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Globalization and Political Violence,
1970–2008
a
Ranveig Drolsum Flaten & Indra de Soysa
a
b
University of Oslo
b
S. Thomas’ College and Norwegian University of Science and
Technology
Accepted author version posted online: 12 Sep 2012.Version of
record first published: 30 Nov 2012.
To cite this article: Ranveig Drolsum Flaten & Indra de Soysa (2012): Globalization and Political
Violence, 1970–2008, International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International
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International Interactions, 38:622–646, 2012
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0305-0629 print/1547-7444 online
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2012.726182
Globalization and Political Violence,
1970–2008
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RANVEIG DROLSUM FLATEN
University of Oslo
INDRA DE SOYSA
S. Thomas’ College and Norwegian University of Science
and Technology
The question of globalization’s effect on social harmony continues
to be fiercely debated. We use a comprehensive measure of
globalization (the KOF index) designed to capture the intensity of
connectivity among countries along economic, social, and political dimensions. Our results suggest that globalization, particularly
economic and social globalization, predicts a lower risk of civil
war and political repression, but economic globalization predicts
lower repression even after unit heterogeneity is accounted. When
country fixed effects are accounted, political globalization’s effect
is problematic for human rights, suggesting that politically influential states escape the constraining effects of globalization on
political repression. Indeed, globalization generally shows up as
more important than per capita income, a variable often found
to be one of the most robust determinants of political violence.
The results taken together support those who argue that increased
globalization may enhance prospects for social progress, not social
resistance and political violence as skeptics claim.
KEYWORDS civil war, economic freedom, globalization, human
rights
We are extremely grateful to the editor and two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments
and suggestions. The comments of Krishna Vadlamannati and Nils Petter Gleditsch were also
very helpful. Any remaining errors are our own.
Address correspondence to Indra de Soysa, Norwegian University of Science and
Technology, Dragvoll Campus, 7491 Trondheim, Norway. E-mail: Indra.de.soysa@svt.ntnu.no
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September 11, 2001 revealed most dramatically that globalization has a
shadow. . . . If the terrible events of September 11 demonstrated anything,
it is that globalization can as readily facilitate violence as it can produce
peace, prosperity, and political order (Devetak 2008:1).
The question of globalization’s impact on social harmony is central in many
academic and policy debates (Rodrik 2011; Stilwell 2006).1 The recent financial meltdown and the accompanying dissent on the streets in Western
capitals, coupled with violent social upheaval in the Middle East, make
the search for answers more pressing than ever. Liberals generally see
globalization, or the widening and deepening of markets across the globe,
as good for peace and social progress (Bhagwati 2004; Mandelbaum 2002;
Russett and Oneal 2001). Others, largely neo-Marxists, critical theorists,
and much of the activist community, view globalization, particularly economic globalization, as a project promoted by the capitalistic interests of
the United States, which destroy communitarian values of equality and
solidarity (Rodrik 2011; Stiglitz 2002). Such conditions apparently lead to
violent conflict (Devetak 2008; Mittelman 2010). The academic discussion
on globalization’s effect on political violence, however, is still rather fragmentary and requires thorough empirical examination (Avant 2006; Devetak
2008; Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003). There is some confusion
because many studies conflate change toward being more globalized with
level of globalization since theoretical explanations for how the two matter for conflict differ (Bussmann, Scheuthle, and Schneider 2005). This study
examines arguments that suggest that being more globalized (level) matters
by assessing a comprehensive measure of globalization and its components
of economic, social, and political dimensions on the onset of civil war and
the degree of respect by governments for human rights.
Globalization is a complex phenomenon, often described as the intensification of flows of human activity and connectivity across the globe
(Held and McGrew 2002). The Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) index of
globalization we use aggregates several factors that capture the flows of
goods, people, and ideas in combination, capturing the level of exposure to
globalization along three main dimensions—economic, political, and social
(Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008). Employing this data in standard models
of civil war and political repression using panel data for roughly 150 countries with populations of above 500,000 inhabitants for the period 1970–2008
(38 years), we find that higher exposure to globalization, particularly social
and economic globalization, predicts a lower risk of civil war and political
repression, controlling for a host of relevant factors. Political globalization,
measured as the degree of government-to-government contact, is generally
1
Globalization is most often thought of as the reduction of barriers to interaction between states and
peoples, intensifying flows of activity, ideas, and people, largely due to lower barriers to the adoption of
technology and trade and investment flows (Held and McGrew 2000).
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unrelated to civil war and perhaps increases repression when all local
level factors are accounted in fixed effects analyses. However, economic
globalization, predicts lower levels of state repression, results also reported
by others who look at change in globalization using somewhat different estimating techniques (de Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011). Moreover, when local
level factors in individual countries are accounted with country fixed effects,
only economic globalization matters for better human rights. The results are
net of other important factors predicting peace, such as higher levels of
political democracy and development.
GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Many see the end of autarchic, nationalist economic policies, the growing
connectedness of people and states around liberal norms and ideals, the galvanization of a global civil society, and an activist international system as new
hope for peace and prosperity and law-based governance of world affairs
(Slaughter 2004). Liberals argue that globalization will bring economic, social,
and political modernization to poor countries, which are the most at risk of
political violence, generating the conditions that foster peace and prosperity
(Bhagwati 2004; Friedman 1999; Fukuyama 1991; Mandelbaum 2002). The
arguments about globalization are based at the country and community level
as well as the systemic level. The forces that are driving globalization apparently bind people in tighter webs of interdependence that allows liberal
ideas and values to spread and global public action that prevents harmful
outcomes such as violence and political repression.
At a highly stylized level, Hecksher-Ohlin, Ricardo-Wiener-Samuelson
theories of trade suggest that globalization helps poor countries because
labor, the abundant factor, benefits while capital, the scarce factor, may lose
from greater openness to global markets. These theories also tell us that
in poor countries outward-oriented industry benefits while inward-oriented
industry may lose due to openness to imports. While these stylized theories
are useful, predicting whether rich capitalists and poor inward-oriented labor
actually foment conflict is hard to systematize. Indeed, the most recent theorizing about conflict suggests that broad-based grievances alone do not lead
to armed violence; rather, the factors that make violence feasible are most
important. Winners and losers from economic openness, at least according
to the stylized theories, should all have high opportunity costs for fomenting
rebellion, particularly since economic prospects for all should be improving
with greater market access for poor countries.
