Title
Author(s)
Journal
Issue Date
Type
Comparative Analysis of the Post-conflict Elections in the
Angolan and Mozambican Civil Wars
Hayashi, Yuri
Cosmopolis = コスモポリス, (5)
2011-03-25
紀要/Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version 出版者/Publisher
URL
Rights
http://repository.cc.sophia.ac.jp/dspace/handle/123456789/329
17
39
［論文］
Comparative Analysis of the Post-conflict Elections
in the Angolan and Mozambican Civil Wars
アンゴラとモザンビークにおける内戦後の選挙の比較分析
林
ゆり* HAYASHI Yuri
内戦終結後に実施される選挙は、政治的対立を武力によって決着しようとしてきた内戦当事者らが、選挙と
いう非暴力的な方法によって政治的競争を繰り広げる初の試みとなる。しかし、内戦後の選挙はある国で成功
する一方、他の国では失敗に終わることがある。内戦後の選挙の成否を左右する要因は何であろうか。既存の
研究では、内戦の継続を経済的に可能にする天然鉱物資源の存在や、内戦当事者らの武装解除の進展に影響を
与える国連平和維持活動部隊の規模が内戦後の選挙の成否を左右する要因として論じられてきた。この二つは、
内戦の遂行あるいは継続能力に影響を及ぼす要因にはなるが、選挙過程そのものに対する内戦当事者らの認識
を直接影響するものではない。本稿は、選挙過程に直接関わる要因として選挙管理委員会に着目し、内戦後の
選挙が成功したモザンビークと、内戦後の選挙が失敗に終わり内戦が再発したアンゴラにおける選挙管理委員
会を比較した。そして、選挙管理委員会の政府および政党からの独立性が、選挙結果に対する紛争当事者の認
識に影響を及ぼすことによって、内戦後の選挙の成否を左右する一因になりうることを明らかにした。
キーワード：内戦、選挙、選挙管理委員会、アンゴラ、モザンビーク
1. Introduction
losing party refuses to accept the election result and
often returns to a violent form of political competition,
Ending civil war by negotiated settlement is a long
an armed conflict. Thus, a nonviolent form of political
process. It involves implementing a number of specific
competition is more likely to be achieved after
agreements
successful post-conflict elections and less likely to be
reached
between
warring
groups
concerning ceasefire, demobilization, power-sharing,
elections etc. Among these implementation tasks,
achieved after unsuccessful post-conflict elections.
In terms of the relation between the maintenance of
post-conflict elections, “the first national or regional
peace
elections held at the end of a civil war”（Kumar 1998:
post-conflict elections, the former becomes one of the
5）, are critical in that they are the very first step for
premises of the latter, because a certain level of
the conflicting parties to engage in institutionalized
security and order must be restored to conduct the
political practice and rules of political competition
elections. Similarly, peace agreements are a necessary
without resorting to arms. Because elections are, in
but not a sufficient condition for the success of the
principle, a nonviolent form of political competition,
post-conflict elections because whether conflicting
post-conflict elections become the first attempt for the
parties accept the result of the elections is affected by
warring parties to shift from a violent political
a variety of other factors, as well.
agreements
and
the
implementation
of
competition to a nonviolent political competition. In
The central aim of this paper is to explain why the
that sense, successful post-conflict elections can be
post-conflict elections in Angola and Mozambique
understood as elections in which political rivals,
resulted in strikingly different outcomes, a complete
especially the losing side, accept the election result and
failure in Angola and a success in Mozambique. In the
unsuccessful post-conflict elections as those in which a
next section, I briefly compare the backgrounds of the
Angolan and Mozambican civil wars as well as the
*上智大学大学院外国語学研究科国際関係論専攻博士後期
課 程 単 位 取 得 退 学 （ Ph. D. candidate in International
Relations, Sophia University）
outcomes of the post-conflict elections in these
countries, and raise the empirical puzzle of this paper.
