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T
HE PAST
10
YEARS HAS WITNESSED A LONG
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OVERDUE SHIFT OF attention to a Marxian analysis of U.S. prison history (Adamson, 1983, 1984; Petchesky, 1981;
Melossi, 1978, 1981; Shelden, 1981; Miller, 1980; Jankovic, 1979; Takagi,
1975, 1976). In contrast to other recent re-interpretations of penal history, which emphasize the relationship between the nature of imprisonment and the ideological consequences of social, political, and economic change (i.e., Ignatieff, 1978;
Foucault, 1977; Rothman, 1971), much of this analysis has focused upon the more direct, political-economic ties between imprisonment and capitalist development, with particular attention to the role of prison manufacture and convict labor. Most contemporary Marxian discussions of imprisonment have thus acknowledged a debt to the early work of Rusche (1933) and Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939), as it offers a model for understanding the relationship between punishment, convict labor, and political-economic change.
An analysis of labor market conditions is central to Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs work. They suggest that imprisonment emerged as the dominant method of punishment as a consequence of a desire to exploit and train captive labor. A scarcity of labor was thus necessary for the emergence of the modern prison, as it allowed the profitable exploitation of convict labor and offered an incentive for training labor reserves. Similarly, Rusche and Kirchheimer projected the demise of imprisonment as the dominant method of punishment in post-industrial capitalism given a perennial surplus of labor and the related reduction in both profits from prison manufacture and the demand for trained labor. Also emphasizing the significance of changes in the labor market, Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs “severity hypothesis”
(see Jankovic, 1979) indicates on the one hand that punishments become more severe when there is a surplus of labor, since the work (and lives) of convicts is of little economic value, and on the other hand more lenient when labor is scarce and a convictʼs work is more profitable to exploit.
Although most Marxian discussions of imprisonment have praised Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs attention to labor market conditions — Adamson (1984) and
Jankovic (1979), for instance, respectively apply the severity hypothesis to 19th century and contemporary imprisonment in the U.S. — there has also been criticism from a Marxian perspective. Hogg (1979), for example, has charged that
Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs model, as well as recent work that emphasizes labor
Crime and Social Justice 29 (198 7 )

Emergence of the New York State Prison System 89 market conditions, is reductionist. This reductionism was, for example, responsible for Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs erroneous projections concerning the nature of punishment in post-industrial society. Hogg thus suggests increased attention to political-ideological, as opposed to political-economic dimensions of imprisonment, provided there is a “theoretical understanding of the relationship between imprisonment and a determinant mode of production.”
The present reassessment of the emergence of the New York State prison system — the system that offered the primary model for the development of U.S. and European prisons — supports Hoggʼs contention that the focus upon labor market conditions has resulted in reductionist interpretations of prison history.
However, this research also indicates that essential, political-economic dimensions of the relationship between imprisonment and the mode of production have been neglected. For example, the contribution of the products of prison manufacture to capitalist development during both the periods of mercantilism and laissez faire capitalism in the U.S. has not been adequately integrated into an analysis of the origin and nature of imprisonment. This article asserts, therefore, that it is the overemphasis on labor market conditions, and not the political-economic aspects of imprisonment in general, or the relationship between imprisonment and the development of capitalism, that is responsible for the reductionism in Rusche and
Kirchheimerʼs model and many contemporary Marxian efforts.
Thus, Rusche and Kirchheimer have been praised for their attention to the relationship between punishment and the mode of production on the one hand, and accused of a reductionist overemphasis upon this relationship on the other.
However, this article suggests that, particularly due to an overemphasis on labor market conditions, analysis of this relationship has been limited. Unlike Hoggʼs response to the reductionism in Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs model, I argue that the essential element in understanding prison history is an emphasis upon an empirical analysis of the relationship between imprisonment and the development of the mode of production — independent of labor market conditions and the related motives of profit and the need to train or re-socialize labor .
In their “Introduction” to Punishment and Social Structure (1939), Rusche and Kirchheimer note that it is a “truism” that “specific forms of punishment correspond to a given stage of economic development” (p. 6). They also state that it is “self-evident” that “enslavement as a form of punishment is impossible without a slave economy, that prison labor is impossible without manufacture and industry...” ( Ibid.
). And although Rusche and Kirchheimer at one point acknowledge that prisons owe their existence to the fact that in mercantile economies prisons became a “successful part of nation industry” (p. 69), they maintain that
“of all the forces which were responsible for the new emphasis upon imprisonment as a punishment, the most important was the profit motive” (p. 68). Rusche and Kirchheimer, therefore, did not reflect upon the initiation of imprisonment primarily in terms of its “self-evident” relationship to the rise of mercantilism

