EPA, Sanitary Survey Guidance Manual for Ground Water Systems, Nov 08
7Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
8DoDD 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program, Aug 03
9AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), Mar 09
10UFC 4-020-02FA, Security Engineering: Concept Design, Mar 05 (FOUO)
11AFI 32-1063, Electric Power Systems, Jun 05 (inc. Change 1, Jun 09)
12AWWA Std G430-09, Security Practices for Operation and Management, May 09
13AFI 10-211, Civil Engineer Contingency Response Planning, Sep 08
14UFC 3-600-02, Operations and Maintenance: Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems, Jan 01
2DoD
FOOTNOTES
aIntegrity:
Refers to the general condition and serviceability of infrastructure and equipment.
Water Source: Preferably, a source independent of the primary source, but can include multiple production points
(e.g., wells) if local stakeholders feel the raw water source (e.g., aquifer) is highly reliable. For bases dependent exclusively on
purveyor water, an alternative source can refer to redundancy in the purveyor supply, e.g., multiple production points or
interconnections with other purveyors. In some instances an alternative source may not be justified or practical; stakeholders
must weigh risk and cost. Factors to consider include, but are not limited to, mission-critical operations requiring a continuous
water supply and reliability of the existing source.
cPipeline Integrity: Line breaks and system leaks not only result in service disruptions and loss of water resources, but are
also potential contaminant entry points for surrounding soils or contaminated water in situations of no pressure or low pressure.
Corrosion on interior surfaces of metal water lines (particularly cast iron) can provide an environment conducive to the growth
and harboring of pathogens and biofilm, despite the presence of a chlorine residual.
dReliable Power Source: Reliable electric supply is defined in UFC 3-600-01, Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities 3-6.4 as
forced down time not exceeding 8 consecutive hours for any single incident and not exceeding 24 hours cumulative over the last
3 years. Depending on well capacities and water demand, emergency power may not be needed at all wells. If elevated
storage tanks maintain system pressure and storage capacity is sufficient, emergency power may not be needed for pumps. For
bAlternative
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #4 (Oct 12)
fire pumps only, when a reliable power source is not available, fire pumps must be diesel driven, or the fire pump equipped with
an automatic transfer switch and connected to an emergency generator (UFC 3-600-01, Sec. 3-6.4).
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4
PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #5 (Oct 12)
Water System O&M
CRITERIA
1. Backflow Prevention Program:
A) All Backflow Prevention Devices (BPDs) have been inspected
and tested within the past 12 months? [1(3.4.5.1), 2(8.1–8.4), 5(4.4.9)]
B)
All facilities and water-using equipment and systems have been
surveyed in the last 5 years to ensure all cross-connections have
been identified and are protected with appropriate devices?
[1(3.4.5.1), 2(7.1–7.4), 5(4.4.9)]
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
(Note: Five year surveys are usually contracted. Survey of 20% of
facilities per year is acceptable only if conducted and documented as a
comprehensive survey of facilities/equipment.)
C) For temporary connections to the water system: [1(3.4.5.1), 2(6.4),
11(9 &13)]
• Construction, grounds maintenance, and others (not including
(water utilities and fire personnel) are required to use a
designated hydrant or filling pointa equipped with a utilityowned and tested reduced pressure (RP) Backflow
Prevention Device (BPD)?
• BPDs protecting designated hydrants or filling pointsa used by
contractors are not accessible to users, e.g. are located
inside a locked structure or protected by a locked cage, to
prevent tampering?
(Note: User-installed BPDs or use of Air Gaps alone may meet
Sanitary Survey requirements, but are not acceptable for AT/Force
Protection purposes).
2. Storage Tank Inspections:
A) Potable Water Storage Tank Inspections: [1(3.4.4, 4(Table 47)]
• Tanks are inspected by owner/operator for corrosion,
structural defects, water quality problems, water level, etc.
semi-annually IAW UFC 3-230-02?
Notes: Frequency may be modified locally, but should be documented,
e.g. OI. Minimum recommended frequency is annually.
• Tanks are drained, cleaned and inspected every 3 to 5 years
IAW UFC 3-230-02, Table 47?
(Notes: Three/five year inspections are usually contracted. If divers are
utilized, tanks do not need to be drained. Frequencies may be
modified locally.)
• See UFC 3-230-02 for fiberglass and pneumatic tanks.
B) Water levels in potable water storage tanks are easily
monitored? (5, 9)
(Note: Monitoring parameter may be hydrostatic pressure, which is directly
related to water level, measured at/near the storage tank.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
USAFSAM #5 (Oct12)
CRITERIA
C) Non Potable Water Storage (Fire) Inspections: [6(Table 2-14)]
• Owner/operator inspections are completed annually?
• Internal inspection for condition, corrosion evaluations and
leaks every 3 years or 5 years?
D) Storage tank inspection results are documented and needed
maintenance is programmed and performed in timely manner?
E) (SS) Potable water is completely turned over with fresh water at
least every 3 to 5 days? [5(4.5.1)]
3. Cathodic Protection: For tanks and other water infrastructure
(e.g., pipelines or appurtenances), cathodic protection is being
tested and calibrated annually?b [8(Chap. 4)]
4. Wells:
A) Active and Temporarily Inactive Wells: are inspected for
sanitary & structural problems at least quarterly and are
maintained? [4(Chap. 4, Table 6)]
B) Abandoned Wells: The casing had been pulled, the bore hole
filled w/concrete, and the top sealed? [4(4.5.6), 5(4.2.2.3)]
C) Nonpotable Water Wells and Groundwater Monitoring Wells:
Wells have been secured?
5. Treatment Systems:
A) Operation & recurring maintenance, e.g., calibrations,
inspections, testing, cleaning, lubrication, etc. is accomplished
IAW manufacturer’s technical manuals and UFC 3-230-02?
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
[3(7.1), 4(Chap. 5)]
B) How are treatment processes monitored? Describe
C) Do alarms alert operators to treatment failures and malfunctions
(e.g. excessive dosing) 24/7? [1(3.4.3.3), 5(2.2.3.2)]
6. Isolation Valves: [1(3.4.5.3), 4(8.3, Table 25)]
A) Critical valvesc (treatment, storage, transmission and
distribution systems) are identified?
B) Critical valves are exercised annually and preventive
maintenance performed?
C) Other isolation valves are exercised periodically? (Every 2-3
years is typical)
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USAFSAM #5 (Oct12)
CRITERIA
7. Flushing: [1(3.4.5.2), 3(Draft), 4(7.3.2.2), 5(4.4.7)]
A) Water utilities plan for flushing transmission and distribution
system lines to maintain hydraulic conductivity and water quality
meets requirements of UFC 3-230-02, AFI 10-246 and AFI 321067?
B) Flushing plan has been coordinated with BE?
C) Transmission and distribution system lines are unidirectionally
flushed at least once every 5 years?
D) Lines that are more susceptible to corrosion, tuberculation,
suspended solids, or biofilm (e.g., cast iron) receive highvelocity, unidirectional flushing more frequently (annually) to
maintain hydraulic capacity and water quality?
8. Fire: [6(Tables 2-12, 2-13)]
A) Fire hydrants are inspected, operationally tested and preventive
maintenance performed every 2 years IAW UFC 3-600-02,
Table 2-12?
B) Fire Pumps, Hydrants, and Standpipes have been flow tested in
the past 5 years (including Static & Residual Pressure tests)?
(Note: testing 20% annually is OK.)
C) Fire pumps, hydrants and standpipes provide the required flows
and meet pressure requirements? (Cross-reference checklist 4)
D) Fire pumps are inspected and operationally tested at least
monthly IAW UFC 3-600-02, Table 2-13?d
9. GENERAL OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
A) Water system controls/monitors/alarms and security systems
(e.g., IDS or CCTV) are effectively operated and maintained?e
(9)
B) Off-Installation, remotely-located transmission and distribution
system lines (including portions of water purveyor-owned lines
dedicated to serving AF installations/facilities) are periodically
inspected along their route for leaks (back-siphonage hazards
and water losses), unauthorized connections, crossconnections, and other problems? (1,2,9,11)
C) Water system emergency and standby generators are
operationally tested at least monthly?f [7(7.1)]
D) All critical water system infrastructure is effectively operated and
maintained?
E) Periodic inspections and required maintenance is entered in the
Recurring Work Program (RWP)g (unless separately scheduled
and tracked, e.g. specialized software for BPD testing and fire
flows)? (Request an RWP print-out for all water system
activities to validate) [2(8.4), 3(10.3), 10(3, 10)]
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
3
USAFSAM #5 (Oct12)
O&M CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Stakeholders: For AF-operated systems, stakeholders include CEO (Operations) and CEX (Fire Emergency
Services). For privatized systems, interview personnel with corresponding responsibilities.
2) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.1.2.1).
3) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. For more stringent or additional O&M criteria that may
apply locally, check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/FGS as applicable. In overseas areas, if a reference does not apply, the
criteria may still be applied as Best Practices (BPs). For privatized systems, determinations whether criteria are applied as
requirements or BPs should be made locally, in conjunction with the utility contract monitor and Legal Office, as
appropriate. In some instances, criteria may not be practical to apply due to local circumstances. Use professional
judgment and if necessary, confer with subject matter experts. (See the WVA Guide, Sec 4.1.2.1 for additional guidance.)
4) Delineating Observations: Status markings of “No” indicate deficiencies. For efficiency and practicality purposes, some
deficiencies may be rolled up and combined with deficiencies identified on this or other checklists to represent a single
observation, when they apply to a particular functional area (e.g., firefighting) or specific asset (e.g., treatment system or
tanks). Other deficiencies may not integrate effectively, and therefore warrant a single observation on their own merit.
(See the WVA Guide, Section 5.1 for additional guidance.)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1AFI
10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
32-1066, Backflow Prevention Program, Oct 07
3AFI 32-1067, Water Systems, Mar 94
4UFC 3-230-02, Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems (prev. MIL-HDBK-1164), Jul 01
5US EPA, Sanitary Survey Guidance Manual for Ground Water Systems, Nov 08
6UFC 3-600-02, Operations and Maintenance: Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems, Jan 01
7AFI 32-1063, Electric Power Systems, Jun 05 (inc. Change 1, Jun 09)
8UFC 3-570-06, Operation and Maintenance: Cathodic Protection Systems, Jan 03
9Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
10AFI 32-1001, Operations Management, Sep 05
11US EPA Water Security Division, Evaluating Backflow Prevention as a Potential Water Security Strategy, Mar 06
2AFI
FOOTNOTES
aDesignated
Filling Points: Best Practices include use of non-potable water supplies vs. potable water system, if possible. If
utilizing the potable water system, locate filling points where activities can be easily observed, and in a part of system where
contamination would minimize impacts (e.g., dead-end, low-demand area, or at least downstream of critical populations). Also,
filling point BPDs should be enclosed within a hardened, locked facility or barrier (e.g., cage, fence, cover) to avert tampering.
bCathodic Protection System Maintenance: is often assigned to CE Exterior Electric (or equivalent).
cCritical Isolation Valves: valves that can shut down the potable water supply to the entire base, or large sectors of the base
(often located on transmission lines, and just inside the fence on incoming supply lines); includes valves used to control
Secondary or Emergency water supplies; critical valves may be located in vaults/pits or on Backflow Prevention Devices.
dFire Pump Operational Tests/Inspections: may be assigned to either CE Power Production or Plumbing Shop.
eElectronic Monitoring and Control Systems O&M: may be assigned to an Electric and/or Communications shop.
fGenerator Operational Tests/Inspections: may be assigned to CE Power Production.
gRecurring Work Program (RWP): a computerized maintenance management system. For active duty installations the RWP
used is typically either the Automated Civil Engineer System (ACES) or Interim Work Information Management System
(IWIMS). ANG installations may use the Integrated Engineering Management System (IEMS).
Note: For b, d, e, and f : As necessary, identify POCs for work centers and attempt to verify recurring maintenance
status.
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PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #6 (Oct 12)
Water System Security Operations
CRITERIA
(Owner/Operator)
1. Written Security Procedures a
A) Written Water System-Specific Security Procedures exist for utility
personnel to follow, e.g., access control measures, security inspections,
increased security measures during elevated FPCONs, etc.?
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
[1(3.7.6, A4), 2(Table 4.1, Fig 5.1), 3(5.1)]
(Note 1: If written security measures exist, ask for a copy to review; measures
should include, but are not limited to, criteria elements in this checklist.)
(Note 2: IAW References 1–3, security measures should be outlined in (or at
least cross-referenced to another document by) the Contingency Response
Plan (CRP), e.g., the CE CRP, or an independent Water CRP (WCRP).
B) Are operators instructed on their Roles & Responsibilities, e.g., security
of the water system, reporting security deficiencies, signs of intrusion,
vandalism, suspicious activity, and water quality problems, alarm
response procedures, etc.? [3(4.2, 4.3)]
2. Detecting Security Deficiencies and Malicious Activities
A) Critical Assets & Access Point Locationsb (e.g., wells, treatment
systems, pumps, tanks, and off-base supply main routes) are routinely
visitedc to assess barriers, locks, lighting, and to detect signs of
intrusion, vandalism, or suspicious activity? [1(3.4.1, A4), 3(4.6.4)]
(Notes: 1) Generally, under normal conditions and FPCON Alpha, visits should
at least be daily for those located off base, and those remotely located on base;
2) Add all locations, increase patrol frequency, and consider additional
measures for elevated FPCONs, as a Random Antiterrorism Measure (RAM) in
FPCON Bravo and routinely beginning in FPCON Charlie; 3) Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) is a supplemental security measure—not a substitute for security
inspections.)
B) Security-related Inspections are documented for each location,
especially during FPCON Charlie and Delta? [3(5.1)]
If yes, ask to see the documentation.
3. Controlling Access to Critical Water Facilities/Assets
A) Access to mission-critical assets and access points (wells, treatment,
pumps, tanks, etc.) are controlled and limited to essential personnel?
[1(3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.6), 3(4.6.5, 4.6.6)]
Contractors, visitors, and non-essential personnel are escorted or
otherwise supervised? [1(3.2.2, 3.2.6), 3(4.6.5, 4.6.6)]
B) An effective Lock Control program is in-place? 3(4.6.5)
(Note: Typical measures include: 1) Limit keys, access cards, or combinations
to essential employees; no loaners to contractors or non-essential employees,
2) Require employees sign keys/cards out and in daily, and 3) Critical locks,
combinations, or codes are changed when employees are fired, keys or access
cards are lost, and whenever compromise of their control is suspected.)
1
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #6 (Oct 12)
4. Control of System Connections/Cross-Connections
A) Filling Points:d
• Personnel (other than fire and water utilities) and contractors who
connect to the system (including grounds maintenance, construction,
pest management, etc.) are required to use designated filling points
protected by a testable Backflow Prevention Device (BPD)?
Y
N
NA
• The Backflow Prevention Device(s) (BPD) is installed, tested, and
secured by the water system owner/operator? [1(3.4.5.1), 4(Table 6-1), 5(9)]
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
• Use of designated fill points is included on contract inspection
checklists and is covered in pre-construction meetings? [1(3.4.5.1), 6]
Y
N
NA
• CE contract inspectors enforce use of designated fill points as part of
inspections? [1(3.4.5.1), 6]
Y
N
NA
• Local procedures for reporting unapproved connections by
contractors and organizations other than fire and water utilities are inplace? (6)
Y
N
NA
• Security Forces are aware of designated fill points and procedures for
reporting unapproved connections to the water system? (6)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
(Note: Air Gaps alone, or user-installed BPDs not acceptable for AT purposes.)
B) Contract Specifications for Temporary Connections: Specifications
requiring use of designated filling points equipped with system ownerinstalled BPD are included in contracts that may involve connections to
the water system (e.g., construction)? [1(3.4.5.1), 4(Table 6-1) 5(9)]
C) Enforcement of System Connection Limitations:
D) Background Checks:
[1(3.2.4.2), 3(4.6.6.1)]
• Are conducted for all new utility personnel?
• Contracts require background checks for unescorted contractors (and
subcontractors) who may connect to or work on the water system,
and background checks are completed prior to work?
E) FPCON Measures: Contractors (or subcontractors) and off-installation
users are prohibited from making connections or taps into the potable
water system during FPCONs Charlie and Delta? The specification is
included in applicable contracts? [1(A4.1.3.3), 8(Enc 4, E4.4.4.6)]
(Contractors may obtain water at designated fill stations protected by AF owned
and installed backflow prevention devices, if allowed by local procedures.)
(Note: If personnel indicate that specifications under 4.B), D), & E) are included
in contracts, ask for a copy of the contract specifications to review & validate.)
5. Water Treatment Chemicals
A) Delivery Inspections: Chemicals delivered by vendors are inspected by
receiving personnel upon delivery to verify proper chemicals and quality,
and to look for signs of tampering, leaks, or other irregularities?
[1(3.3.4.1.1), 3(4.6.5)]
B) Background Checks: Background checks of vendor employees who
deliver water treatment chemicals to the military locations are included in
specification in applicable contracts or purchase orders and background
checks are performed? [1(3.3.4.1.2), (6)]
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PROGRAM REVIEW
C) Storage: Bulk quantities of highly toxic treatment chemicals (e.g.,
fluoride or chlorine gas) are stored in a secure location that is 1)
separate from water system access points (e.g., treatment feed
containers/injection points, wells, etc.), and 2) away from large or
sensitive populations? [4( 4.4),6]
USAFSAM #6 (Oct 12)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
(Note: Storage of bulk quantities (e.g., ≥1 week’s supply) of highly toxic
chemicals at water access locations should be avoided to the extent possible.
Chemicals may be exploited as contaminant of opportunity and introduced into )
6. Safeguarding Sensitive Unclassified Information:
Practical measures are in place to control access to information that
could be useful in planning an attack (e.g., water system
drawings/schematics, data files, reports, photos, etc. that identify critical
assets & access points, their locations, limitations, or deficiencies)?
