Technopolitics:
How Technology Shapes Relations Among Nations
MohanMalik,Ph.D.
Greatpowerpoliticsisverydynamic.Butwhatarethedynamicsofgreatpowerpolitics?What
isthekeydriverofgreatpowerpolitics,especiallyinthe21st century?Thispapercontendsthat
advancesinscienceandtechnology(S&T)havelonginfluencedthecourseofinternationalpolitics.
Technology,infact,isoneofthekeydeterminantsinshapingrelationsamongnations,alongside
warsandeconomicshifts.Itremainsthekeytoolforpromotingeconomicdevelopmentand
nationalsecurity. Inthepast,developmentsintechnologygaveustheindustrialrevolutionthat
created the modern international system. Technologically advanced industrialized nations
accumulatedandexercisedtheirvasteconomicandmilitarypowersinordertoestablishtheir
supremacyoverlessadvancedpartsoftheworld,ineffectcreatingahierarchyamongnations.
Historicallyspeaking,tectonicshiftsinglobalpoliticshaveoccurredrapidlyduetothreefactors:
wars,economicshiftsandtechnologicaldevelopments.In1935,withnoarmedforcestospeakof
andaneconomyindecline,theUnitedStateswantedtobeleftalone.However,only10yearslater,
armedwithnuclearweaponsandflushwithvictoryinWorldWarII,aneconomicallyprosperous
UnitedStatestookoverfromPaxBritannica.Bymakingwarmoredestructive,technologyhas
madewaranunreliablemeansofconductinggreatpowerrelations,therebyfosteringco-operation
amongstates. Twenty-twoyearsagoin1990,ChinawasintheinternationaldoghousepostTiananmenmassacreandIndiaseemedtobeatwarwithitself.JapanwasthenNumberOnein
Asia.ButlongcyclesofeconomicgrowthinChinaandIndiaandstagnationinJapanhaveledto
atectonicshiftintheglobalpowerstructureandchangedthesecountries’rankingandstatusinthe
peckingorder.OneofthekeyfactorsintheriseofChinaandIndiahasbeenrapidtechnological
adoptionandadvancement.
Informationandcommunicationtechnologies(ICT)inparticularhavecastapervasiveimpact
inthedynamicsofinternationalrelations.AccordingtoCharlesWeiss,theimpactofICT“maybe
classifiedasoperatingthroughoneoffourmainmechanisms:
1 changingthearchitectureoftheinternationalsystem:itsstructure,itskeyorganizing
conceptsandtherelationsamongitsactors;
2 changingtheprocessesbywhichtheinternationalsystemoperates,includingdiplomacy,
war,administration,policyformation,commerce,trade,finance,communications,
andthegatheringofintelligence;
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3 creatingnewissueareas,newconstraintsandtrade-offsintheoperationalenvironment
offoreignpolicy,atermwhichincludesnotonlypoliticalconstraintsoninternational
action,butalsoconstraintsimposedbythelawsofnaturalandsocialscience;and
4 providingasourceofchangedsecurityperceptions,ofinformationandtransparencyfor
theoperationoftheinternationalsystem,andofnewconceptsandideas forinternational
relationstheory.”1
The Global Diffusion of Technology
Thedynamicsofglobalizationunleashedbytechnologyistransformingrelationsamongstnations.
Technologicaladvanceshaveemergedastheprincipalagentsofsocial,economicandpoliticalchange,
drawingtheworldcloserwhilstalsodividingit.The“revolutionindual-usetechnologies”for
instance,isgeneratingfundamentaltransformationsbothinthewaywealthandpoweriscreatedand
warsarefoughtbecausetechnologydiffusionisnowvirtuallyinstantaneousandunstoppable.Unlike
inthepast,technologydiffusionnowtakesplaceatitsmostadvancedlevel.Commercialsatellites,
GPSreadings,space-basedimagery,weatherdata,andInternetdata – theyallhavepotentialmilitary
applicationsincommunications,navigation,intelligenceandoperationsupport.The“equalizing”
featureofICThasalsolentnon-stateentitiesmorepowertoinitiatesocietalchangeandtoaddress
thebroadestaudiencepossibleinvirtualtime,undermininginsomecasesthemonopolyofthe
modernstatetogovernandrule.Usingsuicidebombersandimprovisedexplosivedevicesastheir
technologiesofchoice,terroristgroups–considerednon-stateplayersintheinternationalarena–
haveexposedtheshortcomingsoftraditionalwar-fightingresponsesandcreatednewvulnerabilities
forstates.