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Confusion about their primary focus results, in part, from a failure to separate the frequently confounded effects of changes in the mode of production and changes in labor market conditions.
Of particular interest here is Adamsonʼs (1984) recent “threat-resource” model, which more systematically applies Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs severity hypothesis to conditions of imprisonment in the U.S. during the 19th century. Adamson argues that with a scarcity of labor, prisoners represented an economic resource because prison industry was emphasized and prisoners were treated less severely. With an increase in the surplus labor force, however, prisoners were treated more as threats, and, consequently, prison industry was de-emphasized and punishments became more severe. Although Adamson applauds Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs focus upon imprisonment and the mode of production, he prefers to divide the history of the treatment of prisoners during the 19th century into five periods, which correspond to changes in the labor market irrespective of changes in the mode of production (i.e., from mercantilist to competitive to monopoly capitalism). Thus, though Melossi (1979) contends that Rusche and Kirchheimer only focused upon the significance of labor market conditions “within” a given mode of production, the Rusche-Kirchheimer model suggests that punishments are often shaped by both labor market conditions and the drive for profits, independent of changes in the mode of production.
Other recent work has, however, documented the significant contribution of imprisonment to various stages of capitalist development in the U.S. during the 19th and early 20th centuries (Melossi, 1981; Conley, 1980, 1981; Miller,
1981; Adamson, 1981; Shelden, 1981). This work departs from an analysis that explains the character of imprisonment as dependent upon changes in the mode of production, and thus responds to Humphries and Greenbergʼs (1981) suggestion that imprisonment should be viewed as both an independent and a dependent variable with respect to the mode of production. Because Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs emphasis upon labor market conditions receives much praise and little criticism, it is unclear in most of this research if, or to what extent, the
“independent” contributions of imprisonment are dependent upon a shortage of labor. This includes work which has described the significance of prisons in terms of the socialization of the labor force to industrial capitalist production (Melossi,
1981); the proletarianization of the production process and encouragement of the division of labor (Miller, 1981); the preservation of otherwise obsolete systems of production and exploitation of labor (e.g., slavery) (Shelden, 1981; Adamson,
1981); the introduction of industrial technology and innovations in the organization of production (Melossi, 1981; Conley, 1980, 1981); and the lowering of the general cost of labor (Melossi, 1981). Moreover, although this literature suggests that the strength of the relationship between imprisonment and the mode of production is primarily a consequence of prison manufacture, the focus upon labor

Emergence of the New York State Prison System 91 market conditions leads to the exclusion of an analysis of the contribution of the products of prison labor to political-economic development.
Melossi (1978), for example, asserts that the essential contribution of prison manufacture to the capitalist mode of production is not the production of commodities per se, but rather is the socialization of labor — and specifically its proletarianization — through factory discipline. This assertion is initially challenged by the frequent and often violent protests lodged by laborers and manufacturers against prison-manufactured goods that span from the onset of prison industry to its demise. Further, independent of both labor market conditions and concern for the re-socialization of labor, the suppression of imprisonment with hard labor in colonial America and the nature of imprisonment under both mercantilism and laissez-faire capitalism in New York State similarly reveals the important contribution
— as well as fears of the potential contribution of, and the perceived threat posed by — prison manufactured goods to political-economic development. Contrary to the view that such extensive state intervention in economic development is primarily associated with more advanced stages of capitalist development (see
Miliband, 1977), the present study suggests that the role of individual states, in the form of prison manufacture, was more important to an earlier stage of capitalist development in the U.S. than is typically considered.
In economically depressed times, with a large surplus of labor and low profits from prison labor, manufacture in New York prisons was often stimulated by the need to produce unprofitable but necessary goods. This need arose to sustain political-economic stability and development at a time when the production of some essential commodities had been curtailed by imports, reduced profits, and business failures.
Similarly, more severe punishments were not instituted in reaction to a devaluation of labor and disinterest in prison manufacture, as Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs and Adamsonʼs (1984) models suggest. The early history of the New York State prison system demonstrates that, to the contrary, these measures often resulted from attempts to maintain and increase the production of essential commodities in overcrowded, tumultuous prisons. A failure to separate the confounded effects of prison overcrowding and the general, societal surplus of labor is also problematic in Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs model, and has further contributed to the reductionist emphasis upon labor market conditions.
Finally, an overemphasis upon labor market conditions and the failure to note the independent contribution of prison manufacture to political-economic development has distorted the significance of and relationship between the political-ideological and political-economic determinants of imprisonment. For example, Adamson (1984) suggests that the political-ideological dimensions of imprisonment — and particularly efforts to control crime — were more significant when there was a surplus of labor. Economic factors and the “fiscal-industrial” dimensions on the other hand, were more significant when there was a shortage of

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As Takagi (1975) notes, in response to citizen protests against public displays of forced labor, the early Pennsylvania prison reformers abandoned efforts to simultaneously employ prisoners and deter crime through punishments “publicly and disgracefully imposed.” Instead, the antithetic system of separate confinement with labor was initiated. The number of those imprisoned and the carefully managed public image of prison life, however, continued to respond to the need to control crime. But the intentionally more privatized nature of imprisonment served more direct, economic objectives, particularly through prison manufacture during the 19th century. Adamson thus fails to recognize that the “crime control” and “fiscal-industrial” dimensions of imprisonment — and the political-ideological and political-economic dimensions in general — were often exercised simultaneously and with equal intensity, independent of labor market conditions.
The present discussion thus rejects the tendency to focus on political-ideological factors in explanations of contemporary imprisonment, and political-economic factors in the analysis of 19th century imprisonment, and will be seen to establish an alternative framework.
I. Colonial America: The Threat of Competition from
Prison Production and the Suppression of Imprisonment
The absence of imprisonment with labor in colonial America cannot be explained either by labor market conditions, by efforts to resocialize/proletarianize the colonial labor force, or by interests in maximizing prison profits for English or colonial governments. A previously unexplored interpretation of the nature of punishment — and particularly the restricted use of imprisonment — is offered by an analysis of the relationship between punishments and the organization and development of production in England and the colonies. The potential threat of prison production to the development of British manufacture was a significant factor in the suppression of prison labor in the colonies. British policy in this respect focused upon Pennsylvania, the state which led the development of manufacture and industry in the colonies, and where the potential threat from prison manufacture was greatest. After the Revolution, New York primarily modeled its first state prison, Newgate, after Pennsylvania prisons, and particularly after their emphasis upon manufacture.
In contrast to much more severe penalties under English law, pre-18th century colonial law emphasized the use of fines. Even where corporal punishment was prescribed by colonial law, a fine was often substituted (Powers, 1965). As Dickerson (1962) indicates, the British did not interfere with colonial law before the late 17th century due to a dearth of economic activity in the colonies of potential benefit to England. During the late 17th century, however, this potential was demonstrated, particularly in Pennsylvania. Cloth was first woven in Pennsyl-

