The Deadly Mix
The officer, the offender and the circumstances
By Shannon Bohrer
When examining how officers deal with threats, it is important to look at training
and what is both effective and efficient. The ideal training does the right thing (effective)
and does it the right way (efficient). Another perspective of examining training, is
discerning what knowledge, skills and attitudes the officer needs in order to deal with
critical incidents. I believe the majority of our training is both effective and efficient.
However, if it was all worked I think we would be losing fewer officers. Why do we
continue to lose 50 to 60 officers every year to felonious assaults?
In general terms, when law enforcement examines training, we look at what
officers have done in critical incidents (significant emotional events). When they are
injured or killed, a popular response is “what did the officer do wrong?” This
perspective is popular, but yet we are looking at the issues in reverse, not what an officer
did right, but what the officer did wrong. Since 1975, when Pierce Brooks wrote “Officer
Down Code Three” law enforcement training has focused on mistakes that officers make
and their consequences. There is no doubt that the list of the “deadly errors” as specified
in the book has been beneficial in law enforcement training and has saved many lives.
However, in every critical incident there are three part; the officer, the offender
and the circumstances that brought them together. By focusing only on one part of the
mix we have been ignoring the other two. A very good argument could be made that it is
logical to focus on what the officer does, since we have the most control in this area, but
we don’t know what we may have been missing if we don’t examine all of the parts.
In the selected study “Killed in the Line of Fire,” the term, “The Deadly Mix” was
first used to describe the relationship and context of the officer, the offender and the
circumstances that brought them together. This study was published in 1992, and it was
the first time that deadly encounters in law enforcement were examined, taking into
account all three of the parts. It was reported again in “In the Line of Fire” in 1997 and
more recently in “Violent Encounters”, in 2006. As strange as it may seem now, before
these studies law enforcement never really examined a selected group of critical
incidents, the dynamics of the interaction of the officers and offenders and the
circumstances that brought them together. Prior to the studies the vast majority of
literature in law enforcement related to critical incidents and training of officers
involvement, is centered on what the officer does wrong, often ignoring what the officer
does right and generally ignoring the offender and the circumstances.
When trainers develop training objectives they should to be looking at everything.
Examining individual critical incidents and looking at training issues, what we should do,
or could do better, has stood us very well and has been extremely beneficial. Conversely
by only looking at individual incidents and what officers have done wrong, we have only
been looking at the trees. We need to step back and look at the forest. Only, by
examining all of the parts in the “The Deadly Mix” can we obtain a complete picture. It
is the “Deadly Mix” that ties all of the critical incidents together, with the three parts
present in every situation. Examining the “Deadly Mix” adds a different perspective
when examining our current training, what we do and why, and it can only improve our
training.
The Deadly Mix
The “Deadly Mix” consists of the officer, the offender and the circumstances.
The officer brings his/her beliefs, values and judgments to the contact with an offender,
just as the offender brings his/her beliefs, values and judgments. As important, they both
bring their own perceptions, judgments they make of each other, the severity of the
incident and what they expect the outcome to be.
The Officer
Several behavioral descriptors of officers in all three studies included hard
working and feel s/he can read others. Hard working officers make more traffic stops,
more arrest and by the nature of their work more contacts with citizens. Using
probabilities, hard working officers would be more likely to be assaulted just because of
the frequency of contacts with citizens. However, until more data is compiled, it could
just be a small segment of the hard working officers that are assaulted.
The victim officers in all three studies felt they could read others and in doing so
they made judgments of the individuals they met. In the selected study “In the Line of
Fire” over 60 percent of the victim officers reported that they were not aware an attack
was forthcoming. From the offender perspective, 31 percent reported that the victim
officer was surprised by the attack, and 19 percent said the officer appeared unprepared
and/or indecisive. In the study “Violent Encounters,” 33 of the 50 victim officers, were
not aware an attack was forth coming. While the victim officers believed they could read
people, the offenders were reading the officers.
How many judgments about citizens and offenders do officers make everyday?
While many of the officers in the selected studies made wrong judgments, about the
incident when they were assaulted, how many previous times were their judgments
correct? How many times were assaults avoided, because the officers made the correct
judgments about the individuals with which they came in contact? The judgments the
officers make come from training, experiences and mental models of what they believe.
You would be hard pressed to find any group in law enforcement that does not
believe they can read people. While officers make some immediate judgments,
sometimes the judgments are wrong. One model in particular where many officers seem
to have problems in judgments, is the model or picture of the individual(s) that assault
police. Many officers seem to have mental models and or pre-cognitive commitments as
to what a threat is, or at least what a threat should look like, the biker, gang member, i.e.,
someone that assaults police. Unfortunately, some officers sometimes believe they can
recognize a threat by the physical appearance of the individual, and that is not always the
case.
In one case two officers and a security guard tried to arrest a 14 year old boy.
The juvenile stabbed the two officers before escaping. In another case, two officers
went around a female suspect to arrest a male suspect. Both subjects were suspects
in a string of armed robberies. Even with the crime of armed robbery, the female
was ignored and not searched, which was a mistake that ended with the death of the
two officers.
The fact is that police have been assaulted by individuals as young as 11 and as
old as 86. In one recorded assault a 73 year old grandfather, in a wheel chair and on
oxygen, armed himself with a shotgun rather that be arrested. When one of the authors of
the selected studies was questioned about a profile of individuals that assault and kill
police, he responded with “anyone that can pull a trigger”. The model of who could be a
threat is an important part of “The Deadly Mix,” because without it, officers start with
false judgments.
The Offender
From all three studies, no clear profile of an offender that assaults and/or kills a
police officer was developed. With three selected studies, the first in which every officer
died, and the other two where the victim officers were seriously assaulted, you would
think that some descriptors of the offenders that assault police would exist. Many of the
offenders were young males and had previous contact with law enforcement, but not all
were young and not all were male.