[3(4.8), 7(1.3)]
(Note 1: Measures may include, but are not limited to: 1) All requests for
drawings and other sensitive information are scrutinized; 2) Contractors and
other users are asked to destroy or delete information after use, or to return it; 3)
Organizational personnel delete or properly destroy applicable documents,
drawings, and storage media when no longer needed; 4) Access to the
information on the computer network/share drive is restricted to those who have
an official need to know or use for the information.)
(Note 2: Indications by personnel that the information is “already out there” do
not adequately justify why reasonable safeguards have not been implemented.)
ADDITIONAL NOTES
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Stakeholders: For AF-operated systems, stakeholders typically include CEO (Operations). For privatized
systems or systems operated by other DoD agency, interview personnel w/corresponding responsibilities.
2) Checklist Marking & Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking & handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.1.2.1).
3) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. For more stringent or additional criteria that may apply,
check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/FGS and local policy/procedures, as applicable. In overseas areas, if a reference does
not apply, the criteria may still be applied as Best Practices (BPs). For privatized systems, determinations whether criteria
apply as requirements or BPs should be made locally, in conjunction w/utility contract monitor and Legal Office, as
appropriate. Applicability may also need to be determined for operations controlled by other DoD agencies or military allies.
In some instances, criteria may not be practical to apply due to local circumstances. Use professional judgment and if
necessary, confer with subject matter experts. (See WVA Guide, Section 4.1.2.1 for more guidance.)
4) Delineating Observations: Status markings of “No” on this checklist indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up and
addressed as a single observation for “Water System Security Operations,” or deficient areas may warrant a single
observation on their own merit. Deficiencies may also be combined with those identified on other checklists to represent a
single observation, if they apply to the same functional area (e.g., O&M) or asset (e.g., Water Treatment System). (See the
WVA Guide, Section 5.1 for more guidance.) Note also that deficiencies on this particular checklist are often considered in
the Risk Analysis for observations associated with specific assets, i.e., treatment facilities, tanks, etc. For example, if
routine visits are not made to off-base assets, this may increase the likelihood & severity of an incident at these locations.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #6 (Oct 12)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1AFI
10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
USAF/ILEV, USAF Water Contingency Response Plan (WCRP) Guide, Oct 04
3American Water Works Association (AWWA) Standard G430-09, Security Practices for Operation and Management, May 09
4AWWA and American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Guidelines for the Physical Security of Water Utilities (reviewed and
sanctioned by US EPA), Dec 06
5US EPA Water Security Div, 817-R-06-001, Evaluating Backflow Prevention as a Potential Water Security Strategy, Mar 06
6Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
7AFI 10-701, Operations Security (OPSEC), Oct 07
2HQ
FOOTNOTES
aWritten
Security Procedures: A recommended outline for a Water Utility Security Plan can be found in AWWA Standard
G430-09, Security Practices for Operation and Management (Section 5.1.2), May 09. Another helpful reference for developing
procedures: DoD document UG-240-SHR, User’s Guide on Controlling Locks, Keys and Access Cards, Jul 00.
bCritical Water Assets/Access Points: Critical assets are essential to maintaining a safe and reliable supply of water in
sufficient quantities to meet mission needs; Critical access points are specific locations of concern for contaminating or
disrupting the water supply, and where security measures are typically focused, depending upon their accessibility and whether
existing measures are considered inadequate. Examples include valves in transmission mains or at critical interconnections,
exposed mains, and appurtenances attached to exposed or buried mains, e.g., BPDs, flushing valves (blow-offs), hydrants, etc.
Some critical assets are also considered critical access points, particularly wells, surface water intakes, storage tanks, and
treatment system locations.
cRoutine Visits: There is no specific AF criteria concerning how often critical assets & access points should be patrolled. The
following are AF Best Practices: for FPCON Normal and Alpha, visit critical water assets & access points located off base, and
at least those remotely located on base, at least daily to assess barrier integrity, locks, lighting, etc. and to identify and report
signs of intrusion, vandalism, or other suspicious activity. Add all critical assets/access point locations to patrols, increase patrol
frequency, vary patrol times and consider other security measures for elevated FPCONs, beginning at FPCON Bravo.
dFilling Points: Best Practices include use of non-potable water instead of the potable water system, if possible. If utilizing the
potable water system, locate filling points where activities can be easily observed and in a parts of system where contamination
would minimize impacts (e.g., in a dead-end, low-demand area, or at least downstream of critical populations). For locations too
distant from permanent filling points, Water Utilities temporarily equipping a hydrant with a BPD on a project basis may be a
workable solution and will improve customer acceptance and compliance. Also, filling point BPDs should be enclosed within a
hardened, locked facility or barrier (e.g., cage, fence, cover) to avert tampering.
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PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #7 (Oct 12)
Electronic Monitoring and Control Systema Operations
SYSTEM TYPE & DESCRIPTIONb
NOTES
Water Parameter Monitoring and Controlc
1. Parameters Monitored: What water physical or chemical parameters are
monitored? Examples: chlorine, pH, storage tank levels, pump or treatment system
operation, and system pressure.
2. Alarms: What parameters have visual or audible alarms? Examples: chlorine or
fluoride levels, treatment or pump failure, high/low tank level, high/low pressure.
3. Control Functions: What water system functions are controlled by the system?
Examples: pumps or treatment system on and off, valves open and close.
4. Monitoring/Control Location(s): Where is the system monitored & controlled
from, and who monitors it?
5. Maintenance:
• What types of recurring maintenance, calibrations, or tests are required on
equip. and components (e.g., probes, sensors, elec. components, software)?
• Who performs the maintenance, cal’s, tests, and repairs?
Water Security Monitoringc
1. Assets Covered: What water assets or facilities are equipped with or covered by
a security system?
2. Functions: Describe function(s)— Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Electronic
Access Control System (EACS), and/or Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)?
3. Monitoring:
• Where is the system monitored from, and who does it?
• What are the employee procedures for entry/exit of facilities equipped with
security systems?
• What are the response procedures for alarms?
4. Maintenance:
• What types of recurring maintenance/tests are accomplished on security
system components and who performs them?
• Who makes repairs?
GENERAL CRITERIAc
1. System Reliability: Is the overall system (or systems) free of
problematic or recurring failures and malfunctions (including
false/nuisance alarms)? (3, 6) If no, explain/discuss potential fixes.
2. Maintenance Support: Are repairs, maintenance, and
upgrades performed adequately and timely on computer
hardware/software, com equip, and remote monitors, alarms, and
controls? [6, (8 also for security systems, e.g., IDS]) If not, explain.
3. Back-up Equipment/Spare Parts: Are sufficient back-up
components/parts readily available for computer hardware/
software, controls, and remote communications equipment,
monitors, alarms, and control components? (2, 5, 8)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
1
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PROGRAM REVIEW
4. Back-up/Emergency Power: Is emergency. power available
for all components critical to the safe and uninterrupted operation
of the water system, including water assets (pumps, treatment
systems, etc.), critical computers, monitors, and alarms? (3,5)
5. Work-Arounds: Can the water system function safely and
reliably if part of, or the entire Monitoring/Control System fails? (5)
Explain why or why not, and identify work-arounds.
USAFSAM #7 (Oct 12)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR COMPUTER-BASED SYSTEMS
(Note: the system security manager or administrator is typically the SME for these items)
CRITERIA
6. System Administrator/Security Manager: Is provided
sufficient authority and time to effectively implement and oversee
security activities, e.g., controlling access/privilege restrictions,
updating security software, etc.? (1, 4)
7. Access Restrictions: System access is restricted to
personnel on a need-to-have basis? (2, 5, 7)
8. System Privileges/Permissions: Are restricted by function
on a need-to-have basis (e.g., monitoring functions only, vs.
monitoring and control functions)? (1)
9. Passwords: Individual password/logins are required for
system access, and periodic changes are required? (2)
10. Log-in Monitoring: Log-ins are recorded and routinely
audited to detect unauthorized/improper access or use? (1)
11. Network Isolation: The system is closed or isolated from
other network connections as great a degree as possible? (1, 2)
12. Cyber Security Software Programs: The system is
considered adequately protected from unauthorized intrusions (via
Internet, phone lines, RF, etc.) with appropriate measures (i.e.,
firewall, intrusion detection, anti-virus, other)? (1, 2, 7)
13. Security Upgrades/Patches: Security features of the
system are periodically upgraded/patched? (1)
14. Intrusion Response: Incident response procedures are in
place to respond to a suspected system cyber intrusion? (1, 5)
15. Remote Access by Vendor or Maintenance Company:
Remote access by the vendor or maintenance company is not
possible or is never allowed? If response is not Yes, then:
A) Access is controlled each time by validating service need and
validating company personnel requesting access, and
B) Access is always manually established, then terminated
immediately after servicing is complete (e.g., by use of a callback system, or connecting then disconnecting the modem,
wireless card, or phone jack)? (1, 2)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
2
PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #7 (Oct 12)
ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR SECURITY SYSTEMSc
CRITERIA
STATUS
16. Field Tests: Are accomplished at least quarterly to verify
proper operation of detection sensors and alarms? (3, 5, 8)
17. Alarm Monitoring: Alarms are monitored 24/7? (6)
18. Written Procedures: Are followed for entering/exiting areas
equipped w/intrusion detection, responding to alarms, etc.? (6)
19. Recording and Resolving Alarms: Are all alarms recorded,
followed-up, and resolved (including false/nuisance alarms)? (7)
20. CCTV Darkness Capability: For assets monitored by CCTV,
is lighting adequate to assess the threat during darkness? (7)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
ADDITIONAL NOTES
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Stakeholders: For AF-operated systems, stakeholder is typically CE Operations (CEO); if the system is
computer-based, then the system security manager/administrator is also a stakeholder. For privatized systems, interview
operator personnel with corresponding responsibilities. Note: For some information, primary stakeholders may defer to
maintenance personnel and/or the individuals responsible for monitoring water system and/or security system operations
and/or alarms (which may be monitored by CEO, CEX Fire Emergency Services, and/or SF personnel).
2) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.;
otherwise, working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Sec 4.1.2.1).
3) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. For more stringent or additional criteria that may apply
locally, check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/FGS and local policies or regulations, as applicable. In overseas areas, if a
reference does not apply, the criteria may still be applied as Best Practices (BPs). For privatized systems, determinations
whether criteria are applied as requirements or BPs should be made locally, in conjunction with the utility contract monitor
and Legal Office, as appropriate. In some instances, criteria may not be practical to apply due to local circumstances.
Use professional judgment and if necessary, confer with subject matter experts. (See WVA Guide, Sec 4.1.2.1 for
additional guidance.)
4) Delineating Observations: Status markings of “No” indicate deficiencies. Options: for efficiency and practicality
purposes, some deficiencies may be rolled up and combined with deficiencies identified on this checklist, or other
checklists to represent a single observation when they apply to a particular functional area (e.g., O&M) or specific asset
(e.g., treatment system or tanks). Some deficiencies on this checklist may warrant a single observation on their own
merit. (See the WVA Guide, Section 5.1 for additional guidance.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #7 (Oct 12)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1Dept
of Energy (DOE), 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks, No Date
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, Securing Your SCADA and Industrial Control Systems, V1.0, 2005
3DoD O-2000.12-H, DoD Antiterrorism Handbook (Chap’s 22.5.3.12–22.5.5), Feb 04 (FOUO)
4Sandia National Laboratories, Sustainable Security for Infrastructure SCADA, 2003
5AFCESA, Eng Tech Letter (ETL) 04-5, Design Recommendations for Potable Water System Security, Aug 04 (FOUO)
6Best Practices identified by AF vulnerability functional experts (USAFSAM/OEHRV)
7Joint Staff/Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Vulnerability Assessment Benchmarks, Jan 08
8American Water Works Association (AWWA) Standard G430-09, Security Practices for Operation and Management, May 09
2DoD,
FOOTNOTES
aWater
Monitoring and Control System: provides remote control and/or monitoring of water system functions and
parameters and/or security via telemetry (i.e., cable, telephone line, radiofrequency [RF], or other mode). Water parameters
or functions controlled or monitored can include tank levels, valves, water pumps or treatment chemical dosing pumps,
disinfectant or other chemical concentrations, pH, pressure, and/or flow rates. The same system or a separate system may
also monitor and control an intrusion detection system [IDS], electronic entry control [EEC] system, and/or closed-circuit
television [CCTV]). A Monitoring and Control System can be a computerized Supervisory Control and Data Automation
(SCADA) system, or a less sophisticated, computerized or non-computerized system. SCADA systems (also referred to as
Distributed Control Systems [DCS] or Process Control Systems [PCS]) are equipped with software that allow remote
monitoring and control of system functions and parameters, and they record data (data acquisition) for later review,
processing, and/or reporting. A SCADA system sometimes takes the form of an Energy Monitoring and Control System
(EMCS), which is designed to reduce installation energy and manpower needs for utility, facility environment, and even
security systems by providing centralized control, monitoring, and data acquisition. Other, less sophisticated monitoring and
control systems (i.e., non-SCADA) may allow limited remote and/or automated operation of water pumps or treatment
processes, or alarms for security, pump failure, pressure loss, high/low tank levels, etc.). These systems may be
computerized with no data acquisition, or they may not be computerized at all. Well or booster pumps triggered automatically
by a simple tank level switch or system pressure switch is a common example of a simple, non-computerized system.
bSystem Type & Description: Questions are designed to aid in determining system capabilities, criticality, & responsibilities.
bWVA
Benchmarks: Deficiencies will use appropriate system reliability, O&M and security benchmarks.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4
PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #8 (Oct 12)
Water System Contingency Response
CRITERIA
STATUS
NOTES
CEO (or Contract Operator)
1. Water Contingency Response Plan (WCRP):a,b
(Note: Obtain copies of the Water Contingency Response plan (WCRP), CRP and/or supporting plans and checklists for review
outside of interviews. Validate that elements listed below are addressed or cross-referenced to plans where they are adequately
covered. If planning assumptions are unrealistic, or if BE and CE response actions are not integrated, elements are not adequately
addressed.)
A) A Water Contingency Response Plan has been developed and
implemented for systems with a service population of 25 or greater, either
as a stand-alone plan, or included in appropriate base response,
contingency and recovery plans? [1(Reference q), 2]
B) At a minimum the WCRP addresses potable water system-related
contingencies for: [3(5.3.5), 4(4.4, Table 4.1)]
• Water service disruption threats and hazards inc. natural disastersc
What are the estimated recovery times for various scenarios?
• Intentional and non-intentional contamination
• Failure, misrepresentation, and manipulation of the water system’s
utility monitoring and control system or equivalent supervisory
control and/or data acquisition system
C) The following elements are adequately addressed in the WCRP or in
cross-referenced installation/CE plans and/or water utilities supporting
plans and checklists: [3(5.4), 4(4.4, Table 4.1)]
1) The WCRP or equivalent plans include an inventory of credible
intentional and non-intentional contamination and service disruption
threats and hazards addressed
2) Descriptive inventory of installation specific Emergency Response
Plans (ERPs), checklists and other guidance documents relevant to
water contingency response
3) Description of water purveyor-owned water systems and any critical
components/control points for supplying water to the installation
4) Descriptive inventory of installation water system components and
control points for response to water system contingencies including
supporting electrical system elements
5) Initial threat warning and evaluation plan
6) Immediate operation response action, characterization and sampling
plan
7) BE response and sample analysis plan (cross reference BE plans)
8) Remediation and recovery plan
9) Demand reduction plan and priority return to service list
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROGRAM REVIEW
CRITERIA
D) Do response guides adequately address response actions for water
contamination and service disruption events based on likely hazards and
threat scenarios. Response guides include the following elements:b (3, 4)
1) List of response organizations, functional positions, phone numbers
and areas of responsibility
2) Initial threat warning and evaluation tasks
3) Immediate operation response action, characterization and sampling
tasks (sampling cross referenced to BE plans)
4) Public health response tasks
5) Remediation and recovery tasks
6) Drawings/photographs of critical components for task
implementation
E) Are additional sub-elements specified by the WCRP Guide addressed in
the WCRP or in cross-referenced installation/CE plans and/or water utilities
supporting plans and checklists: [4(4.4), Table 4.1)]
1) System specific information:
o Written description of treatment, storage and distribution
processes and protocols
o Key information such as isolation points, single points of failure,
shut-off/shut-down procedures, system shortfalls, normal and
alternate modes of equipment operation and work-arounds
o Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for repair and
replacement of critical system components and equipment
o SOPs for procedures such as flushing, disinfection, sampling and
containing/treating/discharging contaminated water
2) Roles and Responsibilities:
o List of key water system operations staff and alternates, and
emergency response training
3) Communications Procedures:
o Primary and alternate communications procedures and protocols
o External notification protocols and contact lists including
notification sequence, resource requests, regulatory notifications
and response assistance requestsd
o Public and customer notifications including health alerts, protocols
for addressing consumer water quality complaints and list of
priority usersd
4) Personnel safety including emergency equipment (PPE) and
procedures/safety measures for flushing/handling and sampling of
contaminated water (actual and suspected)
5) Alternate water sources/supplies: Emergency water demands and
alternate potable and nonpotable water sources and protocols for
use
6) Replacement equipment and supplies:
o Inventory of water system equipment and supplies with
locations/sources and procedures for procurement
o Mutual aid agreements
USAFSAM #8 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
2
PROGRAM REVIEW
CRITERIA
E) Additional sub-elements (Cont)
7) Property protection: Security processes and protocols, including
procedures for increased FPCON and reporting for intrusion
detection (see also checklist 6)
8) Action Plans (General Response Action Plans and Response
Guides)
o Response action plans include sequential tasks/actions for water
system emergencies
o Responses are tailored to type of emergency (minor including line
breaks, natural disastersc and major accidents, and intentional
attack)
o Response guides address isolation, flushing, containment,
storage, treatment and disposal of contaminated water
2. WCRP Review: The WCRP has been reviewed within the past 12
months, and the information is current? [4(4.3.1)]
(Note: Review document date and plan information to validate.)
