June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
International Journal of Arts & Sciences,
CD-ROM. ISSN: 1944-6934 :: 4(3):127-139 (2011)
c 2011 by InternationalJournal.org
Copyright KANT ON FRIENDSHIP
Stijn Van Impe
Ghent University, Belgium
This paper analyses the taxonomy, distinctive features and evolution of Kant’s conceptions of
friendship by examining Kant’s accounts of this topic in his different Lectures on Ethics from
the mid 1770’s till early 1790’s and his Metaphysics of Morals from 1797 as well as his
scattered remarks on friendship in some of his smaller writings and notes from his manuscript
remains. On the basis of this analysis, I show that (1) Kant’s taxonomy of friendship is far
more intricate that the distinction between friendship based on need, taste and disposition as
Lynch (2005) claims; (2) from the late 1770’s till the late 1790’s, Kant’s writings on
friendship display an increasing focus and emphasis on moral friendship, whereas his
discussion of friendship of need and taste from the early Lectures on Ethics disappears in his
late Lectures on Ethics and the Metaphysics of Morals; (3) although – following Marcucci
(1999) – one can distinguish between an ‘anthropological’ or ‘phenomenological’ account of
friendship especially in the early Lectures on Ethics and a ‘critical’ or ‘metaphysical’ account
of friendship in terms of an interplay of love and respect in the Metaphysics of Morals, the
latter account of friendship is not exclusively present in the Metaphysics of Morals but already
comes to the fore in the late Lectures on Ethics and even surfaces in some of the early
Lectures on Ethics and other ‘pre-critical’ writings; (4) in contrast to his early and late
Lectures on Ethics, Kant’s final account of moral friendship in the Metaphysics of Morals
seems to suggest that moral friendship is primarily based on respect and opposes or at least
brackets love; and (5) Kant’s persistent view on friendship as an idea or ideal of reason that
can merely be approximated but never fully achieved is based on different reasons throughout
his writings and is ultimately replaced in the Metaphysics of Morals by the view that
especially moral friendship may actually exist here and there in the highest degree of its
perfection.
Keywords: Kant, friendship, love, respect
INTRODUCTION
In the literature, rather little attention has been devoted to Kant’s views on friendship.1 This
paper analyses the taxonomy, distinctive features and evolution of Kant’s conceptions of
friendship by examining Kant’s substantial accounts of this topic in his different posthumously
published Lectures on Ethics2 from the mid 1770’s till the early 1790’s and his Metaphysics of
1
See Flynn (2007), Marcucci (1999); Veltman (2004) and Wood (1999:275–282).
During his academic career, Kant lectured during twenty-eight semesters on moral philosophy from 1756–1757 till
1793–1794. Kant’s so-called Lectures on Ethics are in fact student notes which were taken during his classes and
often afterwards carefully crafted into full-length manuscripts. Kant’s Lectures on Ethics are therefore specified by
adding the name of the student author, or, in case the author is anonymous, the name of the manuscript’s editor or
2
127
ijas-0403
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
128
Stijn van Impe
Morals from 1797 as well as by addressing Kant’s scattered remarks on friendship in some of his
smaller writings and notes from his manuscript remains, the so-called Reflexionen. Throughout
this analysis, I shall argue for the following claims. First, I shall argue – pace Lynch (2005:17–
19) – that Kant’s taxonomy of friendship is far more complicated than the ‘Aristotelian’
distinction – made in the early Lectures on Ethics – between friendship based on need, friendship
based on taste, and friendship based on disposition. Secondly, I shall show that from the late
1770’s till the late 1790’s, Kant’s writings on friendship display an increasing focus and
emphasis on moral friendship, whereas his discussion of friendship of need and taste from the
early Lectures on Ethics disappears in his late Lectures on Ethics and the Metaphysics of Morals.
Thirdly, I shall argue – pace Marcucci (1999:439, 441) – that, although one can distinguish
between an ‘anthropological’ or ‘phenomenological’ and a ‘metaphysical’ or ‘critical’3 approach
of friendship in Kant’s philosophy, the latter account of friendship in terms of an interplay
between love and respect is not exclusively present in the Metaphysics of Morals, as Marcucci
claims, but comes already to the fore in his late Lectures on Ethics and even surfaces in some of
his early Lectures on Ethics and other ‘pre-critical’ writings, and that, moreover, some
anthropological features of friendship reappear in his ‘post-critical’ writings. Fourthly, I shall
argue that – in contrast to the early and late Lectures on Ethics – Kant’s ultimate account of
moral friendship from the Metaphysics of Morals seems to suggest that moral friendship is
primarily based on respect rather than love and opposes or at least brackets love. Finally, I shall
show that Kant’s persistent view on friendship as an idea or ideal of reason that can merely be
approximated but never fully achieved in experience is based on different reasons throughout his
writings and is ultimately replaced in the Metaphysics of Morals by the view that especially
moral friendship may actually exist here and there in the highest degree of its perfection.
