Proceedings – EPOC 2012 Conference
Working Paper Proceedings
Engineering Project Organizations Conference
Rheden, The Netherlands
July 10-12, 2012
Learning for Win-Win Cooperation
Jiin-Song Tsai and Cheryl Chi
Proceedings Editors
Amy Javernick-Will, University of Colorado and Ashwin Mahalingam, IIT-Madras
© Copyright belongs to the authors. All rights reserved. Please contact authors for citation details.
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Proceedings – EPOC 2012 Conference
LEARNING FOR WIN-WIN COOPERATION
Jiin-Song Tsai,1 and Cheryl S.F. Chi 2
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an experimental study that explores a learning process in which a series of
games was conducted in the classroom encouraging students to practice the win-win strategy by
resolving the difficulties and disputes within and between small groups. In total, thirty-two
engineering students were teamed up in groups of four. Their personal properties and conflict
management styles were measured with questionnaires of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
(MBTI; Keirsey 1998) and the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI; Kilmann and
Thomas 1977), respectively. They were asked to accomplish the designated tasks in three games:
(1) intra-group joint decision making to deal with the threat of a natural disaster, (2) negotiation
between two groups to deal with their inter-group competition, and (3) cooperation with a
competitor group to achieve an inter-group win-win for mutual gains. The purpose of games is to
observe two types of learning mechanisms: single-loop and double-loop learning models
(Argyris and Schön 1996). A control group composed by another thirty-two students of business
major joins the experiment in the third game. The specific goals for group members to achieve
are: (1) the first game aims to develop their patterns of joint decision-making; (2) the second
game is to learn the consequence of zero-sum competition; (3) the third game is to perform
cooperative actions with a new group of students under the prison’s dilemma. The preliminary
findings indicate that (1) the positive outcomes of group learning through the experiment; (2) the
single-loop learning is repeated a number of times in the prisoner’s dilemma game; (3) the
double-loop learning was driven by needs for getting out of the paradoxical trap to achieve
mutual gains. The measurements of MBTI and TKI seem to be correlated with each other but not
sufficient to be discussed in this paper yet.
KEYWORDS: Learning, collaboration, conflict management, trust building
1. INTRODUCTION
Collaboration has been emphasized as a crucial factor influencing project performance.
It contributes to effective problem-solving, facilitates risk-sharing, and provides flexibility and
responsiveness in the face of uncertainties that characterize construction projects (Rahman &
Kumaraswamy, 2002). Inter-organizational collaboration through trust-based partnership reduces
transaction and monitoring cost and encourages resource and risk sharing (Gulati 1995; Uzzi
1997). This is especially challenging for participants of public construction projects who have to
work under hierarchical and regulatory requirements for fairness, objectivity, transparency, etc.,
which leaves little room for trust-based partnership and relational contracting (Bradach and
Eccles 1989). In addition, the possibility for disputes and conflicts in public construction
contracts is increased by the complexity and the scope of the contract and its subject matter.
Nevertheless, trust-based cooperation can be developed at interpersonal level.
Interpersonal interaction and communication between managers representing different project
1
Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan, ROC.
jstsai@mail.ncku.edu.tw
2
Postdoctoral Researcher, Center for Industrial Development and Environmental Governance, School of Public
Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, 100084, cheryl.sfchi@gmail.com
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parties play a major role in reducing the perceived risk regarding whether other parties will act
opportunistically (Ceric 2011) and thus directly affect trust building across boundaries.
Managers’ interpretations of conflicting issues directly link to their responses to these issues
(Dutton and Jackson 1987). Therefore, the interpretative frames that individuals “bring to make
sense of what others are doing” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 4) determining the meanings
attached to conflicting issues that lead to a certain set of actions rather than other possible actions
(Dutton and Jackson 1987). Backmann (2011) posits that such interpretive frames can be swiftly
and actively created or changed in an institutional environment where people are encouraged to
trust each other by working together to achieve a common goal, and meanwhile learning together
to reach a conceptual understanding. For example, a education program which channels the
behaviors of actors into certain directions through a learning process for increasing the overall
level of trust in a specific system.
