IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
PERTH REGISTRY
No.
P18 of2013
BETWEEN:
Westpac Banking Corporation
ACN 007 457 141
First Appellant
SG Australia Ltd
ACN 002 093 021
10
Second Appellant
National Australia Bank Ltd
ACN 004 044 937
Third Appellant
20
HIGH COURT Of AU?TRAL\A
FlLED
o7 JUN 2013
HSBC Bank Australia Ltd
ACN 006 434162
Fourth Appellant
Standard Chartered Bank
ARBN 097 571 778
Fifth Appellant
THE REGISTRY SYOf'-:EY
Commonwealth Bank of Australia
ACN 123 123 124
Sixth Appellant
Lloyds TSB Bank pic
30
Seventh Appellant
Banco Espirito Santo SA
Eighth Appellant
SEBAG
Ninth Appellant
Bank of Scotland pic
Tenth Appellant
40
Credit Agricole SA
Eleventh Appellant
UniCredit Bank Austria AG
Twelfth Appellant
Filed on behalf of the Appellants:
Herbert Smith Freehills
MLC Centre
Martin Place
SYDNEY NSW 2000
Date of Document: 7 June 2013
Telephone no (02) 9225 5000
Fax No (02) 9322 4000
Ref: Geoff McClellan
Credit Lyonnais
Thirteenth Appellant
Commerzbank AG
Fourteenth Appellant
KBC Bank V erzekerings Holding NV
Fifteenth Appellant
10
Skopbank
Sixteenth Appellant
DZ Bank AG Deutsche ZentralGenossenschaftsbank
Seventeenth Appellant
Calyon
Eighteenth Appellant
20
Gentra Ltd
Nineteenth Appellant
The GulfBankKSC
Twentieth Appellant
AND
The Bell Group Ltd
ACN 008 666 993 (In Liq)
30
First Respondent
The Bell Group Ltd
ACN 008 666 993 (In Liq)
as trustee separately for each of
Dolfinne Pty Ltd
ACN 009 134 516 (In Liq)
40
Industrial Securities Pty Ltd
ACN 008 728 792 (In Liq)
Maranoa Transpmt Pty Ltd
ACN 009 668 393 (in liq)
Neoma Investments Pty Ltd
ACN 009 234 842 (In Liq)
Second Respondent
Bell Group Finance Pty Ltd
ACN 009 165 182 (In Liq)
(Receiver and Manager Appointed)
Third Respondent
Bell Group (UK) Holdings Ltd (In Liq) (In
Administrative Receivership)
Fourth Respondent
10
Bell Publishing Group Pty Ltd
ACN 008 704 452 (In Liq)
Fifth Respondent
Ambassador Nominees Pty Ltd
ACN 009 105 800 (In Liq)
Sixth Respondent
Belcap Enterprises Pty Ltd
ACN 009 264 537(1n Liq)
20
Seventh Respondent
Bell Bros Pty Ltd
ACN 008 672 375 (In Liq)
Eighth Respondent
Bell Equity Management Ltd
ACN 009 210 208 (In Liq)
Ninth Respondent
30
Dolfinne Pty Ltd
ACN 009 134 516 (In Liq)
Tenth Respondent
Great Western Transport Pty Ltd
ACN 009 669 121 (In Liq)
Eleventh Respondent
Harlesden Finance Pty Ltd
ACN 009 227 561 (In Liq)
40
Twelfth Respondent
Industrial Securities Pty Ltd
ACN 008 728 792 (In Liq)
Thirteenth Respondent
Maradolf Ltd
ACN 005 482 806 (In Liq)
Fourteenth Respondent
Maranoa Transport Pty Ltd
ACN 009 668 393 (In Liq)
Fifteenth Respondent
Wanstead Pty Ltd
ACN 008 775 120 (In Liq)
Sixteenth Respondent
10
Western Transport Pty Ltd
ACN 009 666 308 (In Liq)
Seventeenth Respondent
Wigmores Tractors Pty Ltd
ACN 008 679 221 (In Liq)
Eighteenth Respondent
W & J Investments Ltd
ACN 000 068 888 (In Liq)
Nineteenth Respondent
20
Dolfinne Securities Pty Ltd
ACN 009 218 142 (In Liq)
Twentieth Respondent
Neoma Investments Pty Ltd
ACN 009 234 842 (In Liq)
Twenty-first Respondent
30
TBGL Enterprises Ltd
ACN 008 669 216 (In Liq)
Twenty-second Respondent
Wanstead Securities Pty Ltd
ACN 009 218 160 (In Liq)
Twenty-third Respondent
W AON Investments Pty Ltd
ACN 008 937 166 (In Liq)
Twenty-fourth Respondent
40
Western Interstate Pty Ltd
ACN 000 224 395 (Provisional Liquidator
Appointed)
Twenty-fifth Respondent
Geoffrey Frank Totterdell
in his capacity as liquidator (with ALJ Woodings) of
each of the First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth,
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-first, Twenty-second and
Twenty-fourth Respondents
Twenty-sixth Respondent
10
Antony Leslie John Woodings
in his capacity as sole liquidator of the Third, Fifth,
Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth,
Twentieth and Twenty-third Respondents
and as liquidator (with GF Totterdell) of each of the
First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-first, Twenty-second and Twenty-fourth
Respondents
Twenty-seventh Respondent
20
The Law Debenture Trust Corporation pic
as trustee of the BGNV Trusts as defined in the
schedule to the Writ of Summons in CIV 1464 of
2000
Twenty-eighth Respondent
1
APPELLANTS' SUBMISSIONS
Part I: Certification as to form
1.
The appellants certifY that these submissions are in a form suitable for publication on
the internet.
Part II: Issues
2.
The first group of issues concerns the correctness of the finding of the majority in the
Court of Appeal 1 that there had been a breach of fiduciary duties by the Directors of
Bell group companies (issues of principal liability). In particular:
(a) whether fiduciary duties are proscriptive (not prescriptive), and limited to the
duties not to profit and not to act in a position of conflict;
10
(b) whether the duties of company directors (i) to exercise powers for proper
purposes; and (ii) to act bona fide in the interests of the company, are additional
"fiduciary duties";
(c) whether the majority was correct in its conception of both the nature of the
directors' duties at issue, and the standard by which their conduct was to be
assessed;
(d) whether, applying the proper standard and law to the facts found by the trial
judge, the majority was correct in concluding that the Directors breached fiduciary
duties to act for proper purposes, and bona fide in the interests of the company.
20
3.
The second group of issues concerns the correctness of the majority's finding that the
appellants were liable as accessories to breaches of duty by the Directors of the Bell
group companies (issues of accessorial liability). In particular:
(a) whether liability under either limb of Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 ChApp 244
(Barnes v Addy) is, in these circumstances, available otherwise than in respect of a
breach of one of the two fiduciary (proscriptive) duties;
(b) whether, in any event, liability under limb one of Barnes v Addy is available
where there was no receipt of trust property, where no relevant "property" was
received and where the parties' dealings, at all material times (including at the
time of enforcement of securities and dispersal of sale proceeds), were governed
by and carried out in accordance with binding and effective contracts which were
fully performed;
30
(c) whether liability under limb two of Barnes v Addy can now be imposed whenever
it is shown that a third party is on notice of a breach of duty which is more than
trivial and too serious to be excusable on the basis that the fiducimy has acted
honestly, reasonably and ought fairly to be excused, without a pleading or proof
of a dishonest and fraudulent design.
4.
1
The third group of issues concerns the correctness of the majority's approach to
remedies if the Court does not accept the appellants' submissions on Barnes v Addy
Westpac Banking Corporation & Ors v The Bell Group Ltd (In Liq) & Ors [2012] WASCA !57 (AJ), per
Lee AJA & Drummond AJA (the majority), (Carr AJA dissenting on these issues). These submissions adopt
the terms appearing at Attachments I and 2 of the Court of Appeal's reasons (AB9/4472).
2
liability (issues of remedy), namely:
(a) whether, in ordering equitable compensation rather than an account of profits, the
majority was right to award compound interest to reflect a "cardinal principle of
equity that there be disgorgement of profits gained";2
(b) in any event, was there a proper basis for awarding compound interest at the rate
determined by the majority in the present case;
(c) did Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373 mandate a rate of compound
interest at 1% above a commercial overdraft lending rate charged by one trading
bank. 3
10
Part Ill: Section 78B ofthe Judiciary Act 1903
5.
The appellants do not consider that notice is required to be given pursuant to s 78B of
the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
Part IV: Citations
6.
The reasons of the primary judge have been reported at The Bell Group Ltd (in Liq) v
Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) (2009) 39 WAR 1; (2008) 70 ASCR 1 (in pmi);
and The Bell Group Ltd (in Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 10) (2009) 71
ASCR 300. The reasons of the Court of Appeal have been reported at Westpac
Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in Liq) (No 3) (2012) 89 ASCR 1.
Part V: Narrative Statement of Facts
20
7.
The appellants are 20 banks who, immediately prior to 26 January 1990, were
unsecured creditors of various companies in the Bell group. 4 On and about 26 January
1990, various financing and security documents were executed by all Bell group
companies in favour of the appellants (the impugned "Transactions"), extending until
30 May 1991, credit facilities and debts then due by ce1iain Bell group companies to
some of the appellants. Some 14 months later, on 18 April1991, the parent Bell group
company (the first respondent) entered provisional liquidation and other Bell group
companies followed after. At various times, the appellants exercised their securities
and recovered about $284 million from the sale of a number of Bell group assets. 5 On
18 December 1995, the respondents commenced proceedings against the appellants
claiming, inter alia, statutory insolvency liability and alleging liability as knowing
recipients and knowing assistants in respect of breaches of duty by Directors of the
Bell group.
8.
At first instance, Owen J held that the Directors, in causing the Bell group companies
to enter into the Transactions, had breached fiduciary duties to act bonafide in the best
interests of the breached companies and for proper purposes; 6 and that the appellants
30
2
Lee AJA [AJ: 1236](AB8/3751).
Two related issues will be addressed separately in response to the respondents' written submissions on their
Notices of Contention and Cross-Appeal. Those issues are: (a) whether compound interest can be awarded in
aid of statutory claims (Notice of Contention, p~ra I); and (b) whether the Court of Appeal erred in declining
lo grant the respondents an account of profits (Notice of Cross-Appeal, para 2).
2008i WASC 239 (Owen J) (J), [J: 25-26](AB2/542).
5
J: 36 (AB2/545), fJ: 90l(AB2/559); and Owen J Orcfers 30 April2009, [3.4-3.7](AB7/3197).
6 [
J: 60 5- 6128](Afi512079).
3
3
were liable under the first, but not second limb of Barnes v Addy. 7 Owen J ordered the
appellants to repay to the respondents all monies received pursuant to the Transactions
(some $347 million), 8 together with compound interest on that sum calculated by
reference to the best use which the respondents could have made of the money; the
rate being I% below a published rate for unsecured overdraft facilities, the 'Westpac
Business Indicator Rate' (WBIR), being a mid-point between WBIR and the Supreme
Court rate, 9 later adding monthly rests. 10 Owen J also found that the statutory
insolvency claims were made out in part but did not need to grant any relief on them,
and did not hold that they would have justified compound interest. 11
10
9.
20
30
On appeal, the majority confirmed breach of fiduciary duties by the Directors in
respect of the interests of unsecured creditors, namely, duties to act for proper
purposes and bona fide in the interest of the companies. The majority held the
appellants liable under both limbs of Barnes v Addy. 12 As to relief, Lee AJA started
with Owen J' s principal amount of $34 7 million but then held that Owen J erred in
awarding equitable compensation by reference to what the respondents had lost.
Rather, Lee AJA held that equitable compensation "had to reflect the cardinal
principle of equity that there be disgorgement of profits gained." 13 Lee AJA's
reference to profits was a reference to an "estimated" or "indicative" profit that the
appellants "may have received." 14 He then interpreted the "official bank rate, or
minimum lending rate" referred to in Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2)' 5 as translating to
WBIR and so ordered compound interest at 1% above WBIR, with monthly rests. 16
Drummond AJA agreed. 17
10. Carr AJA rejected any liability on the basis of fiducimy law or Barnes v Addy, but
would have granted relief solely on the statutory (insolvency) claims. To the proceeds
of asset sales (some $284 million), he would have added compound interest, but
heavily adjusted to meet the circumstances of the case, viz: at 1% above the REA rate,
not WBIR; yearly, not monthly rests; and without interest on the amounts which, had
the Transactions not occurred, would have been distributed to the appellants by the
Bell group companies upon their notional liquidation; and with allowance for income
tax on the compound interest presumed to be earned on the relevant funds. 18
7
[J: 8749-8755](AB 7/2794), [J: 9758](AB7/3045).
Owen J Orders 30 April 2009, \3.1-3.11](AB7/3197) (the Australian dollar sum of the orders, including
interest, legal fees, and stamp duty .
9715-9716l(AB7/3034), (..1: 9718l(AB7/3035).
1
[2009] WASC I 07 (Remedte~, [24l(AB7/3138).
II J: 9149](AB6/2895), [J: 9219 (AB6/2912), J: 9728-97291AB7/3037).
12
Lee AJA AJ: 1007](AB8/37 8 , [AJ:
, AJ: 1054](AB8/3716 , [AJ: 1068](AB8/3718),
[AJ: 1074](AB8/3719), [AJ: 1085l(AB8/3721), fAJ: lloolc B8/3724), [AJ: 1109l(AB8/3726). Drummond
AJA [AJ: 2079l(AB9/3983), [AJ: 2087](AB9/3986), [AJ: 2096](AB9/3990), [AJ: 2416](AB9/4101), [AJ:
2432-2433]~AB9/4106), [AJ: 2450-2457](AB9/4114).
13
14 ~AJ: 1236 (AB8/3751l.
AJ: 1233 (ABS/3751 .
15
1975] QB 373 at 388.
16
ee AJA, [AJ: 1233-1240](AB8/3751), [AJ: 1281](4)(iv)(AB8/3761).
17
Drummond AJA, [AJ: 2678l(AB9/4180).
18
Carr AJA [AJ: 2964](AB9(427~, [AJ: 2985](AB9/4283), [AJ: 305l](AB9/4300), [AJ: 3059](AB9/4302)
(on fiduciary law); [AJ: 3542 (AB9/4437), [AJ: 3614](AB9/4455), [AJ: 3552](AB9/4440, [Af:
3567](AB9/4445), [AJ: 3571-3572 (AB9/4446), [AJ: 3586](AB9/4450), [AJ: 3599J(AB9/4453),
6, 7
(sums)\AB9/4462), 8-9 (interest)( B9/4463). (Noting that Carr AJA, like Owen , found subordination of
ihe on- oans, which reduced his interest calculation).
8
JI:
1050~(AB8/3715
Or~ers
4
Part VI: Argument
1.