Though there are many studies showing a positive relationship between
globalization and economic growth, whether or not it translates into more
social peace is disputed (Devetak and Hughes 2008; Schneider, Barbieri,
and Gleditsch 2003). We first discuss the liberal perspective that is generally
more optimistic about globalization largely because it views globalization
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as growing market integration, which allows cooperative relations within
and between societies. Going back to Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations,
liberals see people who are free from economic regulations and restraints as
spontaneously acting for the common good by solving collective dilemmas
like peace and security as if by a “hidden hand” (Stilwell 2006). Social conflict and violence are seen to be largely the result of state abuse of political
power and social distortions attributable to politically determined privileges
for favored groups rather than to the operation of free markets. Free markets,
which are characterized by voluntary exchange and the efficient allocation of
goods and services, rather than by rent-seeking and favoritisms, are seen as
healthy for the generation of social capital because people and communities
get bound up in meaningful collaborative enterprise (de Tocqueville 1956).
These processes obtain social harmony because the power to determine
social outcomes rests largely with individuals and communities rather than
those with political power. States will be constrained because civil society is
empowered due to the fact that markets generate alternative nodes of economic power (Stilwell 2006). Thus, the general liberal view can be divided
into two pathways by which good social outcomes are affected—more open
markets, through which globalization might influence individual countries,
directly influence more humane governance by minimizing capricious rule,
and globalization indirectly influences peace by increasing social capital and
wealth.
Globalization also binds people at the international level through its
political and social aspects. The global spread of human rights norms and
their subsequent impact on the ground is well documented (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998). The spread of ideas and connectedness through people-topeople contact because of social media allows faster, more transparent forms
of international public action, where the international community has been
forced to act to prevent crimes against humanity, such as in the former
Yugoslavia, and recently in Libya. Greater people-to-people contacts through
tourism and immigration, as well as the flow of information, exchange of
ideas, and dissemination of technologies through the medium of telephones,
newspapers, radios, cable TV channels, and internet, along with cultural
diversity through international cultural exchanges also play a greater role in
influencing social harmony through understanding and solidarity. The most
important channel through which social integration may affect social harmony is ‘public awareness’ and the spread of norms and ideals across space,
most often seen in the ways in which NGOs and international institutions,
such as the United Nations, engage in conflict prevention (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998; Slaughter 2004). New ideas disseminate from rich places to
poor, where attitudes toward human rights of minorities, gender rights, and
other values might change (Bhagwati 2004). Such value changes apparently
lead to cosmopolitan democracy where human rights and individual liberty
have gained a central place (Held 1995).
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Market economies are also contract-rich, which leads people to respect
the rights of other individuals, no matter their cast, creed, class, etc.
(Mousseau and Mousseau 2008). Others have argued that closed economies
may lead to the buildup of ‘rebellion specific capital’ in terms of organizations that form in the shadows for capturing rents from lucrative shadow
markets, where relationships remain particularistic but also organized for
violence (de Soysa and Fjelde 2010). Yet again, some have argued that being
tied to the global markets raises the premium on peace because of the high
audience costs from political instability, where global markets can punish
unstable political environments, forming strong incentives for the powerful
to cauterize costly conflict within states (Blanton and Apodaca 2007).
Political integration is another dimension of the globalization process.
Closer political ties between governments across the globe bilaterally and in
multilateral institutions lead to cooperation around solving collective dilemmas and adopting strategies for preventing adverse outcomes, such as human
rights violations and civil war. The commonly heard phrase “pariah state” is
the conscious ostracism of some states by others due to their bad human
rights practices. Notice that there are even high costs for powerful states that
violate these norms, such as China. Thus, a state more bound to other states
will feel ostracism more deeply than would a less-dependent state. Political
integration of another sort, like the European Union (EU), which insists on
better human rights before joining, is a positive example of tighter global and
regional integration. Political integration processes may also have many indirect effects on human rights. First, the extent of closer ties between many
states can promote better economic opportunities for its citizens through
trade and investments. Some find that political globalization associates with
economic globalization (de Haan, Lundstrom, and Strum 2006). Second,
good political relations between nation-states can also translate into shared
preferences for social harmony, particularly since the costs of conflict are
likely to be shared by all (Russett and Oneal 2001). As the discussion above
suggests amply, globalization can produce peace through economic, political, and cultural channels. The same might be said for more pessimistic views
about the exposure to globalization and political violence.
The Skeptics
Many scholars, particularly those arguing that globalization is a unique phenomenon that is fundamentally transforming human life, argue that the old
state-centered system is outmoded for handling the challenges facing international community, and that new, more cosmopolitan forms of governance
are required for solving collective dilemmas, such as the environment and
peace (Held and McGrew 2000). These scholars, while they see potential
in social and cultural globalization, particularly for new forms of global
democracy and people-to-people activism to make the world better in
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terms of peace and human rights, lament that the prefacing of economic
globalization dominated by capitalist interests stands in the way of making
things better (McGrew 2007). In this respect, they are likely to part ways with
liberals about the benign nature of economic interdependence. For example,
McGrew (2007:33) writes:
If organized violence is constitutive of contemporary globalization, it
is also the case that economic, political and other dimensions of
globalization are significant factors in the endemic disorder, conflict and
violence. . . . There is considerable evidence to suggest that economic
globalization in particular has contributed significantly to social, ethnic,
and political strains in many developing states and regions which have
resulted in collective violence and “new wars.”
Many suggest that exposure to globalization—measured often as the free
flows of goods, capital, and people, as well as ideas—creates the conditions for social breakdown because of resistance from those who become
marginalized (Apter 2008; Gutiérrez and Schönwälder 2010; Held and
McGrew 2000). Governments once capable of sheltering the “losers” from
market forces are apparently less capable of doing so because the structural
power of markets has tamed politics (Goldblatt, Held, McGrew, and Perraton
1997; Rodrik 2011).