FRIENDSHIP IN KANT’S EARLY LECTURES ON ETHICS
The Idea of Friendship
Apart from one small passage on friendship in his Lectures on Ethics (Herder) from the mid
1760’s, Kant’s first substantial accounts of this topic are found in his Lectures on Ethics (Collins,
Mrongovius I, Brauer and Kaehler) from the mid 1770’s till early 1780’s, upon which my
analysis in this section shall be primarily based. In these Lectures, Kant argues that friendship in
owner or the location where the manuscript was originally discovered, preceded by the abbreviation ‘an’. In total,
there seem to have been twenty-three original manuscripts, twelve of which are currently still available. Ten original
manuscripts are extant (an-Berlin, an-Dilthey, an-Friedländer, an-Mrongovius or Mrongovius I, Brandt, Collins,
Herder, Kaehler, Mrongovius II, and Powalski), an eleventh (Vigilantius) is available as a handwritten copy of the
original, and a twelfth (Brauer) was published in Menzer (1924) before it was lost. By using philological methods,
Kraus (1926) demonstrated that twelve of the original manuscripts originated from a common ancestral text based
on Kant’s lectures on moral philosophy held between the winter semester 1774–1775 and the winter semester 1776–
1777. A thirteenth manuscript (Kaehler), which Krauss did not dispose of, and which was only recently published in
Kant (2004), also stems from this original set of notes. Leaving the duplication of this group of notes aside, Kant’s
Lectures on Ethics can be divided into five distinct sets of notes: (1) LE Herder (1763–1764), (2) the group of
thirteen mentioned above (1774–1775 till 1776–1777 with modifications during the early 1780’s), (3) LE Powalski
(1782–1783), (4) LE Mrongovius II (1784–1785), and (5) LE Vigilantius (1793–1794). For more details on Kant’s
lectures on moral philosophy and other philosophical disciplines, see Naragon (2006ff.).
3
The word ‘critical’ refers to Kant’s approach to and style of philosophy which is characteristic for his three
canonical works, i.e., the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the
Critique of Judgment (1790).
ijas-0403
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
ijas-0403
Kant on Friendship
129
general evolves from the motive of the ‘general love of mankind [allgemeine Menschenliebe] to
promote the happiness of others’ (LE Collins 27:422).4 Friendship thus presupposes concern for
the alter ego (LE Herder 27:54). However, on the basis of anthropological considerations, Kant
observes that ‘it does not seem that human nature implies a special predisposition towards
confidence, cordial well-wishing and friendship’ (R 15:321, n° 726)5 for by nature man is above
all moved by the motive of self-love which attends to the happiness of oneself. Hence, it seems
that in putting the motive of the general love of mankind above the motive of self-love, which is
the right thing to do from a moral point of view, I forsake my own happiness. Kant contends,
however, that true friendship generates ‘an exchange of welfare’. He writes:
if all men are so minded, that each looks out for the other’s happiness, then each man’s
welfare will be nurtured by the rest; were I to know that others were caring for my
happiness, as I would wish to care for theirs, I would be sure of not falling too short in any
cultivation of my own happiness, for it would be made good to me, […] for however well a
man takes care of another’s happiness, that other will be taking equally care of his. It looks
as if a man loses, when he cares for other people’s happiness; but if they, in turn, are caring
for this, then he loses nothing. In that case the happiness of each would be promoted by the
generosity of others, and this is the Idea of friendship, where self-love is swallowed up in
the idea of generous mutual love [Wechselliebe]. (LE Collins 27:422-423)6
However, we can never know for sure that others will look after my happiness. As Kant
already argues in his Lectures on Ethics from the mid 1760’s: ‘I am not convinced […] that
[another] will sacrifice something for my sake. […] We have to be able to assume that [one’s]
efforts on his own behalf will be made also for us, and ours for his; but that is a great deal to
expect, and so friends are few’ (italics added) (LE Herder 27:54). Moreover, the natural motive
of self-love is inextirpable and inevitably clashes with the moral motive of the general love of
mankind. This means that actual friendship can be very defective in experience. For these
reasons, Kant calls friendship an Idea ‘because it not drawn from experience, but has its seat in
the understanding’ (LE Collins 27:423).7 Hence, Kant assesses the Idea of friendship as ‘the
maximum of mutual love’ (LE Collins 27:423) 8 in that it ‘enables us to measure [actual]
friendship, and see how far it is still deficient’ (LE Collins 27:424).9 Kant therefore agrees with
Aristotle’s saying ‘My dear friends, there are no friends’ since ‘no friendship ever matches the
Idea of friendship’ (LE Collins 27:424).10 Kant’s view that true friendship is to be considered as
something that can merely be approximated but never fully achieved is also already expressed in
his Lectures on Ethics from the mid 1760’s, where he contends that people can only ‘come
reasonable close to this’ (italics added) (LE Herder 27:54). Yet, although ‘this Idea is valid only
in reflection, and no such thing occurs among men’ (LE Collins 27:424) 11 , this idea is
nonetheless ‘true’ and ‘necessary’, not from the natural point of view of what we will do, but
4
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1544; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:254); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:292)
My translation: ‘Es scheint nicht, daß die menschliche Natur eine sonderliche Anlage zum Zutrauen, dem
herzlichen Wohlwollen und der Freundschaft enthalte.’
6
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1544; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:255); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:292-293)
7
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1545; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:256); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:293).
8
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1545; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:256); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:295); but see also
the earlier LE Herder 27:54 as well as the later LE Powalski 27:227.
9
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1545; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924: 256); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:295).
10
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1545; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:256); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:295). In the
Lectures on Ethics from the mid 1760’s, Kant argues that ‘Friendship proper [eigentliche Freundschaft] is in part
impossible (owing to the number of our own requirements)’ (LE Herder 27:54).