Principal Liability Issues
11. The decisions of Owen J and the majority in the Comt of Appeal rested upon findings,
not only that the Bell group Directors breached duties to act for proper purposes and in
the best interests of the company, but also that those duties are fiduciary duties. The
appellants challenge both the characterisation of the duties as fiduciary and the finding
of breach.
10
12. If eii:her or both of these issues are disposed of favourably to the appellants, then they
have no accessorial liability in respect of the claims brought by the respondents. The
absence of that liability has the practical effect of confining the respondents to relief
under their statutory claims. That relief differs in fundamental respects from the relief
awarded by the majority.
(i) Under Australian law. fiduciary duties are limited to the proscriptive duties to avoid
conflicts o[dury and not make a profit
20
13. This Court has stated and confirmed that fiduciary duties are proscriptive, exacting
loyalty from the fiduciary by reference to the duties not to act or make decisions in a
position of conflict; and not to profit. This principle was stated in Deane J' s judgment
19
in Chan v Zacharia; was made clear in Breen v Williams; 20 repeated in Filmer v
Duke Group Ltd (in Liq) ;21 and described as "settled doctrine of fiduciary law in
Australia" in Friend v Brooker? 2
14. The reasons underpinning this principle have been fully articulated. 23 The doctrine
has been followed by intermediate appellate courts,24 and at first instance? 5
15. The conduct in which the Directors were found to have engaged did not involve
breach of any fiduciary duty. 26
19
20
(1984ll54 CLR 178 (Chan) at 198-9.
(1996 186 CLR 71 (Breen) at 113 (Gaudron, McHugh JJ). See also at 93-4 (Dawson & Toohey JJ) at 1357 (Gummow J).
21
(2001) 207 CLR 165 (Pi/mer) at 197-8 (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne & Callinan JJ).
22
(2009l239 CLR 129 (Friem[) at [85] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne & Bell JJ); at [92] (Heydon J
~,g):eemg .
- See eg Chan at 198-9 per Deane J; Breen at 113,132-137 per Gummow J; Pi/mer at [731- [75] (McHugh,
Gummow, Hayne & Callinan JJ); and Friend at ~5~[86] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne & l3ell JJ).
24
Du Boulay v Worrell [2009] QCA 63 at [32]- 34 (Keane JA, Muir & Fraser JJA agreeing); StAlder v
Waverley Local Council [2010] NSWCA 22 at 48 , [57 (Allso P, Beazle JA & Handley AJA a eein );
Blackmagic Design Ltd v OverIiese [20 11] FCA C 4 at )93], [105]-fl 08] (Plnkelstein, Jacobson &
J~; Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 2bo FCR 296 at [174], [178] (Finn, Stone & Perram
~esan~o
i
Aequitas Ltd v Ae[c [200lj NSWSC 14 at [280]-[285] (Austin J); P&V Industries Pty Ltd v Porto [2006]
VSC 131 at [211-[241 (Ho lingworth J); CommunE· Association DP No 70180 v Arrow Asset [2007
NSWSC 527 at ~216] McDougall J); Brandv Monks 2009] NSWSC 1454 at [362]-[367] (Ward J); Iacullo v
Remly Pty Ltd 2012] NSWSC 190 at \541, [55] ( lack J); VP/us Holdings Pty Ltd v Bank of Western
Australia (2012 91 ACSR 545 at [66 (Stevenson J); Spaulding v Adams [2012] TASSC 61 at [90]
)Crawford
CJ).
6
That is: (I) there were no findings of any breach of the two proscriptive duties of profit and conflict a&ainst
any of the directors made by Owen J; (il) there were no findings of any such breaches by Carr AJA; (iii) Lee
AJA thought that: "Given the other findings made by his Honour in relation to [Alan] Bond's conduct, his
Honour should have found that Bond breached his duty not to allow his personal fmancml interests to conflict
with his duties as a UK director by participating in the meeting of directors of BGUK in a manner that caused
the other directors to breach their duties to the company.": [AJ: 1085](AB8/3721); (iv) because Lee AJA's
finding in this respect depended critically on an assumption of other breaches of duty by Bond and the other
Directors, the finding cannot be sustained for the reasons set out elsewhere in these submissions; (v) further,
relevantly for the relief granted against the appellants, there were no fmdings made by any judge at any level
that the appellants had knowledge of any such a purported conflict or breach.
5
(ii) The duties of directors to act bona fide in the interests oftheir company and fOr proper
purposes are not fiduciary duties
16. The majority concluded that they were not bound by the principles and settled doctrine
outlined above. Lee AJA distinguished Breen v Williams on the grounds that what was
there said about "proscriptive" and "prescriptive" duties was confined to its own
special facts. 27 Drummond AJA considered Breen v Williams and Pi/mer, but
concluded that there was no decision binding on the WA Court of Appeal re~uiring
him to hold that fiduciary duties of directors to their companies were so limited. 2
17. Drummond AJA concluded29 (Lee AJA holding to the same effect30):
10
"In my opinion, until the High Court declares the law to be otherwise, long
established authority requires the duties of company directors to act bona fide in
the interests of the company and to exercise their powers for proper purposes to be
accepted as fiduciary ones even though they may reguire the directors to take
positive action." (underlining added)
18. There are a number of difficulties with the reasoning. First, as with the terms "trust"
and "trustees", as well as "agent", "fiduciary" and "fiduciary duty" were not always
used consistently in the cases. But this Court has now settled the doctrine.
19. Secondly, whether strictly a matter of precedent or not, the issue is one of equitable
principle; and this Court has declared the law to be otherwise.
20
20. Thirdly, there are no good reasons why (amongst the many others that arise in a
directorship) these two duties alone would be singled out to be 'fiduciary'; or why
directors - apparently exceptionally amongst fiduciaries - should alone be subject to
them as positive duties. The law recognises that companies are established for the
purpose of assuming, and taking, commercial risk with limited liability for
shareholders, and such responsibility is usually delegated to directors. 31 The law also
recognises that in effecting those purposes, not every duty imposed on a director
sourced in law, statute or equity, is or thereby becomes a fiduciary one. For example,
the duty to exercise due care and skill (a duty amongst many others also required of
trustees) is not. 32 As Gummow J observed in Breen at 137-138:
30
"Equitable remedies are available where the fiduciary places interest in conflict
with duty or derives an unauthorised profit from abuse of duty. It would be to stand
27
[AJ: 900](AB8/3685) ("Comments made in Breen on the distinction between prescriptive and proscriptive
duties must be read in the context of the particular facts ofthat case which concerned a very limited fiduciary
relationship of patient and specialist medical practitioner."). His Honour deals with fiduciary duties more
broadly in "The Nature of Fiduciary Duties" at [AJ: 834-908](AB8/3667). Lee AJA did not deal with Pi/mer
11r Friend in his analysis.
-'
~AJ: 1960-1961](AB8/3946). His Honour noted Breen and Pi/mer at [AJ: 1943-1946](AB8/3942).
29
AJ: 19781(AB8/3952).
0
~ AJ: 921-922](AB8/3690), [AJ: 930-933](AB8/3691); CfCarr AJA [AJ: 2858-2867](AB9/4242).
1
' Darva/1 v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 260 at 281; Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37
NSWLR 438 (Daniels v Anderson) at 501; Vrisakis v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 9 WAR 395
(Vrisakis) at 449-450.
2
Giradet v Crease & Co (1987) II BCLR (2d) 361 at 362 (SC), per Southin J (Giradet) at 362 ("to say that
simple carelessness in giving advice is ... [a breach of fiduciary duty] is a perversion of words."); Permanent
Building Society (In Liq) v McGee (1993) II ACSR 260, 287-288; Permanent Building Society v Wheeler
994) II WAR 187 at 237, 239; Breen at 137 per Gummow J; Bristol & West Building Society v Mathew
1998] Ch I at 16C-D per Millet LJ; Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [199512 AC 145 at 205 per Lord
rowne-Wilkinson; Nationwide Building Society v Vande~pump and Skyes [1999] Lloyd's Rep PN 422 at
434 (Ch D); S v Attorney-General [20031 3 NZLR 450 (CA) at [771. See also Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty
(Hart, Oxford, 201 0) at 35; Heath, "The director's 'fiduciary' duty of care and skill: A Misnomer" (2007) 25
C&SLJ 370 at 373.
~
6
established principle on its head to reason that because eauitv considers the
defendant to be a fiduciary, therefore the defendant has a legal obligation to act in
the interests of the plaintiff so that failure to fulfil that positive obligation
represents a breach of fiduciary dutv." (underlining added)
10
20
21. Fourthly, apart from the fact that the "long established authority" preceded this
Court's settling of the doctrine, most, if not all, of the cases which led to an account or
compensation were cases in which there was a breach of the true proscriptive fiduciary
duties (in conflict or for profit), albeit often in the context of what was also a misuse of
powers. However, as demonstrated below, a voidable exercise of a power, and breach
of fiduciary duty, are not the same things.
22. Fifthly, directors are donees of powers33 bestowed on them under a corporation's
constitution. Such powers may be abused, for example, where, upon a construction of
the terms, express and implied, in the instrument creating the power (here, the
constitution of the company),34 a director exercises a power for a foreign purpose. But
the exercise of a power for a foreign purpose does not, of itself, amount to a breach of
fiduciary duty ?5 In order to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, it must be shown that
the power was exercised by the directors in order to obtain a profit at the expense of
the company or in pursuing an interest which conflicts with the directors' duties
towards the company. Thus, for directors to exercise their power to allot shares in
order to benefit their family trusts would be a breach of fiduciary duty. For directors to
allot shares in order to defeat a troublesome minority, would not.
23. In the instant case, no Director sought to profit or made a profit by exercising his
powers to cause the Bell group companies to enter into the Transactions. There was
no relevant finding that any Director pursued an interest in a position of conflict in so
doing. Thus, there was no basis for the majority to find that the Directors had
relevantly breached their fiduciary duties.
(iii) The majority misconstrued the duties to act bona fide in the interests of a companv
and for proper purposes
30
24. The majority's assessment of the conduct of the Directors was grounded in a view that
Australian courts should now be "unashamedll more interventionist" in the affairs of
corporations than had hitherto been the case? According to Drummond AJA, it was
said that there should be a "very considerable readiness" by the courts to review how
directors perform their duties? 7 The "deference" once paid by courts (including this
Court) to the decisions of directors was said to be no longer appropriate, even where
those decisions involved judgments on matters of business or management. 38 While
Lee AJA did not expressly adopt this language, his approach to the content of the two
33
A "power" is "an individual personal capacity of the donee of the power to do something": Ex parte
Gilchrist: In Re Armstrong (1886) 17 QBD 167 (Fry LJ); Joint Stock Companies Act 1844; Limited Liability
)jet
1855; Companies Act 1856.
4
Commonwealth & the Central Wool Committee v Colonial Combing, Spinning & Weaving Co Ltd (1922)
31 CLR 421 (Colonial Combing) at 470-471 per Higgins J, referring to Farwell on Powers, (3rd ed. 1916),
at 458.
35
Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) (2012) 200 FCR 296 (Grimaldi) at [174] (Finn, Stone & Perram
JJ); Colonial Combing at 470-471 per Higgins J; Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (LawBook Co, Sydney, 1977)
t;.:hapter
9 at J?p38-40, [82]-[85].
6
'
[AJ: 2028j(AB9/3969}, quoting with approval Sealy, 'Bona Fides and Proper Purposes in Corporate
Decisions' (1989) 15 Monash University Law Review 265.
7
' [AJ: 2029l(AB9/3970).
38
[AJ: 2029 (AB9/3970).
7
directors' duties reflected the views expressed by Drummond AJA. In particular, both
members of the majority imposed a substantive obligation on directors to avoid
prejudice to creditors and impugned the decisions of the directors on matters of core
business judgment.
25. The majority's approach was erroneous. It infected both their characterization of the
correct legal principles and their evaluation of the facts of this case. Three matters
should be noted at the level of principle.
10
26. First, the majority's approach represents a radical departure from orthodox and settled
law, whereby the business judgments of directors "if exercised in good faith and not
for irrelevant purposes, [are] not open to review in the courts". 39
27. As a result, this Court has stressed that a management decision of a director may not
be invalidated merely because a court considers the decision to be unreasonable,40
41
unwise, or the product of a reasoning process that gave insufficient weight to some
matters or too much weight to others.42
20
28. There are good reasons for adopting such an approach to the assessment of directors'
conduct, particularly where, as here, the decision in question is a management decision
rather than one which, for example, relates to the power to issue shares which involves
different questions of corporate control.43 As Carr AJA recognized, a company is not
a trust and directors ought not be equated with trustees. 44 Directors are required to
address the demands and exigencies of commercial enterprises. 45 Many of their
decisions must be high risk in nature. Whether the decisions were 'right' will often be
evident only with the benefit of hindsight.46 In addition, the very review of the
decisions of directors must reflect the fact that they act, as here, collectively. 47 It is
inevitable that a range of views and beliefs will therefore inform the decision-making
process.
29. Secondly, the considerations just identified are reflected in determining whether the
twin duties of a director to act bona fide in the best interests of the company and for
proper purposes have been contravened. Neither of those tests, as explained by this
Court, authorizes or contemplates an 'interventionist' approach by coUiis.
30
30. So far as the former duty is concerned, the question for the court is not whether,
objectively speaking, a particular decision was or was not in the best interests of the
company: it has long been held in corporate law that the expression "bona fide in the
best interests of the company" means one thing, not two. 48 Rather, the question for the
court is whether the directors honestly believed that to be so;49 "the state of mind of
39
Barlowe's Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co NL (1968) 121 CLR 483 (Barlowe's
Nominees) at 493-4, approved by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol
foetroleum
Ltd fl974] AC 821 (Howard Smith) at 836.
0
Wayde
v
NSW Rugby League (1985) 180 CLR 459 (Wayde) at 469.
41
Richard Brady Franks Ltdv Price (1937) 58 CLR 112 (Richard Brady Franks) at 136.
42
Wayde at 469. See also Barlowe's Nominees at 493 and Daniels v Anderson at 501.
43
Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285 (Wizitehouse) at 289-90.
44
fAJ: 2797](AB9/4225), citing Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR !50 (Mills) at 185-6 per Dixon J and Vrisakis at
449-50.
45
See note 31 above.
46
As
to using hindsight, see, in a different context, Rosenberg v Percival (200 I) 205 CLR 434 at [16].
47
Mills at 185-6.
48
For example, see Shuttleworth v Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927]2 KB 9 (Sltuttlewortlt) at 23-24;
(J: 4384](AB411606).
Richard Brady Franks at 135-6; Mills at 163; Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425 (Ngurl!) at 438;
Barlowe's Nominees at 493; Ashburton Oil NL v Alpha Minerals NL (1971) 123 CLR 614 at 620, 627, 640.
8
those who acted, and the motive on which they acted, are all important". 50 As a result,
the onus is on the claimant to establish that the directors did not act honestly in what
they believed to be the interests of the company. 51 While objective considerations
may be relevant, umeasonableness itself is not enough.
