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© Public Policy and Administration
SAGE Publications Ltd
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi
and Singapore
0952-0767
200901 24(1) 22–46
The Role of Public Agencies in
the Policy Making Process
Rhetoric versus Reality
Bram Verschuere
University College Ghent, Belgium
Abstract
This article focuses on the role public agencies play in the policy making
process. Based on a single embedded case-study of one Flemish public
agency and two policy-programmes in which this agency is involved, the
normative practitioner model of the policy/operations divide is tested. This
model assumes (or prescribes) that policy making is a political prerogative,
while public agencies as administrative actors should stick to implementing
policy. The evidence shows that reality is more complex than the rhetoric of
the practitioner model. Agencies may be more involved in policy preparation
and policy decision-making than assumed, and political actors may in some
cases have a large say in policy implementation. The evidence from my
case-study shows that in reality the policy/operations divide might not be that
clear-cut, and that this normative model should be revised on some points.
Next to that, the findings may be discussed in the light of the current
administrative reform projects in various countries that propagate a strict
labour division between the political sphere (policy) and the administrative
sphere (implementing policy). This discussion is particularly relevant for the
Flemish public sector that is currently facing a major reform of that kind.
Keywords
administrative reform, Flemish public sector, policy/operations divide, public
agencies
Introduction
The focus of this article is the task division between political actors and administrative actors in the policy cycle. As I will show, the normative practitioner doctrine of the ‘policy/operations divide’ assumes that politicians decide on policies,
while administrative agencies should implement these policies. This philosophy is
DOI: 10.1177/0952076708097907
Bram Verschuere, Dept. Handelswetenschappen en Bestuurskunde, Hogeschool Gent,
Voskenslaan 270, 9000 Gent, Belgium. [email: bram.verschuere@hogent.be]
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also one of the cornerstones of the current administrative reform that is transforming the structure of the public sector in Flanders (BBB: Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid,
or Better Governmental Policy [author translation]). The aim of this article is
therefore to investigate empirically the extent to which this model is also found in
reality. Many authors have questioned the empirical validity of a strict task division between politics and administration (e.g. Aberbach et al., 1981; Jacobsen,
2006; Pollitt et al., 2004; Svara, 1998, 2001). In this article, I will first discuss the
rhetoric of the model and how this model has been an inspiration for the ongoing
Flemish public sector reform. Second, I will empirically test the prevalence of the
policy/operations divide in the real world, via a single embedded case study of
one Flemish public agency. Third, I will discuss the research findings and their
relevance for the theoretical and practitioner’s debates.
Rhetoric: The Policy/Operations Divide
The discussion about the task division in the policy process between political and
administrative actors is not new. Already more than one century ago, Woodrow
Wilson (1887) discussed the dichotomy between politics and administration.
Since the rise of the new public management (NPM), this discussion has been
renewed and intensified again. NPM can be defined as a set of ideas that combines
several intellectual and ideological dimensions (Aucoin, 1990). According to
Aucoin (1990), the administrative reform processes observed under the umbrella
of NPM have been inputed by two sets of ideas. First, and emanating from the
school of public choice, there was the idea to re-establish the primacy of government over bureaucracy. Second, and emanating from managerial thinking, there
was the perceived need to re-establish the primacy of managerial practices over
bureaucracy (e.g. fighting ‘red-tape’). One important vehicle that has been introduced in many reform processes is the executive agency at arm’s length of the core
of government (Pollitt et al., 2001; Schick, 2002). Practitioners and decision
makers in large parts of the western world engaged in large agencification programmes (Pollitt et al., 2001). Reformers have often argued that the specialization
of public functions in agencies will lead to better management and better servicedelivery, and that distancing public services in agencies will lead to a professional
management and greater transparency by bringing services closer to the citizen
and by ‘making managers manage and letting managers manage’. Not only large
agencification-programmes were initiated from the 1980s on in some countries
(e.g. in the UK and the Netherlands), but also in countries with a longer tradition
of having arm’s length agencies for delivering public services, reforms of and
within agencies were observed. One practice has been, for example, the introduction of performance control via management contracts as a new management
practice within existing agencies. As Pollitt et al. (2004) state:
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Verschuere: Public Agencies and Policy Making Process
the agency form of organizing government activities has become the subject of reform
programs in dozens of countries in the past decade and a half . . . these initiatives can be
grouped under diverse labels, from reforming pre-existing agencies (in countries such as
the USA, Sweden, and Finland), through creating new and only moderately autonomous
agencies (in the UK and the Netherlands), to a fairly radical separating out of a class of
organizations with extensive autonomy (New Zealand e.g.). (Pollitt et al., 2004: 31)
Inspired and spread by NPM-rhetoric, an ‘ideal-type’ agency-form emerged that is
structurally disaggregated from the core government, has extended managerial
decision-making authority, and is subject to performance contracting (Pollitt et al.,
2001, 2004). Another feature that has been applied in many reforms, is the policy/
operations divide between politicians and executive agencies (Bach, 2006;
Christensen and Laegreid, 2001; Schick, 2002). It is often observed that in many
countries that have implemented NPM reforms, increased horizontal specialization of administrative functions were often coupled with a clearer separation of
political and administrative functions, aiming at a sharper structural separation of
tasks related to policy advice, regulation and control, ownership, purchase and
provision and so on (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001). A clear case is for example
New Zealand where reforms established single-purpose agencies, and adopted the
principle of divided responsibility (Boston et al. cited in Christensen and Laegreid,
2001). Also the Next Steps programme in the UK has some features of the policy/
operations divide (Hood, 1990). Derek Lewis points out that ‘the aim of Next
Steps was to describe more precisely the respective jobs of ministers and civil
servants . . . ministers being responsible for setting policy . . . civil servants in
charge of making it happen, having the autonomy to get on’ (cited in Schick, 2002:
16). Recently however, as Gregory (2003: 41) observes in New Zealand, the
governmental policy is to reverse the negative effects of agencification processes
that fragmented the public sector: ‘(coordination efforts) are to reverse in some
instances the policy operational split that was imposed by the reforms, and seeks
to achieve better integration between operational outputs and policy outcomes’.