Inspired by the lines of research, this study attempts to explore how learning
(representing a social nurturing process) and conflict management styles (representing individual
propensities) affects collaborative attitude. Specifically, it is to experiment whether the win-win
cooperation can be achieved in a learning process through a series of exercise of collaborative
teamwork conducted in the classroom, in which participants (students) are encouraged to
practice win-win strategies to resolve the disputes within and between small groups.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Collaboration
Collaboration is often used interchangeably with cooperation; although they have
different meanings: (1) collaboration is a philosophy (or style) of interaction where people are
responsible for their actions, including recognition and respect the abilities and contributions of
their peers; (2) cooperation is a structure of interaction designed to facilitate the accomplishment
of a specific goal through people working together in groups (Brody 1995). In this paper, we do
not distinguish the two terms, but look at behaviors associated with them. Cooperation can result
from coercive and voluntary forces. In the context of complex projects, coercive forces from
hierarchical authority or contractual terms often fail to reduce opportunistic behavior and ensure
cooperation (Henisz, Levitt, and Scott 2012). Instead, relational contracting based on trust
emanated from norms of obligation and reciprocity often motivates individuals to engage in
cooperative actions with others and reduces the fear regarding other parties may behave
opportunistically (Bradach and Eccles 1989).
2.2 Trust building and collaboration
For projects that comprise multiple organizations, works are mostly one-off customized
cases involving complicated interdependencies between tasks and processes across
organizational boundaries. However, the temporary and dynamic nature of project may hinder
collaboration, unless participants are able to actively cultivate cooperative relationship by trust
building across boundaries (Meyerson et al. 1996).
After stumbling for over decades, the construction industry has learned that long and
inefficient administrative and legal procedures can easily direct the issues away from their
engineering and technical essences and lead to an adversary game and competition. Lau and
Rowlinson’s (2009) study of trust in the construction industry indicates that interpersonal trust is
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more sensible to demonstrate keeping commitments and performing cooperation. Their findings
point out that a good interpersonal relationship involving trust and confidence in others is a must
not only for a socially safe working place but for a profitable business partnership.
In a trustworthy relationship one may transform fuzzy uncertainty in front (the worry of
the other side’s unforeseeable behavior) into an affordable level of risk which he/she is willing or
prepared to take. By doing so, one can confidently presume the threat of opportunistic behavior
exists but is minimized (Luhmann 1979). Therefore, trust can effectively reduce the risk of
opportunism. One the other hand, risk also presents opportunities for trust building, in which
risk-taking is an important act that leads to trust, a psychological condition resulting from
repeated reciprocal interactions and risk-taking acts (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998).
Because the opportunistic tendency of human nature is challenging, some studies regards trust
building a transforming process for enhancing the quality of dyadic relationship (Duck 1990;
Zolin 2005). In this study, some particular behaviors are identified as trust building attempts; for
instance, risk-taking act, attitude to openly disclosure information, and predictable response are
actions that embody collaboration intentions.
2.3 Conflict Management and Learning
Participants in projects often need to coordinate complex tasks and processes that have a
high level of reciprocal interdependence and require mutual adjustments (Thompson 1967),
which greatly increases the risk of conflict that threatens cooperation. In addition, due to various
interests of project participants, goal incongruence is a major source of conflicts that greatly
impacts the project outcome (Thomsen et al. 2004).
Relational conflicts can diminish the cognitive functioning of the individuals involved in
the conflicts and lead to antagonistic behaviors (Jehn 1977). As a consequence, tensions in
relationship interfere with task-related collaboration, and peoples’ attention would be directed to
struggling for power rather than to working together towards completing tasks. To constructively
manage those tensions and conflicts, learning is necessary for changing the antagonistic situation
in order to keep the whole team well functioning (Luthans et al. 1995). Conflict management
involves a interactive learning process for the individuals involved to find out what are the
causes of conflicts (i.e., diagnosis) and then to search for acceptable solutions putting into
actions (i.e., intervention).
Rahim (1988) employs Argyris and Schön’s learning theory (1996) to argue that people’s
habit of defensive reasoning is the main obstacle to the learning for constructive conflict
management. This type of reasoning takes place when people fail to take responsibility for their
decisions and attempt to protect themselves against the negative consequences of the decisions
by blaming others. This psychological reaction leads everyone into adversary interactions that
are totally opposite to those for trust building. As a result, the defensive reasoning would highly
likely result in the situation that individuals, groups, intergroups, and the whole project team stop
learning and are unable to diagnose and intervene existing or potential conflicts.
On the contrary, constructive conflict management involves attitudes and actions of
taking responsibility, open discussion, and actively improving the status quo. All these behaviors
are essential for learning under interpersonal interaction. In this study, we aim to identify the
effects of learning on collaboration in a setting game, in which the consistency of the overall
activities is well retained. The effects of learning are measured based on Argyris and Schön’s
theory. In the following, we first describe the fundamental of learning for win-win cooperation
and then the method employed.