Just as dependency theorists challenged the benign nature of the capitalist world system (Conteh-Morgan 2004) in earlier times, the current
globalization debate mirrors earlier debates in many ways (Apter 2008;
Mason 2003). While many of the large arguments about global transformation
and social peace are “structuralist” in terms of large processes reminiscent of
historical Marxist arguments, there are also many specific mechanisms linking globalization to conflict that are identified by skeptics from disparate
disciplines that are important to the larger discussions. We identify some of
these below.
Several scholars, including some prominent economists, argue that
increased economic competition will spur a “race to the bottom” in social
standards, setting the stage for violent resistance and conflict (Rodrik 1997).
They argue that the spread of corporate capitalism and neoliberal policies
privilege capital over communitarian values, hamstringing government control over taxing and spending decisions, leading to the lowering of social
standards, the lowering of safety nets, and lower production of public goods
(Rodrik 1997). Rodrik (2011:17–18) writes in a pessimistic vein that, “within
countries, globalization generated inequality and insecurity . . . we cannot
simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination, and economic
globalization.”
Apparently, the conditions imposed by global markets prevent states
from protecting their citizens from hardship. Globalization thus will weaken
states and democratic rights of citizens, promoting, according to some, the
rise of ‘warlord politics’ (Gutiérrez and Schönwälder 2010; Münkler 2003;
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R. D. Flaten and I. de Soysa
Reno 2000). Some point to countries such as Russia and China to argue that
market opening leads to new ways in which autocrats can come to dominate society and survive, using the global tools of communication to their
advantage (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005). For others, globalization is
nothing more than the dominance of the rich and powerful through exploitative capitalism now spreading over every corner of the globe, where peace
when it comes is an imposition from above through violence and repression, leading to exploitation and resistance of various forms (Barkawi 2006;
Devetak and Hughes 2008; Martell 2010). Indeed, the Zapatista revolt in the
state of Chiapas in the south of Mexico is often discussed as a classic case of
resistance to globalization because the rebels made it an explicit rallying cry
(Mason 2003).
According to some, it is not reasonable to expect globalization to spread
benign values and norms. Root (2008) argues that countries such as the
United States only talk about promoting democracy and human rights but in
reality their actions abroad are heavily dependent on gaining strategic and
economic goods. He writes (2008:182–187),
This tendency toward global-scale collusion challenges the viability of
globalization. . . . Thus capitalism and democracy need not go hand in
hand. The goods and services that Americans receive from the expansion
of global free markets can often come from the erosion of citizen rights
in other countries.
As global competition for markets and capital heat up, the dictates of
cut throat competition will force states to lower social standards in order to
enhance their competitive edge. They argue that countries seeking assistance
from international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF in the
form of grants/aid/loans are often forced to adopt unsuitable neoliberal
policies that may harm ordinary people (Woods 2006). These initiatives
primarily include reduction in expenditure on social sector and development
spending (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006). Some find that acceptance of
IMF and World Bank programs are associated with a decline in government
respect for human rights and even the onset of civil war because of the
harmful neoliberal policies they push (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007;
Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 2010). Others simply model the relationship
between economic openness, often measured as trade and capital accounts
openness, and conflict as a struggle between the winners and losers of
global competition (Bussmann, Scheuthle, and Schneider 2005). Thus, many
argue that the conditions of globalization directly cause social disarray
and violent conflict (Barkawi 2006; United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development 1995). Others argue that benefits of globalization, such
as higher economic growth, are not shared evenly. Rather, only certain
sections of the society are the beneficiaries because of collusive activity
and monopoly rents, which create the conditions of political violence (Root
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2008). In many cases, economic and political openness lead to minorities
doing so well that they become exposed to scapegoating, leading to ethnic
hatred and violence (Chua 2003).
Finally, economic and political globalization is supposedly supplemented in the latest round of globalization with migration and the rapid
spread of information and communications technology (ICTs). Migration of
poorer peoples to western countries is exacerbating the economic and social
problems associated with globalization, leading to backlash and resistance
(Pickering 2008). On the other hand, the globalization of the media through
new technologies is leading to “moral outrage” within some societies, leading to fundamentalist movements and terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism
(Barber 1995; Lentini 2008). Thus, cultural globalization is a particularly
dangerous element of globalization for explaining new forms of violence
globally. Not only is the new technology spreading the seeds of resistance to
a homogenizing world, but these technologies are supposedly co-opted by
the resistance to globalization very effectively so that globalization may have
elements that undermine its own success by making violence on a grand
scale even more feasible (Devetak 2008). Apparently, September 11 exposes
the shadow of globalization, which is generated by new forms of violence
both motivated by and facilitated by the forces of globalization (Devetak
2008). Indeed, it is often heard that the ongoing “Arab Spring” has been
encouraged by the access to global media and communication, which has
sparked violence in some instances, such as Syria, Egypt, and Libya, but that
these very sources might have constrained governments from open repression, such as in Tunisia, Morocco, and several Gulf States. Naturally, some
of these states have been more exposed to globalization than others.
MEASURING GLOBALIZATION
In order to assess the competing propositions on globalization’s effect on
political instability, we test a comprehensive measure of globalization on the
risk of an onset of civil war and the level of political repression. As the
discussion above suggests, the mechanisms linking globalization to violence
and peace are broad and variegated. Thus, we use a broad measure of
globalization capturing more than just trade and capital flows and we use two
salient indicators of social breakdown. Civil war is large, organized violence
between an armed rebel group and a state. However, even if mass dissent
exists, large civil war may not materialize because of collective action problems, particularly because states could increase repression. Thus, we also
use a measure of political repression of human rights to capture degrees of
political dissent where open conflict does not exist. This measure allows us
to address the explicit claims by some skeptics of globalization who suggest
that globalization empowers elites and leads to consolidation of the status
quo at the expense of democratic reform and positive social change.
