Varieties of Welfare Capitalism in Crisis:
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Labour Market Reforms
in 18 Advanced Welfare States
Paper presented to the annual conference of the Sheffield Political Economy Research
Institute, University of Sheffield, July 1-3.
Faraz Vahid Shahidi
faraz.vahidshahidi@spi.ox.ac.uk
Department of Social Policy and Intervention
University of Oxford
ABSTRACT
Comparative welfare state scholars have long been concerned with explaining the nature
and direction of cross-national welfare state developments. This paper contributes the
literature on welfare state change by providing an empirical survey of and explanation for
labour market reforms enacted across a sample of eighteen advanced welfare states during
the period following the economic crisis that began in 2008. Drawing on a set-theoretic
multi-method research design, the paper utilizes crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis
to systematically test existing theories of welfare state change. The paper finds that the
direction of cross-national labour market reforms implemented since the onset of the
economic crisis can be explained principally in terms of the variable fiscal capacity of the
state. In particular, the results indicate that (i) the presence of fiscal crisis has acted as a
necessary (but insufficient) condition for the presence of recommodification; and (ii) the
absence of fiscal crisis has acted as a sufficient (but unnecessary) condition for the absence of
recommodification. In addition, the findings suggest that mainstream theories of welfare
state change do not provide a compelling explanation for the cross-national diversity of
contemporary crisis management.
I. INTRODUCTION
The economic crisis that began in 2008 has provided students and scholars of the
welfare state with the opportunity to study the political consequences of severe crisis
precisely as they unfold. Advanced political economies have reacted to the recent economic
crisis and its associated aftershocks by embarking upon one or another deliberate strategy of
crisis management. By crisis management, I mean the variable policy responses that
governments formulate in an effort to cope with crisis consequences. Modern welfare states
have played a central role in the development and operation of architectures of crisis
management. The specific contents of these architectures have varied considerably across
space and over time (Farnsworth and Irving, 2011; Pontusson and Raess, 2012; Starke et al.,
2013). It is therefore not surprising that contemporary crisis management has manifested
itself in an uneven fashion across the landscape of advanced welfare states. Cross-national
differences have persisted both in the degree to which countries have been exposed to the
crisis, as well as in the responses they have formulated with which to confront it. Thus,
despite the international scope of the recent economic crisis, its political consequences have
taken a distinctly national form.
This paper is concerned with explaining the cross-national variation in contemporary
crisis management. It employs qualitative comparative analysis to investigate patterns of
recommodification in recent labour market reforms across a sample of eighteen advanced
welfare states. The central research questions are as follows. (i) How can we explain patterns
of welfare state recommodification in the labour market policy trajectories of advanced
welfare states during the aftermath of the recent economic crisis? (ii) What do contemporary
patterns of recommodification suggest about the comparative political economy of the
welfare state and, in particular, its presumed resilience in the face of present and future
challenges. At its core, this paper constitutes an inquiry into the range of factors that have
shaped and constrained the observed diversity of contemporary crisis management. In the
process of providing an explanation for recent labour market reforms, however, it also offers
a preliminary assessment of the extent to which the recent economic crisis has transformed
some of the core architectures of advanced welfare states.
A sample of eighteen advanced welfare states is included in the paper: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. A
number of advanced welfare states are excluded. Luxembourg and Iceland are excluded on
the basis of restrictions on the availability of data. Switzerland and Japan have been
excluded on the basis that their unique systems of social concertation provide an inadequate
foundation for meaningful comparison (Siaroff, 1999). Finally, the United States is excluded
because of the presence of significant variation in the direction of welfare state change
between individual states.
II. EXPLAINING WELFARE STATE CHANGE DURING HARD TIMES
Comparative welfare state scholars have long been concerned with explaining the
nature and direction of cross-national welfare state developments. The existing literature
offers a number of theoretical frameworks with which to attempt to explain welfare state
change. According to a first theoretical framework, the welfare state is first and foremost a
mechanism of social compensation that is presumed to expand (contract) whenever and
wherever there is greater (lesser) need for it (Glatzer and Rueschemeyer, 2005). Advocates of
this social compensation hypothesis suggest that socio-economic challenges—be it globalization
(Garrett, 1998), deindustrialization (Iversen and Cusack, 2000), or economic crisis (Vis et al.,
2011)—create a functional demand for welfare state expansion. Governments are expected to
respond to an economic crisis by adjusting the supply of social welfare in order to reflect the
objective need for it. Not all welfare states are created equal, however. Rather, the functional
need for social compensation is predicted to be greatest in welfare states that are least
equipped to cope with the socio-economic consequences of crisis. Accordingly, it is argued
that the relationship between an economic crisis and welfare state expansion is moderated
by the generosity of existing welfare state measures (Ramesh, 2009). We would therefore
expect welfare state expansion to be most likely in small welfare states that lack strong
automatic welfare state stabilizers. By contrast, we would expect the functional need for
compensation to be the weakest where large automatic stabilizers provide a by and large
adequate buffer to the crisis and its consequences.
The social compensation hypothesis suffers from a number of theoretical and
analytical problems. Chief among these is its functionalist tendency to rely somewhat
singularly on impersonal socio-economic forces to explain cross-national patterns of welfare
state change (Myles and Quadagno, 2002). The approach lacks a necessary attentiveness to
the political and institutional factors that contextualize these forces. Partly in response to the
inherent functionalism of the social compensation hypothesis, a second theoretical
framework that is sensitive to political conflict has approached the question of welfare state
change through the lens of partisan politics (Korpi and Palme, 2003). According to this
second approach, the policy objectives of political parties differ systematically according to
the perceived interests of their respective constituents. Consequently, even when faced with
similar socio-economic circumstances, Left and Right parties are expected to display
different preferences vis-à-vis the nature and direction of welfare state reform.
Empirically speaking, this partisan politics hypothesis has been particularly successful
at explaining the variegated consolidation of modern welfare capitalism during the
immediate post-war period (Huber and Stephens, 2001). By contrast, considerable debates
have emerged with regards to the salience of partisan politics during the ongoing era of
“permanent austerity” (e.g. Hausermann et al., 2013; Kittel and Obinger, 2003). While very
little literature has addressed this topic in the specific context of severe economic crisis, the
literature that exists has given rise to inconsistent findings: while some observe the
persistence of partisan effects during economic downturns (Cusack et al., 2008), others report
its diminution (Lipsmeyer, 2011). There are important theoretical reasons to expect partisan
politics to retain their significance during periods of economic crisis. While it is true that
economic crises affect large portions of the population, they tend to affect the traditional
constituencies of left and right parties differently. Thus, the strategies of crisis management
they formulate can be expected to differ systematically.
An alternative formulation, which we refer to as the constrained partisanship hypothesis,
suggests that partisan differences are contingent upon the institutional context in which the
crisis unfolds (Starke et al., 2013). More specifically, the salience of partisan politics during a
period of economic crisis may depend on the strength of existing welfare state measures.
According to this third hypothesis, partisan differences are most likely to appear under
conditions where the weakness of automatic welfare state stabilizers demand that
governments undertake active forms of crisis management. By contrast, in cases where
strong automatic welfare state stabilizers serve as routine buffering mechanisms, passive
crisis management may suffice. The result is the depoliticization of crisis management and a
concomitant decline in the relevance of partisan politics and any policy differences that it
might entail. In other words, the presence (absence) of a partisan effect on crisis
management may reflect the absence (presence) of strong automatic welfare state stabilizers.
The observation that partisan politics have experienced somewhat of a decline during
the ongoing era of permanent austerity has led to the gradual, if partial, displacement of
arguments about the “old politics” of the welfare state by those addressing its “new politics”
(Pierson, 2001). According to this fourth theoretical framework, the welfare state has become
an irreversible and immovable feature of contemporary capitalism. Advocates of this new
politics hypothesis advance the argument that the welfare state has generated institutional and
political deterrents to retrenchment that make it highly resilient to change. Institutionally
speaking, welfare states are said to create increasing returns whose positive feedbacks
generate a stability bias in favour of continuity. In addition, the existence of broad welfare
state constituencies is said to conspire against an unavoidably unpopular politics of
retrenchment. On this basis, those who adhere to the new politics perspective argue that,
even in the context of a severe economic crisis, welfare state retrenchment is difficult, if not
impossible, to undertake (Kuhnle, 2000; Pierson, 1996). Accordingly, they expect that the
radical curtailment of social welfare is unlikely to figure as a central feature of crisis
management.
Within the context of the emergence of the new politics of the welfare state, a fifth
theoretical framework has emphasized the role of institutions in shaping the pathdependent contours of cross-national welfare state change. Institutionalist scholars have
brought attention to the fact that, even in the face of a common challenge, welfare states will
embark upon different—and often divergent—trajectories of reform (Esping-Andersen,
1996; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Iversen and Wren, 1998; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000).
Proponents of this path dependence hypothesis suggest that welfare states differ systematically
in their logic of operation and, consequently, in their responses to a shared set of
circumstances. In this sense, an economic crisis is presumed to generate distinct and pathdependent “varieties” or “worlds” of crisis management (Chung and Thewissen, 2011;
Iversen, 2007; Lallement, 2011; Wood, 2001). Welfare states are expected to fall back on their
established habits and exhibit regime-specific patterns of adjustment whose contents
correspond neatly to the logic of pre-existing institutional configurations. Specifically, liberal
market economies are expected to rely on market-oriented reforms and a strategy of
deregulation. By contrast, non-liberal market economies are expected to reinforce the
established principles of the welfare state in order to bolster the advantages that these are
thought to confer. In summary, an economic crisis is not only predicted to generate a
variegated set of responses, but the ex-post diversity of welfare state responses is explained
primarily in terms of the ex-ante diversity of distinct “varieties” and “worlds” of welfare
capitalism.