Emergence of the New York State Prison System 93 vania during the mid-1680s. In 1690, the first paper mill in North America was built near Germantown, Pennsylvania. Carders and spinners were employed in the manufacture of wool in 1690, and in 1692 iron was smelted for the first time in the colonies in Pennsylvania (Herrick, 1926).
Recognizing the economic potential of the colonies for Britain, the Board of
Trade was established in 1696 in England to review colonial laws. As Dickerson
(1962) notes, laws would be approved or “disallowed” by the “King in Council,” but it was the Board of Trade that did virtually all the work in terms of the review of colonial laws. Consequently, the Board of Trade exercised real administrative power with respect to colonial policy. Its activities were guided by an unbridled interest in economic gain for the mother country. Its most important functions were to determine what naval stores should be secured, which manufactures should be developed, and which manufactures should be restricted in order to avert competition with English production.
In 1682, the Pennsylvania Code and the “Laws Agreed Upon in England” (by
William Penn) prescribed imprisonment at hard labor for a majority of crimes.
Later, it was ordered that all prisons were to be workhouses, and that one was to be built in each county. The Code of 1682 was re-enacted in 1693. However, after the introduction of the Board of Trade in 1696, the future of colonial punishment became ambiguous and pressure was placed upon state legislatures to change laws. In 1700, an act which confirmed the Code of 1682 was repealed by the
“Crown.” In 1706, the Code was re-enacted and remained (although likely with great uncertainty) until 1718. In 1718, the English Criminal Code became law in
Pennsylvania, and 13 crimes were designated as capital offenses.
Although an absence of economic resources was partly responsible for the failure to construct prisons during the late 17th and early 18th centuries, it is nevertheless likely that if the Board of Trade, or a similar administrative structure, had not been initiated, imprisonment with labor would have emerged in the colonies well before the Revolutionary War. In particular, if Britain would have viewed imprisonment with labor as beneficial to its economic interests, resources for the construction of colonial prisons would have been forthcoming. An analysis of the somewhat unique development of industry in England indicates that imprisonment with labor was stifled by those who feared competition from the products of prison labor.
The introduction of manufacture in the colonies and an increased demand for labor did not result either in less severe forms of punishment or the exploitation and resocialization of convict labor as Adamsonʼs, Melossiʼs, and Rusche and
Kirchheimerʼs discussions suggest. To the contrary, the previous system, which imposed fines and sentenced indentured servants and slaves to additional servitude, was replaced by more severe punishment. As Barnes (1972) indicates, these harsher punishments effectively eliminated the need for penal institutions. The common jail rather than the workhouse was predominant during the 18th century.

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It is not as clear how the application of English criminal law to the colonies benefited the economic prosperity of England as is the case with most other actions approved by the Board of Trade. As Hobsbawm notes, Britain maintained an advantage over many of her competitors during the 18th century given a commitment to “subordinate all foreign policy to economic ends” (1968: 33). The imposition of English criminal law seriously exacerbated political tensions between England and the colonies, and provided colonial revolutionaries with an effective caricature of British brutality and oppression. Since as Zinn (1980) points out, perhaps only one in three colonists ever supported the Revolution, this propaganda was an invaluable instrument for rallying opposition. A neglected explanation for this apparently inconsistent action is that the rejection of colonial law was a conscious attempt to stifle economic competition from imprisonment with hard labor in the colonies. An analysis of the suppression of imprisonment with labor in England helps to clarify actions related to impositions upon colonial law.
As Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) indicate, a demand for labor during the mercantilist era was associated with the exploitation of convict labor and the emergence of imprisonment as the dominant method of punishment. But this was not the case in England. Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs analysis suggests that transportation to the colonies restricted the use of imprisonment in England. However, this interpretation does not explain, and indeed presents a further argument against, the extensive use of capital and corporal punishment in England at this time. A more adequate explanation for the alternative development of punishment in England during the 18th century is related to the fact that manufacturing interests in England gained early and unique control over governmental decision-making.
As Hobsbawm (1968) indicates, merchants and tradesmen were, in general, more wealthy and numerous than manufacturers, but their influence was limited to
London and several port cities. Manufacturing, on the other hand, was dispersed throughout the country. Significantly, the mines and places of manufacture were located on the property of politically powerful landlords who received royalties.
According to Hobsbawm, domestic producers demonstrated decisive political superiority over merchants as early as the late 17th century, as evidenced by government restrictions on the import of foreign textiles. This power appears to have been exercised in the resistance to convict labor and prison manufacture, which posed a potential threat to the development of “free” industry in England.
In 1752, “An Act to Give Power to Confinement and Hard Labor in His
Majestyʼs Dock Yards” was strongly supported in the House of Commons, but rejected by the House of Lords. Radzinowicz (1948) notes that there is an unusual and unexplained absence of debate on this issue, particularly given the extensive support in the House of Commons, and the “high regard” of the men on the committee who offered the Act. There were some unexplained references to the “dangerous” precedent that would be set, but the most frequent explanation for resistance to the use of convict labor was that it was “incompatible with

