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The Timing of Split-Ticket Voting
Decisions in Mixed Systems: Evidence
from South Korea
Timothy S. Rich
a
a
Department of Political Science, Western Kentucky University,
Bowling Green, Kentucky
To cite this article: Timothy S. Rich (2012): The Timing of Split-Ticket Voting Decisions in Mixed
Systems: Evidence from South Korea, Asian Journal of Political Science, 20:2, 203-220
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Asian Journal of Political Science
Vol. 20, No. 2, August 2012, pp. 203220
The Timing of Split-Ticket Voting
Decisions in Mixed Systems: Evidence
from South Korea
Timothy S. Rich
Although two-vote mixed legislative systems have proliferated globally, the factors
contributing to split-ticketing in these cases remains poorly understood. Using survey
data regarding South Korea’s 2008 National Assembly election, this article addresses two
questions: Is ticket-splitting in two-vote legislative systems influenced by the timing of
one’s vote decision and are late deciders more or less rational in their decision to ticketsplit than early deciders? Empirical analysis finds that split-ticket voting under various
specifications is more likely to be carried out by late deciders. Among split-ticket voters,
however, late deciders are more likely to irrationally split their vote.
Keywords: Mixed Member Systems; Split-Ticket Voting; Strategic Voting; Personal Vote;
South Korea
Introduction
Voting is the cornerstone of any democracy as it connects the governed to the
government, providing an institutionalized means of accountability. While acknowledging that voters often are not particularly knowledgeable about politics, scholars
still assume that voters have a basic knowledge of the electoral system and vote
according to their interests. However, evidence in multiple contexts shows voters
choosing different parties for different offices, with their choices ideologically often
opposed to one another. Two-vote mixed legislative systems provide a distinct
context in which to split one’s vote, this time for the same basic office, providing for
two outcomes among ticket-splitters: strategic voting among like-minded parties and
what would be viewed as irrational by choosing ideological adversaries.
Timothy S. Rich is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, Western Kentucky University,
Bowling Green, Kentucky. Correspondence to: Timothy S. Rich, Department of Political Science, Grise Hall 300,
Western Kentucky University, 1906 College Heights Blvd. #11060, Bowling Green, KY 42101-1060, USA. E-mail:
timothy.rich@wku.edu
ISSN 0218-5377 (print)/ISSN 1750-7812 (online) # 2012 Asian Journal of Political Science
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2012.714134
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204 T. S. Rich
This article addresses two questions: how can we measure split-ticketing separate
from personal voting or party nomination decisions and, are late deciders more or
less rational in their decision to ticket-split than early deciders? In two-vote mixed
legislative systems both votes are for the same legislative chamber: one vote for a
single member district (SMD) and one for a party list determined by proportional
representation (PR). Such mixed systems have proliferated in the past 20 years with
much having been written about strategic voting in comparison to pure majoritarian
or proportional systems. Furthermore, the research on mixed systems seldom
attempts to glean insights from the broader literature on ticket-splitting which refers
to splits across different offices (e.g. the US Presidency and Congress).
Evidence from South Korea’s 2008 National Assembly election provides a unique
means to analyze split-ticketing. Although this election was considered by some to be
a realigning election, the results remain consistent with a general trend in Korean
politics towards two-party dominated elections. Seats were allocated to 245 singlemember districts with an additional 54 seats allocated by a national list in which
parties must receive at least 3% of the vote for representation. As the second election
under a two-vote system (and the sixth under a mixed system), one presumes that
much of the electorate had a basic familiarity with the system, even as a third to half
of those polled within a month of the election claimed to not understand the system.
For those supportive of smaller parties, strategic voting through ticket-splitting is
expected under this system, but a further elaboration of the factors motivating ticketsplitting in mixed systems remains unclear.
Disaggregating the factors influencing ticket-splitting is possible using the 2008
General Election Panel Survey from the East Asia Institute (EAI; East Asia Institute,
2008) as this survey asks about the timing of one’s vote decision. Secondly, it includes
a question asking for the rationale behind vote-splitting. Such questions are rare in
surveys related to mixed legislative systems and should give greater insight into
straight and rational split-ticket voting. Finally, it includes information on individual
vote choices, ideology, and the demographics necessary to compare any analysis with
the existing work on strategic voting. This analysis thus provides two contributions:
the ability to separate types of split-ticketing (e.g. personal votes vs the absence of a
party candidate) and to determine whether the timing of one’s decision to ticket-split
correlates with notions of rational vote maximization.
This article is divided into four parts. First the literature on mixed systems
and beyond is assessed to gain insight into rationales for split-ticketing. Next is a
theoretical argument regarding split-ticketing as a response to uncertainty and how
this is affected by the time of the election is presented. An introduction to the South
Korean case follows. Finally, a statistical analysis of post-election survey data from
2008 provides evidence that those who decide on their vote closer to the election
are more likely to split their votes, while, among split-ticketers, late deciders are
more likely to split for reasons beyond traditional conceptions of rational strategic
voting.