Departing considerably from the expectations of the new politics and path dependence
hypotheses, a final approach to welfare state change has argued that economic crises can
cause the erosion of institutional and ideological constraints and give rise to abrupt and
transformative social change. Advocates of this fiscal crisis hypothesis argue that economic
crises have the capacity to interrupt and undermine the established principles of the welfare
state, revive and reinforce earlier concerns about its long-term viability, and provide the
necessary political and economic foundations for radical welfare state retrenchment (Clasen
et al., 2012; Vis, 2009; Hay and Wincott, 2013; Streeck, 2011). In other words, economic crises
are critical windows of opportunity during which political actors are awarded the necessary
capacity to enact reforms that would, under different circumstances, be difficult if not
impossible to undertake. Economic crises, so the argument goes, have the potential to
fundamentally alter the structural opportunities and constraints that governments perceive
themselves to be facing (Bieling, 2012). Significant problem pressures that result from
rapidly rising levels of unemployment and declining levels of fiscal stability can generate
perceptions—real or imagined—of a fiscal crisis of the welfare state (c.f. O’Connor, 1973).
The expectation is that governments will confront such an emergency by embarking upon
an agenda of fiscal consolidation whose implications for the welfare state are likely to be
dramatic.
In summary, a range of theoretical frameworks exists with which to attempt to explain
contemporary welfare state change. However, with some notable exceptions, individual
frameworks and their corresponding hypotheses tend to highlight one or another
determinant of welfare state change to the exclusion of all others. Nevertheless, the
complexity of contemporary crisis management is likely to render each of them less than
universal. Thus, while an individual framework may prove particularly useful in explaining
one or another set of cases, it is unlikely that any of them supplies an adequately dynamic
causal formulation with which to tackle broader patterns of cross-national variation. In other
words, each theoretical framework is unlikely to provide anything more than a partial
explanation for contemporary patterns of recommodification. A central goal of this paper is
to use available methodological tools to confront the observed complexity of crisis
management with the aim generating a more comprehensive account of its welfare state
consequences. The next section of the paper presents qualitative comparative analysis as a
method of comparative inquiry that is particularly suited for the analysis of causal
complexity across an intermediate-size sample of cases.
III. THE STRATEGY OF QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Comparative scholars often face the task of meeting two seemingly contradictory
goals: breadth of study and depth of study (Ragin, 1987). On the one hand, the comparativist
is interested in undertaking extensive research that is capable of establishing generalizable
conclusions across a wide sample of cases. On the other hand, the desire for breadth must be
balanced against the demand for intensive research that is capable of attending to the
complex and substantive relations that exist between the causal contexts underlying a given
case. These seemingly contradictory tendencies have given rise to deep methodological
cleavages within the comparative social sciences; namely, between quantitative (i.e.
extensive) and qualitative (i.e. intensive) strategies (Brady and Collier, 2004; King et al., 1996).
Quantitative strategies in the comparative social sciences are variable-oriented and
rely on the application of formal statistical techniques for the study of large samples of data.
Despite having the capacity to provide researchers with highly generalizable results,
variable-oriented strategies are not well-equipped for tackling the problem of causal
complexity. In particular, they employ an additive approach to causation whose
assumptions rely on the measurement of independent “net effects”. This approach the
substantive relations that exist between causally relevant conditions (Ragin, 2008).
Qualitative strategies, on the other hand, are case-oriented and facilitate the in-depth
analysis of small-size samples of cases whose complexities are made apparent through the
application of more intensive forms of inquiry. Despite offer a more holistic understanding
of cases, case-oriented strategies rely on quasi-experimental designs that are limited in their
ability to accommodate for causal complexity (Mahoney, 2000). Quasi-experimental research
designs involve the systematic comparison of cases with the aim of attributing causation to a
single condition (or combination of conditions). These designs are somewhat extreme to the
extent that they overlook the possibility that multiple causal recipes can give rise to the same
outcome (George and Bennett, 2005).
In summary, both variable-oriented and case-oriented strategies are informed by
assumptions that undermine their sensitivity to causal complexity. Accordingly, neither set
of strategies appears to be particularly appropriate means through which to tackle the
present research problem. Rather, an altogether different strategy is required whose
epistemological and technical foundations are particularly suited for the study of causal
complexity across an intermediate-size sample of cases.
Among the methodological tools available to comparative social scientists, qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) represents a powerful instrument for the analysis of causal
complexity (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). As an approach, QCA draws on the extensiveness of
variable-oriented strategies and the intensiveness of case-oriented strategies. By drawing on
their respective strengths, the method facilitates a shift towards broader and more analytic
questions while simultaneously maintaining a holistic understanding of cases. QCA
therefore embodies a unique sensitivity to both theoretical generality and case complexity.
As a formal technique of analysis, QCA is a configurational comparative method that
employs the logic of Boolean algebra and set theory to implement principles of comparison
across small- and intermediate-size samples of cases.
According to the procedure of crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA), the
specific variant of QCA employed in this paper, each case is represented configurationally
as a combination of causally relevant conditions whose variable presence or absence is said
to result either in the occurrence or the non-occurrence of a given outcome of interest, such
as recommodification. Cases and their corresponding configurations are systematically
compared in order to uncover patterns of similarity and difference between them. Through
the application of logical comparison, the method simplifies complex data structures with
the overall aim of establishing the conditions of occurrence and non-occurrence of the
outcome of interest (i.e. recommodification).
Epistemologically speaking, configurational comparative methods rely on a
conception of causality that is explicitly sensitive to causal complexity. csQCA and related
methods operate through the lens of “multiple conjunctural causation” (Berg-Schlosser et al.,
2009). Multiple conjunctural causation implies a number of assumptions. First, it implies
that there are multiple distinct causal pathways that can lead to the same outcome. Second,
it implies that outcomes are often best explained by a combination of causally relevant
conditions, rather than by any single condition alone. Because they are likely to offer
meaningful explanation only when they are interpreted in conjunction with one another, the
analysis of combinations of causally relevant conditions takes precedence over that of any
individual condition. Finally, the concept of multiple conjunctural causation accounts for the
possibility of causal asymmetry; that is, it does not assume a priori that the occurrence and
the non-occurrence of a given outcome of interest is explained by the same causally relevant
conditions. Partly as a result of its sensitivity to causal complexity, QCA and related
configurational
comparative
methods
are
increasingly
viewed
as
appropriate
methodological instruments for comparative welfare state research (Emmenegger et al.,
2013).
IV. OPERATIONALIZATION AND CALIBRATION
Recommodification
Recommodification
derives
its
meaning
from
the
corollary
concepts
of
commodification and decommodification. Commodification refers to the condition of labour
power under capitalism; namely, as a commodity whose sale in the labour market becomes
a necessary pre-requisite for securing the means of subsistence (Room, 2000). Accordingly,
decommodification is said to occur when a person can maintain an adequate standard of
living without having to rely on the sale of their labour power. Decommodification is
therefore used as a term to describe the process whereby the means of subsistence is
rendered as a matter of right, rather than as a matter of one’s performance in the labour
market (Esping-Andersen, 1990). By contrast, recommodification describes the process
whereby state-market relations are reconfigured in such a way as to imply a greater reliance
on or heightened exposure to the market as a prerequisite for securing the means of
subsistence (Holden, 2003). In other words, one’s ability to secure these means depends to a
greater
extent
upon
one’s
participation
in
the
labour
market.
Thus,
while
decommodification aims to protect citizens from the market, recommodification aims
precisely at orienting them towards it. Recommodification has figured as a central feature of
recent welfare state transformations and, in particular, the emergence of contemporary
“activation” regimes (Peck, 2001).
Recommodification is operationalized along three dimensions of labour market policy
change. The first dimension of recommodification accounts for labour market policy change
that reinforces the obligation to work as a condition of unemployment protection. The reinforcement
of work-related obligations implies a process of recommodification insofar as it strengthens
the emphasis on paid employment as a pre-requisite for securing the means of subsistence
(Clasen and Clegg, 2007). In the analysis, work-related obligations are said to have been
reinforced when (i) mandatory participation in job search activities as a condition for the
receipt of unemployment benefits is introduced or intensified; (ii) mandatory participation
in active labour market policy schemes as a condition for the receipt of unemployment
benefits is introduced or intensified; (iii) the definition of what constitutes a suitable job offer
is tightened; or (iv) punitive sanctions resulting from the failure to comply with benefit
conditionalities are introduced or intensified.
The second dimension of recommodification accounts for labour market policy change
that reduces the generosity of unemployment protection. By reducing the generosity of
unemployment protection, one restricts alternatives to paid employment as a pre-requisite
for securing the means of subsistence (Pierson, 2001; Van Vliet, 2010). In the analysis, the
generosity of unemployment protection is said to have been reduced when (i) the level of
unemployment benefits is reduced; (ii) the maximum duration of unemployment benefits is
reduced; (iii) access to unemployment benefits is reduced through the tightening of
qualifying conditions or the lengthening of the waiting period before benefits can be claimed.
The first two dimensions of recommodification account for the variable intensity of
recommodification experienced by those who are not engaged in paid employment. A third
dimension of recommodification has been included in order to account for the variable
intensity of recommodification experienced by those who are engaged in paid employment.