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3. FUNDAMENTAL OF LEARNING FOR WIN-WIN COOPERATION
The presence of conflict is essential for learning in an organization (Luthans et al. 1995),
and in the need for constructively managing conflict lies the potential for collective learning
(Pascalc 1990; Senge et al. 1994). Argyris and Schön (1996) define learning as the path of error
detection and correction and categorize learning into two types. First, single-loop learning refers
to cases in which errors corrected without altering the underlying paradigm (i.e., interpretive
frames). Second, double-loop learning refers to cases in which errors corrected by changing the
paradigm and then the actions. In other words, single-loop learning results in changes of
people’s perceptions and behaviors within an existing interpretive frame, and double-loop
learning involves cognitive and behavioral changes that entail a change in the existing
interpretive frame.
Rahim and Bonoma (1979) argue that good strategies of managing conflict can encourage
double-loop learning and advocate that organizations should move beyond exercising single-loop
learning for troubleshooting to foster double-loop learning with constructive conflict
management. In addition, learning that shape the motivations of individuals in conflicts also
affect their responses to the conflicts. Learning for cooperation is fundamentally about
individuals or/and teams working together to foster the “shared interests” (Daniels and Walker
2001: 57). The process that directs individuals’ focus shifting from self-interests and individual
gains to the shared interests and mutually beneficial outcomes changes their motivations in the
team work.
Based on these lines of research, we see that cooperation is a structure of people’s
interaction to accomplish a specific goal, in which win-win strategies are embedded in a trustbuilding process. We presume that the process that enacts double loop-learning for win-win
cooperation is constructive conflict management other than resolution, in which conflict is not
necessarily to be avoided, reduced, or terminated. Instead, it is an important ingredient to
facilitate double loop learning that exploits the constructive functions of conflict and fosters the
trust in people’s interaction.
4. RESEARCH METHOD AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We conducted an exploratory experiment to study the potential effect of learning on
collaboration. An undergraduate course in civil engineering, Engineering Negotiation, was
adopted for students to learn how to practice win-win cooperation in a specially-designed
program comprising three games of conflict management. In total, thirty-two juniors and seniors,
ages ranging from 21 - 23, participated. Some of them had construction or design related intern
experience, but less than six months. Another thirty-two students of business major who had
never taken courses from the first author, and whose department had no similar courses, joined
the experiment in the third game as the control group for two types of learning.
4.1 Underlying Assumptions of the Program Design
The processes of the program are designed to bridge and transfer what is learned by
individual team members to the collective and vise versa. We assume that individual learning is a
necessary condition for collective team learning in the intra- or/and the inter-team interactions
(negotiations). The team as a collective can learn from its individual members through a certain
mechanism (Argyris 1978). The unique mechanism developed in each team enables its members
to collectively engage in the exercises involving diagnosis of problems and intervention in
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conflicts. Through this process, team members who see different aspects of a problem can
explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond the limited options that they
individually perceived as possible. By doing so, they can preserve and acquire new knowledge
and inspire each other to adopt the new values and ways of interpreting things fostered in the
process.
In terms of motivation, the exercises of the program are designed for individuals to learn
how to collectively achieve a goal that they cannot achieve alone (Booher and Innes 2001). The
design requires participants to engage in activities with a high level of interdependence so that
they can learn to make choices between collective beneficial goals and self-interested goals and
learn from the consequences of their choices.
4.2 Procedure
In this program, students played three games in groups of four in three consecutive
weekly meetings. These three games represent three different simplified scenarios: (1) intragroup joint decision making to deal with the threat of a natural disaster, (2) negotiation between
two groups to deal with their inter-group competition, and (3) cooperation with a competitor
group to achieve an inter-group win-win for mutual gains.
The first game (Game 1) aims to provide a simple context for group members to interact
and to develop their patterns of joint decision-making. The second game (Game 2) allows
students to learn the negative consequence of zero-sum competition by performing a negotiation
under the given scenario of the prison’s dilemma game. The third game (Game 3) is to test
whether the students make any changes in their strategies and turn to cooperative actions for
win-win after the learning experience, by arranging them to negotiate with a new group of
students under a similar game. Goals and setting of the adopted games are depicted in Table 1.
Table 1 Goals and Setting of Games
Game
1
Main Goal
To make
joint
decisions
Context
We are trapped in a severe snow storm. We have to jointly
decide how to survive the disaster. We also need to prioritize
the things that we should keep for surviving.