Asian Journal of Political Science
205
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Mixed Legislative Systems
Mixed legislative systems*those allocating seats in one legislative chamber using at
least two formulas*have proliferated in the past 20 years, where previously Germany
was one of only a few democracies to employ such a hybrid. While many variations
exist, most today are a combination of SMDs paired with a party list tier allocated at
the national or regional levels.1 These hybrid institutions provide challenges in testing
the impact of institutions on voter behavior. Initially proponents saw these systems as
‘the best of both worlds’, allowing for a form of natural laboratory where both tiers
were expected to behave independently (Lancaster and Patterson, 1990; Moser, 1995,
1997; Moser and Scheiner, 2005; Reed, 1999; Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001;
Stratmann and Baur, 2002). For example, the mechanical effects of only one winner
in SMDs coupled with the psychological effect of voters hesitant to waste their vote
on a non-viable candidate are expected to lead to two-party competition in district
races, as Duverger (1954) predicted in winner-take-all majoritarian systems. The
closer that these races are, the less that voters are willing to risk wasting their
SMD vote, whether in mixed or in pure majoritarian systems (Alvarez and Nagler,
2000; Karp et al., 2002). In contrast, the proportional tier encourages multi-party
competition and largely sincere voting for one’s preferred party, with strategic voting
limited to those who support parties unlikely to clear the electoral threshold of party
list representation.2
In practice, the tiers in many mixed systems appear to interact, creating a
contamination effect, usually in the form of additional district candidates whom
voters do not abandon (Ferrara et al., 2005; Herron and Nishikawa, 2001; Mizusaki
and Mori, 1998). Sartori (1997: 7475) sees questionable utility in the combination,
referring to mixed system construction as a potentially ‘bastard-producing hybrid’.
Furthermore, whether this interaction boosts votes for the party list remains unclear
(see Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Karp, 2009; Maeda, 2008). Analyzing Korea’s 2004
National Assembly election, Choi (2006) found that the party list vote increased by
15% for the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) in areas in which they also ran a district
candidate. Regardless, as voters and parties react to two sets of rules for one legislative
body, one presumes the decision calculus inherent in one of the tiers influences the
other.
Part of this contamination is attributable to how the tiers are linked. In mixed
member proportional (MMP) systems (e.g. Germany, New Zealand) the tiers are
linked, requiring overall proportionality of the outcome, even if this requires
adding seats due to parties’ disproportionate success in district competition. As
such, determining the utility of an individual vote complicates and likely reduces
instances of strategic voting resulting in a greater sincere district vote (Reynolds
et al., 2005). In contrast, parties in mixed member majoritarian (MMM) systems,
where no linking function exists, realize they essentially lose a seat if they cannot
win an SMD and thus have a greater incentive to coordinate with like-minded
parties (Federico and Herron, 2005). Still, even among MMM a larger percentage of
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206 T. S. Rich
the district vote goes to third-party candidates than one would see in a pure
majoritarian system.
While we know more today about how the mechanics of mixed systems influence
the number of parties, the factors influencing ticket-splitting remain under analyzed.
McAllister and White (2000) see ticket-splitting as a measure of weak party
attachment in mixed systems. Considering that many mixed systems produce a
multitude of parties, some with short life spans, voter loyalty or even knowledge of
party platforms is assumed to be limited. In Korea, for example, parties have
historically split and merged frequently, with a slow progression towards two-party
competition only in the past decade. Under the first election in a mixed system,
especially if this coincides with democratization (as in the case in several postcommunist examples), one expects that voters only have vague notions of where
parties place on any sort of ideological spectrum. Over time, voters are expected to
build a basic understanding of where the parties align (even if splits and mergers
occur) and vote within the coalition closest to their own ideological proclivities.
Whether in newer or more established mixed systems, the assumption remains that
split-ticketing is a deliberate strategic act, intended to maximize one’s influence on the
election. Moser and Scheiner (2005) defined strategic vote as voting for an alternative
to one’s first preference in order to alter the expected election results towards a more
favorable outcome. As such, split-ticketing requires some level of comprehension of
the system, as voting a straight ticket requires far less attention to mechanical
incentives or anticipating the viability of candidates and parties. Furthermore,
supporters of larger parties rarely have any incentive to split their votes, with the
parties themselves not encouraging such actions either as it is rarely in their interest to
do so. The only caveat for larger parties encouraging ticket-splitting would be to
ensure seats to a traditional coalitional partner. In Japan, for example, the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) regularly coordinates with the Komeito, as the latter, with
support widely dispersed across the country, can reasonably secure 10,00020,000
votes within many districts. The two parties thus commonly coordinate in district
competitions while running separate lists. Absent such coordination, one expects
ticket-splitting to be limited to those supportive of smaller parties.
Rates of splitting vary greatly among mixed systems, as seen in the first two
waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (Table 1), which asked
respondents about their district and party list vote.3 With the exception of
Hungary, a fifth to over a third of respondents split their vote.4 Additional evidence
for Korea from the 2004 EAI post-election survey, as well as analyses from Lee
(2004) and Park (2005), suggest ticket-splitting ranging from 10%33%.5 Park and
Ryu (2009) estimate split-ticketing in 2008 at 40.8%.