The latter observation shows that also in pioneering NPM-countries such as New
Zealand, the policy–operations divide was a substantial part of the agencification
reforms. If agencies are ‘vehicles of NPM’ and the policy–operations divide is part
of the NPM-doctrine (Gruening, 1998), then there is also a ‘doctrinal’ justification
to consider this feature as a part of the ideal type agency. In a sense, NPM is a
reaction to the ‘old bureaucracies’ that combined policy work and implementation
in the same often very large administrations (Schick, 2002). In terms of Aucoin
(1990) the policy–operations divide can be justified by NPM-advocates by referring to two ‘major sets’ of ideas (cf. supra): the primacy of politics that urges for a
political domination over policy making, and the managerialist school that urges
for a better specialization of tasks (single-purpose agencies, closer to citizens,
efficiency, etc.). To put it in a very simple manner, normative practitioner theories
and reform-rhetoric thus suggest that administrative actors such as arm’s length
agencies should focus on policy implementation, rather than on being involved in
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Influence in policy related decision
PREP
DET
IMP
Principal
Agency
Figure 1 Hypothetical task division in the policy cycle between arm’s length
agencies and their oversight authorities in a simplified manner
the policy-decision-making process. The figure below shows this hypothetical
task division in the policy cycle between arm’s length agencies (agents, full line)
and their oversight authorities (principals, dotted line) in a simplified manner.
On the horizontal axis, the stages in the policy cycle are represented in a simplified manner. The vertical axis shows the influence of agents and principals in
policy decisions made in the different stages of the policy cycle. The preparation of
policies (PREP) and the determination of policies (DET) are tasks that are the
responsibilty of the oversight authorities of the agencies (administrative and political). The key task of arm’s length agencies is implementing these policies (IMP).
The figure thus represents in a simple way the so-called ‘policy/operations divide’,
which suggests that there is a gap between administrative tasks (implementing
policies) and political tasks (preparing and deciding on policies): agencies are
primarily involved in decisions made during the implementation stages of the
policy, while principals make most significant decisions during the preparation and
decision making stages of the policy. If these assumptions by the normative practitioner theories are correct, then one can expect that the involvement of agencies in
the policy making process is low in the preparation and determination stages of the
policy cycle. In these phases, the important policy decisions will be made by the
political and administrative principals of the agency. In the implementation phase,
on the other hand, one can expect that agencies will have higher levels of involve26
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Verschuere: Public Agencies and Policy Making Process
ment (resulting from the agency’s larger role in the implementation of the policy).
However, some authors do not consider the policy/operations divide as a key
feature of the NPM ideal type agency. They observe a discrepancy between official rhetorics and empirical reality. For example Pollitt et al. (2004: 41ff.) do not
include the policy/operations divide in their normative ‘tripod-model’ of agencification. Although the same authors declare that ‘in many accounts of the agency
movement it is suggested that this includes a split between policy-making and
policy implementation’, they doubt this feature is fundamentally part of the
agency idea as there are both doctrinal and empirical examples of where the
policy–operations divide does not form a part of the agency movement. Pollitt et
al. (2004: 41–2) give an overview of agency-practices in which a strict
policy/operations divide seems absent. In Sweden for example agencies and ministers both play important roles in policy making since centuries. Carpenter (2001)
found that many agencies in the USA seem to have a great deal of own policy
making competences (policy autonomy). Talbot (2004) observed that in the UK a
considerable number of large agencies not only provide services, but also are
involved in policy. As a final example, some authors claim that service provision
itself (an assumed task of agencies) includes not only services or products, but also
may include policy advice (Boston et al., 1996; Kemp, 1993).
In the remainder of this article I take a look at the Flemish situation. First I
describe the rhetorics at work by looking at how the policy/operations divide is
normatively conceived in the public sector reform in Flanders. Next, I take a look
at the empirical reality, in order to check whether agency practice matches with
normative rhetorics.
Rhetorics at Work: The Flemish Public Sector Reform
The discussion about the role of agencies in the policy decision making process is
particularly relevant within the context of the current reform project of the Flemish
public sector (cf. Introduction, hereafter BBB). Essentially, the major goal of this
organizational reform is to create a public sector that is organized along some
guiding principles that can to a certain extent be discussed with reference to the
characteristics of the normative ideal-type agency I presented earlier. In the
Memorandum of Understanding of the decree ‘Bestuurlijk Beleid’ it is explicitly
recognized that by this reform ‘recent OECD trends’ are followed. Next to the
feature of structural disaggregation (‘splitting up the public sector’), which results
in the establishment of autonomous agencies, BBB also relies on principles that
can be linked to the three other features of the ideal-type agency. More specific,
the restauration of the ‘primacy of politics’ is a key principle of BBB. It is
explicitly recognized in the preparatory work of the decree that parliament and
government should decide on policy, that policy preparation and – evaluation is a
task for the core departmental organizations such as central ministries, and that
agencies at arm’s length need to implement the policy with a large degree of
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managerial autonomy. As a result, implementation of the policy is the core task of
agencies according to the principles of the BBB reform project. In the same run
however, it is recognized by the decree that there is not such a thing as an
unbridgeable wall between departments and agencies. Both interact as communicating vessels. Agencies can for example provide implementation-checks to
assess the level of realism of the policy proposals, and as such their role in giving
‘policy support’ is recognized. This interaction takes place at a very operational
level, however, as the big strategic policy preparations for the long term are to be
done by the departments. In the Memorandum of Understanding of the decree
(Vl.Parl. Stuk 1612 Nr.1: 22) we read that:
The new organizational model departs from the clear and consistent division of tasks
between departments (policy preparation) and autonomous agencies (policy implementation). This is built on the principle of the primacy of politics . . . this article in the decree
is about the division of tasks between the various parts of the Flemish administration:
departments, and internally and externally autonomous agencies, regarding policy support and policy implementation . . . the point of departure is the policy determination,
which is the task of the minister and the government: choosing policy goals, effects,
instruments and initiatives to take . . .