Because of previous encounters with law enforcement, many of the offenders
made observations and judgments about the officers. Just as the victim officers believe
they could read people (the offenders); many of the offenders stated they could read the
officers.
In one case an offender decided to kill a police officer. He was the only
offender that went out with the intention of killing a police officer without a firearm
in his possession. The offender did find and kill a police officer, by taking the
officer’s gun, killing the officer with his own firearm. At a later date, it was
discovered that the offender had contact with another police officer, prior to and on
the same day that he killed the officer, but he did not assault the earlier contact.
Why would the offender not kill the first officer he met? What part in “The
Deadly Mix” was different in the two meetings?
The offender in the case mentioned above that took an officer’s gun and then
killed the officer, had contact with another officer prior to the killing. When
questioned about this, why he did not assault the first officer, his response was “that
officer was ready” (paraphrased). What was the difference in the two officers? Why
did the offender not assault the officer that “was ready?”
As reported in “Killed in the Line of Duty,” under “Professional Demeanor,”
modern police training should include information that teaches officers how to read
suspect’s behavior. Also, officers need to understand that the suspects are watching them
and making judgments. In the case mentioned above, maybe the offender did not think
he could take the first officer.
While officers often make quick judgments about offenders, sometimes the
offenders are very patient, waiting for an opportunity to assault the officer. It is the
offender’s judgment that determines if s/he is going to assault the officer. Sometimes
offenders are very similar to predators in the animal kingdom, they can be very patient,
waiting long periods of time for their opportunity to strike. Not only are many of the
offenders patient, but while being patient they can be polite and courteous, mentally
disarming those around them.
The Circumstances
It is the offenders that understand, or believe they understand, the severity of the
contact and the circumstances that exist. An officer receiving a call and initiating contact
with an offender generally has no knowledge of the offender’s background, propensity
for violence or any other knowledge, except for the call they are on and the officer’s
initial perspective of the offender’s behavior. Offenders that are wanted, or believe they
are wanted can see the officer’s actions in a different light than intended.
In one case the officer stopped an individual for a traffic violation. While the
officer was writing a ticket he received a radio transmission and he responded to the
radio transmission. The radio message was from another officer he was meeting for
lunch. The offender observed the officer talking into the radio and believed the
officer discovered that the offender was wanted. When the officer walked back up
to the vehicle, the offender shot him. The officer survived the shooting and later
stated that he had no idea he was in danger. The offender, later caught, stated that
he was willing to accept the ticket, but when he saw the officer talking on the radio,
he believed he was going to be arrested.
In the above case, the difference in perceptions and what was really going on was
critical in this incident. If just one thing changed in the circumstances, the radio call not
received, or if the offender did not observe same, the assault may never have occurred.
How many hard working officers while on their way to meet another officer for lunch
would ignore a minor traffic violation?
The offender was arrested for a traffic violation, handcuffed to the rear and
placed in the back of a patrol car equipped with a cage. The officer then took care
of passengers in the offender’s vehicle and called for a tow truck. While the officer
was away from his vehicle, the offender moved his hands to the front, retrieved a
firearm he had hidden in his crotch, and waited for the officer to re-enter the
vehicle. After the officer re-entered the patrol vehicle the offender the shot the
officer in the back of the head, killing him.
The officer may think in terms of temporary contact with an individual. The
offender may believe the officer is going to take them to jail. The severity of the contact
is dependant upon the perspective of the participants. Only the offender knows what is at
stake from their perspective. The officer is often at a disadvantage from the beginning
because they are working from assumptions. The assumption often being this is what I
did the last time and it worked. A frequent misconception is that when someone treats an
officer with what they perceive courtesy and respect, they pose no danger!
Conclusions
In every encounter where an officer is assaulted and or killed, there are three
parts; the officer, the offender and the circumstances. By focusing only on one part we
have been ignoring the other two. This perception has served law enforcement training
very well. However, officers are human beings and while they can be trained to make
fewer mistakes, they are not mistake proof. Have you every searched someone and
failed to find a hidden weapon? Have you ever misread a suspect behavior?
We should continue to examine every critical incident for the purpose of
improving training and in our examination we should include the officer, the offender and
the circumstances. Altering only one aspect of one component in an event where an
officer and offender meet can change the outcome dramatically. Using the perspective of
“The Deadly Mix” should not change what we do; it can only add value to our training.
Knowing our enemy, how they think and act under different circumstances, can only
improve our training.
“The Deadly Mix” is in chapter 6: Training Warriors, in WIN Critical Issue in Training
and Leading Warriors, copyright @2008, by Brian Willis, ISBN 978-0-9808819-0-5
www.warriorsspiritbooks.com
General References:
Pierce R. Brooks, “Officer Down, code three,” Motorola Teleprograms,
Inc., 1975
The “deadly errors” listed in this book are just as valid today as they were
in 1975.
Anthony Pinizzotto Ph.D., Edward Davis, M.S., U.S. Department of
Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Killed in the line of Duty” 1992.
Anthony Pinizzotto Ph.D., Edward Davis M.S., and Charles Miller III,
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “In the line of Fire”
1997.
Pinizzotto Ph.D., Edward Davis M.S., and Charles Miller III, U.S.
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Violent Encounters”
2006.
Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward Davis and Charles Miller, FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin “The Deadly Mix”, January 2007.
“Anyone that can pull a trigger,” a response given by Edward Davis, BSU
Quantico, Va., in response to a reporters question.
Cases used in this article were from all three selected studies.
The case used in the conclusion was from, Law Enforcement Officers
Killed and Assaulted updates, October 2, 2006
Examples of individuals that have assaulted officer came from LEOKA
annual reports and news articles.