In Section 3, I survey two factors that are widely
40
COSMOPOLIS
No.5
2011
considered to have influence on the settlements of civil
two superpower camps in the Cold War supporting
war,
different
namely,
natural
resources
and
third-party
organizations
economically
as
well
as
security guarantees. In Section 4, I focus on the role of
militarily, Angola and Mozambique became Cold War
electoral commissions in post-conflict elections and
battlegrounds.3）
argue that dispute resolution in autonomous electoral
However, as the foreign economic and military
commissions is critical in the sense that it shapes
supports for each warring group decreased with the
political parties’ perceptions toward the final election
decline of the Cold War, changes of perceptions
results. I will then examine the plausibility of this
emerged between the government and rebel groups in
argument by comparing the electoral commissions in
both Angola and Mozambique: the issue of negotiated
the Angolan and Mozambican post-conflict elections.
solutions
Finally, I present some findings and a conclusion in
government-insurgency negotiations and mediation
Section 5.
efforts by outside countries and organizations, peace
to
these
civil
wars.
After
years
of
agreements were reached in Angola and Mozambique.
2. The Empirical Puzzle
In Angola, the MPLA government and UNITA signed
peace accords at Bicesse, Portugal on May 31, 1991（ the
Angola and Mozambique had both been under
Bicesse Accords ） . In Mozambique, the Frelimo
Portuguese colonial rule from the fifteenth century.
government and Renamo signed the formal peace
Although independence from Portuguese rule was
accord, the General Peace Agreement of Mozambique
accomplished in both countries in 1975, full-scale civil
（GPA）, in Rome on October 4, 1992.
war broke out immediately between the newly
Based on the Bicesse Accords, the general and
established Marxist-Leninist single-party regimes and
presidential elections took place in Angola under
rebel organizations. In Angola, among three liberation
United Nations supervision from September 29 to 30,
movements
the
1992.4） The election results showed that the incumbent
Liberation of Angola（MPLA）, the Total Independence
President Dos Santos had received 49.57 percent of the
of Angola（UNITA）, and the National Front for the
vote and Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, 40.07
Liberation of Angola（FNLA）‒ MPLA gained control
percent of the vote in the presidential elections. As for
of the capital and established the Marxist-Leninist
the legislative elections, MPLA won 129 seats and
government, while the opposition was led by UNITA.1）
UNITA gained 70 seats of the 223 seats in the
In Mozambique, the Front for the Liberation of
assembly（Ciment 1997）. Since neither President Dos
Mozambique （ Frelimo ） formed a Marxist-Leninist
Santos nor Savimbi won an absolute majority of the
government
from
vote, the second round of the presidential elections was
Portugal in 1975. The white minority regime of the
supposed to be held. However, Savimbi alleged
former Rhodesia that feared the expansion of black
massive electoral fraud by the MPLA government and
liberation struggles and Communism established an
resumed nationwide military activities. This led
anti-Communist military group called Mozambican
Angola into an even more destructive civil war, which
National Resistance（Renamo）to attack the Frelimo
continued until the death of Savimbi on February 22,
government and accordingly civil war broke out
2002.
‒
the
after
People’s
declaring
Movement
for
independence
between Renamo and the Frelimo government.2） With
1）MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA initially shared the common
goal of liberating Angola, but they varied in their ethnic
roots and ideological inclinations. MPLA had its support
from the Kimbundu, whites, and mixed-race Angolans and
adhered to Marxist-Leninist principles on the primacy of a
centralized one-party state. UNITA gained its support from
the Ovimbundu ethnic group in the southern and center
part of Angola and FNLA drew its strength from the
Bakongo people in Northern Angola（Turner 2002）.
2）Unlike UNITA in Angola, Renamo was neither an
indigenous nor anti-colonial organization. It was a
foreign-created insurgency movement with no political
program conducting a grotesque campaign of terror against
Mozambican civilians（Manning 1998; Venacio and Chan
1998）.
3）During the Cold War, South Africa and the United
States supported UNITA and the Soviet Union and Cuba
aided the MPLA government. As for Mozambique, the
Soviet Union supported the Frelimo government and
Renamo gained its assistance from Rhodesia and then from
South Africa after Rhodesia gained independence in 1980
and became Zimbabwe.
4）There were 5,579 polling stations and over 90 percent
of registered voters participated in the elections（Ottaway
1998）.
Comparative Analysis of the Post-conflict Elections in the Angolan and Mozambican Civil Wars
41
In Mozambique, the elections took place from
why some post-conflict elections succeed or fail to end
October 27 to 29, 1994. With approximately 85 percent
civil war. Two widely studied factors that are
of the electorate participating, Frelimo’s incumbent
considered to contribute to the causes as well as
President, Joaquim Chissano, won the presidential
settlements of civil war are natural resources and
elections with 53 percent of the vote while Afonso
third party security guarantees.