According to BBB, the minister and the government are vested with extensive
policy determination competences that range from setting the goals to choosing
the policy-instruments. The administrative actors’ role in the policy decisionmaking process is restricted to advize and implementation. Ministries advize on
policy, arm’s length agencies implement these policies.
Empirical Scope
For answering my research question (‘to what extent do we observe the model of
the policy/operations divide in reality in Flanders?’), I have performed a single
embedded case study. I have selected one executive Flemish public agency, and
two policy programmes in which this agency is involved. The case organization
(the agency) is the Flemish Public Transport Company (hereafter VVM). VVM is
an agency with an implementing role. It has not many regulative or other policyrelated tasks. Its main goal is to provide public transport, hence driving public
buses and tramways. This is a crucial organizational feature on which I rely for
selecting this agency, as I need to be able to test the assumption that agencies with
a large implementation role are not involved in policy related matters. Hence, I
choose for an agency that has a large role in policy implementation (or service
delivery). The VVM is organized via the principle of territorial decentralisation.
Beside the central management and the staff functions in the central headquarters,
it has five provincial entities that are responsible for delivering public transport in
the province for which the entity is responsible (Flanders has 5 provinces). Next to
that, it is a so-called arm’s length agency, structurally disaggregated from the core
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department, with its own public law legal personality. This is also an important
criterion for choosing the VVM as my case organisation, as I want to test the task
division in the policy between politicians and arm’s length agencies (which are
assumed to be policy implementing vehicles according to normative assumptions). Moreover, the VVM seems to be more or less representative for the group
of arm’s length public agencies in Flanders in terms of observed autonomy and
control practice by the oversight authorities (Verschuere, 2006). Another important point is that the organization is not too much affected by changes resulting
from the reform process that is currently taken place in Flanders (BBB). It is
important that the managerial and organizational structure of my case organization
remains more or less the same before and after BBB, because the data-collection
took place in the middle of the reform process. Additionally, the organization must
be accessible for collecting data. Practical reasons urge for choosing an organization that is accessible and has sufficient critical mass to enable participation in a
study. A final important criterion is that the organization I have selected allows for
a valid data collection and analysis strategy. This means that it needs to be
involved in policy initiatives that are accessible and comparable, and that contain
policy implementation initiatives that are also accessible and traceable. For more
features of the case organization I refer to Appendix 1 (derived from Verschuere
2006).
After a first round of discussions with people that are closely related to the
selected agency I have chosen two policy initiatives in which the VVM is
involved: ‘basic mobility’ and ‘Pegasus’. The policy programme of basic mobility
aims at increasing the supply of public transport in the Flemish region. Via a
decree that was voted in parliament in 2001, the norms for public transport delivery in Flanders were set. Essentially, the decree sees public transport as a social
right for everybody. This social right applies to all citizens, in all regions of
Flanders, notwithstanding special attention is given to certain groups that are considered risk-groups and are vulnerable for suffering from traffic-poverty (disabled
people, elderly people, people living in rural areas, etc.). Therefore, the decree
arranges basic mobility by specifying explicit output norms for the public transport services. Public transport services are to be delivered within acceptable timelimits and distance limits, and therefore norms and criteria have been developed
(frequency of service, number of bus stops, amplitude of service, etc.).
The policy programme of Pegasus has been launched when societal consensus
started to grow that one of the key policy issues for the future was the preservation
of the accessibility of the ‘Flemish Diamond’, the economic heart of Flanders
(region between Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels and Leuven). One of the measures to
be taken to fight ever growing traffic jams and traffic congestion, was the continuous development of a high quality public transport net. The choices are made
explicit and determined in the Pegasus-plan, an overall plan for the Flemish
Diamond, that was taken up in the governmental agreement of the current Flemish
government. In this plan the policy goals and the desired policy output have been
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made concrete. The plan contains mainly tactical choices about how public transport service delivery may help to reach the policy goals expressed. The aim is to
reach extra travelers for public transport and to decrease traffic jams in the region.
This goal is operationalized in explicit figures and goals (80m extra travelers for
public transport by 2025), to be achieved by ameliorating the bus and tram net in
the region. One of the first concrete projects under Pegasus was the implementation of measures that had to decrease the negative mobility effects during the
restoration-works of the Antwerp ringroad in 2004. This very busy highway lost a
considerable part of its automobility-capacity during these works. Large part of
the measures was to replace lost automobility-capacity by extended public
transport (buses, trams). The inspiration for these measures was taken from the
general Pegasus policy plan.
There are some important resemblances between both policy programmes. First,
both policy-programmes have a relatively high impact and visibility. Basic mobility is the restructuring of the supply of public transport in the whole Flemish region,
and in every single local authority. This policy affects virtually every citizen, and
especially the users of the public transport. Pegasus mainly affects the region of the
Flemish Diamond and the people who live there (57% of total population in
Flanders). But it also affects a lot of home-work travellers, as the region hosts many
employers (more than 60% of the workforce is located in the Flemish Diamond). In
both programmes, the VVM is the implementer of the policy, by delivering public
transport services. VVM has to implement basic mobility projects in the field, and
VVM has to implement parts of the policy of Pegasus in the field. Furthermore,
both policy-programmes stem from policy needs that are politically and societally
recognized. This can be illustrated by the fact that both programmes address
problems that are related to two of the key-pillars of the Mobility Plan Flanders:
(1) guaranteeing access to mobility for every citizen in Flanders and (2) guaranteeing the accessibility to the Flemish economic centres. As such, basic mobility is
part of the social policy component of public transport, whereas Pegasus is to be
considered as part of the societal component of public transport.
