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IDEAS & ISSUES (C2)
The Electronic Fire
Support Coordinator
Thinking outside the box
by Maj Paul L. Stokes, USMC(Ret)
Southeast Asia, 2015
he regimental landing
team (RLT) commanding
officer (CO) sat in his chair
in the landing force operations center (LFOC) and viewed his
battle display as his battalions and supporting elements began to execute the
coordinated amphibious/air/ground attack. At first things were going well. 1st
Battalion seized its objectives quickly via
a combined tank/infantry assault
launched from the beachhead supported
by a 155 battery and a Burke-class destroyer. 3d Battalion disembarked
smoothly from the LSDs and LPDs via
assault amphibious vehicles and LCACs
and quickly seized the port complex that
would facilitate the offloading of the follow-on echelon in near record time. But
what concerned the CO was 2d Battalion. Its forward command element
(FCE) and lead companies were airlifted
off the LHD as planned. Even though
they lost one CH–53 en route due to a
hidden antiaircraft position, the flight
leader reported that they landed in
Landing Zone (LZ) Dodo (next to a
major airport 40 miles inland) without
taking any additional fire, and the FCE
signaled that they were good to go. But
that was over 30 minutes ago, and the
FCE has yet to check in on any of the
regiment’s radio nets. Suddenly, the air
officer tells him the forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)) reports observing heavy artillery and small arms
fire in/around LZ Dodo, and the second
wave has lost two Ospreys to enemy fire.
Clearly something has to happen fast, so
he tells his S–3 (operations officer) to
get the staff together to find out what’s
going on.
T
38 www.mca-marines.org/gazette
>Maj Stokes retired in August 2006 after 31 years of active duty service. A former
gunnery sergeant and chief warrant officer 3, he has served in a variety of leadership and communications billets from the team to theater levels. He has served
as the Deputy Director for Operations, Marine Corps Communications-Electronics
School, since January 2007.
The S–3 immediately calls the primary staff together for a hip pocket operational planning team (OPT). He
knows that unless command and control (C2) connectivity is reestablished
he’s going to lose almost 25 percent of
his combat power and hundreds of
Marines. The staff includes leaders who
are responsible for all of the elements
of the RLT, but at this particular moment, the one man who understands
how to employ the RLT C2 systems in
the most effective manner possible, the
. . . the CommO . . .
will soon find himself
being respected as a
tactician. . . .
one man who knows how “to make it
happen” regardless of what the book
says, the one man who can snatch victory from imminent defeat is the electronic fire support coordinator, aka the
RLT S–6 communications officer
(CommO). That’s right, Marines, the
electronic fire support coordinator.
For decades the Marine Corps has
trained its CommOs/chiefs to be technically proficient. But when it comes
to thinking outside the box and em-
ploying our communications gear in
the same manner as weapons systems,
we can do better. For example, when
that RLT S–6 arrives at that OPT in
the LFOC, he must embrace the fact
that he isn’t just a communicator.
Rather, he is an expert in employing a
supporting arm, just like artillery, mortars, and close air support; the only difference is that his weapons fire
electrons vice steel. Or to put it another
way, many of the same planning considerations that would be applied to
fire support planning (e.g., mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and
support available-time available; petroleum, oil, lubricants; supply; maintenance personnel; priority of fires) also
apply to communications. Ergo, the S–
6 needs to ingrain himself into the
planning process by serving in the same
manner as the artillery/air officers by
advising the CO/S–3 on how he can
effectively support the scheme of maneuver with his “electronic artillery.”1
With this approach, the CommO
(i.e., the shooter) will soon find himself
being respected as a tactician vice a technician, which is a key point. All too often
we (the Marine Corps communications
community) focus on the technical aspects of communications and forget the
fact that our mission is to support the
frontline rifleman. This means that we,
as communicators, need to dust off our
old combat arms manuals from The
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Basic School/Expeditionary Warfare
School/Command and Staff College and
begin to think like electronic fire support
coordinators. There are a number of
documents that could help prepare the
shooter for this “shift in mindset,” but
the first one he should get his hands on
is the 1976 version of the old Fleet Marine Force Manual 10–1 (FMFM 10–1),
Communications, because this manual
is based on over 35 years of combat experience and is designed to pass on those
time-tested lessons. Granted, finding
that document could take a little time,
but it’s worth the effort.2 The shooter
should also read the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff Manual 6231 (CJCSM
6231) series of publications, because
they are the standard when it comes to
joint command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems. And
he shouldn’t be afraid to bring them to
an OPT. After all, the artillery/air guys
have to use reference pubs in these meetings, so why can’t he bring his? The next
thing he needs are copies of the initiating
directive, operations order, task organization, force laydown, and concept of
operations, since these products will help
him understand the command relationships/force structure. With that knowledge, the shooter can create the communications control (CommCon) relationships (i.e., the electronic fire support
control structure) that will furnish, install, operate, and maintain the C2 system/network(s) that supports the
evolution that is being OPT’d. The remaining things the shooter needs to
bring with him are a good sense of
humor, patience, and the discipline to
stick to his guns. Face it, artillery and air
can only do so much, and the CO/G–
3/S–3 will usually accept those limitations without question. Communications (i.e., electronic fire support) should
be looked at in the same manner since it
can’t be fairy dusted. It either does or
doesn’t work. That may be hard for some
folks to swallow, but if the shooter can
speak in the G/S–3’s terms, then he will
soon find himself inside the circle vice
out of it.