10
31. A similar recognition of the practical circumstances in which directors find themselves
informs the latter duty. While the court objectively asce1iains, as a matter of law, the
proper purposes for which a particular power has been conferred upon the directors of
a company, it does so with due recognition of the wide variety of circumstances in
which such powers could properly be exercised. 52 (That consideration has particular
force in the present case where the powers being impugned were, like those in Richard
Brady Franks, management powers to enter into legal relations, and confer securities
in favour of third-party financiers.) In Richard Brady Franks, Dixon J referred to the
need for the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the directors' purpose was not in
"furtherance of any purpose or advantage of the company". 53
32. Once the proper purposes underpinning a power are identified, the court assesses
whether the substantial or moving purpose of the directors - as determined by
reference to the directors' states of mind- was inconsistent with those purposes. 54 It
is only if the answer to that question is "Yes", that the duty will have been breached.
20
33. Thirdly, and critically, the majority's emphasis on the need to take an interventionist
approach led them to take two steps that departed from the authorities just identified.
34. The first step was to reject the applicability of earlier High Court precedent on the
basis that those authorities were 'old' 55 or reflected a 'traditional' view. In particular,
the majority rejected the relevance of Richard Brady Franks.
35. That case, as Carr AJA noted, was "very nearly on all fours" with this case. 56 As
Dixon J observed at 142:
"The company was in difficulties. A liquidation might be found unavoidable and,
it is said, they simply wished to secure the debts in question. There are many
circumstances supporting this view of the transaction. But, on the other side, there
is a body of evidence explaining the issue of the debentures on the ground, stated
briefly, that it was part of an anangement by which none of the depositors or
guarantors was to call in his debts or liability for twelve months, in order to give
the company an opportunity of improving its position without any one of them
following the example of the directors who had called in his £250 and so, perhaps,
precipitating a collapse."
30
36. Latham CJ recognized (at 136) that "[i]t is not for a court to determine whether or not
the action of the directors was wise. The question is whether it is shown that they did
not honestly act for what they regarded as the benefit of the company". Similarly,
50
Hindle v John Cotton Ltd (1919) 56 SC LR (Hindle) at 630-1 (PC), quoted with approval in Australian
~etropolitan L(fe Assurance Company Ltdv Ure (1923) 33 CLR 199 (Ure) at 220 and Howard Smith at 835.
Ure at 206, 220-1; Richard Braay Franks at 135-6; Ngur/i at 445; Regen/crest pic (in liq) v Cohen [2001]2
BCLC 80 at [120].
':
Eg Howard Smith at 835; Whitehouse at 289.
5
' At 143.
54
Whitehouse at 294; Hindle at 630-1; Howard Smith at 835; Kokotovich Constructions Pty Ltd v Wallington
(199x 17 ACSR 478 at 490, 491 per Kirby ACJ (with whom Priestley and Handley JJA agreed); R v Byrnes
183 CLR501 at515.
\1995
5
Cf AJ: 1994](AB8/3958).
56
[A : 2815](AB9/4230) and [AJ: 2931](AB9/4263).
9
Dixon J held (at 142) that "the question is not whether the operation of the transaction
was or might give a preference over ordinary creditors or benefit those receiving
debentures at their expense, but whether the object was wholly the advantage of the
directors or their associates so that the interests of the company were sacrificed or
disregarded".
10
37. These constraints imposed on judicial review, as Richard Brady Franks demonstrates,
do not cease to apply where a company faces financial difficulties or liquidation. That
is to say, where a director causes a company facing liquidation to provide security to a
third party, the question is not whether this gives a preference over other creditors or
whether it benefits those receiving security at their expense, but whether the interests
of the company were sacrificed or disregarded. 57 Further, the purpose or object of the
directors is to be distinguished both from the effect of a transaction, and from a case
where the directors realised that the transaction would have an effect and found it
agreeable to their personal wishes. 58 Richard Brady Franks is thus inconsistent with
the conclusion that the court will intervene, "inespective of the directors' beliefs and
business judgments, to ensure that creditors are properly protected." 59 (underlining
added)
38. The second step involved, according to Drummond AJA, an "important illustration" of
the more interventionist approach of courts, namely recognition of a duty on the part
of directors not only to "have regard" to the interests of creditors but also to ~ive
"proper effect" to those interests. 60 This asserted duty was of "central relevance" 1 to
the case and formed the primary foundation for the majority's finding of liability on
the part of the Directors. Lee AJA similarly spoke of a duty not to exercise powers
"for a purpose that had the effect of causing the companies to prejudice the interests of
creditors". 62 In his opinion, an asserted belief of a director that the course of action
constituted by entry into the Transactions was in the best interests of a company
"could not be accepted as rational" given the director's obligation "to take account of,
and not prejudice, the interests of creditors". 63
20
30
39. As to the duty to consider the interests of creditors, in Walker v Wimborne Mason J
said, in relation to the duty to consider the interests of"the company": 64
"... it should be emphasized that the directors of a company in discharging their
duty to the company must take account of the interest of its shareholders and
creditors. Any failure by the directors to take into account the interests of creditors
will have adverse consequences for the company as well as for them." (underlining
added)
40. Mason J thus emphasized that directors must only have regard to the company's
interests, and observed that consideration of the interests of the company required, in
57
Richard Brady Franks at 144. The same consideration applies where a subsidiary provides a guarantee in
favour of a related company's debts where the subsidiary is threatened by the failure of one of the members
of a group: see Carr AJA, [AJ: 2869-2874l(AB9/4244); Equiticorp Finance Ltd (in liq) v Bank of New
~ea/and(l993) 32 NSWLR 50, at 98 and 146-147.
Har/owe 's Nominees at 493; Mills at 163-164 per Latham CJ and Dixon J at 188.
59
60 AJ: 203l~[AB9/3971~.
AJ: 2031 AB9/3971 .
61
AJ: 2031 AB9/3971 .
62
63 AJ: 9481 AB8/3694l.
AJ: 993 AB8/3703 .
64
1976) I 7 CLR I at 7 (Walker).
10
particular circumstances, regard to be had to the interests of other persons (namely,
shareholders and creditors).
41. The "studiously cautious language"65 of Mason J reminds directors that the interests of
the company do not necessarily equate to the interests of shareholders, and that their
obligation to consider the interests of the company may require them to take account
of the fact that other persons (such as creditors) have an interest in the company's
undertakings. That is simply a recognition that "the best interests of the company will
depend upon various factors including solvency". 66 It does not involve a prescribed
standard of conduct towards creditors.
10
42. The fundamental character of the "duty" remains one to act in the best interests of the
company, or to exercise powers for a proper purpose. 67 There is no independent duty
that arises (either generally or upon insolvency) to consider the interests of creditors.
Rather, Walker and Spies v R68 identified the full range of factors to which directors
must have regard in the exercise of their powers in an insolvency context.
43. As to the second of the duties identified by the majority, both Lee AJA and
Drummond AJA held, in slightly different terms, that directors of insolvent, or nearinsolvent, companies have an obligation "not to prejudice the interests of creditors". 69
Their Honours differed, however, in the precise way in which that obligation was said
to arise.
20
30
44. According to the majority, it followed that the directors of a company have a duty not
to commit the company to a course of action if it would entail a real risk of prejudice
to creditors of a company in an insolvency context, regardless of whether they
honestly believed that it would be in the best interests of the company to do so. 70 In
the context of transactions like those at issue in these proceedings (or Richard Brady
Franks), the majority thus imposed an obligation on directors of insolvent, or nearinsolvent, companies to ensure a pari passu outcome for all creditors.
45. There is no "obligation not to prejudice the interests of creditors" (being, in the
context of this case, an obligation to ensure a pari passu outcome for all creditors).
There is nothing in Walker v Wimborne or Spies v R, or in the principles underlying
them, supporting the existence of such an obligation nor the consequential limitation
on the powers of directors.
46. Further, any such duty would conflict with the principle that it is directors in whom are
vested the right and the duty of deciding whether the company's interests lie and how
they are to be served. 71 The duty is to consider and balance the various and often
conflicting interests of the company as a whole. That a sectional interest may be
prejudiced does not lead to a breach of duty if the director considers or acts in the
interests of the company as a whole.
65
Sealy, "Directors' Duties- An Unnecessary Gloss", (1988) 47 Cambridge Law Journa/175 (Sealy) at 176.
Angas Law Services Pty Ltd v Carabelas (2005) 226 CLR 507 at [67], per Gummow and Hayne JJ.
See Carr AJA at [AJ: 2819](AB 9/4232).
68
See Spies v R (2000) 201 CLR 603 at 635 and 636, elaborati~ on the principle dealt with in Walker.
69
Lee AJA at fAJ: 767~(AB 8/3648). See also Lee AJA at, eg, AJ: 770j(AB873649), [AJ: 920](AB8/3689),
fAJ: 948](ABS/3694), AJ: 952l(AB8/3695), [AJ: 954](AB8/3 96), [AJ: 993](AB8!3703), [AJ:
999l(AB8/3706), [A1: 007](AB8/3708), fAJ: 1017l(AB8/3710), [AJ: 1092](AB8/3722), [AJ:
1093](AB8/3723); Drummond AJA at [Al 2041](AB 9/3973).
70
Drummond AfA at [AJ: 2046](AB9/3975). See also Lee AJA at [AJ: 952](AB8/3695), [AJ:
J1093](AB8/3723).
Har/owe"s Nominee's at 493.
66
67
11
47. The majority was therefore wrong to ask whether the course of action contemplated
(and undertaken) by the Directors entailed a "real risk that the creditors of a company
in an insolvency context would suffer significant prejudice",72 and should instead have
asked simply whether the Directors exercised a power otherwise than for the purpose
for which it was granted, or acted otherwise than bona fide for the benefit of the
company.
48. As the facts and reasoning in Richard Brady Franks demonstrated, a negative response
to each question was required.
(iv) The Directors did not breach their duties
10
49. The Directors were not in breach of the duties identified above. That is to say, the
Directors:
(a) honestly believed that entry into the Transactions was in the best interests of the
companies73 ;and
(b) had a purpose of obtaining an advantage for the companies, being consistent with
that for which the relevant powers to enter into the Transactions were confened
upon them.
50. In particular, the Directors' purposes, and their consideration of the interests of the
companies, properly reflected the extent to which the interests of creditors informed
the interests of the companies.
20
30
51. A full account of the relevant primary facts may be found in the appellants'
Chronological Index of Factual Findings. However, once the legal framework by
which the Directors' conduct falls to be assessed is properly understood, the relevant
facts are few. Of central, and decisive, importance are the Directors' honestly held
beliefs.
52. In that regard, it is important to recall, that Owen J expressly found that none of the
Bell group Directors had been dishonest or was guilty of conscious wrongdoing/4 had
acted in their own interests in causing the relevant companies to enter into the
Transactions/ 5 had exercised their powers as a means to entrench their position of
control of TBGL/6 had exercised their powers as a means to protect their financial
interest in BCHL and other BCHL companies77 or had breached the duty to avoid
. of'mterest78
co nfl1cts
.
53. At the date of the Transactions, the managing director and chief executive of TGBL
was David Aspinall. 79 Aspinall was also a director of the other Australian Bell group
companies. 80 Aspinall's role in the Bell group included managing the operations of
the publishing assets, and the negotiation of the refinancing with the appellants from
72
Drummond AJA at [AJ: 2046](AB9/3975). See also Lee AJA at [AJ: 952](AB8/3695) and [AJ:
}3093](AB8/3723).
[AJ: 1988](AB8/3956), [AJ: 2795](AB9/4225), [AJ: 2056](AB9/3977), [AJ: 2072](AB9/3982), [AJ:
f.474](AB9/4121l,JAJ:
2772](AB9/4124), [AJ: 2910](AB9/4258).
4
J:
6031
IAB5/2
78
.
75
J: 6125 AB5/2103 , [J: 6127](AB5/2104).
76
J: 6127 AB5/2104 .
77
J: 6127 AB5/2104 .
78
J: 9745 AB7/3042 .
79
J: 134] AB2/570), J: 4983l(AB4/1775).
80
J: 55]( B2/549), [ : 681](Al32/684), [f: 4983](AB4/1775).
12
July 1989. Aspinall was a very experienced media executive 81 with a detailed
understanding of the publishing assets. 82 During 1990 and until April 1991 he was
involved in consideration of, and attempted implementation of, the restructuring of the
Bell group. 83 Negotiations with the appellants in relation to the refinancing were
conducted on behalf of the Bell group, at least from July 1989, by Aspinall and his
executive assistant, Colin Simpson. 84 Aspinall and Simpson conducted the
negotiations strongll 5 and attempted to get the best deal possible for the Bell group
companies including attempting to get some appellants to extend their facilities in
substitution for other appellants who no longer wished to lend to the Bell group86 ,
seeking an extension to banking facilities without security 87 and seeking an extension
to banking facilities with limited security. 88 Given the central role of Aspinall in the
Transactions, Drummond AlA's observation that if Owen J had applied the subjective
tests identified above, "he could not have found that Aspinall breached his duties to
act bona fide and for proper purposes", is of particular significance. 89
10
20
54. The other directors of TGBL (and the other Australian Bell group companies) at the
relevant time were Peter Mitchell and Antony Oates. 90 Neither Mitchell nor Oates
held an executive position with, or was employed by, TGBL. Both were nonexecutive directors. Mitchell was not involved in the da~ to day operation of the Bell
group and its businesses, and relied heavily on Aspinall. 1 Oates may not have been as
closely concerned in the day to day operations of the Bell group companies as Aspinall
but had a greater involvement than Mitchell. 92 He had a continuing role in the dealings
with the appellants.93
55. The directors of the relevant United Kingdom Bell group companies (BGUK and
TGBIL) were Michael Edwards QC, Alan Birchmore, Alan Bond and Peter Mitcheli. 94
EdwaTds handled the involvement of BGUK and TGBIL in the Transactions. 95
Birchmore, Mitchell and Bond had no day to day involvement in the management of
the companies. 96
56. Four essential matters absolve the Directors of any breach of duty.
Solvency
30
57. First, as at January 1990, the Directors did not believe the companies were actually
insolvent. 97 They resolved on 24 January 199098 that TBGL was able to pay its debts
J: 4984~(AB411775),JJ: 5091](AB4/I805).
J: 1822 (AB2/979), [: 4986](AB4/I776), [J: 5100-5122](AB4/1808).
J: 135~ AB2/570).
84
J: 138 AB2/570), J: 386](AB2/624 .
85
J: 897 -8979l(ABt/2851), rJ: 9756l(AB7/3044).
86
J: 5031l[AB411788l,[ J: 5033](AB411788), [J: 5035-5037](AB411789), Section 4.5.1(AB2/624-629).
87
J: 5019 AB4/I785 .
