Islamic Financial Services Board Transparency and Market Discipline – A Direct Comparison to Basel II Disclosures to Promote Transparency and Market Discipline (TMD) For Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IIFS) (Excluding Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual funds) Presented by Dr. V.Sundararajan Centennial group . 2nd Islamic Financial Services Forum: The European Challenge Dec 5 & 6, 2007 © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Outline Definition & aspects of Transparency & Market Discipline Basel II - Pillar 3 Disclosure Categories What is common among them? IFSB Standard approach for IIFS Disclosures to promote Transparency Summary and conclusion © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board What is Transparency? • Generally, transparency refers to accountability as well as the legal and accounting infrastructure for economic decisions • From operational perspective of a supervisory authority, transparency is characterised by an environment in which the information disclosed is; • Comprehensive, Material, Reliable, Comparable, Relevant & Timely, and Accessible to all stakeholders and to the market at large (IFSB’ TMD 2006) © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Market Discipline • Market Discipline refers to those environmental features which provide incentives for financial institutions including IIFS to limit excessive risktaking and to pursue good governance; • In response to the disclosure of material information, there are prompt adjustments in either prices or quantities of financial positions in the institutions/IIFS • Requires a set of mechanisms through which markets can penalize the excessive risk-taking or inadequate transparency © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board The Basel II Pillars of a Sound banking system Pillar 1 Minimum Capital Requirement Pillar 2 Pillar 3 Effective Supervision Transparency and disclosures © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Pillar 3 – Market Discipline provides Specific Templates on level of consolidation ,capital, risk exposure, risk assessment process, asset securitization & capital adequacy to complement Pillar 1 & 2 12/6/2007 6 How does IFSB fill the gap in TMD? IFSB TMD Enables market participant to complement & support the implementation of IFSB’s Capital Adequacy, Risk Management, Supervisory Review, and Corporate Governance Standards. Facilitates access to relevant, reliable, and timely information by market participants generally, & by IAH in particular thereby enhancing their monitoring capacity. IIFS disclosures can be seen as Pillar 3 plus IAH & other IIFS– specific disclosures. TMD provides detailed guidance on the disclosures (qualitative and quantitative) which are consistent with International Standards without conflicting with them. Transparency and Market Discipline – A Direct Comparison to Basel II IFSB- TMD Basel II- Pillar III Purposes –Pillar III • To complement the minimum capital requirements (Pillar I) and the supervisory review process ( Pillar II) Both aim at strengthening the market environment for bankingindustry and complementing their existing standards Purposes – IFSB TMD • • To specify the key principles and practices for IIFS in making disclosure to achieve transparency and promote market discipline Need for Transparency as a Shari’ah consideration based on principles of justice & fairness Transparency and Market Discipline – A Direct Comparison to Basel II • What is common among them ? • Both IFSB and Basel II aim at creating a banking-industry market environment that induces banks to self-maintaining capital adequacy and self-satisfying the supportive supervisory requirements through the disclosure of relevant information. • To create a market discipline , relevant information is determined by a materiality test and both use qualitative and quantitative format for disclosure reporting • The where, how, how often and the extent of coverage of qualitative information of disclosure is left to the discretion of management under the prevailing authority of supervisors. • General considerations about TMD remain same with slight change in scope of application. (See next slide) ( Supervisory authorities normally have the power and ability to enforce the necessary disclosures) Transparency and Market Discipline – A Direct Comparison to Basel II IFSB TMD • Basel II-Pillar III Scope of Application • Fully-fledged IIFS (other than Takaful institutions & Islamic mutual funds) • Islamic funds managed by IIFS in the form of restricted investment accounts (that are not offered as units or shares) • Fully consolidated basis at the holding company level within group or subgroup of IIFS • Islamic window operations of conventional banks (with both asset & funding facilities) • Scope of Application • Top consolidated level of the banking group to which this framework applies. • Disclosures related to individual banks within the groups would not generally be required to fulfill the disclosures requirements as set out in the standard