11
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1545; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:257); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:296).
5
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
130
Stijn van Impe
from the moral point of view of what we ought to do. For, as Kant argues in a note on
anthropology dating from 1776–1778, it is friendship – together with the general love of
mankind, erudition and virtue – that determines the ‘characteristic value of mankind’
(‘eigenthümliche Werth des Menschen’) (R 15:624, n° 1429).
Having discussed the nature of the Idea of friendship in general, Kant distinguishes in the
Lectures on Ethics from the mid 1770’s till the early 1780’s between friendship of need
(Bedürfnis), taste (Geschmack) and disposition (Gesinnung) (LE Collins 27:424) 12 , a triadic
structure closely resembling Aristotle’s distinction between friendship based on utility, pleasure
and virtue from the Ethica Nicomachea (see Aristotle 2000:1155ff.), which Kant was quite
familiar with.
Friendship of need
Friendship of need is defined as ‘that whereby the participants may entrust each other with a
reciprocal concern [wechselseitige Vorsorge] in regard to their needs in life’ (LE Collins 27:424–
425).13 Hence, it is characterised by the fact that the participants can have confidence and can
presume that each of their friends would be able and willing to look after their affairs. Friendship
of need is considered to be the beginning of friendship among men as it arises in the most
primitive and roughest social conditions. Kant refers to hunter-gatherer societies where men have
to be able to rely on each other in securing their common goals and basic needs for food, shelter,
security, etc. As Kant will also contend in his late Lectures on Ethics, the need on which this
kind of friendship is based is ultimately ‘only the need for self-preservation, the protection so
sorely needed against hostile threats, which constitutes the bond [Band] that chains them’ (LE
Vigilantius 27:681). Consequently, Kant argues that in a state of luxury ‘such friendship does not
occur, and is not even wanted’ for in such a state man ‘has many concerns of his own, and then
he is all the less able to occupy himself with those of others, since he has himself to look after’
(LE Collins 27:425).14
Friendship of taste
Friendship of taste is called merely ‘an analogue of friendship, and consists in taking pleasure in
the company and mutual association [wechselseitige Gesellschaft] of the two parties, rather than
their happiness’ (LE Collins 27:426).15 In a note from 1776–1778, Kant contends that friendship
of taste is outwardly expressed by ‘courtesy’ (‘Hoflichkeit’) (R 15:371, n° 830). Likewise, in his
late Lectures on Anthropology (Dohna-Wundlacken) from 1791–1792, Kant associates
friendship of taste with displaying good manners and ‘politeness’ (‘Politesse’) (Kant 1924:228).
Moreover, Kant argues that in friendship of taste men are bound together not by ‘similarity’
(‘Einerleyheit’), but rather by ‘difference’ (‘Verschiedenheit’) , i.e., ‘by what the one can
contribute to the other’s needs; not by what the other already has, but when the one possesses
what supplies a want in the other’ (LE Collins 27:426).16 For this reason, Kant contends that
friendship of taste is therefore more likely to occur between men from different social levels:
‘Between persons of similar station or calling a friendship of taste is not so common as it is
between those of differing occupations; thus one scholar will have no friendship of taste with
12
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1546; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:257); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:296).
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1546; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:257–258); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:296).
14
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1546; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:258); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:297).
15
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1547; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:259–260); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:298).
16
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1547; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:260); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:299).
13
ijas-0403
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
ijas-0403
Kant on Friendship
131
another, for the one can do what the other can; they cannot satisfy or entertain one another, for
what one knows, the other knows too; but a scholar may well have a friendship of taste with a
merchant or soldier, and […] then each can entertain the other on his own subject’ (LE Collins
27:426).17
Friendship of disposition
‘Friendship of disposition or sentiment’ is characterised by utter unselfishness for it ‘does not
exist in that one desires something from the other, a service, etc., but is merely directed to the
sincere, pure disposition’ of one person towards another (LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:260)).18
This makes up for ‘the delicacy [das delicate] of friendship’ in that it ‘does not reside in the fact
that I see my friend’s coffers to contain even a schilling for myself’ (LE Collins 27:426).19 For
these reasons, friendship of disposition is regarded as the most perfect form of friendship and is
therefore called ‘the friendship that is universal’ (‘die Freundschaft die allgemein ist’) (LE
Brauer in Menzer (1924:260)).20 Friendship of disposition rests moreover on communion, openhearted communication and self-disclosure, a feature that is also already suggested in his
Lectures on Ethics from the mid 1760’s (LE Herder 27:54). Kant argues that
even when we engage in social intercourse and companionship, we still do not enter
completely into society. In any company we tend to withhold the greater part of our
disposition. […] If, however, we can get rid of this constraint, and impart our feelings to the
other, then we are fully in communion with him. So that each of us may be free of this
constraint, we therefore have need of a friend in whom we can confide, and to whom we
may pour out all our views and opinions; from whom we cannot and need not hide anything
and with whom we are fully able to communicate. On this, therefore, rests the friendship of
disposition. (LE Collins 27:427)21
Friendship of disposition resembles friendship of taste in that it does neither require ‘identity
of thought’ nor the negation of one’s personal identity: ‘it is difference, rather, which establishes
friendship, for in that case the one supplies what the other lacks’ (LE Collins 27:429).22 But in
contrast to friendship of taste, friendship of disposition does require and depend upon shared
‘principles of understanding and morality’ (‘Principia des Verstandes und Moralität’) (LE
Collins 27:429) 23 or upon, what Kant calls in his Lectures on Ethics from the mid 1760’s,
‘identity of personality’ (‘Einerleiheit der Persönlichkeit’) (LE Herder 27:54), and it is this
feature that makes that participants in friendship of disposition ‘can fully understand each other;
if they are not alike in that, they cannot get on at all together, since in judgment they are poles
17
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1547; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:260); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:299). According
to Marcucci (1999:437), Kant’s philosophical view on friendship of taste may explain why Kant himself often had
quarrels with fellow academics and philosophers and why he preferred to invite to his house friends from different
social standings than his own such as criminalists, government councilors, jurists, priests, bank masters, businessmen, etc.