Dhlakama, the Renamo leader received 33 percent of
3.1 Natural Resources
the vote. Of 250 legislative seats, Renamo gained 112
seats against 129 seats for Frelimo and 9 seats for a
small third-party coalition, the Democratic Union.
The first factor that can explain the success or
Despite the defeat in the elections, Dhlakama, unlike
failure of post-conflict elections is natural resources in
Savimbi in Angola, accepted Frelimo’s victory and
civil war countries. According to Ross, there are four
Renamo’s role as the main opposition party. In short,
ways that natural resources increase a probability of
the
were
civil war:（ 1）by reducing a country’s economic growth
successful, putting an end to sixteen years of civil war.
and performance;（2）by weakening the effectiveness
post-conflict
Why
did
the
elections
Mozambique
in
of a state’s bureaucracy and ability to provide public
Mozambique succeed in ending civil war while the
goods;（3）by intensifying the incentive of people who
1992 post-conflict elections failed to do so and a civil
live in resource-rich regions to secede from a country;
war reemerged in Angola? To put it more specifically,
and（4）by financing rebel organizations（Ross 2003）.
why did Savimbi reject the electoral defeat and decide
Under the fourth mechanism of financing a rebel
to resume a civil war in Angola while Dhlakama in
organization, which is often called a looting mechanism,
Mozambique accepted his defeat in the elections? It is
abundant natural resources in civil war countries offer
extremely intriguing to compare these different
rebel organizations significant funding opportunities to
outcomes because the post-conflict elections in Angola
sell resources and purchase arms and hire soldiers.
and
For
Thus, it is possible to predict that post-conflict
instance, Angola and Mozambique both 1）modified the
elections in a country in which rebel groups control
constitutions and introduced new laws for democracy
profitable natural resources are more likely to fail
and a multiparty system prior to the elections; 2）
because they possess financial capability to resume a
adopted a List Proportional Representation system for
civil war in face of their defeat in the elections.
Mozambique
1994
in
post-conflict
shared
some
elections
similarities.
legislative elections; 3）conducted direct presidential
Indeed, the looting mechanism seems to play a
elections along with legislative elections; and above all
critical role in determining the respective success or
things, 4）the rebel leader and his political party lost
failure of the post-conflict elections in Angola and
the elections in Angola and Mozambique. In the
Mozambique. As a country with abundant natural
following section, I introduce two factors that are
resources, Angola possesses gold, diamonds, arable
widely discussed as having critical influence on the
land, and large oil deposits. 5） Among these valuable
outcome of elections in civil war countries, namely,
natural resources, diamonds have served as the chief
abundant natural resources and third-party security
source to finance UNITA’s military strategy in civil
guarantees.
war since the late 1970s. UNITA set up its bases in the
diamond-rich provinces of northeast Angola and
3. Two Explanations of Success and Failure in
Post-Conflict Elections
professionalized its diamond operations by training its
staff in diamond sorting and by investing in mining
equipment. UNITA’s reliance on diamond income
Although a couple of books on post-conflict elections
increased dramatically following the withdrawal of US
in civil war countries have recently been published,
and South African financial and military support in the
there is little theoretical and systematic study of
early 1990s（le Billion 2001）. In short, the availability
post-conflict elections （ Kumar 1998; Reilly and
of
funding
from
diamonds
sustained
UNITA’s
Reynolds 1999; Sisk and Reynolds 1998）. Thus, in this
section I utilize the existing theoretical studies of
causes and settlements of civil wars to understand
5）Angola is the second largest sub-Saharan oil producer
and the fourth world diamond producer.
42
COSMOPOLIS
No.5
2011
large-scale military capacities and thus enabled
post-conflict elections. Yet, there was a difference in
UNITA to launch a military offensive following the
the degree of PKO’s commitment and subsequent
defeat in the 1992 elections.6）
demilitarization efforts.
