University of Utah FDR to Clinton, Mueller to ?: A Field Essay on Presidential Approval Author(s): Paul Gronke and Brian Newman Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 501-512 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3219810 Accessed: 21/06/2010 14:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. University of Utah and Sage Publications, Inc. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Research Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org FIELDESSAY FDR to Clinton, Mueller to ?: A Field Essay on Presidential Approval PAUL GRONKE, REEDCOLLEGE BRIAN NEWMAN, DUKEUNIVERSITY Since the 1930s, polling organizations have asked Americans whether they "approveor disapprove of the job [the incumbent]is doing as president."In the early 1970s, John Muellerstartedan academicindustryby askingwhatdrivestheseevaluations.Americanpoliticsand the tools availableto examineit havechangeddramaticallysince then, inspiringa burstof researchon presidentialapprovalin the 1990s. We reviewthis new body of literature,arguing that it builds on but differs importantly from earlier approval studies. Since Mueller's writing,scholarshave expandedhis relativelysimplemodel, takingaccountof presidents'goalsand personal otherpoliticalactors,the ubiquitousmedia,and an inattentivepublic.We describethreewaves characteristics, of research,focusingon the most recentwave. We suggestthat history,along with new intellectualcurrents, data,and methodshave enabledeach wave to incorporatemore of political,social,and psychologicalreality. Finally,we identifythe issues most likelyto motivatepresidentialapprovalresearchfor the next ten years. study of the Americanpresidency,RichardNeustadt (1980: 81, n. 9) arguedthat reportsof these ratings"arevery widely read in Washington"and are "widelytaken to approximate reality."Higher approvalratings tend to pay off electorally, both for the president and for his party in Congress (Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003; Newman and Ostrom 2002; Sigelman 1979) and also affectthe president'spolicymaking goals, legislativestrategy,and success in promoting his agenda.2 The American political universe has undergone important changes since the early 1970s, and the presidencyhas not been immune. The office of the president has endured two majorcrises. RichardNixon resigned, almost certainto be impeached, and left office with 24 percent approval. William Jefferson Clinton was impeached, yet ended his second term with a 64 percent approvalrating, the highest final ratingon record.In addition, presidentialapprovalhas become increasinglyvolatile. One President Bush experienced almost universal acclaim after the first Gulf War, only to watch this support whither by over 50 percentage points in a matterof months. A second PresidentBush was the 1930s, the Gallup organization began asking Americans "do you approve or disapprove of the way [the incumbent] is handling his job as president?"Since then, the question has been asked "withtenacious regularity" (Mueller 1973: 196). In the early 1970s, John Mueller (1970, 1973) sparked something of a political science movement when he treatedthe Gallupapprovalratingsas a dependent variable. Coalitions of minorities, rallying aroundthe flag, economic decline, and war,Muellerargued, drove changes in approvalover time. Since then, scholarly studies of presidential approval have been almost equally tenacious and regular.In fact, a conservative estimate finds over 70 books, articles, and chapters that attempt to explain approval ratings.' The attention is well placed. In the era of "the public relations presidency"(Braceand Hinckley 1993: 382), approvalratings play a critical role in presidentialpolitics. The president's performancein this "new referendum"(Brace and Hinckley 1992: 18) is a key to understandingpresidential power in the postwar era (Neustadt 1980). In his classic In The actualnumberis certainlyhigher.We included only a subset of these studiesin the bibliography.We apologizein advancefor the many books, articles,and workingpapersthatwe have omitteddue to spacerestrictions. 2 NOTE: An earlierversion of this articlewas presentedat the 2000 Annual Meeting of the AmericanPolitical Science Association,Washington, D.C. The authors thank Matt Baum, RichardBrody,Harold Clarke,JeffreyCohen, RobertEisinger,ConstantineSpiliotes, and anonymous reviewers for their comments and CarrieLiken and Jennifer Merolla for their researchassistance. This researchwas supported in part by the National Science Foundation SBR9730854, the NSF Research Experiences for Undergraduates (REU)program,and the Stillman-DrakeFund at Reed College. PoliticalResearchQuarterly,Vol. 56, No. 4 (December2003): pp. 501-512 501 These claims are established in the voluminous literatureon elections, presidentialapproval,and presidentialleadership.Four recent volumes include Brody (1991), Braceand Hinckley (1992), Kernell(1997), and Kingand Ragsdale(1988). On how popularityaffectslegislativestrategy, see Canes-Wroneand Shotts (2002); on legislativesuccess, see CanesWrone and de Marchi (2002). Additional treatments include Kernell (1997); Peterson (1990); Rivers and Rose (1985); Rohde and Simon (1985). Many argue that those effects are variableand not always substantial (e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990; Cohen 1997). We consider the debate over approval'sinfluence on Americanpolitics a significanttopic, one that makes studying approvalas a dependent variablemeaningful. However,we cannot do this topicjustice in the space providedand focus on literaturetaking presidentialapprovalas the dependent variable. 502 502 POLITICAL RESEARCH RESEARCH QUARTERLY POLITICAL QUARTERLY catapulted to 90 percent approvaljust after the terrorist attacks of September 11th and retained remarkablyhigh approvalfor more than a year afterwards.Further,the "avalanche of opinion polls"(Jacobsand Shapiro2000, xi) provides an almost daily renderingof the president'sapproval rating. During the Lewinsky scandal, for instance, John Zaller(1998) examined more than 30 differentpolls over a 20 day period, all of which dealt with Clinton'sjob performance. Presidents'private polling has also dramatically increased, as has scholarly attention to these activities (Jacobsand Shapiro2000). In the academicworld, new analyticaltools have shaped approvalstudies. Longer time series have provided greater leverage on comparisons across administrations. Rich datasetsderived from presidentialarchiveshave provided a farmore detailedtreatmentof presidentialagendas.Increasingly sophisticated analytical methods have been introduced and applied to these new datasources, as well as provided a fresh look at the traditionalGallupseries. Scholarly scrutiny of the presidency and presidential approvalhas intensifiedin response to these developments and especiallyin reactionto the GeorgeH. W Bushand Clinton presidencies.What has not occurred,however,is a comprehensiveoverviewand criticalexaminationof the literature during this same period. We providethis here. We tracethe developmentof the study of presidentialapprovalover the last 30 years, from Muellerthrough the present. We argue that by and large,students of approvalhave taken Mueller's self-described"ratheraustererepresentationof a presumably complex process"and put it into a richer context, taking account of presidents' goals and personal characteristics, other political actors, the ubiquitous media, and a public made up of generallyinattentivecitizens (1973: 217-18). We describethreewavesof research,but focus on the most recent wave, which has emergedover the past decade.3We suggest thathistory,new intellectualcurrentsfromthe broaderpublic opinion field, and new data and methods have enabledeach wave to take more of political,social, and psychologicalreality into account. Finally,we identifythe questions and puzzles which are most likely to motivatepresidentialapproval researchfor the next ten years. THE THREEWAVES OF APPROVALRESEARCH the quarter century since. Despite his sparse and selfdescribed "irreverent" approach, Mueller anticipatedmany of the ways his model would be extended, refined, and enriched.Analytically,he tried to account for the seemingly inevitable decline in approvalover each presidentialterm. He arguedthat this was most likely the result of a "coalition of minorities"that builds during an administrationas the president is forced to act on controversialissues, consequently alienatinggroups of real or potentialsupporters.He operationalizedthe "coalitionof minorities"thesis simply as time in office. Second, he noticed that approval increases during foreign crises, the "rally round the flag" effect.4 Muellerwas the first,but certainlynot the last, to realizethat measuringrallyevents is fraughtwith difficultyTo resistthe temptation to find a rally point to match every bump in approval, fitting the model to sample data, he adopted a priori criteriafor rally events, a recommendationthat has been followed irregularlysince.5Third, Muellerarguedthat "aneconomy in slump harmsa president'spopularity,but an economy that is improvingdoes not seem to help his rating" (1973: 215).6 Finally,given his interest in public opinion during wartime, he included dummy variables for the KoreanWarand Vietnamconflict. Ultimately,he found that all of these variablessignificantlyaffectedapproval.7 When Mueller initially estimated his model, only the time variable was statisticallyor substantively significant. The expected relationships with war, the economy, and other rally events appearedonly once he added a dummy variable for each administration(or a presidency-specific time counter). This simple finding turns out to be a fundamental issue in the study of approvalratings and in presidency research generally:how do we resolve the tension between elegantmodels that capturesystematicforcesactive across presidencies and the harsh empirical realities of importantidiosyncraticfeaturesthat characterizeindividual presidents? Mueller'sposition on this debate is clear: he claimedthat "anyanalysisofpresidential popularitycannotrely variables.. the on [substantive] ., but mustalso incorentirely to the allow for specialcharacterof porateparametersdesigned each administration"(1973: 222, italics in original). He embracedwhat he considered the more empiricallyplausible model, taking into account idiosyncratic and unmeasured effects of each presidencywith the lament "so much for beauty"(ibid.). TheFirstWave-Muellerand Reactions The first wave of researchconsists of Mueller'swork and immediatereactionsto it. Mueller'sinitial article(1970) and his elaborationon it in his book (1973: chs. 9-10) identified much of the agenda that has occupied approvalstudies in 3 Naturally,breakingthe literatureinto three waves oversimplifiesreality and draws sharp boundaries where they do not exist. Many pieces fit imperfectlyin this structure,anticipatingnew trendsor hearkeningback to earlierquestions and methods. We offerthis view of the literaturenot so much as a mutuallyexclusive and exhaustivecategoricalanalysis,but as a bit of intellectualhistory and an organizingframework. Muellercites KennethWaltzas the originatorof the idea that the public will "rallybehind their chief executive"(1973: 208) duringcrises, but he is the first to our knowledge to use the term "rallyround the flag"to describeit. As best we can tell, the term comes from a well-known Civil War song. 5 Events had to be international,to involve the U.S. and particularlythe president directly,and to be "specific,dramatic,and sharply focused" (1973: 209). 6 However, he honestly notes that coding his economic variable so that only increasesin unemploymentand not decreasescould affectapproval was "theonly way the data can be made to come out 'right"'(1973: 215). 7 Mueller found that approvaldeclined during the KoreanWar,but not significantlyduring the Vietnamconflict. 4 FDRTO CLINTON, CLiNTON,MUELLERTO TO?? FDR Although his final model explained 86 percent of the variancein approval,Muellerpointed to severalpuzzles and paths for future research.First, he suggested that the rally variablecould be expanded (1973: 238). He experimented with a domestic rally variable,a variabletapping scandals, and splitting events into positive and negative categories. Although he found these experiments unfruitful, he suggested that "more precise social, political, and economic indicatorscan be sought"(1970: 33). Second, he suggested that greaterattention to individual presidents might prove beneficial.Eisenhower'sapprovaldid not fit the coalition-ofminorities thesis and Mueller conjectured that something about him in particularmay account for the finding. He argued, tongue in cheek, that "ifa presidentwants to leave office a popularman, he should either (1) be Dwight Eisenhower, or (2) resignthe day afterinauguration"(1973: 233). He suggested that taking account of individual presidents' attributes,like their style, integrity,competence, and "personal warmth,"might explain the Eisenhowerphenomenon and other differencesacross administrations(1973: 233). He also suggested that future research examine different economic indicators,group differences,other officeholders, and executives in other countries.8Finally,he points out that serial correlationplagues his analyses, noting that the Durbin-Watsonstatistic "reachedat best only about .70" (1973: 233, n. 28). Impressively,subsequent researchhas taken up all of these puzzles, problems, and suggestions. The initial reactionsto Mueller'swork fill out the rest of the first wave. The two main reactions both addressed Mueller's"coalitionsof minorities"thesis, or more specifically, what it means to include a time counter in a timeseries context. Stimson (1976) agreed that approval was trended, but argued that it drifted downwardquadratically rather than linearly.Thus, approvalimmediately declines, but eventually bottoms out and near the end of the term approval rises again (although not to its original level). Stimson gave this decline a differentsubstantiveinterpretation. He argued that it results from relativelyuninformed citizens having exaggeratedexpectations of the president after a successful election campaign, and their inevitable disappointmentafterthe president took office. The end-ofterm boost, Stimson believed, simply indicates another build up of expectationsas the reelectioncampaignbegins.9 In sharp contrast,Kernell(1978: 521) rejectedthe view that time dominates approval and argued instead for the impact of "real events and conditions." Time, Kemell 8 We will not reviewthe extensiveliteratureon executiveapprovalin other countries,but point to Paldamand Nannestad(1994) for a review.Several studiesexamineapprovalof Congress(e.g., Durr,Gilmour,and Wolbrecht 1997), the SupremeCourt(e.g., Caldeiraand Gibson 1992), statelegislatures (Patterson,Ripleyand Quinlan 1992), and governorsand senators (see a special issue of State Politics& PolicyQuarterlyedited by Niemi, Beyle,and Sigelman(vol.2, no.3, Fall 2002) for six articles). 9 Mueller outlined almost identical disillusionment reasoning for the decay of approvalover time, but ultimatelyargued that the coalition of minoritiesexplanationfit the data best. 503 503 argued, "as a variable has no inherent meaning" and is simply a convenient statistical shorthand for real world forces, such as the economy, wars, Watergate,and international events (508). After operationalizingthese factors in ways that "reflectmore reasonableassumptions about the world," he found approvalresponds to events and conditions ratherthan the marchof time (521). Similarly,Monroe (1978) argued that Stimson underestimatedthe effects of economic variablesvia the use of a time counter.She found that when inflation and militaryexpendituresare included in the model, and their effects estimated in appropriately nuanced ways, approvalreactsto these "realworld"indicators. Both articlestied approvalto elements of the political and economic context and sought to measureand estimate their effectson approvalmore realistically,effortsthat would continue in laterwaves. TheSecondWave-Advancementsin Specification and Estimation The second wave of research,published in the early to mid-1980s, took up many of the themes outlined in the first wave, attempting to specify more realistically the links between the economy,politicalevents, and approval.Scholars used more sophisticated time series techniques in an effort to determinewhether the effects Mueller and others observedwere real or just artifacts.They tried to determine how long rally events (MacKuen1983) and economic conditions affect approval (e.g., Norpoth and Yantek 1983). These efforts spurred methodological debates as scholars offered differentmodel specificationsand disagreed about the durationof effects,appropriatelag structures,functional forms, and estimation techniques. Not surprisingly, the period saw a significantadvance in the technical nature of the field and many took note of the substantiveimplications of different statistical approaches (see Ostrom and Smith 1992 and Beck 1991 for summaries of differentmethods and their implications).10 Arguments about the duration of various effects were importantbecause the question holds substantiveimplications. If effectshave a relativelyshort duration,approvalat any given time depends mostly on recent conditions, a "whathave you done for me lately"assessmentratherthan a long-term summary evaluation. If effects are more durable, past conditions contribute to overall evaluations, making it more difficult to change approval and to use approvalat any give time as an indicatorof the public'sreaction to recent actions (MacKuen1983). In addition, scholars in the second wave responded to Mueller'scall for a more nuanced treatmentof events. Many examined the effects of election campaigns, speeches and 10 It is interesting to note that approval models have often been at the methodologicalfrontierin political science. Although immediatelydiscardedin favorof more advancedmethods, Mueller(1970) points out that his use of multiple regressionwas relativelyrarein politicalscience. 504 504 other public appearances, domestic crises, significant domestic policy accomplishments, scandals and other events involving the presidentpersonally,such as the assassination attemptagainstReagan(see especially Ostrom and Simon 1985 and MacKuen1983). They found that domestic events affect approval and that events could boost or depress approval.ll Two important theoretical developments mark the second wave. In both cases, Mueller'sinitial ideas were put into richer political context. First, scholars began to take account of presidents' incentives to gain and maintain approval. Although presidents may have limited control over the economy,they have both the power and the incentive to create dramaticsymbolic events such as speeches, trips, legislative proposals, or even international engagements that boost approval(Ostromand Job 1986; Ragsdale 1984; but see Simon and Ostrom 1989). By paying more explicit attention to the president'sincentive structureand the public'sattractionto drama,second wave studies made these models significantlymore political and realistic. Second, some scholars began to think more explicitly about approvalat the individual-level.For example, Kerell and Hibbs (1981) and Hibbs, Rivers,and Vasilitos(1982a, 1982b) wrestledwith the consequencesof the way approval ratings are typically conceptualizedand constructed.They took seriouslythe factthatapprovalratingsareaggregations of individualopinionsratherthan the opinion of an aggregate. Although data limitations often constrained second wave studies to analyzingaggregatedata ratherthan modeling the individual-levelresponsesdirectly,some scholarsbuilt explicitly micro-level theories and tested their implications for aggregateapproval(e.g., Ostrom and Simon 1985; but see Kinder1981 and Tedin 1986 for two analysesof individuallevel data). Conceptualizingapprovalas an aggregationof individual opinions led some analysts to consider whether differentpartisanor class groupsemployeda differentmix of considerationswhen evaluatingthe president (Tedin 1986; Hibbs, Rivers,and Vasilitos1982a). Regardless,the distinctive featureof the second wave was an elaborationof the statistical technology used to estimate aggregate models of approval.This wave culminatedwith severaldefinitivestatements, MacKuen's(1983) treatment of "politicaldrama," Hibbs, Rivers,and Vasilitos'(1982a, 1982b) analysisof the economic underpinnings of approval, and Ostrom and Simon's(1985) comprehensivemodel of approvaland legislativesuccess. Littlemore needed to be said. By the mid-1980s, then, the presidentialapprovalfield had reached something of a standstill. Continued progress was being made, particularlyas carefully conceived data collection effortsand increasinglysophisticatedattentionto design and method enrichedour knowledge of the determinants of approval.However,Mueller'soriginalclaims largely drove the intellectualagenda. 11Competingevent coding schemes, however,became a continuingpoint of controversy,which we discuss below. QUARTERLY POLITICAL RESEARCH TheThirdWave-Media, Elites,Individuals, Public and a Heterogeneous By the late 1980s and early 1990s, presidentialapproval studies experienceda renaissance,largelyin response to the "new look" approachto public opinion (Sniderman1993). The new look emphasizes the explicit efforts of politicians, parties, and other elites to shape and change political attitudes and behavior. Reflecting the new look perspective, scholarsthought beyond the usual theoreticalsuspects, and considered how the media stand as an intervening force between presidentsand the public, and how elite discourse about events and conditions shape public attitudes. This most recent wave of researchalso wrestleswith heterogeneity, explicitly modeling group- and individual-levelvariations in approval. AlthoughBrodyand Page (1975) cited media coverageas a significantinfluence on approval,this insight was seldom exploited until recently,when scholars emphasized media's capacity to shape individual reactions to events and economic conditions, therebyaffectingaggregateapproval(e.g., Nadeau et al. 1999; Goidel, Shields, and Peffley1997; Mutz 1992, 1994; West 1991). Brody(1991) provided the clearest statementof the way media content shapes approvalratings. He constructed a media-based reinterpretationof empirical regularities like honeymoon periods and rally events (see also Callaghanand Virtanen1993), arguingthat public reactions to events and new presidents were best understood via a two-step process, as events are first interpretedand evaluatedamong opinion elites, then these interpretationsand assessmentsare transmittedto the public via the mass media. For example, Brody argued that honeymoon periods result from an overwhelminglypositive balance of media coverageat the beginning of a term as most elites tend to offer little criticism, withholding judgment until the president begins to take controversial actions. Once this happens, opponents offer criticism,media coverage becomes more negative, and public support falls as a result. He explained the rally phenomenon similarly. One psychological process by which media coverage influences public attitudes-priming-has also become an important part of the approval literature. According to Miller and Krosnick (2000: 301), "primingoccurs when media attention to an issue causes people to place special weight on it when constructingevaluationsof overallpresidential job performance."The notion of priming rests on the claim that when individualsmake a choice, they rely on salient and accessible information.This tends to be information emphasized"bythe prevailingeconomic, social, and political conditions of the time,"which in turn are generally portrayedvia mass media (Krosnickand Kinder1990: 500; see also Iyengarand Kinder1987). Mediacoveragecan changethe ingredientsof presidential support by making some considerations more salient or accessiblethan others (Iyengarand Kinder1987) and salient considerationsaffect approval more than other considerations do (Edwards,Mitchell,and Welch 1995). For example, FDR TO TO CLINTON, CLINTON, MUELLER MUELLER TO TO?? FDR Krosnickand Kinder(1990) found that opinions about foreign affairshad greaterinfluence on approvalin the wake of Iran-Contrarevelations. Similarly,Krosnick and Brannon (1993) found that evaluationsof Bush'shandling of foreign affairshad greaterinfluence on overallevaluationsafterthe GulfWarthan they had previously(see also Goidel, Shields, and Peffley1997; Peffley,Langley,and Goidel 1995). The primingliteratureraisesan importantquestion:does the public hold constant expectations of presidents over time? In statistical terms, does one model account for approvalat all times? Mueller initially raised this question and concluded that models must take the idiosyncrasiesof each presidentinto account. However,Mueller,like almost all afterhim, estimateda single coefficientfor events and the economy,assumingthat their effectsdid not vary over time. Some argue explicitly that the public holds stable expectations across presidencies. Ostrom and Simon (1985: 336) argue that "all presidents are expected to maintain peace, prosperity,domestic tranquility,and both the authorityand integrity of the office" (emphasis added). On the other hand, the priming literaturefinds that they can vary with current conditions. New estimation techniques that allow for time varying coefficients(Wood 2000) or data sets that pool cross sections over time (Gronke1999) may help solve this puzzle. History also raises this question on occasion. For example, despite enduring "the worst recession since the Great Depression,"a foray into Beirut that cost 265 American lives, a host of scandalsinvolving appointees, and the IranContraAffair,Reagan'sapprovalremainedhigh, resultingin claims that "heis The Manin the TeflonSuit;nothing sticks to him" (Weisman 1984: 39). It seemed that the conventional wisdom regardingpublic approvalno longer applied. Similarly,flying in the face of researchfinding that approval declines in response to scandal (e.g., Norpoth 1996; Ragsdale 1987; Ostromand Simon 1985), Bill Clinton'sapproval remained high during and after the Lewinskyscandal and impeachment, again suggesting that he was evaluated by differentcriteria.The spectacularrise and fall of Bush the elder'sapprovalafter the Gulf War and his son's dramatic and long lastingboost afterSeptember11 also seem to challenge general explanation. Can a single model account for all these presidencies? Remarkably,the answerseems to be "yes."The same factors that accounted for variations in approval from 1948 through 1980 continue to operateboth before and after.For example, Ostromand Simon (1989) found that Reaganwas not made of Teflon after all. The elder Bush'sapprovalfollowed expected patterns (Clarke, Rapkin, and Stewart 1994). Clinton'sapproval fits well within the findings of extant research(Newman 2002). Baum and Kerell (2001) even found that the standardset of indicators account for public approvalof FranklinRoosevelt.At least some factors consistently affect approvalacross a wide variety of conditions and presidencies. Beyond paying greater attention to media and elites, scholarsin the third wave explicitlyincorporatedaspects of 505 the mass public into their models, including individuals' own assessmentsof the politicaland economic environment ratherthan objectiveindicatorsof those environments.This marks a significant departure from the first two waves, which relied on aggregateand objective measures. Several studies, including Brody's,unpack the public's reaction to rally events, examining exactly who rallies-what types of people change from disapproval to approval. They find much more than blind patriotismis behind rallies.12In fact, panel studies with waves sandwiching a rally event (Edwardsand Swenson 1997; Peffley,Langley,and Goidel 1995) and time series analyses disaggregatedby partisanship and education (Baum 2002; James and Rioux 1998) find that individual-levelpredispositions and attention to media coverage of events shape attitudes toward the event and the president.13 Many have taken a similar approach to study the link between economic conditions and approval. Rather than measuringaggregateresponses to objective economic indicators, studies examined perceptions of the economy and their links to presidential approval (e.g., Norpoth 1996; Clarkeand Stewart 1994; MacKuen,Erikson, and Stimson 1992). Manyof the majordisputes in this period shift from the correctstatisticalspecificationof the effectsof the economy to the correctpsychologicalfoundationsof the way the public thinks about the economy. Most notably, scholars sparredover whether individualsare "peasantsor bankers," relying on retrospectiveor prospective assessments of economic conditions when evaluatingthe president (Norpoth 1996; Clarke and Stewart 1994; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992, 1996). These studies posited differentviews of how individuals connect their perceptionsof the economy to evaluationsof the president.One side arguesthat the public, in the aggregate, acts remarkablysophisticated,punishing or rewarding presidentsbased on its expectationsof futureeconomic performance (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). Although a sophisticated public defies mountains of research(Delli Carpiniand Keeter 1996), MacKuen,Erikson, and Stimson argue that the public lets economic expertsmake forecasts,which media sourcesbroadcast,and the attentive portion of the public responds, adjusting approvalin line with expectations.On the other side, scholars argue that the public evaluatescurrentand past conditions, punishing or rewarding the president accordingly (Norpoth 1996; Clarke and Stewart 1994). As Norpoth (1996: 777) put it, "therequirementsfor that kind of behavior are far more modest regardingboth the averagecitizens' capabilities and motivations to follow politics." Although 12 13 See Edwards(1983) and Hibbs, Rivers,and Vasililtos(1982a) for earlier examinationsof partisandifferencesin response to Watergateand rally events. In additionto disaggregatingapprovalby partisanship,Jamesand Rioux (1998) furtherenrich the study of the rally phenomenon by incorporating insights from international relations theory and taking into account the costs of reactionsto internationalcrises. 506 the precisenatureof the links between economic elites, economic news, mass perceptionsof the economy,and evaluations of the presidentremainunder debate (e.g., Nadeau et al. 1999), explicitly specifying these links is a significant step forward.All sides of the debateoffera richerview of the American public than that offered in early studies of approval.Ratherthan models of a public that almost mechanistically responds to economic conditions, these works offer more explicit models of the public'sinteractionwith the economic and media environment. In addition to taking perceptionsof rally events and the economy into account, several studies incorporatedmicrofoundationsin a more direct way-they estimatedindividual-level models. Although studying approvalat the individual-level differs significantly from the aggregate, discovering that individual-level analyses largely corroborate the findings of aggregate-levelstudies lends credenceto our general understanding of approval. Individual-level studies consistentlyconclude that economic conditions and perceptionspowerfully affect approval(e.g., Gronke 1999; Gilens 1988; Ostrom and Simon 1988), as do assessments of the way presidentshave handled significantinternational and domestic crises, i.e., rally events (e.g., Greene 2001; Edwards and Swenson 1997; Peffley,Langley,and Goidel 1995). We expect continued effortsto compare and bridge individualand aggregatemodels of approval. Beyond corroboratingaggregate-levelfindings, however, individual-levelstudieshavepointedto importantfactorsthat affectapproval,which aggregatestudies cannot isolate.First, these studies arebetterable to takepredispositionslike partisanshipinto account(Fischle2000). The unsurprisingeffects of partisanshiphave importantimplications.The weakening of partisanties among the public, ties that stabilizeindividuals' evaluations,may have made aggregateapproval more volatile over time and individualevaluationsmore uncertain at any given time (Gronkeand Brehm2002; Gronke 1999). Second, individual-levelstudies find that policy attitudes affectapproval(e.g., Gronke1999; Gilens 1988; see Erikson, MacKuen,and Stimson 2002 for a discussion of policy attitudes and approvalat the aggregatelevel). Third,individuallevel studies point to the significantrole assessmentsof the president'scompetence and integrityplay in overallevaluations (e.g., Newman 2003; Greene2001). Individuallevel theorizingalso highlightssignificantheterogeneity within the public, raising the possibility that variableshave differenteffects on differentsegments of the population. This is hardly a new idea, as Muellerdisaggregated approvalby partisanshipin his book (1973: ch. 10; see also Monroeand Laughlin1983 and Hibbs, Rivers,and Vasilitos1982a). However,thereseems to be renewedattention to differences across the public as recent work has examined heterogeneity across gender, racial, and party groups, across informationlevels, and at the level of individual attitudes. Examininggroup differencesin approvalprovides three important insights that aggregatestudies easily overlook. First, studies examining group differencescan point to the QUARTERLY POLITICAL RESEARCH sources of those differencesand how these differencesrelate to the politicaland social positions that these groupsoccupy in Americansociety (Newman 2003). Groupdifferencescan result from two sources, differencesin the levelsof the independent variables(e.g. blacksmay perceive,or experience,a differenteconomy than whites) or differencesin the weights that they attach to variables,or both. For example, in their individual-level studies of approval by men and women, Gilens (1988) and Newman (2003) conclude differencesin attitudes(levels of independentvariables)explainedmuch of the "approvalgender gap." However, Gilens (1988) also found thatwomen weighed theirmoreliberaldefensespending views moreheavilywhen evaluatingthe President(in this case, Reagan) than did men. Furthermore,Clarke et al. (2000) found that approvalamong men responds more to pocketbook considerations,while approvalamong women respondsmore to sociotropicassessments. Other studies similarly find that independent variables have differenteffects across differentgroups. For example, Ostrom and Simon (1988), using three panel waves in 1980, found that news coverage of the Iran Hostage Crisis droveDemocrats'approval,inflationwas the strongestinfluence on Republicans' assessments, and unemployment influenced independents. Others have found differential reactions across income and partisan groups (Baum and Kernell2001; Ragsdale1987), while Dawson (1994) found that AfricanAmericansrespond more to economic conditions, particularlyunemployment, than do whites. Future work should continue to examine subgroup differencesin the weights that groups attach to various economic and political considerations. Second, focusing on differences across the public can help to isolate stability and change among the public. Not everyone in the public is equally likely to change his or her evaluation (Kernell and Hibbs 1981). Focusing on who changes and why will provide insight into approvalat the aggregate level. For example, Tatalovich and Gitelson (1990) found that out-partisanswho initially support the president fall into disapproval over time, leading to a decline in approvalover the term.14 Further,Tedin's(1986) analysis of panel data found that out-partisanswere the most unstablein their opinions (see also Ostromand Simon 1988; Ragsdale1987). Other approval studies focused on whether the most sophisticated (Miller and Krosnick 2000; Krosnick and Brannon 1993) or the least sophisticated (Krosnick and Kinder1990; Tedin 1986) are most likely to altertheir evaluations of the president, and what the implications are for the quality of the public'sjudgments. These studies have primarilyexploredwhetherprimingis more powerfulat different levels of political knowledge. Some found that the least knowledgeable were most susceptible to priming 14 Again, Mueller outlined almost identical reasoning for the decay of approvalover time, but arguedthat the coalition of minoritiesexplanation fit the data best. FDR TO CLINTON, CLINTON, MUELLER MUELLER TO TO?? FDR TO (Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Iyengar et al. 1984), while others found no knowledge-baseddifferences(Iyengarand Kinder 1987). Most recently,Krosnickand Brannon(1993) and Millerand Krosnick(2000) found that primingis most likely among those with greaterstores of political knowledge. While previous work suggested that political novices were helpless against the tide of media coverage, more recent work argues that considerable sophistication is required to "interpret,store, and later retrieve and make inferences from news stories"(Miller and Krosnick2000: 312). The responsiveness of presidentialapproval to elite and media priming, the relative stability or instability of approvalcompared to other political opinions, and differences between sophisticatedand less sophisticatedrespondents remain open questions. Nevertheless, raising these questions has enriched the study of presidentialapproval. TheDevelopmentof the ThreeWaves We believe four factors drove this broad trend toward richer, more contextualized models, and we suspect that many of these factors will continue to shape the research agenda in the future. First, as alreadymentioned, events of the past 30 years forced scholars to extend, elaborate,and challengeconventionalwisdom. For example, GeorgeH. W Bush'srapid rise and decline in the polls during and after the Gulf War prompted studies of priming (e.g., Goidel, Shields, and Peffley1997; Krosnickand Brannon1993) and volatility (Gronke and Brehm 2002; Brace and Hinckley 1992). Likewise,many scrambledto make sense of Clinton's rising approvalin the face of scandal(e.g., Shah et al. 2002; Fischle 2000; Miller 1999; Rozell and Wilcox 1999; Zaller 1998).15The simple passageof historywill continue to force the literatureforward. Second, changes in the field of public opinion-the emergenceof the "newlook"-encouraged scholarsto consider political competition, elite discourse, media coverage, and heterogeneityin their studies of presidentialapproval, thus pointing the way toward the individual-level and group-centricanalysesof approvalcited above. Third,rapid advancesin methodologicaltechniques and the accumulationof richer data sources undoubtedly stimulated, and were stimulatedby, these trends in opinion and approval research. The first wave's focus on aggregate approvalwas in large part due to the availabilityof a sufficiently long, systematic,and consistent Gallup time series. While some disaggregateddata were available as early as Mueller's(1973) writing, disaggregatedtime series data and cross-sectional studies only recently became available. Today,the Galluptime series, disaggregatedby majordemographicsand partyidentification,is easily obtainablein both printed (Ragsdale 1998) and electronic form (the Gallup 15 Manyof these pieces fit nicely into the thirdwave, focusing on individual level changes, emphasizing media coverage and elite debate, and examiningdifferencesin reactionsacross groups. 507 and Roper archives). Severalindividual-levelsurveys have built up considerable time series. The National Election Studies began to ask a presidentialapprovalitem in 1972. Unlike the Gallup survey,the NES allowed respondents to "strongly"approveand disapprovefrom 1980 on, providing a scale with twice as many response categories.In addition, NYT/CBSpolls, administeredroughly on a monthly basis, have included a presidentialapprovalitem since 1976 and are available.These data have not been tapped to their full potential to study presidentialapproval.16 Fourth,methodologicaladvances-the growingpopularity of experimental and quasi-experimental research designs, the increasingsophisticationof time series analysis, and the development and popularization of discrete response models-have enabled scholars to model processes more precisely and have strengthenedour inferences about cause and effect. Experimentaltechniqueshave led to greater attention to the individual-level processes underpinning evaluations, helping us understand public reactionsto rally events and the assignmentof rewardand blame for economic change.17Time series advances have allowed scholars to test when and for how long independent variables affect approval.l8 Discrete response models (e.g., binomial, ordered, and heteroskedastic probit and logit) make individual-levelmodeling of approval feasible (Gronke 1999). Studentsof presidentialapprovalhave a far more variedset of datawith which they can explorevarious questions and a dramaticallymore sophisticated toolkit with which to test their ideas. PRESIDENTIALAPPROVALAND DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCE These innovations have been far more than data-fitting exercises. Presidentialapproval research speaks to larger 16 Approvaldata are readily availableover the worldwide web and electronic databases.Variouswebsites like pollingreport.comoffer aggregate-levelresults. The "pollsand surveys"section of Lexis-Nexiscan be used to accumulate a large number of survey observations, although only at the aggregatelevel. Gallup recently announced a feature,available to subscribersto the "TuesdayBriefing,"which will allow downloading of individuallevel survey data. The Roper Center's"Poll"service has long been a way to access individual Gallup studies, although the cost to assemble a largenumber of individualpolls can be prohibitive. Scholarsand students affiliatedwith the Inter UniversityConsortium for Politicaland Social Researchcan obtain NES surveys, as well as media polls (ABC,NY Times). Individuallevel Harrissurveys, from the 1960s-1990s, are availableat the Universityof North Carolina. 17 For instance, Krosnick and Brannon (1993) took advantage of wellplaced panel surveys before and afterthe Gulf War to develop a quasiexperimentaldesign to assess the way the political environmentshapes the criteriaof evaluation.Otherstudies (e.g., Iyengarand Kinder1987; Miller and Krosnick 2000) set up explicitly experimental designs to assess the degree to which media coverage may prime the public to evaluatethe presidentin particularways, or how the Stateof the Union boosts approval(Druckmanand Holmes 2003). 18 E.g., Box-Steffensmeierand Smith (1998, 1996); DeBoef and Granato (1997); see also a special edition of ElectoralStudies(Lebo 2000) and volume 4 of PoliticalAnalysis(Freeman1992), which summarizesvarious techniques. 508 508 questions rooted in democratic theory.Does the president have any power to improvehis standing?The answerto this question, positive or negative, has implicationsfor democracy In a perfect world, if higher approval means greater power, the public would rewardthe president for meeting realistic and appropriateexpectations. Then the president would have an incentive to meet those expectations and would benefit from doing so. However,if the public holds the presidentaccountablefor outcomesthathe has little control over, or has unrealisticallyhigh expectations,then the president'spower depends on the whims of the economy and history,setting up the presidencyfor almost inevitablefailure. On the other hand, if presidentshave too muchcontrol over approval,they could boost it without meeting appropriateexpectations,manipulatingtheir way to power. Scholarshave tried to assess the president'sabilityto control approvalsince the firstwave'sdebateover the decline of support.Mueller,who arguedthat presidentsface the "inexorabledescent"of their approval,offereda bleak view of the presidency,an officealmostdoomed to failure(Mueller1973: 213). Similarly,Stimson'sanalysis led him to suspect that "presidentialapprovalmay be almostwholly independentof the President'sbehavior in office, a function largely of inevitableforcesassociatedwith time"(1976: 1). The only way presidentscanshapeapprovalis by runningfor reelectionand "using their office to control events, particularlysymbolic events"to boost approval(1978: 10, emphasisin original). For his part, Kernell contended that presidents are judged on the basis of "outcomes in the form of current events and conditions"ratherthan what the presidentactually does in office (1978: 515). Kernellarguedthat holding presidents responsible for outcomes "should prompt the system'smost powerful actor to engage in problem solving" (ibid.). Others,however,would laterarguethat holding the president responsible for outcomes he can do little to control leads inevitablyto public disillusionmentand cynicism, and ultimately,presidentialfailure(e.g., Waterman,Wright, and St. Clair 1999; Lowi 1985). Studies in the third wave offer more hope for the president, finding that perceptionsof the political and economic environment,not just objective indicators, drive approval. Perceptionsdo not always perfectlyfollow objectiveindicators (e.g., Nadeau et al. 1999), and can be cultivatedmore easily than objectiveindicatorscan be altered.Furthermore, the priming literaturesuggests that presidentsmay have an even subtlertool. Ratherthan changingcitizens'minds, presidents may be able to change how they make them up. If presidentscan shape media coverage,which they sometimes succeed in doing (e.g., Edwardsand Wood 1999), they may be able to affectapprovalindirectly.19 Thus, public expectations may be met more easily than previouslythought. 19 For example, just days after revelationsof the Lewinsky scandal, Bill Clinton tried to refocus the nation's attention during his State of the Union address, not once mentioning the scandal, a strategythat may have worked to boost his approval(e.g., Zaller 1998). QUARTERLY POLITICAL RESEARCH However, these features also hold darker prospects. Faced with impossible expectations,presidentsmay be left little choice but to create the image that they are fulfilling expectations, using the powers of office to stage symbolic events, public relations derbies to effect favorableperceptions, resulting in nothing more than an "image-is-everything presidency"(Waterman,St. Clair,and Wright 1999; see also Brace and Hinckley 1992). In the extreme, some fear the possibility that the presidentmay use his power in the internationalsphere in hopes of creatinga rallyevent to divert attention from other less favorable considerations, trying to induce the so-called "wag the dog" effect (see James and Rioux 1998 for an overview of literatureon the "diversionaryhypothesis"). In the end, it appearsthat presidentsare neither entirely at the mercy of outside forcesnor in total command of their approval.As usual, the truth is somewhere in the middle. Sorting out when and to what extent the president shapes approvaland under what conditions the public resistspresidential efforts to boost approvalwill provide insight into the natureof presidentialpower and the characterand quality of accountabilityin the Americansystem. QUESTIONAND PUZZLESFOR THE FUTURE Although the general flow toward greatercontextualization has taught us much, this trajectoryhas left important questions unanswered. First, who or what determines the criteriathe public uses to evaluatepresidents?The first two waves took these criteria as largely exogenous, while the priming literatureof the third wave suggests that they are endogenous to the political, economic, social, and media environments.Extantliteraturedoes not tell us much about the conditions under which the public will resist priming, but there appearto be some. For example, in his analysisof the Lewinsky scandal, Zaller (1998: 185) argued that the public ultimately returns to "bottom line politics" and is concernedwith "politicalsubstance."As he put it, "however poorly informed, psychologically driven, and 'mass mediated'public opinion may be, it is capableof recognizingand focusing on its own conception of what matters"(1998: 186). Still, the bases of expectationsabout presidentialperformanceremainsurprisinglyunexplored(see, for example, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's1995 penetrating analysis of Congressionalapproval). Second, while research to date has demonstrated the importanceof the two pillars of presidentialapproval-the economy and foreign affairs-little researchhas considered whether and how the changing internationalenvironment may affect presidentialpolitics, presidentialapproval, and ultimately the power of the presidency In the economic realm, globalization and economic interdependence has reducedthe abilityof the presidentto controlmacroeconomic forces (if the president ever had such control in the first place). If Americaneconomic conditions are deeply affected by a regionalrecession,tradingdisputes,or the crashof a foreign stock market, will the president be held accountable? FDR CLINTON,MUELLER TO?? FDR TO CLINTON, TO Perhapsfuturemodels of approvalwill have to include international,as well as national,economic conditions. Anotherrevolutionarychange has taken place in foreign affairs.In the last decade, since the end of the Cold War,the U.S. militaryhas been engaged in frequent,low-level international conflicts. Under the conventional model, these should result in a series of "rallyevents." Foreign affairs, however, have always had something of a contradictory impact on approval. Internationalconflict is supposed to boost approval,even if just temporarily,while ongoing conflict tends to undermine it. This provides little insight into how we should expect the public to react to militaryactivity in the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, or at the time of this writing, possibly Iraq. Does the public receive these differently than peacekeeping missions in Kosovo or Bosnia, or an ongoing, undefined war on terrorism?There are some indicationsthat the public does see some nuance in foreign affairs.The public, both at the mass and elite levels, have displayedfarless consensus with respectto foreignaffairsin the post Cold War era (Holsti 1996). Thus, presidential action in the international sphere may produce more divided responsesthan has historicallybeen the case. To our knowledge, therehave been few scholarlyattemptsto examine the impact of these changes on presidentialapproval, beyond simply coding these conflicts as foreign policy "events"(e.g., Gronkeand Brehm2002; Braceand Hinckley 1993). If nothing else, these changes in the economy and foreignaffairsopen up a rich new avenue of researchfor the next ten years. Third, while we are considering revolutions, future researchmust be sensitive to the changing media universe. Massmedia are undergoingtremendouschange, as newspapers merge and disappear,cable television stations proliferate, and the Internet continues to revolutionize the way informationis disseminatedand viewed. The rapiddiffusion of the Starr Reportprovided just a glimpse of this future: informationthat disseminatesat "warpspeed"duringthe 24hour news cycle (Kovach and Rosenstiel 1999). How this may affect the president'sability to marshalpublic opinion remains unclear. Some have begun to tackle this question, finding that the growth of cable television has diminished the president'sabilityto dominatethe news (Baumand Kernell 1999). Furthermore,trust in media has decreased, potentiallyalteringits affectson approval.Millerand Krosnick (2000) found that trusted media sources were more effective in priming viewers (see also Druckman 2001). Futureresearchmust take these changesinto account. Fourth,most studies have contextualizedapprovalin different ways, resulting in a patchwork of increasinglyrich models thatdo not fit togethereasily.We have surveyedstudies of individual-,group-,and aggregate-levelapproval,some of which focus on economics,otherson dramaticevents, and others on media effects. Future researchwill have to bring togetherthe variousfeaturesof mediabehavior,the economy, events, presidentialdrama, and individuals'predispositions and long-termexpectations.Furthermore,it will have to deal with significantheterogeneityacrossthe public. This work of 509 509 synthesis will prove difficult but is essential for progress towarda generalmodel of approval. Fifth, most studies have ignored problems of simultaneity bias that often creep into analyses of presidential approval and presidential governance. Analyses of single wave surveys certainly suffer from this as individuals may first decide whether they approveof the president'sjob performance,and then use thatjudgment to inform their other responses.In addition,some have arguedthat presidentsare more likely to score legislativevictorieswhen their approval ratings are high, and then these same accomplishments enhance theirapprovalratings(see Ostromand Simon 1985 for an example of dealingwith this issue).20Froma very different direction,Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) argue that the popular view of the presidencyand the polls is backwards. Superficially,it seems like presidents are slaves to public opinion, but Jacobs and Shapiro demonstratethat, in fact, presidentshave a specific politicalagenda,and use the polls as a guide to achieving that agenda. Often thought to be a data issue, these examples show that simultaneityis more broadly an issue of researchdesign and causal interpretations. To date, no simple solution presents itself. It seems that carefulconceptual and theoreticalthinking, along with using a varietyof data sourcesand analyticaltechniques,are the best strategiesavailable. Finally, we think the field would benefit from greater unity in data and measures. We have reviewed a large number of studies and very few of them draw upon the same set of survey data or event series. Each new scholar seemingly builds the dataset anew. Selection of events is especially inconsistent across studies.2' We realize that different substantive questions may call for different operational approaches, but we echo Mueller'sinitial call for developing better measures to capture political realities.A unified event series would save significant labor, ease the temptationto use events to boost model fit, and limit suspicions that others have done so. Further,a unified and available dataset, containing Gallup, Harris, and New York Times polls, would be a boon to the field. In the end, we think much has been gained by 30 years of pushing, refining, and contextualizing the basic arguments Mueller advanced. Our understandingof how and why the economy,events, time, individualcitizens,and individual presidentsaffectapprovalis more rich, realistic,and comprehensive.Future researchmust continue to deepen our understanding,bringingtogetherinsights that currently remainsomewhat in isolation. Doing so will lead to greater 20 21 This particularissue is moot if approvalreally does not affectthe president'spower in congress (e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990). Comparingtwo careful operationalrules for identifying events (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Ostromand Simon 1985; Ostromand Smith 1992) is illustrative.Over the 1953-1988 period that each study examined, the Ostrom, Simon, and Smith strategyidentified 122 events and the Braceand Hinckley strategyidentified 98. Only42 eventswereidentified by bothstrategies,less thanhalf of the eventsidentified.Further,17 of the 42 commonly identified events were coded as affectingapprovalin differentmonths. QUARTERLY RESEARCH POLITICAL POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 510 understanding of that "unfocused" but politically important question of whether individuals approve or disapprove of the president's performance in office (Neustadt 1980: 81). REFERENCES Baum, Matthew A. 2002. "The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon." International Studies Quarterly46: 263-98. Baum,Matthew,and SamuelKerell. 1999. "HasCable Ended the Golden Age of PresidentialTelevision?"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview93 (January):99-114. .2001. "Economic Class and Popular Support for FranklinRooseveltin Warand Peace."PublicOpinionQuarterly 65: 198-229. Beck, Nathaniel. 1991. "ComparingDynamic Specifications:The Case of PresidentialApproval."PoliticalAnalysis3: 51-88. Bond,Jon R., and RichardFleisher. 1990. ThePresidentin the LegislativeArena.Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press. Box-Steffensmeier,Janet M., and Renee M. Smith. 1996. "The Dynamics of AggregatePartisanship."AmericanPoliticalScience Review90 (September):567-80. _ . 1998. "InvestigatingPolitical Dynamics Using Fractional IntegrationMethods."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience42 (April):661-89. Brace,Paul, and BarbaraHinckley. 1992. Followthe Leader:Opinion Pollsand theModernPresidents.New York:BasicBooks. . 1993. "Presidential Activities from Truman through Reagan:Timing and Impact."Journalof Politics55 (2): 382-98. Brody,RichardA. 1991. Assessingthe President:The Media, Elite Opinion,and PublicSupport.Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversity Press. Brody,RichardA., and Benjamin I. Page. 1975. "The Impact of Events on Presidential Popularity:The Johnson and Nixon Administrations."In Aaron Wildavsky,ed., Perspectiveson the Presidency, pp. 136-47. Boston, MA:Little,Brown. Caldeira,GregoryA., and JamesL. Gibson. 1992. "TheEtiologyof Public Support for the Supreme Court."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience36: 635-64. Callaghan,KarenJ., and Simo Virtanen.1993. "RevisedModels of the 'Rally Phenomenon':The Case of the CarterPresidency." Journalof Politics55: 756-64. Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Scott DeMarchi. 2002. "Presidential Approval and Legislative Success." Journal of Politics 64: 491-509. Canes-Wrone,Brandice,and KennethW Shotts. 2002. "TheConditional Nature of PresidentialResponsivenessto Public Opinion." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest PoliticalScience Association,Chicago. Clarke,Harolde D., Jon Rapkin, and MarianneC. Stewart. 1994. "APresidentOut of Work."BritishJournal of PoliticalScience24: 292-305. Clarke, Harold D., and MarianneStewart. 1994. "Prospections, Retrospections,and Rationality:The 'Bankers'Model of Presidential Approval Reconsidered."AmericanJournalof Political Science38: 1104-23. Clarke, Harold D., MarianneC. Stewart,Michael Ault, and Euel Elliott. 2000. "Men,Women and the Dynamics of Presidential Approval."WorkingPaper.Universityof North Texas. andPublicPolicyCohen,JeffreyE. 1997. Presidential Responsiveness Making.Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress. Dawson,MichaelC. 1994. BehindtheMule:RaceandClassin AfricanAmericanPolitics.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress. DeBoef, Suzanna, and Jim Granato. 1997. "Near-IntegratedData and the Analysisof PoliticalRelationships."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience41 (April):619-40 Delli Carpini,MichaelX., and Scott Keeter.1996. WhatAmericans KnowaboutPoliticsand Why it Matters.New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress. Druckman,James. 2001. "On the Limits of FramingEffects:Who Can Frame?" Journalof Politics63: 1041-66. Druckman,JamesN., andJustinW Holmes. 2003. "ThePoliticsof Presidential Approval: How Presidential Rhetoric Affects Approval."Presentedat the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Midwest PoliticalScience Association,Chicago. Durr,RobertH., John B. Gilmour,and ChristinaWolbrecht.1997. "ExplainingCongressionalApproval."AmericanJournalof Political Science41: 175-207. Edwards, George C. 1983. The PublicPresidency.New York: St. Martin'sPress. Edwards,GeorgeC. III,William Mitchell,and Reed Welch. 1995. "ExplainingPresidentialApproval: The Significance of Issue Salience."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience39: 108-34. Edwards,George C. III, and Tami Swenson. 1997. "WhoRallies? The Anatomyof a RallyEvent."Journalof Politics59: 200-12. Edwards,GeorgeC. III,and B. Dan Wood. 1999. "WhoInfluences Whom? The Presidentand the Public Agenda."AmericanPolitical ScienceReview93: 327-44. Erikson, Robert S., Michael MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. TheMacroPolity.New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. Erikson, RobertS., Gerald C. Wright, and John P Mclver. 1993. StatehouseDemocracy:PublicOpinionand Policyin theAmerican States.New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. Fischle, Mark. 2000. "MassResponse to the Lewinsky Scandal: MotivatedReasoning or BayesianUpdating?"PoliticalPsychology 21: 135-59. Freeman,John R., ed. 1992. PoliticalAnalysis,vol. 4. Ann Arbor: Universityof MichiganPress. Gilens, Martin. 