These aggregate results unfortunately give little insight into what is fundamentally
an individual act. Besides the size of parties and partisan support varying by country,
the rationales behind splitting one’s vote are not uniform. Respondents may not have
necessarily intended to split their vote, as voters are limited by the decisions of parties
to choose to run candidates in both the district and the list (Burden, 2009; Hirano,
Asian Journal of Political Science
207
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Table 1. Self-Reported Rates of Split-Ticket Voting
Germany 1998
Germany 2002a
Germany 2005
Hungary 1998
Hungary 2002
Japan 1996
Korea 2004
Korea 2008
New Zealand 1996
New Zealand 2002
25.38
27.25
29.75
14.68
8.73
30.24
20.81
37.59
38.46
38.31
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).
Notes: aThis is the split-ticket response rate from the mail-back survey. The
telephone survey, also included in CSES, had a 20.05% rate of split-ticketing.
2006). Voters often reward a district candidate who is not from their preferred party,
casting a personal vote (Cain et al., 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Fenno, 1978).
Karp et al. (2002), for example, view split-voting in New Zealand as highly
predictable, in terms of a combination of strategic voting and personal votes for
popular district candidates. A general ignorance of the system potentially also
produces ticket-splitting, yet the prevalence of such ignorance has not been
empirically verified. For example, evidence in Germany suggests ignorance of how
the two tiers interact (Roberts, 1988; Schoen, 1999: 492), but does not delve into
ticket-splitting specifically. Unpacking the motivation for ticket-splitting thus
remains necessary.
Split-Ticketing: Insight Beyond Mixed Systems
Most of the literature on ticket-splitting in mixed systems thus relies on expectations
of strategic actions by voters if not parties themselves, potentially missing insights
from the broader literature on split-ticketing. Admittedly, the broader research
reflects a fundamentally different context*generally offices at different levels of
government*but the findings in other contexts can be used to influence a more
systematic study of the factors at play in strategic voting in cases of mixed systems.
In the US, split-ticketing emerged largely with the introduction of the Australian
ballot (Rusk, 1970). Academic interest arose regarding the difference in popular vote
among presidents and their party colleagues; for example, how Eisenhower fared far
better than his Republican congressional counterparts (Campbell and Miller, 1957).
Evidence of such ticket-splitting was rare in the US prior to World War II, with
growing rates of a split regarding presidential and congressional candidates in most
elections since. Early works debated whether split-ticketing was a sign of motivation
or indifference, while presuming that party-oriented voters chose a straight ticket
(Campbell and Miller, 1957). The UK also saw split-ticketing largely confined to
the least partisan (Rallings and Thrasher, 2003). Fiorina (1992) proposed that
splitting could be a sign of limited trust in either party and a means of balancing.
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208 T. S. Rich
Such balancing also could be seen in voting for different parties at the national and
local levels in the late 1960s in Israel, although a multitude of parties (17 national
and 13 local in Tel Aviv for example) makes balancing far more complex (Arian and
Weiss, 1969).
A preference for divided government is also commonly claimed in the US (Alesina
and Rosenthal, 1995; Ladd, 1990; Sigelman et al., 1997: 880), yet minimal evidence
exists of this motivating split-ticketing (Mebane, 2000: 51). Jacobson (1992) argues
that instead of balancing, voters look for different things from a president and a
house member (national interests vs district benefits). Such a distinction seems
particularly relevant to a mixed system in which the two tiers ostensibly have different
primary functions (the district vote for local representation and the PR vote for
national polls), even if actions within parliament (e.g. roll call voting) are similar.
Attitudinal and demographic factors also influence ticket-splitting (Campbell and
Miller, 1957; Devries and Tarrance, 1972), usually suggesting that the more educated
will be more sophisticated voters. Campbell and Miller (1957) saw split-ticketing
disproportionately among the least educated in the US, although it has become more
widespread over time. Early works assumed voters under ‘cross pressures’ lead
citizens to be less likely to vote (Berelson et al., 1954: 200; Campbell et al., 1960; for
a counter, see Pool et al., 1965: 76). One further expects that as the strength of
partisan attachments declines, ticket-splitting will be more prevalent (Beck et al.,
1992). Mattei and Howes (2000), however, find ticket-splitting aligned more with
incumbency and cross-pressures than partisan evaluations. In sum, the broader
literature on split-ticketing suggests potential control variables applicable to mixed
systems as well.