Compared with Angola, Mozambique has less
In Angola, the United Nations Angola verification
profitable natural resources and is often characterized
mission II（UNAVEM II）was established in May 1991
as one of the world's poorest countries. Although they
to support Angola’s new peace process. It was
are abundant, the coal, semi-precious stones, gold, and
composed of approximately 350 military observers, 90
natural gas extracted from Mozambique are less
police
profitable than the oil and diamonds in Angola.
observers（Turner 2002）. UNAVEM II, however, was
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Renamo ever
too small to “discharge its complex tasks of
controlled these resources, and none of them became a
monitoring the demobilization process of UNITA and
major source of income for Renamo to finance its
MPLA military force” in Angola（Turner 2002: 227）.
military equipment during the civil war. Instead,
At the time of the elections, it is said that 45 percent of
Renamo relied heavily on financial assistance from the
MPLA troops had been demobilized and only 24
South African and the former Rhodesian governments.
percent of the forces assembled by UNITA had
As the sources of financial as well as military support
surrendered their weapons （ Hoddie and Hartzell
from South Africa disappeared after the end of the
2003）.8） The incomplete demobilization allowed Savimbi,
Cold War, Renamo had no resources to advance its
the UNITA leader, to keep large numbers of his best
insurgent activities. Therefore, one can argue that the
troops and military weapons and to use them to launch
absence of renewed civil war after the post-conflict
a military offensive when he was dissatisfied with his
elections in Mozambique was primarily due to
defeat in the 1992 post-conflict elections.
Renamo’s lack of resources to finance its military
observers,
and
only
71
civilian
election
In Mozambique, the United Nations Mission in
Mozambique（ONUMOZ）was created to verify and
activity.
monitor
3.2 Third-Party Security Guarantee
the
political,
military,
electoral,
and
humanitarian portions of the peace accords. In order to
undertake
these
tasks,
ONUMOZ
at
its
peak
Since elections are the principal event to replace
comprised 5,914 military personnel, 1068 civilian police,
civil wars with nonmilitary political competition among
and 2,300 electoral observers（Honwana 2002）. Unlike
warring political parties, demobilization of conflicting
UNAVME II with limited personnel in Angola,
groups and establishment of the new unified national
ONUMOZ was relatively successful in demilitarization.
army are indispensable to conduct the post-conflict
By mid-April, seven months before the elections, 14,000
elections. However, because demobilization leaves
of Renamo’s 20,000 soldiers（70%）and 34,000 of the
combatants extremely vulnerable to a violation of the
government’s 80,000 regular troops （ 43% ） were
ceasefire and an opportunistic military offensive by the
demobilized（GTZ 1997; Honwana 2002; United Nations
opposition,
1994）. Hence, it can be argued that the successful
third-party
security
guarantees
are
extremely crucial to carry out post-conflict elections.7）
demilitarization
In
eliminated a possibility of renewed civil war by a losing
Angola
and
Mozambique,
United
Nations
peacekeeping operations（PKOs）were established and
sent to oversee demobilization processes before the
by
ONUMOZ
in
Mozambique
rebel group after the post-conflict elections.
In sum, abundant natural resources and third-party
security guarantees are two factors that are likely to
6）Furthermore, UNITA brought all of Angola’s
diamond-rich areas under its control and gained
considerable amount of profits from diamond sales after the
renewed conflict in 1992. According to Ciment, UNITA
shipped over $100 million worth of diamonds to Europe and
Israel during December 1992 to January 1993, using that
income to purchase arms via Zaire and South Africa
（Ciment 1997）.
7）For the theoretical argument of the role of third party
security guarantees, see Walter（1997; 2002）.
contribute to the success or failure of the post-conflict
elections in civil war countries. These factors are
common in the sense that they both affect capabilities
8）According to Vines（1995）, by June 1992, four months
before the elections, a total of only 20,000 soldiers from
UNITA and the MPLA government had been demobilized
and only 8,800 soldiers had been integrated into the unified
Angolan Armed Forces（FAA）.