Emergence of the New York State Prison System 95 the status and dignity of free people.” However, as Radzinowicz suggests, this latter rationale is obviously suspect as imprisonment would have replaced the practice of executing criminals as a popular amusement! Even during the 1760s and 1770s, with a shortage of labor and increased industrial development — the major requirements for the development of imprisonment with labor according to Rusche and Kirchheimer — the House of Lords maintained its opposition to convict labor.
It appears, therefore, that the Board of Trade, which had the protection of home manufacturing as a priority, opposed convict labor on the basis of its potential to detract from the profits of English manufacturing interests. Examples of the threat of prison manufacture to “free” manufacture were evident at least as early as the mid-16th century when the competition from the rasp houses in
Holland became a serious challenge to “free” producers. More specifically, the threat of competition from “captive” labor, organized by colonial governments, was illustrated during the 16th century in Mexico.
Indians in Mexico were forced to labor in the equivalent of a debtorsʼ prison and primarily produced textiles (Chevalier, 1963). These Mexican fabrics soon outsold Spanish fabrics in the West Indies. Spain initially attempted to restrict this production, and both limited the amount an individual could fall into debt and imposed fines on those who exploited labor by means of debt peonage. Although these efforts were not entirely effective, other measures eventually crushed the
Mexican textile industry. As Chevalier indicates, the textile industry in Mexico never fully recovered from these sanctions. However, debt peonage on rural haciendas , which did not threaten Spanish production, continued and represented an essential component of the Mexican economy.
Thus, Spanish laws regulating the Mexican textile industry and the associated use of criminal labor appeared after production was extensive. Later, English manufacturing interests, with more political power and a more efficient bureaucracy with regard to protecting its economic interests, exercised more effective control and stifled the introduction of convict labor in the colonies. As one of many examples of British attention to potential economic threats, the “Wool Act” of
1699, which prevented wool from being loaded in any plantation for shipment to another plantation, was instituted almost immediately after discovering an instance in which wool was manufactured in the colonies. The U.S. did not recover from its dependence upon imports of wool from Britain until several decades after the
Revolutionary War. Thus, it was only after the Revolutionary War that prisons participated in the effort to combat the import of British wool and textiles.
II. 1800–1815: American Mercantilism —
The Stateʼs Interest in Prison Production
The development of Newgate, New Yorkʼs first state prison, was closely related to the interests of the Federalist government. As Lewis (1965) notes, Thomas Eddy

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Walnut Street Jail in Pennsylvania in 1796. In the same year, Shuyler convinced the legislature to empower a committee to begin construction of Newgate. Thomas
Eddy, a Quaker and a Federalist, became the prisonʼs first administrator.
During the late 18th century, most manufacture in New York State fell far behind that of Pennsylvania and other neighboring states. The greatest number of those employed in the large port city of New York, however, were machinists who were seriously threatened by competition from imports (Zinn, 1980). In the mercantile economy, the need to develop manufacture and eliminate both foreign and domestic imports into the state was an essential factor in the design of the early New York prison system.
New York State, and particularly the “New York Society to Promote Domestic Industry,” led national efforts to develop domestic manufacture as a means to thwart British imports and prevent the related drain of U.S. specie. As most of the exports from the U.S. were agricultural products from the South (tobacco represented one-third of U.S. exports), the imbalance of trade was particularly acute in the northern states. Also, as Dowd (1977) indicates, the experience with
British rule had created a distrust of a centralized federal government, and state governments inherited a large share of the responsibility for the management of the economy, including the balance of trade.
In 1800, there were approximately 225 felons in the New York State prison in Greenwich Village, New York. The manufacture of shoes and boots was the primary industry at the prison, employing 80 prisoners (JA, 1800–1801). The shoes and boots were sold at retail prices by the state from a warehouse in New
York City. This business represented a large and concentrated enterprise at the time, and complaints soon arose from the cordwainers. Responding to a petition from the cordwainers in New York County, the Governorʼs report to the State Assembly in February 1802, appeared to sympathize with the petitionersʼ complaints of unfair competition and suggested changes at the state prison.
Foremost, the Governorʼs report of 1802 addressed the need to involve the prison in efforts to correct the imbalance of trade. The three areas of manufacture recommended to partially replace the manufacture of shoes and boots were
“the rasping or grinding of dye woods, the manufacture of nails and brads and clothiers jack cards” (JA, 1800–1801: 46). The Governor noted that dye-woods were exported to Europe, where they were ground and shipped back to the U.S. at a high price. He also indicated that nails and brads were imported in large quantities, even though there was an ample supply of iron in the U.S. In addition, while clothierʼs jack cards were essential to the manufacture of cloth for infant wear, the Governor noted that Great Britain had restricted exports, forcing the
U.S. to import the cloth. The Governor thus indicated that the state should commit its resources to economic production that “would benefit the state at large, by manufacturing articles that individuals, from want of capital, and from being