Timing in the Decision Calculus
I contend that while strategic factors certainly come into play in two-vote mixed
systems, broader attitudinal factors also influence decision-making. Some literatures
suggest confusion about how two-vote systems ultimately lead to seat allocation
affecting participation (see, for example Jesse, 1988; Schoen, 1999). In contrast, I
suggest a more a nuanced interaction where voters attempt to anticipate the results in
a complex environment and how to maximize their influence. For those uncertain
about how their preferences align with anticipated results, hedging one’s bets by ticketsplitting would be expected. This conflicts with Cox and Schoppa (1998), who argue
that when confused, ‘sticky voting’ occurs in which voters opt for a straight ticket.6
I suggest that the timing of one’s decision is intimately tied to whether one casts a
straight or split ticket. With additional campaign messages, undecided or confused
voters attempt to navigate the intricacies of a mixed system. Conversely, citizens
inclined to split their vote for strategic reasons have reasons to wait as well, to
determine the viability of their choices and whether splitting will maximize their
influence. Smaller parties in particular are presumed to encourage strategic voting,
realizing that their limited resources are best suited in maximizing party list seats
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Asian Journal of Political Science
209
than running what amounts to marginal candidates in most district races.
Meanwhile, supporters of smaller parties must determine whether their district
support for the party’s candidate is a wasted vote or not (Gschwend, 2007; Moser and
Scheiner, 2005), potentially using media clues to ultimately decide upon defection or
voting sincerely (Johnston and Pattie, 2002).
Parties often reveal their coalitional preferences well in advance (e.g. Germany),
but even absent this information, voters generally have some expectation of who
could and could not be part of the ruling coalition. If voters are instead waiting for
additional cues, then split-ticket voters should be rather predictable in their actions,
opting to vote within traditional coalitions if not voting for a large party in a district
and their preferred smaller party on the party list. Controlling for other factors, as the
campaign continues, partisan voters presumably are less likely to be swayed, leaving
those most detached as undecided. Evidence from US presidential races shows that
late deciders (those who choose in the last two weeks of campaigning) are less
predictable, with their choice appearing more random in character. The same is
expected here. Having no clear ideological bent, these voters should be the most likely
to vote in balance, preserving a notion of being ideologically independent while
reducing the likelihood that both of their votes will be for parties not in power.
Since the primary interest in this analysis is whether the timing of one’s decision
correlates with split-ticketing, one needs to control for factors presumed to also
influence such actions. Evidence in other two-vote systems suggests that third-party
supporters, either on their own initiative or due to their respective parties’ campaign
efforts, appear more knowledgeable about the mechanics of mixed systems. Panel
data from the Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University (NCCU)
leading up to Taiwan’s 2008 Legislative Yuan election (the first under a mixed
system), shows that supporters of the People’s First Party (PFP), Taiwan Solidarity
Union (TSU), and New Party (NP) all registered higher rates of understanding the
basic aspects of their new mixed system (electoral threshold, number of votes, term
length) than supporters of the two largest parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Cursory evidence suggests a similar knowledge
of the mechanical effects among smaller parties in Korea.
Two contextual factors also require consideration. First, a voter may split their
votes across parties due to an appeal from a local candidate. Incumbents in particular
traditionally develop a personal vote (Born, 1994) instead of relying solely on the
party label. Secondly, split-ticketing may occur when a voter’s preferred party fails
to run candidates in both tiers. Small parties often lack the resources to run
candidates in every district, opting instead to concentrate on the party list. Even
larger parties may fail to run candidates in every district, either due to the dominance
of another party or out of deference to a coalitional partner. In both contexts, the
decision calculus behind vote-splitting may fail to correspond with expectations of
strategic voting.
Differences in gender, age, education, and income also potentially influence ticketsplitting, either in identifying strategic opportunities or due to parties targeting
210 T. S. Rich
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particular demographics. Finally, the role of ideology potentially influences ticketsplitting as well, with those at the extremes presumably less likely to vote strategically.
Controlling for party and demographic factors, while imperfect, should provide
greater means to assess timing in the decision-making calculus.
With this framework in mind, I intend to test the following hypotheses:
H1: Voters supportive of smaller parties and those who decide on their vote closer to the
election will be more likely to engage in split-ticketing.
H2: Among those who split their votes, the later a voter decides on their vote choice, the
greater likelihood that their split-ticketing will cross traditional coalitional lines.
The South Korean Context
From democratization in 1988 to 2008, South Korea had six National Assembly
elections under three different mixed system formulas, all variations of MMM. For
1988 and 1992, a one-vote system was in place where the district vote was of primary
importance. In addition, the party list remained highly disproportional, with one
third to one half of the seats automatically going to the party that won the most
district races. For 1996 and 2000, a one-vote system continued, but the party list was
allocated proportionally to those clearing the 3% threshold. District votes were
aggregated to allocate party list seats. As such, the expectation was for supporters of
smaller parties to strategically vote for often non-viable district candidates in order to
ensure at least minimal representation through the party list. Only in 2004, after the
Constitutional Court ruled against the one-vote system, did Korea implement the
more common two-vote variety. This finally allowed one to avoid wasting a district
vote while still giving support to one’s preferred party in the party list. Unlike the
two-vote systems of Japan, Germany, and New Zealand, where candidates can appear
in both tiers, dual listing is prohibited in Korea.7 While two large parties increasingly
dominate Korean politics, smaller parties endure. Furthermore, similar to party
competition in Taiwan, the traditional coalitional boundaries largely separate left and
right leaning parties, with limited evidence of voters splitting across coalitional lines.