As one can quickly surmise, developing these “battle skills” takes time,
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1.
Be a leader, first and foremost.
2.
Electronic fire support systems (e.g., communications gear)
are employed in the same manner as artillery, crew-served
weapons, and close air support—the only difference is that
they fire electrons not steel.
3.
Become an expert in terrain appreciation from the tactical to
strategic levels.
4.
Understand the command’s mission, capabilities, and
limitations.
5.
Create a “toolbox” of reference material, and don’t be afraid
to bring it to an OPT.
6.
When reporting to an OPT, bring a good sense of humor,
patience, and the discipline “to stick to your guns” when
discussing why a particular course of action is
unsupportable.
7.
Read as much as you can about battle leadership, tactics,
and C2 from the tactical to strategic levels.
8.
Learn to think, talk, and brief like an “operator.”
9.
Write and publish electronic fire support plans that are clear,
concise, and easily adaptable to changes on the battlefield
and/or scheme of maneuver.
10.
Become an integral part of your respective staff and focus
not only on the immediate missions but also prepare for
those that always seem to “pop up” when you least
expect them.
The electronic fire support coordinator’s basic tenets.
but if the shooter makes the conscious
decision to embark upon a journey of
lifelong self-study, he’ll find that the
challenges of C4 are nothing new. The
hard part is figuring out how to best
employ the available electronic fire support systems/personnel. Where does
the shooter start?
The first step would be embracing
the fact that he is a leader first and foremost. Technicians are, quite frankly, a
dime a dozen. Ergo, the shooter can’t
allow himself to get sucked into the vortex of minutia. Therefore, he should
pull out his copy of Marine Corps
Warfighting Publication 6–11 (MCWP
6–11), Leading Marines, and read it,
study it, and implement it in all of his
daily activities. After all, it’s his primary
duty as a leader to “take care of Marines
and support operations.”
The second step would be learning
how the operators think. This is a cultivated skill, but if the shooter studies
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1
(MCDP 1), Warfighting; MCDP 1–0,
Marine Corps Operations; MCDP 1–
1, Strategy; MCDP 1–2, Campaigning;
MCDP 1–3, Tactics; MCDP 2, Intelligence; MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operwww.mca-marines.org/gazette 39
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IDEAS & ISSUES (C2)
It’s time to think outside the box. (Photo courtesy of author.)
ations; MCDP 4, Logistics; MCDP 5,
Planning; MCDP 5–1, Marine Corps
Planning Process; and MCDP 6, Command and Control, he’ll become an operator in his own right, especially when
he finds himself being assigned as the
leader of the next OPT.
The third step would be to become
tactically and technically proficient in
the employment of electronic fire support systems. The schoolhouse does a
good job teaching technical skills, but
to be truly effective, the shooter needs
to create a publications “toolbox” (see
Table 1) that would contain the tools,
techniques, procedures, and technical
data that he can use when furnishing,
installing, operating, and maintaining
C4 systems in support of an operation.
Besides the publications we’ve just mentioned, this toolbox would include:
MCWP 3–40.3, MAGTF Communications Systems, dated 8 January
2010. This MCWP outlines how the
MAGTF communications systems
(MCS) provide effective C2 support.3
Headquarters
Marine
Corps
(HQMC) C4 Tri-MEF Communications Standing Operating Procedures
(SOP), Version 3, dated 21 October
2009. This SOP “sets the bar” for tac40 www.mca-marines.org/gazette
tical C4 systems operations in all three
MEFs and serves as a source of MCS
technical information.4
Joint Publication 6–0, Joint Communications Systems, dated 20 March
2006. This is an overview of how joint
C4 works at the Department of Defense (DoD), combatant command,
and joint task force (JTF) levels and includes a comprehensive JTF J–6 planning checklist that can be readily
adapted by a MAGTF G–6/S–6.
. . . read as much as one
can on leadership, operations, fire support, planning, and how to cope
with great adversity.
The Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA) Global Contingency
and Exercise Plan (ConExPlan). DISA
Network C2 services (secure voice,
data, and video) are now being extended down to the company/pla-
toon/squad level, which magnifies the
planning and engineering challenges
faced by the shooter. The ConExPlan
provides the guidance, points of contact, and techniques and procedures for
accessing/troubleshooting these services via a DoD teleport/standard tactical entry point, making it a valued
addition to any S–6’s toolbox.
