S H I N Z O A B E A N D T H E F U T U R E O F J A PA N
Shinzo Abe and the New Look of Japanese Leadership
MICHAEL GREEN AND NICHOLAS SZECHENYI
When Japan had seemingly unstoppable economic
growth and a relatively benign security environment in
Asia, the quality of Japanese leadership did not matter so
much. Today Japan has very little margin for error when
it comes to leadership. The economy is back on a 2% per
year growth trajectory, if the right decisions are made.
North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon and China is
expanding its soft-power and strategic influence at Japan’s
expense. The United States is a reliable ally, but focused
almost entirely on Iraq. Japan needs a strong leader more
than ever.
So when Junichiro Koizumi ended his five year term
as Prime Minister in September 2006, a certain uneasiness
set in about how well his young protégé, Shinzo Abe,
would do in his place. Since taking over as Prime Minister, however, Abe has proven the skeptics wrong. Indeed,
he may be demonstrating precisely the leadership credentials most suitable for this tumultuous period in international relations. Nevertheless, Abe faces some serious
challenges, beginning with tough elections scheduled for
the upper house of parliament in July 2007, and unavoidable decisions on consumption tax increases, agricultural
liberalization and the history problem. Abe is off to a
strong start on foreign policy to be sure, but he will now
need to prove his mettle on domestic politics and the
economy to truly make a lasting mark on Japan’s post-war
history. And as Japan’s youngest Prime Minister at the
age of 52, he has big plans for his nation, ranging from
Constitutional revision to expanded strategic relations
with India and a tighter defense alliance with the United
States. But first he must survive.
PRAGMATIC DIPLOMACY
Abe began his term with an attempt to overcome one
negative legacy inherited from his predecessor: strained
relations with China and South Korea. The leaders of
both countries refused to meet with Koizumi unless he
promised not to visit the Yasukuni shrine, where Japan’s
war dead and several Class A war criminals are memorialized. Koizumi continued to visit the shrine anyway and
consequently put summitry with China and South Korea
on hold. Eager to break the deadlock, Abe pursued a
strategy of ambiguity on Yasukuni throughout his campaign for prime minister. Hu Jintao and Roh Moo-hyun
took notice and signaled tacit approval of Abe’s position
by no longer making public demands for a promise not to
visit the shrine. This paved the way for Abe’s visits to
Beijing and Seoul in October 2006, his first diplomatic
initiatives as prime minister. Japan and China produced
the first joint statement in eight years; joint study groups
on history were proposed; and Abe’s counterparts expressed solidarity on the need to roll back North Korea’s
nuclear ambitions. Pyongyang’s October 9 nuclear test,
announced as Abe made his way to Seoul, undoubtedly
prompted a shift in emphasis from the past to the challenges of the present. Nonetheless, Abe’s sojourn to
China and South Korea began a process of rapprochement and denoted an instinct for pragmatic diplomacy;
North Korea’s nuclear test revealed additional attributes:
leadership and resolve. On both counts, Abe impressed
his domestic public and a Bush administration that is inclined to cooperate closely with Japan, but needs Japan to
take proactive care of its own neighborhood as much as
possible.
COUNTERING NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATIONS
Most intriguing was the strong message Abe sent the
international community when his government imposed
unilateral sanctions against North Korea and then led
other members of the United Nations Security Council to
support Resolution 1718, which invoked Chapter 7 of the
UN charter calling for mandatory sanctions against countries that threaten international security. Abe made a
strong plea for sanctions back in July 2006 after North
Korea’s missile tests and began a process where Japan,
together with the United States, put pressure on China
and other nations to support punitive measures against
Kim Jong Il’s regime. In so doing, Abe illustrated an ability to orchestrate a multilateral response to a crisis. He
then moved quickly to correct the misperception that
Japan might act on its resolve by pursuing a nuclear arsenal.
Several days after the nuclear test, the policy chief of
the LDP and the foreign minister argued publicly that
Japan should discuss the nuclear option in the context of
a broader debate on security policy. Japan’s nuclear debate goes back decades and often resurfaces in the wake
of crises, though the ultimate conclusion—that a nuclear
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arsenal could isolate Japan, damage the alliance with the
derscores the centrality of the bilateral relationship to his
United States, and destabilize the region—has not
overall strategic vision for Japan.
changed. Nonetheless, the comments by key figures in
The notion of shared values and global norms also
the Abe administration caused widespread concern about
motivates Abe’s strategy to pursue alliances with other
an arms race in Asia. Abe stated repeatedly that the govlike-minded nations. For example, he wishes to cultivate
ernment of Japan would adhere to its three non-nuclear
ties with Australia and India, two countries that view Japrinciples (not to produce, possess, or allow entry of nupan as a strategic partner, and has proposed quadrilateral
clear weapons) and had no intention of pursuing an indetalks including the United States. Abe also wishes to
pendent nuclear capability. This was complemented by a
strengthen Japan’s relationship with the North Atlantic
statement from President Bush
Treaty Organization and plans to
reiterating America’s treaty obliNATO headquarters in
Success in foreign policy is often concomitant with visit
gations to defend Japan and
January 2007 to identify addiimplying the continued viability leadership at home, and Abe’s domestic political tional opportunities for Japan to
skills will be tested in the months ahead.
of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, a
be more forward leaning in repoint reinforced days later dursponse to international chaling a hastily arranged visit to the region by Secretary of
lenges. The strategy is impressively ambitious but will not
State Condoleezza Rice. Abe’s experience with U.S.-Japan
bear fruit unless Abe secures his political footing at home.
alliance coordination, honed during his stint as Koizumi’s
chief cabinet secretary, also proved vital in formulating a
POLITICAL HURDLES
response to the North Korean crisis.