18
My translation: ‘Die Freundschaft der Gesinnung oder des Sentiments besteht nicht darin, daß Einer von dem
Anderen was verlangt, eine Dienstleistung usw., sondern die nur bloß auf die aufrichtige, reine Gesinnung geht.’ See
also LE Mrongovius I 27:1547; LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:299). This characterisation of friendship of disposition is
absent in LE Collins.
19
See also Mrongovius I 27:1547; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:259); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:298).
20
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1547; LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:299).
21
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1548; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:260–261); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:300).
22
See also LE Mrongovius I 27:1549; LE Brauer in Menzer (1924:263); LE Kaehler in Kant (2004:302).
23
Ibid.
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
132
Stijn van Impe
apart’ (LE Collins 27:429). 24 By identity of personality, Kant means that in friendship of
disposition the participants share the same moral feeling (‘moralisches Gefühl’), i.e., a
receptivity (‘Empfänglichkeit’) for the moral law. As Marcucci (1999:437–438) aptly remarks,
friendship of disposition is based on the intellect [‘Verstand’] but also on sentiment [‘Sentiment’]
and is therefore closely akin – but not fully identical – to Kant’s notion of ‘moral friendship’,
which is analysed in greater detail in his late Lectures on Ethics, to which we now turn.
FRIENDSHIP IN KANT’S LATE LECTURES ON ETHICS
Kant’s second substantial account of friendship appears in his Lectures on Ethics (Vigilantius)
from 1793–1794. Like in the early Lectures on Ethics, Kant starts his discussion of friendship by
arguing that the general Idea of friendship ‘is so seldom to be met with in appearance’ and hence
is ‘taken to be unattainable’ (LE Vigilantius 27:675). The same conclusion is afterwards repeated
with regard to the more specific notion of moral friendship. As Kant writes, the latter is an
‘ideal’ which ‘men certainly strive to attain to […] though they are capable only of approaching
it. They assuredly see friendship as a need, but since nothing in experience corresponds to the
idea of it, the thing was to be considered as intellectual, merely, as a concept whose perfection is
never attained by men’ (LE Vigilantius 27:680).Yet, despite of its supersensible quality, the idea
of friendship is no less significant in that it proves to be ‘so very needful for the elevation
[Erhebung] of human life, and a moral reality to be developed therein for man’s end’ (LE
Vigilantius 27:675). Hence, friendship is given an important propaedeutic function for becoming
a moral agent, a picture which contradicts the often but wrongly acclaimed individualism,
coldness and moroseness of Kant’s ethics. In contrast to his early Lectures on Ethics, Kant no
longer offers an analysis of friendship of need and of taste, but focuses nearly exclusively on the
notion of moral friendship or – to put it perhaps more accurately – offers an explicitly moral
account of friendship. Kant defines moral friendship as ‘a complete love of well-wishing
[Wohlwollens] and also of well-liking [Wohlgefallens] among equals, in regard to their moral
disposition and inclinations’ (LE Vigilantius 27:680). According to Kant, moral friendship is
thus characterised by the following five features:
Well-wishing love to others (‘die Liebe des Wohlwollens gegen Andere’)
As Wood (1999:278–279) correctly argues, the fundamental ground of friendship is the
philanthropic love or benevolence that we rationally feel for every human being as a rational
nature and that is grounded on the well-liking (‘Wohlgefallen’) that we experience in the dignity
of the other’s rational nature. In this context, Kant contends that in moral friendship we ‘cherish
the inclination of well-wishing toward [others] from maxims’, i.e., that we love the other ‘from
duty’ (italics added) (LE Vigilantius 27:675–676). This means that moral friendship is not
grounded in what Kant calls ‘pathological love’, i.e., love based on passions, affects, inclinations
or mere sensibility, but rather in what he calls ‘practical love’, i.e., love based on practical reason
or love ‘whose determining ground is moral’ (LE Vigilantius 27:668). For this reason, Kant
argues that ‘when friendship demands a reciprocal love, in that it is based on unity of the moral
disposition, this is not a natural inclination, but rather an intellectual unification of the feelings
and thoughts of the parties, and the well-being that springs from this constitutes reciprocal love’
(italics added) (LE Vigilantius 27:682). In sensu lato, however, our well-wishing love towards
24
Ibid.
ijas-0403
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
ijas-0403
Kant on Friendship
133
others does not necessarily imply that the other has the same well-wishing love toward ourselves.
As Kant notices, ‘it is not at all necessary that there be a return of love’ (LE Vigilantius 27:682).
In this case, well-wishing love towards others establishes only an ‘amor unilateralis’ or
‘unilateral bond’ which comes down to me ‘being everyone’s friend’ without the assumption that
everyone else is my friend as well. Yet, in sensu stricto, so Kant argues, well-wishing love
towards others is ‘more closely and strictly coupled with the idea of friendship’ if this love is
reciprocal: ‘well-wishing changes into friendship (amicitia) through a reciprocal love, or amor
bilateralis’ (LE Vigilantius 27:676). This is also what it means to ‘make friends with everyone’:
it is ‘based on a reciprocal trust that the other also views my best interests as his own and is a
bilateral bond’ (Ibid.).
Equality
Kant denies that there can be any true friendship between unequals: ‘inter superiores et
inferiores no friendship occurs’ (LE Vigilantius 27:676). 25 Any relationship of inequality, in
which one participant has superiority over the other, can only generate and display favour
(‘Gunst’) and is a hindrance to the intimacy of trust and the unity of personality between friends
that allows them to share their thoughts, judgments, feelings and lives with one another (see LE
Vigilantius 27:683), but above all to reciprocally share in each other’s situation as if they
encountered it themselves. In particular, friendship requires equal mutual love but also equal
mutual respect (see LE Vigilantius 27:683).
Reciprocal possession (‘wechselseitiger Besitz’)
Kant defines ‘reciprocal possession’ as ‘the communal possession of one person by the other’ or
‘the union of their person as to moral disposition’ (LE Vigilantius 27:677). Reciprocal
possession is ‘based on moral principles and a mutual [practical] love derived from that’ and is
hence an ‘intellectual’ possession that cannot be sought in ‘the likeness or affinity of
inclinations’ (Ibid.). The core idea behind the notion of reciprocal possession is that friends
‘belong’ to the other, i.e., ‘that they possess each other in respect of their whole moral
disposition, and [that] each mutually shares in every situation of the other, as if it were
encountered by himself; and this, indeed, by laws of moral freedom’ (Ibid.). In the Metaphysics
of Morals, Kant will address this idea of reciprocal possession in terms of ‘each participating and
sharing sympathetically in the other’s well-being’ (MM 6:469).
Intimate communication (‘Mittheilung’) and openheartedness (‘Offenherzigkeit’)
Kant contends that ‘the reciprocal enjoyment of [the] humanity’ of friends lies in their standing
together by means of ‘the mutual disclosure of thoughts’26 (‘die wechselseitige Eröffnung der
Gedanken‘) (LE Vigilantius 27:677). As Kant continues: ‘This mutual enjoyment, which arises
in that man shares his thoughts with the other, and the other, conversely with him, is the
foundation of openheartedness’ (Ibid.). Significantly, this openheartedness requires more than
25
Notice that Aristotle is in agreement with Kant on this issue for, although he does not deny that there can be
friendship between unequals, he views such friendships as deficient and considers equality as a necessary condition
for perfect friendship. See Aristotle (2000:1157–1158).
26
For a thorough discussion and analysis of the feature of self-disclosure in Kant’s and Aristotle’s views on
friendship, see Veltman (2004).
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
134
Stijn van Impe
merely sharing each other’s ‘sensory fellow-feeling’ or ‘receptivity to the joys and sorrows of the
other’ for such a sharing would be based on ‘kindliness’ (‘Gutherzigkeit’) (Ibid.), which means
that it would therefore be arbitrary and contingent, i.e., merely dependent on one’s natural
character and temperament. Openheartedness must also – and perhaps above all – imply an
intellectual sharing. Moreover, ‘in the mutual humanity among friends, openheartedness must
serve as the basis, whereby alone the so needful sharing of feelings and thoughts, the necessary
enlargement of our various perfections, and the closer bonding with the friend is established’ (LE
Vigilantius 27:679). Recall that this feature of openheartedness and self-disclosure was also
crucial in Kant’s characterisation of friendship from disposition from the early Lectures on
Ethics. Interestingly, Kant argues that this ‘naturally implanted need to communicate’ clashes
with the equally naturally imprinted ‘love of honour’, i.e., ‘a drive constantly to perfect oneself
in comparison with others’ (LE Vigilantius 27:679–680). Consequently, this natural antagonism
causes that ‘an unconcealed communication of all one’s means, ends and endeavours […] will
[…] seldom occur’ (LE Vigilantius 27:680). This is another, different reason why Kant views
moral friendship in the late Lectures on Ethics as unachievable: ‘for this reason, and insofar as
we demand friendship in its ideal form, Aristotle is correct in saying: My friends, there is no
friend’ (LE Vigilantius 27:680).
The love for mutual well-liking (‘die Liebe zu dem wechselseitigen Wolhgefallen’)
Kant contends that this mutual well-liking ‘lies solely in the intellectual disposition of the friends,
engendered from the material of reciprocal esteem’, which is the basis for the intellectual need
for friendship (LE Vigilantius 27:680). What Kant means by this is that friends cherish
‘something of great moral value that friendship instantiates, namely, the fact that two human
beings really do reciprocally esteem one another, [but also] show benevolence toward one
another, communicate intimately, and unite their ends, swallowing up the happiness of each into
a shared end’ (Wood 1999:280). It is this feature that turns friendship into an ethical duty.
Wood (1999:280) aptly argues that these five elements are different necessary conditions for
moral friendship. Reciprocal benevolence or well-wishing love to others ‘identifies the ultimate
foundation of friendship in the objective value of the persons who enter into it, without which
nothing like friendship would be possible’. Equality ‘is the necessary condition of its possibility
in the relationship of the two who are friends’. Reciprocal possession ‘is the unique effect
friendship has on the rational volition of the individuals, which accounts for its moral value and
importance’. Intimate communication and openheartedness ‘is the final end of friendship from
the standpoint of our natural needs’. The love for mutual well-liking ‘is the final end of friendship
from the standpoint of morality’.
Finally, it has to be noticed that moral friendship from Kant’s late Lectures on Ethics closely
resembles friendship of disposition from the early Lectures on Ethics in that Kant repeatedly
stresses that it requires a sharing of principles of understanding and morality. As he writes, ‘it all
comes down to the fact that [friends] approximate to one and the same principle in their mode of
thought, or maxims of action; […] the discovered incompatibility of their principles equally
distances and destroys any instituting of friendship’ (LE Vigilantius 27:681). Likewise, he
contends that the ‘sweet delight in the enjoyment of friendship is afforded only by the harmony
of judgement, i.e., that the feelings and thoughts of the parties are derived from the same
principia’ and that men ‘do not long remain friends if they differ from each other in their
principia’ (LE Vigilantius 27:683).
ijas-0403
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
ijas-0403
Kant on Friendship
135
FRIENDSHIP IN KANT’S METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
In the Metaphysics of Morals from 1797, Kant discusses friendship immediately after the section
‘On ethical duties of human beings toward one another with regard to their condition’ (MM
6:468–469). He defines the general idea of friendship as ‘the union of two persons through equal
mutual love [Liebe] and respect [Achtung]’ (MM 6:469). This is a delicate balance according to
Kant ‘For love can be regarded as attraction [Anziehung] and respect as repulsion [Abstoβung],
and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle of respect requires them to
stay at a proper distance from each other. This limitation on intimacy […] is expressed in the rule
that even the best of friends should not make themselves too familiar with each other’ (MM
6:470). Hence, true friendship is something very difficult to realise. Referring to Aristotle’s
saying already used in the Lectures on Ethics, Kant thus once more concludes ‘My dear friends,
there is no such thing as a friend!’ (MM 6:470). Hence, just as in the early and late Lectures on
Ethics, Kant emphasizes that friendship is an ideal or idea, viz. ‘an ideal of each participating
and sharing sympathetically in the other’s well-being through the morally good will that unites
them’, or ‘only an idea (though a practically necessary one) and unattainable in practice’; but
here Kant significantly and explicitly adds that ‘striving for friendship (as a maximum of good
disposition toward each other) is a duty set by reason’ (italics added) (MM 6:469). Moreover, the
reason why true friendship cannot be achieved seems to have altered once more or at least
specified differently. Whereas in the early Lectures on Ethics actual friendship was considered to
be defective because it could never completely match with the ‘Idea’ or ‘Ideal’ of friendship as a
‘maximum of mutual love’, and in the late Lectures on Ethics (moral) friendship was regarded as
unachievable due to a natural antagonism of dispositions that renders an unconcealed
communication and openheartedness nearly impossible, the conclusion that friendship is
unachievable is now defended on the basis that it is hard to realize and maintain the balance
between love, which, as Marcucci (1999:440) puts it, ‘moves us to help the friend but also to
help him consider his faults’, and respect, which ‘one friend demands from another when he is
considered as a person, and so not as a subordinate’.
For this reason, Kant argues that the delicate relation of love and respect between friends is
broken ‘if one of them accepts a favor from the other’ for ‘then he may well be able to count on
equality in love, but not in respect; for he sees himself obviously a step lower in being under
obligation without being able to impose the obligation in turn’ (MM 6:471). Nonetheless, it is
this balance between love and respect that makes friendship something ‘tender’ – Kant refers to
the ‘teneritas amicitiae’ – although friendship cannot be grounded merely in feelings for in that
case it would never be ‘safe from interruptions’. On the contrary, the ‘mutual sympathy’ and
‘self-surrender’ in friendship have to be ‘subjected to principles or rules preventing excessive
familiarity and limiting mutual love by requirement of respect’ (italics added) (MM 6:471). On
the basis hereof, Marcucci (1999:440) claims ‘that a conclusion, until now hidden, comes to our
attention’, namely that, as Kant writes, ‘friendship cannot be a union aimed at mutual advantage
but must rather be a purely moral one [muβ rein moralisch sein]’ (MM 6:470). Yet, although
Marcucci is right in arguing that Kant’s view on friendship as having to be purely moral presents
a break in that on that account Kant can no longer leave room for friendship based on need and
friendship based on taste from the early Lectures on Ethics, he is wrong in arguing that Kant’s
view that friendship has to be unselfish is new and unique for the Metaphysics of Morals for, as
we have seen, Kant explicitly argued in the early Lectures on Ethics that friendship of disposition
‘does not exist in that one desires something from the other, a service, etc.’
Marcucci (1999:439, 441) also argues that Kant’s treatment of friendship in terms of love
and respect is unique for his later, so-called ‘critical’ account of friendship in the Metaphysics of
Morals as opposed to the different Lectures on Ethics which offer an ‘anthropological’ and
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
136
Stijn van Impe
‘phenomenological’ treatment of friendship and where Kant does not particularly insist on these
two concepts. Yet, already in the early Lectures on Ethics, Kant argued that friendship evolves
from the motive of ‘the general love of mankind to promote the happiness of others’ (LE Collins
27:422). Moreover, Marcucci does not deal with Kant’s late Lectures on Ethics where Kant does
assess friendship as an interplay of love and respect. For instance, Kant explicitly argues there
that the reciprocal love in friendship ‘must absolutely be coupled, among friends, with mutual
respect for humanity in the person of the friend’ and that this interaction makes up for the
‘delicacy’ of friendship (LE Vigilantius 27:682). Likewise, he contends that in friendship ‘each
is obligated to preserve the other’s respect, and unite only with this disposition. From this,
therefore, it emerges that only a reciprocal love based on respect can secure a lasting friendship’
(LE Vigilantius 27:683). Finally, he argues that the establishment of ‘perfect friendship’ requires
that we ‘keep sufficiently at a distance from our friend, [so] that the respect which in all
circumstances we owe to this personhood is in no way infringed thereby’ (LE Vigilantius
27:685).
Marcucci might reply that the late Lectures on Ethics – given its date and content – no
longer offers an anthropological or phenomenological account of friendship as in the early
Lectures on Ethics, but already presents the critical view of friendship as in the Metaphysics of
Morals. Yet, while this may be true, it has to be noted that even in some of his early Lectures on
Ethics Kant already mentions the ‘critical’ view of the necessity of respect as a fundamental
constituent of friendship. In the Lectures on Ethics from 1782–1783, he notes that – besides love
– ‘in all friendship, there has to be at the same time respect’ (LE Powalski 27:227).27 Likewise, in
his ever earlier Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime from 1764, Kant
holds that a person of a sublime cast of mind displays not only ‘a certain noble trust in oneself
and an appropriate self-esteem’, but also ‘a calm benevolence and respect towards others’ which
makes such a person apt to ‘have a heart for friendship’ (OBS 2:235). Hence, in this ‘pre-critical’
work, which is generally acknowledged by scholars as one of Kant’s ‘anthropological’ writings,
Kant suggests a ‘critical’ account of friendship in terms of benevolence and respect. Conversely,
in Kant’s ‘post-critical’ On Pedagogy from 1803, an anthropological account of friendship
reappears: in discussing the physical education of children, Kant argues that a trait of a child’s
character has to be ‘sociability’ (‘Geselligkeit’) and suggests that this feature displays itself in
developing friendship understood as a condition in which one does not merely exist for oneself
(P 9:484). On the whole, it seems that Marcucci is right if he were to maintain that Kant’s
account of friendship gradually evolves throughout his oeuvre in terms of an increasing emphasis
on (moral) friendship in terms of love and respect and that in this evolution some of the
‘anthropological’ features of Kant’s earlier views on friendship gradually diminish in
importance. Yet, the so-called ‘anthropological’ and ‘critical’ accounts of Kant’s views on
friendship cannot so neatly be separated as Marcucci claims: it is both the case that some
‘critical’ features of friendship already appear in Kant’s ‘pre-critical’ works and that some
‘anthropological’ features of friendship reappear in his ‘post-critical’ works.
Kant dedicates the final section of his discussion on friendship in the Metaphysics of Morals
explicitly to the concept of moral friendship. In contrast to friendship based on feeling, i.e.
‘aesthetic friendship’, Kant defines ‘moral friendship’ as ‘the complete confidence of two
persons in revealing their secret judgments and feelings to each other’ (MM 6:471). Remember
that this feature of intimate communication, self-disclosure or open-heartedness was already
crucial for Kant’s notion of friendship of disposition from the early Lectures on Ethics and was
also listed as the fourth criterion for the notion of moral friendship in the late Lectures on Ethics.
Yet, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant significantly adds that this mutual self-disclosure of
judgments and feelings is characteristic for moral friendship ‘as far as such disclosures are
27
My translation: ‘Bey aller Freundschaft muβ auch zugleich Achtung seyn’.
ijas-0403
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
ijas-0403
Kant on Friendship
137
consistent with mutual respect’ (italics added) (MM 6:471). 28 As Marcucci correctly notices
(1999:440), the concept of respect thus seems to be given a primordial function in Kant’s
ultimate determination of moral friendship, whereas the concept of love, which was crucial for
friendship of disposition in the early Lectures on Ethics as well as for moral friendship in the late
Lectures on Ethics, seems to be bracketed – although it has to be admitted that Kant already
seemed to consider this bracketing of love in the late Lectures on Ethics by arguing that ‘only a
reciprocal love based on respect can secure a lasting friendship’ (italics added) (LE Vigilantius
27:683). Ultimately, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant even seems to oppose love to the
concept of friendship in arguing that ‘the relation of the protector, as a benefactor, to the one he
protects, who owes him gratitude, is indeed a relation of mutual love, but not of friendship, since
the respect owed by each is not equal’ (MM 6:473; see also MM 6:471). Finally, true moral
friendship is no longer seen here as it was in the early and late Lectures on Ethics, i.e. as a mere
unattainable ideal, but as something that is at least sometimes completely achievable: ‘This
merely moral friendship is not just an ideal but (like black swans) actually exists here and there
in its perfection’ (MM 6:672). As such, moral friendship is here contrasted with pragmatic
friendship, ‘which burdens itself with the ends of others, although out of love, can neither have
the purity nor the completeness requisite for a precisely determinant maxim; it is an ideal of
one’s wishes [ein Ideal des Wunsches], which knows no bounds in its rational concept but which
must always be very limited in experience’ (MM 6:472). Once more, in the passage above, love
and respect seem to be implicitly opposed for, as Marcucci (1999:441) notices, ‘love seems to be
the characteristic of pragmatic friendship and it seems to be on the level of desire’. Hence, it
seems that in Kant’s final account of moral friendship from the Metaphysics of Morals it is
respect rather than love that comes to the fore.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have shown that:
1. Kant’s taxonomy of friendship is far more intricate that the distinction between friendship
based on need, taste and disposition as Lynch claims.
2. From the late 1770’s till the late 1790’s, Kant’s writings on friendship display an increasing
focus and emphasis on moral friendship, whereas his discussion of friendship of need and
taste from the early Lectures on Ethics disappears in his late Lectures on Ethics and the
Metaphysics of Morals.
3. Although – following Marcucci – one can distinguish between an ‘anthropological’ or
‘phenomenological’ account of friendship especially in the early Lectures on Ethics and a
‘critical’ or ‘metaphysical’ account of friendship in terms of an interplay of love and respect
in the Metaphysics of Morals, the latter account of friendship is not exclusively present in the
Metaphysics of Morals but already comes to the fore in the late Lectures on Ethics and even
surfaces in some of the early Lectures on Ethics and other ‘pre-critical’ writings.
28
Hence, in Kant’s view on moral friendship from the Metaphysics of Morals, there is a tension between upholding
self-disclosure (and thus honesty) on the one hand and avoiding too much intimacy on the other hand. For discussion
of this specific problem in Kant’s account of friendship, see Flynn (2007).
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
138
ijas-0403
Stijn van Impe
4. In contrast to his early and late Lectures on Ethics, Kant’s final account of moral friendship in
the Metaphysics of Morals seems to suggest that (moral) friendship is primarily based on
respect and opposes or at least brackets love.
5. Although Kant’s view on friendship in general as an idea or ideal of reason that can merely be
approximated but never fully achieved in experience is consistent throughout his early and
late writings, the reasons for upholding this view are different. In the early Lectures on Ethics,
it is due to the fact that actual friendship can never completely match with the ‘Idea’ or ‘Ideal’
of friendship as a ‘maximum of mutual love’. In the late Lectures on Ethics, it is due to the
fact that man’s natural antagonism of dispositions renders an unconcealed communication and
openheartedness impossible. In the Metaphysics of Morals, it is due to the fact that it is hard
to realize the delicate balance between love and respect. However, in the latter work, Kant
ultimately also considers the possibility of moral friendship as something that at least
sometimes can actually exist.29
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to thank Bart Vandenabeele and the Research Foundation Flanders for their support of my
research.
REFERENCES
Aristotle (2000). Nicomachean Ethics. Translated and edited by Roger Crisp. Cambridge:
University Press.
Cambridge
Flynn, Patricia C. (2007). ‘Honesty and Intimacy in Kant’s Duty of Friendship’. International
Philosophical Quarterly 47(4):417–424.
Kant, Immanuel (1902ff). Gesammelte Schriften. Edited by the Royal Prussian (later: German) Academy
of Sciences. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Kant, Immanuel (1924). Die philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen Immanuel Kants. Nach den neu
aufgefundenen Kollegheften des Grafen Heinrich zu Dohna-Wundlacken. Herausgegeben von
Arnold Kowalewski. München & Leipzig: Rösl & Cie.
Kant, Immanuel (2007). Kant im Kontext III. Werke, Briefwechsel, Nachlass und Vorlesungen. Berlin:
Karsten Worm.
Kant, Immanuel (1996). Practical Philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor. General
Introduction by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel (1997). Lectures on Ethics. Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind. Translated by
Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel (2004). Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie. Herausgegeben von Werner Stark. Einleitung
von Manfred Kühn und Nachwort von Werner Stark. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
June 8, 2011
15:25
Research Publishing : IJAS Sample
ijas-0403
Kant on Friendship
139
Kant, Immanuel (2008). Anthropology, History and Education. Edited and translated by Robert B.
Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Krauss, Wilhelm (1926). Untersuchungen zu Kants moralphilosophischen Vorlesungen. Doctoral
dissertation. Tübingen.
Lynch, Sandra (2005). Philosophy and Friendship. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Marcucci,
Silvestro (1999). ‘“Moral Friendship” in Kant’. Kant-Studien 90:434–441.
Menzer, Paul (Ed.) (1924). Eine Vorlesung Kants über Ethik. Berlin: Pan-Verlag Heise. Naragon, Steve
(2006ff.). ‘Kant in the Classroom’. http://www.manchester.edu/kant/ [6 December 2010]
Veltman, Andrea (2004). ‘Aristotle and Kant on Self-Disclosure in Friendship’. The Journal of Value
Inquiry 38:225–239.
Wood, Allen W. (1999). Kant’s Ethical Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.