Emergence of the New York State Prison System 97 able to pursue businesses that holds our great advantages, will not engage in”
(JA, 1800–1801: 46).
Contrary to Lewisʼ (1965) contention that production at the prison was shaped by the complaints of “free” laborers, the cordwainersʼ petition appears to have been only an additional, politically expedient justification to pursue other industry that would combat imports. During 1800 (before the Governorʼs report) nails, as well as spikes and grating for prison facilities, were produced at the prison. In the same year, a convict had discovered a way in which cut nails could be tempered to satisfy the requirements of wrought nails. Annual financial reports for future years indicate that the manufacture of nails realized greater profits per inmate than any other industry. However, the manufacture of shoes and boots, which often operated at a loss, was not discontinued despite sustained protests. It remained the dominant industry at the prison — in terms of the number of prisoners employed
— until 1813 when it fell to second place behind the weaving industry.
The shoe industry was the first industry to be placed on the contract system.
In 1802, the prison received $1,200 per month for 179 prisoners employed in the shoe industry. A year later, the nail industry started on the contract system (JA,
1803–1804). The public account system — with its greater state control over production — appeared to be more consistent with the objectives of the state during mercantilism. The protests of labor, however, perhaps most influenced the nature of prison manufacture in this regard. Through the use of the contract system the state gained contractors as allies in its opposition to the interests of labor, while prison manufacture continued to respond to the needs of the mercantile economy.
With the emergence of a more competitive capitalist economy and the increased power of entrepreneurial capitalists who could benefit extensively from the contract system, the transition to this system was completed.
Nail-making had a brief history at Newgate. Its elimination, however, was not a consequence either of protests from labor or of changes in the labor market.
Rather, the production of nails at the prison appears to have responded to the most immediate needs of the mercantile economy. A nail-making machine, capable of producing 100 nails per minute, was developed in the U.S. in 1809. By 1810 the
U.S. exported 280 tons of nails worth $1.2 million (Nettels, 1962). Although in
1808 nail manufacturing was the most profitable industry at Newgate, employing over 40 convicts, in 1810 only 12 convicts were so employed. By 1811, there is no indication that nails were manufactured at the prison (JA, 1809–1812).
Significantly, a nail-making machine was not purchased by the prison in order to increase profits and pay prison expenses. Instead, prison manufacture continued to follow the stateʼs commitment to contribute to the more general needs and development of the mercantile economy.
Immediately after the demise of the nail industry, more looms were placed into operation at the prison. Carding, roving, and spinning machines were also erected in 1811 (JA, 1811). In 1808 the weaving industry employed almost as

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The predominance of the shoe and weaving industries at the prison is best understood in the context of innovations in production and the stateʼs participation in the development of the mercantile economy. As discussed below, the prisonʼs participation in political-economic development also shaped other aspects of imprisonment, particularly the severity of punishment. Shoe-making was primarily a household industry for the first four to five decades after the Revolution (Clark,
1928). Typically, the leather and linings were cut at a central location. The stitching and binding of the uppers, and the lasting and soling was performed in households as separate operations. The nearby states of Massachusetts and New Jersey led in the production of shoes and boots. Therefore, in New York prices were competitive, but there was a need to import shoes from other states. Prison earnings from the production of shoes and boots were, consequently, never extensive. As the annual report for 1815 indicates, the production of shoes was unprofitable, but the industry was “necessary” — necessary, that is, for the balance of trade for
New York State. The prison thus did not yield to the protests of the cordwainers, even though this may have increased prison earnings. Instead, shoe making was continued as part of the stateʼs more general political-economic agenda.
The production of textiles was also organized on a domestic basis, but not on the same scale as the production of shoes and boots. As late as 1820, two-thirds of the textiles used in the U.S. were made by families (Clark, 1928). A considerable amount of textiles had to be imported during the early 1800s, primarily from
England. New York trailed significantly behind other New England and some
Middle Atlantic states in the production of textiles, and the state coordinated numerous efforts to encourage household production of textiles during the early
19th century. Hence, weaving, spinning, and carding at Newgate represented another — and the stateʼs most direct — effort to increase textile production and discourage imports.
III. 1815–1821: Depression, Prison Manufacture, and Punishment
Adamson (1984) argues that as a consequence of a depressed economy and a surplus of labor, the period 1815–1825 represents the only time during the 19th century when convict labor did not represent an economic resource in the U.S. As
Dowd (1977) indicates, there was an economic panic in 1815, a depression from
1816 to 1818, another panic in 1819, and another, milder depression from 1820 to 1821. The period from 1822 to 1824, however, was one of relative prosperity.
This section will thus focus upon the most depressed period, from 1815 to 1821.
An analysis of imprisonment at this time perhaps offers the clearest test in U.S. prison history of Adamsonʼs “threat resource” and Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs
“severity” hypothesis — that a surplus of labor encourages more severe forms of punishment and a reduction in the exploitation of convict labor. My research