This final dimension of recommodification accounts for labour market policy change that
reduces the strictness of employment protection. The analysis focuses on changes to the
regulatory architectures that govern the parameters of lawful and unlawful dismissals.
Accordingly, employment protection is said to have been reduced when (i) the parameters
of lawful dismissal is relaxed; or (ii) the punitive consequences associated with the use of
unlawful dismissal are relaxed. Notably, employment protection and additional labour
market regulations are by and large neglected in existing indices of decommodification (e.g.
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Scruggs and Allan, 2006). Nevertheless, they are centrally linked to
the experience of commodification and are therefore crucial elements in its reconfiguration
vis-à-vis the welfare state (Papadopoulos, 2005).
A comprehensive review of labour market reforms enacted across the eighteen
advanced welfare states between January 2008 and March 2013 is conducted in order to
collect the necessary data on labour market policy change. Temporary labour market
reforms are excluded from the analysis on the basis that the aim of the study is to generate
insight into the substantive impact of the economic crisis on the long-term trajectories of
advanced welfare states. The data were derived from two databases of the European
Commission (2013a/2013b) and a database of the International Labour Organization/World
Bank (2013). These sources were supplemented with relevant case-based knowledge where
such information was available in the existing literature.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the comprehensive review of recent labour market
reforms across the eighteen advanced welfare states. A more detailed outline of the reforms
is provided in Appendix A. The results of the comprehensive review indicate that fourteen
of the eighteen cases included in the study enacted at least one measure of
recommodification between January 2008 and May 2013. These findings suggest that
recommodification may not be as difficult as is often suggested by advocates of the new
politics hypothesis (c.f. Pierson, 2001; Kuhnle, 2000).
Among the fourteen cases that enacted measures of recommodification in their
respective labour market policy architectures, considerable empirical diversity is observed.
Cross-national variation is observable both in the relative scale of labour market reforms, as
well as in the specific policy instruments they have targeted. A detailed comparison of the
labour market reforms reveals that measures belonging to the first dimension of
recommodification have been the most common variety of policy change. Work-related
obligations in national unemployment protection systems were reinforced in twelve of the
eighteen advanced welfare states. They were reinforced through the intensification of
existing work-related obligations (e.g. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, and
Portugal); through their extension to additional categories of benefit claimants (e.g. France,
Ireland, and New Zealand); through the implementation of new work-related obligations
(e.g. Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain); or through the implementation of new punitive
sanction measures (e.g. Finland, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom).
In addition to work-related obligations, nine of the eighteen cases enacted reforms
that reduced the overall generosity of national unemployment protection systems.
Generosity was reduced through the reduction of benefit levels (e.g. Belgium, Greece;
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom); through the reduction of the duration of
benefits (e.g. Denmark, France, Ireland, and Portugal); through the abolition of benefit
schemes (e.g. Germany); through the tightening of qualifying conditions (e.g. Denmark and
Ireland); or through the extension of the waiting period before which benefits can be
claimed (e.g. Belgium).
Table 1 Overview of Labour Market Reforms, 2008-2013
Change that reinforced
the obligation to work
Australia
Change that reduced
the generosity of
unemployment
protection
Change that reduced
the strictness of
employment
protection
X
Austria
Belgium
X
Canada
X
Denmark
X
Finland
X
France
X
Germany
X
X
X
X
X
Greece
X
Ireland
X
Italy
X
X
X
X
Netherlands
New Zealand
X
Norway
Portugal
X
X
X
Spain
X
X
X
X
X
Sweden
United Kingdom
Sources: European Commission (2013a/2013b); International Labour Organization/World Bank (2013).
the obligation to work
Australia
unemployment
protection
employment
protection
X
Austria
Belgium
X
Canada
X
X
Finally, six of the eighteen
of employment protection by
Denmark
X cases reduced the strictness
X
loosening
Finland the legal parameters
X of lawful individual dismissal (e.g. France, Greece, and
France by loosening the legalXparameters of lawful collective
X
X Greece and
Spain);
dismissal (e.g.
Germany
X
Greece
X
Spain); or by reducing the extent of sanctions applied to employers who are found to have
transgressed
the legal parameters
of dismissal (e.g. Italy,XPortugal, and Spain).
Ireland
X
Italy
X
X
X
Netherlands
In order to derive crisp membership scores, the outcome of interest is calibrated such
New Zealand
X
that each case is described as belonging either to the subset of cases displaying the outcome
Norway
[1] or to the subset of cases displaying the negation of the outcome [0]. For the purpose of
Portugal
X
X
X
the
present analysis, a distinction
is made between cases
that display strong
Spain
X
X
X evidence of
Sweden
recommodification
and those that display limited or no evidence of recommodification.
Unitedevidence
Kingdom of recommodification
X
X
Strong
is said to be observable
when a case tests positively
Sources: European Commission (2013a/2013b); International Labour Organization/World Bank (2013).
for more than one of the dimensions of recommodification. These cases are assigned a score
of [1] for the outcome and are formally operated in the csQCA as the subset of cases that
display the presence of recommodification. By contrast, cases that test either positively for
only one of the dimensions of recommodification or negatively for all three of them are said
to offer limited or no evidence of recommodification. These cases are assigned a score of [0]
for the outcome and are formally operated in the csQCA as the subset of cases that display
the absence of recommodification. The results of the calibration of recommodification along
with the cases that correspond either to its presence or its absence are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 Calibration Results for the Outcome of Interest
Cases
Recommodification
Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom
Present [1]
Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden
Absent [0]
Causally Relevant Conditions
A “perspectives approach” is applied to the selection of causally relevant conditions
(Amenta and Poulsen, 1994). This approach aims to combine the core propositions of
different theoretical hypotheses, such as those outlined above. It has the advantage of
facilitating a combinatorial analysis of multiple hypotheses with the aim of deriving a more
complex and, by extension, more comprehensive account of the phenomenon under
investigation. On the basis of a perspectives approach, a total of five causally relevant
conditions are included in the formal csQCA. The raw data corresponding to these five
causally relevant conditions is summarized in Table 3. In order to derive crisp membership
scores, thresholds are derived for each of the causally relevant conditions according to
which the raw data can be recoded into binary form. Whether or not a case meets a defined
threshold determines whether it is assigned membership in the subset of cases displaying
the condition [1] or in the subset of cases displaying the negation of the condition [0]. The
process of calibration is informed by theoretical and substantive criteria (Rihoux and De
Meur, 2009).
Existing knowledge suggests that labour market policy change during an economic
downturn may depend on the partisan composition of government (Cusack et al., 2008;
Starke et al., 2013). Accordingly, the first causally relevant condition [RIGHT] accounts for
the partisan composition of government. Data on the partisan composition of government
were derived from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al., 2012). A score of [1]
is assigned to countries in which right-leaning parties dominated during key periods of
crisis management. A score of [0] is assigned to countries in which left-leaning parties,
centrist-parties, or government coalitions involving parties of opposing partisan tendencies
dominated during key periods of crisis management.
The direction of labour market policy change during an economic downturn may also
depend on the fiscal capacity of the state (Bieling, 2012). The current account balance of a
national political economy provides a strong indication of the fiscal maneuverability of a
country (Claessens et al., 2012). Accordingly, the second causally relevant condition [DEF]
accounts for the strength of national current account balances as a proportion of GDP. Data
on current account balances were derived from the OECD (2013). A score of [1] is assigned
to countries that reported current account deficits in both 2007 and 2008. A score of [0] is
assigned to countries that reported a current account surplus in both 2007 and 2008.
A third factor that may shape the direction of labour market reforms during an
economic downturn is the level of unemployment (Streeck, 2011). Accordingly, the third
causally relevant condition [UNEMP] accounts for the change in national levels of
unemployment over the course of the economic crisis. Data on unemployment rates were
derived from the OECD (2013). Figure 1 shows the percentage change in levels of
unemployment between 2007 and 2011 for the eighteen cases. Case-based knowledge
suggests that the United Kingdom and Portugal have experienced qualitatively different
jobs crises. The United Kingdom has experienced an unexpectedly mild, though far from
Table 3 Raw Representation of the Causally Relevant Conditions
Partisanship
Australia
Current Account Balance
(% GDP)
2007
2008
Percentage Change in
Unemployment, 2007-2011 (%)
Variety of
Capitalism
Automatic Stabilizers
-4.5
16
LME
5.6
Left
-6.1
Austria
Mixed
3.5
4.8
-6
CME
5.4
Belgium
Mixed
1.9
-1.3
-4
CME
10.1
Canada
Right
0.8
0.3
24
LME
6.7
Denmark
Right
1.3
2.6
99
CME
10.5
Finland
Mixed
4.0
2.6
13
CME
8.5
France
Right
-0.9
-1.7
16
SME
6.9
Germany
Right
7.4
6.1
-31
LME
7.5
Greece
Left
-14.3
-14.6
113
SME
N/A
Ireland
Right
-5.3
-5.6
209
LME
10.5
Italy
Right
-2.4
-2.8
38
SME
4.5
Netherlands
Right
6.7
4.2
24
CME
10.6
New Zealand
Right
-8.1
-8.7
78
LME
4.6
Norway
Left
12.4
15.9
30
CME
12.9
Portugal
Left
-10.0
-12.6
60
SME
N/A
Spain
Left
-9.9
-9.6
162
SME
N/A
Sweden
Right
9.1
9.0
24
CME
10.6
United Kingdom
Right
-2.2
-1.0
48
LME
6.6
Sources: Partisanship (Armingeon et al., 2012); Current account balances (OECD, 2013); Unemployment rates (OECD, 2013); Variety of capitalism (Hall and Gingerich, 2009;
Schmidt, 2009); Automatic stabilizers (Scruggs, 2004).