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As the discussion in the previous section demonstrates, the issue of
whether or not globalization has an effect on social harmony is an empirical one, but the arguments suggest that the pathways from globalization
stem from diverse aspects of globalization—economic, social, and political—
which may have diverging effects on social peace (McGrew 2007). Previous
studies have mostly used single dimensions of globalization, such as trade
or investment dependence, with rather mixed results (Bussmann, Scheuthle,
and Schneider 2005; Hafner-Burton 2005; Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001;
Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003). When this wide and complex phenomenon is disaggregated into singular categories, or one or two individual
variables are chosen to gauge its effect, the results can be unrepresentative or, at best, inadequate in terms of the broad arguments made about
globalization and social disarray. Moreover, there is variation in the type of
globalization between countries and these types matter for conflict in different ways. We agree with others who define globalization as “the process
of creating networks among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated
through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods” (Dreher, Gaston, and Marten 2008:43).2 This definition of
globalization as complex interaction and flows at distances is widely recognized as a core aspect of globalization (Devetak 2008; Giddens 1999;
McGrew 2007; Norris 2001). Thus, the KOF index is an aggregation of relevant economic, political, and social variables that capture the intensity of
interaction between countries. A composite index has much greater potential for capturing the complexity of the phenomenon without giving any one
indicator too much weight over the others. It also allows researchers to examine the effect of the different dimensions of globalization independently, thus
making it possible to identify if there is a specific form of globalization that
has more effect on the dependent variable. As Dreher puts it, “proxies of
globalization can only give partial answers” (Dreher et al. 2008:25).
It is usually economic aspects of globalization that receive the most
attention by empirical researchers (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005; Bussmann,
Schneider, and Wiesehomeier 2005; Hafner-Burton 2005). One reason for
this is probably because it is an easy dimension to quantify, and there
is extensive and reliable information on economic openness, such as the
extent of international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), tariffs, etc.
Since many view economic globalization as driving other aspects of global
integration, and because many are only interested in the economic outcomes of globalization, such as the impact on economic growth and income
inequality, it is not surprising that trade and investment related proxies
have dominated (Held and McGrew 2000; World Bank 2002). The economic indicators chosen are in line with most previous research on economic
globalization, including the extent of trade, FDI, portfolio investment, import
2
See appendix for a full list of variables and weights used in the calculation of the index.
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Globalization and Political Violence, 1970–2008
631
barriers, and tariff rates (see “Data, Models, and Method” for a complete
list of indicators).
Cultural and political factors rarely appear in research on the effects of
globalization within the field of conflict studies, or studies on international
relations. Culture can be a difficult concept to quantify and measure, and to
date few tools are available to empirical researchers who want to gauge the
effects of social or cultural globalization. Systematic data sources that capture
the effect of transmittable ideas and values are rare. Dreher has tried to find
sufficiently good and transparent proxies for “social globalization,” emphasizing personal contact between people from different countries, information
flows, and cultural proximity. As Dreher stresses, it is risky to “. . . dismiss the
importance of culture” because we lack methods to quantify it (Dreher et al.
2008:68). Measuring social globalization naturally is messy. The subcomponent “cultural proximity” is measured by such indicators as the number of
McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA outlets, as well as trade in books, which
might be seen by some as too narrow. However, few would argue that a
more globalized country that accepts such businesses are in fact more integrated with global markets culturally than ones who do not have access
to these symbols of global consumption. The KOF index uses three indicators to measure “political globalization,” namely the number of embassies
and consulates, membership in international organizations, and participation
in UN peacekeeping missions. Participation in international institutions, for
example, is commensurate with greater involvement in cooperative efforts
globally.
The KOF index has been revised since the original version was published in 2002 and corrections have been made based on comments and
critique that have followed its initial release (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens
2008). One of the strengths of the KOF index is the inclusion of data on
many countries over a long time span (150 countries between 1970 and
2008). The transparency of methodology is supposedly high and we do not
run into any problems when trying to review the construction of the index
and its different components.3 The three main dimensions are fairly highly
correlated with each other, as well as with the composite index (see correlation matrix in appendix). There is a relatively high correlation between
social globalization of the KOF index and economic development (r = 0.81),
which explains roughly 69% of the variance between social globalization
and income. Contrarily, the relationships between economic and political
globalization and income are modest, with income explaining only 22% of
the variance in political globalization and 47% of economic globalization
respectively. Our tests of globalization’s effects on conflict, however, will
account separately for income, so as to assess the net effect of globalization
3
On the transparency of the index and its measurement, see discussion in Dreher, Gaston, and Martens.
(2008).
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on the onset of civil war. A proper effect of globalization on political violence can only be obtained in multivariate models where relevant factors are
controlled at the country level that may capture better the nuances associated
with why states experience violence. Thus, we follow a strategy based on a
host of other, known empirical studies for comparison, employing standard
statistical techniques and data (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin
2003; Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke 2010).
DATA, MODELS, AND METHOD
The main independent variables are the KOF globalization measures, which
are tested as the total index and its three distinct parts measuring economic,
social, and political globalization.4 These variables are continuous measures
that stretch from 1 to 100 (see summary statistics in appendix). Because of the
problem of simultaneity bias, we lag the globalization variables and each of
the control variables by one year, so that the globalization score the previous
year matches up against the value on the dependent variable in the current
year. The main dependent variable is the onset of civil war, where an onset
is denoted as 1 when 25 battle deaths in a single year are reached in the
intensity of fighting. We use two versions of this data. The first uses a 2-year
rule to gauge the onset of a new conflict, which is that two years of peace has
to be recorded in order to assess when one conflict has ended and another
begun. We also use a 5-year rule for testing our basic models for robustness.
To prevent bias from time dependence, we enter the years of peace since
1946 (time since the last civil war) and a set of 3 natural cubic splines to
smooth the baseline hazard over time, following the recommendation of
Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). We test the time period, 1970–2008 for which
there is complete data on all variables. We use the Cingranelli and Richards
Index (CIRI) human rights data to measure the degree of state violations of
human rights, which are available for the 1981–2008 period (Cingranelli and
Richards 1999).5 These data are widely used in the literature, and we use
a standard set of controls in our models, following others (de Soysa and
Vadlamannati 2011; Landman 2005; Poe and Tate 1994).
The question of the correct specification of a model of civil war onsets
is a thorny issue. What the field of peace research has thus far is a loose
set of empirical associations between several independent variables and civil
war (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Many recent studies utilize a set of variables gleaned from empirical models of civil war offered by Paul Collier and
Anke Hoeffler (2004) as well as Fearon and Laitin (2003), which are widely
thought to be standard bearers in the field (Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke
4
5
Our full dataset and do files will be made available upon publication.