Emergence of the New York State Prison System 99 suggests, however, that although severe punishments were initiated during this period at Newgate, these punishments were not a consequence of the devaluation of labor, but rather were designed to maintain productivity in an extremely overcrowded and rebellious prison environment.
In 1809 Newgate prison exceeded its capacity of 450 prisoners (JA, 1810).
In 1815, the year of the economic panic, the number of prisoners increased from
494 to 559 (JA, 1818). However, the size of the prison population at any one time underestimates the crisis of overcrowding. For example, in 1816, 293 prisoners were pardoned, while only 5 were released as a consequence of an expired sentence.
As 666 prisoners remained at the end of the year and 30 prisoners died, over 1,000 prisoners were at some time incarcerated at Newgate during 1816.
Strategies designed to deal with this increased population did not initially include more harsh punishments, and the general devaluation of labor was not reflected in a de-emphasis of prison production. There was instead a renewed search for ways to employ the increased number of prisoners. In 1815, the blacksmith shop was expanded in order to make a large coopersʼ shop. Also, the prison inspectors proposed an extension of the prison walls in order to add 30 to 40 more looms for weaving (JS, 1816).
In February 1816, Governor Tompkinsʼ annual message reiterated the necessity to free the country from British imports. The focus was clearly upon the import of cotton and woolen cloth and clothing. As Tompkins indicated, “no nation can be really and substantially independent, which relies on any other for it essential supplies of clothing” (JA, 1817: 855). As the prison population continued to increase in 1816, the prison inspectors proposed to double the number of looms at the prison, which then totaled 78. During the next several years the number of looms did, in fact, increase to 117 (JA, 1822). Further expansion appears to have been stifled by innovations in production that reduced the demand for textile imports.
In 1816, a proposal was made to the prison to employ prisoners in the marble industry. Prisoners would be paid 18õ per foot to saw marble (JA, 1816–1817).
This business was established in 1817 and in 1818 the prison acquired a new yard to cut, saw, and polish marble. The business proved extremely profitable and necessary to the economy in contrast to previous prison enterprises where the products of manufacture were not in demand during the depression and were often either sold at auction or shipped, at additional expense, to other parts of the country where there was greater demand. In particular, much of the marble was used for the construction of state buildings, at a cost many times cheaper than the marble previously imported from Italy and Russia. The availability of an inexpensive source of marble thus facilitated state construction, which, in turn, stimulated production and employment.
This experience with the marble industry came at a time when a decision had to be made whether to enlarge Newgate or construct another prison. Also at this

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Rhode Island, in 1817. In 1819, one mill in Taunton County and one mill in Oneida
County, New York, installed power looms. By 1820, one-third of the looms in the U.S. were operated by power (Clark, 1928). Coupled with the depression and a reduced demand for various types of clothing, this innovation in production significantly reduced imports of cloth and clothing. The foundation of Newgateʼs industries and its contribution to economic development were thus eroded.
In April 1820, a report on the selection of a site for a prison to replace Newgate was presented to the State Legislature. The site in Westchester County was located near marble deposits. During the first years of the prison (later to be known as Sing Sing), production was almost entirely devoted to marble. Thus, both the decision to abandon Newgate and the plans for Sing Sing reflect the stateʼs commitment to production and to the general well-being of the economy during a time of economic crisis.
From 1815 to 1821, much more severe punishments were instituted at Newgate. Adamson (1984) cites this as evidence that economic depression and the general, societal devaluation of labor meant that prisoners were treated more as threats than as economic resources. It can be argued, however, that these punishments were designed to maximize production under conditions where there was an immediate threat of prison revolt.
In 1803, 4 of 20 prisoners attempting to escape were killed. In 1804 and again in 1812, prisoners burned part of the prison, halting some industries. With just over 400 prisoners in Newgate, however, disturbances until this point had been contained. After 1815, in the eyes of the administration, the increased number of prisoners and the extensive use of pardons increased the likelihood of an unmanageable revolt. In 1817, the death penalty was instituted in cases where prisoners either assaulted a guard with the intent to kill, or set fire to the prison. There was also discussion of raising a militia to curb disturbances at the prison.
In 1818, the administrationʼs fears were realized. On June 2, there was a
“mutiny” of prisoners that threatened the prison with “total destruction” (JA,
1819). Municipal and military authorities were called to quell the revolt, and 100 prisoners were placed in solitary cells for two to three months. But acts of violence and sabotage continued; there were instances in which prisoners ran through the shops and wrecked looms and destroyed cloth with knives.
Instead of recommending an increase in the severity of punishments, however,
Newgateʼs Annual Report for 1818 sought the elimination of solitary confinement.
The primary reason for this suggestion was that many of the 100 prisoners sent to solitary confinement were so debilitated afterwards that they could not work. In addition, one-third to one-half of the looms could not be used while the prisoners were in solitary confinement. The prisonʼs earnings for 1818 were nearly 50% less than for 1817 (JA, 1819).

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New methods of punishment, consistent with production rather than retribution, were thus instituted after the experience of 1818. In 1819 prisoners were assigned a daily quota of work, and if this quota was not met, they were punished
(JA, 1820). This form of brutality, however, did not increase productivity, but created greater discontent and protests against work. A system was thus suggested in 1819 and adopted in 1820 whereby prisoners received one-half of what they produced above their quota. Also as an incentive to work, the inspectors recommended in 1819 that those who had not averaged between 25õ and 30õ per day for the previous year should not be pardoned. This suggestion was implemented in 1821 (JA, 1820–1822).
In 1819 a system of classification was instituted which again focused upon increased productivity. The best workers, who were placed in the “first class,” had the most comfortable cells, access to lights at all times, and were eligible for a pardon. Those in the “second class,” who were less productively employed, had less comfortable cells, were allowed lights only once each week, and were not eligible for a pardon. Those who did not work were placed in the “third class” and were never allowed to have lights in their cells.
Also, in 1816, the prison inspectors proposed a change in the definition of grand larceny from a theft of $12.50 to $25.00 (JA, 1817–1818). Because petty larceny was not punished with imprisonment in state facilities, this suggestion, which was adopted the next year, was an attempt to remedy prison overcrowding, increased costs of imprisonment, the disruption of production, and the inability to provide productive employment for the increased number of prisoners. Therefore, even with falling prices and a greater incidence of theft during the depression, the definition of grand larceny was liberalized. Since more prisoners were incarcerated for grand larceny than for any other crime, this change did help to ease problems related to overcrowding.
Thus, although longer hours, closer supervision of work, and more severe punishments for not working or working too slowly were imposed on prisoners from 1815–1821, these measures did not reflect a de-emphasis of production or the decreased value of prisonersʼ labor, as Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs and
Adamsonʼs models suggest. To the contrary, the primary criterion in the design of punishments appears to have been increased productivity, and not retribution as Rusche and Kirchheimer emphasize, or crime control as Adamson indicates.
The importance of prison products appears to have nurtured, and was, in turn, reinforced by a philosophy which emphasized restitution. As one prison inspector indicated in the Annual Report for 1821, “the prison is not a place to commence reformation.... The most effectual method to overcome evil, is to overcome it with good...” (JA, 1822: 22). The “good,” of course, was the prisonersʼ economic contribution to society. This inspector thus went on to suggest that workhouses should be established in each county of the state and “furnished with looms and tools for various branches of manufacture” (JA, 1822: 22).

