@
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Presentation Caveat
The following presentation was made by Marv Nuss of Nuss Sustainment Solutions at the 2013
Aircraft Airworthiness and Sustainment Conference – Australia.
The presentation title is: An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment &
Risk Management Approach. Mr. Nuss describes the USA Federal Aviation Administration’s
(FAA) approach to risk assessment and risk management for aircraft continued operational
safety.
Mr. Nuss, a retired FAA certification engineer, explains the FAA’s Transport Airplane Risk
Assessment Methodology (TARAM) published in FAA document PS-ANM-25-05. He uses the
2013 Boeing 787 lithium-ion battery failures as an example. The presentation contains facts
from publicly available documents, including published USA’s National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) reports and newspaper reports.
Mr. Nuss received no information from the FAA or Boeing for the presentation. The
assumptions made for the example risk assessment using the TARAM method are those of Mr.
Nuss, and are based only on publically available information. Mr. Nuss believes his assumptions
to be realistic and a good example of the TARAM method. However, it is completely an
“outsider’s” perspective.
Mr. Nuss believes quantitative risk assessment is an effective means to manage risk. Concepts
similar to those explained in the presentation provide valuable tools for continued operational
safety managers – whether a regulator, manufacturer, or operator. The presentation is
intended to demonstrate how such a risk assessment works, not as a critique of either the FAA
or Boeing.
The FAA’s risk assessment and management methods continue to evolve. Mr. Nuss
understands that the FAA’s TARAM document used for the example in this presentation is likely
to be revised with updated policy at some point in the future.
Mr. Nuss asks the reader to view the presentation with the understanding of his outsider’s
perspective. He also hopes the reader finds it informative and provides a better understanding
of quantitative risk assessment and risk management.
An Outsider’s Perspective on
FAA’s Aircraft Safety
Risk Assessment &
Risk Management Approach
2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment Conference
(Australia)
Brisbane, QLD
July 23-25, 2013
Marv Nuss
1 + 913-962-4683
marv.nuss@marvnuss.com
www.marvnuss.com
An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety
Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach
•
•
•
•
© 2013 NuSS
Background
FAA approach
Definitions
Case study
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
1
RA&RM Background
• Managing risk is the bottom line task for any enterprise
 Risk, one definition: the existence of a potential for an undesirable loss
 Undesirable loss could be:
 Life
 Health
 Money
 Time
 Customers
• In the aerospace industry, these risks can be competing




Safety risk vs. mission readiness risk
Safety risk vs. design risk
Safety risk vs. financial risk
Financial risk vs. mission readiness risk
RA&RM: Risk Assessment and Risk Management
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
2
RA&RM Background
• In order to manage risk it must first be quantified
 Risk assessment is a means of quantifying risk
 Useful data are necessary for sensible risk assessment
 Computer computational speed enables easier risk assessments
 Ability to collect and store data
 Ability to analyze large amounts of data
• Increased pressure to make processes more efficient puts
increased pressure on understanding associated risks
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
3
Big Picture Perspective on Life Risk
1.0E-04
Professional Rodeo (Bull,
Bronc)
Motorcycle Individual
Death Probability
1.0E-05
Probability, per hour
Female Probability of
Death - All Causes
Male Probability of
Death - All Causes
1.0E-06
Passenger Vehicle
Individual Death
Probability
TARAM Individual Risk
Threshold
1.0E-07
Average Accidental
Death Probability
Drowning in Bathtub
Individual Death Probability
Passenger Bus Individual
Death Probability
Commercial Airplane (part 121)
Individual Death Probability
1.0E-08
0
© 2013 NuSS
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Age
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety
Risk(years)
Assessment & Risk Management
Approach

Ref:
FAA TARAM
Handbook
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
4
www.marvnuss.com
FAA’s Disciplined Approach to Risk Management
• FAA established its “Safety Risk Management Policy” in 1998:
“The FAA shall use a formal, disciplined, and documented decision-making
process to address safety risks in relation to high-consequence decisions
affecting the complete life cycle.” (FAA Order 8040.4, revised to 8040.4A in 2012)
• FAA Aviation Safety organization followed with its Safety
Management System (SMS)
 FAA Aircraft Certification Service SMS includes specific policies regarding
risk assessment and management
 “Monitor Safety/Analyze Data” (MSAD) is FAA’s Aircraft Certification
Service’s process to manage risk:
“designed to promote data-driven, risk-based continued operational safety
decision-making.”
 The MSAD process is documented in FAA Order 8110.107A (2012)
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
5
FAA MSAD Risk Management Process
MSAD process relies heavily in-service data.
Service difficulty reporting (SDR) is the major source of in-service data.