Notwithstanding these similarities, there is one crucial difference between both
policy programmes as well. The level to which the policy programme of basic
mobility is formalized and detailed is much larger than the level to which the
policy programme of Pegasus is formalized. In terms of Huber and Shipan (2002),
this means that the policy of basic mobility is spelled out with a much larger level
of detail compared to the policy of Pegasus. The bottom line is that basic mobility
is arranged via a decree that was voted in Parliament, and via accompanying
governmental decisions. These regulations arrange the way basic mobility is to be
implemented in the field with a large level of detail. On the other hand, the policy
of Pegasus is only formalized to a small extent. Its formal status is a policy plan
that has been taken up in the governmental agreement implying a commitment by
the government to take initiatives that start the implementation of the Pegasusplan. Such a commitment has less direct consequences than a decree, as it is not
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implying a right that has to be fulfilled by law. Next to that, the way the implementation projects that are under the Pegasus-umbrella are to be implemented is
specified in a less detailed way as is the case for basic mobility.
Data and Analysis
In order to be able to measure the influence of the various actors in the policy
process, I use data from a written questionnaire that was addressed in 2006 to 41
respondents (24 of them responded). These respondents were selected for their
expertise with mobility policy in general, and with the policy programmes under
scrutiny in specific (ministerial advisers, MP’s, experts, people from the administration, people from the VVM, etc.). In the questionnaire I asked to which extent
the different actors in the policy process had exerted input in the key-decisions
made in the different phases (preparation, determination, implementation) of the
policy of basic mobility and Pegasus. The actors in the policy process whose influence had to be rated were (1) the central management of the agency (VVM central
services), (2) the territorially decentralized implementing units of the agency
(VVM provincial entities), (3) the political oversight authorities (cabinet of the
minister of mobility), and (4) the administrative oversight unit of the agency
(ministry of mobility and public transport).
The respondents were asked to rate the input of these actors in the policydecisions that were taken on a scale ranging from 1 (very small) to 10 (very large).
For identifying the key decisions that were made during the different stages of the
policy process, I have performed an extensive document analysis (Author). In
Appendix 2 the major policy decisions are briefly outlined in the questions of the
questionnaire. These key policy decisions I identified were then presented to the
respondents, whose job it was to rate the different actors influence in the decisions
made.
The data I received from these questionnaires were analysed in a quantitative
way. I calculated the mean score of N respondents per policy phase and per actor
in the policy process. These mean-scores give an indication of the influence of the
actors in the policy process. The scores of the individual respondents were not
weighted, for two reasons mainly: all the respondents were selected for their
expertise and knowledge about the policy programme, and the respondents were
asked not to answer questions about issues (policy phases) they are unfamiliar
with. I thus presume to have control over at least (1) the respondents interrogated
(all are key-respondents, familiar with the topic) and (2) the validity of their
answers (respondents themselves selected topics to answer, based on the level of
familiarity with, for example, a programme, or a certain policy-phase). To a
certain extent I rely on the notion of ‘intersubjectivity’ here. In Appendix 3, I
present tables that show the distribution of the scores of the individual respondents, per policy phase of both policy-programmes. Moreover, the empirical
results presented hereafter have been triangulated with complementary evidence
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AG MAN
10.00
AG ENT
PR POL
9.00
PR ADM
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
PREP
DET
Phase
IMP
Figure 2 Analysis for the policy programme of ‘basic mobility’
from document analysis (policy documents, parliamentary documents, etc.).
Although for reasons of parsimony only the results of the quantitative questionnaire-data are presented here, the additional documentary evidence has shown to
be in support of the data presented below (Verschuere, 2006).
The Real World: Empirical Evidence
Figure 2 shows the results of the analysis for the policy programme of ‘basic
mobility’. On the vertical axis the stages of the policy cycle can be found (preparation, determination, implementation). On the vertical axis the mean score of the
actors in the policy process can be found (agency management and provincial
entities, political and administrative principals).
As the figure shows, the key decision maker in the preparation and determination phases of the policy is the minister of mobility and his cabinet (dotted line:
average score of approx. 9 in the PREP and DET phases of the policy cycle). Other
actors such as the agency or the administrative oversight authorities are considerably less involved in the decisions made concerning the policy during the preparation and determination phases of the policy of basic mobility. In the
implementation phase however, we can observe that both the agency (management, and provincial entities) and the oversight authorities are quasi equally
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Table 1 Results of the Wilcoxon test (SPSS)
AG_MAN
(mean + N)
AG_ENT
(mean + N)
PR_POL
(mean + N)
PR_ADM
(mean + N)
BM_PREP
4,9 (18)
3,2 (17)
9,2 (19)
5,1 (19)
BM_DET
6,1 (20)
3,6 (18)
9,5 (20)
6,7 (19)
BM_IMP
7,5 (20)
8,4 (20)
7,6 (20)
6,7 (18)
Wilcoxon test (paired)
+ significance of
differences
AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.00)
AG_MAN * PR_POL (.00)
AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.80)
AG_ENT * PR_POL (.00)
AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.01)
PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)
AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.00)
AG_MAN * PR_POL (.00)
AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.12)
AG_ENT * PR_POL (.00)
AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.00)
PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)
AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.10)
AG_MAN * PR_POL (.87)
AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.42)
AG_ENT * PR_POL (.14)
AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.00)
PR_POL * PR_ADM (.12)
Wilcoxon
PREP*DET (.03) PREP*DET (.32) PREP*DET (.25) PREP*DET (.00)
test (paired) PREP*IMP (.00) PREP*IMP (.00) PREP*IMP (.02) PREP*IMP (.02)
+ sig. of
DET*IMP (.01) DET*IMP (.00) DET*IMP (.00) DET*IMP (.65)
differences
involved in the decision-making process. Table 1 shows the results of the
Wilcoxon test (SPSS). This test looks whether the differences between the mean
scores of the actors in the policy process are statistically significant. One can read
the table horizontally (mean scores of the actors, per policy phase, and N of
respondents). In the last column the results of the Wilcoxon test for comparing
means are showed. This test looks for statistically significant differences in the
means of two related samples. It shows for example that in the preparation-phase,
the mean scores of the different actors are significantly different, except between
the agency management (mean: 4.9) and the administrative principal (mean: 5.1).