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IV. Auburn: Solitary Confinement and the
Transition to Laissez-Faire Capitalism
While Auburn prison was under construction in 1818, it was suggested that the original design of the prisonʼs north wing and center should be altered at a cost of $20,000 to provide solitary cells (JA, 1819). This introduction of solitary confinement at Auburn has been primarily explained in terms of an attempt to experiment with the Pennsylvania system. Curiously, however, there was no attempt to provide work for prisoners in solitary confinement at Auburn, an essential component of Pennsylvaniaʼs system of “separation with labor.” Adamsonʼs
(1984) analysis suggests that the use of solitary confinement was a consequence of a devaluation of labor and the treatment of prisoners as “threats” rather than as
“resources.” As previously indicated, however, a mild depression ended in 1822
(opposed to Adamsonʼs suggestion that the economic down-swing continued to
1825), yet solitary confinement continued to be used at Auburn until 1824. The use of solitary confinement at Auburn was neither a test of the Pennsylvania system nor a repudiation of prison productivity. Instead, it was a response to the internal threat of revolt at the prison and a concern, particularly given changes in the forces and relations of production, that all prisoners could not be productively employed.
Solitary confinement was initially used while areas for prison manufacture were still under construction and large numbers of prisoners were consequently idle.
Indeed, the prisonʼs annual reports for these years discussed solitary confinement not as a punishment, but rather as a method of dealing with prisoners for whom work could not be found. The difficulty in employing prisoners at this time was exacerbated by pressures to significantly change the nature of prison manufacture, particularly as a consequence of changes in technology and the transition from mercantilism to laissez-faire capitalism.
The potential for prison revolt had recently, and very dramatically, been demonstrated in New York at Newgate in 1818. In the same year, a militia of 30 people was raised to suppress possible “insurrections” of prisoners at the new prison in Auburn, and a fire engine was purchased in the small village in case of fires at the prison (JA, 1819). The plans for Auburn were also changed to include solitary cells. As feared, however, prisoners burned part of the north wing while it was still under construction in 1819.
Although there was an interest in manufacture at Auburn from the beginning, there appears to have been confusion with respect to specific plans. The Annual
Report for 1819 lauds a prison official who, apparently on his own initiative and with foresight, built a dam across the outlet of Owasko Creek, and erected a cast-iron forcing pump. Similar to production at Newgate, this allowed the operation of a trip hammer shop, turning lathes and carding machines. But these early plans for manufacture were inappropriate as the prison neared completion.
As indicated, the power loom had been introduced in New York in 1818 and the

Emergence of the New York State Prison System 103 need for weaving, the most extensive prison industry in New York at that time, was eroded. In addition, general changes in the organization of production and the stateʼs role vis-à-vis the management of the economy encouraged other changes in prison production.
As Dowd (1977) indicates, the role of state governments in managing the economy was reduced as a consequence of the transition from mercantilism to laissez-faire capitalism. The statesʼ role shifted from an emphasis upon the management of trade and more national and international concerns, to an interest in the needs of local capitalist enterprises. This change was reflected in the nature of production at Auburn.
For example, New York led the nation in the number of distilleries, and an adequate and inexpensive supply of barrels was essential to that industry. Coopers in New York, however, could often not supply enough barrels in a timely fashion, particularly given an additional demand for barrels in the West Indies. In 1820 a coopersʼ shop was completed in the south wing of Auburn. This enterprise represented the prisonʼs most extensive business, exceeding the production of consumer goods from weaving and shoe making. In the past, prison manufactured goods would, in most cases, be sold directly to the public. The manufacture of barrels at the prison was the first case in which prison labor in New York was extensively devoted to the provision of essential supplies for a major industry, a change which further served the interests of industrial capitalists.
In addition, by the 1830s, the larger, regional manufacturers became the primary recipients of contracts for prison labor at Auburn. Lewis (1965) has emphasized the significance of the pressures placed upon prison administrators to increase production and profits, suggesting that it may have been the primary penological consideration at this time. However, Lewis also notes without explanation the contradictory fact that during the 1830s bids for contracts were often not advertised. Favored contractors were allowed to pay much lower fees to the state, significantly reducing prison earnings. Much of the concern for increased earnings and the pressures placed upon prison administrators may thus have been political rhetoric designed to pacify a public plagued by increasing taxes. Thus, the ostensibly desirable concern for profits appears to have been secondary to serving the interests of an emerging industrial bourgeoisie.
As Miller (1980) suggests, prison contracts to the newly emerging capitalist interests was a significant force in eliminating the competition from smaller shops, operated by master craftsmen and controlled by the apprentice system, who were unable to compete with prison manufacture. This change in the character of prison production, which served the interests of large capital at the expense of the businesses of master craftsmen, did not begin, however, until the emergence of laissez-faire capitalism. Consequently, during the early, transitional years at Auburn, the direction of prison manufacture was ambiguous, particularly as the once powerful master craftsmen vehemently complained about the ruinous competition