88
J: 5023 AB4/1786, [J: 5026l(AB411786),~J: 5600](AB4/I967).
89
AJ: 2059](AB9/3978). See afso [AJ: 2474] AB9/4121).
90
J: 55](AB2/549), [J: 134](AB2/570), [J: 13 ](AB2/570 ), [J: 137](AB2/570), [J: 681](AB2/684).
91
J: 136]1AB2/570),~J: 5372](AB411891).
92
J; 5485 (AB4/I935 .
93
J: 5481 (AB4/1934.
94
J: 55](AB2/549), [ : 682](AB2/684).
95
96 J: 5766t~AB5/2007),JJ: 5777l(AB5/2010).
J: 5767 AB5/2008), J: 5875 (AB5/2035).
97
J: 6035 )](AB5/207 ); [J: 6086](AB5/2093).
98
GBL.01058.047(AB
). To the same effect, the letter from Aspinall and Oates to the UK directors
(including Mitchell) dated 23 January 1990 TBGL.07207.030(AB
) (referred to at [J: 5078](AB
4/1802) as part of the package TBGL.07207.029-TBGL.07207.033(AB
).
81
82
83
13
and meet its obligations in respect of the bondholders and that the realisable value of
TGBL' s assets exceeded the amount of its liabilities. They knew that the companies
were of doubtful solvency, or nearly insolvent, but that is aii. 99
Two alternatives
10
58. Secondly, the Directors believed that they had two options: either to place the groufo
companies into immediate liquidation, or to carry out a restructure of the group. 1 0
They believed that, unless restructured, the Bell group companies would have gone
into liquidation. That was because one or more of the Australian banks would have
caused one or other or both of TGBL and BGF to be wound up. If either TBGL or
BGF was wound up, each other company in the Bell group would have been wound
up.
Restructure is preferable to liquidation
20
30
59. Thirdly, the Directors believed that a restructure was preferable to a liquidation. 101 The
restructure would focus on the publishing assets. A contemporaneous file note dated
22 Janumy 1990, shmily before the Transactions, 102 confirmed that Aspinall had plans
to become a more efficient newspaper operator and to consolidate in this business and
pay off the group's bonowings after disposal of the BRL stake. Owen J accepted that
Aspinall had great confidence in the future of the publishing assets, accepted the
genuineness of his beliefs in this respect and thought that, generally speaking, they
were based on a sound foundation. 103
60. Aspinall was confident that the Bell group companies could meet recurrent expenses
and believed that he had enough "tools" to sustain the operation of the Bell group to
104
Aspinall was dete1mined to
enable the restructure to occur post Janumy 1990.
confi·ont Bell group's problems and he was intent on securing its surviva1. 105 Owen J
accepted that Aspinall "considered that the first step in any restructure, or way
forward, was to secure the medium-term financing facility. This would give him time
to plan and implement a restructure, undoubtedly based on the 'tools' that he had
available and the ideas that he had in his mind for utilising the tools .... he certainly had
some ideas in mind before the refinancing was entered into. But he had to achieve the
refinancing to buy the 12 months' time that he considered he needed to plan and
. Iement h"IS 1"deas. " 106
Imp
61. It was common ground that the Directors believed, and an honest and intelligent
director would have believed, that it was possible to restructure the financial position
of the Bell group so that the companies in the Bell group could meet their obligations
99
[J: 6035(1)](AB5/2079), [J: 6086](AB5/2093) ("! think that Aspinall believed that 'the group' was not
actually insolvent").
100
[J: 1828](AB2/981), [J: 1881l(AB3/995), [J: 4295](AB4/1581), rJ: 4966-4967l(AB4/1771), [J:
5018](AB4117ll3), [J: 5055](AB411793), [J: 5060]("AB4/1795), [J: 5370l(AB4/1890), [J: 5434l(AB4/f918),
rJ: 5900l(AB5/2042), [J: 6035(1)-(3)](AB5/2079); [AJ: 2095](AB9/3989), [AJ: 2260](AB9/4050), [AJ:
'2759-2764l(AB9/4208).
101
2J: 5018](AB411783); [J: 5083](AB4/1803), [J: 5384](AB4/1897), [J: 5438](AB4/1919); [AJ:
2§63
(AB9/4243).
10
[ J: 2773](AB9/4214) referring to TBGL.04735.032(AB
). To the same effect, the letter from
Aspinall and Oates to the UK directors (including Mitchell) dated 23 January 1990 TBGL.07207.032(AB
} (referred to at [J: 5079](AB4/1802)) as part of the package TBGL.07207.029-TBGL.07207.033(AB
03
104
105
106
J: 1822l~AB2/979).
J: 5154 AB4/1826 .
J: 5074 AB4/1799 .
J: 5367 AB4/1890l. See also [J: 5362](AB4/1888), [J: 6086](AB5/2093).
14
as and when they fell due. 107 A liquidation, on the other hand, would involve a "fire
sale" destruction of the value of the Bell group's assets and the likelihood that some
creditors would not be paid.
62. The Bell group held two principal assets: the publishing assets and the BRL shares. 108
Many of the Bell group companies either owed debts to, or were owed debts by, or
held shares in, other Bell group companies, such that the worth of those assets would
be determined by the value of the two principal assets. 109
10
63. The Directors believed that liquidation would result in a substantial loss of value
those principal assetsY 0 That is because a liquidator would conduct a "fire sale"
the group's assets.lll The Directors believed that the Bell group had a surplus
assets over liabilities, but not if its principal assets were sold in a "fire sale" .112
particular:
of
of
of
In
(a) Aspinall believed the publishing assets were worth between $500-$600 million at
the time. 113 The trial judge's finding was that liquidation would have reduced its
value by $1 00 million or $200 million. 114
(b) The BRL shares had negligible realisable value as at January 1990 in the short to
medium term, 115 but if "the brewery transaction" could be completed, Aspinall
believed that those shares could be worth up between $200 million to $456
million by the end of l990Y 6 If liquidation occurred, then the opportunity to
restore significant value for the BRL shares would be lost and there would be no
prospect of restoring any value to the BRL shares. 117
20
64. The Directors considered that it was in the interests of all the companies in the Bell
group to enter into the Transactions. The Transactions afforded the only attainable
opportunity to preserve and enhance the value of the key assets, and to restructure and
pay or receive payment of debts to the direct or derivative advantage of each company
in the group. 11
65. In terms of liabilities, the total bank debt owed by companies in the Bell group, in
107
PLED.OlO.OOl at 48A(c) particular G)(ABI/191,193); PLED.Ol2.001 at 122(e) and (f))(ABI/405,406),
{t}J:
2920-2922)(AB9/4260).
8
[J: 3ll!AB2 543), [J: 32](AB2/544), [J: 48](AB2/548), [J: 463](AB2/640), [J: 1802-1804](AB2/974), [J:
I ~85](AB'l/996).
10
[J: 1882](AB3/995), [J: 496~[AB4/1771), [J: 5018](AB4/1783); Mitchell WITD.026.007.Tat [105](AB
)"Aspinall WITD.026.011 at [34- 36](AB
).
10
AB4/1918), [J: 5438l(AB4/1919).
111 tJ: 5018tfAB4/1783l, tJ: 543
J: 5018 AB4/1783, J: 5083](AB4/1803), [J: 5436](AB4/1918), [J: 5438](AB4/1919).
112
J: 5018 AB4/1783 , J: 5436](AB4/1918).
113
AJ: 27 O](AB9/4214. In mid-November 1989, the directors had approved the TBGL Annual Report
054.02.0002 (AB
) valuing the publishing assets at $626 million as at 30 June 1989. The auditors had
qualified that valuation by $125 million, im_plymg a valuation of$501 million: fJ: 1805-1806](AB2/975); fJ:
6446]l(AB5/2186), [AJ: 2803]](AB9/4nt;. There had been expressions of interest in purchasing the
publishing assets for prices ranging from $300 million to $576 million on a debt-free basis: [J:
5l02](AB4/1809), fJ: 5097](AB4/1807).
II ~1: 290l](AB9)4253).
115
J: 1798(4) and (5) AB2/972), [J: 6035(4)](AB5/2079).
116
J:
fJ: 5018l(AB4/1783), fJ: 5139-5140l(AB4/1821), fJ: 5417-5420](AB: 4/1908191 ), [J: 5422](AB4/19lb[J: 54~5-5436](AB471918), [J: 6035(4)l(AB5/1079); WITD.026.007.T at
[68](AB:
). Hill and Henson, the independent directors ofBRL, 6elieved that the brewery transaction
wtmld be completed and BRL's financial proolems would be resolved: fAJ: 2863](AB9/4243).
11
[J: 5435](AB4/l918), [J: 6035l(4)](AB5/2079); [AJ: 2863](AB9/4283), [AJ: 2.90l](AB9/4253). See also
the evidence of Aspinall T: 30938(AB
); Henson T: 13203, 13210(AB
); Hill T: 13475(AB
1798(2)](AB2~9~2),
lis Cf Walker v Wimborne at 6.
15
Australian dollars, was approximately $260 million. 119 Otherwise, the liabilities,
which the trial judge found and the Court of Appeal confirmed, 120 included the
disputed tax debts of approximately $34.3 million and the obligation in respect of the
bonds (approximately $385.4 million plus £75 million).l2l In addition to those debts,
there were also trade creditors, but both Owen J and Drummond AJA held the
Directors were conect in their view that the Bell group would continue to meet these
debts. 122
10
66. The tax debts were in respect of three companies in the group and were disputed bona
fide. 123 The Directors believed that the companies would succeed in their dispute with
theDCT. 124
67. The Directors believed that the obligations in respect of the bonds would be
subordinated in a liquidation. 125 The Directors were aware that the conve1tible
subordinated bonds were selling at 20% of their face value. 126 The Directors believed
that, in a liquidation, the bondholders would have received little or nothing m a
winding up, whereas the appellants and other creditors would likely be paid. 127
The Transactions as a Necessary Step in any Restructure
20
68. Fourthly, the Directors believed that a restructure was only possible if refinancing of
the Bell group's banking anangements could be achieved, and the Transactions
afforded the best available terms for such a refinancing, and were a necessary first step
in any restructuring. 128 That is to say, the Directors believed that, unless the
Transactions were entered into, the Bell group companies would be wound up at the
suit of one or more of the Australian banks. 129
69. While Owen J held that "there were a range of other possible transactions that might
have been available to the directors" 130 to effect a restructure of the Bell group without
the first step of the Transactions, no specific alternative, let alone one that would have
been more advantageous to the companies, was identified either by his Honour or the
respondents.l3l In any event, the Court of Appeal did not adopt Owen J's reasoning,
119
120
121
~J: 1192l(AB2/807).
311](AB2/60~,
J: 2096 (AB3/1046); [AJ: 2343-2344 (AB9/4078).
J: 309T(AB2/606), fJ:
[J: 313](AB2/607), [J: 318](AB2/608). The bonds included two
!ranches of bonds issuea directly by TB(k and BGF, amounting to $150m. It was not in dispute that these
debts were subordinated. The "subordination" issue in the case related to the "on-loans" of almost A$400
million in bonds issued by BGNV (guaranteed on a subordinated basis by TBGL), the proceeds of which
Jl8nd
issues had been on-lent to TBGL (as to around $60 million) and BGF (as to around $340 million).
2
[J:5005-5006l(AB4!1781), [J:5438](AB4/1919), [J:5470(f)l(AB4/1930); [AJ: 2343-2344l(AB9/4078).
Owen J included a small num&er of relatively minor extemaf liabilities, totalling about $600,000, at [1:
2Q96](AB3/1046),
but these were rejected by Drummond AJA at [AJ:2343-2344](AB9/4078).
12
[J: 2014](AB3/1027).
124
\J: 5158l(AB4/1828), [J: 5442](AB4/1921). The auditors concurred with that view: [J:
2g46
(AB3/10~4~J: 5442](AB4/1921).
12
[J:
5057-5058 AB4/1794), [J: 5060-5061](AB4/1795), [J: 5380-5385](AB4/1894).
126
AJ: 2852](
/4239).
127
J: 5438](AB4/1919).
128
IJ: 1881](AB3/995), [J: 5018l(AB4/1783), [J: 5362](AB4/1888), [J: 5367](AB4/1890), [J:
5438 (AB4/1919), (J: 5452](AB4/1924), [J: 6057](AB5/2086), [J: 6086](AB5/2093). Tlieir plans were to
refinance to a medmm term facility to enable the Directors to concentrate on the publishing assets and
improving their P.rofitability, so as to preserve the opportunity to restore value to the BRL shares and to sell
these and possibly an interest in the publishing assets and defease bonds [J: 5082-5l(AB4/2092),
[J:5364](AB4/1889); [J:5367](AB4/1890); [J: 5425j(AB4/1911), [J: 5434-6](AB4/1917); WITD.026.00l.T
at
[73], T7~, [3761, [598](AB
) (Aspinall).
129
J:
Ul81
(AB3(995),
[J:
5018](AB4/1783),
[J:
5370](AB4(JS90),
[J: 6035](AB5/2079).
130
J: 4306 (AB4/1584 .
131
430
Owen J accepted a submission advanced at first instance by the respondents,
that there were theoretical alternatives [J: 4303](AB4/1583), but the respondents did not advance, and did not
~J: -4307](AB~Il584)
16
and considered that the only alternative was liquidation. 132 That is of central
importance in light of the fact that the honest belief of the Directors as to the necessity
of the Transactions (and their indispensability to any restructure) is not in dispute.