Aggregate level election results suggest strategic voting in Korea, consistent with an
adequate understanding of electoral mechanisms. As the two largest parties, the
United Democratic Party (UDP)8 and Grand National Party (GNP) both obtained
more district seats than the party list. In contrast, smaller parties would be expected
to fare better on the party list. The Democratic Labor Party (DLP), for example,
surprised observers in 2004 by winning 10 seats, eight of which were in the party list.
In 2008 the DLP again won two district seats and four from the party list (Table 2).
Similarly, in 2008, a rift within the GNP led one faction to bolt to form the Pro-Park
Alliance (PPA), running their own party list and candidates in select districts. Like the
DLP, the PPA found greater success on the party list, securing eight seats compared to
six from constituency seats. The Creative Korea Party (CKP) also managed to secure
two of their three seats on the party list. Of parties beyond the big two, only the
Liberty Forward Party (LFP), a regionally based party, garnered more district seats
than party seats, although the party list still garnered more votes than the districts in
Asian Journal of Political Science
211
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Table 2. Party Representation by Tier in the 2008 National Assembly Election
Grand National Party (GNP)
Liberty Forward Party (LFP)
Pro-Park Alliance (PPA)
United Democratic Party (UDP)
Creative Korea Party (CKP)
Democratic Labor Party (DLP)
New Progressive Party (NPP)
Independents
SMD
PR
131
14
6
66
1
2
0
25
22
4
8
15
2
4
0
n/a
aggregate. Meanwhile, the New Progressive Party (NPP), while failing to clear the 3%
threshold, garnered twice as many votes on the party list. District results also suggest
strategic voting, as competition largely coalesced around the top two candidates, with
an average of 86.75% of the district vote.
Further evidence on whether the public understands the mixed system does not
suggest widespread or enduring ignorance among most citizens. A 2008 poll by the
National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr) found 49.8% stating they did
not understand the mixed system a month before the election, the second under a
two-vote system. Another NEC survey just days before the election found this rate to
drop to 36.4%, still alarming if misunderstanding the system leads to citizen demands
not being reflected properly in a representative democracy. The surveys, however, did
not distinguish between those likely versus unlikely to vote, as the latter may have
little interest in developing a greater understanding of the system.
An additional though imperfect means to tap into understanding is to identify the
disparity in the number of total ballots in each tier in aggregate data. Some variation
is expected; for example, if a voter does not have a preferred choice in a tier because
the party fails to slate a candidate or a party list. A cursory examination of aggregate
tier deviation, however, follows expectations with little variation.9 For example, in
Korea in 2004 there were 44,786 more district ballots submitted than party list seats
in an election with over 21 million votes in each tier, a difference in turnout rates of
less than 0.12% between tiers. In the 2008 Korean election, 81,153 more district
ballots were counted out of over 17 million votes in each tier. The Korean rates are
consistent with rates seen in other mixed systems, with only three examples of a
discrepancy of 1% or more.10 Based on existing evidence then, we assume that
Koreans have a basic grasp of the system and thus will vote to maximize their
influence, voting a straight ticket if preferring the UDP or GNP, and splitting their
ticket if preferring a smaller party.
Any discussion of Korean electoral politics eventually turns to the influence of
regionalism, even if its influence appears to be on the decline. With roots in the Three
Kingdoms Era (Hermanns, 2004; Nahm, 1993), regionalism’s salience in electoral
politics has a more recent history, as every Korean president from Park Chung Hee to
Kim Young Sam (19621998) was from the Yeongnam region in the southeast.
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212 T. S. Rich
Accordingly, each president prioritized economic development of their home region
at the expense of the southwest region of Honam, fomenting opposition even during
the authoritarian era. Such prioritization shifted with the election of Honam native
Kim Dae Jung in 1998; however, the saliency of regionalism remained evident in
district elections where virtually all districts in Honam were won by progressive
parties while conservative parties had a similar dominance in Yeongnam. As Korea
gradually moved towards a two-party dominated system, both the UDP and GNP
made in-roads into regional strongholds, yet the common perception remains that
regionalism characterizes the electoral competition in the country.