Developments in advanced technologies – such as the next generation microelectronics,
nanotechnology,biotechnology,roboticsandartificialintelligence–willupsetexistingbalances
of power and shape military capabilities for future conflicts. Forecasts indicate that S&T
advancementswilltransformthebattlefieldinthedecadesahead.Bytheyear2030,severalstates
willacquireformidablepower-projectionmilitarycapabilitieswithweaponsofincreasingrange,
accuracyanddestructivenessfortheconductofhigh-intensityconflict.Doctrinesofflexible
responseformultiplemissionsbasedonhigh-technologyweaponsandadiversified,yetintegrated,
forcestructurewillbethekeyprinciplesofdefensepoliciesofmajorpowers. The“front”will
disappearasthewholecountrywillbecomethebattlefield.Sincethefrontwillnolongerbethe
mainbattlefield,long-rangeforceprojectionweaponryfordeepstrikes,likeballisticandcruise
missilesandamphibiouscapabilities,willassumesignificanceinthefrontlesswarsofthefuture.
Noarmscontrolagreementornon-proliferationregimeortechnologycontrolmechanismcan
preventtheproliferationofthetechnologicalmeansofwar.
Butglobaltechnologicaldiffusionwillcontinuetobeuneven,andwillallowsomenationswho
havethetechnologicaledgetogainstrategicadvantageoverothers.Thechangesingeopolitical
systemsoftrade,offshoreproductionbymultinationalcorporations,andintellectualproperty
protection,coupledwithadvancesinICT,havehelpedglobalizeresearchanddevelopment(R&D)
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activities.WhiletheUnitedStates,JapanandthecountriesinWesternEuropehavebeenthe
traditionalfocusofR&D,ChinaandIndiahaveemergedasthenewdestinationsforR&D,atrend
thatwillenhancetheirabilitytoattainglobalscientificandtechnologicalleadership.Chinahas
thepotentialtoleapfrogincyberandspacetechnologiesandconcepts.Chinesestrategistshave
longcalledforahigh-techupgradeofitsmilitarytopreparetofightafuturewarinwhichsoftware
beatsmanpower.2 Asearlyasin1997,threemembersofthePeople’sLiberationArmy’s(PLA)
AcademyofElectronicTechnologywroteanessayinChina Computer World thatcalledupon
Chinatoabandonthe“traditionalconceptsofwar-making...whichemphasizedthedestructionof
hardware,attackingcities,seizingterritoryandinflictingcasualties.Now,thestruggletocontrol
informationisthefocusofweaponsystemsandthecountermeasurestakenagainstthesesystems…
Conductingwarfarewithcomputervirusesismoreeffectivethanusingnuclearweapons.”3 The
PLAhasidentifiedanumberof“focusareas”:moderncommand-and-controlcommunications
systems,cyber,spaceandlong-rangeballisticandcruisemissilesfordeepstrikes,stealthplatforms,
andimprovedairdefenses.Indeed,outerspace,cyberspaceandoceanbedsareemergingasthe
newarenasofstrategiccompetition.Countriesthatdominateinkeytechnologiesinthesedomains
willhaveanedgeoverothers.Itisnotacoincidencethatagreatpowershiftnowunderway
coincideswiththesearchanddevelopmentofnewweaponstechnologiesofthefuture.Whichever
countryinventsanewweaponsystem(“theassassin’smace”astheChinesecallit)wouldshiftthe
overallbalanceofpower(asnuclearweaponsdidin1945)initsfavor.