10
20
70. The Directors negotiated hard with the appellants over a period of six months in an
attempt to achieve the most favourable terms by which they could refinance bank debt
to permit a restructure of the group and avoid liquidation and consequent losses to all
companies and their creditors. 133 The respondents themselves alleged that if a lender
or lenders, other than the appellants, had been willing to advance BGF sufficient
moneys as at 26 January 1990, they would only have done so upon the same, or
substantially the same, terms as the Transactions. 134
71. The majority's views concerning the reasonableness or rationality of the Directors'
beliefs are, for the reasons given above, iiTelevant. Those conclusions were, in any
event, factually wrong, and frequently a corollary to the enoneous views as to the
nature of the directors' obligations regarding creditors. 135 Moreover, a finding that the
decisions of the Directors lacked reasonable grounds was not a proper basis for a
conclusion of breach. Any lack of reasonable grounds did not entail that the Directors'
decisions were "inational, if not bizane . . . - which is to say one that is so
unreasonable that no reasonable person could have anived at it". 136 As Carr AJA
conectly held, Owen J made no finding of ilTationality but, rather, he found that the
Directors honestly believed that entering into the Transactions was in the best interests
of each of the companies in the group. 137
72. Equally, once it is appreciated that the Directors honestly believed that the
Transactions were in the best interests of the companies, the suggestion of the
existence of a "scheme" to transfer control of the Bell group assets to the appellants
(and other purposes) cannot be sustained. 138 Such a finding was inconsistent with the
case as pleaded or found by Owen J, and inconsistent with the actual beliefs and
purposes of the Directors. 139 For example, Owen J expressly found that Aspinall's
purpose was to buy 12 months' time in order to undeiiake a restructure. 140 Moreover,
it made no commercial sense to conclude that directors, who had fought hard to
seek to advance (see [J: 4304, 4307](AB4/1584), a case to establish that there was any chance of achieving
an alternative, particularly where the position had been reached in January 1990 (after six months of
negotiations) that either the refinancing went ahead promptly or the appellants would call up their loans
leading to liquidation ~: 1828](AB2/981), [J: 188l](AB3/995), fJ: 5018j(AB411783), [J: 5055J(AB4/1793),
[J: 5434](AB4/1917), J: 5900](AB5/2042), [J: 6035(2) and (3) (AB5/2079)). The maJority in the Court of
Appeal simply procee ed upon the basis that the decision to refmance constituted breach, in the abstract,
V{Ithout any regard to whether the alternative, liguidation, would be worse.
l>'[AJ: 1087](AB8/3721), [AJ: 2095](AB9/3989), fAJ: 2260](AB9/4050), [AJ: 2808-AJ:2814](AB9/4228)
133
For example, see fJ: 5019J(AB4/1785), fJ: 5020](AB4/1785), [J: 5023](AB4/1786), [J: 5026](AB4/1786),
({.: 8978-8979](AB6/2851), [: 9756](AB7/~044).
4
fJ: 1693](AB2/945).
135
!':ee. for examnle. f A.T: 99:111 ARR/3701).
136
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18 at [68]; Wayde at 469-70.
137
[AJ: 2772](AB9/4214).
138
[AJ: 945](AB8/3693). It is, in any event, important to note that none of the paragraphs in Owen J's
judgment to which Lee AJA refers as constituting a finding of the existence of the sclieme support his
conclusion. Most are recitations of allegations made by the respondents, rather than findings by his Honour.
His references are largely based upon findings made in the "objective insolvency" case, not in the section of
the judgment contaimng findings against the Directors. Thus, they ignored findings about cash flow which
the Directors believed would be received (and were in fact received), for example the asset sale proceeds
i~cluding Bell Press of$25m [J: 5197](AB4/1839), [J: 5436l(AB4/1918).
1 9
Not only was Lee AJA's statement at [AJ: 945l(AB8/3693) ("the pnncipal object of fthe Scheme] was to
transfer control of the Bell group assets to the Banks for the conduct of an mfonnal admmistration controlled
b.;t the Banks") never pleaded, but a similar notion was explicitly rejected by Owen J [J: 6066](AB5/2088).
I
[J: 5362](AB4/1888), [J: 5367](AB4/1890), [J: 6086](AB5/2093).
17
refinance with no or minimal security, and who had strong belief in the future
profitability of the publishing assets and the potential for restoring value to the BRL
shares, had a purpose (never articulated by any of them and contrary to the purpose
evident in the contemporaneous documentation) of transferring control of the
companies' assets to the appellants to conduct an informal administration, in
circumstances where the directors did not stand to gain (and did not receive) any
financial or other personal benefit from doing so.
The Position of Creditors
10
73. The above account of the facts demonstrates, that the Directors' purposes and
consideration of the best interests of the companies appropriately acknowledged the
extent to which the interests of creditors informed the interests of the companies. In
particular:
(a) the Directors believed that the bondholders were subordinated to ordinary
unsecured creditors. 141 Although two of the four judges who have considered this
question came to a different conclusion, 142 the honesty of the Directors' views is
not in dispute. Because the Directors considered the bondholders to be
subordinated, they regarded them as the principal persons advantaged by a
restructure compared to their position in a liquidation. 143 The trial judge accepted
that it was "undeniable" that, based on his subordination finding (which accorded
with the Directors' belief) had the companies gone into liquidation shortly after
26 January 1990 it was unlikely the bondholders would have received a return on
their investments. 144
20
(b) the Directors believed that the disputes regarding the tax assessments would be
resolved in the companies' favour. 145
(c) the Directors believed that the trade creditors' interests would not be affected by
the Transactions because they would be paid in any event. 146
(d) the Directors were aware of the position of the appellants (who were of course
creditors of companies in the group) and the bondholders holding bonds issued
directly by TBGL and BGF, which were, on any view, subordinated. 147
30
74. Once it is appreciated that the question is only whether the Directors honestly believed
that the entJy into the Transactions was in the best interests of the companies
(informed, where appropriate, by the interests of creditors) and were exercising their
powers consistently with the purpose for which they were given, the error in the
majority's criticisms of the Directors' beliefs becomes plain.
75. The basis upon which Lee AJA held that the Directors failed to consider the interests
of the DCT was that to hold their (honest) opinion that the companies would prevail
141
rJ: 5057](AB411794), [J: 5058](AB4/1794), [J: 5060](AB4/1795), [J:506l](AB4/1795), [J: 5380-
5~8Z](AB4/1894).
14
Carr AJA held that commercial people would regard a conclusion that the on-loans were unsubordinated
"as
totally lacking in commercial reality": [AJ: 3242J(AB9/4354).
143
[J: 5384](AB4/1897), [J: 5438](AB4/1919).
144
Remedies, r52j (AB7/3145).
145
[J: 5158l(AB4 1828l, [J: 5442J(AB411921).
146
[J: 5005 (AB4/1781 , [J: 5438 (AB4/1919), [J: 5470(f)](AB4/1930); [AJ: 2344](AB9/4079).
147
Nor was it wrong, given their elief that the group was not actually insolvent, for the Directors to take into
account TBGL's shareholders: see Neat Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWE Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 277 at [47].
18
was "imprudent and unreasonable". 148 His Honour simply erred by asking whether the
Directors' view was correct, or whether they ought to have held a different view. The
only relevant question was whether they honestly held the view they did.
10
76. Equally, the basis upon which Lee AJA held that the Directors failed to consider the
interests of the BGNV bondholders was that they were not, as the Directors (and
Owen J and Carr AJA) thought, subordinated. 149 Once more, the question is not
whether the Directors' view about subordination was right or wrong. Indeed, the
difficulty of the subordination issue provides a powerful illustration of the error in the
majority's approach. It cannot be the law that whether directors breach their duty to
act in bona fide and for proper purposes turns on an ultimate judicial finding on an
issue of this type, despite the Directors' belief, on the material known, that the bonds
and on-loans were subordinated.
77. Once the proper test is applied to the facts, the Directors are seen to have appropriately
considered the interests of creditors.
20
78. Moreover, questions of "prejudice" were dealt with globally, notwithstanding that no
"group" Barnes v Addy case was advanced, as Owen J accepted. It was necessary for
each company to establish its individual claim against its directors for breach of duty
owed to that company and prove knowledge by the appellants of that breach. 150
"Prejudice" was not proved on this basis. Thus, for example, Bell Equity's only asset
was 3,323,981 BRL shares. As at 26 January 1990, the only realistic prospect of
restoring value to the BRL shares was to proceed with the refinancing. 151 Bell
Equity's only debt was a debt owed to BGF of $6.34 million. 152 It had no capacity to
repay its debt to BGF unless value was restored to the BRL shares. Yet not only did
the majority find that Bell Equity's directors breached their fiduciary duties in causing
Bell Equity to enter into the Transactions, (as part of the global finding of prejudice)
they found that equity required that the appellants account to Bell Equity for the
proceeds of the sale of its proportion of the BRL shares, plus compound interest.
Those proceeds would never have come into existence, but for the Transactions.
Summary
30
79. The Directors did not breach any of their duties. They honestly believed, on the basis
of their assessment of the options facing the companies, on the basis of their
assessment of the assets and liabilities of the companies, and on the basis of their
judgment as to future events, that it was in the best interests of all companies to
proceed with the restructure. The findings of Owen J and the majority involve
second-guessing this decision upon their own analysis of these matters, and requiring
compliance with the asserted obligation (in reality a new rule of law) that directors of
companies of doubtful solvency must ensure that their decisions do not cause
prejudice to any creditors.
"'1AJ: 979l(AB8/3701). His conclusions were based upon matters not known to the Directors. [AJ: 968974 (ABS/3699), and he criticised the Directors for not going beyond the advice of their in-house expert [AJ:
975 (ABS/3700) who was confident there would be no liability on the assessments [J: 5157](AB4/1828);
0
(a'}J[1PJmtJ:J~~ 1osl.
150
151
152
J: 4807-4808](AB4/1731).
J: 1798l(AB4/972) [J: 5570-5772l](AB4/1958).
ISP.00026.003 TIFF 079-080(Al3__j; PLED.009.001 at [7C], [8(e)] (AB. _ __)
19
2.
Accessorial liability (Barnes v Addy) issues
(i) Barnes v Addv was not engaged
80. Since the duties in issue were not fiduciary duties, there was no reason why the
Directors, as fiduciaries, should be treated "as if trustees" for the purposes of Barnes v
Addy liability. In those circumstances, the case for liability of the appellants (other
than under the insolvency or Bankruptcy Acts regimes) should end there. However,
there are also errors in the application by the majority of Lord Selbome's judgment in
Barnes v Addy itself.
(ii) No first limb liability
10
81. The majority erred in upholding the trial judge's conclusion that the plaintiffs had
made out a case of knowing receipt. This conclusion was erroneous for three reasons:
(a) First, there was no trust property;
(b) Secondly, in any event, here, the "property" said to have been received by the
appellants was a basket of "rights" arising from the execution of the Transactions;
and
(c) Thirdly, in any event, here, the parties were dealing under a series of umescinded
contracts which were binding and effective at law in accordance with their terms.
There could be no question of the rights being "trust property" or subject to
constructive trusteeship or knowledge of receipt of trust property in those
circumstances.
20
82. Each is considered in turn below. However, a preliminmy observation should also be
made. A critical element in establishing a cause of action for knowing receipt is
knowledge of the existence of the relevant duty and breach of that duty. That means
that any findings by this Court in relation to breach of directors' duty will only lead to
liability under limb one of Barnes v Addy to the extent that the findings of Owen J and
the Court of Appeal regarding the knowledge of the appellants (which are not
challenged) are capable of supporting a finding of knowledge of the breaches so
found.
The first limb ofBarnes v Addy does not apply to company directors
30
83. This Court in Farah noted that "in recent times it has been assumed, but rarely if at all
decided, that the first limb applies not only to persons dealing with trustees, but also to
persons dealing with at least some other types offiducimy". 153 In relation to that, two
observations should be made.
84. First, the whole point of Lord Selbome's dictum in Barnes v Addy was to resist the
umeasonable extension of the doctrine of trusts, as it had been established by the
Court of Chancery, and avoid "umeasonable and inequitable applications" of the
sound doctrines of equity. 154
85. The law in Australia is that articulated by this Court in Consul, Warman v Dwyer and
Farah. 155 In Consul, both Stephen J (with whom Barwick CJ agreed) and Gibbs J
153
(2007) 230 CLR 89 at [113].
Barnes v Addy at 251.
155
Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 (Consul); Warman
International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544 (Warman); see also Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls
154
20
endorsed the existing principle of limb one of Barnes v Addy. Stephen J accepted the
orthodox rule that there were two alternatives: receipt of trust property and knowing
participation. 156 Gibbs J's judgment was to like effect. His Honour considered the first
limb as applicable only to receipt of trust property "in the strict sense" but that the
second limb extended to dealings with fiduciaries breaching their fiduciary duty,
including dealings whereby property or a benefit was received. Thus, after quoting
Lord Selbome's dictum, and the cases which had considered it, Gibbs J said: 157
10
"All these authorities, however, are dealing with trustees and trust propertv in the
strict sense, and the question is whether the principle applies to impose liability on
strangers who knowingly participate in a breach of fiduciarv duty committed by a
person who is not a trustee or is at most a constructive trustee." (underlining added)
and: Iss
"I therefore conclude, on principle, that a person who knowingly participates in a
breach of fiduciary duty is liable to account to the person to whom the duty was
owed for any benefit he has received as a result of such participation." (underlining
added)
20
86. Hence, the extension Gibbs J contemplated related solely to the second limb. This
extension was endorsed by this Court in Warman and also in Farah. There has been no
extension by the Court of the first limb, so as to apply it beyond trust property in the
strict sense. That limb one is inapplicable to receipt of property arising from breach of
fiduciary duty is supported by Warman which applied limb two to deal with receipt in
those circumstances.
87. Other observations of this Court are consistent with the first limb applying only to
trust property in the strict sense. 159
30
88. Trust property is unique because it involves the recognition of two separate proprietary
interests, not present in the case of property owned absolutely (as in the case of
property owned by a corporation). The separate equitable interest is in place at the
outset, and follows the property. That is, there is a certain proprietary foundation for
the receipt, and the relief. In this case, the companies' claims to the property could not
arise before the contracts were avoided.
89. Secondly, it is particularly inappropriate to extend limb one to dealings by
corporations, a fortiori trading corporations - the primary vehicles of commerce which routinely and properly pay away or transfer their property to third parties. This
is not the proper field of operation for the application of the strict principles of
constructive trusteeship. Directors do not have the protections of a trustee, including,
for example, the ability to seek judicial advice about whether a decision is justified.
90. There are no separate legal and beneficial estates involved. 160 Whilst a third party
(2011) 244 CLR 427 at [106].
56
Consul at 408.
157
Consul at 396.
158
Consul at 3 97.
159
Zhu v Treasurer of the State of New South Wales (2004) 218 CLR 530 at [12ll; see also United States
Surgical Corporation v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 157 at 253; Rogers v
ffffbriel [J999] NSWSC 368 at [173].
1
See Commissioner a/Taxation v Linter Textiles Australia Ltd (In !iq) (2005) 220 CLR 592 (Linter) at 606
per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.
21
dealing with a trustee can "know" that the trustee is only the legal owner of property, a
recipient of property from a corporation knows the precise opposite: that the company
is the absolute owner of the property.
91. The directors are not absolute or limited owners of the property of the corporation.
The correct position was confirmed by the High Court in Clay v Clay: 161
"It is to be recalled that, in the past, the term 'trustee' sometimes was used to
describe the position of a director in relation to the company in question. Such a
use of the term 'trustee could at best be metaphorical because property of the
company was not vested in the directors. Again, in Knox v Gye Lord Westbury
said:
10
"Another source of error in this matter is the looseness with which the word
'trustee' is frequently used. The surviving partner is often called a 'trustee',
but the term is used inaccurately. He is not a trustee ...
The application to a man who is improperly, and by metaphor only, called a
trustee, of all the consequences which would follow if he were a trustee by
express declaration - in other words a complete trustee - holding the property
exclusively for the benefit of the cestui que trust, well illustrates the remark
made by Lord Mansfield, that nothing in law is so apt to mislead as a
metaphor."