Analysis
The 2008 General Election Panel Survey identifies a split-ticketing rate of 34.82%
when limited to just the seven parties articulated by name in both tiers, the same as in
Table 2. Admittedly, this may underestimate splitting considering the traditional bias
in recalling one’s vote choice (e.g. Wright, 1993), but is consistent with other survey
estimates from the year. In terms of why people split their vote, the most common
response (25.66%) was that it was due to liking the district candidate, thus evidence
of a personal vote. The lack of a party district candidate was the second most
common response (18.42%). Meanwhile, roughly another quarter combined stated it
was to strengthen the ruling party (9.54%) or the opposition (16.45%). Finally,
17.43% stated their preference for a minority party to receive PR representation.11
Of particular importance for this study is when voters decided upon their vote. The
EAI survey asks when respondents made their choice: on voting day (1), twothree
days prior (2), less than a week prior (3), a week ago (4), a month ago (5), or more
than a month ago (6). To ease interpretation, the order of this variable was flipped so
that the timing is in chronological order. Figure 1 shows the distribution of this time
divided by straight and split tickets. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirms a statistical
significance in the difference in distribution at the 0.001 level. As expected, splitticketers decide closer to the election than their straight ticket counterparts. As
strategic voting requires more information (e.g. the viability of candidates) and
previous evidence suggests that information affects strategic voting (e.g. Karp et al.,
2002), voters that wait to decide their vote choice should be more likely to vote
strategically. Yet the same pattern would also be expected where voters are confused
or disengaged with the electoral process, waiting not out of strategic calculation but a
more general sense of not understanding the mixed system or the ramifications of the
two votes.
A simple bivariate probit model on ticket-splitting among the seven parties
identified by name finds that the longer a person waited to decide on their vote the
more likely they would be to split their ticket, significant at the 0.001 level. The
pseudo R2 reached only 0.0257, evidence that timing alone does not account for
much of the variance in ticket-splitting. To better analyze ticket-splitting, three more
advanced specifications were tested (Table 3). The first uses the same binary
Asian Journal of Political Science
Split Ticket
Density
.1
0
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.2
.3
Straight Ticket
213
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
Timing of Vote Decision
Figure 1. Distribution of the Timing of Voting Decision
dependent variable as the bivariate model and includes all voters. The second
removes a category of split-voters, the unintentional splitters whose preferred party
failed to run a district candidate, and will be referred to as Ticket-Splitters By Choice.
The third excludes unintentional splitters and those who claimed to vote for a district
candidate based on a personal vote, thus trying to limit the cases to where splitting is
for reasons other than situation or fondness for a district candidate. This category
will be referred to as Ticket-Splitters Beyond Personal Vote. The main independent
variable of interest remains the amount of time between the election and the
respondent’s decision on whom to vote. To control for partisanship, and under the
assumption that voters vote sincerely in the party list, variables for six of the parties
are included (leaving the GNP as the base). The respondent’s ideology (on a 010
liberalconservative scale) is also included as a control, as well as the two regions
traditionally associated with regional voting in Korea: Honam (the southeast) and
Yeongnam (the southwest). Finally, demographic controls for age, education, gender,
and monthly income are included.
As expected, as the election loomed near, late deciders were more likely to split
their vote among two parties, significant at the 0.001 level. Meanwhile, controls for
each party were positively correlated with ticket-splitting, at 0.001 for the smaller
parties and only 0.05 for the UDP. While ticket-splitting is expected among smaller
parties, the positive coefficient for the UDP runs counter to theoretical expectations.
Even after controlling for partisan support, timing remained a significant factor
in ticket-splitting. When the model is restricted to ‘Ticket-Splitters By Choice’
214 T. S. Rich
Table 3. Correlations of Ticket-Splitting
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Model 1
Decision time
Prvote PPA
Prvote NPP
Prvote CKP
Prvote LFP
Prvote DLP
Prvote UDP
Self ideology
Honam
Yeongnam
Age
Education
Female
Income
Constant
N
Pseudo R2
Model 2
Model 3
Coef.
SE
Coef.
SE
Coef.
SE
0.1278***
1.7409***
2.2339***
2.7296***
1.3218***
1.2707***
0.3186*
0.0019
0.3969
0.1904
0.0065
0.0629
0.0865
0.0004
2.1949**
856
0.3074
0.0348
0.1599
0.2559
0.3124
0.2078
0.2066
0.1409
0.0271
0.2313
0.1232
0.0046
0.0837
0.1063
0.0287
0.4828
0.1314***
1.6592***
2.0333***
2.562***
1.1654***
1.1314***
0.2472
0.0152
0.3718
0.2634*
0.0073
0.0564
0.0921
0.0028
2.2906**
802
0.2708
0.0362
0.1648
0.2742
0.3344
0.2178
0.2168
0.1442
0.0279
0.2389
0.1299
0.0048
0.0856
0.1096
0.0298
0.4998
0.1127**
1.8892***
2.1724***
2.7748***
1.3642***
1.137***
0.4251*
0.0024
0.2278
0.3591*
0.0098
0.0228
0.1234
0.0272
2.4697
726
0.3046
0.0416
0.1904
0.3048
0.3637
0.2400
0.2544
0.1663
0.0313
0.2472
0.1535
0.0054
0.0961
0.1251
0.0347
0.5667
Notes: ***p B 0.001, **p B 0.01, *p B 0.05.
(Model 2), similar results emerge. Again, the later one’s decision, the more likely one
is to split their ticket, while the five smaller parties correlate with higher rates of
splitting. Meanwhile, Yeongnam, the regional stronghold of the GNP, negatively
correlates with ticket-splitting at the 0.05 level. Finally, the most restrictive model
(Model 3) shows consistent results, although the time variable falls to the 0.01 level of
significance.
