Syllabus for POLS 4190:
Game Theory (Special Topics in Political Theory)
Instructor:
Office:
Office phone:
Instructor email:
Sean Ingham
306-A, Baldwin Hall
542-5925
ingham@uga.edu
Course location:
Course time:
Park Hall 250
MWF, 12:20–1:10
Office hours:
by appointment
Course description
This course introduces students to game theory and its uses in political science. Students will learn
about the different types of games—strategic- and extensive-form games, games of perfect and imperfect
information—and the associated equilibrium concepts—Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, Bayesian and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Applications will be drawn mainly from political
science: electoral competition, the U.S. Congress, war, and special interest politics, among others.
Prerequisites
There are no course prerequisites. (POLS 1101 is listed as a prerequisite, but only because I had to use the
course number POLS 4190. If you have not taken POLS 1101 and Athena does not allow you to register,
contact me and I will enroll you in the course.)
The course presupposes no previous knowledge of game theory, and it will not require calculus or any
mathematics beyond what is typically taught in high school. Nonetheless, the course will be challenging,
because abstract thought and logical reasoning are hard.
Required materials
We will spend the first third of the semester on chapters 1, 2, and 3 of Martin Osborne’s An Introduction to
Game Theory. These chapters are available on Osborne’s website:
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/osborne/igt/
For the latter two thirds of the semester, we will use a course packet that Bel-Jean Copy and Print has
produced for us. It contains additional excerpts from Osborne’s textbook as well as an excerpt from
Joseph Harrington’s Games, Strategies, and Decision-Making.
Students must also purchase a subscription to TopHat.com, which we will use for quizzes as well as
in-class exercises.
Assignments and grades
The final grade will consist of scores on weekly quizzes (20%), the first midterm (25%), the second midterm
(25%), and the final exam (30%), as well as any extra credit received.
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There will be regular problem sets, which will not be graded but which will form the basis for weekly
quizzes. Problem Set 1 includes examples of possible quiz questions. Students are strongly encouraged to
work on the problem sets in groups, but the quiz questions must be answered individually, without help
from others. The quizzes will be conducted in class. Students will have access to their textbooks, notes,
and completed problem sets. The quiz questions will always be questions about the problem sets. It will
be impossible to do well on the quizzes if you do not do the problem sets.
The questions for the exams will be identical or very similar to questions from the problem sets.
Participation is not graded, but students who at the end of the semester have fallen just short of the
threshold for a higher letter grade are more likely to get bumped up if they have participated actively
in class. Students who participate—asking questions and venturing answers to questions posed to the
class—are more likely to learn the material, too.
Students can also earn extra credit based on how well they perform in games played in class.
Schedule
The current plan is to cover the following topics:
• Simple two-by-two strategic-form games, Nash equilibrium, dominant strategies
• Nash equilibrium in n-person strategic-form games; applications to electoral competition, collective
action, public goods provision, war
• Extensive-form games, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; applications to agenda-setting, delegation of political authority, electoral competition, revolution and democratization
• Nash equilibria to Bayesian games; applications to jury voting, auctions, elections
• perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria to signaling games; applications to international conflict, campaigns
and political communication
Here is the schedule up until spring break; the schedule for the rest of the semester will be released after
the first midterm exam on February 22nd.
[1] Jan. 11. Introduction.
- No readings assigned.
[2] Jan. 13. Preliminaries: payoff functions, “rational” actors, and games
- Osborne 1.1, 1.2
[3] Jan. 15. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Osborne 2.1, 2.2
- Quiz on Problem Set 1
No class Jan. 18: Martin Luther King Jr. Day.
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[4] Jan. 20. Additional games: battle-of-the-sexes, serving and receiving in tennis, and stag hunt
- Osborne 2.3–2.5
[5] Jan. 22. Nash equilibrium
- Osborne 2.6
[6] Jan. 25. Exercises on Nash equilibria
- Osborne 2.7
[7] Jan. 27. More exercises on Nash equilibria
- Osborne 2.7, continued
[8] Jan. 29. Best response functions and Nash equilibria
- Osborne 2.8.1, 2.8.2
- Quiz on Problem Set 2
[9] Feb. 1. Best response functions and Nash equilibria, continued
- Osborne 2.8.3
[10] Feb. 3. Public goods provision
- Osborne 2.8.4
[11] Feb. 5. Dominant strategies
- Osborne 2.9.1, 2.9.2
- Quiz on Problem Set 3
[12] Feb. 8. Voting and other collective decision-making games
- Osborne 2.9.3, 2.9.4
[13] Feb. 10. The Hotelling (or Downsian) model of electoral competition
- Osborne 3.3, through Exercise 72.1
[14] Feb. 12. More models of electoral competition
- Remainder of Osborne 3.3
- Quiz on Problem Set 4
[15] Feb. 15. Wars of attrition
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- Osborne 3.4, up until Exercise 77.2
[16] Feb. 17. Wars of attrition, continued
- Exercises 77.2, 78.1, and 78.2 in Osborne
[17] Feb. 19. Review session for first midterm exam
- Quiz on Problem Set 5
[18] Feb. 22. First midterm exam
[19] Feb. 24. Extensive-form games
- Osborne 5.1, 5.2
[20] Feb. 26. Nash equilibria to extensive-form games
- Quiz on Problem Set 6
- Osborne 5.3
[21] Feb. 29. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
- Osborne 5.4
[22] March 2. Backwards induction
- Osborne 5.5
[23] March 4.
- Quiz on Problem Set 7
No class March 7–11: Spring Break.
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