Figure 2 Automatic Welfare State Stabilizers
15
10
insignificant, increase in unemployment (Clasen et al., 2012; Leschke and Watt, 2010). By
5
contrast,
in Portugal, recent labour market reforms have in fact exacerbated an already steep
increase in unemployment (Rodrigues and Reis, 2012). The threshold is therefore placed
0
ay
No
rw
de
Sw
e
erl
Ire
n
s
an
d
d
lan
ark
ium
nm
Fin
l
Be
lg
an
d
an
y
Ge
rm
Fra
n
ce
a
ad
Ca
n
om
gd
Au
str
ia
lia
d
Au
str
a
ala
n
Ze
Ita
ly
between the United Kingdom (48%) and Portugal (60%). A score of [1] is assigned to
Ne
th
De
Kin
Un
ite
d
Ne
w
countries where the increase in unemployment between 2007 and 2011 amounted to 50% or
more. A score of [0] was assigned to countries where the increase in unemployment between
Source: Scruggs (2004).
2007 and 2011 was less than 50%.
Figure 1 Change in Unemployment, 2007-2011 (%)
250
200
150
100
50
0
lan
d
Ire
ain
Sp
ce
Gr
ee
nm
ark
nd
De
ala
Ze
Ne
dK
ite
w
ing
do
m
Po
rtu
ga
l
ly
ay
rw
No
en
ed
Ita
Un
Source: OECD (2013).
Sw
s
Ne
the
rla
nd
da
na
Ca
e
nc
Fra
alia
str
Au
lan
d
Fin
um
Be
lgi
tria
Au
s
Ge
rm
an
y
-50
A fourth causally relevant condition [LME] is included in order to account for the
possibility that labour market policy responses to the economic crisis may vary
systematically between differently organized models of welfare capitalism (Lallement, 2011;
Iversen, 2007). According to the varieties of capitalism and welfare regimes approaches,
when faced with an economic shock, liberal market economies are more likely than nonliberal market economies to rely on a market-oriented strategy of crisis management. A
score of [1] is assigned to liberal market economies. A score of [0] is assigned to non-liberal
market economies. The distinction between liberal and non-liberal market economies is
informed by the empirical analysis of Hall and Gingerich (2009) and Schmidt (2009).
Finally, existing knowledge suggests that the presence or absence of automatic welfare
state stabilizers may shape the direction of welfare state change during an economic
downturn (Ramesh, 2009; Starke et al., 2013). Accordingly, a fifth causally relevant condition
[STAB] is included in order to account for the strength of automatic welfare stabilizers. In
the analysis that follows, the generosity of unemployment benefits is taken as a proxy for the
strength of automatic welfare state stabilizers. Data on the generosity of unemployment
benefits were derived from the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Dataset (Scruggs, 2004).
Figure 2 lists the generosity scores for the eighteen countries. Case-based knowledge
suggests that a significant qualitative distinction can be made between the national
unemployment benefit systems of Finland and Germany. While the former is characterized
by a comparatively generous and inclusive system of unemployment benefits, the latter is
characterized by an exclusive system of unemployment insurance whose generosity has
experienced considerable decline over the past decade (Dingeldey, 2011; Picot, 2012). The
qualitative threshold is therefore placed between Germany (7.5) and Finland (8.5). A score of
[1] is assigned to any country whose unemployment benefit generosity score is 8 or higher.
A score of [0] is assigned to countries whose generosity score falls below 8.
Figure 2 Automatic Welfare State Stabilizers
15
10
5
ay
rw
No
ed
Un
ite
Ne
the
Sw
rla
en
nd
s
d
Ire
De
Be
lgi
nm
lan
ark
um
d
Ge
Fin
rm
lan
an
y
e
nc
Fra
m
da
na
Ca
Au
dK
ing
do
str
ia
alia
Ne
w
Au
Ze
str
ala
Ita
ly
nd
0
Source: Scruggs (2004).
FigureIn1 Change
in Unemployment,
2007-2011
(%)
the analysis
that follows,
partisan
effects on crisis management are said to be
constrained when the case is assigned a score of [1] for the condition [STAB]. In addition,
250
fiscal crisis is said to be present when a case is assigned a score of [1] for either the condition
200
[DEF]
or the condition [UNEMP]. By contrast, fiscal crisis is said to be absent when a case is
150
100
assigned
a score of [0] for both the condition [DEF] and the condition [UNEMP].
50
0
d
lan
Ire
Sp
ain
ce
Gr
ee
ark
lan
nm
d
l
ga
Ze
a
ing
Po
rtu
do
m
ly
Ita
ay
en
No
rw
ed
Sw
nd
s
rla
da
na
Ca
ce
Fra
n
alia
str
nd
Fin
la
um
Be
lgi
ia
str
Au
rm
an
y
V.
TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS
-50
De
w
Ne
dK
ite
the
Ne
Au
Ge
Based on the above calibration of the outcome and the causally relevant conditions, it
Source: OECD (2013).
Un
is possible to generate a configurational representation of the cases and their corresponding
membership scores. This is depicted in Table 4. The derived matrix of scores is reformulated
into a truth table. The truth table is the fundamental unit of analysis in configurational
comparative analysis (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009). It lists all of the logically possible
combinations of causally relevant conditions, the cases that correspond to them, and the
empirically observed outcomes with which they are associated. Due to limited diversity in
the world of actually observed cases of the phenomenon, not all of the logically possible
combinations listed in the truth table exist in reality. Table 5 depicts a partial truth table. It is
partial because it excludes logical remainders; that is, combinations of causally relevant
conditions that are not associated with actually observed cases.
Table 4 Configurational Representation of the Cases
RIGHT
DEF
UNEMP
Australia
0
Table
4 Configurational Representation
of 1the Cases 0
Austria
0
0
0
RIGHT
DEF
UNEMP
Belgium
0
1
0
Australia
0
1
0
Canada
1
0
0
Austria
0
0
0
Denmark
1
0
1
Belgium
0
1
0
Finland
0
0
0
Canada
1
0
0
France
1
1
0
Denmark
1
0
1
Germany
1
0
0
Finland
0
0
0
Greece
0
1
1
France
1
1
0
Ireland
1
1
1
Germany
1
0
0
Italy
1
1
0
Greece
0
1
1
Netherlands
1
0
0
Ireland
1
1
1
New Zealand
1
1
1
Italy
1
1
0
Norway
0
0
0
Netherlands
1
0
0
Portugal
0
1
1
New Zealand
1
1
1
Spain
0
1
1
Norway
0
0
0
Sweden
1
0
0
Portugal
0
1
1
United Kingdom
1
1
0
Spain
0
1
1
Note: [1] denotes presence; [0] denotes absence.
Sweden
1
0
0
LME
STAB
OUTCOME
1
0
0
0
LME
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
STAB
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
OUTCOME
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
United
Kingdom
1 for the Presence
1
0
1
0
Table
5 Partial Truth Table
and Absence
of Recommodification
Note: [1] denotes presence; [0] denotes absence.
RIGHT
DEF
UNEMP
LME
STAB
OUTCOME
Cases
Table05 Partial 1Truth Table
and
0 for the Presence
1
0 Absence of
0 Recommodification
Australia
0
RIGHT
00
01
01
10
11
01
11
DEF0
11
00
10
00
01
00
10
0
UNEMP
00
00
01
00
10
00
00
LME0
10
STAB0
01
10
00
01
10
01
00
00
00
00
11
10
01
0
OUTCOME
01
00
11
00
11
00
10
Austria
Cases
Belgium
Australia
Canada
Austria
Denmark
Belgium
Finland, Norway
Canada
France, Italy
Denmark
Germany
Finland,
Norway
Netherlands,
Sweden
France, Italy
10
11
01
01
01
01
00
01
00
11
01
01
Greece, Portugal, Spain
Germany
Ireland
Netherlands,
Sweden
01
11
11
11
11
10
01
11
00
10
10
11
New Zealand
Greece,
Portugal, Spain
United Kingdom
Ireland
1
1
1
1
0
0
New Zealand
1
1
0
1
0
1
United Kingdom
0
1
Truth table analysis proceeds through the process of logical minimization. Broadly
speaking, logical minimization refers to the systematic application of Boolean logic with the
aim of reducing the complexity of the truth table. The end result of logical minimization is a
Boolean solution whose constituent elements reveal minimally relevant causal relations that
explain the data within the truth table. The notation and operators involved in the
application of Boolean algebra are listed in Box 1. Logical minimization involves the paired
comparison of different truth table rows that display the same outcome. The paired
comparison of different rows is informed by a simple rule that reflects the system of logic
first proposed by Mill (1843). Ragin (1987) summarizes the rule as follows: “if two Boolean
expressions differ in only one causal condition, yet produce the same outcome, then the
causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can
be removed to create a simpler, combined expression” (p. 93).
Box 1 Boolean Notation and Operators
• Upper case letters (e.g. [RIGHT]) represent the [1] value for a given condition.
• Lower case letters (e.g. [right]) represent the [0] value for a given condition.
• Logical “AND” is represented by the [*] symbol.
• Logical “OR” is represented by the [+] symbol.
Adapted from Rihoux and De Meur (2009).