Ref: FAA Order 8110.107A
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
6
FAA MSAD Risk Management Process
• MSAD is an attempt to standardize the safety risk associated
with any failure




Mechanical systems
Electrical systems
Engine and fuel systems
Structure
• Each directorate developed specific process for risk
assessment and management
 Transport Directorate: TARAM -- Transport Airplane Risk Assessment
Methodology, published Nov. 2011 (PS-ANM-25-05)
 Small Airplane Directorate: SARA – Small Airplane Risk Analysis
 Rotorcraft and Engine/Propeller Directorates have similar processes
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
7
FAA Risk Analysis Specification Process
Statistical
Exposure
(Time, Number of
Flights)
Probability
(Exposure x Frequency of
Occurrence)
Quantitative
© 2013 NuSS
Frequency of Occurrence
(Failure Rate, Event Rate)
(Number of Occurrences per
Hour, per Flight)
Conditional Probability
(Event to Severity)
Risk
(Expected Probability of an Fatal
Accident)
Severity
(Fatal Accident)
Measurable
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
8
FAA Safety Risk Definitions
Severity definitions
• Catastrophic: Multiple fatalities (or fatality to all on board) usually with the
loss of aircraft
• Hazardous: Multiple serious injuries; fatal injury to a relatively small number
of persons (one or two) or a hull loss without fatalities
• Major: Physical distress or injuries to persons and/or substantial damage to
aircraft
• Minor: Physical discomfort to persons and/or slight damage to aircraft
• Minimal: Negligible safety effect
Likelihood definitions
• Extremely improbable: So unlikely that it is not expected to occur, but it is
not impossible
• Extremely remote: Expected to occur rarely
• Remote: Expected to occur infrequently
• Probable: Expected to occur often
Ref: FAA Order 8040.4A
• Frequent: Expected to occur routinely
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
9
FAA Risk Assessment and Management Definitions
Causes: Underlying circumstances, occurrences, and/or failures that contribute, or
could contribute, directly or indirectly, to an event.
Corrected risk: Residual risk that remains after corrective action is taken. When
highly effective corrective action is taken, residual risk is considered to be zero.
Corrective action: Any action to mitigate a safety issue.
Fleet: Aircraft, engine or propeller products of a type currently in service affected by
a certain safety issue.
Hazard: Any existing or potential condition that can lead to injury, illness or death to
people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property or damage to the
environment. A hazard is a condition that is a prerequisite to an accident or
incident.
Probability: Ratio of the number of actual occurrences to the number of possible
occurrences.
Risk: Expression of the severity and probability of an undesired event.
Severity: The consequence or impact of a hazard in terms of degree or loss or harm.
Uncorrected risk: Risk that accumulates over time in the affected fleet if no
corrective action is taken for a certain safety issue.
Ref: FAA Order 8110.107A
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
10
FAA Risk Assessment Definitions
Conditional Probability (CP): the probability that an unsafe outcome, for which an
injury ratio is known, will result from a particular condition under study. The
conditional probability is the product of the individual conditional probabilities for all
of the conditions that must occur, after the condition under study, to result in the
defined unsafe outcome.
Defect Airplanes(s) (DA): the predicted number of airplanes that would have the
subject failure if the condition under study is left undetected during the timeframe
being analyzed.
Exposed Occupants (EO): the average number of persons expected to be exposed to
fatal injury during an unsafe outcome or condition.
Frequency of Occurrence (F): the rate at which the condition under study is expected
to manifest itself within the affected fleet or sub fleet. For non-constant failure rates,
such as wear-out failures, Weibull and log-normal analysis techniques are helpful in
determining the distribution of failures over time.
Hazard Function (h(t)): the instantaneous failure rate of a unit. Hazard function is
analogous to the frequency of occurrence.
Ref: PS-ANM-25-05 FAA TARAM Handbook
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
11
FAA Risk Assessment Definitions
(con’t)
Injury Ratio (IR): the average single-event probability that those exposed to a
particular condition or outcome will suffer fatal injury.
Utilization (U): the airplane’s flight hours or flight cycles per defined-unit time period
(e.g., per day).
Not Detected (ND): the probability that an occurrence of a defect will not be
detected before the defect leads to an unsafe condition or outcome. ND is a
conditional probability, but it is defined separately because of its importance in
certain wear-out issues, such as structural fatigue.
Number of Aircraft (Σ): the number of airplanes in the affected fleet during the time
period under study.
Time Period (T): the time period over which risk is calculated. See Paragraph 4.6 for
specific guidance on time period determination.