Comparative Analysis of the Post-conflict Elections in the Angolan and Mozambican Civil Wars
43
of warring groups. The natural resources argument
disputes and allegations are expected to arise during
underscores warring groups’ financial capability to
electoral processes. Although ordinary courts of justice,
resume civil war after elections on the one hand, and
not electoral commissions, have authority to make
the third party security guarantees argument stresses
legal judgements and impose sanction against electoral
their military capability to renew civil war after
offences that clearly violate the electoral laws,
elections on the other hand.
resolving electoral disputes by electoral commissions
is often preferred by political parties due to the
4. Argument:The Role of the Electoral Commissions
lengthy process of litigation in courts. Thus, electoral
commissions often become a dispute resolution arena
Are financial and military capabilities the only
in which political parties resolve a variety of electoral
factors that constitute a losing rebel group’s incentive
disputes
to instigate new civil war after the post-conflict
measures to establish the equity and fairness of an
elections? While the natural resources and third-party
electoral process.
and
allegations,
and
take
appropriate
security guarantees arguments provide a plausible
In order to undertake the formal task of delivering
explanation of why it is possible for a rebel group to
free and fair elections and the informal task of
resume civil war after losing the post-conflict elections,
resolving electoral disputes, electoral commissions
these arguments have no analysis of an electoral
“should not be subject to the direction of any other
process internal to the parties participating in
person, authority or political party”（Harris 1998: 310）.
post-conflict elections. Since elections are generally
That is, the functioning of an electoral commission
conducted
under
that
must be highly independent from both the ruling
administer
the
by
government and rebel groups. This means that
implementing electoral rules and procedures, it is
electoral commissions must be composed of members
essential to analyze the success and failure of
designated from almost all the political parties
post-conflict elections in terms of the institution of
contesting the elections on a structural level and that
electoral commissions.
each member on electoral commissions must be less
institutional
entire
mechanisms
electoral
process
The formal and principal purpose of electoral
partisan to perform joint dispute resolution on an
commissions is to deliver free and fair elections to
individual level. Independence and autonomy of
candidates and voters by carrying out a number of
electoral commissions are extremely critical especially
logistical tasks that are stipulated in the electoral laws:
in resolving electoral disputes, since partial and biased
demarcation of electoral districts; registration of
dispute resolution can only exacerbate the already
eligible voters; management of the electoral campaign;
existing distrust and suspicion among political parties
implementation of an electoral code of conduct for
and can create an incentive to derail an entire electoral
political
process or even to reject the final election results. Fair
parties;
civic
education
for
voters;
administration of polling and vote tabulation; and
and
official proclamation of election results. In addition to
electoral commissions can assure political parties of
the formal aspect of electoral commissions exemplified
the legitimacy of the elections and thereby strengthen
in these administrative tasks, there exists an informal
incentives to support the electoral process and to
aspect that is not fully recognized or appreciated but is
accept the final election results.
unbiased
dispute
resolution
in
autonomous
crucial to successful post-conflict elections: an electoral
In short, the central argument of this paper is that
commission establishes a dispute resolution arena that
dispute resolution in autonomous and independent
shapes political parties’ incentives and attitudes to the
electoral commissions ensures the legitimacy and
final election results.9）
credibility of the electoral process for the political
Given that profound suspicion and distrust are
prevalent
following
protracted
civil
war,
many
parties and thereby shapes their incentive to accept
the final results of the post-conflict elections. In order
to examine whether this argument can explain the
9 ） Lyons is a leading scholar who raises a similar
proposition that “post-conflict electoral commission is one
specific set of often overlooked institutions that can promote
the demilitarization of politics”（Lyon 2004）.
empirical puzzle of this paper, I suggest that the
different degree of autonomy in their electoral
commissions led to the unsuccessful 1992 elections in
44
COSMOPOLIS
Angola
and
the
No.5
2011
in
providing poll worker training（Bayer 1992）. Since the
Mozambique. I will next show how the electoral
successful
political parties were not informed about the MPLA
commissions
the
government’s contract with De La Rue through their
elections, and resolved electoral disputes in the
representatives on the CNE, the contract was
Angolan and Mozambican post-conflict elections.
perceived as “a lack of openness on the government’s
were
1994
established,
elections
carried
out
part” and fueled “the parties’ claims that the
4.1 The National Election Council（CNE）in Angola
government controlled too many aspects of the
elections”（Bayer 1992：3）.