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It appears, therefore, that it was perhaps only “after the fact” that the proponents of the congregate system — to which the design of Auburn was always essentially committed — labeled the use of solitary confinement at Auburn as an “experiment” of the Pennsylvania model, in an attempt to discredit a system of imprisonment which did not contribute sufficiently to industrial capitalism.
Complete isolation (the Pennsylvania model encouraged visits from “acceptable” members of the community and the prison staff) and no opportunity for labor predictably resulted in the severe physical and psychological deterioration of prisoners at Auburn. However, solitary confinement at Auburn was not abandoned in response to this abuse of prisoners; rather it was discarded as the prison discovered ways in which it could contribute through prison labor to the rapidly emerging power of industrial capitalists.
According to Melossi, the resocialization of labor was primarily responsible for the elimination of solitary confinement and the initiation of congregate labor at Auburn. Although virtually no information on the benefits of the congregate system in terms of resocialization or rehabilitation existed, advocates of the separate system had documented and spoken extensively on that systemʼs merits in terms of recidivism and the adoption of a work ethic. Indeed, it was in deference to their widely accepted wisdom regarding the appropriate means for resocialization that congregate prisons initially enforced a code of silence during the day, and returned convicts to their separate cells at night. Specific training in the congregate method of production and development of skills on machines that could not be introduced into separate cells appears to be only a secondary and perhaps post facto reason for the selection of the congregate prison. Then as now, an industrial workerʼs “attitude” and motivation was more significant than the relatively easy-to-learn technical skills.
V. Conclusion: Toward an Analysis of
Imprisonment in Post-Industrial Capitalism
This article has documented the essential relationship between political-economic development and the initiation of imprisonment as the dominant method of punishment in New York State. In general, Melossiʼs observation that “the history of the rise of the American prison is the history of models of prison employment” (1981: 135) is supported. The present analysis indicates, however, that the relationship between imprisonment and the mode of production is not essentially dependent upon the industrial nature of imprisonment.
Although prison manufacture made a significant economic contribution to the late mercantilist and more competitive stage of capitalism in the U.S., the demise

Emergence of the New York State Prison System 105 of prison manufacture did not, according to reductionist interpretations, dissolve the economic nature of the relationship between imprisonment and capitalist development. Thus, Rusche and Kirchheimerʼs projection that prisons would disappear in post-industrial capitalism as a consequence of unprofitable prison manufacture erroneously assumes that prisons were constructed to exploit scarce labor through prison manufacture rather than as an important part of the stateʼs more general role with respect to political-economic development. The prisonʼs economic contribution to monopoly and post-industrial capitalism has thus been altered, but not negated or necessarily diminished.
With the transformation from laissez-faire to monopoly capitalism, the interests of relatively small, regional business interests, which derived extensive profits from prison contracts, were overshadowed by monopolistic concerns. The statesʼ allegiances also changed, and by the end of the 19th century were aligned with organized businesses who protested unfair competition from low-cost, prisonmanufactured goods. Therefore, over the next 50 years state prison industry was virtually eliminated. This process began in New York, where monopoly interests were most influential; soon spread to other northeastern states; and extended to other states as monopoly capital gained increased power, particularly over federal policy.
A failure to carefully reflect upon the relationship between prison manufacture
(particularly the products of prison manufacture) and the development of monopoly capital has resulted in an overemphasis upon the protests of “free labor” as an essential, and often more important, factor than capital in the demise of prison industry. Indeed, Petchesky (1981) is alone in challenging this analysis.
The positive response to the protests of labor did not coincide with the increased power of labor, as labor had been more organized and politically more powerful during the anti-convict labor protests of the early 19th century. Instead, after decades of protest, complaints were recognized when they complemented the interests of capital.
With regard to the nature of imprisonment in late monopoly capitalism, the failure to adequately reflect upon the relationship between imprisonment and political-economic development has obscured the significance of the prisonsʼ efforts to stimulate consumption in response to the crisis of overproduction and underconsumption. Particularly at the individual state level, the consumption of resources to construct and maintain prisons emerged, very early on, as a major source of consumption. The transition of the state prison from a producer to consumer during the early stages of monopoly capitalism in the late 19th century, and the completion of this process throughout much of the U.S. by 1940, help to explain the persistence and expansion of an otherwise politically and economically anachronistic form of punishment, as viewed by Rusche and Kirchheimer and others. Prisons thus represent one of the statesʼ first and most significant efforts to stimulate consumption as prescribed by the Keynesian remedy. With nearly

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With respect to contemporary debates on the revival of prison industry, the method of analysis suggested in this article offers an explanation for the reluctance of many state prisons to return to profitable prison industry, while industry at federal prisons continues unabated. This difference cannot be explained either by more liberal ideals and resistance to the exploitation of prison labor at the state level, or by the need for profits. Federal prison policy is, in general (although not in all cases), more liberal, and its funding more secure. Attention to the difference between prison consumption and the impact of competition from prison production at the state level where there are very important implications, in contrast to federal prisons where consumption and production have a more limited affect upon the national economy, provides the basis for a more convincing explanation. Thus, makeshift work, idle time, and storage of prison-manufactured goods continues to characterize many state prisons. But recent revelations on production in federal prisons to meet essential, “high-tech” military needs confirms the continued political-economic significance of prison production at the federal level.
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