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CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
January 9, 1976
Re: No. 74-204, Mathews v. Eldridge
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in
this case.
Sincerely yours,
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST
January 12, 1976
Re: No. 74-204 -- Mathews v. Eldridge
Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely,
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Mr. Justice Powell
cc:
The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE
January 13, 1976
Re:
No. 74-204 - Mathews v. Eldridge
Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
Mr. Justice Powell
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CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN
January 14, 1976
Re: No. 74-204 - Mathews v. Eldridge
Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
J~
Mr. Justice Powell
cc:
The Conference
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CHAMB E RS Of"
January 26, 1976
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL
Re: No. 74-204 ;- -F. David Mathews v. George H. Eldridge
Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,
.._/
:/~t1 T.M.
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference
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February 19, 1976
No. 74-204 Mathews v. Eldridge
Dear Mr. Putzel:
The line-up in the above case is as follows:
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Cour~ in
which Burger, C.J., Stewart, White, Blackman, and Rehnquiat,
JJ., joined. Brennan, J: 1 J filed~ dissenting opinion, in
which Marshall, J., joiaea,
post, p.
• Stevens, J.,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
L.F.P., Jr.
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The Print Shop
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CHAMBERS OF"
THE CHIEF JUSTICE
February 19, 1976
Re:
74-204 - Mathews v. Eldridge
Dear Lewis:
I join your proposed opinion in the above.
Regards,
w(-
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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This case eema& co
~s
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on certiorari from the Court
of Appeals fqr the Fourth Circuit.
It presents a question of what process is
disability benefits are terminated.
~e~hen
Under the Social
Security Act, a worker receiving such
benefits~has
burden of showing continuous~disability.
the
When disability
is put in issue, l as it was with respect to respondent,;'
regulations of the Secretary of HEW/ prescribe an elaborate
administrative review procedure.
But this procedure does not include ~n oral evidentiary
~ ;q~spondent
hearing prior to termination of benefits .
I
challenged the validity of the procedure by a suit in
~
the federal district court.
That court, relying on
th~
Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, held that such a
hearing was constitutionally required.
The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
The decision whether to discontinue disability
benefit, lnormally turns upon documented medical evidence.
The issue of disability tRerei9~ is a focused~and limited
one.
Prior to termination of benefits, the claimant
2.
is given access to the
governme~t
file/
and t .o the reasons
for the tentative decision to discontinue.
also / is afforded an
I.
and arguments.
The claimant
opportunity/=~bmit ~dditional
u-~ ~
Following discontinuance
c.
evidence
.#,
there is a right
to an oral evidentiary hearing ~nd ultimately to judicial
review before the denial
beco~s
In view of the nature of the
final.
inquiry ~and
the care-
fully strus tured system for administrative review; lwe find
no deprivation of procedural due process.
Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Chief Justice, and Justices Stewart, White,
Blackmun and Rehnquist have joined the opinion of the
Court.
--
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Mr. Justice Marshall has joined.
Mr. Justice
Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
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MEMORANDUM
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TO:
Greg Palm
FROM:
'II•~'
~ ·~·
March 2, 1976
;i!':;,.;:•
Powell, Jr. /
Holds for No. 74-204 Mathews v. Eldridge
I agree with your recommendations in the draft of a
memorandum to the Conference, but - as you anticipated
the memorandum is much too long.
See what you can do to summarize the presentations on
on Mattern and Frost.
These should be reduced at least .,;:
some 50% to conform to what is customarily presented.
r
We may assume that most of the Justices have cert memos
in their offices on these cases.
be summary and conciusory.
most.
ss
Thus, our presentation can
Our recommendation is what counts
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CHAMB E R S OF
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .
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March 3, 1976
Cases held for No. 74-204, Mathews v. Eldridge
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Two cases currently are being held for Eldrid~e and
one for Eldridge and Norton v. Mathews, No. 74-621 .
1.
No. 74-205, Mathews v. Williams
This case presents the same issue as Eldridge. The
state agency notified respondent that since her disability
had ceased her social security benefits would be terminated.
Respondent demanded a pre-termination evidentiary hearing,
and she brought this action when none was granted. DC and
CAS held, relying on the DC decision in Eldridge, that an
evidentiary hearing is required prior to termination of
benefits. I will vote to grant, vacate and remand in light
of Eldridge.
2.