See the CIRI website for detailed descriptions of the data http://ciri.binghamton.edu/
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Globalization and Political Violence, 1970–2008
633
2010). Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke, using out-of-sample heuristics, show that
the full models used by these studies generally have poor predictive power
because they might be overdetermined due to the addition of variables that
contribute little to overall predictive power. They find that per capita income,
population size, and peace duration do most of the heavy lifting, which are
generally found also to be the most robust variables explaining civil war in
within-sample estimations (Hegre and Sambanis 2006).
There is much theorizing about how income per capita matters for civil
war, but our concerns are that exposure to globalization’s effect might be
spurious because of its tight connection with the level of wealth in a society. Population size too is related to aspects of globalization because of
economies of scale. Larger countries are likely to be less open to global markets because of large home markets (Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 2000).
Peace duration is useful also as a control for endogeneity. If globalization
is likely to be affected by ongoing conflict, then recording the duration of
peace allows us to estimate the effect of globalization independently of the
history of peace.6 In order to eliminate spurious results, we add several other
variables that are used as standard controls in the literature. First, we add the
level of democracy and autocracy as dummy variables, leaving out the category of anocratic states. Democracy receives the value 1 if the Polity score of
regime type is above 6 and zero if not.7 Autocracy is determined as values
below −6 on the Polity scale. Since more liberal regimes might be more
globalized, we test the net effect of globalization regardless of democracy’s
independent effect. Following others, we add a dummy variable capturing
oil export dependence coded as 1 if export revenues from oil exceed 1/3 of
GDP and 0 if not (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Oil exporting countries are likely
because of a number of reasons to suffer conflict, but they are also less
likely to be globalized because of the so-called ‘resource curse’ effects on
the macro-economy (de Soysa 2002; de Soysa and Binningsbø 2009; Ross
2004).
We also add ethnic fractionalization in the model as many others do
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). We enter a squared-term
of ethnic fractionalization to model the quadratic effect of fractionalization
on conflict since many argue that what matters is not fractionalization by
polarization (Esteban and Ray 2008). Further, we test several other relevant
variables such as a variable measuring the post-Cold War period that might
be confounders in robustness checks.8 Since the post-Cold War period has
seen a steep decline in the incidence of conflict, which according to many
6
The question of endogeneity may also be addressed statistically by undertaking instrumental variables
analyses. However, valid instruments—that is, factors that are related to globalization but not causally
related to conflict—are very hard to come by.
7
For a detailed explanation of the Polity data, see Gurr and Jaggers (1995).
8
We dummy code the post-Cold War years assigning the value 1 to the years 1991 (the end of the USSR)
until 2005 and 0 for all other years.
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634
R. D. Flaten and I. de Soysa
has been because of the end of superpower-supported proxy wars, and since
this period has coincided with increased globalization, we test the effect of
globalization net of any effects of the post-Cold War peace (Mack 2007).
We also account for time independently in the model by employing year
dummies, so as to capture any unique contemporaneous effects because of
unobserved systemic factors, such as superpower tensions, etc. In general,
all of the variables used in the conflict analyses are also valid for very similar
reasons in the analyses of state violations of human rights (Landman 2005;
Poe and Tate 1994). However, these studies also include legal systems, such
as British and Socialist legal systems, because of their impact on human rights
(Poe and Tate 1994). They are particularly important to control for given
the potential association between the degree of globalization with being a
socialist country or a former British colony with the advantage of possessing
access to common wealth markets and the English language.
Finally, we use logistic regression to estimate our models civil war
models using the cluster option that treats the standard errors with the
assumption that there is dependence in the data within the units (countries) but not across, which provides robust estimates of variance. When
estimating the effects of the globalization variables on human rights, which
is an index measuring respect for personal integrity rights presented as a
scale from 1 (no respect for rights at all) to 8 (no violations of rights at
all), we use OLS regressions with Newey-West standard errors, which are
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Newey and West 1987).
The autocorrelation is handled by computing an AR1 process. Since the
CIRI scale is relatively normally distributed the OLS method gives relatively accurate estimates while allowing some standard fixes for pooled data.
For robustness, we replicate all our results using ordered probit, which is
maximum-likelihood estimation for an ordinal dependent variable. When
estimating the human rights models, we also estimate time fixed effects to
capture any simultaneously-trending effects or extraordinary years where
global effects are present, such as the end of the Cold War, and country
fixed effects to capture idiosyncratic local level factors that may influence
state violations of human rights.
One serious caveat about existing studies of civil war and phenomena such as globalization is the problem of endogeneity and making causal
inferences from observed data (Nichols 2007). Several studies, for example, find that civil war reduces trade and investment (Magee and Massoud
2011). Thus, political instability could reduce the level of globalization and
not the reverse. Finding valid instruments to estimate models free of endogenity biases, however, are extremely difficult. This problem is even more
vexing when using a broad measure of globalization as we do. Single variables such as trade are more easily instrumented with measures such as
distance to major markets, or economic growth rates by levels of rainfall, or
quality of institutions by colonial settler patterns (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
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Globalization and Political Violence, 1970–2008
635
Robinson 2001; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). However, we are currently unaware of an instrument used in globalization studies that would be
a strong predictor of globalization but one not affected in turn by conflict.
We rely, however, on several small fixes to minimize endogeneity effects at
least partially. First, our models account for the history of violence (peace
years and splines) so that these variables capture the negative effects of violence on globalization over time. Secondly, we lag our variables by 1 year
so that the values of globalization are previous to the onset of civil war or
repression. Thirdly, we account for unit heterogeneity by estimating fixed
effects models where the within unit variance (within country variance) is
assessed so that changes in levels of globalization associates with changes in
the risk of conflict and repression. Finally, it should be noted that the problem of endogeneity is not an issue if the main arguments being refuted is that
globalization causes conflict because no one argues that conflict increases
globalization.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents results of our estimates of globalization and its subcomponents on civil war. In column 1, we present results from the basic model, and
they all replicate previous findings. Per capita income, population size, and
oil exporters all predict the risk of conflict in expected ways (Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke 2010).