Ref: PS-ANM-25-05 FAA TARAM Handbook
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
12
Components of Fleet Risk
(Total Uncorrected Fleet Risk)
FREQUENCY of
OCCURRENCE
(Failure Rate / Event
Rate per Hour /
Flight / Cycle)
OUTCOME
SEVERITY
RATE
FLEET
EXPOSURE
(Time, Flights,
Cycles )
NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES
(Fleet Exposure and Frequency of Occurrence)
-OR-
(90-Day and Control Program Fleet Risk)
EXPOSED
OCCUPANTS
(Passengers and
Crew)
(Injury Ratio)
OUTCOME
SEVERITY
RATE
(Injury Ratio)
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY
SEVERITY
(Probability of Outcome
Given the Occurrence)
(Weighted Events or
Number of Expected Fatalities per Outcome)
Risk
(Probability of Fatality over Time or
Number of Fatalities over Time )
Components of Individual Risk
FREQUENCY of OCCURRENCE
(Failure Rate / Event Rate per Hour / Flight / Cycle)
CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY
(Probability of Outcome
Given the Occurrence)
OUTCOME SEVERITY RATE
(Injury Ratio)
Risk
(Individual Probability of Fatal Injury per Flight Hour)
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management
Approach

Ref:
FAA TARAM
Handbook
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
13
www.marvnuss.com
TARAM Risk Assessment Equations
•
•
•
•
•
Fleet exposure: U x T x Σ
Predicted number of Occurrences: U x T x Σ x F
Severity: S = IR
Fleet Risk: R = (U x T x Σ x F) x CP x S
Individual risk: R = F x CP x S
 Individual risk: Probability of individual fatal injury per flight hour
Variants of these equations are used to determine:
• Uncorrected and corrected risk (constant rate or wear-out)
• Short term risk
U: Utilization
T: Time Period
Σ: Number of Aircraft
F: Frequency of Occurrence
S: Severity
IR: Injury Ratio
R: Risk
CP: Conditional Probability
TARAM: Transport Airplane risk Assessment Methodology
TARAM Handbook
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft SafetyRef:
Risk PS-ANM-25-05
Assessment & RiskFAA
Management
Approach 
© 2013 NuSS
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
14
Risk Assessment Case Study:
B-787 Battery Fires
Was the FAA justified in grounding the fleet?
Information sources:
• NTSB Interim Factual Report for NTSB No. DCA13IA037, March 7, 2013
• FAA special conditions No. 25-359-SC, Federal Register October 11, 2007, page 57842
• Wall Street Journal (WSJ), various dates
• Aerospace
Defense News
(ASDNews),
various
dates

An Outsider’s&Perspective
on FAA’s
Aircraft Safety
Risk Assessment
& Risk Management Approach 
© 2013 NuSS
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
15
B-787 Battery Fires Information
Timeline
 Jan. 7, 2013: APU battery event in Boston (JAL)
 Jan. 16, 2013: main battery event in-flight in Japan (ANA)
 Jan. 16, 2013: FAA issued emergency AD 2013-02-51 that grounds the fleet
Pertinent incident information
 JAL: heavy smoke and fire coming from front of battery case (3” flames)
 JAL: “intense” smoke in cabin
 ANA: burning smell and smoke in the cabin, battery malfunction similar to JAL
Fleet history as of Jan. 16, 2013
 50 airplanes in service
 Total accumulation: 51,662 hours, 18665 cycles
Certification information
 Battery vent and/or smoke (without fire) classified Hazardous
(Extremely remote, 1 x 10-7/hour)
 Battery vents smoke/fire classified Catastrophic
(Extremely improbable, 1 x 10-9/hour)
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
16
JAL JA829J APU 787-8 Battery Fire Photos
Forward face of the battery case
APU installation location with battery removed
Ref: NTSB
#DCA13IA037
Interim Factual
Report, 3/7/13
Side face of the battery case
© 2013 NuSS
Battery case with sides folded down
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
17
ANA 787-8 Main Battery Fire Photo
View into the battery case
Ref: WSJ
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
18
TARAM Risk Assessment
Frequency of Occurrence (F) = Occurrences/Fleet Exposure:
F = 2/52,000 hrs.  4x10-5/hr. (400 times greater than cert (1x10-7))
A comparison example:
• Fleet of 500 x 50 hrs/week x 50 weeks  1.25M hrs./year (.125x10-7)
• Certificated expectation of hazardous battery vent and/or smoke (without fire) no
more often than once/ 8 years for this example
TARAM: Transport Airplane risk Assessment Methodology
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
19
TARAM Risk Assessment
Conditional Probability (CP): the probability that an unsafe outcome, for which
an injury ratio is known, will result from a particular condition under study.
Per TARAM guidance, assume next failure results in a more severe
outcome
• First two battery failures could be classed as “Major” or “Minor”
• Assume next failure either “Catastrophic” or “Hazardous”
• CP = .333
(2 failures + next failure (with assumed higher severity) = 3 occurrences,
one of which is an unsafe outcome)
Severity (S): The consequence or impact of a hazard in terms of degree or loss or harm.