We can also read the table vertically (scores of 1 actor over the different policy
phases). Also here, the significance of differences between mean scores has been
tested statistically. The results thus show that the agency seems to be more
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AG MAN
10.00
AG ENT
PR POL
9.00
PR ADM
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
PREP
DET
Phase
IMP
Figure 3 Policy process of Pegasus
involved in the implementation phase than in the preparation- and determination
phases, which is consistent with the normative model (compare figure 1 on page 5
with figure 2). Especially the provincial entities of the agency seem to have a large
role in the implementation phase. These findings are also statistically significant.
Moreover, we can also see that during the first two policy phases, the political
principal seems to have a significantly larger influence, than any other actor in the
policy process, which is also consistent with the normative model. On the other
hand, the large influence of the political and administrative oversight authorities in
the implementation phase (no significant differences with other actors) is not in
line with the assumptions of the policy/operations divide model.
A similar analysis can be done for the policy process of Pegasus. The figure
underneath shows that the key decision maker in the preparation-phase of the
policy, is the minister of Mobility and his cabinet.
Actors in the agency and actors from the administrative oversight authorities
were involved to a lesser extent in the preparation phase. During the determination
phase however – when the policy-vision is translated into a politically approved
policy plan – also the actors in the agency start to play a role. The agency management and the agency provincial entities, together with the minister of mobility
(PR POL) seem to play an equal and large role in the decision-making process
during the determination of the policy of Pegasus. In the implementation phase
this is also the case: the political oversight actors and the agency simultaneously
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Table 2 Meanscores of the actors per policy phase and over different policy phases
AG_MAN
(mean + N)
AG_ENT
(mean + N)
PR_POL
(mean + N)
PR_ADM
(mean + N)
PEG_PREP
6,5 (17)
5,2 (17)
8,4 (18)
5,6 (16)
PEG_DET
7,9 (18)
8,1 (18)
7,4 (17)
3,5 (15)
PEG_IMP
7,3 (19)
8,4 (20)
8,4 (20)
4,1 (16)
Wilcoxon test (paired)
+ significance of
differences
AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.02)
AG_MAN * PR_POL (.01)
AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.35)
AG_ENT * PR_POL (.00)
AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.62)
PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)
AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.80)
AG_MAN * PR_POL (.41)
AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.00)
AG_ENT * PR_POL (.48)
AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.00)
PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)
AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.02)
AG_MAN * PR_POL (.05)
AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.01)
AG_ENT * PR_POL (.95)
AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.00)
PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)
Wilcoxon
PREP*DET (.01) PREP*DET (.00) PREP*DET (.04) PREP*DET (.01)
test (paired) PREP*IMP (.09) PREP*IMP (.00) PREP*IMP (.56) PREP*IMP (.17)
+ sig. of
DET*IMP (.13) DET*IMP (.44) DET*IMP (.02) DET*IMP (.17)
differences
play a considerable role in the decision-making process. The table underneath is
similar to the table presented above for the policy of basic mobility, and shows to
what extent the differences between the mean scores of the actors per policy phase
(horizontally), and of the same actor over different policy phases (vertical) are
statistically significant.
Contrary to the policy-programme of basic mobility, the findings for the policy
programme of Pegasus seem to contradict the normative model to a large extent
(compare Figure 1 with Figure 3). In the preparation phase of the policy, the
influence of the political principal is significantly higher than any other actor’s
influence, but in the determination and implementation phases this is not the case.
The influence of the agency in both phases is equal to the political principal’s
influence (and high). The influence of the administrative is low throughout the
policy cycle.
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Discussion
The results of my case study shed an interesting light on the policy/operations
divide. It seems that the strict policy/operations divide is absent in the case of the
VVM, and that this agency cannot be simply positioned in one or another position
along the division between policy and operations. The political oversight authorities, and to a lesser extent the administrative oversight authorities, have a substantial input during the implementation phase of the policy. Meanwhile, and
especially for the case of Pegasus, the agency has a considerable influence in the
preparation and determination of the policy. Based on these observations, we can
conclude that there is no clear ‘gap’ between ‘policy’ (task of democratically
elected politicians and their staff, political and/or ministerial) and ‘operations’
(implementation as the exclusive task of the arm’s length agency) as some practitioner theories would suggest (and sometimes advocate). This finding is in line
with a growing number of empirical evidence for the lack of a strict policy/
operations divide between oversight authorities and agencies (e.g. Pollitt et al.,
2004). The case study shows that the level to which the agency is involved in
policy decisions may vary between different policy programmes in which it is
engaged, and between different policy phases. The conclusion that the
policy/operations divide is rare among Flemish agencies, is also reflected in
earlier research on Flemish agencies by Verhoest et al. (2003). Using data from a
survey among the group of Flemish agencies, these authors found that he majority
of Flemish public agencies declares to have high levels of policy autonomy vis-avis their political and administrative principals, concerning the choice of policy
instruments and concerning the choice of target groups of the policy. This suggests
that many agencies perceive themselves to be able to make significant policy
choices. Next to that, and based on data from the same survey (Verhoest et al.,
2003), the majority (approx. 75%) of Flemish public agencies seem to declare to
have ‘policy implementation’ as primary task. In the same run however, there is
also a considerable number of agencies that see ‘policy preparation’ as their
primary task (20%), or even ‘decision-making’ (5%). Furthermore, research by
Rommel (2006) of five Flemish public agencies also concludes that the separation
between policy and execution is unrealistic and normatively disputed, and
that agencies may be involved in the preparation and the formulation of policy
simultaneously.
Also other authors have concluded that what the policy/operations divide is
concerned, the reality seems to be more complex than the normative model would
suggest (as argued earlier). The dichotomy between politics and administration,
which is rooted in the belief that politicians and administrators should not interfere
in each others ‘domain’, has repeatedly been proven false by various scholars who
suggest a model of complementarity between political and administrative actors
instead. According to Jacobsen (2006) there has been much research (e.g.