As seen in column 2, however, higher levels of globalization produce peace
net of per capita income, population size, ethnicity, regime types, and the
brevity of peace. Per capita income, which is one of the most robust determinants of civil war, is now statistically not significant when the intensity of
exposure to globalization is in the model. Since globalization is statistically
highly significant, this result is not likely due to multi-collinearity. In column
3, exposure to economic globalization is also negatively related to the risk of
civil war, but it narrowly misses statistical significance at the 10% level (p <
.19). In column 4, social globalization matters negatively for the risk of civil
war independently of all the controls, but political globalization in column
4 is far from statistically significant at conventional levels. While per capita
income’s effect is not statistically significant when the globalization variables
are present in the model, population size has a positive and significant effect
as reported also by many others. To interpret the results substantively, we
take the exponential of the logit coefficient and interpret the odds ratios.
In this case, holding all the other variables at the mean values, a unit increase
in globalization reduces the odds of an onset of civil war by .96 (e−.05 ).
However, for the estimated sample, the standard deviation of globalization
is roughly 18 points on the scale (e−.05 × 18 ). Reestimating these effects at a
standard deviation above the mean value would reduce the odds of an onset
by more than half. This effect is only a little less than the increase in the odds
636
0.16
(0.143)
0.41∗∗∗
(0.081)
0.43
(0.274)
0.00
(0.273)
−0.60∗∗∗
(0.232)
4.67∗∗∗
(1.328)
−3.66∗∗
(1.495)
−10.00∗∗∗
(1.493)
4,466
144
−0.24∗∗∗
(0.093)
0.38∗∗∗
(0.081)
0.60∗∗
(0.265)
−0.14
(0.271)
−0.61∗∗∗
(0.226)
3.95∗∗∗
(1.383)
−3.08∗
(1.573)
−8.04∗∗∗
(1.471)
4,466
144
−0.05∗∗∗
(0.014)
(2)
onset2
(1.763)
−8.75∗∗∗
(1.651)
4,152
130
−0.14
(0.137)
0.39∗∗∗
(0.084)
0.70∗∗
(0.279)
−0.02
(0.271)
−0.57∗∗
(0.268)
4.90∗∗∗
(1.554)
−4.14∗∗
−0.02
(0.012)
(3)
onset2
p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1.
Peace years and 3 splines plus year-fixed effects computed in all tests.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗
Observations
Number of countries
Constant
Ethnic fractionalization
squared
Ethnic fractionalization
Autocracy
Democracy
Oil exporter
Population size
Income per capita
Political globalization t-1
Cultural globalization t-1
Economic globalization t-1
Globalization t-1
(1)
onset2
(1.546)
−9.06∗∗∗
(1.476)
4,466
144
0.10
(0.161)
0.34∗∗∗
(0.089)
0.41
(0.277)
−0.04
(0.276)
−0.58∗∗
(0.234)
4.57∗∗∗
(1.363)
−3.80∗∗
−0.04∗∗
(0.015)
(4)
onset2
TABLE 1 Globalization’s Effect on the Risk of an Onset of Civil War, 1970–2008
(1.544)
−8.87∗∗∗
(1.631)
4,466
144
−0.01
(0.007)
−0.20∗
(0.102)
0.43∗∗∗
(0.092)
0.60∗∗
(0.261)
−0.09
(0.268)
−0.63∗∗∗
(0.226)
3.95∗∗∗
(1.372)
−3.01∗
(5)
onset2
(1.723)
−9.61∗∗∗
(1.517)
4,355
144
0.05
(0.180)
0.41∗∗∗
(0.092)
0.21
(0.335)
−0.05
(0.330)
−0.65∗∗
(0.279)
5.23∗∗∗
(1.474)
−4.73∗∗∗
−0.04∗∗
(0.018)
(6)
onset5
(2.000)
−8.76∗∗∗
(1.685)
4,047
130
−0.20
(0.135)
0.41∗∗∗
(0.102)
0.48
(0.309)
−0.03
(0.349)
−0.57∗
(0.317)
5.92∗∗∗
(1.691)
−5.92∗∗∗
−0.02∗
(0.010)
(7)
onset5
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(1.764)
−8.57∗∗∗
(1.435)
4,355
144
−0.06
(0.192)
0.36∗∗∗
(0.104)
0.22
(0.366)
−0.10
(0.337)
−0.64∗∗
(0.280)
5.04∗∗∗
(1.500)
−4.73∗∗∗
−0.03
(0.018)
(8)
onset5
(1.857)
−8.39∗∗∗
(1.766)
4,355
144
−0.01
(0.008)
−0.29∗∗
(0.112)
0.42∗∗∗
(0.109)
0.37
(0.305)
−0.14
(0.323)
−0.68∗∗
(0.279)
4.61∗∗∗
(1.586)
−4.20∗∗
(9)
onset5
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Globalization and Political Violence, 1970–2008
637
of an onset if population size is increased one standard deviation above the
mean value. Going from the mean value of globalization to the maximum
value reduces the odds of an onset by a full 98%.
Table 1, columns 6, 7, 8, and 9 report results of the tests using the 5-year
hiatus for coding a new onset of civil war, or in other words, any break in
fighting as measured by battle deaths must last at least 5 years before the war
is declared over. As seen there, the results are almost the same as reported in
columns 1–5, except that economic globalization is now statistically significant at the 10% level and social globalization only narrowly misses statistical
significance. Political globalization still does not seem to have much effect on
the risk of civil war. The results taken together demonstrate clearly that there
is little empirical support for the view that states disintegrate into violence
because of greater exposure to globalization. Indeed, the contrary might be
true, particularly when considering economic and social globalizations. The
main finding, however, is that total globalization, perhaps driven by social
globalization and to a more limited extent economic globalization, reduces
the risk of an onset of civil war, net of a host of other important factors
identified in the extant literature on civil war.
Next, we run a host of robustness checks on our main findings.