Models with additional controls were also tested, but registered little substantive or
statistical difference. Evidence from American politics suggests greater split-ticketing
in cities versus rural areas, but a dummy variable for urban areas failed to reach
significance in any test. While Honam and Yeongnam are most closely associated with
regional voting, the Chungcheong region has at times exhibited similar patterns,
including being the home district of the Liberty First Party (LFP). The inclusion of this
regional variable failed to reach significance either. A measurement of the ideological
difference between the respondent and the main two parties (assuming ticket-splitters
fell in between)12 also fails to reach significance. Finally, two separate measurements of
ideological moderates were tested with the assumption that those near the ideological
center may be willing to split their votes, rationally or otherwise. The first measure
employed a dummy variable for those who identified in the center of the 11-point
scale (4, 5, 6). The second measure identified distance from the ideological center (5),
ranging from 1 (those at the center) to 6 (those identified as 0 or 10). These additions
failed to reach significance or substantively alter the previous findings.
Since probit models are non-linear, predicted probabilities were generated for each
model holding all but the decision time at the mean. Figure 2 shows that in each
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Asian Journal of Political Science
215
model as the election looms closer one’s likelihood of ticket-splitting increased. The
predicted rate of ticket-splitting between the extremes (deciding over a month in
advance versus the day of the election) more than doubles under each model (0.2027
to 0.4234 among all voters, 0.1625 to 0.3717 among ‘Ticket-Splitters By Choice’, and
0.1063 to 0.2473 among ‘Ticket-Splitters Beyond Personal Vote’). Even between the
last two time periods (twothree days before the election versus the day of the
election) we see a 3%5% predicted increase in splitting, consistent with theoretical
expectations. Furthermore, while predicted rates of split-ticketing overall approach
0.43 the day of the election, the most restricted model, presumably limited primarily
to rational acting vote maximizers, is far lower at slightly below 0.25.
The above analysis suggests that late deciders are more likely to split their vote,
even when not forced into it due to the absence of a district candidate from the
preferred party or due to a personal vote for a district candidate from other than
one’s preferred party. However, it does not further disaggregate in the types of split
voting occurring, namely whether late deciders who split their votes do so rationally.
Because of regionalism, small parties potentially remain electorally viable in some
districts but not others and thus one expects ticket-splitting. For this analysis,
splitting was considered rational if it was within traditional progressive or
conservative coalitions.13 Of the 304 ticket-splitters, surprisingly only 178 (58.55%)
could be identified as rational splitters by this definition. When restricted to just
ticket-splitters where one’s preferred party ran candidates in both tiers, the rate drops
slightly to 55.65%. Meanwhile, ticket-splitting due to the absence of a party district
candidate resulted in considerably higher rates of rational splitting at 71.43%,
although the total number of respondents in this segment were rather few (56 total).
For a more rigorous analysis, Models 46 replicate the above models with the
dependent variable restricted to just split-ticket voters, coding 1 if the split could be
considered rational vote maximizing and 0 if it did not (Table 4). Model 4 finds that
the closer to the election one decides to split their vote, the more likely it is to fall
Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Ticket-Splitting
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216 T. S. Rich
under the category of irrational vote maximizing, although this fails to reach
statistical significance. Meanwhile, controls for party list voting for the PPA, NPP, and
CKP all reach statistical significance in the expected direction. Model 5 excludes those
who essentially were not ticket-splitters by choice. Here decision time does reach
significance at the 0.05 level, while only the control for the PPA also reaches
significance. Finally, the last model is largely consistent with these findings as well. In
addition, across all models, smaller parties were expected to be rational ticketsplitters, even if the coefficients failed to reach significance, while the control for
those who gave their party list vote to the UDP remained negative. While this control
never reached significance, it is consistent with the notion that some splitters are
motivated by promoting balance among the main parties.14 Again, additional
specifications similar to the earlier models failed to alter these core findings.
Again, predicted probabilities highlight the influence of the timing of one’s vote
decision. In all three, rates of rational ticket-splitting decline as the election nears.
Under all three specifications, over two thirds of early deciders (a month or earlier) split
within their traditional coalition. The decline over time in split-ticketing within the
coalition among the three models differs considerably. Among all voters, the difference
is the smallest, from 0.6839 down to 0.5383, while among ‘Ticket-Splitters By Choice’,
the decline is by 31% (0.7587 to 0.4457). Finally, among ‘Ticket-Splitting Beyond
Personal Vote’, the decline is more than half (0.8456 to 0.4148) (Figure 3). Taken as a
whole, these findings suggest that among ticket-splitters, irrational ticket-splitting
becomes more prevalent the closer to the election one makes their voting decision.
Table 4. Correlations of Rational Ticket-Splitting
Model 4
Decision time
Prvote PPA
Prvote NPP
Prvote CKP
Prvote LFP
Prvote DLP
Prvote UDP
Self ideology
Honam
Yeongnam
Age
Education
Female
Income
Constant
N
Pseudo R2
Model 5
Model 6
Coef.