Measurements
After-class
summaries
2
To
maximize
the gain
Questionnaire;
After-class
summaries
3
To achieve
win-win
outcomes
We have a competitor group in the market. Our profitability
depends on matching our price with theirs in a pricing game.
This game runs many rounds, and the profit is accumulated
accordingly.
Same as above, but this time we still need to achieve the
same profitability but by turning the adversary game into a
collaborative win-win. Limit communication between both
sides to build trust is conducted by some verbal negotiations
or by the messages conveyed by our prices.
Observation
reports;
Questionnaire;
After-class
summaries
Note: We also administered questionnaires of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Keirsey
1998) and the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI; Kilmann and Thomas 1977) to
measure students’ personalities and conflict management styles and assess their effects on
cooperation. However, this part of results is not discussed in this paper.
Each of the three games lasted for three hours. The purpose of the three-stage design is to
observe two types of learning mechanisms. In each of Game 2 and 3, students played 8 times of
the same game and demonstrated the behaviors of single-loop learning. Each group gained their
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experience by trial-and-error for their best winning tactics under intensive interactions. In order
to strengthen the learning leading to the double-loop learning, after-game assignments,
discussions, and three lectures are given to facilitate reflection of experience and to elaborate
useful concepts and skills for trust building and cooperation.
4.3 Measurements
The double-loop learning is examined in two sets of data: (1) the changes of students’
winning strategies from the second to the third stages, and (2) the reflection stated in their
summaries after each game. As the result, the students of business major who had never learned
the concepts from the first author’s courses could only gain trial-and-error learning from the 8
rounds of game in the third stage. This allows us to differentiate the effect of single-loop learning
and double-loop learning on collaboration. The resulting decision-making patterns and
negotiation strategies were measured with five approaches.
First, each group was assigned one observer to record group members’ interactions.
Second, immediately after the exercises, the students were asked to complete a questionnaire
about their intention and instinctual reaction (i.e. feeling and emotion, or “affective responses;”
Gilboa 1994). Third, the students were required to provide after-class reports summarizing their
reflections of the lessons learned from each exercise. Fourth, after each stage, the instructor led
group debriefing and discussion to recap the activity and clarify some ambiguous issues. Finally,
the first author interviewed four group leaders to delve into actual group interactions.
5. GAME CONTEXTS AND RESULTS
In Game 1, students jointly discussed the situation and learn about the communication
between the members of the group. After Game 1, students reported how they arranged their
attention and effort on different issues in their discussion for reaching consensus including: (1)
Proposing alternatives and reasoning them (19%), (2) Getting things done soon (16%), (3)
Figuring out rules and procedures to make decision (38%), and (4) Making a friendly climate for
discussion (28%). These four issues are correlated to the four main concerns of conflict
management (Shell 1999) that signify different tendencies and preferences of communication
approaches (Crowley 1996). Figure 1 illustrates the result.
Dominating
Collaborating
16%
19%
Compromising
38%
Avoiding
38%
28%
19%
16%
28%
Accommodating
Figuring out rules and procedures to make decision
Making a friendly climate for discussion
Proposing alternatives and reasoning them
Getting things done soon
Figure 1 Main Issues in Group Discussion for Reaching Consensus
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In Game 2, the group exercise is based on a modified version of the oil pricing game
originally written by Fisher (1986). This is a multiple-round, iterative game under a scenario of
tactic collision between two groups upon the price of oil. It is about two companies selling oil to
a market that they commonly share. Each group's profitability would depend on the price they set
and the price set by the other group (as shown in Figure 2). Therefore, the profitability is closely
related to one side’s prediction of the likely actions of the other side as well as their accordingly
countermeasures. In this way, the game subtly places both sides in an iterated prisoner's
dilemma, in which each group must maneuver, in a way of limited communication, to produce
their best payoffs.
Figure 2 Price—Profit Diagram
Figure 3 Price—Market Share Change Diagram
In Game 2, the profit for each round is determined by the gained unit profit times the
market share which may vary according to the comparative prices of parties in the game (Figure
3). In addition, two criteria were used to judge the parties’ survival at the end of the game: (1)
minimum average profit > 500, and (2) minimum market share > 30%. The main goal of each
group in Game 2 was to maximize the total profit.
There is one mechanism embedded in the game that provides incentives for opportunism.