3. Water System Drawings: Critical water assets and valve locations are
shown, and drawings are up-to-date? [5(3.4.1.4)]
4. Resources: Sufficient equipment, parts, tools, and supplies are on hand,
or are readily accessible to handle possible water contingencies (including
power disruptions)? [6(5.1)]
5. Base Disaster Exercises: At least annually, disaster response exercises
include scenarios that simulate water system damage and/or contamination of
the water supplies? e [5(2.25.10, 3.5.1)]
USAFSAM #8 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
(Note: Because response to system contamination is more challenging, exercise of
scenarios involving contamination of the water system is recommended to fully test CE
and BE response capabilities. Exercises may be table-top and/or field exercises.)
Bioenvironmental Engineering (BE)
6. BE WCRP Elements:b BE-specific WCRP elements and subelements/tasks are adequately addressed in the WCRP, the BE Annex to the
Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP) or in supporting BE response
binders, references and checklists? (See item Question 1 above, elements
C.6, C.7, D.3, E.1, E.3, E.4, E.6). [5(3.5.2), 3(5.3.5), 4, 8(A2.7.6)]
7. FPCON Monitoring:
A) Monitoring during elevated FPCON is included in the WCRP or MCRP,
or in supporting BE response plans, response binders or checklists? (1, 5, 7)
B) If the BE monitoring sub-element for elevated FPCON is conditional
[based on a threat assessment or Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG)
direction], is FPCON monitoring consistent with base antiterrorism (AT)
plans/instructions? (1, 5, 7)
[Note: Most installation AT plans/instructions require increased monitoring (do not
state if required or similar) starting at FPCON Charlie and as a Random
Antiterrorism Measure (RAM) in Bravo.]
C) Monitoring points are identified in the water system, including upstream
points that, to the extent possible, provide time to perform analyses, isolate
suspect water and notify consumers before contaminant reaches consumer
points of use? (9)
CRITERIA
STATUS
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
3
PROGRAM REVIEW
8. Contingency Monitoring Methods:f
• Include bacteriological, disinfectant residual, pH, M-272, and
conductivity (or total dissolved solids [TDS])? [5(A4.1.3), 8(Tbl 3-3), 9]
• Include broad-spectrum, acute toxicity screening (e.g., ECLOX,
MICROTOX, etc.)? [8(Tbl 3-3), 9]
9. Contingency Monitoring Resources: Sufficient quantities of test kits,
reagents, accessories/parts, sampling containers, preservatives, and other
essential supplies are on hand, are serviceable and where applicable, have
not exceeded their expiration dates? [5(3.7.5), 10(3.2.1, 3.2.2)]
10. Baseline Water Quality Parameters/Characteristics: [5(3.4.6.1),10(3.4)]
• Have been recorded to allow potential contamination events to be
recognized during subsequent routine and contingency monitoring
activities?
• On-going routine monitoring for acute health hazards (disinfectant
residual, coliforms, etc.) meets all primacy agency requirements (EPA,
state, OEBGD, FGS as applicable)?
11. Tank Sampling: Raw or treated water storage tanks are equipped with
taps to allow direct sampling of the top, middle, and lower strata of the tanks,
or BE is equipped to sample strata with bailer, bomb, Kemmerer-type
samplers or similar drop lines? [5(3.4.4.3),9]
12. Readiness Training: Personnel are sufficiently trained to use all
available contaminant testing and analytical methods to detect and quantify
CBRN agents? [5(3.5.3), 8(7.2.4, table 7.5)]
13. Water Contaminant Information Tool (WCIT) Registration: One or
more BE personnel are registered to access EPA’s online database “Water
Contaminant Information Tool (WCIT)”? [9, 11(5, Step 2)]
USAFSAM #8 (Oct 12)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
(Note: It may take 1-2 weeks to receive approved access; register at
https://cdx.epa.gov/SSL/CDX/regwarning.asp?Referer=registration.)
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Stakeholders: For AF-operated systems, stakeholders include CEO (Operations) and CEX (Emergency
Management). For privatized systems, interview the contracted system operator.
2) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see Water Vulnerability Guide, Section
4.1.2.1).
3) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. For more stringent or additional criteria that may apply
locally, check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/FGS, as applicable. In overseas areas, if a reference does not apply, the criteria
may still be applied as Best Practices (BPs). For privatized systems, determinations whether criteria apply as
requirements or Best Practices should be made locally, in conjunction with Utility Contract Monitor and Legal Office, as
appropriate. In some instances, criteria may not be practical to apply due to local circumstances. Use professional
judgment and if necessary, confer with subject matter experts. (See WVA Guide, Section 4.1.2.1 for additional guidance.)
4) Delineating Observations: Status markings of “No” indicate deficiencies. For efficiency and practicality purposes, some
deficiencies may be rolled up and combined with deficiencies identified on this or other checklists to represent a single
observation when they apply to a particular functional area (e.g., “Contingency Response”). Other deficiencies may not
integrate effectively, and may warrant a single observation on their own merit. (See the WVA Guide, Section 5.1 for
additional guidance.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4
PROGRAM REVIEW
USAFSAM #8 (Oct 12)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1DoDI
2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, Oct 06 (inc. thru Change 2, Dec 06)
USAF/SGO, Air Force Policy on Potable Water Vulnerability Assessments and Emergency Response Plans, Oct 03
3HQ AFCESA, Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 12-1 (Change 1): Recommendations for Incorporating Water System
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Requirements, Jan 12
4HQ USAF/ILEV, USAF Water Contingency Response Plan (WCRP) Guide, Oct 04
5AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
6AFI 10-211, Civil Engineer Contingency Response Planning, Sep 08
7AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), Mar 09
8AFI 41-106, Unit Level Management of Medical Readiness Programs, Apr 08 (inc. thru Change 2, Jul 09)
9Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability and contingency monitoring functional experts
10US EPA, Response Protocol Toolbox, Module 3, Site Characterization and Sampling Guide, Dec 03
11US EPA, Water Security Handbook: Planning for & Responding to Drinking Water Contamination Threats & Incidents, Apr 06
2HQ
FOOTNOTES
a Required plan elements
are grouped by reference with ETL 12-1 (reference 3) having precedence over the WCRP Guide
(reference 4). The assessor should evaluate whether the WCRP, regardless of plan organization (stand-alone, CRP/MCRP
elements, supporting checklists, response guides, etc.), adequately covers all of the required/recommended elements and
“sub-elements”. Stand-alone plans developed to meet one time requirements of the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 that have not
been kept up to date and/or are effectively not in use should not be considered.
bTogether, CE and BE elements make up the whole of the WCRP, and can be included in a single, stand-alone document.
Instead of a stand-alone document, the WCRP may be written and maintained as separate plans or as elements of the CRP
and MCRP with appropriate cross references. Aspects of the WCRP in references 3 and 4 that are too detailed for inclusion in
formal plans should be included in supporting checklists, response guides, response binders or references maintained by BE
or Water Utilities, respectively. Regardless of whether the WCRP is maintained as a stand-alone plan, BE and CE should
coordinate on WCRP organization and the information included, and both should maintain copies of all elements.
cEffective contingency response (and recovery) from natural disasters (tornadoes, hurricanes, flooding, earthquakes, droughts,
etc.) and other incidents that do not directly involve terrorism, reduce the time period over which water system may be more
susceptible to terrorist incidents and/or is not capable of supporting response to terrorist incidents.
dPublic notification and health alerts are BE responsibilities, while investigation of consumer water quality complaints may be
investigated by CE, BE or jointly by CE and BE, depending on the situation and complaint. ETL 12-1 (Change 1) and the
WCRP Guide mirror EPA guidance. EPA guidance is tailored to municipal and private water utilities where monitoring and
public health notifications are handled by the utility.
eAFI 10-246, para 3.5.1 requires exercise of scenarios for both food and water, while 2.25.10 requires exercise for scenarios
for food or water.
fTravel time and restrictions on movement during FPCON Charlie may make contingency monitoring at locations without
assigned BE personnel, such as geographically separated and supported units and locations, impractical. Other options for
contingency monitoring include, but are not limited to: 1) limited contingency monitoring (disinfectant residual, pH, possibly
conductivity) performed by CE or other on site personnel, 2) sample collection by on-site personnel for delivery to BE for
analysis and 3) owner/operator physical security may mitigate need for contingency FPCON monitoring.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
5
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #9 (Oct 12)
Surface Water Sourcea
CRITERIA
1. Physical Barriers: The surface water source and associated
water system assets are effectively secured and include as
necessary? (1,2,3,4,5)
A) An independent see-through fence equipped with barbed or
razor wire out-riggers or other stand-off barrier enclosing the
intake point (or water body) and associated components that
effectively restricts access?b
B) Is found to be locked?c
C) Is free of damage, defects, or man-passable gaps (≥ 6
inches)?
A) Is clear of vegetation/objects that can aid climbing or
concealment?
2. Signage: Clearly indicates restricted access/warning, but does
not identify asset or indicate function (and, if off-base, AF/base
affiliation)? (4,5,6)
3. Illumination:d (4,5,6)
A) Is in working order?
B) Is activated automatically by darkness or motion sensor?
C) Enables effective observation of activities surrounding the
intake structure from outside the area during darkness?
4. Enhanced Security: Are there any security “enhancements”
(beyond basic security, e.g. IDS, cameras, DoD high security
locks, electronic access control, door/window alarms, motion
sensors, etc.) in place? (1,2,5,6) If yes, list
5. Isolation Valves: (1,2,5,7)
A) Critical valves are effectively secured to prevent tampering?e,f
B) Are not leaking or flooded (posing a hazard associated with
siphonage/backflow and excessive corrosion and failure)?
6. Condition of Components: Intake structure including screen,
conduit, pump (if integrated/collocated), valves, etc. and any
supporting structure/components appear properly maintained and
in good physical/working condition? (3,7)
7. Intake Configuration: (3,7)
A) Intake is designed to withdraw water at various depths, or can
move vertically as necessary, to accommodate fluctuating
surface water levels and variations in water quality?
B) Intake is designed/situated to avoid physical damage from
debris, ice, watercraft, etc., and clogging or damage due to
excessive silt or sand loads?
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
8. Contaminant Sources:g (3,7)
A) Refuse or debris are not present/have not accumulated
accumulated at the intake?
B) There are no signs of water contamination in the area of the
intake?
C) There are no nearby contamination sources that lack appropriate
controls for spills/leaks or discharges, e.g., TIC/TIM or HazMatrelated activities or processes, sewage/wastewater outfalls or runoff, agricultural/animal activity run-off, etc.?
9. Access Points: (2,6)
A) Assets do not have unnecessary connection points (valves,
piping, etc) that can easily be exploited for intentional contaminant
introduction?
B) Necessary connection points that can be exploited for intentional
contaminant introduction are secured (locked vaults, inside fence
or locked facility, etc.)?
10. Onshore Components/Access Points: Note: Surface water
pumps, treatment systems, and other critical assets or water access
points located onshore should be enclosed within a secure secondary
barrier/structure and can be assessed using Checklist #13, Water
Pumps & Miscellaneous Assets/Facilities.
USAFSAM #9 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
N/A
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
SURFACE WATER CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.2.2.2). Consider
using generic/nonspecific identifiers, e.g., a number that corresponds with the order asset was visited/assessed.
2) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. Check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/Foreign Governing
Standards (FGS) as applicable for more stringent or additional criteria that may apply. Due to unique circumstances, criteria
may not always be practical to apply; if necessary, confer with subject matter experts (SMEs) and use professional judgment
to determine status (and, if applicable, appropriate recommendations).
3) Delineating Observations: ‘No” status markings indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up into a single observation. An
observation may also encompass multiple assets/facilities—when they are similar in function, have similar control
deficiencies, and pose a similar level of risk.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #9 (Oct 12)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1AFI
10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 04-5, Design Recommendations for Potable Water System Security, Aug 04
3US EPA, Guidance Manual for Conducting Sanitary Surveys of Public Water Systems: Surface Water and Ground Water Under
the Direct Influence (GWUDI), Apr 99
4Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-020-02FA, Security Engineering: Concept Design, Mar 05 (inc. Change 1, May 06)
5American Water Works Association (AWWA) and American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Guidelines for the Physical
Security of Water Utilities (reviewed and sanctioned by US EPA), Dec 06
6Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
7UFC 3-230-07A, Water Supply: Sources and General Considerations, Jan 04.
2AFCESA
FOOTNOTES
aChecklist
Applicability: Surface Water Intakes used for potable water purposes. Surface water includes rivers, streams,
lakes, ponds, impoundment reservoirs, seas, and oceans. If a portion of the intake structure is enclosed within a facility, use
Checklist #13, Pumps & Miscellaneous Assets/Facilities. For nearby Transmission Lines that are exposed or that have access
points (e.g., isolation valves, meters, flushing valves [blow-offs], air release valves, BPDs, etc.), use Checklist #14, Water Supply
Pipelines.
bPhysical Barriers: Independent barriers for surface water intakes may not be necessary (but may still be recommended) when
the risk is not considered high; for example, when the water source is located within the confines of a base with effective control
of access.
cLocks: If justifiable (typically assets that are especially critical or are located off-base or in a remote area), use integrated,
tamper-resistant locking mechanisms (e.g., tamper-resistant dead-bolts) or high-security padlocks and hasps (that are securely
anchored) IAW AFCESA ETL 04-5. High-security padlocks and hasps are only as effective as doors or barriers the locks secure.
See the following DoD Website for more information on high-security padlocks and hasps: http://www.dscp.dla.mil/gi/locks/.
dIllumination: One (1) footcandle (fc) within 50′ radius of asset IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (1 fc is generally sufficient to read the
text on this checklist once eyes are acclimated). A proper assessment often requires visiting the site during darkness. 0 Note:
some locations may choose to restrict lighting where attack by mortar/other propelled munitions is credible, or when the site is in
a remote area where lights may draw unwanted attention to the asset, while providing little benefit in deterring/detecting
intruders. Consider trade-offs.
eIsolation Valves: For critical valves with affixed handles—secure in vaults (w/locks or keyed bolts), remove or chain valve
handles, and/or install a locked cage/enclosure around the valve handles. For valves that are below grade and require a tool to
operate (e.g., T-wrench)—secure the valve box cover.
fHardening: Effective use of construction techniques & materials and security hardware to impede intrusion attempts. Often
involves use of steel and/or concrete (but not exclusively) securely anchored by welds or fasteners (e.g., bolts) designed to avert
removal using standard tools. May include structural modifications and/or off-the-shelf retrofits. See the following EPA Website
for more information on hardening and product sources: http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/guide/tableofcontents.cfm.
gContaminant Sources: Utilizing Bank Filtration or an Infiltration Gallery increases protection against intentional and accidental
contamination. See references 2 (Sec 5.2.5) and 3 (Sec 3.1.8) for more information.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #10 (Oct 12)
Wellsa
CRITERIA
1. Fence: The well and associated water system assets are surrounded by
an independent barrier, as necessary?b (1,2,3,4,7)
A) An independent, see-through fence at least 7 feet high and topped by
barbed outriggers and/or razor wire?
B) Gates are found to be locked?c
C) Is free of damage, defects, or man-passable gaps (≥ 6 inches)?
D) Is clear of vegetation/objects that can aid climbing or concealment?
2. Signage: Clearly indicates restricted access/warning, and does not
identify asset or indicate function (and, if off-base, AF/base affiliation)? (1,4,7,8)
3. Illumination:d (1,2,4,8)
A) Is provided and in working order?
B) Is activated automatically by darkness or motion sensor?
C) Enables observation of activities surrounding the asset from outside
the area during darkness?
4. Exterior Power Switch, Controls, & Critical Wiring:e
A) Are judged to be effectively secured?c (4,8)
B) Well maintained/in good condition? (5,7)
5. Exterior Isolation Valves:f (2,3,4,5,7)
A) Critical valves are effectively secured to prevent tampering?b,c (2,3,4)
B) Are not leaking or flooded (posing a hazard associated with backsiphonage/backflow, and excessive corrosion and failure)? (5,7)
6. Well Enclosure:
A) The well (and any collocated pumps, treatment system, chemicals, or
injection points) are housed in a fully enclosed structure? (2,7,8,10 )
B) Enclosure is found to be secure (locked)?c
7. Doors, Hatches, & Other Designed Entryways:g [1,2,3(3.2.1),4]
A) Are found to be locked?c
B) For doors with hinges on the outside, hinges equipped such that hinge
pins can not be removed when door is closed?
C) Judged to be sufficiently hardened to hinder forced entry?h
8. Windows, Vents, & Other Openings:i [1,2,3(3.2.1),4]
A) Are found to be secure?
B) Have an area not more than 96 in2 or are effectively hardened with
metal bars or grilles (not screens) that are well-anchored?
C) Are masked or otherwise designed to obscure interior
assets/processes?
9. Facility/Structure Walls, Roof, & Floor: Are judged to be designed,
constructed, and in a condition that does not enable easy penetration/forced
entry using simple hand tools? [1,2, 3(3.2.1)]
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
(Note: conventional construction methods and materials can be used, but masonry
and/or steel is preferred.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
10. Enhanced Security: (2,3,4,8)
A) Are there any security “enhancements” (beyond basic security, e.g.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), cameras, DoD high security locksc,
electronic access control, door/window alarms, motion sensors, etc.) in
place? If yes, list
B) IDS or door/window alarms are provided for high-risk wells?j
C) IDS and door/window alarms alert operators or security 24/7?
D) Works properly and effectively? (Note: ask operators to test/demo IDS.)
11. Wellhead:
A) Construction effectively discourages tampering, especially
contaminant introduction, and is sealed/watertight (no cracks/openings
except for air vent)? (3,7,8)
B) (Sanitary Survey) Extends above floor/surface at least 12 inches? (8,10)
C) Floor/surface area slopes away from wellhead? (7,8,10)
12. Wellhead Air Vent: (3,7,8)
A) Vent opening faces downward and is at or above the top of the
wellhead?
B) (SS) Is covered by a corrosion-resistant mesh screen?