Severity definitions
• Catastrophic: Multiple fatalities (or fatality to all on board) usually with the loss of aircraft
• Hazardous: Multiple serious injuries; fatal injury to a relatively small number of persons (one or
two) or a hull loss without fatalities
• Major: Physical distress or injuries to persons and/or substantial damage to aircraft
• Minor: Physical discomfort to persons and/or slight damage to aircraft
• Minimal: Negligible safety effect
Ref: FAA TARAM Handbook, FAA Order 8040.4A
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
20
TARAM Risk Assessment
Injury Ratio (IR): the average single-event probability that those exposed to a
particular condition or outcome will suffer fatal injury. (IR = S)
Per TARAM guidance example, IR = 0.16 for in-flight fire
• Individual risk: R = F x CP x S
• R = (4 x 10-5/hr. ) x 0.333 x 0.16
• R  2 x 10-6/hr.
• TARAM guideline for normally accepted individual risk is R  1 x 10-7/hr.
For the scenario of a battery failure causing an individual fatality
due to a fire, the risk is 20 times higher than the TARAM guideline.
This would justify the FAA’s AD.
Ref: PS-ANM-25-05 FAA TARAM Handbook
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
21
TARAM Risk Assessment
Fleet risk: R = (U x T x Σ x F) x CP x S
R = (5 x 365 x 20 x 1000 x 4x10-5) x 0.333 x 0.16  80
Hrs./day Days/yr. Yrs.
No. A/C
Freq.
CP
S = IR
TARAM guideline for normally accepted fleet risk is R  0.02
Note: Hrs./day and years are probably low estimates
Ref: PS-ANM-25-05 FAA TARAM Handbook
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
22
TARAM Risk Assessment
Fleet risk: R = (U x T x Σ x F) x CP x S
R = (5 x 365 x 20 x 1000 x 4x10-5) x 0.333 x 0.16  80
Hrs./day Days/yr. Yrs.
No. A/C
Freq.
CP
S = IR
TARAM guideline for normally accepted fleet risk is R  0.02
90 day fleet risk: R = (U90x T x Σ90 x F) x CP x IR x EO
R = (5 x 90 x 50 x 4x10-5) x 0.333 x 0.16 x 150  7
Hrs./day Days No. A/C Freq.
CP
IR Exposed Occ’s.
TARAM guideline for normally accepted 90 day fleet risk is R  0.5
Note: Hrs./day probably a low estimate
© 2013 NuSS
Ref: PS-ANM-25-05 FAA TARAM Handbook
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
23
TARAM Risk Assessment
• It appears that risk of battery malfunctions is an unsafe condition
 Individual per hour risk (20x FAA normally accepted risk)
 Fleet risk (4000x FAA normally accepted risk)
 90 day fleet risk (10x FAA normally accepted risk)
• Assumptions appear to be reasonable
• However, “injury ratio (IR)” may be too high for the 787 scenario
 One order of magnitude less would put 90 day risk within acceptable range
From an outsider’s perspective, it appears the FAA was correct
issuing its AD. However, additional data could substantiate a reduced
injury ratio that would justify continuing operations for a short time
to allow design and installation of a mitigating risk control.
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
24
Comparison of Old and New 787 Battery
Redesign
Mitigating redesign features
•
•
•
•
•
Increased space between cells
Fireproof containment box
Vent fumes outside
Detailed pre-flight data review
Repeated in-flight status checks
Ref: WSJ 2/21/13
WSJ photo
© 2013 NuSS
Original
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment
& Risk
Management Approach 
NTSB
photo
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
25
New 787 Battery Reduces Risk
• FAA issued AD 2013-08-12 on April 26, 2013
 Mandates installation of new batteries per Boeing Service Bulletin
• Mitigating redesign features should sufficiently reduce risk





Increased space between cells
Fireproof containment box
Vent fumes outside
Detailed pre-flight data review
Repeated in-flight status checks
• If each feature reduces risk by factor or 10:
 Fleet risk goes from 80 to 0.0008
 Reduces risk to 25 times less than TARAM normally accepted fleet risk (0.02)
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
26
An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety
Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach
Summary
• RA&RM is a part of life
• Quantitative RA&RM is should be a skill of every
aircraft engineer
• FAA has a rational approach to RA&RM
 The FAA AD to ground the B-787 appears justified
 Boeing’s mitigations appear to lower risk significantly
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
27
An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety
Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach
• Questions?
• Perspectives?
Thanks for your attention!
Marv Nuss
1 + 913-962-4683
marv.nuss@marvnuss.com
www.marvnuss.com
© 2013 NuSS
 An Outsider’s Perspective on FAA’s Aircraft Safety Risk Assessment & Risk Management Approach 
 2013 Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment (Australia) Conference  Brisbane, QLD  July 23-25, 2013 
www.marvnuss.com
28