Under the Angolan Electoral Law which was
In spite of the government’s control on electoral
approved at the People’s Assembly on April 3, 1992,
preparations, the CNE carried out the presidential and
the National Electoral Council（CNE）was set up on
legislative elections on September 29 and 30. The
May 9 to organize and administer all the aspects of
voting took place at 5,579 polling stations and more
multiparty
elections
than 91 percent of registered voters cast their ballots
scheduled to be held on September 29 and 30. The CNE
in the first multiparty elections in Angola. Vote
was composed of members who were nominated by
counting began after the close of the polls on
the President and ratified by the National Assembly:
September 30. But when the CNE, with only 10 percent
they are 1）Antonio Caetano de Sousa, a Judge of the
of
Supreme Court elected by all the Members of the
provisional results that showed a majority of vote for
Court, as the President of the CNE; 2） one Judge
the ruling MPLA in both the presidential and
designated by the President of the Supreme Court of
legislative elections on October 2 and 3, Jonas Savimbi
Justice; 3）Antonio Paulo Kassoma, the Minister of
immediately made a threatening radio speech（Cohen
Territorial Administration; 4）five citizens chosen from
2000）. He announced that he would not accept the
among specialists with high standing and designated
electoral results because he believed that the MPLA
by the President of the Republic; 5）Onofre dos Santos,
conducted massive and systematic fraud in the
the General Director of the Elections who was
elections.
presidential
and
legislative
designated by the President of the Republic after
the
The
entire
CNE
vote
counted,
released
consequently
the
established
first
four
consultation with political parties; 6）Jose Gualberto de
subcommissions and eighteen provincial teams to
Matos, a representative of the National Council on
investigate Savimbi’s allegations of fraud. On October
Social Communication; 7）one representative of the
16, the CNE held a meeting at its headquarter and
Ministry of Foreign Relations; 8）one representative of
presented the results of its investigation that no
each registered political party in the elections; 9）one
conclusive evidence of systematic and massive fraud
representative of each of the candidates for the
was found. Nevertheless, Victor Hossi, UNITA’s
presidential elections（Rial, Culkin and Siqueira 1992;
delegate to the CNE, continued to represent Savimbi’s
Anstee1996）.10）
conviction that there was widespread fraud in the
When the CNE established an electoral registration
elections and did not agree on CNE’s investigation
period on May 11, however, it was brought to light that
results.
the MPLA government entered into a contract with a
“impervious to all arguments and entreaty” and
private British firm, De La Rue and Co. Ltd., to provide
seemed to be “plainly acting on precise instructions,
equipment
voter
presumably part of a wider strategy” of Savimbi
registration prior to the CNE’s appointment（Bayer
（Anstee 1996：33-234）. In other words, Hossi never
1992; Anstee 1996 ） . Furthermore, the MPLA
put aside his political allegiance to solve the dispute
government announced in mid-July that De La Rue
and the CNE could do nothing to change his partisan
was also given a contract for voting tasks of producing
attitude. In the end, CNE’s investigation results were
and delivering ballots and polling station kits, and
never accepted by Savimbi.
10）Although a candidate for the Presidential elections
could designate a representative to the CNE, no member
could be a candidate in the legislative or presidential
elections.
election results showing MPLA had won with 53.74
and
materials
necessary
for
According
to
Anstee,
Hossi
remained
On the following day, the CNE publicized the official
percent of the votes（129 seats）against UNITA’s 34.10
percent（ 70 seats）in the legislative elections. Similarly,
Comparative Analysis of the Post-conflict Elections in the Angolan and Mozambican Civil Wars
45
incumbent President dos Santos of MPLA received
and implement the whole electoral process by
49.57 percent against Savimbi of UNITA with 40.07
interpreting and enforcing the electoral rules.
percent in the presidential elections（Ottaway 1998）.
During the electoral process, Renamo submitted a
As neither of them had achieved 50 percent of the vote,
number of allegations and complaints regarding the
a second round of the presidential election was
government’s electoral activities. But since little
required as stipulated in the Electoral Law. Despite
evidence for its complaints was presented by Renamo,
the fact that Savimbi agreed to participate in the
the CNE concluded that most of the allegations did not
second round of presidential elections scheduled to
qualify as complaints in the strict sense of the law. The
take place in December 1992 or January 1993, UNITA
most
started to launch a nationwide military offensive and
Dhlakama, the Renamo leader and a presidential
heavy
candidate,
fighting
broke
out
between
the
MPLA
serious
incident
accused
the
happened
Frelimo
when
Afonso
government
of
government and UNITA in a number of areas.
