C.S. Lewis, author of The Four Loves, has claimed that lovers are absorbed in each
other while friends are absorbed in some common interest. Discuss and evaluate
this claim about the distinction between love and friendship.
Brad Knott
The standard way of thinking about romantic love and companion friendship has it that
romantic love falls into a distinct, separate category due to the element of sexual
intimacy. Traditionally, it has been claimed that companion friendships are of a ‘higher’
nature since, unlike romantic love, they are not tethered to bodily passion, causing them
to be more conducive to virtue. C.S. Lewis claims that friends are absorbed in a common
interest, whereas lovers are absorbed in each other. In this essay, I will examine what I
consider to be certain flaws in this assumption. I will argue that eros permeates both
types of relationships which makes it difficult to distinguish between the two.
Furthermore, I will argue that companion friends are not only absorbed in a common
interest, but are intricately absorbed in each other due to the dynamic combination of
mutual self-disclosure, reflection, and interpretation of each other.
C.S. Lewis in The Four Loves (1960) claims that when we refer to ‘all our
friends’ we are usually referring to acquaintances and people who are valuable to us in a
utility sense. These types of friendship form what he terms the ‘matrix’ of friendship,
serving to bind society together into a functioning whole (77). This perspective mirrors
Aristotle, who, in the Nichomachean Ethics, refers to philia as the quality of ‘goodwill’
in our relations which is crucial for the wellbeing of society. Aristotole sees philia as a
good in its own right and, like other Greek philosophers of the time, does not reduce it to
one particular category, but extends the term to include all forms of relationships,
including romantic love. Lewis expresses this same broad view and is thus careful to
point out that everyday, acquaintance/ utility-based friendships, should not be reduced to
a ‘lesser’ form. He writes: ‘We do not disparage silver by distinguishing it from gold’
(Lewis, 1960, 77). However, Lewis, like Aristotle, does distinguish a form of friendship
which, he believes, is more conducive to virtue; a type where each party sees the
mirrored image of their own character and disposition. For Lewis, ‘character’ friendships
such as these come about via the medium of a common interest, or passion.
According to Lewis, this sort of friendship arises when two acquaintances in a
group encounter a moment where each is stunned to find the other shares the same kinds
of thoughts, interests and views as themselves. A kindred spirit is found, and a deep
friendship is forged upon the strength of a ‘shared vision’ which sets the two apart from
the group (Lewis, 1960, 78). Lewis goes on to distinguish this kind of friendship from
romantic love in a language which is, ironically, very romantic in its tone. He speaks of
the shared passion of friendship in terms of it being a ‘journey’ which must always be
‘about something’: ‘We picture lovers face to face but friends side by side; their eyes
look ahead’ (Lewis, 1960, 79). Furthermore, he describes eros as having ‘naked bodies’
whereas friendship ‘naked personalities’ (Lewis, 1960, 84).
Lewis’ description of friendship in terms of ‘naked personalities’ versus romantic
love’s ‘naked bodies’ naturally suggests that what separates the two is sexual intimacy, a
common assumption among academics. Immanuel Kant certainly agreed. He writes:
‘Sexual love brings with it an entirely new constellation of emotions, among which is the
sheer delight in the body of another person which sets it apart from friendship’ (Kant in
Lamb, 1997, 131). However, many academics point out certain flaws in the way sexual
involvement is used to distinguish friendship from romantic love. This in turn leads us to
the questioning of academic distinctions between types of love.
Mark Vernon (2005) in The Philosophy of Friendship draws attention to how the
lines which separate romantic love and friendship are often obscure, giving rise to the
notion that friendship is not as different to romantic love as one might think. Vernon
quotes from a letter by Montaigne to his friend Etienne la Boetie: ‘Take me and all I
have, give me but your love, my dear friend. Tuesday is longed for by me and nights and
days move a tedious pace till I am near you’ (Montaigne in Vernon, 2005, 29). Contrary
to Lewis’s claim that friends are strictly absorbed in a common interest as opposed to
each other, this portrait of friendship sees two friends expressing feelings that seem to
mirror romantic love to a remarkable degree. Montaigne appears to be completely
absorbed in his friend. In fact, Montaigne believed that the highest form of friendship
involved a perfect fusion between two people. However, Lewis might argue here that this
sort of longing for the other arises from the urge to re-engage the shared passion one has
with ones ‘kindred spirit’, rather than a love which resembles romance with its erotic
undertones. However, the examples of eros crossing the boundaries into friendship are
many. C.D.C. Reeves points out Kierkegaard’s claim that eros and philia are ‘involuntary
feelings ignited by the beloved’s physical, psychological qualities’ (Reeves, 2005, 4).