No. 75-649 Mathews v. Mattern [held for Eldridge
and Norton]
Respondent, a recipient of disabled widows' benefits under
§ 402(e)(l)(B)(ii) of the Social Security Act, was erroneously
paid $1,063.80 by the Social Security Administration (SSA). There
is a dispute whether the SSA notified her by telephone, prior to
receipt of the payment, that she should return it. Several months
later the SSA notified her by letter that future benefits would
be reduced until the overpayment had been recouped. Respondent
was further informed that she was entitled to contest the
finding of overpayment or to request the Secretary to "waive"
the overpayment if she was not at fault in receiving it and
recoupment would cause her severe financial hardship or be
unfair for some other reason. Petitioner requested reconsideration of the recoupment decision, and the SSA affirmed its
- 2 -
initial determination. Although her monthly benefits were then
reduced, respondeqt was thereafter entitled to an evidentiary
hearing, as well as administrative and judicial review.
Meanwhile (after the reconsideration request, but prior
to decision), respondent filed this class action, contending
that the procedures for recovering overpayments violated due
process since they do not afford claimants a prerecoupment
oral hearing. The DC concluded that it has jurisdiction under
the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, declared the recoupment
procedures unconstitutional and enjoined the Secretary from
recovering overpayments until after a hearing. CA3 affirmed,
but remanded for a more limited order that would require a
prior oral hearing only where the Secretary's decision might
turn on the credibility of witnesses.
Under Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) and
Eldridge there is jurisdiction over respondent's constitutional
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) only with respect to those
members of the class who disputed a recoupment decision that
occurred within 60 days of the filing of this action. Since
Norton will make clear that there is no basis for jurisdiction
here other than§ 405(g), the case probably should continue
to be held for that decision.
On the merits the case is not necessarily controlled by
Eldridge. CA3 has limited the orerecoupment hearing right
to cases in which issues of credibility may be important in
the decision, but this requirement will be triggered in a
substantial number of cases. Moreover, under the current
procedures the recipient may personally discuss his case with
officials at the SSA office. Finally, the extent of the
potential deprivation implicated by a reduction in benefits
is less than the total cutoff at issue in Eldrid.~. On the
other hand, this case differs from Eldridge in that issues
of credibility will play a significant role in the agency
decision. Accordingly, I will vote to hold for Norton and
then to grant, vacate, and remand in light of Salfi,
Eldridge and Norton.
3.
No. 75-5220 Frost v. Mathews
Petitioners are the mother and legitimate children of a
deceased wage earner receiving mother's and surviving children's
benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 202. Two other children claim to
be illegitimate offspring. The Secretary determined that
they are illegitimate children of the wage earner and notified
- 3 -
the petitioners that their future payments would be reduced
by the amounts to be paid to the illegitimate children.
Under the Secretary's procedures, after the current
beneficiaries are notified they may submit additional evidence
challenging the determination. If the current beneficiary's
protest is rejected he is so notified, and the benefit payments are adjusted as of the first month after the decision.
He has a right to petition for reconsideration, to an
evidentiary hearing, to administrative appeal, and to judicial
review.
Petitioners apparently did not protest but instead
sought reconsideration and a hearing. Meanwhile the SSA
reduced their benefits. They then filed this class action
seeking an injunction against such reductions until after an
evidentiary hearing and requiring that past reductions be
restored. Petitioners lost their administrative hearing and
the government moved for dismissal on several grounds, including
mootness. The DC certified the class and granted declaratory
relief requiring pre-reduction hearings.
CA2 held that there was mandamus jurisdiction over the
suit (the decision pre-dated Salfi). It also held that the
case was not moot due to the presence of the members of the
class other than the named plaintiffs. Although the class
action was not declared until after the case had arguably
become moot as to petitioners, CA2 pointed to n. 11 in Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) and permitted certification to
relate back to the time when the DC deferred its ruling on the
question. On the merits CA2 reversed distinguishing Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) on three grounds:
(1) This
case involved a reduction, not a termination of benefits.
(2) Survivor benefits are not necessarily the recipient's
only resource - if income falls below subsistence, welfare
may be available. (3) Although the government makes payments
in excess of the family maximum during the short period
allowed for protest, it indicates that such payments might
not be made during the longer period until decision after
an evidentiary hearing. Thus, in striking the appropriate
due process balance, the weights against requiring a prereduction hearing include the interest of the illegitimate
children in immediate payments.
Under Salfi, Eldridge and Norton the class is limited
to those persons who contested a decision to reduce their
benefits that occurred within 60 days of the filing of this
action. Assuming that there exist such persons, it is my
- 4 -
view that Sosna supports § 405(g) jurisdiction here.
Although the Conference may want to remand to ascertain
whether any such persons exist, I think it quite likely
that they do. On the merits CA2's holding is consistent
with Eldridge. Accordingly, I will vote to deny.
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