Depending on the strategy of minimization employed, a single truth table can produce
several Boolean solutions of varying complexity (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009; Schneider and
Wagemann, 2010). Solutions vary in their complexity based on whether or not they exclude
or include logical remainders in the process of paired comparison. If they are excluded, a
purely descriptive solution is derived. This descriptive solution does not go much beyond
the world of actually observed cases. In order to further reduce the complexity of the truth
table, logical remainders can alternatively be included in the process of logical minimization
to generate a parsimonious solution. The latter strategy relies on the use of simplifying
assumptions. These are simplifying because they allow for a greater number of paired
comparisons and, by extension, facilitate the derivation of more parsimonious solutions.
However, they are also assumptions because they rely on counterfactual cases that are not
observed in the empirical world. Parameters for the use of simplifying assumptions are
established on the basis of technical and theoretical criteria (Ragin and Sonnett, 2005).
Truth table analysis was conducted for the presence and the absence of
recommodification using Tosmana (version 1.3.2). For both the presence and the absence of
the outcome, the analysis proceeds in a two-fold manner, beginning with the analysis of
necessary conditions and ending with the parsimonious analysis of sufficient conditions.
Truth Table Analysis for the Presence of Recommodification
The analysis of necessary conditions is concerned with determining whether any
condition (or combination of conditions) is necessary for an outcome to occur. In other
words, it aims to establish whether the outcome is a subset of a condition (or combination of
conditions). The analysis of necessary conditions in configurational comparative methods
relies on two measures: consistency and coverage (Bol and Luppi, 2013; Ragin, 2008).
Consistency refers to the degree to which a given subset relation is approximated by the
data. It is measured as the proportion of cases displaying a given condition (or combination
of conditions) among the subset of cases displaying the outcome. Coverage refers to the
empirical relevance of a subset relation that has already been determined to be consistent.
It is measured as the proportion of cases displaying the outcome among the subset of cases
displaying a given condition (or combination of conditions) (Goertz, 2006).
Table 6 summarizes the consistency and coverage scores of the causally relevant
conditions for the presence of recommodification. The analysis of necessary conditions is
conducted using a consistency threshold of 0.900 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2007).
Conditions whose consistency scores fall above this threshold are said to be necessary. A test
for necessity reveals that none of the individual conditions are individually necessary for
recommodification to occur. A test for necessity can also be performed for combinations of
conditions. However, such a test is plausible only where there are theoretical arguments to
justify it (Schneider and Wagemann, 2007). The fiscal crisis outlined above states that
recommodification should occur in the presence of either current account deficits or a
significant increase in unemployment. In other words, while the hypothesis holds that fiscal
crisis is necessary for the presence of recommodification, there are two causally relevant
conditions—[DEF] or [UNEMP]—that individually constitute sufficient but unnecessary
conditions for the presence of fiscal crisis. Accordingly, the combination of conditions [DEF
+ UNEMP] is included in the analysis of necessary conditions. The consistency score for the
configuration [DEF + UNEMP] is 1.000, indicating perfect consistency. Furthermore, the
combination of conditions reports a somewhat high coverage score of 0.818, revealing that
the necessity relation is far from trivial. In other words, fiscal crisis, represented by the
combination
[DEF
+
UNEMP],
is
a
necessary
condition
for
the
presence
of
recommodification. A case must display a current account deficit in 2007 and 2008, an
increase in unemployment of 50% or more between 2007 and 2011, or both in order for
recommodification to occur.
UNEMP
0.556
0.833
unemp
0.444
0.333
LME
0.222
0.400
lme
0.778
0.538
STAB
0.333
0.500
stab
0.667
0.500
DEF + UNEMP
1.000
0.818
Table 6 Analysis of Necessary Conditions for the Presence of Recommodification
Condition Tested
Consistency
Coverage
Table
4.7 Descriptive Analysis of Sufficient Conditions0.556
for the Presence of Recommodification
RIGHT
0.500
right
0.444
Solution
Case Coverage 0.500
DEF
0.889
0.800
RIGHT*DEF*unemp*stab +
France, Italy, United Kingdom
def
0.111
0.125
UNEMP
0.556
0.833
right*DEF*unemp*lme*STAB +
Belgium
unemp
0.444
0.333
RIGHT*def*UNEMP*lme*STAB +
Denmark
LME
0.222
0.400
lme
0.778 Greece, Portugal, Spain
0.538
right*DEF*UNEMP*lme*stab
+
STAB
0.333
0.500
RIGHT*DEF*UNEMP*LME*STAB +
Ireland
stab
0.667
0.500
DEF + UNEMP
1.000
0.818
Descriptive Analysis
Table 74.7
Parsimonious
Analysisof
ofSufficient
Sufficient Conditions
Conditions for
for the
the Presence
Presence of
of Recommodification
Recommodification
Solution
Solution
DEF*lme
RIGHT*DEF*unemp*stab +
+
Belgium,
France,
right*DEF*unemp*lme*STAB
+
Case Coverage
Greece, Italy,
RIGHT*def*UNEMP*lme*STAB
+
Portugal,
Spain
right*DEF*UNEMP*lme*stab
+
Raw
Coverage
0.667
Case Coverage
UNEMP*STAB +
RIGHT*DEF*unemp
France, Italy, United Kingdom
Belgium
France, Italy, United
Denmark, Ireland
Kingdom
Denmark
Greece, Portugal, Spain
0.222
0.333
Unique
Coverage
0.444
RIGHT*DEF*UNEMP*LME*STAB
+
Consistency
1.000
0.222
Solution Consistency
1.000
Solution Coverage
1.000
1.000
Ireland
0.111
1.000
Table 7 Parsimonious Analysis of Sufficient Conditions for the Presence of Recommodification
The
analysis of sufficient
conditions
with determining
the configurations
Solution
DEF*lme
+ is concerned
UNEMP*STAB
+
RIGHT*DEF*unemp
of conditions that are sufficient for an outcome to occur. The analysis of sufficient conditions
Belgium, France,
Greece, Italy,
Denmark, Ireland
Kingdom
comparison described above.
Table
7
summarizes
the results of the parsimonious
analysis of
Portugal, Spain
Italy, United
is conducted through the logical reduction of the truth table usingFrance,
the process
of paired
Case Coverage
sufficient conditions. The parsimonious solution suggests that there are three causal paths
Raw Coverage
0.667
0.222
0.333
that
lead
to the presence of recommodification.
Each
causal path is composed
Unique
Coverage
0.444
0.222
0.111 of a unique
Consistency of conditions. However,
1.000
1.000
combination
each combination
of conditions 1.000
is individually
Solution Consistency
1.000
sufficient
to ensure the presence of recommodification.
The empirical relevance of a solution
Solution Coverage
1.000
term is assessed by way of its coverage score (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009). Both raw and
unique coverage scores are listed in Table 7. The first term [DEF*lme] in the parsimonious
solution combines a current account deficit and non-liberal market arrangements. The
second term [UNEMP*STAB] combines a significant increase in unemployment and strong
automatic welfare state stabilizers. The third and final term [RIGHT*DEF*unemp] combines a
right-leaning government, a current account deficit, and the absence of a significant increase
in unemployment.
Notably, either [DEF] or [UNEMP] appears in all three of the parsimonious solution
terms, confirming the earlier finding that fiscal crisis is a necessary condition for the
presence of recommodification. The truth table of the analysis for the presence of
recommodification reveals that fiscal crisis—a condition that is sufficiently though not
necessarily met by the presence of either [DEF] or [UNEMP]—is a necessary but insufficient
condition for the occurrence of recommodification. Fiscal crisis is insufficient insofar as it
must operate in combination with the other causally relevant conditions to generate the
causal recipes that are sufficient for the presence of recommodification. More specifically,
fiscal crisis combines with either (i) the presence of non-liberal market arrangements; (ii) the
presence of strong automatic welfare state stabilizers; or (iii) the presence of a right-leaning
government and the absence of a significant increase in unemployment in order to create the
sufficient conditions for the presence of recommodification. On this basis, [DEF] and
[UNEMP] are said to form a pair of SUIN conditions (Mahoney et al., 2009). In other words,
they are individual conditions that are sufficient but unnecessary parts of a broader
configuration (i.e. fiscal crisis) whose presence is itself insufficient but necessary for the
occurrence of recommodification.
Truth Table Analysis for the Absence of Recommodification
The analysis of necessary conditions for the absence of recommodification proceeds
in a similar fashion to that for the presence of recommodification. Table 8 lists the
consistency and coverage scores of the causally relevant conditions for the absence of
recommodification. All of the causally relevant conditions report consistency scores below
the threshold of 0.900. Accordingly, no single condition appears to be individually necessary
for the absence of recommodification to occur.
Table 9 lists the results of the parsimonious analysis of sufficient conditions for the
absence of recommodification. The parsimonious solution indicates that there are three
minimally relevant paths that lead to the absence of recommodification. Each of the paths
consists of a unique combination of conditions. The first term [def*unemp] in the
parsimonious solution combines a current account surplus and the absence of a significant
increase in unemployment. The second term [right*unemp*LME] combines a right-leaning
government, the absence of a significant increase in unemployment, and liberal market
arrangements. The third and final term [UNEMP*LME*stab] combines a significant increase
in unemployment, liberal market arrangements, and low levels of automatic welfare state
stabilizers.