C) If located off base, outdoors, or within a facility/enclosure that lacks
adequate physical security—vent components are judged to be effectively
secured/hardened?h
13. Wellhead/Borehole Access Ports: (3,4,7,8)
A) Are tightly/snugly capped?
B) If located off base, outdoors, or within a facility/enclosure that lacks
adequate physical security—port components are judged to be
secured/hardened?h
14. Well Appurtenances: The well is equipped for: (3,7,8)
A) Flushing and sampling of untreated water (e.g., hose bib)?
B) With a Backflow Prevention Device (BPD) to prevent backflow into
well?
USAFSAM #10 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
(Note: BPD should at least be a Check Valve, installed upstream of all line
connections; a reduced pressure (RP) or double check (DC) device is preferred.)
15. Condition of Components: Pumps, controls, electrical system, valves,
BPDs, etc. appear properly maintained, and are in good physical condition
and working order? (5,7)
16. Contaminant Sources: (2,6,7)
A) Area surrounding wellhead is free of standing water, signs of vermin,
and other potential pollutants
B) Unauthorized sources/activities do not threaten the Wellhead
Protection Areak, (e.g., TIC/TIM or HazMat, sewage, agricultural/animal
activity, vehicle parking area, etc.)?
(Note: ensure review of the Wellhead Protection Plan and any related Primacy
Agency regulations concerning well/source water protection.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
Treatment Systems Collocated with Wells
17. Treatment Chemicals: (4,7,8)
A) Incompatible chemicals (e.g., sodium hypochlorite & fluorosilicic acid)
are separated?
B) Chemicals are protected from excessive heat/moisture?
C) Spill containment is provided for liquid containers?
D) Gas cylinders are restrained and proper ventilation provided?
E) A minimum supply (e.g., no more than a few days) of toxic chemicals
(fluoride, chlorine gas, etc.) are kept onsite?
USAFSAM #10 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
(Note: Store bulk toxic treatment chemicals in excess of the minimum supply
needed for treatment at a separate, secure location where they are less
susceptible to mass introduction into the water supply, or release into the
environment or populated area.)
18. Treatment Failure/Malfunction Alarm: For automated treatment (e.g.,
dosing pumps), is the system equipped to alert operators 24/7 of process
failure or malfunction (e.g., excessive dosing)? (3,7)
19. Backflow Protection (if applicable): Are potable water feed lines to
treatment chemical solution tanks, injectors, and backwash filters protected
by a permanent air gap or an appropriate BPD? (3,7,9)
20. Condition of Treatment Components: Treatment dosing pumps,
controls, electrical system, BPD, etc. appear properly maintained, and are in
good physical condition and working order? (5,7)
ADDITIONAL NOTES
WELL CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.2.2.2).
Consider using generic/nonspecific identifiers, e.g., a number that corresponds with the order asset was visited/assessed.
2) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. Check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/Foreign Governing
Standards (FGS) as applicable for more stringent or additional criteria that may apply. Due to unique circumstances,
criteria may not always be practical to apply; if necessary, confer with subject matter experts and use professional
judgment. Questions that apply to sanitary surveys only are annotated (SS).
3) Delineating Observations: ‘No” status markings indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up into a single observation. An
observation may also encompass multiple assets/facilities—when they are similar in function, have similar control
deficiencies, and pose a similar level of risk; for example, a cluster of wells with similar deficiencies and risk.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #10 (Oct 12)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1Unified
Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-020-02FA, Security Engineering: Concept Design, Mar 05 (inc. Change 1, May 06)
Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 04-5, Design Recommendations for Potable Water System Security, Aug 04
3AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
4American Water Works Association (AWWA) and American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Guidelines for the Physical Security of Water
Utilities (reviewed and sanctioned by US EPA), Dec 06
5UFC 3-230-02, Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems (prev. MIL-HDBK-1164), Jul 01
6AFI 48-144, Drinking Water Surveillance Program, Sep 10
7US EPA, Sanitary Survey Guidance Manual for Ground Water Systems, Nov 08
8Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
9AFI 32-1066, Backflow Prevention Program, Oct 07
10UFC 3-230-07A, Water Supply: Sources and General Considerations, Jan 04
2AFCESA
FOOTNOTES
aChecklist
Applicability: Wells used for potable water (inc. backup/emergency wells and wells temporarily off line) as well as
any Pumps and/or Treatment Systems collocated in same facility. Wells used only for nonpotable purposes but that draw from a
potable water source (e.g., aquifer), e.g., decommissioned, monitoring, test, or irrigation wells should at least be sealed, secured,
and protected from contaminant sources (2,4,5,7); consider whether the risk warrants additional measures, e.g., a
barrier/enclosure.
bPhysical Barriers: Independent barriers for wells may not be necessary (but may still be recommended) or barriers that do not
meet AT may be acceptable if the risk is not considered high; for example, when the well and all associated equipment and
piping is housed in a building meeting current AT standards, is not located in a remote area, and control of access is effective.
cLocks: If justifiable (typically assets that are especially critical or are located off-base or in a remote area), use integrated,
tamper-resistant locking mechanisms (e.g., tamper-resistant dead-bolts) or high-security padlocks and hasps (that are securely
anchored) IAW AFCESA ETL 04-5. High-security padlocks and hasps are only as effective as doors or barriers the locks secure.
See the following DoD Website for more information on high-security padlocks and hasps: http://www.dscp.dla.mil/gi/locks/.
dIllumination: One (1) footcandle (fc) within 50′ radius of asset IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (1 fc is generally sufficient to read the text
on this checklist once eyes are acclimated). A proper assessment often requires visiting the site during darkness. Note: Some
locations may choose to restrict lighting where attack by mortar/other propelled munitions is credible, or when site is in a very
remote area where lights may draw unwanted attention to the asset, while providing little benefit in deterring/detecting intruders.
eExterior Power Switch/Controls/Wiring: Power and control switches/panels should be relatively hardened and locked. When
possible, protect exposed critical wiring for power and controls/telemetry by enclosing in conduit or use other practical measures.
fExterior Valves: Secure critical valves if off base, public accessible, or otherwise considered high risk. For critical valves with
affixed handles—secure in vaults (w/locks or keyed bolts), remove or chain handles, and/or install cage/enclosure. For valves
requiring a tool to operate (e.g., T-wrench)—secure valve cover. Options for air release/relief valves—remove or enclose valve.
gDoors, Hatches, Other Entryways: If entryway physical security is deemed poor, or risk is high, recommend UFC 4-020-02FA
& ETL 04-5 criteria—steel, stock hollow steel, or steel clad doors/covers w/steel frame and tamper-resistant hinges (e.g., welded
or internal hinges) and hinge pins (tack weld, peen, or use pins secured by screw accessible only when the door/cover is open).
hHarden: Effective use of construction techniques & materials and security hardware to impede intrusion attempts. Often
involves use of steel and/or concrete (but not exclusively) securely anchored by welds or fasteners (e.g., bolts) designed to avert
removal using standard tools. May include structural modifications and/or off-the-shelf retrofits. See the following EPA Website
for more information on hardening and product sources: http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/guide/tableofcontents.cfm.
For vents, access ports, valves, etc. (anything potentially exploitable for contaminant introduction) 1) all metal construction, 2) all
pipe segments and the vent cover are welded or otherwise not designed to be unscrewed/removed, and 3) the vent opening is
covered by steel grating or is otherwise designed to impede contaminant entry by pouring or use of a hose or other device.
iWindows, Vents, & other Structure Openings: Eliminate or harden/reinforce windows and all potential man-passable
openings (>96 in2, with no dimension <6 inches) IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (e.g., use securely-anchored 3/8-inch or larger hardened
steel bars at 4 inches apart). Note: for round openings, a diameter >11 inches (≈ 96 in2) is considered “man-passable.”
jHigh Risk: estimated risk level of High or Extremely High based on the Probability and Severity of a credible worst case
incident, as determined by applying the risk analysis steps outlined in the WVA Guide, Section 5.2, Analyze Risk.
kWellhead Protection Area: “The surface or subsurface area surrounding a water well or wellfield supplying a public water
system, through which contaminants are reasonably likely to move toward and reach such well or wellfield" (US EPA).
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #11 (Oct 12)
Water Storagea
CRITERIA
STATUS
Reservoir Exterior
1. Fence: The well and associated water system assets are surrounded by
an independent barrier? (1,2,3,4,7)
A) An independent, see-through fence at least 7 feet high and topped by
barbed outriggers and/or razor wire?
B) Gates are found to be locked?b
C) Is free of damage, defects, or man-passable gaps (≥ 6 inches)?
D) Is clear of vegetation/objects that can aid climbing or concealment?
2. Signage: Clearly indicates restricted access/warning, and does not
identify asset or indicate function (and, if off-base, AF/base affiliation)? (1,4,6,7)
3. Illumination:c (1,4,7)
A) Is provided and in working order?
B) Is activated automatically by darkness or motion sensor?
C) Enables observation of activities surrounding the asset from outside the
area during darkness?
4. Exterior Power Switch, Controls, & Critical Wiring:d
A) Are judged to be effectively secured?b (4,7)
B) Well maintained/in good condition? (5,6)
5. Exterior Isolation Valves:e (2,3,4,5,6)
A) Critical valves are effectively secured to prevent tampering?b (2,3,4)
B) Are not leaking or flooded (posing a hazard associated with backsiphonage/backflow, and excessive corrosion and failure)? (5,6)
6. Overflow & Drain Pipes: Openings are fully covered by fine-mesh screen
and self-closing flap, and do not connect directly to sewer/storm drain? (5,6)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
A) Are judged to be sufficiently hardenedg and designedi to impede
contaminant entry by pouring or use of a hose?
Y
N
NA
B) Are in good condition?
Y
N
NA
C) Covered with heavy duty screen/grate, if accessible?
Y
N
NA
D) (Sanitary Survey) Covered with fine mesh screen to prevent entry of
insects, birds, rodents, etc.?
Y
N
NA
(Note: Sanitary concern if not exploitable for contaminant introduction and not directly
connected to sewer.)
7. Affixed Ladderf: Is structurally stable and secured in a manner that
effectively prevents climbing/access to the top of the tank/reservoir? (2,3,6,7)
8. Exterior Surfaces of Tank/Structure: Are free of water leaks, notable
corrosion/rust, and other structural defects? (5,6)
9. Service Hatches:
(2,3,4,6)
A) Are found to be locked?b
B) Are hardenedg and designedh to prevent contaminant introduction?
C) Free of gaps, openings, notable corrosion, and other defects?
10. Air Vents: (2,3,4,5,7)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
11. Other Openings: Tank roof is watertight, i.e., no unsecure openings or
vents including unsealed gaps around cables or pipes entering reservoir,
missing or poorly fitted anode plates, corrosion? (2,3,6)
USAFSAM #11 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
C) IDS and door/window alarms alert operators or security 24/7?
Y
N
NA
D) Works properly and effectively? (Note: ask operators to test/demo IDS.)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
12. Enhanced Security: (2,3,4,8)
A) Are there any security “enhancements” (beyond basic security, e.g.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), cameras, DoD high security locksb,
electronic access control, door/window alarms, motion sensors, etc.) in
place? If yes, list
B) IDS or door/window alarms are provided for high-risk wells? j
Secondary Enclosurek
13. Doors & other Designed Entryways: [1,2,3(3.2.1),4]
A) Are found to be locked?b
B) For doors with hinges on the outside, hinges equipped such that hinge
pins can not be removed when door is closed?
C) Judged to be sufficiently hardened to hinder forced entry?g
14. Windows, Vents, & Other Openings: l [1,2,3(3.2.1),4]
A) Are found to be secure?
B) Have an area not more than 96 in2 or are effectively hardened with
metal bars or grilles (not screens) that are well-anchored?g
C) Are masked or otherwise designed to obscure interior
assets/processes?
15. Facility/Structure Walls, Roof, & Floor: Are judged to be designed,
constructed, and in a condition that does not enable easy penetration/forced
entry using simple hand tools? [1,2, 3(3.2.1)]
(Note: conventional construction methods and materials can be used, but masonry
and/or steel is preferred.)
Reservoir Interior
16. Surfaces: Interior surfaces are free of notable corrosion, deteriorating
surface coating, excessive sediment, and other physical problems? (5,6)
17. Water Level: Is appropriate? (6,7)
(Note: ask operator how full it should be.)
18. Water Quality: Water is free of contamination indicators (e.g., surface
film or sheen, suspended matter, debris, notable turbidity, unusual color or
odor, birds, vermin, insects, algae, biofilm buildup on surfaces, etc.)? (9)
STORAGE CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.2.2.2). Consider
using generic/nonspecific identifiers, e.g., a number that corresponds with the order asset was visited/assessed.
2) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. For more stringent or additional criteria that may apply locally,
check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/FGS as applicable. In situations where a particular requirement may not apply, the criterion
may still be considered a Best Practice (BP). Due to unique local circumstances, some criteria may not be practical to apply.
3) Delineating Observations: Status markings of “No” indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up into a single observation. An
observation may address multiple assets—when they are similar in function, have similar deficiencies, and pose similar risk.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #11 (Oct 12)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1Unified
Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-020-02FA, Security Engineering: Concept Design, Mar 05 (inc. Change 1, May 06)
Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 04-5, Design Recommendations for Potable Water System Security, Aug 04
3AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
4American Water Works Association (AWWA) and American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Guidelines for the Physical Security
of Water Utilities (reviewed and sanctioned by US EPA), Dec 06
5UFC 3-230-02, Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems (prev. MIL-HDBK-1164), Jul 01
6US EPA, Sanitary Survey Guidance Manual for Ground Water Systems, Nov 08
7Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
8AFI 32-1066, Backflow Prevention Program, Oct 07
9AFI 48-144, Drinking Water Surveillance Program, Sep 10
2AFCESA
FOOTNOTES
aChecklist
Applicability: 1) For potable storage consider all applicable criteria; 2) For non-potable storage (e.g., fire), primary items
to check include: A) water level, B) structural integrity, and C) backflow protection if the tank is filled by a potable water connection.
bLocks: When possible, use integrated, tamper-resistant locking mechanisms (e.g., tamper-resistant dead-bolts) or high-security
padlocks and hasps (that are securely anchored) IAW AFCESA ETL 04-5. See the following DoD Website for more information on
high-security padlocks and hasps: http://www.dscp.dla.mil/gi/locks/.
cIllumination: One (1) footcandle (fc) within 50′ radius of asset IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (1 fc is sufficient to read the text on this
checklist once eyes are acclimated). A proper assessment often requires visiting the site during darkness. Note: some locations
may choose to restrict lighting where attack by mortar or other propelled munitions is credible, or when site is located in a very
remote area where lights may draw unwanted attention to asset, while providing little benefit in deterring/detecting intruders.
dPower Switch/Controls/Wiring: Outdoor power and control switches/panels should be relatively hardened and locked. When
possible, protect exposed critical wiring for power and controls/telemetry by enclosing in conduit or use other practical measures.
eValves: Secure critical valves if off base or otherwise considered at high riskj. For valves with affixed handles—secure in vaults
(w/locks or keyed bolts), remove or chain handles, and/or install fence/cage/enclosure. For valves requiring a tool to operate (e.g.,
T-wrench)—secure valve cover. May include isolation valves, altitude valves, or pressure-reducing valves (PRVs).
fLadders: 1) Remove or cut to provide a 10 to 20 foot vertical clearance between bottom rung and any fixture/appurtenance than
can aid climbing. (Note: many ladder barriers/blocking devices can be bypassed relatively easy, and are not recommended in lieu
of ladder removal.); 2) Use a hydraulic lift or portable ladders that are secured at a separate location when not being used; 3) install
ladder barrier, if needed.
gHardening: Effective use of construction techniques & materials and security hardware to impede intrusion attempts. Often
involves use of steel and/or concrete (but not exclusively) securely anchored by welds or fasteners (e.g., bolts) designed to avert
removal using standard tools. May include structural modifications and/or off-the-shelf retrofits. See the following EPA Website for
more information on hardening and product sources: http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/guide/tableofcontents.cfm.
hHatch Design: Hatches should be hardenedg and equipped with a raised rim and a tight-fitting cover to avert intentional
contamination by pouring, hose transfer, etc. or by accident (runoff, birds, vermin, insects, etc.); gaskets are highly recommended.
iVent Designs: Vent covers should be hardenedg; vent openings should face downward, be as narrow as practical to avert
insertion of hands/tools, and be fully covered w/corrosion-resistant fine-mesh screen (e.g., 20 mesh). Recommended Designs: 1)
Internal baffles avert direct reservoir access; 2) Vent is integrated w/service hatch, i.e., the hatch opening is covered by a removable
screen and a hardened, locked cover; a narrow slit at the closed cover/roof interface enables air to enter/exit the tank; the raised rim
around the opening acts as a baffle/barrier; 3) A reduced diameter gooseneck shaft w/grille or grate anchored inside the shaft, or
secured over shaft opening. See the EPA Website:
http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/guide/productguide.cfm?page=ventsecurity.
jHigh Risk: Estimated risk level of High or Extremely High based on Probability & Severity (see WVA Guide, Sec 5.2, Analyze Risk).
kSecondary Enclosure: For tanks enclosed or partly enclosed by a structure/facility, or with a collocated structure/facility housing
water system assets.
l Windows, Vents, & other Structure Openings: Eliminate or harden/reinforce windows and all potential man-passable openings
(>96 in2, with no dimension <6 inches) IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (e.g., use securely-anchored 3/8-inch or larger hardened steel bars at
4 inches apart). Note: for round openings, a diameter >11 inches (≈ 96 in2) is considered “man-passable.”
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #12 (Oct 12)
Water Treatmenta
CRITERIA
1. Fence: The water treatment plant/facilities and associated water system
assets are surrounded by an independent barrier, as necessary? (1,2,3,4,7)
A) An independent, see-through fence at least 7 feet high and topped by
outriggers with barbed and/or razor wire?
B) Gates are found to be locked?b
C) Is free of damage, defects, or man-passable gaps (≥ 6 inches)?
D) Is clear of vegetation/objects that can aid climbing or concealment?