Importantly, we use multiple imputation to fill in the data for 14 missing
countries on economic globalization by using the information on all the
available data by regressing the other independent variables on the available
coverage for economic globalization. After imputing these values, we run
the basic model and find that economic globalization is now strongly statistically significant with 14 additional countries accounted for (p < .02).9 This
suggests temporarily at least that data availability due to ongoing conflict
does not influence our results because of list-wise deletion. Next, we interact our globalization measure with the period of the Cold War where factors
that influence globalization may also be associated with Cold War period
conflicts. Adding the interaction had no effect on globalization’s independent effect on peace. We also include an interaction term of globalization
with countries deemed Western (North America, Western Europe, Oceania,
and Japan). Globalization still mattered net of the level of globalization
among Western countries. Given the argument put forward by Rodrik (2011)
that suggests that globalization’s effects are cushioned by high government
spending, we also controlled for government consumption to GDP, but
globalization’s effect remained negative and significant and robust to its
inclusion. Next we lagged the incidence of civil war and drop the brevity of
peace variable to test an alternate operationalization as suggested by Fearon
9
We use the mi function in Stata11 to impute data. Stata regresses the other independent variables on
economic globalization, uses the observed information from how these variables relate to economic
globalization, and then fills in the missing economic freedom values for these countries based on the
discovered patterns from the available data.
638
10.96∗∗∗
(0.476)
3,514
0.04∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.04
(0.046)
−0.48∗∗∗
(0.021)
−0.30∗∗∗
(0.086)
0.80∗∗∗
(0.083)
−0.15
(0.095)
−2.14∗∗∗
(0.104)
0.32∗∗∗
(0.095)
0.08
(0.072)
0.54∗∗∗
(0.147)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1.
Year fixed effects computed in all tests.
FE = year and country fixed effects.
Observations
Constant
Political globalization
Social globalization
Economic globalization
Ethnic fractionalization
British legal system
Socialist legal system
Civil War
Autocracy
Democracy
Oil exporter
Log population size
Log income per capita
Globalization
(1)
9.12∗∗∗
(0.470)
3,276
0.29∗∗∗
(0.036)
−0.42∗∗∗
(0.023)
−0.48∗∗∗
(0.090)
0.84∗∗∗
(0.085)
−0.18∗
(0.104)
−2.26∗∗∗
(0.111)
0.24∗∗
(0.102)
0.04
(0.077)
0.63∗∗∗
(0.152)
0.02∗∗∗
(0.003)
(2)
10.87∗∗∗
(0.475)
3,519
0.03∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.03
(0.050)
−0.43∗∗∗
(0.021)
−0.33∗∗∗
(0.085)
0.82∗∗∗
(0.084)
−0.27∗∗∗
(0.095)
−2.17∗∗∗
(0.105)
0.14
(0.098)
0.02
(0.071)
0.63∗∗∗
(0.146)
(3)
(0.003)
10.69∗∗∗
(0.520)
3,519
0.01∗∗∗
0.36∗∗∗
(0.032)
−0.56∗∗∗
(0.027)
−0.48∗∗∗
(0.084)
0.82∗∗∗
(0.083)
−0.18∗
(0.097)
−2.20∗∗∗
(0.107)
0.53∗∗∗
(0.100)
0.18∗∗
(0.074)
0.66∗∗∗
(0.149)
(4)
TABLE 2 The Effects of Globalization on the Respect for Human Rights, 1981–2008
6.78
(6.479)
3,536
−0.00
(0.006)
0.06
(0.170)
−0.17
(0.315)
−0.07
(0.111)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.101)
−0.27∗∗
(0.119)
−1.69∗∗∗
(0.108)
1.54
(1.368)
2.81∗∗∗
(0.760)
(drops)
(5)
FE
4.18
(6.589)
3,276
0.01∗∗
(0.005)
0.07
(0.172)
−0.07
(0.323)
−0.07
(0.116)
0.89∗∗∗
(0.104)
−0.30∗∗
(0.126)
−1.66∗∗∗
(0.112)
0.34
(1.053)
2.40∗∗∗
(0.768)
(drops)
(6)
FE
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6.14
(6.497)
3,541
0.00
(0.005)
0.05
(0.170)
−0.14
(0.318)
−0.06
(0.112)
0.91∗∗∗
(0.100)
−0.28∗∗
(0.119)
−1.69∗∗∗
(0.108)
1.72
(1.356)
2.72∗∗∗
(0.773)
(drops)
(7)
FE
−0.01∗∗∗
(0.003)
5.19
(6.376)
3,541
0.13
(0.167)
−0.07
(0.312)
−0.07
(0.111)
0.93∗∗∗
(0.100)
−0.31∗∗∗
(0.118)
−1.70∗∗∗
(0.108)
1.51
(1.317)
2.64∗∗∗
(0.740)
(drops)
(8)
FE
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Globalization and Political Violence, 1970–2008
639
and Laitin (2003). The results on globalization remain unchanged when
adding a lagged incidence of civil war instead of peace years and splines.
The results taken together suggest that higher levels of globalization
associate with a lower risk of civil war, results that seem robust to sample size
and alternative models. Moreover, the substantive impact of globalization,
relative to many other standard predictors such as per capita income, is not
negligible. Despite the myriad ways identified in the pessimistic arguments
about globalization and social disarray, the empirical evidence here points
in the opposite direction, supporting those who show that trade and FDI
and neoliberal economic policies predict peace (Blanton and Apodaca 2007;
de Soysa 2011; de Soysa and Fjelde 2010; Mousseau and Mousseau 2008).
Globalized countries seem to avoid civil war, not attract it. Of course, as
discussed above, endogeneity is likely a problem in that countries at risk of
civil war are likely not to become globalized. At some level, the peace years
potentially account for this relationship, but given the lack of proper instruments that can account for globalization but not be affected by civil war are
hard to find, but is something for future research to probe. Regressing peace
years on globalization, however, yields an R2 of only 0.25 (p < .00001), which
suggests that the relationship albeit positive is not very strong. Finally, theory that forms the explanation for why globalization is interesting for conflict
research should guide our interpretations of the results because regardless
of potential endogeneity problems, the skeptics argue that it is the exposure
to globalization that leads to social collapse, which is an assertion largely
unsupported by the results here.