Table 8 Analysis of Necessary Conditions for the Absence of Recommodification
Table
8 Analysis
for the Absence of Recommodification
Condition
Testedof Necessary ConditionsConsistency
Coverage
Condition
Consistency
Coverage
RIGHT Tested
0.556
0.500
RIGHT
0.556
0.500
right
0.444
0.500
right
0.444
0.500
DEF
0.222
0.200
DEF
0.222
0.200
def
0.778
0.875
def
0.778
0.875
UNEMP
0.111
0.167
UNEMP
0.111
0.167
unemp
0.889
0.667
unemp
0.889
0.667
LME
0.333
0.600
LME
0.333
0.600
lme
0.667
0.462
lme
0.667
0.462
STAB
0.333
0.500
STAB
0.333
0.500
stab
0.667
0.500
stab
0.667
0.500
Table 9 Parsimonious Analysis of Sufficient Conditions for the Absence of Recommodification
Table 9 Parsimonious Analysis of Sufficient Conditions for the Absence of Recommodification
def*unemp
+
right*unemp*LME
+ UNEMP*LME*stab
Solution
def*unemp
+
right*unemp*LME
+ UNEMP*LME*stab
Solution
Austria, Canada,
Austria, Germany,
Canada,
Finland,
Case Coverage
Australia
New Zealand
Finland, Germany,
Netherlands,
Norway,
Case Coverage
Australia
New Zealand
Netherlands,
Norway,
Sweden
Sweden
Raw Coverage
0.778
0.111
0.111
Raw
Coverage
0.778
0.111
0.111
Unique
Coverage
0.778
0.111
0.111
Unique
Coverage
Consistency
Consistency
Solution Consistency
Solution
SolutionConsistency
Coverage
Solution Coverage
0.778
1.000
1.000
0.111
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.111
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
It is noteworthy that the second and third terms in the parsimonious solution account
for only a single observed case, respectively. This is reflected in their relatively low coverage
scores of 0.111. The low coverage scores indicate that these solution terms are by and large
empirically trivial. This is not to say that these terms are theoretically irrelevant. On the
contrary, the analysis of atypical or anomalous cases can often generate crucial insights into
the causal mechanisms underlying empirical phenomena (Collier et al., 2004). Nevertheless,
their overall explanatory relevance to contemporary patterns of recommodification is
severely limited, as compared to the first term. Indeed, the first term [def*unemp] is highly
empirically relevant. With a coverage score of 0.778, the term covers seven of the nine cases
belonging to the subset of cases displaying the absence of recommodification. The
combination [def*unemp] represents the absence of fiscal crisis. In other words, the results of
the analysis of sufficient conditions demonstrate that the absence of fiscal crisis is a sufficient
condition for the absence of recommodification, and that the empirical relevance of this
causal path is very high.
Finally, the combined truth table analysis for the presence and the absence of
recommodification reveals that contemporary patterns of recommodification have unfolded
irrespective of (i) the partisan composition of government; (ii) the variety of capitalism; and
(iii) the strength of automatic welfare state stabilizers. The results indicate that their
explanatory relevance is far from systematic. Thus, it would appear that there is little
evidence in favour of theoretical hypotheses whose explanatory underpinnings rely
centrally on these conditions.
VI. DISCUSSION
Revisiting Mainstream Theories of Welfare state Change
The empirical regularities unmasked by the configurational analysis of recent labour
market reforms suggest that there is a need to revisit mainstream theories of welfare state
change and, in particular, the causal leverage they provide during periods of economic crisis.
Among the theoretical perspectives that require revisiting, three in particular are addressed
in this section of the paper: the social compensation perspective; the path dependence
perspective; and the partisan politics perspective. For the purpose of the present discussion,
the partisan politics and constrained partisanship hypotheses are addressed simultaneously.
Advocates of the social compensation perspective conceive of the welfare state as a
mechanism of social compensation that is presumed to expand (contract) whenever and
wherever there is a greater (lesser) need for it (Glatzer and Rueschemeyer, 2005). Economic
crises are expected to generate increased levels of socio-economic insecurity and, by
extension, a functional requirement for welfare state expansion (Ramesh, 2009). The results
of this paper have called this perspective and its central claim into question. It is certainly
the case that in the immediate aftermath of the recent economic crisis, social protection was
temporarily reinforced, albeit to variable extents, by way of labour market reforms aimed at
the expansion of short-time work schemes, the strengthening of active labour market
policies, the strengthening of unemployment benefit schemes, and their extension to
previously excluded groups (Vis et al., 2011). However, this by and large temporary spell of
expansionary crisis management has since expired and been displaced by a more austere
agenda characterized by a tendency towards less rather greater levels of social protection
(Bieling, 2012). In other words, the functional demand for social welfare to which the crisis
has given rise has not been met by an increase in the supply of social welfare. This has been
the case even where the demand for social welfare has been greatest, such as in Greece and
the United Kingdom. This represents somewhat of a break from the economic crises of
decades past, the consequences of which triggered structural improvements in levels of
social protection (Pontusson and Raess, 2012; Rueda, 2012). Rather than expand the scope of
the welfare state, the majority of the governments of advanced political economies have
opted to compensate for the most recent crisis by sacrificing established levels protection in
favour of fiscal consolidation.
The observed inconsistency between the theory and evidence of social compensation
raises concerns regarding its functionalist tendency to neglect the political, institutional, and
economic conditions that define the parameters according to which governments determine
what is or is not a necessary measure of social compensation. Whether or not there is room
for such compensatory maneuvering is contingent upon a range of factors, not least of all the
political will of government actors, their perceptions of economic and fiscal constraints, and
the institutional contexts in which they are situated.
A second strand of literature has highlighted the role of institutional path dependence
in shaping cross-national welfare state change. Advocates of path dependence argue that
welfare states differ systematically in their logic of operation and, consequently, in the
responses they are likely to formulate when confronted by a common challenge (EspingAndersen, 1996; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Iversen and Wren, 1998; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000).
During periods of economic crisis, welfare states are therefore expected to fall back on their
old habits and exhibit regime-specific patterns of adjustment (Chung and Thewissen, 2011;
Iversen, 2007; Lallement, 2011). In other words, advocates of path dependence attempt to
explain the cross-national diversity of crisis responses by making reference to the presence
of pre-existing differences in cross-national institutional architectures.
This paper has provided limited evidence of any such rigid pattern of
correspondence between institutional contexts and crisis responses. Indeed, patterns of
recommodification have deviated from the predictions of the path dependence literature in
some important ways. Countries with similar institutional arrangements, such as Sweden
and Denmark, have embarked upon very different strategies of crisis management.
Moreover, countries with different institutional arrangements, such as Denmark and Greece,
have nevertheless shared similar trajectories of crisis management. More generally, in
contrast to the claims of the path dependence literature, the presence and the absence of
recommodification is visible across the established “worlds” and “varieties” of welfare
capitalism. Neither the presence of recommodification has been confined to liberal market
economies, nor its absence confined to their non-liberal counterparts. Taken together, these
findings suggest that the ex post diversity of cross-national crisis management cannot be
explained strictly or even primarily in terms of the ex ante diversity of cross-national
institutional architectures. These findings confirm the conclusions raised by a number of
recent comparative surveys of crisis management (Bermeo and Pontusson, 2012; Clasen et al.,
2012; Grant and Wilson, 2012; Heyes et al., 2012; Pontusson and Raess, 2012).
A third strand of literature has highlighted the role of partisan politics in shaping
cross-national welfare state change (Korpi and Palme, 2003). This literature has suggested
that strategies crisis management should differ systematically between left and right parties,
with the latter being more likely to opt for a market-oriented crisis reaction. However, the
findings of this paper suggest that partisan politics provide little causal leverage for
explaining cross-national patterns of labour market policy reforms in the aftermath of the
recent economic crisis. In other words, the partisan composition of governments explains
neither the observed disinclination towards social compensation nor the corollary tendency
towards recommodification. This is the case both in countries with weak automatic welfare
state stabilizers and in countries where strong automatic welfare state stabilizers are
presumed to have depoliticized crisis management (c.f. Starke et al., 2013). In other words,
contemporary patterns of recommodification have unfolded, by and large, irrespective of
the partisan complexion of ruling parties. It is noteworthy, however, that some instances of
crisis management appear to have an important partisan component to them. The results of
this paper suggest that this is particularly true for Australia and the United Kingdom, where
strong partisan differences have persisted between parties of the left and their counterparts
to the right (Starke et al., 2013; Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011). Notably, both countries
display weak automatic welfare state stabilizers. Nevertheless, the overall results of the
analysis suggest that the recent economic crisis has, for the most part, encouraged a political
convergence between parties of varying ideological tendencies (c.f. Bermeo and Pontusson,
2012; Pontusson and Raess, 2012).
The existing literature on partisanship and welfare state change provides a number
of explanations for such a convergence. On the one hand, Rueda (2012) has pointed to the
fact that, contrary to the crises of decades past, the recent economic crisis has primarily
affected labour market outsiders whose interests are increasingly neglected by both centreleft and centre-right parties (Rueda, 2007). However, this explanation cannot account for
instances of recommodification that have targeted labour market insiders. For example, it
fails to explain the recommodification of unemployment benefits in Denmark and the
erosion of employment protection legislation in Southern Europe. It would therefore appear
that an altogether different explanation is required. Notably, the results of the analysis have
highlighted the central importance of economic conditions in shaping contemporary
patterns of recommodification. This would suggest that economic constraints associated
with economic crises have the capacity to restrict the policy options available to political
parties, which in turn results in a political convergence across them.
The Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State
The results have demonstrated that economic conditions in general and fiscal crisis in
particular have played a particularly powerful role in shaping and, perhaps more
appropriately, constraining contemporary patterns of welfare state change. The analysis of
recent labour market reforms has revealed that the presence of fiscal crisis is a necessary (but
insufficient) condition for the presence of recommodification. It has also revealed that the
absence of fiscal crisis is a sufficient (but unnecessary) condition for the absence of
recommodification. Together, these results point to the centrality of fiscal concerns as a
determinant of welfare state change since the onset of the recent economic crisis.
In the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis, the governments of advanced
political economies enacted an array of expensive rescue measures with the aim of
stabilizing financial markets and stimulating domestic demand. As part of this expansionary
phase of crisis management, social programs were temporarily adjusted so as to provide for
greater levels of labour market protection (Clasen et al., 2012). Notably, governments have
had to mobilize considerable financial resources in order to accomplish these activities
(Bieling, 2012). The combined direct and indirect costs of the economic crisis have implied a
dramatic increase in public debt. The rapid increase in public indebtedness in turn
encouraged governments to promote austere exit strategies through which they now intend
to re-establish and maintain the conditions of fiscal stability (Heyes, 2013). If a temporary
expansion of labour market protection was the defining feature of earlier crisis responses,
then the defining feature of contemporary exit strategies has been a structural decline in
labour market protection.
If we are correct in assuming that democratic governments are inclined to provide
relief against the experience of socio-economic insecurity, the question remains why
electoral concerns have not encouraged the governments of advanced welfare states to
compensate for the insecurities that have resulted from the recent economic crisis
(Pontusson and Raess, 2012). In contrast to the economic crises of decades past, it would
appear that the fiscal scope for an expansion of the welfare state was sorely lacking across
the landscape of advanced political economies. Indeed, the potential for such expansionary
maneuverability was limited regardless of the institutional and partisan context in which
crisis management unfolded. In some countries, fiscal pressures have interrupted preexisting policy legacies and facilitated the enactment of path-breaking reforms. In others,
they have limited the policy options that both parties of the right and parties of the left have
perceived to be available to them, resulting in a political convergence between them.
This is not to deny the causal relevance of institutional and partisan conditions to
individual cases of crisis management. Indeed, as the above analysis has indicated, fiscal
crisis operates neither singularly as a necessary condition for the presence of
recommodification, nor universally as a sufficient condition for its absence. Nevertheless, at
least since the onset of the recent economic crisis, the explanatory weight of institutional and
political factors has diminished considerably while the causal leverage provided by
economic conditions in general and fiscal crisis in particular has increased dramatically. It
follows that a scholarly preoccupation with institutional arrangements and partisan politics
may result in a neglect of the conditions that have proven most decisive during the
aftermath of the recent economic crisis.
In summary, the paper findings suggest that contemporary patterns of welfare state
change can be explained principally in terms of the variable fiscal capacity of the state.
Where the fiscal stability of public finances has been more or less maintained, governments
have been awarded the sufficient conditions to avoid resorting to measures of
recommodification. By contrast, where perceptions of an acute fiscal crisis have dominated,
the established principles of the welfare state have eroded. Moreover, their erosion has
provided the necessary political and economic conditions for governments to embark upon
variable trajectories of recommodification (c.f. Vis, 2009). In countries where the fiscal
maneuverability of the state has been constrained, social policy goals have been
subordinated to the objective of re-establishing the conditions of fiscal stability (Bieling,
2012; Heyes, 2013). All in all, while the recent economic crisis has generated a functional
demand for welfare state expansion, the governments of advanced political economies have
thus far proven incapable or unwilling to meet it. These empirical developments raise
important theoretical questions regarding the propensity of the capitalist state to sacrifice
social welfare in order to promote economic recovery. They demand, in other words, a
scholarly return to the problematic relationship between the welfare state and capitalism
(Streeck, 2011).
Continuity and Change in Contemporary Welfare Capitalism
The tensions inherent to the relationship between the welfare state and capitalism
have proven less than fatal and not altogether unmanageable (Pierson, 2006). Indeed, early
theoretical articulations of an imminent crisis of the welfare state have given way to a rather
broad consensus that its architectures display a remarkable degree of institutional and
ideological resilience (Castles, 2004; Kuhnle, 2000; Pierson, 2001). According to this
consensus and its assumptions about the “new politics” of the welfare state, the crisis has
not arrived as predicted because the welfare state has established itself as a permanent and
immovable feature of contemporary capitalism. Notably, the recent economic crisis has
undermined this consensus and revived earlier concerns about the long-term viability of the
welfare state (Hay and Wincott, 2013; Yerkes and van der Veen, 2011). The question today,
as it was thirty years ago, is whether the crisis has compromised the institutional and
ideological barriers to radical welfare state retrenchment and thereby posed a fundamental
challenge to the presumed continuity of contemporary welfare capitalism.
To what extent has the recent economic crisis succeeded in transforming some of the
core architectures of advanced welfare states? While the results of this paper do not provide
a definitive answer to the question, they nevertheless suggest that proponents of the “new
politics” perspective have drastically overemphasized the resilience of the welfare state.
Since the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, employment and unemployment protection
systems have been subject to significant and unexpected levels of change. With some
exceptions, labour market reforms have implied the introduction of lower rather than higher
standards of social protection. In this sense, modern welfare states have not withstood the
test of resilience, at least as it is conceived by advocates of the new politics hypothesis. Of
course, the extent of recommodification has varied considerably across countries. In some
cases, it has even been more or less absent. Indeed, the political consequences of the
economic crisis have manifested themselves unevenly across the landscape of advanced
political economies. The persistence of institutional diversity, however, does not negate
evidence of the fact that advanced welfare states are converging upon a common political
agenda
of
fiscal
consolidation.
Nor
does
it
contradict
the
observation
that
recommodification has figured as an important empirical feature of this agenda. In
summary, contemporary welfare state developments are characterized by both parallel
trends and persisting differences (Heyes et al., 2012; Thelen, 2012).
These empirical developments are not easily accounted for by institutionalist
accounts of path dependence and their claims about the centrality of institutional equilibria
(e.g.
Ebbinghaus
and
Manow,
2001;
Hall
and
Thelen,
2009)
and
institutional
complementarities (e.g. Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Rhodes, 2005). In fact, contemporary
patterns of recommodification call into question the prevailing notion that cross-national
responses to exogenous crises vary systematically according to different “world” and
“varieties” of welfare capitalism (c.f. Chung and Thewissen, 2011; Iversen, 2007; Lallement,
2011; Wood, 2001). To this extent, the complexity of contemporary welfare state
developments appears to pose a critical challenge against the concept of path dependence
and the institutional determinism from which it has been known to suffer (Crouch and
Farrell, 2004; Deeg and Jackson, 2007).
At its core, the literature on path dependence has been informed by a static
comparativism whose methodological and analytical shortcomings have led its advocates to
stress the continuity of institutional diversity across different “worlds” and “varieties” of
welfare capitalism at the expense of broader historical transformations that they have shared
in common (Coates, 2000/2005; Heyes et al., 2012; Howell, 2003; Pontusson, 2005). The
varieties of capitalism literature and its proponents among comparative welfare state
scholars have relied on cross-sectional snapshots of institutional diversity in order to code
countries somewhat strictly into one or another ideal type whose logic they are presumed to
observe without interruption. As demonstrated by the recent economic crisis, however, the
contours of institutional configurations can be renegotiated, redefined, and reoriented. In
contrast to the assumptions of the path dependence literature, the nature and direction of
social and political outcomes is not always-already determined by the institutional context
in which they unfold. This literature has suffered from a “path dependence” of its own,
which has overlooked empirical developments such as those reviewed in this paper (Bruff
and Horn, 2012, p. 162). More specifically, its bias in favour of institutional continuity and
stability within each “world” or “variety” of welfare capitalism has led to a neglect of
actually-existing patterns of change within and across them.
As comparativists, we face the challenge of having to attend to both cross-national
similarities and cross-national differences (Pontusson, 1995). However, recent scholarship on
the impact of the economic crisis has tended to take notice of the former while largely
ignoring the latter (e.g. Chung and Thewissen, 2011; Hay and Wincott, 2013; Hemerijck,
2012; Lallement, 2011; Starke et al., 2013). It is true that the crisis has played out differently
across advanced political economies, giving rise to unique varieties of crisis management.
These varieties nevertheless share some features in common, including an overarching
emphasis on fiscal consolidation. The simultaneous presence of parallel trends and
persisting differences suggests the need to attend to both continuity and change in
contemporary welfare capitalism. After all, while many varieties of crisis management are
observable across the landscape of advanced political economies, they are all of a distinctly
capitalist nature.
VII. CONCLUSION
The political consequences of the recent economic crisis have manifested themselves
unevenly across the landscape of advanced welfare states. As a result, cross-national
variation is clearly observed with respect to the policy responses formulated in the
aftermath of its emergence. This paper has attempted to make sense of this cross-national
diversity by investigating the political, economic, and institutional conditions that have
shaped and constrained it.
The existing literature on welfare state change provides a number of theoretical
frameworks with which to explain cross-national social policy developments. Drawing on a
set-theoretic multi-method research design, the paper has systematically tested these
frameworks and their corresponding hypotheses. A crisp-set qualitative comparative
analysis of recent labour market reforms was conducted for the purpose of uncovering the
conditions under which welfare state recommodification has occurred and not occurred
across a sample of eighteen advanced welfare states. The results indicate that economic
conditions in general and fiscal crisis in particular have operated as particularly decisive
determinants of welfare state change since the onset of the economic crisis in 2008. In
particular, the analysis demonstrates that (i) the presence of fiscal crisis is a necessary (but
insufficient) condition for the presence of recommodification; and (ii) the absence of fiscal
crisis is a sufficient (but unnecessary) condition for the absence of recommodification.