2. Signage: Clearly indicates restricted access/warning, and does not
identify asset or indicate function (and, if off-base, AF/base affiliation)? (1,4,7 )
3. Illumination:c (1,2,4,7)
A) Is provided and in working order?
B) Is activated automatically by darkness or motion sensor?
C) Enables observation of activities surrounding the asset from outside the
area during darkness?
4. Exterior Power Switch, Controls, & Critical Wiring:d
A) Are judged to be effectively secured?b,e (4,7)
B) Well maintained/in good condition? (5,6)
5. Exterior Isolation Valves:f (2,3,4,5,6,7)
A) Critical valves are effectively secured to prevent tampering? b (2,3,4)
B) Are not leaking or flooded (posing a hazard associated with backsiphonage/backflow, and excessive corrosion and failure)? (5,6,7)
6. Treatment System Enclosure
A) Treatment system and chemicals, pumps, and injection point(s) are
housed within a fully enclosed facility/structure? (2,6,7 )
B) Enclosure is found to be secure (locked)?b
7. Doors, Hatches, & Other Designed Entryways:g [1,2,3(3.2.1),4]
A) Are found to be locked?b
B) For doors with hinges on the outside, hinges are equipped such that
hinge pins can not be removed when door is closed?
C) Judged to be sufficiently hardened to hinder forced entry?e
8. Windows, Vents, & Other Openings:h [1,2,3(3.2.1),4]
A) Are found to be secure?
B) Have an area not more than 96 in2 or are effectively hardened with
metal bars or grilles (not screens) that are well-anchored?e
C) Are masked or otherwise designed to obscure interior
assets/processes?
9. Facility/Structure Walls, Roof, & Floor: Are judged to be designed,
constructed, and in a condition that does not allow easy penetration/forced
entry using simple hand tools? [1,2,3(3.2.1)]
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
(Note: conventional construction methods and materials can be used, but masonry
and/or steel is preferred.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
10. Enhanced Security: (2,3,4,7)
A) Are there any security “enhancements” (beyond basic security, e.g.
Intrusion Detection Ssystems (IDS), cameras, DoD high security locksb,
electronic access control, door/window alarms, motion sensors, etc.) in
place? If yes, list
B) IDS or door/window alarms are provided for high-risk facilities?i
C) IDS and door/window alarms alert operators or security 24/7?
D) Works properly and effectively? (Note: ask operators to test/demo IDS.)
11. Treatment Systems: (3)
A) Chemical injection is flow-paced (injection rate depends on water
flow)?
B) Chemical injection automatically stops when water flow rate is zero?
C) Operators are alerted 24/7 of treatment failures and malfunctions
(e.g., excessive dosing and chlorine gas leaks)? (6)
12. Backflow Protection (if applicable): Potable water feed lines to
treatment chemical solution tanks, injectors, and filter backwash are protected
by permanent air gaps or appropriate backflow prevention devices (BPDs)?
USAFSAM #12 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
(3,6)
13. Condition of Components: Treatment process equipment, pumps,
controls, electrical system, emergency generator (if available), etc. appear
well-maintained, and are in good physical condition and working order? (5,6 )
(Note: if unsure, ask operators to demonstrate operation.)
14. Treatment Chemicals/Contaminants:j (2,4,6,7)
A) TIC/TIM, HazMat, and other contaminants are not collocated with, or
in proximity to, treatment chemicals, feed reservoirs, or injection points?
B) Incompatible chemicals (e.g., sodium hypochlorite and fluorosilicic
acid) are separated?
C) Chemicals are protected from excessive heat/moisture?
D) Liquids have spill containment?
E) If applicable, gas cylinders are restrained and proper ventilation is
provided?
F) A minimum supply (e.g., no more than a few days) of toxic chemicals
(fluoride, Cl2 gas, etc.) is kept on site/in the vicinity of chemical feed
reservoirs or injection points?
TREATMENT CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.2.2.2).
Consider using generic/nonspecific identifiers, e.g., a number that corresponds with the order asset was visited/assessed.
2) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. Check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/Foreign Governing
Standards (FGS) as applicable for more stringent or additional criteria that may apply. Due to unique circumstances, criteria
may not always be practical to apply; if necessary, confer with subject matter experts (SMEs) and use professional
judgment to determine status (and, if applicable, appropriate recommendations).
3) Delineating Observations: ‘No” status markings indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up into a single observation. An
observation may also encompass multiple facilities—when they are similar in function, have similar control deficiencies, and
pose a similar level of risk. Generally, however, each major treatment facility will represent a single observation.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #12 (Oct 12)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1Unified
Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-020-02FA, Security Engineering: Concept Design, Mar 05 (inc. Change 1, May 06)
Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 04-5, Design Recommendations for Potable Water System Security, Aug 04
3AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
4American Water Works Association (AWWA) and American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Guidelines for the Physical
Security of Water Utilities (reviewed and sanctioned by US EPA), Dec 06
5UFC 3-230-02, Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems (prev. MIL-HDBK-1164), Jul 01
6US EPA, Sanitary Survey Guidance Manual for Ground Water Systems, Nov 08
7Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
8AFI 32-1066, Backflow Prevention Program, Oct 07
2AFCESA
FOOTNOTES
aChecklist
Applicability: Primary water treatment facilities and bulk treatment chemical storage areas. If a simple treatment
process (e.g., chlorine or fluoride dosing) is located in a well facility, use the Well checklist instead (it includes treatment criteria).
bLocks: If justifiable (typically assets that are especially critical or are located off-base or in a remote area), use integrated,
tamper-resistant locking mechanisms (e.g., tamper-resistant dead-bolts) or high-security padlocks and hasps (that are securely
anchored) IAW AFCESA ETL 04-5. High-security padlocks and hasps are only as effective as doors or barriers the locks
secure. See the following DoD Website for more information on high-security padlocks and hasps:
http://www.dscp.dla.mil/gi/locks/
cIllumination: One (1) footcandle (fc) within 50′ radius of asset/facility IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (1 fc is generally sufficient to read
the text on this checklist once eyes are acclimated). A proper assessment often requires visiting the site during darkness. Note:
some locations may choose to restrict lighting where attack by mortar or other propelled munitions is credible, or when site is in a
very remote area where lights may draw unwanted attention to asset, while providing little benefit in deterring/detecting intruders.
dExterior Power Switch/Controls/Wiring: Power and control switches/panels should be relatively hardened and locked.
When possible, protect exposed critical wiring for power and controls/telemetry by enclosing in conduit or by other practical
measures.
eHardening: Effective use of construction techniques & materials and security hardware to impede intrusion attempts. Often
involves use of steel and/or concrete (but not exclusively) securely anchored by welds or fasteners (e.g., bolts) designed to avert
removal using standard tools. May include structural modifications and/or off-the-shelf retrofits. See the following EPA Website
for more information on hardening and product sources: http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/guide/tableofcontents.cfm.
fExterior Valves: Secure critical valves if off base, public accessible, or otherwise considered high risk. For valves with affixed
handles—secure in vaults (w/locks or keyed bolts), remove or chain handles, and/or install cage/enclosure. For valves requiring
a tool to operate (e.g., T-wrench)—secure valve cover. Options for air release/relief valves—remove or enclose the valve.
gDoors, Hatches, other Entryways: If entryway physical security is deemed poor, or risk is high, recommend UFC 4-020-02FA
& ETL 04-5 criteria—steel, stock hollow steel, or steel clad doors/covers w/steel frame and tamper-resistant hinges (e.g., welded
or internal hinges) and hinge pins (tack weld, peen, or use pins secured by screw accessible only when the door/cover is open).
hWindows, Vents, & other Structure Openings: Eliminate or harden/reinforce windows and all potential man-passable
openings (>96 in2, with no dimension <6 inches) IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (e.g., use securely-anchored 3/8-inch or larger hardened
steel bars at 4 inches apart). Note: for round openings, a diameter >11 inches (≈ 96 in2) is considered “man-passable.”
iHigh Risk: Estimated risk level of High or Extremely High based on the Probability and Severity of a credible worst case
incident, as determined by applying the risk analysis steps outlined in the WVA Guide, Section 5.2, Analyze Risk.
jToxic Treatment Chemicals: Store bulk toxic treatment chemicals at a separate, secure location where they are less
susceptible to mass introduction into the water supply, or release into the environment or populated area.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #13 (Oct 10)
Water Pumps
& Miscellaneous Assets/Facilitiesa
CRITERIA
1. Fence: The water treatment plant/facilities and associated water
system assets are surrounded by an independent barrier, as necessary?
(1,2,3,4,6,7)
A) An independent, see-through fence at least 7 feet high and topped
by outriggers barbed and/or razor wire?
B) Gates are found to be locked?b
C) Is free of damage, defects, or man-passable gaps (≥ 6 inches)?
D) Is clear of vegetation/objects that can aid climbing or concealment?
2. Signage: Clearly indicates restricted access/warning, but does not
identify asset or function (and, if off-base, AF/base affiliation)? (1,4,7)
3. Illumination:c (1,2,4,7)
A) Is provided and in working order?
B) Is activated automatically by darkness or motion sensor?
C) Enables observation of activities surrounding the asset from outside
the area during darkness?
4. Exterior Power Switch, Controls, & Critical Wiring: e
A) Are judged to be effectively secured?b,c (4,7)
B) Well maintained and in good condition? (5,6)
5. Exterior Isolation Valves:f (2,3,4,5,6,7)
A) Critical valves are effectively secured to prevent tampering?b (2,3,4)
B) Are not leaking or flooded (posing a hazard associated with backsiphonage/backflow, and excessive corrosion and failure)? (5,6,7)
6. Facility/Asset Enclosure: Water pumps, control systems, bulk
treatment chemicals, and other critical assets (as applicable) are housed
within an enclosed facility or structure? (4,6,7)
7. Doors, Hatches, & Other Designed Entryways:g [1,2,3(3.2.1),4,7]
A) Are found to be locked? b
B) For doors with hinges on the outside, hinges equipped such that
hinge pins can not be removed when door is closed?
C) Judged to be sufficiently hardened to hinder forced entry?c
8. Windows, Vents, & Other Openings:h [1,2,3(3.2.1),4,7]
A) Are found to be secure?
B) Have an area not more than 96 in2 or are effectively hardened with
metal bars or grilles (not screens) that are well-anchored?c
C) Are masked or otherwise designed to obscure interior
assets/processes?
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
9. Facility/Structure Walls, Roof, & Floor: Are judged to be designed,
constructed, and in a condition that does not allow easy penetration/forced
entry using simple hand tools? [1,2,3(3.2.1),7]
USAFSAM #13 (Oct 10)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
(Note: conventional construction methods and materials can be used, but
masonry and/or steel is preferred.)
10. Enhanced Security: (2,4,7)
A) Are there any security “enhancements” (beyond basic security, e.g.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), cameras, DoD high security locksb,
electronic access control, door/window alarms, motion sensors, etc.) in
place? If yes, list
B) IDS or door/window alarms are provided for high-risk
facilities/assets?i
C) IDS and door/window alarms alert operators or security 24/7?
D) Works properly and effectively? (Note: ask operators to test/demo
IDS.)
11. Condition of Components: Pumps, controls, electrical system,
emergency generator (if so equipped), etc. appear well-maintained, and
are in good physical condition & working order? (5,6)
(Note: if unsure, ask operators to demonstrate their operation.)
Treatment Systems Collocated with Pumping Facilities
12. Treatment Chemicals: (4,6,7)
A) Incompatible chemicals (e.g., sodium hypochlorite & fluorosilicic
acid) are separated?
B) Chemicals are protected from excessive heat/moisture?
C) Spill containment is provided for liquid containers?
D) Gas cylinders are restrained and proper ventilation provided?
E) A minimum supply (e.g., no more than a few days) of toxic
chemicals (fluoride, chlorine gas, etc.) are kept onsite?
(Note: Store bulk toxic treatment chemicals in excess of the minimum supply
needed for treatment at a separate, secure location where they are less
susceptible to mass introduction into the water supply, or release into the
environment or populated area.)
13. Treatment Failure/Malfunction Alarm: For automated treatment
(e.g., dosing pumps), is the system equipped to alert operators 24/7 of
process failure or malfunction (e.g., excessive dosing)? (3,6)
14. Backflow Protection (if applicable): Potable water feed lines to
treatment chemical solution tanks, injectors, or backwash filters are
protected by a permanent air gap or appropriate Backflow Prevention
Device (BPD)?3,6
15. Condition of Treatment Components: Treatment dosing pumps,
controls, electrical system, BPD, etc. appear properly maintained, and are
in good physical condition and working order? (5,6)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #13 (Oct 10)
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.2.2.2). Consider
using generic/nonspecific identifiers, e.g., a number that corresponds with the order asset was visited/assessed.
2) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. Check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/Foreign Governing
Standards (FGS) as applicable for more stringent or additional criteria that may apply. Due to unique circumstances, criteria
may not always be practical to apply; if necessary, confer with subject matter experts (SMEs) and use professional judgment
to determine status (and, if applicable, appropriate recommendations).
3) Delineating Observations: ‘No” status markings indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up into a single observation. An
observation may encompass multiple facilities—when they are similar in function, have similar control deficiencies, and pose
a similar level of risk. Generally, however, each facility (e.g., pumphouse) will represent a single observation.
CRITERIA SOURCES
1Unified
Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-020-02FA, Security Engineering: Concept Design, Mar 05 (inc. Change 1, May 06)
Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 04-5, Design Recommendations for Potable Water System Security, Aug 04
3AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
4American Water Works Association (AWWA) and American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Guidelines for the Physical
Security of Water Utilities (reviewed and sanctioned by US EPA), Dec 06
5UFC 3-230-02, Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems (prev. MIL-HDBK-1164), Jul 01
6US EPA, Sanitary Survey Guidance Manual for Ground Water Systems, Nov 08
7Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
8AFI 32-1066, Backflow Prevention Program, Oct 07
2AFCESA
FOOTNOTES
aChecklist
Applicability: Major raw and treated water pumping stations. Checklist may also be used for other assets/facilities
considered critical to water system operations, e.g., central control facilities (may include SCADA and other, less automated
systems/controls). When pumps or controls are located in a well or treatment facility, the respective Well or Treatment checklist
should be used instead (these checklists include criteria that cover collocated pumps & controls).
bLocks: If justifiable (typically assets that are especially critical or are located off-base or in a remote area), use integrated,
tamper-resistant locking mechanisms (e.g., tamper-resistant dead-bolts) or high-security padlocks and hasps (that are securely
anchored) IAW AFCESA ETL 04-5. High-security padlocks and hasps are only as effective as doors or barriers the locks secure.
See the following DoD Website for more information on high-security padlocks and hasps: http://www.dscp.dla.mil/gi/locks/
cHardening: Effective use of construction techniques & materials and security hardware to impede intrusion attempts. Often
involves use of steel and/or concrete (but not exclusively) securely anchored by welds or fasteners (e.g., bolts) designed to avert
removal using standard tools. May include structural modifications and/or off-the-shelf retrofits. See the following EPA Website
for more information on hardening and product sources: http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/guide/tableofcontents.cfm.
dIllumination: One (1) footcandle (fc) within 50′ radius of asset/facility IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (1 fc is generally sufficient to read
the text on this checklist once eyes are acclimated). A proper assessment often requires visiting the site during darkness. Note:
some locations may choose to restrict lighting where attack by mortar or other propelled munitions is credible, or when site is in a
very remote area where lights may draw unwanted attention to asset, while providing little benefit in deterring/detecting intruders.
eExterior Power Switch/Controls/Wiring: Power and control switches/panels should be relatively hardened and locked. When
possible, protect exposed critical wiring for power and controls/telemetry by enclosing in conduit or by other practical measures.
fExterior Valves: Secure critical valves if off base, public accessible, or otherwise considered high risk. For valves with affixed
handles—secure in vaults (w/locks or keyed bolts), remove or chain handles, and/or install cage/enclosure. For valves requiring a
tool to operate (e.g., T-wrench)—secure valve cover. Options for air release/relief valves—remove or enclose valve.
gDoors, Hatches, other Entryways: If entryway physical security is deemed poor, or risk is high, recommend UFC 4-020-02FA
& ETL 04-5 criteria—steel, stock hollow steel, or steel clad doors/covers w/steel frame and tamper-resistant hinges (e.g., welded
or internal hinges) and hinge pins (tack weld, peen, or use pins secured by screw accessible only when the door/cover is open).
hWindows, Vents, & other Structure Openings: Eliminate or harden/reinforce windows and all potential man-passable
openings (>96 in2, with no dimension <6 inches) IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (e.g., use securely-anchored 3/8-inch or larger hardened
steel bars at 4 inches apart). Note: for round openings, a diameter >11 inches (≈ 96 in2) is considered “man-passable.”
iHigh Risk: Estimated risk level of High or Extremely High based on the Probability and Severity of a credible worst case incident,
as determined by applying the risk analysis steps outlined in the WVA Guide, Section 5.2, Analyze Risk.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #14 (Oct 12)
Transmission and Distributiona,b
CRITERIA
STATUS
On Base/Controlled Areasc
1. Filling Points:d (2,6,7,8 )
A) Filling Points (hydrants, standpipes, spigots designated for
use by contractors/personnel other than utilities and fire)
are equipped with affixed, reduced pressure (RP) backflow
prevention devices (BPD)?
B) BPDs are owned and tested by the water system
owner/operator (not user)?
C) BPDs are enclosed within a hardenede, lockedf facility or
barrier (e.g., cage, fence, cover) to prevent tampering?
2. Plumbed Cross-Connections: Hazardous cross-connections
have been eliminated or are controlled by an air gap or BPD
appropriate for the hazard? (2,6,8)
(Note: Perform random spot checks of high-hazard crossconnections identified in the last 5-yr survey and/or where they are
common, e.g., chemical cleaning systems, wastewater treatment
plant, chemical firefighting systems, and nonpotable tanks used
for firefighting/other.)