Lewis himself admitted that the moment a man and a woman find that they have a
‘shared interest’, erotic love arises almost immediately (Lewis, 1960, 79). And, of course
reductionists such as Freud claimed that all types of love have their origin in sexual
impulses. This would seem to contradicts Lewis’ claim that there is nothing ‘throaty’ in
Friendship; nothing to ‘quicken the pulse’, as he puts it (Lewis, 1960, 79). Moreover, it is
common experience that many of the emotions associated with romantic love, such as a
heightened feeling of affection, along with jealousy, and, sometimes hatred, are also
common to friendship.
In light of this, perhaps it would be fair to claim that companion friends are not
only absorbed in a common interest, but also in each other in a way that is not very
different to romantic love; that many aspects of eros seep into each category. Perhaps
Mark Vernon puts it best by likening eros to the sand in the oyster’s shell around which
‘a smooth, lustrous coating of friendship may form’ (Vernon, 2005, 35). This analogy to
some extent parallels Plato’s theory in Symposium where the journey of eros begins on
the lower rungs of loves ladder (such as the loving of particular bodies) and ends with the
ultimate love - the union with the Forms; with Beauty itself. Accordingly, Vernon
concludes that the best kind of friendship is where the erotic element has been sublimated
into ‘a shared passion for life’ (Vernon, 2005, 35).
The idea of an undercurrent of erotic possibility running through friendship
indicates there is a type of love in romantic relationships and companion friendship
which is the same; the big difference being that in romantic relationships this love is
expressed through sexual involvement, whereas in companion friendship this type of love
must seek other means of expression.
Lawrence Thomas (1989) draws attention to the fact that sexual involvement is
not necessarily an indication of romantic love, especially in modern society where sex is
often treated as more of a commodity, rather than something which cements ones deep
love for another human being. Thomas believes that a better indication of the union
between two people is found in the concept of ‘nurturing touching’. This is because
‘nurturing touching’ is not necessarily motivated by sexual desire, nor is it restricted to
one type of relationship - but rather, it is an act which carries a variety of feelings and
expressions all of which are governed by a sincere care for the other (124). Consequently,
it enriches all types of relationships.
Thomas scrutinises how society deems male-female romantic relationships to be
the peak of union between individuals which causes ‘nurturing touching’ to find its
fullest expression there. Society’s focus on romantic love causes people to feel inhibited
about expressing ‘nurturing touching’ in other types of relationships, particularly in
relationships between men (Thomas, 1989, 125). For Thomas, this ought not to be the
case since it is conceptually possible for ‘nurturing touching’ to be equally expressed in
all human relationships, causing the barriers between romantic love and companion
friendship to collapse. He makes a good point. In countries such as India, where open
physical expression between men and women is frowned upon, nurturing touching takes
place quite openly in the streets with men holding hands and stroking each other
affectionately. Moreover, it is common knowledge that in Arabic cultures men kiss upon
greeting. Yet, some would argue that this would not be the case if these societies allowed
open expression between men and woman. It does, however, give evidence to the idea of
eros permeating all relationships. What Thomas is suggesting here is that if (in an ideal
world) you were asked at a dinner party if you were in relationship, you should be able to
say yes, if indeed you are in a relationship where ‘nurturing touching’ takes place. Hence,
in contrast of Thomas’s stance, Lewis’s claim that friends are not absorbed in each other
seems ill-conceived. However, there are many more ways in which friends can be said to
be absorbed in each other; ways which may not necessarily be defined by undercurrents
of eros or ‘nurturing touching’.
Lewis claims that friends ‘meet like sovereign princes of independent
states…freed from contexts’ (Lewis, 1960, 83). He argues that friends are not interested
in revealing details about each others private affairs since this detracts from the ‘common
interest’. However, Thomas contests this view. He claims that mutual self-disclosure of
private information (‘secrets’) is absolutely vital in cementing the intimacy between
companion friends. This is because such disclosure facilitates openness and vulnerability.
If we drop our social guard and reveal intimate secrets to another, it signifies that we trust
them. This allows a deeper relationship to flourish. However, Thomas believes that we
must be discerning in how much we reveal of ourselves in public. This is because a
person who reveals secrets to all and sundry is not a person who would make a good
friend since they leave nothing secret for the other to be privy to. Furthermore, they
would not be the sort of person one would be inclined to entrust with their private
information (Thomas, 1989, 105). However, according to Dean Cocking and Jeanette
Kennett, the sharing of secrets is not in itself significant to friendship.
Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett (1998) claim that the disclosure of private
information does not, in itself, indicate intimacy (518). For example, men are known to
share intimate details of their sexual encounters with relative strangers. In fact, they claim
that the revealing of secrets may in fact disrupt friendship. For instance, if a man were to
reveal to his companion friend a fetish for women’s clothes, there is a fair chance this
would cause a disturbing sense of embarrassment in the friendship. As a result, Cocking
and Kennett would seem to support Lewis’s stance that friends are not interested in
absorbing themselves in the personal details of the other.
Yet this is not quite true. What Cocking and Kennett are saying is that the sharing
of secrets is the outcome of something much deeper in friendship. For what is at stake
here is not the nature of the private information in itself, but rather the fact that a friend
chooses to reveal to the other what they value (Cocking and Kennett, 1998, 518). In this
way, Cocking and Kennett claim that sharing personal information such as a marriage
break up is significant to friendship. This is because it shows that the friend places a very
high value on the ‘hopes and concerns that [they] share with each other’ (Cocking and
Kennett, 1998, 519).
Cocking and Kennett go on to claim that what matters in companion friendship is
not so much the ‘shared interest’, but rather, the way in which friends are ‘responsive to
[their] interests being directed by each other’ (Cocking and Kennett, 1998, 508). But
before examining what this means, it is first important to look at two other concepts that
tie into this; the concepts of ‘mirroring’ and ‘drawing’.
Lewis claims that “friendship is born at that moment when one man says to
another: ‘What! You too? I thought that no one but myself’” (Lewis, 1960, 77). Here we
have one person astounded to see their own point of view and qualities mirrored in
another. Hence it could be argued that this sort of friendship is grounded in
narcissism.(Aristotle believed that such friendships were an extension of self; Kant also
held to the ‘mirroring’ view in terms of ‘character’ friends mirroring each others virtues.)
However, Cocking and Kennett believe that this ‘mirroring’ concept of friendship is far
too shallow.
Contrary to Lewis, Cocking and Kennett claim that the mirroring of ones own
traits in another is not what cements intimacy in a friendship. They claim that it is not the
‘shared interest’, nor the seeing of our selves in the other that is important, but rather our
willingness to be mutually ‘drawn’ by the other (Cocking and Kennett, 1998, 508). Hence
they provide the analogy of a portrait painter which, in their view, better illustrates the
dynamic nature of friendship. In this analogy the friend is not so much attempting to see
themselves in the other, but is rather attempting to ‘draw’ their own version of the other,
depicting them in a fresh way. They claim that the mutuality and reciprocity of this
‘drawing’ process enriches both parties. Consequently, Cocking and Kennett claim that it
is not so much a case of seeing oneself in the other that shapes friendship, but the seeing
oneself through the eyes of the other (Cocking and Kennett, 1998, 509). This dynamic
take on the nature of friendship challenges Lewis’ concept. Here, we find the two parties
deeply absorbed in the other. Furthermore, Cocking and Kennett show how friends are
not necessarily engrossed in an overarching ‘common interest’ in the way Lewis seems to
suggest. By contrast, friends often take delight in the other person’s interests, even when
such interests are not ‘common’ to their own, such as the example they provide of one
friend who does not like ballet taking delight in ballet simply because the other friend
loves it (Cocking and Kennett, 1998, 504). By this view, friends are very much shaped by
the other person, modifying themselves in accordance with the others interpretation
I have attempted to highlight some of the discrepancies in the way that romantic love is
defined as a distinct category to friendship. The overlapping characteristics of both types,
such as the all-pervading, often ambiguous, presence of eros, along with the concepts of
‘nurturing touching’ and mutual self disclosure and intimacy, suggests that lovers and
friends function in similar ways. Nevertheless, the question of whether there are clearly
defined ‘types’ of love and friendship, which can be separated into specific academic
categories, is likely to produce much debate for years to come.
References
C.S. Lewis (1960) The Four Loves. London: Geoffrey Bles.
CDC Reeves (2005) Love’s Confusions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Roger E. Lamb (1997) Love Analyzed. Boulder: Westview Press.
Mark Vernon (2005) The Philosophy of Friendship: New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lawrence Thomas (1989) ‘An Account of Friendship [and Other Loves]’, selections from
Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character: Philadelphia: Temple University
Press.
Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett (1998) ‘Friendship and the Self’, Ethics, Vol.108
pp.502-27