Aberbach et al., 1981; Aberbach and Rockman, 1988; Kingdon, 1995; Svara,
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1998, 2001) that shows an ‘extensive, though varying, intermeshing of the two
spheres [political and administrative]’. This view is best formulated by Svara
(1998, 2001), who claims that the ‘politics-administration dichotomy is an aberration’. The dichotomy model remains important as a normative standard for practitioners, but it ‘is not what it seems’. Based on research, Svara (1998) proposes an
alternative model of complementarity with shifting boundaries between the
policy-arenas and the administrative arenas, implying changes in the behavior of
both politicians and bureaucrats. Complementarity entails ‘ongoing interaction,
reciprocal input, and mutual deference between elected officials and administrators. Administrators help to shape policy and they give it specific content and
meaning in the process of implementation. Elected officials oversee implementation, probe specific complaints about poor performance and try to fine tune in
performance problems’ (Svara, 2001: 180). Also other authors come to similar
conclusions, based on empirical research in different contexts. Jacobsen (2006),
for example, shows that the border between the political and administrative sphere
is not absolute. His research in 30 Norwegian municipalities (Jacobsen, 2006:
303) shows that this border is a variable ‘opening up for the possibility that it may
vary among contexts, structures, demographics and over time’. Fedele et al.
(2005) point at a similar phenomenon based on research on Italian agencies:
the experience in many countries highlights examples of minister’s involvement in
agency managerial and operational matters . . . [on the other hand, also] the study of two
agencies in Italy seems to indicate an influential role of the executive agencies in the
policy formulation process, with a potentially ‘political’ role. (Fedele et al., 2005: 9)
A second point for discussion is an issue for further research. Given the observation that in some cases the agency (as an administrative actor) is involved in policy
making processes, and in other cases not, it might be interesting to investigate the
circumstances under which agencies have a considerable say in the policy process,
or not. Earlier research may provide us with some answers. A first factor that may
be influencing the involvement of administrative actors in the policy process is
‘capacity’. Carpenter (2001) found that organizational capacity and expertise,
resulting from strong leadership, talented offices that are coherent, and offices in
which turnover is minimized (stability, experience), is one important factor for
establishing the reputation and legitimacy of the agency upon which it can rely to
‘forge’ decision making autonomy. Similar claims about the importance of organizational capacity and expertise were advanced by Hammond and Knott (1999),
who argued that specific leadership and skills of the management may be a
prerequisite to advance the preferred policy of the agency. Krause (2003) argued
that organizational stability is important for the agency to be able ‘to handle’ discretion, and Hawkins and Jacoby (2004) have argued that agency-expertise and
knowledge of the agency may be important resources for the agency to be able to
have discretion or autonomy in (implementing) policy. Other factors may be
related to the policy-programme at stake, for example the political salience around
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the policy programme. One might argue that in highly salient policy issues the
agency will tend to be steered more strictly (Pollitt et al., 2004; ‘t Hart 2002) or
will have the incentive to demand less discretion (Krause, 2003), hence having
fewer opportunities to be involved in the policy making process. On the other
hand, one could also reason the other way around. It could be the case that in times
of high political turbulence around te policy, the political oversight will tend to
pass the hot potato the agency, and give them the discretion to taken policy related
decision (Verschuere, 2006). Another factor may be the attitude of the agency
towards the programme. This factor is likely to be related to cultural-institutional
theories, which would explain decision-making behavior of agencies as being
largely culturally determined and based on ‘internalized’ normative and valueframeworks (Laegreid et al., 2005, 2006; Thoenig, 2003). The attitude of the
agency towards the policy-programme can be induced by a ‘normative’ belief of
the agency about whether the proposed policy seems to deal with some urgent
societal problems or needs, and whether the issues with which the proposed policy
deals with are the right issues to be addressed as a policy priority (according to the
agency’s perception). Still other factors may be internal to the actors in the policy
process, such as the rather normative role perception of the agency. The role
perception of agencies may be defined as the belief of how actors are supposed to
behave (or what behavior is ‘appropriate’). The assessment of appropriateness
will be done by the actor via comparing actual behavior to the normative valueframeworks, roles, and routines that apply and are internal to the organization.
Role perceptions of the agency may determine whether it is appropriate to be
involved in the decision making process (‘are we an agency with a policy-role?’).
Gains (1999, 2004) showed that customs and traditions derived from the past such
as existing formal and informal constitutional and institutional arrangements in
governmental departments to a large extent determine the features of the ministeragency relations that are at work today in next steps agencies (via mechanisms of
path dependence). Moynihan and Pandey (2006) found that features of organizational cultures may help to explain the level of (managerial) autonomy in public
agencies. According to the latter authors, agencies with a strong managerial and
entrepreneurial culture tend to demand and receive more managerial autonomy
(contrary to agencies with a bureaucratic culture). Finally, the relationship
between political principal and administrative actor may influence the extent to
which administrative actors, such as agencies, are involved in the policy making
process. According to Laegreid et al. (2005, 2006), high levels of mutual trust and
support between the agency and the oversight authorities may be assumed to
decrease levels of cultural collusion between agency and minister, increasing the
levels of leeway that is left to agency, because the agency is trusted to make the
‘right’ decisions. Also other authors found that large political support for the
agency may lead to larger autonomy of the agency. Moynihan and Pandey (2006)
claim that politicians are likely to provide autonomy to an organization they trust,
has a strong track record and is unlikely to use their autonomy in an undesirable
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way. Carpenter (2001) found that agencies with a good reputation, a strong legitimacy and being embedded in strong political networks may be able to ‘forge’ their
policy autonomy. Verhoest (2003) found that agencies showing an open and
consistent attitude towards the political principals may enjoy larger levels of
autonomy (or lower oversight control).