U.S. Army Field Manual 6–02.71
(FM 6–02.71), Network Operations,
dated 15 January 2009. This FM explains how the Army conducts network
operations (CommCon) from the theater to battalion level, to include a set
of corps-level network operations techniques and procedures that directly
correlate to the ones that are used by a
MAGTF G–6/S–6.
The fourth step is to read as much
as one can on leadership, operations,
fire support, planning, and how to
cope with great adversity. In addition
to the Marine Corps Professional
Reading Program, the shooter should
seek out and read the following books
and reports.
Battle Leadership.5 This book has
been a favorite of Marine officers since
the 1930s, and its lessons are timeless
(e.g., “We must kill institutionalized
training otherwise it will kill us!”).
Leaders and Battles: The Art of Military Leadership.6 When it comes to
military history, the trend is to overlook the human factors that ultimately
led to success or defeat. This study
“brings to life” these elements and gives
the shooter a clear understanding of
why the best-laid plans go “haywire”
once the first round goes downrange.
Edson’s Raiders.7 You’re a senior
colonel tasked to create a brand new
unit that’s designed to strike the enemy
quickly and deeply, and you don’t have
the luxury of time to put it all together.
That’s the challenge that “Red Mike”
Edson faced back in 1941 when he
found himself in command of the 1st
Marine Raider Battalion—and that’s
the same challenge that every electronic
fire support coordinator faces when
he’s told to throw together a task-organized communications team. So why
not learn from the best?
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The Electronic Fire Support Coordinator’s Toolbox
1.
MCWP 6–11, Leading Marines
2.
MCDP 1, Warfighting
3.
MCDP 1–0, Marine Corps Operations
4.
MCDP 1–1, Strategy
5.
MCDP 1–2, Campaigning
6.
MCDP 1–3, Tactics
7.
MCDP 2, Intelligence
8.
MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations
9.
MCDP 4, Logistics
10.
MCDP 5, Planning
11.
MCDP 5–1, Marine Corps Planning Process
12.
MCDP 6, Command and Control
13.
FMFM 10–1, Communications, 24 June 1976 Edition
14.
Director C4, Communications Control, Strategy, dated
4 February 2010, HQMC, Washington, DC
15.
MCWP 3–40.3, MAGTF Communications System, dated
8 January 2010
16.
HQMC C4 Tri-MEF Communications Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP), Version 3, dated 21 October 2009
17.
Joint Publication 6–0, Joint Communications System,
dated 20 March 2006
18.
The CJCSM 6231 Series of Publications
19.
DISA Global ConExPlan
20.
FM 6–02.71, Network Operations, dated 15 January 2009
21.
Joint Forces Command JTF Communications Officer (J6)
Handbook, dated 7 August 2002
Table 1. The toolbox.
M a r i n e C o r p s G a z e t t e • A p r i l 2 011
Easter Offensive.8 It is 1972 in
Vietnam. You’re an advisor on your
first inspection tour visiting the 3d
Division Headquarters, Army of the
Republic of Vietnam, just south of
the demilitarized zone, which just
happens to be the same day that the
North Vietnamese Army launches its
Easter offense. The next thing you
know you’re coordinating the defense
of the Northern Provinces of an entire nation. LtCol G.H. Turley entered this crucible, succeeded, and left
behind a story that will teach any
leader how to cope with events that
would crush a lesser man. As any successful MAGTF G–6/S–6 will tell
you, overcoming adversity is a daily
occurrence when it comes to electronic fire support.
Guadalcanal: The Definitive Landmark Account.9 Guadalcanal was the
last time the United States fought a
determined enemy in an expeditionary environment, without the luxury of air/sea/ground superiority, thus
forcing our Marines, sailors, soldiers,
and airman to think “out of the box,”
lead from the front, and employ tactics, techniques, and procedures that
ultimately led to victory. This operational history is exactly what its title
implies. It is the definitive account.
Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of
Unity in Command and Control,
1942–1991.10 If there is no communications, there is no aviation C2,
which means that the shooter must
immerse himself in the nuances of
joint air operations. This RAND study
is the best analysis I’ve read on how
Marine aviation is affected by national
policy, technology, and resources.
A Bias for Action: The 7th Panzer
Division in France and Russia, 1940–
1941.11 The German Army was so
successful in World War II because its
commanders/staffs used a common
doctrine that stressed initiative, critical thinking, and the willingness to
make decisions at the lowest practical
level. One can learn much from this
treatise since it explains how leaders
interact as they successfully execute
mobile combat operations.