The New Great Game: “Techno-Resource Nationalism”
Everyinternationalorderisbasedonanenergyresource.Resourcepoliticsgeneratesboth
competitionandcooperationbetweennations.Greatpowercontestsareessentiallystrugglesfor
resources.WemovedfromtheAgeofSailtoCoalandSteam,bothofwhichwerethebasisofPax
Britannica.WhentheBritishranoutofsteam,literallyspeaking,theU.S.-ledordercameinto
being,basedonoilandnuclearenergy.IsitacoincidencethattheU.S.isseenasadecliningpower
justwhentheworldseemstoberunningoutofoil?
Mostwarsofthe20th centurywereenergywars.Statingtheobvious,muchlikehumans,nations
need energy to revitalize and re-energize in order to defend core interests. In this context,
technologyforrisingpowerssuchasChinaandIndiaiscentraltoanydiscussionoftheirresource
base,certainlyakeyvariableintheir“comprehensivenationalpower”strategiesandpolitics.To
understandthegreatpowerplayunderwayinAsiaoftheearly21st century,strategistscontendthat
weneedtobrushupourknowledgeoftheclassicworksongeopoliticsbyHalfordMackinderand
NicholasJ.Spykman.Theroleoftransportationtechnology,inparticular,deservesspecialattention
asitischangingthegeopoliticsoftheEurasianlandmass.Toillustrate,muchlikeBritainand
Russiabeforeit,Chinaisnowemployingmoderntransportationtechnologytore-drawthemapof
Eurasiaviahigh-speedrailways,highwaysandpipelines.Beijingisspendingbillionstocreateits
alternativehub-and-spokeseconomicsystemwherebythevariouspipelines,railroadsandhighway
transportationnetworkslinkingChinawithCentral,SouthwestandSoutheastAsiawillserveas
thespokesorarteriesthatwillbringinrawmaterialsandenergyresourceswhileexportingChinese
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manufacturedgoodstothoseregionsandbeyond.Onecanarguethatthetwomostimportant
determinantsofChina’sforeignpolicytodayisoilandtechnology(specificallyenergytechnology)
–notTaiwan,nottheU.S.,oranyotherissue.
Intheabsenceofamajorscientificdiscoveryortechnologicalbreakthrough,theoilpolitik will
continue to shape power capabilities and culminate in the emergence of new coalitions and
geopoliticalalliancesinthedecadesahead.Theenergycompetitionisalsoheighteningtensions
overtheongoingterritorial/maritimedisputes,andshapingdefensemodernizationplansandforging
newmilitaryalliances.Withinthenextdecadeorso,theArcticOceanislikelytobecomeanother
areaofenergycompetition.
Notsurprisingly,theforeignpoliciesofmajoreconomiesarebeingtransformedasmuchby
the energy imperative as by the technological imperative. We are seeing the rise of “petrosuperpowers”–nationsthatwielddisproportionatepowerintheinternationalsystembyvirtueof
theirsuperiorenergyreserves.Anewenergyarchitectureisemerging.Newalliancesbetween
consumersandproducersareemerging.SaudiArabiaisnowlookingfornewpartnersintheEast.
Russiaisusingenergytostageacomebackontheworldstage.Wearewitnessingamadrush–a
sortoftreasurehunt–togaincontrolofenergyresourcesbyChina,IndiaandJapan,especiallyin
thosecountrieswhichareoutsidethecontrolofmajorwesterncompaniesforpoliticalreasons.
ThequestforresourcetechnologyisprovidinganewthrusttoChina,U.S.,RussiaandIndia’s
diplomacy.Whilepursuingamercantilistforeignpolicyoveroil,gas,andminerals,Beijingisalso
investingheavilyingreenenergytechnologies(renewableenergyresourcessuchassolar,wind
andnucleartechnologies)thatcouldhelpChinaleapfrogoverothermajoreconomiesinthefuture.4
Thecreationordiscoveryofanewclean,cheapenergysourcecouldbeatechnologicalsurprise
thathasthepotentialtousherinanewworldorder.Forthefirsttimeinhistory,majoreconomic
powers,whilestilldesperatelysearchingforoil,seemseriousaboutfindingasubstituteforoil.