I acknowledge the fact that my empirical evidence is too narrow for being able
to test the existing explanations for policy autonomy or policy influence of administrative agencies. This discussion also is beyond the scope of this article. At most
I can feedback my single case study results to this literature, and develop a refined
hypothetical model based on this evidence (see Verschuere, 2006). It might be
worthwile however in future research to test existing explanations based on largeN or multiple case study research. Coming back to my case study, some initial
statements about the reasons for agencies’ involvement in the policy decisionmaking process can be made. The fact that in Pegasus the influence in the policy
making process by the VVM was substantially larger than in the policy of basic
mobility, can be related to some of the factors discussed above (Verschuere,
2006). First, the fact that the VVM has evolved over time into an agency with
extended policy making capacities, and the subsequent normative shift in the
agency that started to see itself as an agency with a policy role, may be related to
the fact that in the ‘older’ policy programme (basic mobility, preparation started in
1995) the input by the VVM was smaller than in the ‘younger’ policy programme
(Pegasus, preparation started in 2000). Second, the attitude of the VVM towards
the policy-programme of basic mobility was less positive than their attitude
towards the policy of Pegasus. Extending service delivery and developing high
quality transport nets in the densely populated region of the Flemish Diamond, has
been priority number one for the agency since decennia. The VVM had a firm
belief that the policy of Pegasus was addressing the right policy problems in the
field (fighting congestion in the Flemish Diamond via extended public transport).
Hence when the debate about the accessibility of the Flemish Diamond is launched
politically (e.g. parliamentary debates around the Mobility Plan Flanders), the
VVM has an incentive to jump on the wagon and to be closely involved in preparing public transport policies that address this issue. To the contrary, the VVM was
not that much in support of public transport policy-programmes as proposed with
basic mobility. They believed that basic mobility was the wrong policy in the field
of public transport. The VVM has always been used to work demand-related
(delivering where the needs are highest) and in an efficient and economical way (a
heritage from the past when the resources for public transport were poor). Basic
mobility to the contrary stood for a supply model of public transport, and induced
the perception in the VVM of ‘spending money’ (delivering services where the
demand is low is very costly, ‘empty buses also have to be paid’).
As final point for discussion, it is interesting to compare the Flemish governmental intention to create agencies in the ‘pure’ form as suggested by the normative models (and more specific with a focus on the policy/operation divide), with
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the results of the empirical analysis. As I found in my case, there is no clear-cut
policy–operations divide between agencies and oversight authorities today. In
some cases the agency is strongly involved in policy preparation and even policy
making, and in other cases the political and administrative oversight authorities
are involved in implementation processes. This might lead to a paradoxical situation between the ‘real world’ (interplay between agency and oversight authorities
throughout the policy cycle), and the ‘formal world’ (the strict policy/operations
divide as proposed by Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid). Not only in my case organization,
but also in other Flemish public agencies a similar observation can be made, as is
argued by De Rynck (2004):
In many instances, all the policy-capacity is within the agency itself [by referring to the
example of the VDAB, Flemish Employment Agency] . . . such agencies deliver the
knowledge to the cabinet to steer and control themselves . . . BBB makes an explicit
choice for the policy/operations divide whereby politics steer and administrations implement . . . I believe that we need more interwovenness between both spheres instead of
strict divisions for dealing with complex policy problems. (De Rynck, 2004)
Besides the fact that the involvement of agencies in the policy decision-making
process is commonplace in many cases, this practice also seems to be defended by
the agencies because they want to keep close ties with their policy domain, their
clients, in other words ‘the field demands participation’ (Rommel, 2006). The
formal world of the strict policy/operations divide is thus to a certain extent also
perceived as a threat by many agencies (e.g. year report 2005 of MOVI, the
representative organization of Flemish agencies). A quote from an interview is
exemplary for that:
We are against a strict policy/operations divide, because (today) in reality we perform
tasks of policy preparation, management and implementation . . . next to that, it is a threat
for our company and we also think that this will not improve policy: we have built up
the knowledge, and it would not be good to take this knowledge away, secondly, the
department will have to built up this knowledge, but their knowledge will inevitably be
‘theoretical’. (interview with author, 16 May 2006)
Knowing that agencies today are to a large extent involved in the decisions made
during the policy-process, and that this is a role they are aware of, and to a certain
extent even claim, the future will have to show to what extent the rhetoric of BBB
(a reform programme of which the implementation has only started recently) will
match with the practice in the field.
Conclusion
In this article I have shown for the Flemish case that the rhetoric of the
policy/operations divide does not always match with the practice of how different
actors are involved in the policy process. The results of my case study are to a
certain extent in line with a growing number of evidence provided on this issue by
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other research in diverse settings. I found that in the case of basic mobility, the
agency was hardly involved in the preparation and the determination of the policy,
while on the contrary this was the case for the policy of Pegasus. Whether the
agency is involved in policy matters or not, seems to vary largely with policyprogrammes, or with features of the agency (that may change over time, e.g.
policy making capacity). One important direction for further research will therefore be to investigate the circumstances under which administrative actors such as
agencies are involved in the policy process, or not. Earlier research may provide
us with some potential hypotheses to address this question.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the colleagues at the Public Management Institute at K.U. Leuven
(especially Geert Bouckaert and Koen Verhoest), for the support and inspiration during
the research that resulted in this article. Also I would like to thank the anonymous
reviewers of PPA for their valuable comments and suggestions.
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Bram Verschuere is lecturer in public management and third sector policies at the
University College Ghent (part of the Association of the Ghent University) in Belgium. He
holds a PhD in social sciences, and his main research interests are organization of the public
sector, organization of public service delivery, welfare policy and third sector organization.
Part of his work has been published in Governance, Public Management Review, Public
Administration and Development, and Management International.
Appendix 1: Features of the case organization VVM
ORIGIN
Established in 1991, as a merger of 3 regional public transport
companies. The VVM is an ‘externally autonomous agency with public
law legal personality’.
STRUCTURE
One central headquarter for the total region of Flanders, which
comprises a CEO, and five directors that are functionally decentralized
within these central headquarters: Finance, Personnel, Marketing &
strategy, Services, Research
Another central actor is the Board, and the General Council of
stakeholders (Flemish Community as majority stakeholder). Five
directors are territorially decentralized, one per province of Flanders.