20
The maiority wrongfUlly extended the concept o[property (or the purposes oflimb one
92. The trial judge found that the appellants received "the basket or aggregation of rights"
arising from the execution of "instruments conferring rights on [them] to protect or
further [their] commercial position". 162 In this way, he found that the appellants
"received" trust property when, for example, a respondent entered into a facility
agreement or guarantee. 163
93. Drummond AJA held 164 that the rights which were "created and conferred on the
banks" by execution of the various Transaction instruments constituted choses in
action and, as such, constituted property capable of being held in trust. Further, he
upheld Owen J's finding. 165
30
94. To the extent that the findings involve the proposition that there was a receipt of
property constituted by the "basket of rights" (the choses in action comprised in the
Transactions per se), they were in error. The supposed justification for the findin~ was
apparently that choses in action are "property capable of being held on trust". 16 But,
the same proposition has been considered, and the application of Barnes v Addy
rejected, by the House of Lords in Criterion Properties Plc v Stratford UK Properties
LLC. 167 Entering into an executory contract which is valid at law (and remains valid at
least until avoided) is not analogous to a receipt of property. Those rights were not
property that could be "assigned to the Bank" nor could the appellants have reassigned
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
2001)202CLR410at430-431. SeealsoLinterat605.
J: 8737~(AB6/2788}, [J: 8739)(AB6/2788).
J: 8739 (AB6/2788); see also [): 8750](Al36/2795).
AJ: 21 ~AB9/4010.
AJ: 2169 AB9/4013).
AJ: 2158 AB9/4010}.
2004)1
R 1846 at 1855.
22
that right to the respondent company . 168
95. None of the choses in action which arose on the execution of the securities were trust
property received by the appellants. The position is a fortiori in the case of the facility
agreements and guarantees.
96. The characterisation of the "trust property" as the "assets of the Bell group
companies" "given over" to the appellants "by way of the securities" gives rise to two
further problems.
10
20
97. First, property was not "given over" to the appellants in the sense of being transferred.
By entering into the Transactions, the Bell group companies made contractual
promises to the appellants and, in some cases, provided securities. The securities had
an effect on the assets, but only subject to the terms of the Transactions. Neither the
promises nor the securities resulted in the beneficial receiRt by appellants of any of the
assets of any Bell group company as at January 1990. 69 There was no beneficial
receipt by the appellants of the respondents' assets. The appellants obtained some
securities over assets. Those securities were held subject to the terms of the
Transactions, and, at the very least, the equity of redemption.
98. Secondly, if the appellants received, by way of the securities, the worthwhile assets of
the Bell group companies, it is those assets which would be the subject of the
constructive trust. The contractual arrangements, (the facility agreements and the
guarantees) would be untouched.
The majority wrongfully extended the concept of "receipt"
99. At all material times up to and including enforcement of the Transactions and dealings
with the proceeds of enforcement, those Transactions were unrescinded and were
binding and effective in accordance with their terms. 170 Before rescission, there can
be no property to which a constructive trust can attach, and hence no trust property.
And there can be no knowing receipt without knowledge that there was a receipt of
trust property. !71 Each of these elements (trust property and knowledge) must be
established at the time of receipt. This cannot occur under an unrescinded contract.
30
I 00. Here, at the date of the agreements (the time of pleaded receipt), there was no trust
property, and no knowledge of trust property. Even at the time of the disposal and
dispersal, there was no trust property (nor knowledge of trust property) and the
proceeds belonged legally and beneficially to the appellants. Knowing receipt of trust
property cannot be established retrospectively, especially at a time when the
"property" has ceased to exist.
(iii) No second limb liability
IOI.This Court in Farah confirmed that the second limb required a "dishonest and
fraudulent design" and that this required a "dishonest and fraudulent breach of
fiduciary duty"; it was not sufficient to show a "breach of fiduciary duty" [185] or
even a "significant breach of fiduciary duty" [180]. Rather, the "breach of fiduciary
168
169
Broad v Commissioner ofStamp Duties [1980] 2 NSWLR 40 at 46.
CfHoffinann LJ in El A~·ou v Dollar Land Holdings pic [1994] BCC 143 (CA) at 154 per Hoffinann LJ
uoted in Brown v Bennett 1999 BCC 525 (CA) at 655.
\l!o Daly v The Sydney Stoc
Limited (1986) 160 CLR 371 at 389-90; Hancock Family Memorial
Fqundation Ltdv Porteous (2000) 22 WAR 198.
17
Farah at [112].
Exc~ange
23
duty relied on must be dishonest and fraudulent" [179]. However, Drummond AJA
amended this requirement by devising what he described as a "cumbersome but ... not
unworkable test", namely the existence of a breach which was "more than trivial and
. . . too serious to be excusable because the fiduciary has acted honestly, reasonably
and ought fairly to be excused" .172 This simply deviates unwarrantedly from the
requirements laid down in Farah. In particular, it undercuts the requirement for
dishonesty. 173
10
102.Drummond AJA's approach was based substantially on his view 174 that the Court in
Farah at [184] "[dealt] with the kind of conduct by a trustee or fiduciary which will be
'dishonest and fi·audulent' for the purposes of the second limb in Barnes v Addy". This
is simply wrong. At [184], the Court merely pointed to the fact that breaches of duty
varied greatly in seriousness.
103.Not only was Drummond AJA's approach inconsistent with the express decision of
this Court, it reintroduces uncertainty. There is clarity in the test of dishonesty:
Belmont Finance Corporation Limited v Williams Furniture Ltd. 175
104.Moreover, the Court of Appeal's finding of a "dishonest and fraudulent design" was,
on its face, erroneous having regard to the trial judge's conclusions that:
(a) the respondents only alleged "that the directors breached their fiduciary duties to
the companies"; there was no allegation "that they did so dishonestly"; 176
(b) he would not (and did not) make any findings of dishonesty against any director 177
20
or bank officer or appellant; 178
(c) there was no profit made in breach of duty, no conflict of interest and no pursuit
of any interest in a position of conflict;
(d) he would not make a finding of knowledge of a dishonest and fraudulent design
on the part of a guiding mind or minds of each appellant and that such a finding
was essential to a finding of participation in dishonest and fraudulent design. 179
105. A pleading of fraud and dishonesty 180 required that any such case had to be pleaded
specifically and with particularity", 181 with the particulars "exactly given". 182 As this
Court has recently affirmed, 183 this is fundamental to a fair trial. It properly attracts a
172
173
174
[AJ: 2112(c)](AB9/3996).
It is clear that the High Court required "dishonesty" in its ordinary sense: [172-3].
At fAJ: 2123](AB9/3999).
[19'791 I Ch 250 (CA) at 267, 270, 274. See also Farah at [173], Macleod v R (2003) 214 CLR 230 at
17
r-161-[37].
' J: 4813 ~AB4/1732l.
177
J: 6031 ABS/2078 .
178
J: 6202 ABS/2126 .
179
J: 6159tAB5/2113). His Honour found "knowledge" on the basis of aggregation [J: 8742l(AB6/2789),
[J:8722-8724](AB6/2784), fJ:8726](AB6/2785). To make out a case of participation in a dishonest and
fraudulent design required t&e respondents to particularise the guiding mind or mmds of the Bank who were
alleged to have the relevant knowledge and prove that such person had that knowledge: Macquarie Bank Ltd
v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd [1998J 3 VR 133 at 145; ACCC v Radio Rentals Ltd (2005) 146 FCR 292 at
[199]; NIML Ltd v MAN Financial Australia Ltd [2006] VSCA 128 at [37]-[38]; Krakowski v Eurolynx
Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563 at 582-583. Nor did the Court of Appeal make a finding of knowledge
bs'
b the relevant guiding mind or minds of the appellants [AJ: 2199](AB9/4024).
1
Fortescue Metals Group Ltdv Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39 at [26]
p,er
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ.
81
Farah
at [170]; Powerv Ekstein [2009] NSWSC 130 at [52].
182
Jonesco v Beard [1930] AC 298 per Lord Buckmaster (with whom the other members of the House
cgncurred)
at 300.
18
Fortescue Metals Group Ltd at [25].
175
24
Briginshaw onus.
Such a case had to be opened 185 and ex~ressly put to those
accused of such conduct, here, being the Directors and bankers. 1 6 Here, there was no
pleading of a dishonest and fraudulent design, 187 there were no particulars of such
allegation, no case of dishonest and fraudulent design was opened, there was no
suggestion put to any of the Directors that they were engaged in a dishonest and
fraudulent design and there was no suggestion put to any of the bank officers that the
appellants were knowingly assisting or participating in a dishonest and fraudulent
design (or any type of dishonesty or fraud). In those circumstances, and contrary to the
conclusion of the majority, the finding was simply not open (as the trial judge
correctly held).
184
10
Remedies and Interest
106.For the reasons set out above, the appellants were not liable to the respondents at
general law. It follows that the only relief to which the respondents were entitled was
that available pursuant to their statutory claims. The proper scope of that relief which differs in material respects from relief available in aid of a Barnes v Addy claim
- will be addressed in reply to the respondents' Notices of Contentions and Crossappeal.
20
107. Were the Court to find, however, that liability under Barnes v Addy has been
established, it would be necessary to consider the relief awarded by the majority.
Against that contingency, the appellants submit that the majority's approach was in
error for the reasons which follow.
(i) Majority wronglv awarded equitable compensation on a profit disgorgement basis
I 08.Lee and Drummond AJJA awarded the respondents equitable compensation. That
compensation was comprised of: (a) the proceeds received by the appellants from
enforcement of the Transactions; and (b) an amount of interest calculated so as to
disgorge profits that might have been earned by the appellants on the proceeds.
109.The core of the majority's reasoning on equitable compensation was as follows: 188
"If the right to elect an account of profits was to be foreclosed in a case where it
had been found that the Banks received property from which profits were obtained
with knowledge that disposition of that property to the Banks had been effected by
breach of fiduciary duty, then the equitable compensation provided in lieu had to
reflect the cardinal principle of equitv that there be disgorgement of profits gained."
(underlining added)
30
llO.The majority proceeded to calculate equitable compensation in order to disgorge
profits which the appellants may have made from use of frmds obtained by the
Transactions. According to Lee AJA, this disgorgement analysis formed the
"foundation for the assessment of equitable compensation". 189
lll.The majority's approach was erroneous on several levels. First, there is no principle
184
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. See Farah atJI70l.
Oldfield Knott Architects Pty Ltd v Ortiz Investments Pty Lt [2000] WASCA 255 at [421.
186
Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v FA! General Insurance Co Ltd (In Liq) (2003) 214 CLR 514 at 534.
187
The respondents proffered a draft fleading containing an allegation of "dishonest and fraudulent design"
in 1999: MISA.OOOOI.OOI at [147(h) (AB
). However, tliis draft was never filed and the claim was
never made in any subsequent pleading.
188
[AJ 1236l(AB8/3751 ), per Lee AJA, Drummond AJA agreeing: [AJ: 2678](AB9/4180).
189
AJ: 1259](AB8/3755).
185
25
of equity that profits must be disgorged, let alone a "cardinal" principle to that effect.
The existence of the 'principle' is inconsistent with the well-established - and
mutually exclusive 190 - remedies of equitable compensation and account of profits
awarded by equity courts.
10
112. Equitable compensation seeks to compensate a claimant for losses suffered as a result
of a breach of fiduciary duty. 191 In Nocton, Viscount Haldane LC spoke of
compensating the claimant by putting him in as good a pecuniary position as that in
which he was before the injury. 192 The modern Australian statement of the remedyin Re Dawson 193 -is to the same effect. There, Street J (at 216) observed that a
defaulting trustee is liable to place the trust estate in the same position as it would have
been if no breach of trust had been committed.
113. The remedy's concern with the loss suffered by the claimant informs and confines its
scope. It is "essential" that equitable compensation only compensate a claimant for
losses that were caused by the breach. 194 In Target Holdings Ltd v Redfern, 195 Lord
Browne-Wilkinson expanded upon this limitation (at 432):
"[T]he defendant is only liable for the consequences of the legal wrong he has done
to the plaintiff and to make good the damage caused by such wrong. He is not
responsible for damage not caused by his wrong or to pay by way of compensation
more than the loss suffered from such wrong. The detailed rules of equity as to
causation and the quantification of loss differ, at least ostensibly, from those
applicable at common law. But the principles underlying both systems are the
same."
20
114.His Lordship's ultimate conclusion was that equitable compensation is "designed to
achieve exactly what the word compensation suggests; to make good a loss in fact
suffered by the beneficiaries and which, using hindsight and commonsense, can be
seen to have been caused by the breach". 196 This reflects the law in Australia. 197 A
necessary consequence is that whether the defaulting trustee or fiduciary has made, or
could have been expected to make, a profit is not the focus of the inquiry: "it is no pmt
of its function to strip profits from the defendants". 198
30
115. In contrast, an account of profits seeks to disgorge the profits obtained by the
defendant connected with his wrongdoing. 199 The extent to which the claimant has
suffered injury or loss is iiTelevant to the quantification of the amount to be accounted
190
A party may not obtain both equitable compensation and an account of profits from the same defendant:
Warman at 569-70; Personal Representatives of Tang Man Sit v Capacious Investments Ltd [1996] AC 514
at
521.
191
Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 (Nocton) at 956-7; Re Dawson [1966]2 NSWR 211 at 216.
192
At
952.
193
[1966]2 NSWR 211 at 216; see also O'Halloran v R TThomas & Family Pty Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 262
(O'Halloran)
at 272.
94
Canson Enterprises Ltd v Boughton & Co [1991]3 SCR 534 at 556; approved in 0 'Halloran at 273.
195
[199611 AC 421.
196
At
439.
197
See eg Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449 at 469-70; Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris
Fletcher (2003) 212 CLR 484 at [35]; O'Halloran at 272-3; Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd
(j\012]
NSWCA 383 at [171].
8
Houghton v Immer (No I 55) Pty Ltd (1997) 44 NSWLR 46 at 56 per Handley JA, with whom Mason P
a,j§d
Beazley JA agreed.
1
Co/beam Palmer Limited v Stock Affiliates Pty Limited (1968) 122 CLR 25 at 32; Hospital Products Ltd v
United States Surgical Corporation (f984) 156 CLR 41 at 110; Dart Industries Inc v Decor Corporation Pty
Ltd(l993) 179CLR 101 at 111.