What makes them different ? Let us see next slide Shari'ah governance disclosures Capital adequacy differs as UIAH as source of funding, requires specific disclosure Treatment of IAH and Retail Investor Oriented disclosures TMD draws on principles from ISOCO-CIS, AAOIFI, IFRS IFSB -TMD as Pillar III equivalent Equity of IAH in Capital Structure and disclosures Focus on Additional risk disclosure such as DCR & Rate of Return Risk Introduces Role of Islamic Windows disclosures Islamic Financial Services Board Necessary Conditions for Effective Transparency • Infrastructure for an effective disclosure regime • • • • • Accounting & auditing standards Corporate governance framework for IIFS External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAI) Investor education programme Supporting environmental factors • Availability of markets in which IIFS issue instruments • Market microstructure for price discovery • Legal & institutional arrangements for insolvency, investor rights, investor protection & asset recovery etc. © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Disclosures relative to IAH • Disclosures related to the rights to profits and associated risks with simplified disclosure format • Qualitative disclosures on products & product design, redemption procedures, principles of allocation of assets, investment policy and commingling policy • Disclosure of industry or IIFS-specific policies on maintaining reserves (PER/IRR) to ‘manage’ payouts to IAH • Standard draws on CIS disclosure practices endorsed by IOSCO and requires consistency of disclosures with those of CIS © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Retail Oriented Disclosures for IAH • Supervisors shall encourage simplified disclosures • Non-technical presentation of risk-return characteristics, management rights to appropriate IAH’s share of investment, asset allocation policies • Penalty in early withdrawal, management fees, expenses & taxes, historical returns, complaints procedure to dissatisfied IAH • Availability of personal banking and investment advisory for the benefits of IAH with degree of independence in recommending products • True, factual, and well-balanced statements, not projections or estimates of future performance © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Investment Accounts (Both Unrestricted and Restricted IAH) General Qualitative Disclosures F P 1. Written procedures and policies including: • variety of investment products from IIFS; • characteristics of investors; • purchase, redemption and distribution procedures; • experience of portfolio managers, investment advisors and trustees; • governance arrangements for the IAH funds; and • strategy for trading and origination of assets 2. Investment and management of IAH funds √ √ √ √ 3. Product information and the manners 4. Bases of allocation of assets, expenses and profit in relation to IAH funds √ 5. Policies governing the management of both unrestricted and restricted IAH funds, which cover the management of the investment portfolios, establishment of prudential reserves, and the calculation, allocation and distribution of profits √ √ Investment Accounts (Both Unrestricted and Restricted IAH) General Quantitative Disclosures [1] F 6. PER / PSIA*100 by type of IAH. √ 7. IRR / PSIA*100 by type of IAH. √ 8. ROA = NI[1] / TA[2] √ 9. ROE = NI[3] / SHE √ 10 Profit Dist / PSIA*100 by type of IAH √ 11. Financing to PSIA*100 by type of IAH. √ Before distribution of profit to unrestricted IAH [2] Assets financed by shareholders’ equity and minority interests, Unrestricted IAH, and current accounts and other liabilities. [3] After distribution of profit to IAH P √ Islamic Financial Services Board Rate of Return Risk • Refers to the possible impact on the net income of the IIFS arising from the impact of changes in the market rates and relevant benchmark rates on the ROA and on the returns payable on funding • This impact arises from the unrestricted IAH funds being invested in fixed-return assets such as Murabahah • The greater the absorption of risks by IIFS (known as DCR) , the greater the likely magnitude of the rate of return risk • An IIFS shall make disclosures , both qualitative and quantitative , of factors that cause rate of return © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR) • Refers to the magnitude of risks that are transferred to shareholders in order to cushion the IAH from bearing some or all of the risks (e.g. credit and market risk) to which they are contractually exposed in a Mudarabah contract • Disclosure of aggregate Mudārabah profits, the Mudarib share, IAH share and profit distributed to IAH together with movements in PER & IRR • The proportion of RWA funded by IAH that is included in total RWA for capital adequacy purposes, as approved by supervisor, and the rationale. see DCR disclosure table © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Displaced Commercial Risk (cont’d) • IIFS policy on DCR, including framework for managing risk-return expectations of IAH & shareholders; • In order to minimize the