If one group choose a more competitive price than the other group and slightly sacrifice their
market share as the trade-off, this would increase their profit at the expense of the profit of the
other group. On the other hand, if the prices of both parties are the same, their market shares
remain unchanged. In other words, they can retain one half of the market share from the
beginning as long as the prices remaining equal.
To strengthen the effect of the mechanism that induces opportunism, players were
initially told that they would only play the game 4 times in order to shorten the time they
expected to maximize their own profits. In addition, before the expected end-game round
(Rounds 4 and 8), players were told that their profits would be doubled.
In most rounds, communication was through a limited way by showing a “number”
indicating their prices. At certain points, both groups are given the opportunity to communicate
explicitly by face to face negotiation. Table 2 shows an example of results.
Table 2 The Records of Game 2: Group A against Group B
Round
1
2
Group A’s Price
Market share (%)
Group B’s Price
Profit
Market share (%)
10*
50
20
500
50
150
10*
20
45
Profit
135
53
8
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Proceedings – EPOC 2012 Conference
3
4
(×2)
5
30
48
480
48
Average
profit
480
30
960
48
960
10*
20
48
144
48
480
10*
51
8
(×2)
48
30
6
7
30
20
510
43
129
20*
30
46
92
46
920
10*
51 (> 30)
480
20
1020
38 (> 30)
(< 500)
485
228
(< 500)
Note: (1) The game was first described as a 4-round game. After the fourth round, the
instructor announced that the game would continue another 4 rounds. (2) Each
time before the end-game round (Rounds 4 and 8), both parties were told that
their profits would be doubled. (3) There were 4 chances of face-to-face
negotiation after their trials of Round 2, 3, 5, and 7. (4) * indicates the “winner.”
Game 2 is a so-called “social trap” exercise. In any negotiation each party need to make
decisions regarding (1) reaching pricing agreement or not, and (2) subsequently, honoring that
agreement or not. Once the game was repeated a number of times (as shown in table 2), both
groups attempted to tacitly achieve a better payoff in the short round either by anticipating the
other party to defect the agreement or by cunningly defecting the agreement at certain trials. As
shown in Table 2, when the end-games were expected (Rounds 4 and 8), the groups would tend
to competed by maximizing short-term gains.
According to the after-game debriefing and students’ summaries, the most efforts of all
groups were put on trying to beat their competing groups. Therefore, assuming the other side an
opportunist reflected their dominant interpretive frames of self-defense. Distrusting was reflected
in the actions of competition that strove to safeguard and/or increase their own profitability. The
chances of face-to-face negotiations mostly aimed at probing the other group’s intentions, and
less at making concessions. Playing along with the game, both groups carefully adjusted pricing
strategies according to what they had learned. They focus on making anticipation and modifying
(or trial and error) the expectation in the game just like a thermostat that responses to high or low
temperatures by turning the heat on and off. This is typical single-loop learning.
Several students reported in their summaries (one week later) that their group learning
seems to differ from their individual learning. They pointed out that their groups’ strategies and
decisions failed to reflect what they learned individually. Some even complained that their
personal input had little impact on the group behavior, indicating group think effect at work
(Janis 1972). For example, some individuals were aware that long-term maximization required
mutual trust to survive the doomed social trap, however significant short-term gains still attracted
their group to break the agreement.
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Some students argued that the goal to maximize the total profit was ambiguous and was
easily misinterpreted. Their response tended to be driven by the anticipation of possible negative
and adversarial intentions of the other party. Consequently, such projections became selffulfilling by leading to competition and adversary acts.
In Game 3, the experienced students who participated in the entire program played the
game with new-comer groups, in which the experienced group must decide whether to adopt a
cooperative stance or a competitive strategy. Once again, they must maneuver and negotiate in a
similar environment of limited communication, to maximize individual and joint gains. Table 3
shows one of Game 3 records.
Table 3 A Game 3 Records of Group A against New Group B
Round
1
2
3
4
(×2)
5
Group A’s Price
Market share (%)
Profit
50
Average
profit
50
250
20*
30
40
80
57
1140
20*
30
45
90
49
1500
41
980
30*
50
10
410
20*
30
40
80
48
960
30*
10
675
40
200
30
35
30
350
47
470
30
35 (> 30)
528
Profit
10
750
45
8
(×2)
Market share (%)
30*
6
7
New Group B’s Price
30
700
47 (>30)
(> 500)
625
840
(> 500)
Note: (1) * indicates the “winner.”
After Game 3, the debriefing of the results allowed students to examine the different
outcomes between Games 2 and 3. They could also reflect on both what they had learned from
these two games that produced their behavioral difference. All the lessons learned and reflections
were discussed openly, and the instructor (the first author) highlighted the commonalities and
differences of their findings and made connections with key concepts and theories related to
cooperation.
The discussion and students’ summaries showed that students experienced a different
way interpreting the action of their paired group. In Game 3, they could better sense how the
other team (or themselves earlier) would make imprecise assumptions once being involved in the
competition of conflicting interests, so that they became aware of keeping their own assumptions
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explicit and testing them in the game. Moreover, their follow-up reflection stated in the
summaries was valuable for making sense of why the outcomes of Game 3 differed from Game
2. Most students reported in their summaries that they were impressed by the experienced of
altering their actions to reach the desired solution in trust. The way they learned to build trust
with others was quite straightforward by being predictable of what they did and being consistent
with what they said (shown in Table 3). Subsequently, several students were very pleased that
the decision making towards trust was much easier and faster. The after-game questionnaires
recording their decision making time confirmed this point.
The three games demonstrated that learning for win-win cooperation did not easily occur
by just knowing the importance of cooperation. It requires experiences in real practices.
Theories of learning suggest that double-loop learning involves a process of confronting the
existing interpretive frames regarding how and why certain things happen, breaking them down,
and acquiring a new model or set of cause-effects interpretations to replace the old ones.
Nevertheless, Argyris and Schön (1974) point out:
The trouble people have in learning new theories may stem not so much from the
inherent difficulty of the new theories as from the existing theories people have
that already determine practices. We call their operational theories of action
theories-in-use to distinguish them from the espoused theories that are used to
describe and justify behavior. We wondered whether the difficulty in learning
new theories of action is related to a disposition to protect the old theory-in-use.
This explains why learning does not simply occur by knowing new theories. Existing
interpretive frames tend to persist and lead to experiences and justifications that reinforce the
interpretive frames. The process of learning from reflection of experience is crucial because it
makes people aware of discrepancies between knowing and experience (Marsick, Sauquet, and
Yorks 2006), which allows new interpretive frames to be adopted. This meta-examination of
underlying assumptions is double-loop learning. It stands in contrast to single-loop learning, in
which people adjust tactics when actions do not produce intended results.
6. DISCUSSIONS
Learning can be described as a process whereby people’s interpretive frames are
internalized into their cognition thus leading to changes of thoughts and actions (Dewey 1938;
Kolb 1984). Learning by doing (or exercising) implies that there is an experience (i.e. the doing)
that causes such changes. This paper presents a case of learning by doing for win-win
cooperation addressing primarily how learns (students) learn. Employing the difficult prison’s
dilemma game as a metaphor, the students experienced two types of learning through exercising
the same situation twice. By comparing their different behaviors in two games through
reflection, student witnessed their changes of thoughts and actions in a learning process. The
preliminary results indicate that:
1. The results showed the positive outcomes of group learning through the experiment.
Nevertheless, the students’ learning as a member of a team seems to differ from their
individual learning. Many of the reflection reports of students showed that their group
negotiation strategies failed to reflect what they had learned individually. Some group leaders
complained that they learned significantly by being in the leadership position, but their
personal input had little impact on the group behavior as a whole.
2. The single-loop learning is repeated a number of times in the prisoner’s dilemma game, and
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most teams become more sophisticated in terms of their rational reasoning through their
experiences. In fact, most teams hardly achieved what they desired since the development of
operational trust was easily broken by fear of the breach of the agreements that the leaders
reached in the negotiations between rounds, especially when an end-game was anticipated.
3. The double-loop learning was driven by needs for getting out of the paradoxical trap to
achieve mutual gains. By understanding the common human fears of distrust, some
experienced teams became more able to empathize with the feelings of their opponents and
were much willing to continue the efforts of trust building in the game. Because of their
empathy with others, coupled with their rational reasoning and the knowledge learned from
the lectures, the win-win cooperation became a feasible goal for them.
The measurements of MBTI for personality and the TKI measurements for conflict
management style are very likely to be correlated with each other. Nevertheless, additional
analysis efforts are needed to explore their links in between. Our current accomplishment is not
sufficient to further discuss in this paper yet. Preliminary findings drawn out in the present study
are to elicit future cross-national collaborations on similar researches.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors wish to thank anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. We also
thank the financial support from the National Science Council project number NSC 99-2211-E006-189-MY3.
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