26
°
for. 20 For the same reason, it is irrelevant whether the claimant could itself have
obtained the profit in fact made by the defendant. 201
10
116. It may be accepted that a profit made by a defendant may, in particular circumstances,
be taken into account in determining the loss in fact suffered by the claimant where the
profit was one that could have been made by the plaintiff itself. It is that possibility to
which Tadgell J was referring in Hill v Rose when observing that "it might be
appropriate to compensate the plaintiffs Joss by reference to the defendant's gain".202
However, as his Honour recognised, the focus of inquiry remains the calculation of an
amount that will compensate a claimant for "loss [suffered] by reason of a breach of
the fiduciary's obligation".203 Any suggestion that equitable compensation can be
awarded on a 'gains based' or disgorgement basis, independently of the Joss in fact
suffered by the claimant, should be disavowed by this Court. The correct position was
stated by Windeyer J in Co/beam (albeit in an intellectual property context) as follows:
"If a plaintiff elects to take an inquiry as to damages the loss to him of profits
which he might have made may be a substantial element of his claim.... But what
a plaintiff might have made had the defendant not invaded his rights is by no
means the same thing as what the defendant did make by doing so." 204
20
117. The approach to relief of Lee and Drummond AJJA completely elided the distinctions
drawn out above between equitable compensation and an account of profits. Despite
having conectly rejected an account of profits, their Honours approached the question
of compensation on the basis that they were both entitled and requirecf05 to focus their
attention on the profits gained by the appellants rather than the losses suffered by the
respondents. To proceed in this way necessarily results in an award of equitable
compensation that bears no relationship to the Joss in fact suffered by the respondents.
J18.Secondly, their Honours' erroneous approach to equitable compensation was
reinforced in their specific consideration of the question of interest. Their Honours
rejected Owen J's approach to interest because it focused on the amount of interest
which the respondents (as claimants) would likely have made if the proceeds of the
Transactions had remained in their hands. 206 According to the majority, the 'cardinal
principle' of disgorgement required interest to instead be calculated so as to reflect an
"appropriate approximation of the profit earned by the Banks" _2°7
30
119.However, the majority's approach failed to recognise that the distinctions between
equitable compensation and an account of profits drawn out earlier in these
submissions are mirrored in equity's approach to interest in aid of these two remedies.
Each remedy requires a different approach to the determination of whether to order
200
Warman at 557.
Warman at 558.
[1990] VR 129 at 143. Tadgell J cited McKenzie v McDonald f]927l VLR 134 as an example of that
situation. In that case, Dixon AJ referred to the profit obtained by tlie defendant in breach of fiduciary duty
IJefore
awarding equitable compensation at a lesser amount that reflected the claimant's loss: at 146-7.
03
At 143. At 144, Tadgell J similarly recogoized that the aim of equitable compensation was to "place the
party who suffers following the breach of duty as nearly as possible in the positiOn in which he would have
~t\'od had there been no breach."
° Co/beam at 32.
205
According to Lee AJA at [AJ: 1236](AB8/3752), the equitable compensation awarded "had" to reflect the
cardinal principle. Expressed in this way, the so-called cardinal principle admits of no discretion on the part
gfthe Court, which serves only to reinforce the error made by the majority.
06
[AJ: 1235l(AB8/3751l, [AJ: 1238](AB8/3752).
207
[AJ: 1242 (ABS/3752 .
201
202
27
compound interest and, if so, how it should be calculated.
10
l20.In Nocton, Viscount Haldane LC recognised that interest could be awarded in aid of
equitable compensation to make good "the amount of interest lost by what [the
defendant] did". 208 In the context of equitable compensation, the Court's "jurisdiction
in selecting the appropriate rate of interest is exercisable solely for compensatory
purposes. " 209 The interest component of an award of equitable compensation focuses
on the best use that the claimant could be expected to have made with the funds taken
by the defendant or, put another way, the income forgone by a claimant as a result of
the defendant's wrong? 10 This was the premise adopted by Owen J at trial when
calculating the amount of interest to be awarded211 although, as dealt with below,
Owen J erred in his application of that premise to the evidence before him.
12!. Conversely, where an account of profits is ordered by the Comt, an award of interest
may be made to ensure that the full amount of profit obtained by a defendant is
disgorged to the claimant. It is in that context that presumptions have been developed
by equity courts that assist in determining the rate of interest to be applied. 212 The
majority failed to recognise this critical difference. Lee AJA cited Grimaldi in support
of his approach to the calculation of compound interest213 but failed to recognize that
Grimaldi was concerned only with the different question of an award of interest in aid
214
of an account of profits.
20
l22.Thirdly, the majority proceeded on the basis that it was modifying or correcting the
calculation of the trial judge's award of equitable compensation without
acknowledging that, by doing so, it was in fact ordering a different remedy, governed
by different rules, presumptions and purposes. 215 In particular, the majority failed to
express any appreciation of the fact that, if compound interest were to be used as a
component of a remedy directed to stripping the defendants' profits rather than
compensating the plaintiffs for lost revenues, a different analysis (calibrated so as to
identify the defendants' profits rather than revenues) was required. The failure to
attend to that inquiry resulted in an award of compound interest which, contrary to
well-settled authority, punished the appellants216 and unjustly enriched217 the
respondents by, inter alia, impermissibly straying from an account of profits to an
account ofrevenue. 218
30
l23.Fourthly, the analysis carried out by the majority was based on a false premise:
namely, that "it had been found" that the appellants had received property from which
profits "were" obtained.219 However, no finding to that effect was ever made by Owen
208
209
210
211
Nocton at 958 (underlining added).
Re Dawson at 407.
See eg Duke Group Ltd v Pi/mer (1999) 73 SASR 64 at [8091.
As recognised by Lee AJA at [AJ: 1235](AB8/3751). See Owen J at [J: 9716-9717](AB7/3035). At fJ:
9714](AB7/3034), his Honour noted that "[t]he rationale in the cases for compound interest is based on the
£est
use of the money thesis."
12
See Jones v Foxall (1852) 15 Beav 388 at 393; Attorney-General v Alford (1855) 4 De GM & G 843
(Alford) at 851; Burdick v Garrick (1870) LR 5 Ch App 233 at 241-2. In each case, the award of interest was
made in aid of an account of profits.
213
At [AJ: 1231](AB8/3750-3751): (2012) 200 FCR296 at [547]-[552].
214
Grimaldi at [5461: "the account ordered b:t the primarrjudge".
215
See eg, [AJ: 1236](AB8/3751), [AJ: 1242j(AB8/3752 .
216
See Vyse v Foster (1872) 8 ChApp 309 at 333; (1874 LR 7 HL 318.
217
Warman at 561.
218
An account of revenue is impermissible: Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298 (Harris)
at
[328] per Heydon JA.
219
[AJ: 1236](AB8/3751).
28
J or any member of the Court of Appeal. The highest the sparse evidence went was
that the respondents had performed an arithmetic calculation, for the purposes of the
proceedings, which suggested that profits "may" have been obtained by the
appellants.220 This evidentiary issue is considered further in relation to issue 2 below,
but it serves to reinforce the errors in the majority's framework for analysis of the
amount of equitable compensation to which the respondents were entitled.
10
20
30
124.For these reasons, this Court should find that the majority applied incorrect principles
to the calculation of the amount of equitable compensation to which the respondents
were entitled. Having determined (correctly) that equitable compensation, rather than
an account of profits, ought to be awarded, the majority should have calculated that
compensation by reference to the position that the respondents would have been in but
for the breach. That analysis in turn required the majority to consider the likely
amount of interest that the respondents would have received if the proceeds of sale of
the Transactions had been retained by them.
125. Usually, interest in such a context will be calculated on the basis that the respondents
would have ~laced the monies on interest bearing deposit since 1990 (as Owen J
recognised)? 1 However, the present case is different for three reasons. First, the
Court of Appeal found that, absent the Transactions, the companies would (and
should) have been liquidated. 222 Upon liquidation, the companies themselves would
not have retained the monies and earned interest for some 20 years but would have
distributed them to creditors, whether as lump sums or in the form of periodical
dividends. In such cases, the correct compensatory approach is simple, rather than
compound, interest. 223 Secondly, the respondents chose not to adduce evidence of
typical deposit rates in the period since 1990?24 No other evidence was led as to how
the respondents would have utilised the proceeds of sale of the Transactions if they
had been retained by them. The evidence of WBIR rates is not apt to fill this
evidentiary lacuna because the WBIR was an idiosyncratic overdraft rate of interest
charged by one bank to some customers in some circumstances, not one credited to
depositors and "it is common knowledge that banks generally charge a higher rate of
interest on overdrafts than they give to depositors". 225 Nor, for the reasons given by
Carr AJA,226 was it appropriate for Owen J to adopt - "for want of any better
measme"227 - a rate of 1% below WBIR. This was particularly so given Owen J's
refusal to admit evidence of actual deposit interest rates (calculated by reference to
BBSW) that could have been obtained by the respondents if they had retained the
proceeds of the Transactions. 228 Thirdly, if the Comt accepts the appellants'
220
Third Witness Statement of Anthony Leslie John Woodings dated 11 June 2003 WITP.00001.054 at
!J60lff(AB__j referred to in [J: 9706j(AB7/3032) and [AJ: 1233J(AB8/3751).
I [f: 9717]\AB'T/3035).
222
Lee AJA [AJ: 1087](AB8/3721); Drummond AJA agreeing at [AJ: 2095-2096J(AB9/3989).
223
Re Colorado Constructions (1976) I ACLR 334 at 336. A company in liqmdation may also be equated
for present purposes with a non-accumulating trust estate, in respect of which simple, rather than compound,
interest will usually be awarded: Heydon and Leeming, Jacobs Law o{Trusts in Australia (2006) at r2209].
224
"There is no evidence of typical deposit rates in the period since !990": Owen J at [J: 9717](AB7)3035).
225
[J: 9717](AB7/3035).
226
Carr
AJA at [AJ: 3568l(AB9/4446).
227
Owen J at [J: 9718](AB7/3035).
228
The evidence was contained m an affidavit of Mr Russell Armstrong, the Managing Director of Debt
Markets at Westpac, dated 30 January 2009 WITD.032.004(AB____), WITD.032.004.00l(AB
). Owen
J admitted the affidavit but refused to grant the appellants leave to rely on it as evidence of theoeposit rates
that could have been obtained by the respondents, notwithstanding that a hearing on the question of relief had
not occurred T: 37166 (AB
), final orders had not been made T: 37165-37166 (AB
), his
Honour had adopted WBIR-1% without giving the parties an opportunity to address his HonoufOiilliilt rate
29
submission that no knowing assistance claim was made out, the appellants' liability as
mere knowing recipients provides a further justification for an award of simple interest
only because it could not be said that the appellants engaged in fraud or serious
misconduct or otherwise committed a "gross misapplication of trust funds"? 29 If
compound interest were to be awarded, this circumstance justified yearly, rather than
monthly, rests for the reasons given by Carr AJA. 230
10
126.Accordingly, any entitlement which the respondents may otherwise have had to
compound interest at the proper measure must fail at the threshold. It was for the
respondents to adduce - as the claimants in the proceedings - all evidence necessary
for the Court to calculate the interest payable. 231 Further, there were many reasons
why one could not safely presume that the respondents, in liquidation, could have
made use of the monies at monthly rests and at a rate referable in some way to a rate
published by a bank over a 19 year period. For one thing, the whole point of the
liquidations would have been to realise the assets, pay off the debts and deregister the
companies, meaning the monies would have returned to creditors, including in part,
even without subordination, to the appellants for their own use? 32 The respondents
are therefore confined to an award of simple interest at Court rates.
(ii) No proper basis fOr a gains-based award ofinterest in any event
20
127.Even if, contrary to the above submissions, the majority did not err in seeking to
award compound interest on a purely profit disgorgement basis, the material relied
upon by their Honours could not justify such an award in the present case.
128.According to Lee AJA, 233 with whom Drummond AJA agreed: 234
"The evidence before his Honour, referred to by his Honour at [J: 9706], included a
calculation of estimated profit that pointed to a conclusion that the Banks may have
received a return from the use of the funds obtained from the Transactions in an
amount that exceeded in substantial degree the amount of compound interest
obtained from applying the Westpac Business Indicator Rate on monthly rests
(WITP.00001.054, [160]- [171]; WITP.00001.084, [9])." (underlining added)
30
129.His Honour also noted that the WBIR rate utilised in that evidence 'seemed' to be
'taken' as a base earning rate for the appellants.235 (By whom the rate was 'taken' was
not explained). On the basis of evidence characterized in this way, Lee AJA ordered
the appellants to pay compound interest in an amount of $2.3 billion.
130.The approach adopted by the majority should be rejected.
131.First, no authority was cited by Lee AJA for the proposition that a mere possibility of
(cf Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [69]) and his Honour
acknowledged that adoption of a BBSW rate would reduce the award by some $550m below the rate his
Honour had selected (Remedies at [21](AB7/3137)). At the relief hearing, Owen J ruled that it was not open
t~ the parties to debate the determination of interest T: 37117 (AB
).
2 9
Bailey v Nama! Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 112; Hungeiforas'VWalker (1990) 171 CLR 125 at 148;
Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ewing (1988) 91 FLR 271 at 285: "High authority confirms
that fraud and serious misconduct by a trustee or fiduciary in a trustee-like position will lead to an award of
cgmpound interest. .. ".
23
[AJ: 3572](AB9/4447).
2 1
~ cf Farah at [200?:; Tadrous v Tadrous [2012] NSWCA 16 at [56]-[591.
,233 Section 477{1)(a Coriorations Act; Re Wreck Recovery & Salvage Co (1880) 15 Ch D 353.
234 ~AJ: 1233l~AB8 3751 .
AJ: 2678 AB9/4180.
235
AJ: 1240 AB8/3752 .
30
profiting by a respondent is sufficient for the Court to conclude that compound interest
should be awarded for tbe purpose of disgorging profit, let alone at the rate determined
by the majority. Such a principle would flout the well-established prohibition on
equity punishing a defendant as well as the prohibition on equitable remedies being
used as a vehicle for the unjust emichment of the claimant. 236
10
20
l32.Secondly, the "evidence" referred to by Lee AJA237 provided no probative foundation
for the orders made. The first document was adduced in support of a submission that
Owen J should order an account of profits.Z38 The figures contained in tbe document
were calculations made by the liquidator of tbe respondents on an approximate basis
and for the purposes of the proceedings.Z 39 The figures contained a number of
simplifYing assumptions and made no provision for any allowances in favour of tbe
appellants. 240 They were not to operate as evidence on which tbe Court itself could fix
an amount of profit to be disgorged, let alone an amount of equitable compensation,241
and were not admitted on tbat basis.Z42 The second document was again a calculation
- also carried out by the respondents for the purposes of tbe proceedings - of the
"potential total value of the [respondents'] claim"243 if certain rates of compound
interest were applied to the proceeds obtained by the appellants. The document
expressly stated that the calculation was "admitted for a limited purpose" as a
"mathematical calculation to assist in [sic] the Court". 244 In no way could the
document constitute evidence of profits actually obtained, or even potentially
obtained, by the appellants from the proceeds of the Transactions.