adverse impact of income smoothing for PSIA on shareholders’ returns (DCR) and meet potential but unexpected losses that would be borne by the IAH, the IIFS can set up prudential reserves (PER and IRR) • Policies on Profit Equalisation Reserves (PER) and Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) used to smooth or enhance periodic payouts to IAH and to mitigate DCR – see following slides © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Displaced Commercial Risk (cont’d) • Reserves: • Profit equalization reserve (PER) Is the amount appropriated out of gross income of Murābahah income, before allocating the Mudarib’s share, in order to smooth returns paid to the IAH and the shareholders • Investment risk reserve (IRR) Is the amount appropriated out of IAH’s income after deduction of the Mudarib’s share of income in order to cover any future losses on investments financed by PSIA (NB PER may not be used to cover losses) © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Contract- Specific Risks • Each type of Islamic Financing asset is exposed to a varying mix of credit and market risks because of the holding of assets as part of Islamic financing. This mix varies according to stage of contract. • Hence, the need for monitoring the total exposure in each type of financing asset and the corresponding capital charge • An IIFS shall make disclosures , both qualitative and quantitative , of contract-specific risks © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board General and Shari’ah Governance Disclosures • Disclosures of general and Shari’ah governance are designed to provide information on the structure and functioning of such governance in an IIFS • Objective of these disclosures is to ensure transparency regarding Shari’ah compliance by IIFS • These disclosures are consistent with International Standards such as Principles of Corporate Governance by the OECD, Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations by the BCBS. © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board General and Shari’ah Governance Disclosures (cont’d) • The IFSB’s Corporate Governance Standard deals with four areas; • General governance • Rights of IAH • Compliance with Islamic Shari’ah rules and principles • Transparency of financial reporting in respect of investment accounts • Some countries have national Shari’ah authority that issues the fatawa, while in other countries, each IIFS has a Shari’ah board which issues fatawa © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Islamic Windows Disclosures • Definition of window under this standard…. • As a part of conventional financial institution (may be branch or dedicated unit ) that provides both fund management (investment accounts) financing and investment that are Shari'ah compliant. • This standard applies to fully-fledged windows, i.e. with Shari’ah compliant funds invested in Shari’ah compliant assets, subject to materiality criteria • Asset side only “windows" shall disclose risk management, risk weightings, and their treatment in capital adequacy of the institutions • Shari’ah oversight arrangements of windows to be disclosed © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board TMD implementation Issues and Challenges • Impact of guarantee schemes such as deposit protection, risk absorption by shareholders with the perception of principal protection with PER and IRR, weaken incentives to monitor IIFS • Market overreactions when IIFS in weakened position , reaction through interbank linkages • safety nets and liquidity facilities, emergency lending • The cost involved in public disclosure • Incremental cost of developing , implementing and maintaining a system to generate required disclosure • Accounting and auditing systems that safeguard the accuracy of disclosure © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board TMD implementation Issues and Challenges (cont’d) • A weak information environment and a situation of system-wide risk exposures will limit the capacity to identify relative performances of banks, and market discipline cannot work • Market discipline requires a broader policy response, going beyond prudential controls on individual IIFS, to foster a stronger information environment • A stronger information environment provides incentives for voluntary disclosures and use of ECAI and other information intermediaries © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD Islamic Financial Services Board Summary & Conclusion • IFSB TMD Standard complements BCBS Pillar 3 and International Financial Reporting Standards by • Plugging gaps in financial disclosure requirements with respect to specificities of IIFS • Adding requirements for ‘consumer friendly’ retailoriented disclosures re products and services on offer • TMD Standard is concerned with disclosure but not with accounting issues of the classification, recognition and measurement of financial statement elements – • Effectiveness requires adequate supervisory transparency and macro transparency © ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD