THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION: A DEFENCE AND AN
APPLICATION TO ECONOMIC THEORY
August 2007
Prepared for an invited lecture at the Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (LMPS)
conference, Beijing, 9-15 August 2007
By Philippe MONGIN
CNRS & HEC
1 rue de la Libération, F-78350 Jouy-en-Josas
mongin@hec.fr
Abstract. The first part of this paper revisits the classic distinction made in the philosophy of
language between analytic and synthetic propositions, with a view of making it workable for the
philosophy of science. It reexamines and tries to overcome some of the classic objections made by
Quine and others, like Putnam. The second part applies the distinction to a microeconomic example
taken from consumer theory, i.e., Hicks's classification of goods into substitutes, complements and
independent goods. It argues against the classification from the distinction, using it as a way of
posing semantic difficulties and dilemmas. This exercise is meant to illustrate its practical
usefulness for economic philosophy and the philosophy of science more generally.