Thisquestforenergytechnologyexplainsthemadrushtoplantflagsonthemoonandonocean
beds.Indeed,theraceisonforgreenenergy.Thenewglobalordermaywellbebasedonamix
ofsolar,hydrogen,lithiumandthorium.Newenergyresourcesandtechnologieshavethepotential
toreshapemajorpowerrelationsandburyonceandforallthetalkofembargoes,containmentand
blockades.Imagineascenariowherewewakeuponefinemorningtothenewsthatareal,cheap
substituteforoilhasbeenfoundandwedon’tneedtheMiddleEastasmuchwedotoday.What
would that mean for geopolitical alliances? Hence, it is argued that “resource & technonationalism”lieattherootofthenewGreatGame.
Technology Determines Hierarchy in International Relations
There is a direct correlation between a country’s place in the global hierarchy and S&T
capabilities.Moderntechnologyiscentraltothepursuitofnationalgoalsforallnations-bigor
small.However,thepaceoftechnologicalchangeacrosscontinentsandcountriesisneveruniform.
Earlyadoptionofnewtechnologiesbestowsadvantagesonnewcomers.Inaglobalizedworld,
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technologyaccessandtechnologydenialplaykeyrolesindeterminingthefateofnations.Nations
competeeitherbyraisingthemselvestohigherlevelsoftechno-economicperformanceorby
keepingothersdown,technologicallyandeconomically.Technologicallyadvancednationsalso
enjoythepowertosetthenormsandstandardsofbehaviorininternationalpolitics.Greatpowers,
inparticular,competeferociouslytomaintaintheirtopdogstatusthroughtheiredgeintechnology.
Most high-tech developments are driven by the competitive national quest to maintain the
technologicalsuperiorityoverothers.5 Militarystrategists,inparticular,seesuperiortechnology
asthekeytoremainingaheadofenemiesandcompetitors.Technologicaladvancesinvariably
upsetexistingpowerbalancesandshapemilitarycapabilitiesforfutureconflicts.Therestrictions
onthetransferofhightechnologyhavelongbeenaboneofcontentioninWashington’srelations
withbothNewDelhiandBeijing.
In the 21st century, China is determined to become globally competitive in technology
innovation.Interestingly,theChinesedonotsubscribetothe“GlobalCommons”perspective.
Theycallcyber,space,environmentandmaritimedomainsasChina’s“strategicfrontiers”where
Beijing must have technological edge over others. Releasing the 2006-2020 Science and
TechnologicalDevelopmentPlanonJanuary9,2006,formerChinesePresidentHuJintaosaid:
“By the end of 2020, China’s science and technological innovation ability will be greatly
improved…Bythattime,Chinawillachievemorescienceandtechnologicalbreakthroughsofgreat
worldinfluence,qualifyingittojointheranksoftheworld’smostinnovativecountries.”6
Both the current global S&T leader, the U.S. and rising India are also on the innovation
offensive.In“AStrategyforAmericanInnovation”in2009,BarackObamasaid:“TheUnited
Statesledtheworld’seconomiesinthe20th centurybecauseweledtheworldininnovation.Today,
thecompetitioniskeener;thechallengeistougher;andthatiswhyinnovationismoreimportant
thanever.”Hisadministrationcontinuestoprovidesupportonawidearrayofcivilianandmilitary
technologicalplatformsdesignedtokeeptheU.S.ontheleadingedgeofS&Tinnovation.Forhis
part,whileannouncingthecreationofIndia’sNationalInnovationCouncilin2010,IndianPrime
MinisterManmohanSinghstatedthattheGovernmentofIndiahasdeclaredthenextdecade(201120)tobethe“DecadeofInnovation.”7 ThoughIndiahasalongwaytogo,theinstitutionaland
policyfoundationsforsustainedS&Tinnovationaretakingshape.Geopoliticalalliancesareas
muchabouttechnologyasaboutsharedinterestsandvalues.AfterIsrael,Indiaisnowpoisedto
becomeaglobalhubforhigh-techR&D,especiallydefenseR&D,mainlybecausemajorAmerican
andEuropeandefensemanufacturersaremorecomfortablewithIndiathanChina. Andthishas
implicationsforgreatpoweralignmentsandAsianbalanceofpower.Aspectsoftechno-nationalism
arereflectedinarangeoftrophyprojects,includingineffortstosetnewtechnologicalstandards
andChineseandIndianambitionsinspaceandtheoceans.
China’sR&Dexpenditureincreasedto1.5percentofGDPin2010from1.1percentin2002,
andshouldreach2.5percentby2020.Itsshareoftheworld’stotalR&Dexpendituregrewto12.3
percentin2010from5.0percentin2002,placingitsecondonlytotheU.S.,whoseshareremain
steadyat34to35percent.AccordingtoUNESCO,Chinanowemploysmorepeopleinscience
andtechnologyR&Dthananyothercountry.8 Innovationandideagenerationremainstrongin
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JapanandSouthKoreaandhavebeenpickingupinChinaandIndiaduetoimprovingeducation
andareversediasporabraingain. ReversebraingainisseeingtensofthousandsofskilledChinese
andIndianworkersfromtheWestreturninghomeandfuelingeconomicgrowth.Thisfloodof
Western-educatedandskilledtalentwillboosttheircountries’economiccompetitiveness. From
BeijingtoBangalore,fromSeattletoSaoPaulo,newindustriesandinnovationsareflourishing.
ChinaandIndiaproducefivetimesasmanyengineersastheU.S.Someestimatesshowthat90
percentofengineerswillhailfromAsiaby2030.Nearly25percentofpatentapplicationsinthe
U.S.haveforeignnationalsasinventorsorco-inventors.
Forthetimebeing,theU.S.leadsinR&Dworldwidewith35percentofthetotaloutput.China
comesinsecondwith16percent,andJapaninthirdwith13percent–butbotharecatchingup
fast.AccordingtotheThomsonReutersNationalScienceIndicators,Asiaincreaseditsglobal
shareofpublishedsciencearticlesfrom13percentintheearly1980sto30percentin2009.China
isleadingtheway,havingincreaseditsshareofarticlesto11percentin2009fromjust0.4percent
intheearly1980s.Japanisnext,accountingfor6.7percent,followedbyIndiawith3.4percent.
Studiesshowthatin15years,ChinaandIndiaareexpectedtoachievenearparitywiththeU.S.in
two very different areas: scientific and human capital (India) and government receptivity to
businessinnovation(China). ChinaandIndiawillnarrowsignificantly–butnotclose–thegap
inallremainingfactors.TheU.S.isexpectedtoremaindominantinthreeareas:protectionfor
intellectualpropertyrights,businesssophisticationinmaturinginnovationsandencouragementof
creativity.
ManyprojectionssayChina’sandIndia’sgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)couldovertakethat
oftheU.S.andJapanrespectivelyby2025.However,sizealonemaynotmatteraslongasthe
U.S.andJapanretaintheirtechnologicaledge.Thecultureofcreativityandentrepreneurshipcould
givetheU.S.andJapantheboosttheyneed.Majoreconomiesrecognizethecriticalimportance
ofinnovation–theapplicationofnewinventionsandtechnologiestosolveoldproblems,address
newchallengesandgenerateeconomicgrowth.Whenitcomestotechnologicalinnovation,open
societiesseemtohaveanedgeoverclosedsocietiesasopenmindsgenerateinnovativeideas.And
innovationistheengineofeconomicgrowth.ThatiswhyitwouldbeunwisetowriteoffJapan.
Japancouldyetspringatechnologicalsurprise.SomeChineseeconomistscalculatethatwithina
decadeorsoIndiacouldcomecloseto“spoilingBeijing’spartyofthecentury”byoutpacingChina
ineconomicgrowth.FromBeijing’sperspective,India’seconomicrisecoupledwiththeU.S.’
S&TedgewouldprolongAmericanhegemonyinAsia,therebyhinderingtheestablishmentofa
post-AmericanSino-centrichierarchicalregionalorderintheAsia-Pacific.Thatisonereasonfor
thedeteriorationinChina’srelationswithIndia.9
Giventheirrapidpaceofeconomicdevelopmentandlargedomesticmarketsize,China,India
and other emerging economies have the potential to be the sources of new revolutionary
technologies,e.g.,thedevelopmentofnewcleanwaterandenergysources,thenextgenerationof
Internet,powergeneration,andsoon.Futuretechnologicalbreakthroughswilltransformourworld
inasimilarwayastheInternetdid,leadingtoarebalancingoftheglobaleconomyandarebalancing
ofthepowerwithinit.Inshort,technologiesofthefuturewillonceagaindeterminethefateof
nations.Technologicalinnovationsofthefuturecouldturntoday’slosersintotomorrow’swinners.
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Techno-economiccompetitionwillremainthemosteffectivetoolforperpetuatinghegemonyand
forneutralizingorkeepingapoliticalandmilitaryadversaryatbay.10
Tosumup:asinthepast,sointhefuture,technologywillplayarolegreaterthananyother
factorinshapingrelationsamongnations.Geopoliticalalliancesofthefuturewillcontinuetobe
underpinnedbythevaryinglevelsoftechnologicaldevelopmentamongnations.Inaglobalized
worldeconomy,countrieswilltakeadvantageoftheircomparativetechnologicaladvantageover
others.Accesstotechnology(orthelackofit)willdetermineacountry’splaceonthepecking
orderintheregionalandglobalhierarchy.Letmeendbyparaphrasingthefamousnavaltheorist
AlfredThayerMahan:inaglobalizedworldeconomy,whoeverhasthetechnologicaledgewill
dominatetheworld.Inthe21st century,thedestinyoftheworldwouldbedecidedintheS&T
field.Shortofwars,majorpowerrivalriesandallianceswillrevolvearoundtechnology,resources
andtrade.Technologycouldhelpmoderategreatpowercompetitionandhopefully,preventwars
asnuclearweaponstechnologydidaftertheSecondWorldWar.Advancementsintechnologywill
notonlychangethewayweliveandfight,butalsothewayourworldisorganized. Soagreatdeal
ofthoughtneedstobegivennotjusttohowtechnologywillchangebattlefieldsofthefuture,but
togeopoliticalshiftsandmarketplacedynamicsaswell.Ateverylevelofinter-stateinteraction,
technologyremainsthefundamentalexplanatoryvariableinunderstandingtheinternationalsystem.
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Notes
1.CharlesWeiss,“Science,TechnologyandInternationalRelations,”Technology in Society 27,no.3(2005):295-313.
2.AbookpublishedbytwoChineseairforcecolonelsinthe1990slisted24formulationsinwhichChinacouldusetacticsoutside
theconventionalhandbookofwartoinfiltrateandweakenanopposingcountry.Politicalandeconomicchaoscouldbecreatedby
hackingintoordestroyingcomputersystemswithviruses,withterroristactsorthroughbiochemicalwarfare,thePLAcolonels
said.SeeLynneO’Donnell,“Chinagearsarmyforcyber-war,”The Australian,November10,1999,11.
3.QuotedinChina: Will It Become the West’s Next Great Adversary?, PublicationoftheCenterforSecurityPolicy,No.98-D21
DecisionBrief,February4,1998;SeealsoIvoDawnay,“BeijingLaunchesComputerVirusWarontheWest,”The Age,June16,
1997,A8.
4.Commentary,“China’sGlobalArrangementandDiplomaticFocusforItsStrategicResources,”Chinese Cadres Tribune, July
30,2011,trans.http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/3776/92/.
5.AmitavMallik,Technology and Security in the 21st Century (SIPRI:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),ix-x.
6.QuotedinJamesWilsdonandJamesKeeley,“China:Thenextsciencesuperpower?,”
http://www.naider.com/upload/82_China_Final.pdf.
7.Amb.KarlF.InderfurthandPersisKhambatta,“AU.S.-IndiaInnovationPartnership,”U.S.-India Insight 1,no.5(2011).
8.AnilK.GuptaandHaiyanWang,“ChinaasanInnovationCenter?NotSoFast,”Wall Street Journal,July28,2011.Seealso
RobertJ.Herbold,“Chinavs.America:WhichIstheDevelopingCountry?,”Wall Street Journal,July9,2011.
9.Fordetails,seeMohanMalik,China and India: Great Power Rivals (BoulderandLondon:LynneRiennerPublishers/First
ForumPress,2011).
10.Mallik,Technology and Security in the 21st Century,102.
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