3. Critical Isolation Valves:g
A) Valve vaults or pits are hardenede and secured (w/locksf or
keyed bolts)? (1,2,3,7)
B) Are not flooded or do not appear to be leaking (posing a
back-siphonage/backflow hazard)? (4,5,8)
C) Exposed valve handles (e.g., on BPDs) are chained and
lockedf or otherwise judged to be secure? (1,2,3,7)
(Note: Handles should be removed, where feasible.)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Off Base/Uncontrolled Areash
(Note: BE follow the route of the buried/unburied, base-dedicated supply main)
4. Exposed Mains: Exposed mains are, at the least, isolated
Y N
from direct access by a fence or other barrier? (1,2,3,7)
(Notes: Bury when feasible. Exposed lines with fittings or connections
that might be exploited for contaminant introduction are greatest risk.)
5. Water Leaks: There are no signs of leaks, e.g., pooling water
or unusually heavy vegetation growth over supply/transmission
line routes? (2,6,8)
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
(Note: Poses risk for back-siphonage/backflow as well as indicating
possible water loss.)
6. Cross-Connections: There are no uncontrolled CrossConnections, e.g., unprotected filling points or unprotected service
lines to farm/agricultural activities, industrial operations, domestic,
or off-base entities? (2,6,8)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
7. Critical Hydrants:i Critical hydrants are secured by one or
more of the following: (1,3,7 )
A) Hydrant isolation valves are shut off and the valve boxes
are hardenede and lockedf?
B) Hydrants are equipped with Anti-Tampering Devices?
C) If applicable, hydrants are consistently monitored (e.g.,
CCTV or Gate Guards)?
USAFSAM #14 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
(Note: Remove hydrants that aren’t needed/required vs. above
options.)
8. Critical Isolation Valves and/or Meters:g
A) Vaults and pits housing critical isolation valves and/or
meters are hardenede and lockedf? (1,2,3,7)
B) Vaults and pits are not flooded and do not appear to be
leaking (posing a back-siphonage/backflow hazard)? (4,5,8)
C) Exposed valve handles are chained and lockedf or
otherwise judged to be secured? (1,2,3,7)
9. Backflow Prevention Devices: Exterior BPDs are secured by
one or more of the following: (1,2,3,6,7)
A) BPDs are enclosed within a locked barrier (e.g., fence or
“tough-cage”)?
B) Handlesg (if equipped) for isolation valves have been
removed or are chained and lockedf (or otherwise judged
to be secure) AND test connections have been removed
(replaced with plugs)?
10. Other Accessible Appurtenances [Flushing Valves
(“Blow-offs”), Air Release Valves, Standpipes, Couplings,
Etc.]: (1,3,7)
A) Are enclosed within hardenede, lockedf covers/barriers?
B) For those appurtenances equipped with isolation valves,
isolation valves are shut off and the valve boxes are judged
to be effectively secured/locked?f
(Note: Remove appurtenances if not needed/required.)
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.2.2.2). Consider
using generic/nonspecific identifiers, e.g., a number that corresponds with the order asset was visited/assessed.
2) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. Check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/Foreign Governing
Standards (FGS) as applicable for more stringent or additional criteria that may apply. Due to unique circumstances, criteria
may not always be practical to apply; if necessary, confer with subject matter experts (SMEs) and use professional judgment
to determine status (and, if applicable, appropriate recommendations).
3) Delineating Observations: ‘No” status markings indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up into a single observation. An
observation may encompass multiple assets—when they are similar in function, have similar control deficiencies, and pose
similar risk (e.g., a few off-base hydrants along a single stretch of water main dedicated to supplying the base).
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #14 (Oct 12)
CRITERIA SOURCES
1AFCESA
Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 04-5, Design Recommendations for Potable Water System Security, Aug 04
10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
3American Water Works Association (AWWA) and American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Guidelines for the Physical
Security of Water Utilities (reviewed and sanctioned by US EPA), Dec 06
4UFC 3-230-02, Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems (prev. MIL-HDBK-1164), Jul 01
5US EPA, Sanitary Survey Guidance Manual for Ground Water Systems, Nov 08
6AFI 32-1066, Backflow Prevention Program, Oct 07
7Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
8AFI 48-144, Drinking Water Surveillance Program, Sep 10
2AFI
FOOTNOTES
aChecklist
Applicability: Includes raw or treated water transmission/distribution mains and major service lines that supply AF
personnel/operations potable water (regardless of who owns/operates system), as well as critical access points, e.g., Hydrants,
BPDs, Valves, Meters, Stand Pipes, Couplings, Flushing Valves (Blow-Offs), Air Release Valves, Unauthorized Connections, etc.
bTransmission vs. Distribution Lines: Transmission is generally considered that portion of the system that transmits water from
the source up to the first interconnecting line that services facilities and other points of use (where distribution begins). Also, raw
water transmission lines may connect the raw water source to treatment facilities.
cOn Base/Controlled Area Access Points: Considered those pipeline access points that are within a perimeter with effective
access control, and there is effective oversight of contractor, vendor, visitor, and foreign national activities. Controlled areas
typically have few if any High Risk or Extremely High Risk pipeline access points, and supplemental physical security measures
are generally not required, with the exception of water filling points and critical valves.
dDesignated Filling Points: 1) for FP purposes, air gaps alone are no longer adequate because they can be easily bypassed;
2) when possible, fill points should be established where activities can be easily monitored by base personnel, and downstream of
critical or large populations (e.g., dead-end or low-demand areas). For aircraft watering points, use Checklist #15.
eHardening: Effective use of construction techniques & materials and security hardware to impede intrusion attempts. Often
involves use of steel and/or concrete (but not exclusively) securely anchored by welds or fasteners (e.g., bolts) designed to avert
removal using standard tools. May include structural modifications and/or off-the-shelf retrofits. See the following EPA Website
for more information on hardening and product sources: http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/guide/tableofcontents.cfm.
fLocks: If justifiable (typically assets that are especially critical or are located off-base or in a remote area), use integrated,
tamper-resistant locking mechanisms (e.g., tamper-resistant dead-bolts) or high-security padlocks and hasps (that are securely
anchored) IAW AFCESA ETL 04-5. High-security padlocks and hasps are only as effective as doors or barriers the locks secure.
See the following DoD Website for more information on high-security padlocks and hasps: http://www.dscp.dla.mil/gi/locks/
gCritical Isolation Valves: Considered those valves (in vaults or located on BPDs) that can shut down the potable water supply
to the base, or sectors or facilities that are particularly large or critical. Includes valves used to control the flow of Secondary or
Emergency water supplies. On base, critical valves are often located on transmission lines and just inside the fence on incoming
supply lines. Off base, critical valves are often located just outside the perimeter fence near where supply lines enter the base.
hOff Base/Uncontrolled Area Access Points: Access points on supply lines located off the base or in areas without effective
access control or oversight of contractors, visitors, vendors, or foreign nationals. Portions of off-base supply lines dedicated (or
mostly dedicated) to AF operations are of primary concern, and generally requires that assessors follow the route of the supply
main. Access points located upstream of high-service connections to non-AF commercial, industrial, and/or housing areas pose
less risk and may require no supplemental physical security measures.
iCritical Hydrants: Considered those hydrants located on supply/transmission lines to the base. Hydrants on on-base
supply/transmission line located in isolated areas, serving particularly large or critical sectors/facilities may also be considered
critical.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #15 (Oct 12)
Aircraft Potable Water Pointsa
POCs: Fleet Services/Flight Operations and/or Flight Kitchenb
CRITERIAc
STATUS
Aircraft Water Service Connections
1. Plumbed Cross-Connections: There are no plumbed connections
between the aircraft water service line, faucet, or spigot, and sources of
chemicals or non-potable water? [1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2), 2(9.2)]
2. Temporary (Potential) Cross-Connections: Are not created, i.e.,
faucet or spigot (and any connecting hose) are not being used/shared for
cleaning or filling any container used for non-potable water or hazardous
material or substance, including mop buckets, janitor sinks/basins, aircraft
lavatory servicing trucks, etc.? [1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2, 2(9.2))]
3. Aircraft Potable Water Transfer Hose: Hoses (and nozzles) used for
filling potable water trucks, trailers, coolers, jugs, etc. are clean, kept off the
ground, and are used only for filling potable water containers?
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
[1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2), 2(9.2), 3]
4. Bacteriological Sampling: Aircraft watering points, including spigots or
lines used for filling jugs, cans, coolers, etc., are sampled monthly for
bacteriological analysis? [1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2, 4.1.3), 2(9.4)]
(Note: Samples from containers can be collected at BE discretion)
Aircraft Potable Water Servicing Trucks/Trailers
5. Security: Trucks and trailers used for transporting aircraft potable water
are parked in areas inaccessible to the general base population, or truck
and trailer water reservoir hatches are kept securely locked? (3)
6. Potable Water Truck Markings:
A) Trucks and trailers used for transporting aircraft potable water are
clearly marked “Potable Water” and used exclusively for that purpose?
[1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2), 2(9.2)]
B) Other aircraft servicing trucks and trailers are clearly marked for their
specific function (e.g., Lavatory)? [1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2), 2(9.2)]
7. Truck Hose and Hose Connection/Nozzle: Are in good condition,
clean, kept off the ground, and maintained in a sanitary manner? [1(1.9.2.4,
3.2.2),2(9.2),3]
8. Exterior Condition: Are free of deterioration, leaks, or other problems?
[1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2), 2(9.2), 3]
9. Water Reservoir Covers/Hatches: [1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2),2(9.2), 3]
A) Are kept closed/latched and locked?
B) Are sealed, i.e., gaskets are fully intact, fit properly, and in good
condition?
10. Other Reservoir Openings: No unnecessary reservoir openings,
gaps, cracks, etc. exist that can be potential contaminant entry points? (3)
11. Interior Condition: Surfaces are free of corrosion, chips, cracks,
deteriorating surface coating, sediment, or other abnormalities? [1(1.9.2.4,
3.2.2), 2(9.2), 3]
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIAc
12. Water: Is free of debris, turbidity, sheen, film, algae, and foreign
matter? [1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2), 2(9.2), 3]
13. Written Instructions: [1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2), 2(9.2)]
A) Written procedures had been developed for cleaning and sanitizing
reservoirs and maintaining equipment?
B) Procedures are being followed?
USAFSAM #15 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
B) FPCON Charlie: control access & use sign-in and sign-out logs for all
personnel entering BW storage areas, and limit/inspect all personal
items? [3(A4.1.3),5(A2.5.5)]
Y
N
NA
(Notes: BW should be routinely checked by receiving organization upon receipt
and by the consumer/user prior to consumption/use, regardless of FPCON.
Additional attention and more thorough inspections are warranted in FPCON
Bravo)
Y
N
NA
17. Inspection of BW Deliveries: Do personnel who receive deliveries
inspect BW upon receipt for damage, leakage, quality, clarity, and signs of
tampering, and report any irregularities to their superiors? [6(3.3.4.1.1),7]
Y
N
NA
18. BW Source Approval: Is BW Source on US Army Veterinary
Command’s (VETCOM’s) approved list? [4(2.31.6,3.3.3.1,3.4.7.3),5(2.6.3)]
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
(Note: Ask for and review procedures and records of cleaning/maintenance.)
14. Bacteriological Sampling: At least one truck or trailer is being
sampled monthly, and all are being sampled and analyzed at least once
each quarter (unless prevented by infrequent use)? [1(1.9.2.4, 3.2.2, 4.1.3), 2(9.4)]
Aircrew Bottled Water (BW)b
15. BW Physical Security: [3, 7(3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.6)]
A) BW is stored in a secure structure/facility/room and is not stored in a
common-use or general access area?
B) If applicable, the distribution point is chosen to discourage and
minimize opportunities for tampering?
C) BW is not stored with or in proximity to HazMat?
16. FPCON Measures: Owning unit/organization has written FPCON
measures including the following?
A) FPCON Bravo: Randomly inspection of bottled water for evidence of
tampering or contamination before use. Inspections include delivery
vehicles, storage areas/facilities and storage containers.
[3(A4.1.2),5(A2.4.8)]
(Notes: 1) Verify approval: http://vets.amedd.army.mil/vetsvcs/approved.nsf; 2) To
access CENTCOM sources, login & password are required.) 3) If source of BW
source is locally approved, describe.
19. BW Transport Requirements: Are background checks conducted (as
determined locally) on contractor/vendor personnel who deliver BW?
[4(3.3.4.1.2), 5(2.18.2)]
(Note: as necessary, validate by reviewing contract provisions and discussing with
appropriate Contracting Officer.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIAc
20. Additional BW AT Contract Provisions for Deployment Locations,
when Source or Transporters are Foreign, or when FPCON Warrants:d
Do BW contracts include provisions for BW security from point of origin to
point of receipt (sealed and locked vehicles/shipping containers with seal
numbers identified on shipping documents, AF/DoD guards/escort)? [4(3.3.3 &
USAFSAM #15 (Oct 12)
STATUS
Y
N
NOTES
NA
3.3.4.1)]
(Note: Review contract, Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA), or Purchase Order as
applicable to assess if appropriate provisions are included. For recommended
provisions, see WVA Tech Guide, Appendix A, Sec A.3.1)
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.2.2.2).
Consider using generic/nonspecific identifiers, e.g., a number that corresponds with the order asset was visited/assessed.
2) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. Check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/Foreign Governing
Standards (FGS) as applicable for more stringent or additional criteria that may apply. Due to unique circumstances,
criteria may not always be practical to apply; if necessary, confer with subject matter experts (SMEs) and use professional
judgment to determine status (and, if applicable, appropriate recommendations).
3) Delineating Observations: ‘No” status markings indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up into a single observation. An
observation may also encompass multiple assets/facilities—when they are similar in function, have similar control
deficiencies, and pose a similar level of risk.
CRITERIA SOURCES
1AFI
48-144, Drinking Water Surveillance Program, Sep 10
Water Surveillance Technical Guide, Apr 2011
3Best Practices derived from AFMAN 48-138_IP, Sanitary Control and Surveillance of Field Water Supplies, May 10
and USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
4AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (incorporating Change 1, Nov 09)
5AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), Mar 09
2Drinking
FOOTNOTES
aChecklist
applies to: 1) Acft Water Filling Points, 2) Acft Potable Water Service Trucks, and 3) Bottled Water issued to aircrews.
Flight Kitchen may control and issue bottled water to aircrews.
cCriteria applies regardless of who owns, operates, or maintains water system or aircraft potable water assets.
dAdditional BW Contract AT Provisions: Additional AT contract provisions are generally expected to be similar to provisions
included in contracts for food with similar sources and supply chains.
bThe
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #16 (Oct 12)
Bottled Water (BW)a
CRITERIA
1.
STATUS
Fence: b [1,2(1.3.3,3.2.1,3.4.1.5),3]
A) Is the BW storage area surrounded by independent, see-through fence at
least 7 feet high equipped with barbed or razor wire outriggers?
B) Gates are found to be locked? c
C) Is free of defects and man-passable gaps (≥ 6 inches)?
D) Is clear of vegetation and objects that may aid climbing or concealment?
2. Signage: Clearly indicates restricted access/warning, and does not identify
asset or indicate function (and, if off-base, AF/base affiliation)? (1,3)
3. Illumination:d (1,2(1.3.3,3.2.1,3.4.1.5)3)
A) Is provided and in working order?
B) Is activated automatically by darkness or motion sensor?
C) Enables observation of activities surrounding the asset from outside the
area during darkness?
4. Enclosure: Is BW housed within a fully enclosed structure? [1,3,4(2.6.2)]
5. Doors and Other Designed Entryways:e [1,2(1.3.3,3.2.1,3.4.1.5),3]
A) Are found to be locked?c
B) For exterior doors with hinges on the outside, are hinges equipped such
that hinge pins can not be removed when door is closed?
C) Judged to be sufficiently hardenedf to hinder forced entry?h
6. Windows, Vents, & Other Openings:g [1,2(1.3.3,3.2.1,3.4.1.5),3]
A) Have an area not more than 96 in2 or are effectively hardenedf with
metal bars or grilles (not screens) that are well-anchored
B) Are masked or otherwise designed to prevent visual observation of
interior assets/processes?
7. Facility/Structure Walls, Roof, & Floor: are judged to be designed,
constructed, and in a condition that does not enable easy penetration/forced
entry using simple hand tools? [1,2(1.3.3,3.2.1,3.4.1.5),3]
(Note: conventional construction methods and materials can be used, but
masonry and/or steel is preferred.)
8. Enhanced Security: [1,2(1.3.3,3.2.1,3.4.1.5),3]
A) Are there any security “enhancements” (beyond basic security, e.g. IDS,
cameras, DoD high security locks, electronic access control, door/window
alarms, motion sensors, etc.) in place? If yes, list and describe.
B) Are in good condition and work properly and effectively?
9. BW Access Control: (2,3)
A) BW is stored in a secure structure/facility/room and is not stored in a
common-use or general access area?
B) If applicable, the distribution point(s) is chosen to discourage and
minimize opportunities for tampering?
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
10. Key Control: Is a key (and/or combination) control program? (3)
Some recommended elements: Key sign in/sing out; Keys and combinations not
provided to contractors and non-essential personnel; Change locks when keys
are lost or when control may be compromised.
11. Collocated Chemicals or Processes: Toxic Industrial Chemicals/Materials
(TIC/TIM), HazMat, or other potential contaminants are not collocated with, or in
proximity to, BW? [(3,4(2.6.2)]
12. BW Source Approval: Is BW Source on US Army Veterinary Command’s
(VETCOM’s) approved list? [2(2.31.6,3.3.3.1,3.4.7.3),(4(2.6.3)]
USAFSAM #16 (Oct 12)
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
(Notes: 1) Verify approval: http://vets.amedd.army.mil/vetsvcs/approved.nsf; 2) To
access CENTCOM sources, login & password are required.) 3) If source of BW is locally
approved, describe.
13. Inspection of BW Deliveries: Do personnel who receive deliveries inspect
BW upon receipt for damage, leakage, quality, clarity, and signs of tampering,
and report any irregularities to their superiors? [2(3.3.4.1.1,3.4.7.4),3]
14. BW Transport Requirements: Are background checks conducted (as
determined locally) on contractor/vendor personnel who deliver BW? [2(3.3.4.1),
5(2.18.2)]
(Note: as necessary, validate by reviewing contract provisions and discussing with
appropriate Contracting Officer; ensure provisions are included in future contracts.)
15. Privately Procured Water:
A) Are background checks conducted (as determined locally) on personnel
who deliver bottled water? (3)
B) Does bottled water handling, storage and security generally in comply with
AF requirements? (3)
(Notes: 1) “Water funds” (similar to coffee funds) taking direct delivery of 5 gallon or
45 liter water jugs are popular at some installations, and 2) are potentially exploitable
for targeting high value individuals or groups such as Wing HQ or Operations.)
16. FPCON Measures: Owning unit/organization has written FPCON measures
including the following?
A) FPCON Bravo: Randomly inspection of bottled water for evidence of
tampering or contamination before use. Inspections include delivery
vehicles, storage areas/facilities and storage containers. [2(A4.1.2),5(A2.4.8)]
B) FPCON Charlie: control access & use sign-in/out logs for all personnel
entering BW storage areas, and limit/inspect all personal items? [2(A4.1.3),
5(A2.5.5)]
(Notes: BW should be routinely checked by receiving organization upon receipt and
by the consumer/user prior to consumption/use, regardless of FPCON. Additional
attention and more thorough inspections are warranted in FPCON Bravo)
17. Additional BW Contract AT Provisions for Deployment Locations, when
BW Source or Transporters are Foreign, or when FPCON Warrants: h
Do BW contracts include provisions for BW security from point of origin to point
of receipt (sealed and locked vehicles/shipping containers with seal numbers
identified on shipping documents, AF/DoD guards/escort)? [2(3.3.3 & 3.3.4.1)]
(Note: Review contract, Blanket Purchase Agreement or Purchase Order as applicable
to assess if appropriate provisions are included. For recommended provisions, see WVA
Tech Guide, Appendix A, A.3.1)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #16 (Oct 12)
BOTTLED WATER CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.2.2.2). Consider
using generic/nonspecific identifiers, e.g., a number that corresponds with the order asset was visited/assessed.
2) Criteria Applicability: Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. Check Primacy Agency/MAJCOM/Foreign Governing
Standards (FGS) as applicable for more stringent or additional criteria that may apply. Due to unique circumstances, criteria
may not always be practical to apply; if necessary, confer with subject matter experts (SMEs) and use professional judgment.
3) Delineating Observations: ‘No” status markings indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up into a single observation. An
observation may also encompass multiple facilities—when they are similar in function, have similar control deficiencies, and
pose a similar level of risk.
CRITERIA SOURCES
1Unified
Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-020-02FA, Security Engineering: Concept Design, Mar 05 (inc. Change 1, May 06)
10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
3Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
4AFI 48-144, Drinking Water Surveillance Program, Sep 10
5AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), Sep 12
2AFI
FOOTNOTES
aChecklist
Applicability: Central BW storage areas, but criteria may be selectively applied to other storage areas, such as
unit/flight storage area, as determined locally (consider risk). Applies to BW purchased with government funds for use in food
facities (Dining Halls, Commissary facilities, etc.) and issue to/consumption by personnel. While BW sold through Commissaries
falls under Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) food and water security programs, checks of Commissaries may uncover local
problems, particularly at overseas locations.
b Physical Barriers: Independent barriers may not be necessary or barriers that do not meet AT may be acceptable depending
on degree of security provided by the building/facility and level of risk.
c Locks: If justifiable (typically assets that are especially critical or are located off-base or in a remote area), use integrated,
tamper-resistant locking mechanisms (e.g., tamper-resistant dead-bolts) or high-security padlocks and hasps (that are securely
anchored) IAW AFCESA ETL 04-5. High-security padlocks and hasps are only as effective as doors or barriers the locks secure.
See the following DoD Website for more information on high-security padlocks and hasps: http://www.dscp.dla.mil/gi/locks/
dIllumination: One (1) footcandle (fc) within 50′ radius of asset/facility IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (1 fc is generally sufficient to read
the text on this checklist once eyes are acclimated). A proper assessment often requires visiting the site during darkness. Note:
some locations may choose to restrict lighting where attack by mortar or other propelled munitions is credible, or when site is in a
very remote area where lights may draw unwanted attention to asset, while providing little benefit in deterring/detecting intruders.
eDoors, Hatches, other Entryways: If entryway physical security is deemed poor, or risk is high, recommend UFC 4-020-02FA
& ETL 04-5 criteria—steel, stock hollow steel, or steel clad doors/covers w/steel frame and tamper-resistant hinges (e.g., welded
or internal hinges) and hinge pins (tack weld, peen, or use pins secured by screw accessible only when the door/cover is open).
fHardening: Effective use of construction techniques & materials and security hardware to impede intrusion attempts. Often
involves use of steel and/or concrete (but not exclusively) securely anchored by welds or fasteners (e.g., bolts) designed to avert
removal using standard tools. May include structural modifications and/or off-the-shelf retrofits. See the following EPA Website
for more information on hardening and product sources: http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/guide/tableofcontents.cfm.
gWindows, Vents, & other Structure Openings: Eliminate or harden/reinforce windows and all potential man-passable
openings (>96 in2, with no dimension <6 inches) IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (e.g., use securely-anchored 3/8-inch or larger hardened
steel bars at 4 inches apart). Note: for round openings, a diameter >11 inches (≈ 96 in2) is considered “man-passable.”
hAdditional BW Contract AT Provisions: Additional AT contract provisions are generally expected to be similar to provisions
included in contracts for food with similar sources and supply chains.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #17 (Sep 10)
Deployment Water Assetsa
CRITERIA
STATUS
WELLS
1. Barrierb: Well is in a controlled area surrounded by an independent
see-through security fence or equivalent barrier that is kept lockedc?1,2,3,4,7,8
Y
N
NA
2. Signage: clearly indicates restricted access/warning, and does not
identify asset or indicate function (and, if off-base, US/base affiliation)?1,4,7,8
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
3. Illuminatione: is in working order, and enables observation of activities
surrounding the asset from outside the area during darkness?1,2,4,8
Wiringf:
4. Exterior Power Switch, Controls, & Critical
are judged to be
A) effectively secured4,8cd and B) in good condition5,7?
5. Exterior Isolation Valvesg: A) are secured2,3,4cd and B) are not leaking
or flooded (posing a hazard associated with back-siphonage/backflow, and
excessive corrosion and failure)3,5,6,7,9?
6. Well Enclosure: The well (and any collocated pumps, treatment
system, chemicals, etc.) are housed in a fully enclosed structure?2,3,7,8,11
Entrywaysh:
7. Doors, Hatches, & other Designed
are found to be
lockedc and judged to be sufficiently hardenedd against forced entry?1,2,3,4
other Openingsi:
8. Windows, Vents, &
A) have an area not more than
96 in2 or are effectively hardenedd with metal bars or grilles (not screens)
that are well-anchored, and B) are masked or otherwise designed to
obscure view of interior assets/processes?1,2,3,4
9. Facility/Structure Walls, Roof, & Floor: are judged to be designed,
constructedj, and in a condition that does not enable easy
penetration/forced entry using simple hand tools?1,2,3
10. Wellhead: A) is judged to be effectively
and sealed (no
cracks/openings except for air vent)3,7,8, B) extends above floor/surface at
least 12 inches,8,11, and C) floor/surface slopes away from wellhead7,8,11?
hardenedd
11. Well Air Vent: A) Vent opening faces downward, is covered by a
corrosion-resistant mesh screen, and is at or above the top of the wellhead,
and B) if located off base, outdoors, or within a facility/enclosure that lacks
adequate physical security: 1) vent components are hardened (e.g., metal
construction), and 2) a vent cap/cover/grill is securely attached (e.g.,
welded on) to avert removal and to impede contaminant introduction3,7,8
12. Well Access Ports: A) are tightly/snugly capped, and B) if located off
base, outdoors, or within a facility/enclosure that lacks adequate physical
security—1) port components (pipes/caps) are hardened (e.g., metal
construction—not plastic), and 2) caps are securely locked?3,4,7,8
13. Well Appurtenances: exist to A) flush and sample well (e.g., spigot),
and B) to prevent backflow into the well, i.e., a Backflow Prevention Device
(BPD)3,7,8? (Note: BPD should at least be a Check Valve and installed
upstream of all line connections (flushing/blow-off line, sample spigot, etc.);
a reduced pressure (RP) or double check (DC) device is preferred.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NOTES
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
14. Condition of Components: Pumps, pipes, controls, electrical
system, valves, BPDs, etc. appear properly maintained and in good
physical condition, and are not leaking or heavily corroded?5,7
15. Contaminant Sources: A) Area around wellhead is free of standing
water, signs of vermin, & other contaminants, B) latrines, septic tanks,
soakage pits, and bivouac areas are located at least 100 yards (yd) downhill
from well, C) other sources, e.g., refuse, HazMat or TIC/TIM activities,
agricultural/animal activities, etc. are at least 30 yd downhill from well, D)
drainage from nearby pollution sources do not flow toward the well, and E)
any major pollution source uphill of the well is at least 2 miles away?2,6,7,10
USAFSAM #17 (Sep 10)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
16. Treatment Systems Collocated with Wells: Also apply criteria 11–13
under section Treatment Systems, Pumps, & Miscellaneous Critical Assets.
NOTES
N/A
SURFACE WATER
1. Physical Barrierb: An independent security fence or other type of barrier
(that does not obscure the view of the intake) effectively restricts access to
the intake opening(s) and associated components?1,2,3,4,8,12
Y
N
NA
2. Signage: clearly indicates restricted access/warning, but does not
identify asset or indicate function (and, if off-base, US/base affiliation)?1,4,8,12
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Illuminatione:
3.
is in working order, and enables observation of activities
around the intake from outside the area during darkness?1,4,8
4. Isolation
Valvesg:
are effectively
secured?2,3,4cd
5. Condition of Components: Intake structure including screen, conduit,
pump (if integrated/collocated), valves, etc. and any supporting
structure/components appear properly maintained and in good
physical/working condition?11,12
6. Intake Positioning:
A) Intake is located where it can be easily observed,
B) Intake is located where it is not susceptible to interference or
damage from debris, ice, watercraft, or shoreline activities, and
C) The opening is maintained at a depth between 8 inches below the
surface and 8 inches above the bottom of the water source?3,8,10,11
7. Contaminant Sourcesl:
A) No refuse or debris have accumulated at the intake,
B) No signs of contamination are observed in the area of the intake,
C) Effluent discharges from reverse osmosis treatment units are at
least 25 yd downstream of intake,
D) Discharges or potential run-off from latrines, septic tanks, other
sources of sewage/wastewater, bivouac areas, HazMat or TIC/TIMrelated activities, agricultural/animal activities, & other pollution
sources are at least 100 yd downstream from the intake, and
E) Major pollution sources upstream are at least 2 miles away?10,11,12
8. Onshore Components: Note: For onshore pumps, treatment systems,
& other critical assets or access points, apply applicable assessment criteria
located in other sections of this checklist (e.g., Treatment Systems, Pumps,
& Miscellaneous Critical Assets or Bulk Storage).
N/A
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
USAFSAM #17 (Sep 10)
STATUS
NOTES
TREATMENT SYSTEMS, PUMPS, & MISCELLANEOUS CRITICAL ASSETS
1. Locationm: Assets are located in an area that optimizes security?3,8
Y
N
NA
2. Physical Barrierb: Assets/access points are within a controlled area
surrounded by an independent see-through security fence or equivalent
barrier with lockedc/controlled access?1,2,3,4,7,8
Y
N
NA
3. Signage: clearly indicates restricted access/warning, but does not
identify asset or function (and, if off-base, US/base affiliation)?1,4,8
Y
N
NA
4. Illuminatione: is in working order, and enables observation of activities
surrounding asset(s) from outside the area during darkness?1,2,4,8
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
9. Windows, Vents, &
A) have an area not more than
96 in2 or are effectively hardenedd with metal bars or grilles (not screens)
that are well-anchored, and B) are masked or otherwise designed to
obscure view of interior assets/processes?1,2,3,4
Y
N
NA
10. Facility/Structure Walls, Roof, & Floor: are judged to be designed,
constructedj, and in a condition that does not enable easy penetration or
forced entry using simple hand tools?1,2,3,8
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Wiringf:
5. Exterior Power Switch, Controls, & Critical
are judged to be
4,7,8cd
A) effectively secured (for fixed assets)
and B) in good condition5,7?
6. Exterior Isolation Valvesg: A) are secured2,3,4cd and B) are not leaking
or flooded (posing a hazard associated with back-siphonage/backflow, and
excessive corrosion and failure)3,5,7,9?
7. Asset Enclosure: Where practical, the critical assets/access points are
housed within a fully enclosed facility or structure?1,2,3,7,8
Entrywaysh:
8. Doors, Hatches, & other Designed
are found to be
lockedc and judged to be sufficiently hardenedd against forced entry?1,2,3,4
other Openingsi:
11. Backflow Protection (if applicable): Potable water feed lines to
treatment chemical solution tanks, injectors, or backwash filters are
protected by a permanently-installed air gap or appropriate BPD?3,7
12. Condition of Components: Treatment process equipment, pumps,
controls, electrical system, etc. appear well-maintained and in good working
order?5,7 (Note: if unsure, ask operators to demonstrate operation.)
Chemicalsn/Contaminants:
13. Treatment
A) No TIC/TIM, HazMat, or other contaminants are collocated with, or
in proximity to, treatment chemicals, feed reservoirs, injection
points, or other water access points,
B) Incompatible chemicals (e.g., activated carbon and calcium
hypochlorite) are separated,
C) Chemicals are protected from excessive heat/moisture,
D) Liquids have spill containment,
E) Gas cylinders are restrained & proper ventilation is provided, and
F) A minimum supply (e.g., no more than a few days) of toxic
chemicals are kept on site?2,4,7,8,10
(Note: store bulk toxic treatment chemicals at a separate, secure
location where they are less susceptible to mass introduction into
the water supply, or release into the environment/populated area.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
USAFSAM #17 (Sep 10)
STATUS
NOTES
BULK WATER STORAGEn (Tanks, Bladders, Containment Structures)
1. Locationm: Asset is located in an area that optimizes security?3,8
Y
N
NA
2. Physical
Asset is within a controlled area surrounded by an
independent see-through security fence or equivalent barrier with
lockedc/controlled access?1,2,3,4,7,8
Y
N
NA
3. Signage: clearly indicates restricted access/warning, but does not
identify asset or function (and, if off-base, US/base affiliation)?1,4,8
Y
N
NA
4. Illuminatione: is in working order, and enables observation of activities
around the asset from outside the area during darkness?1,2,4,8
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Barrierb:
Wiringf:
5. Power Switch, Controls, & Critical
are judged to be A)
4,8
cd
effectively secured (for fixed assets)
and B) in good condition5,7?
Valvesg:
6. Isolation
A) are
and B) are not leaking or
flooded (posing a hazard associated with back-siphonage/backflow)3,5,7,9?
7. Marking: Exterior clearly marked with water classification, e.g., “Potable
Water” or “Nonpotable Water”?8,10
8. Water Transfer Hoses/Couplings/Nozzles: are clean, off the ground,
and maintained in a sanitary manner?10
secured2,3,4,7cd
Y
N
NA
9. Overflow/Drain Pipes: Openings are fully covered by fine-mesh screen
& self-closing flap, and do not connect directly to sewer/storm drain?5,7
Y
N
NA
10. Affixed Ladderp: is structurally stable, and secured in a manner that
effectively prevents climbing/access to the top of the tank/reservoir?2,3,7,8
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
12. Service Hatches: A)
B) effectively
q
designed , and C) free of gaps, notable corrosion, and other defects?2,3,4,7
Y
N
NA
13. Air Vents: A) are judged to be sufficiently
and
impede contaminant entry by pouring or use of hose, B) are in good
condition, and C) openings are fully covered by a fine mesh screen?2,3,4,5,7,8
Y
N
NA
14. Other Openings: Top/roof is covered and absent of openings other
than screened vents, e.g., unsealed gaps around cables or pipes entering
reservoir, missing or poorly fitted anode plates, corrosion holes, etc.?2,3,7,10
Y
N
NA
15. Interior Surfaces: are free of notable corrosion, deteriorating surface
coating, excessive bottom sediment, and other physical problems?5,7
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
11. Exterior Surfaces of Tank/Structure: are free of water leaks, notable
corrosion/rust, and other structural defects?5,7
are lockedc,
hardenedd and
hardenedd
designedr to
16. Water Quality: A) The appropriate chlorine residual is being
maintained (test to verify), and B) water is free of contaminant indicators,
e.g., surface film or sheen, suspended matter/debris, notable turbidity,
unusual color or odor, vermin, insects, algae, biofilm on surfaces, etc.)?6,10
17. Water Level: is
be.)
appropriate?7,8 (Note:
ask operator how full it should
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
USAFSAM #17 (Sep 10)
STATUS
NOTES
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION LINES
On Base/Controlled Areass
1. Potable Water System Filling Points for Nonpotable Usest
(designated standpipes, spigots, hydrants, etc.):
A) Are equipped with affixed, reduced pressure (RP) backflow prevention
devices (BPD) to protect system from temporary cross-connections and
B) BPDs are owned and tested by water system owner/operator?3,6,8,9,10,13
(Note: Air Gaps alone are no longer adequate; see Footnote t.)
2. Filling Points for Potable Uses (inc. aircraft water service connections):
A) Potable water transfer hoses (and nozzles) are kept clean and off the
ground, and are used only for filling potable water trucks, trailers, tanks,
coolers, and other potable water containers?8,10
B) Overhead fill lines are designed so that they cannot be inserted directly
into trucks, trailers, or containers being filled?3,8
3. Plumbed Cross-Connections: All high-hazard cross-connections in the
potable water system have been identified and eliminated, or are controlled
by air gap or BPD appropriate for the hazard?3,6,9
(Note: Perform checks where high-hazard cross-connections were
identified or are commonly found, e.g., chemical cleaning systems,
wastewater treatment operations, and feed lines to nonpotable storage).