SE
Coef.
SE
Coef.
SE
0.0765
1.3996***
0.792*
0.731*
0.5032
0.3063
0.556
0.0753
0.0184
0.1767
0.0116
0.1049
0.1329
0.0189
0.7016
297
0.1792
0.0583
0.2738
0.3116
0.2972
0.3182
0.3329
0.3121
0.0456
0.4296
0.2007
0.0075
0.1371
0.1646
0.0447
0.7927
0.1677*
1.3871***
0.4328
0.5274
0.6317
0.3315
0.5489
0.0632
0.1693
0.2236
0.012
0.1251
0.1199
0.0307
0.4799
243
0.1976
0.0684
0.2868
0.3427
0.3232
0.3431
0.3585
0.3248
0.0494
0.4722
0.2263
0.0085
0.1521
0.1829
0.05119
0.9055
0.2466**
1.6255***
0.4739
0.9447
0.808
0.2698
0.4008
0.0279
0.171
0.3309
0.0004
0.0746
0.0774
0.0049
0.3415
167
0.2462
0.0896
0.4009
0.4539
0.4274
0.4483
0.4998
0.4318
0.0625
0.5571
0.2985
0.0105
0.1866
0.2287
0.0648
1.1285
Notes: ***p B 0.001, **p B 0.01, *p B 0.05.
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Asian Journal of Political Science
217
Figure 3. Predicted Probabilities of Rational Ticket-Splitting
Conclusion
Two-vote mixed legislative systems create additional complexities for voters. Whether
looking for additional cues as to the viability of parties and the potential allocation of
seats or simply confused about the electoral system, evidence from South Korea
suggests that late deciders in general are more likely to split their ticket. Evidence
further shows that irrational splitting increases as the election looms near, consistent
with voters with weak partisan attachment. Strong partisan attachment may lead to
voters not opting to vote strategically. For example, Park and Ryu (2009) found that
strong supporters of the UDP or GNP were less likely to split their tickets in 2008,
while those who looked favorably on the smaller PPA were more likely to split their
vote. In addition, irrational vote-splitting potentially provides further evidence as to
the extent to which the public understands the two-vote system and its ramifications
on legislative representation.
Whether additional campaign messages in the final days clarify or further confuse
such voters remains unclear. Future research should identify whether the timing of
one’s decision in voting is consistent over mixed systems, including those with different
tier linkages (MMP vs MMM) and those in different regions (e.g. post-communist vs
the East Asian variants). Explicitly measuring knowledge of the mechanics of mixed
systems (e.g. the electoral threshold for party list representation) will also allow
scholars to tackle whether irrational split-ticketing is a result of ignorance. Analysis of
attributes of the physical ballots in mixed systems may also provide insight into factors
that prime voting behavior. For example Rusk (1970: 1234) found that split-ticketing in
the US declined when party identification and party emblem were prominent on
ballots, yet ballot design remains largely ignored in mixed systems. Ultimately, this
analysis confirms that the Korean populace generally understands their mixed system
enough to effectively translate preferences into representation.
218 T. S. Rich
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Notes
[1] Current mixed systems of this sort include Armenia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Germany,
Hungary, Japan, Korea, Lesotho, Lithuania, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Philippines,
Seychelles, and Taiwan.
[2] In most mixed systems the threshold is around 5%. Therefore, for voters that support a party
only polling at 3%, they are expected to abandon their first choice for the closest electorally
viable alternative.
[3] All respondents who only identified one vote or did not name a party/candidate were
dropped.
[4] Hungary’s deviation may be to some extent explained both by the partially compensatory
nature which pools second place finishes in the districts for additional seats and the emerging
two-coalition competition in 2002.
[5] Also see Lee (2004) and Park (2005).
[6] Most two-vote mixed systems have two physical ballots, so the option of voting a straight
ticket still requires two deliberate acts.
[7] Allowing for dual listing has many supporters in Korea, both among academics and in
particular the Grand National Party. The most common argument is that dual listing will
undermine parties’ regional strongholds by encouraging other candidates to make more than
a token effort in district races.
[8] The UDP changed its name to the Democratic Party shortly after the 2008 election.
[9] All data on tier turnout comes from the election commission websites of the country or the
database of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org).
[10] In Nepal’s first MMM election in 2008, a difference of over a quarter of a million votes
separated tiers, but comprising only 2.5% of the larger vote total. In Armenia’s 2003 election
123,782 votes separated the tiers, comprising slightly over 10% of the larger proportional tier.
Similarly, in the 2010 Philippine election, the party list tier received over three million less
votes than the district tier, comprising almost 11% of valid district seats.
[11] In addition, roughly 6% identified issues regarding the GNP nomination or the Pro-Park
Alliance.
[12] See Born (1994).
[13] For conservatives, this included the GNP, PPA, and LFP; for progressives this included the
UDP, DLP, CKP, and NPP.
[14] Among all ticket-splitters, 16.12% split tickets between the UDP and GNP.
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