electoral fraud and declared a boycott of the elections
Renewed civil war resumed after the post-conflict
on October 26, the night before the first elections. In
elections in Angola.
face of Dhlakama’s claim of fraud, even the Renamo
representatives on the CNE collaborated with other
4.2 The National Elections Commission（CNE）in
Mozambique
members to reject his charge unanimously, in spite of
the fact that most representatives were afraid of
confronting their political superiors with difficult
On December 28, 1993 the Mozambican National
issues（Lyons 2002; Manning 2002）.13） In fact, it was
Assembly passed the Mozambican Electoral Law
reported that Dhlakama was clearly irritated when he
which was jointly drafted by Frelimo, Renamo and
realized that he could not issue orders to the Renamo
Multiparty
representatives on the CNE（ Africa Confidential 1994）.
Conference. 11 ） In terms of the Electoral Law, the
Indeed, Manuel Frank, one of the seven Renamo
other
smaller
parties
through
the
National Elections Commission（CNE）and the Election
representatives
Court12） were created for the purpose of verifying the
Dhlakama’s boycott as null and void by stating that
regularity and validity of the entire electoral process of
Dhlakama’s claim had no legal effect at a press
the first multi-party general elections in Mozambique.
conference （ Mozambiquefile 1994 ） . In fact, Frank
Although there had been a series of disagreements
insisted that he was speaking solely in the name of the
between Renamo and the Felimo government over the
CNE, and when he was asked whether Renamo
composition of the members in the CNE, the CNE was
representatives on the CNE knew about Dhlakama’s
formally set up on January 21, 1994, ten months before
boycott in advance, he answered that they were taken
the elections. It was comprised of 21 members: 10 from
by surprise（Mozambiquefile 1994）.
on
the
CNE,
clearly
dismissed
the Frelimo government; 7 from Renamo; 3 from
The CNE instantly issued a statement refuting all
unarmed opposition parties; and Chairman without
the justifications Dhlakama made for his boycott in the
party affiliation. Brazao Mazula, a Mozambican scholar
elections. Dhlakama later announced an end to the
who had experience as a civil servant in the Ministry
boycott and ordered his party to return to the elections
of Education but with no party affiliation, was selected
in the next afternoon. While Dhlakama still insulted the
as Chairman and Leonardo Simbine nominated by the
CNE by stating that it had ruined everything by not
Frelimo government and Jose de Castro nominated by
attending to Renamo’s complaints, he cast his own
Renamo were chosen as vice-presidents（Synge 1997）.
vote at the polling station in Maputo on October 29
The responsibility and task of the CNE was to organize
（ Africa Confidential 1994）.
11）The Multiparty Conference was established for the
government to draft the electoral law in consultation with
Renamo and all other political parties. This is stipulated in
Protocol III of the General Peace Accord（GPA）of 1992.
12）The Election Court is “the judicial body with the
power to give final rulings on appeals against CNE decisions
on electoral disputes”（UNDP 1996: 6）.
created by Dhlakama, the elections took place
Despite tremendous uncertainty about the elections
13）According to Manning, although representatives on
the CNE were having regular meetings with their party
leaders, they did not inform their leaders of “the internal
analysis and discussions being carried out in the CNE”
（Manning 2002: 183）.
46
COSMOPOLIS
No.5
2011
peacefully. On November 19, 1994, the CNE announced
independent not only from the ruling government in
that President Joaquim Chissano of the Frelimo
the number of representatives but also from UNITA.
government won the presidential elections with 53.3
When the CNE conducted investigations in response to
percent of the vote. Dhlakama received 33.7 percent of
Savimbi’s allegation of electoral fraud and concluded
the vote. In the legislative elections, Frelimo won 44.33
that no evidence of fraud was found, the UNITA
percent（129 seats）, Renamo 37.78 percent（112 seats）
delegate on the CNE continued to represent Savimbi’s
and a small third-party coalition, the Democratic Union,
conviction of massive fraud. Due to his strong political
5.15 percent（9 seats）（Synge 1997）. Despite the fact
allegiance and partisan attitude, the CNE could neither
that Dhlakama lost the presidential elections, he
resolve the dispute raised by Savimbi in a credible and
perceived that the election outcomes were legitimate
collaborative way nor make Savimbi accept the CNE’s
and accepted his defeat in the elections. The 1994
conclusion on that dispute. In Mozambique, however,
post-conflict elections indeed succeeded in ending
when Dhlakama attempted to derail the elections by
sixteen years of civil war in Mozambique.
making an allegation of electoral fraud by the
government, even the Renamo representatives on the
5. Findings and Conclusion
CNE rejected Dhlakama’s declaration of boycott and
succeeded to make Dhlakama return to the elections.