Next, we examine the effects of the level of exposure to globalization
on the degree of state respect for personal integrity rights of people, a form
of one-sided violence where states repress dissidents (Table 2). As seen in
there, globalization and its three components all predict higher levels of state
respect for rights. The OLS coefficients are easily interpreted. Holding all the
other variables at their means, a country that increases its globalization score
by a standard deviation increases respect for human rights by roughly 40% of
a standard deviation of the physical integrity rights score, which is certainly
not negligible. A country that moves from the average score on globalization
to the maximum roughly reduces state repression by a full standard
deviation, or 2.3 points on the 9-point CIRI scale. Similar assessment of the
components of globalization yields very similar impacts. Our results support
de Soysa and Vadlamannati’s (2011) basic findings for a shorter time period
using somewhat different estimating procedures. They found that the results
held even when controlling for endogeneity using lagged values of human
rights, distance to major trading centers, and population size as instruments.
We estimate country fixed effects and find that the basic results uphold,
particularly for economic globalization, whereas political globalization
changes sign and is statistically significant when both country fixed effects
and time fixed effects are in the model. These results suggest that when
country heterogeneity is controlled, political globalization may capture
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640
R. D. Flaten and I. de Soysa
strategic aspects related to how some autocracies relate to the international
system for self-serving objectives. Remember that Libya headed the UN’s
Human Rights Committee until recently and that strategically important countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the oil-rich Gulf states might get
away with repressive tactics and not face civil war. Also, many human rights
violators, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, enjoy access to diplomatic and
superpower support and notoriety simply because of their strategic value
to the system, and country size, often associated with bad human rights
outcomes such as in China, may also matter here.
The results show rather clearly that exposure to globalization and its
economic and social components reduce the risk of political violence, contrary to many pessimistic views about the value of economic globalization in
particular (Held and McGrew 2000). However, the results taken together cast
some doubt on the impact of political globalization, which captures how
politically active states are in global institutions. This may support others
who have found that some states use international institutions cynically to
hide their crimes (Keith 1999; Neumayer 2004) and that strategically important countries may not face international actions for human rights violations
because of their value to superpowers, or the costs associated with acting
against politically powerful states, such as China (Root 2008). Such considerations might also explain the wide variance currently observable in terms
of which countries did and did not face sanctions from the international
community during the Arab Spring.
CONCLUSION
The recent political upheaval on Western streets and in the Middle East
has heightened concern over globalization’s effect on social peace. Skeptics
of globalization claim that despite the potentially enhanced conditions for
progress after the collapse of the Cold War, globalization casts a shadow in
terms of civil and political violence, apparently caused by the dislocations
associated with increasing flows of economic, political, and cultural contact
binding the diverse peoples of this planet ever closer together. These scholars
and activists are likely to blame economic globalization in particular for its
disruptive effects on people’s welfare and on communitarian values.
Our results are easily summarized. Higher levels of globalization reduce
the risk of an onset of civil war and reduce state violations of human rights.
The effect of globalization is substantively quite large and robust to the
inclusion of several potential confounding factors. The results taken together
show that globalization is a stronger predictor of peace than is per capita
income, which is argued to be one of the best predictors of conflict onset.
Economic globalization, in particular, seems to have the most robust effects
on both outcomes, which generally goes against the main thrust of the
arguments made by much of the pessimistic literature. Nevertheless, this
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Globalization and Political Violence, 1970–2008
641
study has not fully considered problems stemming from endogeneity, which
means that future research might use the KOF measures to test for outcomes short of civil war and political repression and are less state centered
violence, such as crime, terrorism, non-state violence, and other maladies
often blamed on a country’s exposure to globalization. For the moment, the
data suggests that a tighter embrace of globalization smothers the conditions
that lead to political violence, not social peace. Moreover, arguments about
the malign effects of economic globalization are likely exaggerated, which
is good news since social and political globalization is likely prefaced by
economic globalization.
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APPENDIX
2010 KOF Index of Globalization
Indices and Variables
A. Economic Globalization
i) Actual Flows
Trade (percent of GDP)
Foreign Direct Investment, flows (percent of GDP)
Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP)
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP)
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP)
ii) Restrictions
Hidden Import Barriers
Mean Tariff Rate
Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue)
Capital Account Restrictions
B. Social Globalization
i) Data on Personal Contact
Telephone Traffic
Transfers (percent of GDP)
International Tourism
Foreign Population (percent of total population)
International letters (per capita)
ii) Data on Information Flows
Internet Users (per 1000 people)
Television (per 1000 people)
Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP)
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity
Number of McDonald’s Restaurants (per capita)
Number of Ikea (per capita)
Trade in books (percent of GDP)
C. Political Globalization
Embassies in Country
Membership in International Organizations
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions
International Treaties
Source: Dreher (2006).
Weights
[37%]
(50%)
(19%)
(20%)
(24%)
(17%)
(20%)
(50%)
(22%)
(28%)
(27%)
(22%)
[39%]
(33%)
(26%)
(3%)
(26%)
(20%)
(25%)
(36%)
(36%)
(36%)
(28%)
(31%)
(43%)
(44%)
(12%)
[25%]
(25%)
(28%)
(22%)
(25%)
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R. D. Flaten and I. de Soysa
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Summary Statistics
Variable
Obs
Mean
SD.
Min
Max
Onset2
Onset5
Civil war
Human rights
Globalization
Ec glob
Soc glob
Pol glob
lnincome/pc
lnpopulation
Oil exporter
Democracy
Autocracy
Socialist law
British law
Peace yrs
_spline1
_spline2
_spline3
Ethnic frac
4841
4841
4841
3643
4699
4274
4699
4699
4691
4699
4728
4716
4716
4555
4555
4841
4841
4841
4841
4692
.0328445
.023962
.1631894
4.91216
47.7205
49.61661
40.06328
58.46675
7.466115
15.94046
.2288494
.3999152
.2555131
.115258
.3315038
19.89444
−4452.938
−12602.7
−14847.75
.4219992
.1782477
.1529465
.3695766
2.240845
18.30054
19.73136
21.67056
21.67508
1.587412
1.56688
.4201365
.4899326
.4361955
.3193681
.4708054
17.82128
5745.004
17741.79
23319.15
.2819757
0
0
0
0
11.71922
6.969388
5.492799
4.274032
4.130945
12.129
0
0
0
0
0
0
−22140
−69768
−96200
.0041175
1
1
1
8
92.89336
97.38827
94.57511
98.78104
10.76919
21.00442
1
1
1
1
1
63
0
0
0
.9250348