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IDEAS & ISSUES (C2)
Under the Red Sea Sun.12 It’s midDecember 1941. You’ve been sent to
British-occupied Italian East Africa to rebuild the port of Massawa—one of the
hottest places on the planet—with nothing much more than the verbal order “to
make the port operational ASAP.” That
is the challenge that CDR Edward Ellsberg faced, and this is the best memoir
I’ve ever read on how to do the impossible with little to no resources. The
shooter may find himself in similar circumstances, and knowing that aggressive
leadership can overcome any obstacle
will make him that much more effective.
a level of success that may have evaded
him in the past. Because quite frankly,
learning the technical skills of C4 is the
easy part. The real challenge lies in effectively leading Marines.
Southeast Asia, 2015
The OPT started rough and after
several tirades from his fellow staff
members the electronic fire support coordinator (aka RLT S–6) checked the
RLT’s radio plan then recommended
that the RLT air officer call the FAC(A)
to see if he still had contact with the 2d
Battalion FCE’s tactical air control
Because quite frankly, learning the technical skills of
C4 is the easy part.
Operation Stabilise: Australian East
Timor Operations: September 1999–
December 1999.13 You’re a Marine
captain 0602 on your way to Australia.
The next thing you know you’re ordered to report for duty as the J6 future operations officer to the U.S.
component of an Australian-led,
United Nations-sanctioned combined
task force. Does that sound like a challenge for any leader, let alone the
shooter? You bet it does, and these reports provide a firsthand view of just
how complicated C2 becomes in a
coalition operation.
The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting
Small Wars in the Midst of a Big
One.14 To defeat the enemy one must
first understand him. This modern classic on global insurgencies is absolutely
invaluable to learning how to be successful in this era of “violent peace.”
The fifth step is to become an integral part of your respective staff and
focus not only on the immediate missions but also on preparing for the ones
that always seem to “pop up” when you
least expect them. This is the essence of
electronic fire support, and if the
shooter makes the determined effort to
become a combat leader he will realize
42 www.mca-marines.org/gazette
party (TACP). Five minutes went by
and the air officer confirmed that he
did; immediately the RLT S–6 recommended that they set up a voice radio
relay between the TACP, the FAC(A),
and the LFOC. The RLT S–3 nodded
in agreement. C2 was reestablished
with the remnants of the 2d Battalion
FCE, and a potential disaster was adverted. Was the solution a throwback
back to days of Higgins boats and
LVT–1 alligators? Maybe so, but that’s
why you have an electronic fire support
coordinator—to think outside the box
when the plan goes out the window!
Notes
1. Electronic artillery: long-range—ground mobile forces satellite communications systems
(i.e., Phoenix, secure mobile antijam reliable
tactical-terminal, secure wide area network, and
lightweight multiband satellite terminal);
medium range—TRC–170 super high-frequency troposcatter radio transmission systems;
short range—MRC–142 mircrowave radio
transmission systems, mobile and manpacked
single-channel radio systems, and tactical telephone and computer systems.
3. MCWP 3–40.3, MAGTF Communications
System, dated 8 January 2010, p. 1–1, paraphrased. The MCDPs cited in this article were
published by the Department of the Navy,
HQMC, Washington, DC.
4. HQMC C4 Tri-MEF Communications
SOP, Version 3, dated 21 October 2009, p. 3,
paraphrased.
5. Von Schell, Capt Adolf, Battle Leadership,
Staff Corps, German Army, The Benning Herald, Fort Benning-Columbus, GA, 1933,
reprinted by The Marine Corps Association,
Quantico, 1982.
6. Wood, W.J., Leaders and Battles: The Art of
Military Leadership, Presidio Press, New York,
1984.
7. Alexander, Col Joseph H., USMC(Ret),
Edson’s Raiders: The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in World War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001.
8. Turley, Col G.H., USMCR(Ret), The Easter
Offensive: The Last American Advisors, Vietnam, 1972, Presidio Press, 1985, reprinted by
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1995.
9. Frank, Richard B., Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle, Random
House, New York, 1990.
10. Winnefeld, James A., and Dana J. Johnson,
Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1993.
11. Stolfi, Dr. Russell H.S., “A Bias for Action:
The German 7th Panzer Division in France and
Russian, 1940–1941,” Marine Corps University Perspectives on Warfighting, Number One,
Command and Staff College Foundation,
Quantico, 1991.
12. Ellsberg, CDR Edward, USNR, Under the
Red Sea Sun, Dodd, Mead & Company, New
York, 1946.
13. Operation Stabilise: Australian East Timor
Operations: September 1999–December1999,
DISA-PAC PC32 Combined Reports, dated 14
January 2000, Marine Corps Lessons Learned
System Reference Number 4562.
14. Kilcullen, David, The Accidental Guerrilla:
Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,
Oxford University Press, 2009.
2. The Gen Alfred M. Gray Research Center at
Marine Corps Base Quantico has this document on file.
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