MIEG (Game Theory and Microeconomics)
Part 1 (AK) – [till 19.02.2014]
[If not otherwise mentioned, reading for Part 1: Osborne-Rubinstein (OR)]
Introduction

Lecture 1
Objective: What is Game theory; why should we learn Game Theory
One stage games of complete information

Lecture 2 (OR 2 + First time reader: Osborne, Introduction to game theory, 2, 3)
Strategic form games: Introduction to formal model, action and strategy
Introduction to the issues of cooperation, co-ordination and conflict
 Lecture 3, 4 (OR, 2 + First time reader: Osborne, Introduction to game theory, 2, 3)
Dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium

Lecture 5 (OR, 3 + First time reader: Osborne, Introduction to game theory, 4)
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, Correlated equilibrium

Lecture 6 (OR 4)
Iterated strict Dominance, Rationalizability (if time permits)
Multi stage games of complete information (OR 6 + First time reader: Osborne, Introduction to game theory, 5,6)

Lecture 7
Extensive form games, Introduction to formal model, history and strategy

Lecture 8,9
Nash equilibrium, Subgame perfect equilibrium
Introduction to the issues of credible commitment and reputation

Lecture 10
Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
Introduction to mixed strategy (if time permits)

Repeated Games (OR 8)

Lecture 11
Introduction to repeated game, Finitely repeated game

Lecture 12,13
Infinitely repeated game: Folk theorem, Different kinds of trigger strategies

Lecture 14
Infinitely repeated game: Random matching (if time permits)
Back to Microeconomics

Lecture 15,16,17 (OR 7)
Bargaining: Finite period, Infinite period alternating offer game, variation in protocol

Lecture 18 (To be added later)
Bargaining: War of attrition, hold up

Lecture 19 (To be added later)
Commitment and trust

Lecture 20 (To be added later)
Coordination

Lecture 21 (To be added later)
Cooperation (if time permits)

Part 2 (UBS)
1.
Static games of incomplete information
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Auction
Fudenberg and Tirole , Game Theory, Chapter 6 pages 209-211; page 230
Gibbons, R., A Primer in Game Theory, Chapter 3
2.
Dynamic games of incomplete information
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Applications
Fudenberg and Tirole , Game Theory, Chapter 8, pages 321-331.
Gibbons, R., A Primer in Game Theory, Chapter 4
3.
Information Economics
Moral hazard
Adverse selection
Signaling : job market signaling, advertisement signaling.
Mas-Colell, A., M Whinston, and J. Green (1995), Advanced Microeconomic Theory,
Chapter 13 and 14.
Debraj Ray, (1999), Development Economics, OUP, pages 474-478.
Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz, Industrial Organization: Markets and. strategies,
Chapter 12, pages 283-296.