133.The true position, with respect to both the pleadings and evidence was as follows:
(a) the respondents' claim as framed was for compound interest at "tbe rate charged
from time to time by Westpac (or other commercial banks) on overdrafts
The
exceeding $1 00,000" or otherwise as determined by the Court.Z45
respondents did not seek to prove that Westpac had a general practice or ability of
lending the amounts in question at 1% above WBIR on overdrafts exceeding
$100,000, or that its rests were monthly, or that it had managed to do so
successfully, so as to be every month adding the whole sum to tbe base amount on
which further such lending could occur;
30
(b) at trial, the liquidator proffered some calculations at WBIR (not 1% above). As
noted, these were admitted only as proof of arithmetic calculations on stated
assumptions. Otherwise, the respondents chose to leave the role of WBIR in the
practices of Westpac as unproven, and umelated to tbe claim for compound
236
237
Vyse at 33; Warman at 561.
See the two docwnents identified at the end of [AJ: 1233](AB8/3751): WITP.OOOOI.054 at [160]p71](AB
); WITP.00001.084 at [9](AB__ . ).
38
Sectioi11T1 of the affidavit (AB_____)\W]llch contains the paragraphs referred to by Lee AJA) is
entitled "Account of profits" and commences: "With the assistance of members of my staff, I have attempt to
quantify the sum that is likely to be required to be disgorged by the defendants if the Court were to order an
jiCcount
ofprofits."
39
At [161j(AB
).
240
See WITP.OOUOT:li54 at [169](AB
).
241
As the liquidator noted at [171](~ ): "Should the Court be minded to order an account of profits, I
am of the opinion that once Westpac, a!leffiatively the Banks, have provided an account of their use of the
Ielevant
funds, it will be possible to calculate the )refits derived."
42
,
See the objections taken at T: 13702(AB
, T: 13777-13778(AB_____).
-"
WITP.OOOOI.084 at ~](AB
) (under 1mmg added).
244
WITP.OOOOI.084 at I OJ(~ .
245
PLED.008.002.001, rayer
1/86).
~efJ(a)(AB
31
interest as framed; 246
(c) on appeal, the only evidence pointed to by the respondents of any actual lending
rate by Westpac was one occasion involving a Bell group com,gany, in 1989, at
WEIR plus 0.6% (not 1%), and at quarterly (not monthly rests);2 7
(d) nothing at all was proved as to the lending practices of the 19 appellants other
than Westpac, or how their practices related, if at all, to WEIR (noting also that 14
of the 20 appellants were based overseas);
10
20
30
(e) the respondents led no evidence as to what proportion of the interest charged by
Westpac or any other appellant was profit, once deductions had been made for
costs, expenses, skill and risk. In other words, no evidence was adduced in
support of the inherently implausible propositions that each appellant lent out the
proceeds of the Transactions without incurring any expenses of operating a
banking business, and added the interest earned each month to the principal in
full, without deduction for income tax, so as to lend it out and earn further interest
on the ever increasing amounts.
134.No reference was made by the majority to these matters. Nor was any further or
independent explanation given by their Honours as to why: (a) it would be presumed
that a bank's profit would be 1% higher than a rate at which it lends out money; (b) it
would be presumed, without evidence, that WEIR (amongst the numerous rates
charged by Westpac) plus 1% appropriately reflected its profits from the monies it
obtained; (c) it would be presumed that each of the 20 appellants earned profits on the
subject moneys at WEIR plus 1% notwithstanding that they operated in a variety of
different jurisdictions around the world and through turbulent periods; and (d)
presumptions should be made in the respondents' favour (as to the existence of a profit
and its amount) but no regard should be had, when selecting a rate or rest periods, to
any possible allowances available to the applicants.
135.Nor was any reference made by the majority to the likelihood that the appellants
would have been required to pay tax on amounts of interest income it may have
received from the proceeds of the Transactions - such that it could not be said that
100% of the interest income could properly be compounded from month to month.
The majority's approach to this issue was contradictory. The entirety of their
Honours' consideration of tax constituted: (a) an acceptance that the respondents'
liability to tax may have been relevant if equitable compensation had been awarded by
reference to their loss;248 and (b) a denial of the relevance of that tax liability (ie the
respondents') where, as here, the foundation of the assessment of equitable
compensation was disgorgement of profit possibly obtained by the appellants. 249
However, no explanation was essayed as to why the appellants' liability to taxation
ought not be taken into account when awarding so-called gains based equitable
compensation, as it would be if an account of profits had been awarded. 250
246
T: 13702(AB__), T: 13777(AB__). Owen J merely 'presumed' that the WBIR was the rate
!eferred
to in the prayer for relief ([J: 9717](AB7/3035)) and, of course, did not add a ]Jer cent to it.
4
AT: 2800(AB__). The respondents placed no reliance on the interest rates disclosed in the January
JP,90
facility documents themselves.
8
[AJ: 1252(AB8/3754l, [AJ: 1258](AB8/3755).
249
[AJ: 1259 (AB8/3755 .
250
See eg 'Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd [1985] I QB 428 at 462: "In calculating
compound interest on such sums as are found due on the taking of the account, it will be necessary therefore
to deduct in each and every year the amount of corporation tax paid or payable by the defendants, since it is
32
136.The practical effect of the majority's approach was therefore to award interest on the
basis that every one of the appellants lent 100% of the monies obtained by them from
the respondents, recovered interest on those amounts, and enjoyed an identical profit
margin in excess of I 00%251 for a period of 20 years, with no expenses incurred in the
management and control of those monies, no liability to taxation in respect of any part
of the interest received, and with no risk assumed, or skill exerted. There is no basis
on which such assumptions could properly be made in an attempt to ensure the
disgorgement of profit from a defendant.
10
20
137.Thirdly, their Honours failed to recognise that, but for the appellants' breaches, a
substantial proportion of the moneys the subject of the compound interest award
would have been paid to the appellants in the ordinary course if the respondents had
been wound up in 1990 in the absence of the Transactions. The appellants were, after
all, unsecured creditors of the respondents. 252 Requiring the appellants to pay
compound interest on moneys inevitably due to them is both inconsistent with the
compensatory nature of the remedy and punitive. Equity has sufficient flexibility to
require this consideration to be taken into account by way of a reduction in the rate
selected or the amount of principal upon which interest was charged. The approach
adopted by Carr AJA in this respect was correct. 253
138.Fourthly, these defects in the evidence and the majority's approach cannot be
remedied by re-characterizing the award as an account of profits or as an award of
interest in aid (or lieu) of an account. So far as the former is concerned, the Court of
Appeal expressly rejected the respondents' entitlement to an account in this case. So
far as the latter is concerned, the principles have been deliberately calibrated to avoid
the possibility of a defendant being required to disgorge more than it has in fact
obtained by way of profit. As Lord Cranworth LC recognized in Alford: 254
"What the Court ought to do, I think, is to charge him only with the interest which
he had received, or which it is justly entitled to say he ought to have received, or
which it is so fairly to be presumed that he did receive that he is estopped from
saying that he did not receive it." (underlining added)
30
139.There is no evidence that the appellants actually received amounts of interest. Nor is
there evidence from which it could be concluded that the appellants "ought" to have
received interest on the Transaction monies at a rate of WBIR plus 1%. The
deficiencies in the evidence also deny a conclusion that a presumption ought to be
imposed that the appellants received interest at that rate. It is clear from the passage
just cited that the irrebuttable presumption was only to be applied at a rate that would
only the net amount after payment of tax which would be available to them for investment in the succeeding
year. The interest should accordingly be compounded year by year at the rate ordered by the judge less tax at
lge appropriate rate which would have been paid by the defendants."
1
G1ven that WBIR was the rate charged by Westpac to customers, compound interest at a rate of I% above
WBIR necessarily means that the appellants were taken to have made a profit greater than the price of the
~gods (money) sold.
Owen J at [J: 3307](AB3/1335) and [J: 9689](AB7/3028).
253
[AJ: 3544-3548J(AB9/4437-4439). Carr AJA found - premised, inter alia, on his reasoning on the
subordination questwn, in which he dissented, and in respect of which no appeal has been made by the
appellants - that the "vast bulk" of the moneys owing to the Bell group creditors ($333m) were owed to the
appellants ($260m) (at~AJ: 3544l(AB9/4438)) and that the appellants would have received repayment of that
amount in 1ts entirety at [AJ: 3546](AB9/4439). Absent subordination, the total moneys owing to the Bell
I[OUp non-subordinate creditors was approximately $733 million, of which amounts owing to the appellants
ll\260
million) constituted 35.5%.
4
At 851. See also Burdick v Garrick (1870) LR 5 Ch App 233 at 242.
33
not be the product of injustice or result in punishment to a defendant.
10
140. More fundamentally, no remedy - let alone an equitable one- should be adopted
unless the court has a proper basis to be satisfied that no injustice is being done to the
party subjected to the award; and the plaintiffs are not being handed inequitable
windfall gains. Injustice will be manifest, as here, when there are substantial reasons
to conclude that the focus solely on inflow on the notional account (namely the
presumed, continual earning of interest on an ever increasing base amount) does not
fairly capture how that income would have played out in the real world, and simply
ignores the expenses, skill and risk inherent in emning that inflow. Indeed, the
approach of the majority violates the two protections afforded to a defendant in the
accounting context: namely, (a) the principle that an account applies only to profits
(not revenue) actually made; 255 and (b) the related principle that due allowance should
be given for due skill, cm·e and diligence in achieving the profits. It cannot be the law
that a defendant enjoys such protections when an account is made, but loses any and
all access to them where an award of interest is made as equitable compensation
(albeit on a disgorgement basis).
14l.For these reasons, the award of compound interest made by the majority was
unsupported by the evidence before the court and did not reflect an amount that the
appellants could fairly be presumed to have eamed by way of profit in any event.256
20
(iii) Misapplication o(Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2)
142.The legal and practical difficulties just identified were compounded by the majority's
misreading of the English Court of Appeal's reasoning in Wallersteiner. In fixing
compound interest at a rate "1% above the base em·ning rate",257 it is clear that Lee
AJA was purporting to apply that decision? 58 In Wallersteiner, the Court of Appeal
had imposed compound interest at 1% above the "official bank rate or minimum
lending rate" in operation from time to time? 59
30
143.However, as Carr AJA recognised in dissent, and as the expression indicates, the
'official rate' or 'minimum lending rate' is "the rate which the Bank of England
charged to trading banks and other like institutions for ovemight money."26° CatT
AJA's approach comports with authority261 and with common sense. The references
in Wallersteiner to "the" official bank rate or minimum lending rate are inexplicable if
the Court was in fact intending to refer to a particular commercial rate charged by a
25
' Harris at [328] per Heydon JA: "the profits which must be accounted for are those to which the plaintiff is
entitled: the gross receipts in the fiduciary's hands are not profits, and that which constitutes profit is what
has been received less "fair remuneration"" (original emphasis); Dart Industries at Ill: "[ajn account of
p,rofits is confmed to profits actually made".
56
CfLee AJA at [AJ: !258](AB8/3755).
m [AJ: 1242](AB8/3752).
258
His Honour referred to that decision at [AJ: 1237](AB8/3752).
259
At 388, 399.
26
° Carr AJA at [AJ: 357l](AB9/4446).
261
See egNishina Trading Co Ltdv Chiyoda Fire and Marine Insurance Co Ltd [196811 WLR 1325 at 1336
("a rate of one per cent in excess of the Bank of England official discount rate"); FMC Meat Ltd v Fairfield
Cold Stores Ltd [1971]2 Lloyd's Rep 221 at 227 ("! per cent over the bank rate, calculated as the bank rate
changes"); BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2) [ 1979] I WLR 783 at 849 ("bank rate or minimum
lending rate plus I per cent"); Polish SS Co v Atlantic Maritime Co [1985] I QB 41 at 66-7 ("I per cent
above the base rate ... [being] the London and Scottish clearing banks' lending rate"). See also Oxford
English Dictionary, '~minimum lending rate": "n. Finance the mimmum percentage at which a central bank
will discount bills (introduced in Britain for the Bank of England in 1971, suspended in 1981 but occas.
briefly reintroduced); (more ~enerally) the minimum interest rate charged on loans by a bank or other
institution; abbreviated MLR.'
34
specific, but unidentified, trading banlc
144.The central error, if the 1% margin approach was to be used, was that WEIR, so far as
anything was known about it, was not a rate at which Westpac or any other appellant
could have obtained these funds. It makes no sense to stmt with a published lending
rate charged by a pmticular defendant (already a commercial overdraft rate), and then
assume without evidence that it would make a profit 1% above that rate (ie a profit in
excess of 100%) on every dollar lent, for eve1y day it had that money. This confusion
of concepts is a short error, but occasions an enormous monetmy consequence.
(iv) Conclusion on remedies
10
20
145.Ifthe appellants fail on the question of liability, equitable compensation ought to have
been calculated so as to place the respondents in the position they would have been but
for the impugned conduct (ie an orthodox compensatory basis). In light of: (a) the
Court of Appeal's finding that liquidation would and should have occurred but for the
Transactions; (b) the absence of evidence of applicable deposit rates; and (c) the fact
that the appellants were not guilty of fraud or gross rnisconduct,262 the proper approach
was to awm·d simple interest at court rates. If, contraiy to this submission, compound
interest was to be awarded, it should have been calculated at the rate and rests
determined by Carr AJA (RBA+ 1% at yearly rests) subject to the proviso concerning
tax liability identified by his Honour263 and ensuring that interest is not paid on the
sums that would have been distributed to the appellants upon the notional liquidation
of the Bell group companies.
Part VII: Statutes
146.There are no statutes relevantly relied on for the appeal by the appellant.
147 .For the avoidance of doubt, the case concerning preferential payments (sometimes
described as the statutory claims) concerned s 565 of the Corporations Act (picking up
claims under s 120 and s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)) and s 89 of the
Property Law Act 1969 (WA).
Part VIII: Precise Orders Sought
148.The appellants seek the orders set out in their Notice of Appea!. 264
30
Part IX: Estimate of time
149.The appellants estimate that they will require in aggregate no more than two days for
the presentation of oral argument, in chief and in reply, on all issues arising in the
appeal (including the notice of contention) and the cross appeal.
Dated: 7 June 2013
262
Assuming that knowing assistance is not made out.
At [AJ: 3599](AB9/4453).
264
AB(I0/4500).
263
35
AC Archibald
T: (03) 9225 7478
F: (03) 9225 8370
archibaldsec@owendixon.com
Nicholas Owens
T: (02) 8257 257&
F: (02) 9221 8387
nowens@s1;jarnes.netau
How<trd Insall
T: (02) 9224 1505
F: (02) 9235 1042
insall@stjarnes.net.au
James Watson
T: (02) 8239 0248
F: (02) 8239 0299
watson@banco.net.au
DFCThomas
T: (()2) 9232 4478
F: (02) 9232 1069
dthotnas@si;ctbfloor.com.au
Name: Geoff McClellan
Telephone: (02) 9225 5419
Facsimile; (02) 9332 4000
10
Email: geoff.mcclellan@hsf.com