4. Critical Isolation Valvesg:
A) Vaults or pits are hardenedd and secured (w/locksc or keyed
bolts)2,3,4,8, and are not flooded/leaking (posing a backsiphonage/backflow hazard)5,6,7?
B) Exposed valve handles are chained and lockedc, or otherwise
effectively secured?2,3,4,8 (Note: remove handles when feasible.)2,8
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Off Base/Uncontrolled Areasu (Note: BE follow route of the buried/unburied, base-dedicated supply main.)
1. Exposed Mains: Exposed sections of mains are at least isolated from
direct access by a fence/other barrier?2,3,4,8 (Note: bury when feasible.)2,8
2. Water Leaks: No signs of leaks exist, e.g., pooling water or unusually
heavy vegetation growth over the supply main route (which can pose both a
back-siphonage/backflow hazard and water losses)?3,6,9
3. Cross-Connections: No uncontrolled cross-connections exist, e.g.,
unprotected filling points or unprotected service lines to farm/agricultural
activities, industrial operations, domestic uses, other?3,6,9
4. Hydrants: are secured by one or more of the following:2,3,4,8,13
A) Hydrants are consistently monitored (e.g., gate guards)?
B) Hydrant isolation valves are closed and valve boxes hardenedd/lockedc?
C) Hydrants are equipped with anti-tampering devices?
(Note: remove hydrants when feasible, vs. above options.)2,8
5. Critical Isolation Valvesg and/or Meters:
A) Vaults or pits are hardenedd and lockedc2,3,4,8, and are not flooded or
leaking (posing a back-siphonage/back-flow hazard)5,6,7?
B) Exposed valve handles are chained & lockedc or otherwise judged to be
effectively secured?2,3,4,8 (Note: remove handles when feasible.)2,8
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
5
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
6. Backflow Prevention Devices (on water mains/major service lines):
A) BPDs are enclosed within a lockedc barrier2,3,8,9,13 (e.g., fence or cage),
and
B) BPD Valve Handles (if equipped) are chained & lockedc or otherwise
judged to be secure?2,3,4,8 (Note: remove handles when feasible.)2,8
7. Other Accessible Appurtenances, e.g., Flushing Valves (“Blowoffs”), Air Release Valves, Standpipes, Couplings:
A) Are enclosed within hardenedd, lockedc covers or barriers, or for those
appurtenances equipped with isolation valves:
B) Appurtenance valves are shut off & valve boxes judged to be effectively
secured/locked?2,3,4,8,13 (Note: remove appurtenances if feasible.)2,8
USAFSAM #17 (Sep 10)
STATUS
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
NOTES
UNIT LEVEL STORAGE & DISTRIBUTION ASSETS (Trailers, Trucks/Tankers, Drums, Cans, etc.)
1. Locationm: Asset is located in an area that optimizes security?8
Barrierb and
2. Physical
Signage: Where feasible, A) asset is within a
controlled area surrounded by an independent see-through security fence or
equivalent barrier with lockedc/controlled access, and B) signage clearly
indicates restricted access/warning, but does not identify assets or area’s
function (and, if off-base, US/base affiliation)?3,8
3.
Where feasible, is in working order, and enables
observation of activities around asset from outside area during darkness?8
4. Marking: Exteriors of all assets used to store or transport water are
clearly marked on both sides with water classification, e.g., “Potable Water”
or “Nonpotable Water,” as applicable?8,10
5. Hatches/Covers, Ports, Caps, & Other Designed Openings: A) are
kept closed and (when designed) secured/locked, and B) gaskets and
screens are fully intact, fit properly, and are in good condition?8,10
6. Exterior Surfaces: are free of A) deterioration, leaks, & other structural
defects, and B) unnecessary openings that serve as potential contaminant
entry points?8,10
7. Interior Surfaces: A) are free of notable corrosion, cracks, and other
structural defects, B) stainless steel interiors of DoD assets are not painted
or coated, and C) interiors of non-DoD assets that are painted or coated use
coatings approved by NSF International or an equivalent organization?8,10
8. Water Quality: A) Water is free of contaminant indicators, e.g., surface
film or sheen, suspended matter/debris, sediment, notable turbidity, unusual
color or odor, vermin, insects, biofilm buildup on surfaces, etc., and B) The
appropriate chlorine residual is being maintained IAW AFMAN 48-138_IP, or
applicable policy (test to verify)?8,10
9. Potable Water Transfer Operations:
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Illuminatione:
A) Potable water transfer hoses (and nozzles) are kept clean and off the
ground, and are used only for filling potable water trucks, trailers, tanks,
coolers, and other potable water containers?8,10
B) Overhead fill lines are designed so that they cannot be inserted directly
into trucks, trailers, or containers being filled?3,8
C) Dust caps, when available, are applied to cover nozzles/dispensing
ports/couplers when they are not being used?8,10
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
6
PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
CRITERIA
USAFSAM #17 (Sep 10)
STATUS
NOTES
BOTTLED & PACKAGED DRINKING WATER
1. Locationm: Water is stored in an area that optimizes security?3,8
2. Physical
Storage area is surrounded by an independent seethrough security fence/barrier with lockedc/controlled access?1,3,8
3. Signage: clearly indicates restricted access/warning, but does not
identify assets (drinking water) or US/base affiliation?1,8
4. Illuminatione: is in working order, and enables observation of activities
around storage area/structure from outside the area during darkness?1,3,8
5. Enclosure: Where feasible, water assets are stored within a fully
enclosed facility/structure?1,3,8
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Y
N
NA
Barrierb:
Entrywaysh:
6. Doors, Hatches, & other Designed
are found to be
lockedc and judged to be sufficiently hardenedd against forced entry?1,3
7. Windows, Vents, Other Openingsi: A) have an area not more than 96
in2 or are hardenedd w/metal bars or grilles (not screens) that are wellanchored, and B) are masked or otherwise obscures view of assets?1,3
8. Facility/Structure Walls, Roof, & Floor: are judged to be designed,
constructedj, and in a condition that does not enable easy penetration or
forced entry using simple hand tools?1,3
9. Access Control: Water is not stored in a common-use or general
access area (i.e., access to stored water is restricted)?3,8
10. Collocated Chemicals or Processes: No TIC/TIM, HazMat, or other
potential contaminants are collocated with, or in proximity to, water assets?8
11. Key Control: A key (or, combination) control program is in place?8
Some recommended elements: Sign keys out and back in after use; No
keys or combinations to contractors, non-DoD, or non-essential personnel;
Change locks when keys are lost or when control may be compromised.
12. FPCON Measures: Owning unit’s written FPCON measures include:
A) at FPCON Bravo, begin inspections of stored water for signs of
tampering & contamination, and B) at FPCON Charlie, control access and
use sign-in and sign-out logs for all personnel entering storage areas, and
limit/inspect all personal items? 3(Sec A4.1.2.3) 14(Sec’s A2.4.8 & A2.5.4.2)
13. Inspection of Water Deliveries: Personnel who receive delivery
inspect assets upon receipt for damage, leakage, quality, clarity, and signs
of tampering, and report irregularities to their superiors? 3(Sec 3.3.4.1.1),8
14. Water Source Approval: The source of water is on the US Army
Veterinary Command (VETCOM) approval list? 3(Sec 3.3.3.1)
(Notes: 1) Verify VETCOM approval at the following Website:
http://vets.amedd.army.mil/vetsvcs/approved.nsf;
2) To access CENTCOM sources, you must request a login & password.)
15. Transporter Background Checks: Contractor personnel who deliver
water receive appropriate background checks (as determined locally)?
3(Sec 3.3.4.1.2) 14(Sec 2.18.2) (Note: as necessary, validate by reviewing
contract provisions and discussing with appropriate Contracting Officer.)
16. Contract AT Provisions: Water contracts include provisions for water
security from point of origin to point of receipt? 3(Sec’s 3.3.3.2 & 3.3.4.1.3)
14(Sec 2.18.1) (Note: review contract; see WVA Guide, Section D.2.4.3.)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #17 (Sep 10)
CHECKLIST INSTRUCTIONS
1) Checklist Marking and Handling: Avoid identifiers that indicate installation, facility/location, organization, etc.; otherwise,
working paper may require classification and appropriate marking and handling (see WVA Guide, Section 4.2.2.2). Consider
using generic/nonspecific identifiers, e.g., a number that corresponds with the order asset was visited/assessed.
2) Criteria Applicability: Criteria from references that may not be considered directly applicable to overseas locations are still
applied as AF Best Practices. Checklist includes AF-level criteria only. Check local, MAJCOM, Foreign Governing Standards
(FGS) as applicable for more stringent or additional criteria that may apply. Due to unique circumstances, criteria may not
always be practical to apply; if necessary, confer with subject matter experts (SMEs) and use professional judgment to
determine status (and, if applicable, appropriate recommendations).
3) Delineating Observations: ‘No” status markings indicate deficiencies that can be rolled up into a single observation for the
applicable facility or asset. An observation may also encompass multiple assets/facilities—when they are similar in function,
have similar control deficiencies, and pose a similar level of risk; for example, a cluster of wells, collocated storage
tanks/bladders, or a facility that houses more than one type of asset may be considered a single observation.
CRITERIA SOURCES
1Unified
Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-020-02FA, Security Engineering: Concept Design, Mar 05 (inc. Change 1, May 06)
Engineering Tech. Letter (ETL) 04-5, Design Recommendations for Potable Water System Security, Aug 04
3AFI 10-246, Food and Water Protection Program, Dec 04 (inc. Change 1, Nov 09)
4American Water Works Association (AWWA) and American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Guidelines for the Physical
Security of Water Utilities (reviewed and sanctioned by US EPA), Dec 06
5UFC 3-230-02, Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems (prev. MIL-HDBK-1164), Jul 01
6AFI 48-144, Drinking Water Surveillance Program, Sep 10
7US EPA, Sanitary Survey Guidance Manual for Ground Water Systems, Nov 08
8Best Practices (BPs) identified by USAFSAM water vulnerability functional experts
9AFI 32-1066, Backflow Prevention Program, Oct 07
10AFMAN 48-138_IP, Sanitary Control and Surveillance of Field Water Supplies, May 10
11UFC 3-230-07A, Water Supply: Sources and General Considerations, Jan 04
12US EPA, Guidance Manual for Conducting Sanitary Surveys of Public Water Systems: Surface Water and Ground Water Under
the Direct Influence (GWUDI), Apr 99
2AFCESA
13US EPA Water Security Division, 817-R-06-001, Evaluating Backflow Prevention as a Potential Water Security Strategy, Mar 06
14AFI
10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), Mar 09
FOOTNOTES
aChecklist
Applicability: 1) Use to assess fixed and/or field (tactical) potable water assets, including water approved for personal
hygiene/human contact but not consumption due to Force Protection, palatability, or reliability issues. May be used for nonpotable assets used for mission-critical purposes, e.g., firefighting, decontamination, industrial operations, construction, and any
use where human contact and inhalation are a factor; 2) For water assets owned, operated, and/or maintained by non-AF entities,
criteria in this checklist can still be applied as AF-recognized Best Practices, regardless of source/reference.
bBarrier: Best Practice (BP)--utilize a 7-foot high, see-through security fence topped by barbed wire outriggers and/or razor wire,
is free of defects or man-passable gaps (≥ 6 inches), and is clear of objects/vegetation that may aid climbing or concealment.
cLocks: When possible, use integrated, tamper-resistant locking mechanisms (e.g., tamper-resistant dead-bolts) or high-security
padlocks and hardware (securely anchored) IAW AFCESA ETL 04-5. See the following DoD Website for information on highsecurity padlocks/hasps: http://www.dscp.dla.mil/gi/locks/.
dHarden: Effective use of construction techniques & materials and security hardware to impede intrusion attempts. Often
involves use of steel and/or concrete (but not exclusively) securely anchored by welds or fasteners (e.g., bolts) designed to avert
removal using standard tools. May include structural modifications and/or off-the-shelf retrofits. See the following EPA Website
for more information on hardening and product sources: http://cfpub.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/guide/tableofcontents.cfm.
eIllumination: BP—lighting is automatically activated by darkness or motion sensor, and provides at least one (1) footcandle (fc)
within 50-foot radius of asset IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (1 fc is generally sufficient to read the text on this form once eyes are
acclimated). A proper assessment often requires visiting the site during darkness. Note: some locations may choose to restrict
lighting where attack by propelled munitions is credible, or when site is in a very remote area where lights may draw unwanted
attention to the asset, while providing little benefit in deterring/detecting intruders. Consider the trade-offs and associated risks.
fExterior Power Switch/Controls/Wiring: For fixed (non-tactical) assets, power and control switches/panels should be relatively
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT
USAFSAM #17 (Sep 10)
hardened and locked. When possible, protect exposed critical wiring for power and controls/telemetry by enclosing in conduit or
use other practical measures.
gIsolation Valves: Critical valves (in vaults/pits or on BPDs) are those that can shut down the water supply to the base, or areas
or facilities that are particularly large or critical. Includes valves that control the flow of Secondary or Emergency water supplies.
On base, critical valves are often located on transmission lines, and are often just inside the fence on incoming supply lines. Off
base, they are often located just outside the perimeter fence near where supply lines enter the base. For critical valves with
affixed handles—secure in vaults (w/locks or keyed bolts), remove or chain handles, and/or install cage/enclosure. For valves
requiring a tool to operate (e.g., T-wrench)—secure valve cover. Options for air release/relief valves—remove or enclose valve.
hDoors, Hatches, other Entryways: If entryway physical security is deemed poor, or risk is high, recommend UFC 4-020-02FA
& ETL 04-5 criteria—steel, stock hollow steel, or steel clad doors/covers w/steel frame and tamper-resistant hinges (e.g., welded
or internal hinges) and hinge pins (tack weld, peen, or use pins secured by screw accessible only when the door/cover is open).
iWindows, Vents, & other Structure Openings: Eliminate or harden/reinforce windows and all potential man-passable openings
(>96 in2, with no dimension <6 inches) IAW UFC 4-020-02FA (e.g., use securely-anchored 3/8-inch or larger hardened steel bars
at 4 inches apart). Note: for round openings, a diameter >11 inches (≈ 96 in2) is considered “man-passable.”
jConstruction: Conventional construction methods and materials can be used, but masonry and/or steel is preferred.
kSurface Water Intake Barriers: Independent barriers for surface water intakes may not be necessary (but may still be
recommended) when the risk is not considered high; for example, when the water source is located within the confines of a base
with effective control of access and oversight of contractor, vendor, visitor, and foreign national activities.
lContaminant Sources: The use of Bank Filtration or an Infiltration Gallery increases protection from intentional or accidental
contamination events, and are highly recommended in deployment areas. See references 2 (Sec 5.2.5) and 3 (Sec 3.1.8).
mOptimal Location: When possible, assets should be at least 150′ inside the installation boundary, clear of vegetation, materiel,
and geographic features that can provide cover/concealment, in an area easily observed day and night, and where they are not
easily accessible to non-US Forces personnel.
nToxic Treatment Chemicals: Store bulk toxic treatment chemicals at a separate, secure location where they are less
susceptible to mass introduction into the water supply, or release into the environment or populated area.
oBulk Storage: 1) consider all criteria For potable storage (mark “N/A” under Status if item does not apply); 2) For non-potable
storage (e.g., fire storage), primary items to check include: A) water level, B) structural integrity, and C) backflow protection (air
gap or testable BPD, e.g., Double Check or RP device) if tank is filled by a potable water line connection.
pLadders: 1) Remove or cut to provide at least 20 feet vertical clearance between bottom rung and any fixture/appurtenance than
can aid climbing. (Note: many ladder barriers/blocking devices can be bypassed relatively easy, and are not recommended in
lieu of ladder removal.); 2) Use portable ladders or hydraulic lift that are secured at a separate location when not being used.
qHatch Design: Hatches should be hardenedd and equipped with a raised rim and a tight-fitting cover to avert intentional
contamination by pouring, hose transfer, etc. or accident (e.g., runoff, birds, vermin, insects); gaskets are highly recommended.
rVent Designs: Vent covers should be hardenedd; vent openings should face downward, be as narrow as practical to avert
insertion of hand or tools, and be covered w/corrosion-resistant fine-mesh screen (e.g., 20 mesh). Recommended Designs: 1)
Vent is equipped w/internal baffles to avert direct reservoir access; 2) Service hatch opening (which is covered by a removable
screen) serves as the vent also, and is under a hardened, locked cover. A raised rim or lip around the opening acts as a baffle; 3)
A reduced diameter gooseneck shaft with an internal grille or grate (or at least secured over the vent shaft opening).
sOn Base/Controlled Area Access Points: Considered those pipeline access points that are within a perimeter with effective
access control, and there is effective oversight of contractor, vendor, visitor, and foreign national activities. Controlled areas
typically have few if any High Risk or Extremely High Risk pipeline access points, and supplemental physical security measures
are generally not required, with the exception of water filling points and critical valves.
tDesignated Filling Points: 1) Air gaps alone for filling points are no longer adequate—they can often be bypassed inadvertently
or intentionally relatively easy; 2) User-provided BPDs are no longer acceptable due to FP purposes; 3) When possible, filling
points should be established where activities can be easily monitored by base personnel, and downstream of critical or large
populations (e.g., on dead-ends or in areas of low water use).
uOff Base/Uncontrolled Area Access Points: Access points on supply lines located off the base or in areas without effective
access control or oversight of contractors, visitors, vendors, or foreign nationals. Portions of off-base supply lines dedicated (or
mostly dedicated) to AF operations are of primary concern, and generally requires that assessors follow the route of the supply
main. Access points located upstream of high-service connections to non-AF commercial, industrial, and/or housing areas pose
less risk and may require no supplemental physical security measures.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
9