Notably, mainstream theories of welfare state change and their corresponding hypotheses
do not provide a compelling explanation for the cross-national diversity of contemporary
crisis management. The paper has therefore illustrated that the determinants of welfare
change operating during one era are not necessarily the same as those operating during
another.
As a direct result of the crisis and ongoing attempts to arrest it, the fiscal crisis of the
welfare state—whether real or imagined—has returned as a core concern across the political
landscape of advanced welfare states (Gough, 2010; Hay and Wincott, 2013). In countries
where the consequences of the crisis have been most acutely experienced, the established
principles of the welfare state have been severely undermined. To the extent that the
necessary conditions for recommodification have presented themselves, the economic crisis
can be said to have generated a concomitant, if only partial, crisis of the welfare state. In
other countries, an immediate sense of fiscal crisis has been more or less absent. Its absence
has, in turn, presented governments with sufficient conditions to refrain from embarking
upon explicit trajectories of welfare state recommodification. However, broader concerns
about the need to re-establish the conditions of fiscal stability have nevertheless given rise to
variegated agendas of fiscal consolidation whose consequences for the welfare state are as of
yet unclear. While the economic crisis has generated a functional demand for welfare state
expansion, the governments of advanced welfare states have thus far proven incapable or
unwilling to supply it. Whether the observed disinclination to social compensation will
persist into the future or will be displaced by an altogether different agenda remains an
empirical question.
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED OVERVIEW OF LABOUR MARKET REFORMS
Change that reinforces the
obligation to work as a condition
of unemployment protection
•
Job search requirements now apply
immediately upon the receipt of
unemployment benefits rather than
after three months.
•
The geographical scope of job search
requirements has been extended
from 25km to 60km.
Australia
Change that reduces the generosity
of unemployment protection.
Austria
•
Belgium
•
The right to limit job search
according to the recipient’s previous
employment now ends after 3
months for youth and 5 months for
others rather than after 6 months.
Personal contracts with public
employment services are now
mandatory rather than voluntary.
•
Benefit levels after 15 months of
unemployment have been reduced by
12% for a co-habiting person with
dependents, 17.5% for a person living
alone, and 41.5% for a co-habiting
person with no dependents.
•
The waiting period for youth to receive
unemployment benefits has increased
from nine months to one year.
Change that reduces the strictness
of employment protection.
Change that reinforces the
obligation to work as a condition
of unemployment protection
Canada
•
The right to limit job search according
to the recipient’s previous wage has
been abolished.
•
A new measure dictates that job
search should take place up to 100km
away from the recipient’s place of
residence, whereas previously the
recipient could limit job search to the
immediate area in which they lived.
•
Denmark
Mandatory participation in active
labour market policy programs for
those under the age of 30 now begins
after 3 months rather than after 6
months.
•
New
sanctions
dictate
that
unemployment benefits not be paid
for 15 days if the recipient fails to
attend a scheduled appointment with
the public employment services.
•
The timetable for the development of
individualized job search plans has
been tightened.
Finland
Change that reduces the generosity
of unemployment protection.
•
The
maximum
duration
unemployment insurance has
reduced from 4 years to 2 years.
of
been
•
Qualifying conditions for regaining the
right to unemployment insurance have
increased from 26 weeks of previous
employment to 52 weeks.
Change that reduces the strictness
of employment protection.
Change that reinforces the
obligation to work as a condition
of unemployment protection
•
France
•
Registration
with
the
public
employment
services
is
now
compulsory for recipients of social
assistance, whereas previously it had
been voluntary.
Change that reduces the generosity
of unemployment protection.
•
The
maximum
duration
of
unemployment insurance is now equal
to the duration of one's contributions.
This has resulted in a reduction in
benefit duration for those with
moderate to high contribution records.
•
A transitional allowance awarded to
the unemployed moving from the first
to the second tier of the benefit system
has been abolished.
Job search requirements now apply
to all working-age members of the
recipient’s household.
Germany
Greece
•
All unemployment benefits have been
reduced by 22%.
Change that reduces the strictness
of employment protection.
•
The probationary period during
which employees can be lawfully
dismissed without any compensation
has increased from 1 to 2 months for
blue-collar workers, and from 3 to 4
months for those in management.
•
The notice period for lawful dismissal
has been reduced; for example, from
60 days to 30 days for employees who
have worked for one year.
•
The threshold for collective dismissals
has been relaxed from 4 to 6
employees for companies with 150 or
fewer employees, and from 2-3% of
employees to 5% of employees for
companies with more than 150
employees.
Change that reinforces the
obligation to work as a condition
of unemployment protection
Ireland
•
New sanctions dictate that benefit
cuts can be applied if the recipient
refuses a work or training offer.
•
A new measure has established job
search
requirements
for
unemployed youth in receipt of
unemployment benefits. Youth you
fail to comply with the new measure
face a 51% benefit cut.
•
New
sanctions
dictate
the
unemployment benefits may now be
terminated on the grounds of a
refusal to accept a job offer.
Italy
•
Access to unemployment benefits is
now conditional upon the recipient
declaring immediate readiness to
work or participate in training.
Change that reduces the generosity
of unemployment protection.
•
The
duration
of
unemployment
insurance has been reduced from 15
weeks and 12 weeks (depending on one’s
contributions) to 12 weeks and 9 weeks,
respectively.
•
Qualifying conditions for unemployment
insurance have doubled, from 52 weeks
of contributions to 104 weeks.
•
The
generosity
of unemployment
benefits has also been reduced by 8%
(from €204 to €188).
Change that reduces the strictness
of employment protection.
•
The parameters of lawful dismissal
for economic and disciplinary
reasons have been eased.
•
Employees found to have been
unlawfully dismissed will no longer
be entitled to reinstatement.
•
The repayment of foregone wages
after unlawful dismissal has now
been capped at 12 months.
!
!
Change that reinforces the
obligation to work as a condition
of unemployment protection
Change that reduces the strictness
of employment protection.
Change that reduces the generosity
of unemployment protection.
Netherlands
•
New
Zealand
The unemployment benefit system
has been restructured. As a result of
this restructuring, new categories of
benefit recipients now face job
search
requirements,
despite
previously having been exempt
from them.
Norway
Portugal
A new measure dictates that benefit
recipients must accept a job offer if the
wage is equivalent to 10% more than their
unemployment benefit level. Moreover,
after the first year of unemployment, the
benefit recipient must accept a job offer
even if the wage is equivalent to their
benefit level.
•
The
minimum
duration
of
unemployment benefits has been cut
from nine months to five months,
affecting those with leaner contribution
records.
The level of unemployment benefits is now
reduced by 10% after 180 days of receipt.
•
The time awarded to employees to
launch an unfair dismissal claim
has been reduced from 1 year to 2
months.
Change that reinforces the
obligation to work as a condition
of unemployment protection
•
Spain
The
receipt
of
extraordinary
unemployment
benefits
for
recipients whose entitlement to
ordinary unemployment benefits
has expired is now conditional upon
participation
in
mandatory
retraining programs.
Change that reduces the strictness
of employment protection.
Change that reduces the generosity
of unemployment protection.
The replacement rate of unemployment benefits
is now reduced from 70% to 50% rather than to
60% after 6 months of benefit receipt.
•
New legislation has promoted the
use of contracts with reduced levels
of severance pay in the case of
unfair dismissal. Severance pay in
case of dismissal is 33 days per year
of service as opposed to 45 days.
•
The notice period for lawful
dismissal has been reduced from 30
days to 15.
•
A new definition of collective
dismissal has been adopted in order
to allow collective dismissals for
economic reasons.
New legislation has legalized collective
dismissals in the public sector on
economic, technical, or organizational
grounds.
Sweden
United
Kingdom
New sanctions dictate that unemployment
benefits can be withdrawn for a period of 1
to 2 weeks if the benefit recipient fails to
attend a scheduled appointment with the
job centre.
A re-indexation of cash benefits has resulted in a
1.5% decrease in the real value of
unemployment benefits.
APPENDIX B: SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS (PRESENCE OF RECOMMODIFICATION)
(1) right*def*UNEMP*lme*STAB +
(2) right*def*UNEMP*LME*STAB +
(3) right*DEF*unemp*lme*stab +
(4) right* DEF*UNEMP*lme*STAB +
(5) right*DEF*UNEMP*LME*STAB +
(6) RIGHT*def*UNEMP*LME*STAB +
(7) RIGHT*DEF*unemp*lme*STAB +
(8) RIGHT*DEF*unemp*LME*STAB +
(9) RIGHT*DEF*UNEMP*lme*stab +
(10) RIGHT*DEF*UNEMP*lme*STAB
APPENDIX C: SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS (ABSENCE OF RECOMMODIFICATION)
(1) right*def*unemp*LME*stab +
(2) right*def*unemp*LME*STAB +
(3) right*def*UNEMP*LME*stab +
(4) right*DEF*unemp*LME*STAB
(5) right*IMBAL*UNEMP*LME*stab +
(6) RIGHT*imbal*unemp*LME*STAB +
(7) RIGHT*imbal*UNEMP*LME*stab