Abe faces a hostile opposition party eager to embarrass him in the lead-up to elections for the upper house
AMBITIOUS AGENDA
of parliament scheduled for July 2007. He cleared one
The Abe agenda is not limited to improved relations
small political hurdle by rallying the LDP to victories in
with Japan’s neighbors and steadfast opposition to North
two local by-elections in October 2006. Abe then engiKorea’s nuclear ambitions; his policy objectives move far
neered a major feat in the Okinawa gubernatorial election
beyond the geographic parameters of Northeast Asia. He
that followed, securing victory for the LDP-backed canwould like to revise Japan’s pacididate who has expressed a willfist constitution so as to particiingness to cooperate with the
pate in a broader range of decentral government on the reafense operations and cement
lignment of U.S. forces there, a
Japan’s leadership role in global
critical component of a bilateral
security, a long-term goal that
agreement announced in May
provides context for the rest of
2006. Abe’s diplomatic forays in
his agenda. He is developing a
the wake of the North Korea
Japanese version of the U.S.
crisis boosted his approval ratings
National Security Council to
but surveys released in December
improve coordination with U.S.
2006 indicate a decline to fifty
counterparts and continue to
percent on average, due in large
strengthen the U.S.-Japan allipart to concerns about his comance. During his first meeting
mitment to economic reform. A
with President Bush as prime
failure to instill public confidence
minister, held on the margins of
in his economic agenda could
the November 2006 Asia Pacific
leave Abe extremely vulnerable.
Economic Cooperation Forum
Various dynamics in Japan such
(APEC) in Vietnam, Abe echoed
as demographic change, a declina theme developed during the
ing birth rate, high government
Koizumi administration: that the
debt, and a perceived increase in
U.S.-Japan alliance is based on
income disparity present unpleasfundamental values such as freeant choices for policymakers.
dom, democracy, basic human
Abe has several prominent advisflickr.com/photos/toyochin/
rights and the rule of law, and
ers and preserved a special council
that strengthening bilateral cooperation would maintain
on economic policy created by Koizumi to advance necpeace and security in Japan, Asia, and throughout the
essary reforms outside the confines of the government
world. Abe sees the U.S.-Japan alliance as a global alliance
bureaucracy. Nonetheless, he has offered little by way of
and a key departure point for Japan’s desire to assume
details other than the need to promote growth and reduce
greater leadership roles abroad. Abe’s emphasis on syngovernment spending. He has studiously refrained from
ergy between alliance managers in the two countries uncommenting on calls to increase the consumption tax, an
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understandable position in the context of an upcoming
parliamentary election. Rhetorical statements on growth
and increased economic opportunity may suffice to secure victory in the upper house elections, but neglecting
to address fiscal imbalances could fuel suspicion that Abe
favors a return to the pump-priming style of economic
management Koizumi railed against. Couple this with
concerns about persistent agricultural protectionism and
little public discussion of regulatory reform and the Abe
administration ends up painting a troubling picture.
A recent political move by the LDP aimed at securing
additional votes in the upper house elections generated
even greater uncertainty about Abe’s commitment to reform and is widely attributed to the recent decline in his
public approval ratings. The symbol of reform during the
Koizumi administration was the former prime minister’s
determination to privatize Japan’s postal savings system, a
primary source of pork barrel spending. Koizumi was so
wedded to the cause that in August 2005 he expelled several members of the LDP who refused to support his
reform initiatives, which resonated well with the public
and propelled Koizumi and the LDP to a sweeping victory in the September 2005 general election. Much to the
public’s bewilderment, the “postal rebels” were reinstated
in November 2006, perhaps signaling Abe’s willingness to
temper reform in favor of traditional consensus-based
policymaking in the LDP. The upper house elections are
several months away, but a sustained backlash against
Abe’s presumed retreat from reform amid concerns about
a vague economic policy agenda could significantly raise
the bar he must clear to secure his leadership position
atop the hierarchy of Japanese politics.
LEADERSHIP TEST
Shinzo Abe has performed well thus far as Japan’s
prime minister and befuddled his critics by displaying a
diverse range of diplomatic skills. Clearly a pragmatist he
chose China and South Korea as his first foreign destinations to repair fractured bilateral relationships critical for
regional stability. Yet he is also a strategic thinker and
balanced his overture to China with a new emphasis on
partnership with India and Australia. He has managed to
mix this realpolitik with a very un-Japanese commitment
to advancing global norms and values such as democracy
and the rule of law. His critics cannot decide whether he
is a neocon or a neorealist. Perhaps he is his own unique
combination of the two. He can also thank Kim Jong Il
for allowing him to demonstrate his deftness as a national
security policy manager in the wake of the missile and
nuclear tests. Questions remain as to the sustainability of
Abe’s ambiguous position on the Yasukuni shrine; varying
approaches to the North Korean issue, and a strategic
rivalry with China, will continue to complicate Japan’s
relationships with its neighbors; and Abe is just beginning
to expand Japan’s alliance relationships to fit his broad
foreign policy goals. Though still early, he appears to
possess traits of a seasoned leader who can address urgent issues on the world stage.
In July 2007 the Japanese people will decide if Abe’s
economic policies are as progressive as his diplomatic
agenda. Success in foreign policy is often concomitant
with leadership at home, and Abe’s domestic political
skills will be tested in the months ahead. A solid LDP
victory in the upper house elections will take Abe one
step closer toward realizing his bold vision for Japan’s
future. A setback could render his agenda ambitious but
short-lived. He has surprised skeptics in the past and will
work tirelessly to prove himself yet again as the right person to maintain Japan’s economic vitality and cement its
status as a leader in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
Michael Green is senior adviser and Japan chair at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) and an associate professor of international
relations at Georgetown University.
Nicholas Szechenyi is a fellow and assistant director
to the Japan chair at CSIS.
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