Why did Dhlakama in Mozambique, unlike Savimbi
CNE’s successful dispute resolution in Mozambique
in Angola, accept his defeat in the elections in spite of
can be attributed to its high autonomy from the
his initial attempt to boycott the elections by alleging
government and rebel groups, particularly from the
the government’s electoral fraud? Can this puzzle be
opportunistic rebel leader.
answered by the dispute resolution mechanism in
To summarize, unsuccessful dispute resolution by
autonomous electoral commissions as I argued above?
the less autonomous CNE in Angola shaped Savimbi’s
My findings and conclusion can be summarized as
perception that the elections were less credible and
follows.
eventually created his incentive to reject the final
First, I found that while the CNE in Angola clearly
lacked
autonomy
and
independence
from
the
election results. In contrast, the independent CNE in
Mozambique
resolved
the
electoral
dispute
government, the CNE in Mozambique was fairly
successfully
balanced and independent. In Angola, for instance, only
incentive to respect and accept the final election
one representative from each political party was
outcomes. I believe these findings fairly support my
appointed as a member on the CNE and the majority of
initial argument that the differences in the degree of
the remaining CNE members were governmental
the electoral commission’s autonomy in the Angolan
officials from the incumbent MPLA government and
and Mozambican elections led to the unsuccessful 1992
judges from the Supreme Court in Angola. In
elections in Angola and the successful 1994 elections in
Mozambique, seven Renamo delegates and three
Mozambique.
Furthermore,
delegates
conventional
arguments
from
other
opposition
parties
were
and
thereby
increased
in
Dhlakama’s
relation
regarding
to
civil
the
war
appointed among twenty-one members on the CNE. I
settlements, the following tentative conclusion can be
believe that the lack of independence from the ruling
drawn from the analysis. That is, the probability of
government in Angola’s CNE undermined impartial
whether civil wars resume after post-conflict elections
electoral dispute resolution, which increased the rebel
or not is most likely determined by a combination of
group’s
mistrust
well
three factors: natural resources that affect the
exemplified in the electoral dispute that emerged
when MPLA government’s contract with De La Rue
economic capability of warring groups, third-party
security guarantees that affect the military capability
for
of warring groups, and the autonomy of electoral
electoral
and
suspicion.
preparations
prior
This
to
the
is
CNE’s
appointment became evident in the CNE. Because the
commissions
CNE was dominated by governmental officials, the
perception of the electoral processes and the election
that
influences
warring
groups’
CNE seemed unable to either dispute or repeal the
result.
government’s decision of the contract with De La Rue.
Since relatively few recent works have focused on
Second, I found that the CNE in Angola was less
the role of electoral commissions, it seems that not
Comparative Analysis of the Post-conflict Elections in the Angolan and Mozambican Civil Wars
47
much attention has been paid by scholars and
Appendix: Military Power Sharing Provisions and
policy-makers to the influence of electoral commissions
Assessments of Implementation,”
on the success and failure of post-conflict elections.
http://www.polisci.tamu.edu/upload_images/18/JP
This study suggests an important policy implication:
R%20Final%20Online%20Appendix.htm
that
（accessed December 2010）.
the
constitution
of
autonomous
electoral
commissions as well as the selection of delegates on
Honwana, Joao（2002）“Mozambique: What Nexus
electoral commissions must be seriously taken into
among
account in peace-implementing processes since they
Development?” in Ricardo Rene Laremont（ed.）
may increase or decrease the likelihood of resumption
The Causes of War and the Consequences of
Peacekeeping in Africa, Portsmouth, Heinemann.
Kumar, Krishna（ 1998） “ Posconflict Elections and
International Assistance,” in Krishna Kumar（ed.）
Postconflict
Elections,
Democratization,
and
International Assistance, Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
Kumar, Krishna（ed.）（1998） Postconflict Elections,
Democratization, and International Assistance,
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