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SIZE
Personnel: Over 7000 employees, increase in personnel numbers with
33% over 5 years (1999–2004). 80% of the employees are blue collar
(mainly bus drivers and technical personnel). This makes the VVM the
largest agency in Flanders, in terms of personnel numbers.
Budget: 580 million euros of governmental transfers, and 111 million
euros of own revenue in 2004, makes the VVM one of the largest
agencies in Flanders, in terms of budget. The governmental transfers
have increased dramatically over the last five years, while the own
revenues decreased in the period 1999-2004.
Clients/travellers: There is a constant and impressive growth in number
of travellers over the last 10 years (from 215 million in 1996, to 413
million in 2004).
TASK
VVM was established as an agency that has to deliver public transport
by buses and trams. However since 2000 the mission of the VVM has
been expanded from pure operational (implementing tasks) to more
strategic tasks, like policy preparation, developing new products,
although the core business remains ‘driving buses’.
PERFORMANCE – The number of travellers increases dramatically since 2000: 90% in 5
years, whereas in the period 1991–1999 the number of travellers was
constant.
– Client surveys commissioned by the VVM show a positive evolution –
resulting in very high appreciation – for nearly all indicators in the period
1998–2004 (safety, quality, comfort, fees, information, services delivered
etc.). These findings are supported by the trust and satisfaction research
by Van de Walle et al. (2003) and Kampen et al. (2003)
– But these good results have a cost. Since 1996 the governmental
budget transfer to the VVM has increased from 240 (1996) to 580 million
euro (2004). This, combined with a decreased own income for the VVM,
leads to a decreasing efficiency of public means (governmental subsidy /
N of travellers): 1,1 euro per traveler in 1996 versus 1,6 euro per traveler
in 2004.
ENVIRONMENT Political environment:
Cabinet of the minister responsible for Mobility (political oversight)
Cabinet of the minister responsible for Budget (political-financial
oversight)
Unit of Persons Traffic and Airports (administrative, part of the Ministry
of the Flemish Community)
’Salience’ of the VVM:
Compared to some peer-organizations (type 4) the VVM has a lot of
attention in the press, and this attention is still growing. This makes the
VVM a highly visible agency. The VVM represents also a ‘brand’ that is
well-known and is highly visible in the streets (people literally see the
buses in the street).
Competitive environment:
VVM has the monopoly on the organization of public transport on the
road in Flanders.
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Appendix 2: Questions from the questionnaire (translated from Dutch)
Basic Mobility
PREP: In the period 1995–2000 the principles of basic mobility were developed: desirable
societal effects, goals, target groups, etc. What has been, according to your opinion, the
actual input/influence of following actors, in the development of these principles? Please
tick a number from 1–10 for each actor.
DET: In the period 1999–2003 the principles of basic mobility were formalized in a decretal
(legal) framework: the decree and the governmental decisions. What has been, according
to your opinion, the actual input/influence of following actors, in the development of the
content (norms for service delivery etc.) of the decretal framework? Please tick a number
from 1–10 for each actor.
IMP: Since 2000 basic mobility is being implemented via implementation projects in the
field. The norms are fixed in the decree, but what is, according to your opinion, the actual
input/influence of following actors in the decision of how the implementation is achieved
(choice of vehicles of transport, implementing structures, processes, ...)? Please tick a
number from 1–10 for each actor.
Pegasus
PREP: Since the nineties mobility issues were on top of the policy agenda. One crucial
theme from (amongst other) the Mobility Plan Flanders is the issue of accessibility of the
Flemish Diamond. What has been according to you the actual input/influence of following
actors in the development of the vision about accessibility (desirable effects, goals), and
about the role of public transport in this? Please tick a number from 1–10 for each actor.
DET: In 2003 the Pegasus-plan was presented as the answer for the problem of
accessibility of the Flemish Diamond. What has been according to you the actual
input/influence of following actors in the development of this plan? Please tick a number
from 1–10 for each actor.
IMP: The works of the Antwerp ringroad needed a plan to decrease the negative
(auto)mobility effects. A large part of the solution lay in increased public transport service
delivery. What has been according to you the actual input/influence of following actors in
the decisions about the content of these plans? Please tick a number from 1–10 for each
actor.
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Public Policy and Administration 24(1)
Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics questionnaire analysis
Basic Mobility
PREP: AG_MAN
PREP: AG_ENT
PREP: PR_POL
PREP: PR_ADM
DET: AG_MAN
DET: AG_ENT
DET: PR_POL
DET: PR_ADM
IMP: AG_MAN
IMP: AG_ENT
IMP: PR_POL
IMP: PR_ADM
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
SD
18
17
19
19
20
18
20
19
20
20
20
18
1,00
1,00
7,00
1,00
1,00
1,00
8,00
1,00
3,00
5,00
4,00
1,00
9,00
9,00
10,00
8,00
9,00
8,00
10,00
10,00
10,00
10,00
10,00
10,00
4,8889
3,2353
9,2105
5,0526
6,1500
3,6667
9,4500
6,7368
7,5000
8,4500
7,6000
6,7222
2,44682
2,22288
,91766
2,17239
2,20705
2,24918
,68633
2,25689
1,93309
1,35627
1,87504
2,13667
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
SD
17
17
18
16
18
18
17
15
19
20
20
16
3,00
1,00
6,00
1,00
5,00
6,00
3,00
1,00
4,00
4,00
5,00
1,00
10,00
10,00
10,00
9,00
10,00
10,00
10,00
8,00
10,00
10,00
10,00
9,00
6,5294
5,1765
8,4444
5,6250
7,8889
8,0556
7,4118
3,4667
7,3158
8,4000
8,4000
4,1250
2,03463
2,72110
1,09664
2,41868
1,67644
1,34917
2,12305
2,47463
1,88717
1,72901
1,27321
2,72947
Pegasus
PREP: AG_MAN
PREP: AG_ENT
PREP: PR_POL
PREP: PR_ADM
DET: AG_MAN
DET: AG_ENT
DET: PR_POL
DET: PR_ADM
IMP: AG_MAN
IMP: AG_ENT
IMP: PR_POL
IMP: PR_ADM
46