1988. "Genderand Support for Reagan:A Comof prehensiveModel of PresidentialApproval."AmericanJournal PoliticalScience32: 19-49. Goidel, RobertK., ToddG. Shields, and MarkPeffley.1997. "Priming Theory and RASModels:Towardan IntegratedPerspective of MediaInfluence."AmericanPoliticsQuarterly35: 287-318. Greene,Steven. 2001. "TheRole of CharacterAssessmentsin PresidentialApproval."AmericanPoliticsResearch29: 196-210. Gronke, Paul W 1999. "Policies, Prototypes, and Presidential Approval."Paperpreparedfor the AnnualMeetingof the American PoliticalScience Association,Atlanta. Gronke,Paul, andJohn Brehm.2002. "History,Heterogeneity,and PresidentialApproval."ElectoralStudies21: 425-52. Gronke,Paul,JeffreyKoch, andJ. MatthewWilson. 2003. "Follow the Leader?PresidentialApproval,PerceivedPresidentialSupport, and Representatives'ElectoralFortunes."Journalof Politics 65: 785-808. Hibbs, Douglas A. Jr., R. Douglas Rivers,and Nicholas Vasilatos. 1982a. "TheDynamicsof PoliticalSupportfor AmericanPresidents Among Occupational and Partisan Groups."American Journalof PoliticalScience26: 312-32. 1982b. "Onthe Demand for Economic Outcomes:Macroeconomic Performance and Mass Political Support in the United States, GreatBritain,and Germany." Journalof Politics, 44: 426-62. FDR FDR TO CLINTON,MUELLER TO?? TO Hibbing,John R., and ElizabethTheiss-Morse.1995. Congressas PublicEnemy:PublicAttitudesTowardsAmericanPublicInstitutions.New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. Holsti, Ole. 1996. PublicOpinionand AmericanForeignPolicy.Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress. Iyengar,Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. News that Matters. Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress. Jacobs,LawrenceR., and RobertY. Shapiro.2000. PoliticiansDon't Pander:PoliticalManipulation and theLossof DemocraticResponsiveness.Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress. James, Patrick, and Rioux, Jean Sebastian. 1998. "International Crises and Linkage Politics: The Experiences of the United States, 1953-1994." PoliticalResearchQuarterly51: 781-812. Kernell,Samuel. 1978. "ExplainingPresidentialPopularity.American PoliticalScienceReview72 (2) June: 506-22. . 1997. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, 3rd ed. Washington,DC: CongressionalQuarterlyPress. Kernell, Samuel, and Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. 1981. "A Critical Threshold Model of Presidential Popularity."In Douglas A. Political Hibbs, Jr. and Heino Fassbender,eds., Contemporary Economy:Studieson theInterdependence of PoliticsandEconomics, pp. 49-71. New York:North-HollandPublishingCompany. Kinder,Donald R. 1981. "Presidents,Prosperity,and Public Opinion." PublicOpinionQuarterly45: 1-21. King, Gary,and Lyn Ragsdale.1988. TheElusiveExecutive.Washington, DC: CongressionalQuarterlyPress. Kovach, Bill, and Tom Rosenstiel. 1999. WarpSpeed.New York: CenturyFoundationPress. Krosnick,Jon A., and LauraA. Brannon.1993. "TheImpactof the GulfWaron the Ingredientsof PresidentialEvaluations:MultidimensionalEffectsof PoliticalInvolvement."AmericanPolitical ScienceReview87: 963-75. Krosnick,Jon A., and Donald Kinder.1990. "Alteringthe Foundations of Supportfor the PresidentThroughPriming."American PoliticalScienceReview84: 497-512. Lowi, Theodore. 1985. ThePersonalPresident.Ithaca,NY:Cornell UniversityPress. MacKuen,Michael. 1983. "PoliticalDrama,Economic Conditions, and the Dynamics of PresidentialPopularity." AmericanJournal of PoliticalScience27: 165-92. MacKuen, Michael, Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson. 1992. "Peasantsor Bankers?The AmericanElectorateand the U.S. Economy"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview86: 596-611. _. 1996. "Presidents and the Prospective Year: Comment." Journalof Politics58: 793-801. Miller,ArthurH. 1999. "Sex,Politics, and Public Opinion: What Political Scientists Really Learnedfrom the Clinton-Lewinsky Scandal."PS:PoliticalScienceand Politics32: 721-29. Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. 2000. "News Media Impacton the Ingredientsof PresidentialEvaluation:Politically Knowledgeable Citizens are Guided by a Trusted Source." AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience44: 295-309. Monroe, Kristen R. 1978. "EconomicInfluences on Presidential Popularity."PublicOpinionQuarterly42: 360-69. Monroe,KristenR., and Dona MetcalfLaughlin.1983. "Economic Influenceson PresidentialPopularityAmong Key Politicaland Socioeconomic Groups:A Review of the Evidence and Some New Findings."PoliticalBehavior5: 309-45. Mueller,John. 1970. "Presidential PopularityfromTrumanto Johnson." TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview64 (1) March:18-34. . 1973. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. Lanham, MD: UniversityPress of America. 511 Mutz, Diana C. 1992. "MassMedia and the Depoliticization of Personal Experiences." AmericanJournal of Political Science 36: 483-508. .1994. "ContextualizingPersonal Experience:The Role of the Mass Media."Journalof Politics56: 689-714. Nadeau, Richard,RichardG. Niemi, David P Fan, and Timothy Amato. 1999. "Elite Economic Forecasts, Economic News, Mass EconomicJudgements, and PresidentialApproval."Journal of Politics61: 109-35. Neustadt, Richard. 1980. PresidentialPower, 2nd ed. New York: Wiley Newman, Brian.2002. "BillClinton'sApprovalRatings:The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same." Presidential ResearchQuarterly55: 781-804. .2003. Standardsof Judgment:The Foundationsof Presidents' PopularSupport.Ph.D. Dissertation,Duke University Newman, Brian,and CharlesW Ostrom,Jr.2002. "ExplainingSeat Changesin the US House of Representatives:1950-1998." LegislativeStudiesQuarterly27: 383-405. Norpoth, Helmut. 1996. "Presidentsand the ProspectiveVoter." Journalof Politics58: 776-92. Norpoth, Helmut, and Thom Yantek.1983. "MacroeconomicConditions and Fluctuationof PresidentialPopularity:The Question of LaggedEffects."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience27: 785-807. Ostrom,CharlesW.,Jr. and BrianL.Job. 1986. "ThePresidentand the PoliticalUse of Force."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview80: 541-66. Ostrom,CharlesW, Jr. and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. "Promiseand Performance:A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity." AmericanPoliticalScienceReview79: 334-358. .1988. "ThePresident'sPublic."AmericanJournalof Political Science32: 1096-1119. 1989. "The Man in the Teflon Suit? The Environmental Connection, Political Drama, and Popular Support in the ReaganPresidency"PublicOpinionQuarterly53: 353-87. Ostrom, CharlesW, Jr., and Renee M. Smith. 1992. "ErrorCorrection, Attitude Persistence,and ExecutiveRewardsand Punishments:A BehavioralModel of PresidentialApproval,"Political Analysis4: 127-83. Paldam,Martin,and Peter Nannestad. 1994. "TheVP Function:A Surveyof the Literatureon Voteand PopularityFunctionsAfter 25 Years."PublicChoice79: 213-45. Patterson,Samuel C., RandallB. Ripley,and Stephen V Quinlan. 1992. Citizens'OrientationsTowardLegislatures:Congressand the State Legislatures."WesternPoliticalQuarterly45: 315-38. Peffley,Mark,Ronald E. Langley,and RobertKirbyGoidel. 1995. "PublicResponses to the PresidentialUse of MilitaryForce:A PanelAnalysis."PoliticalBehavior17: 307-37. TheWhiteHouseand Peterson,MarkA. 1990. LegislatingTogether: to Reagan.Cambridge,MA:Harvard CapitolHillfromEisenhower UniversityPress. Ragsdale,Lyn. 1984. "ThePolitics of PresidentialSpeechmaking, 1949-1980." AmericanPoliticalScienceReview78: 971-84. .1987. "PresidentialSpeechmaking and the Public Audience: Individual Presidents and Group Attitudes."Journalof Politics49: 704-36. .1998. Vital Statisticson the PresidencyWashington, DC: CongressionalQuarterlyPress. Rivers,Douglas, and Nancy L. Rose. 1985. "Passingthe President's Program:Public Opinion and PresidentialInfluence in Congress."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience29: 183-96. QUARTERLY RESEARCH POLITICAL RESEARCH POLITICAL QUARTERLY 512 Rohde, David W, and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. "Presidential Vetoes and CongressionalResponse:A Study in Institutional Conflict."AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience29: 397-427. Rozell, MarkJ., and Clyde Wilcox, eds. 1999. "Scandaland Government:Currentand FutureImplicationsof the Clinton Presidency A Symposium"PS:PoliticalScienceandPolitics32: 538-61. Shah, DhavanV, MarkD. Watts,David Domke, and David P Fan. 2002. "NewsFramingand Cueing of Issue Regimes:Explaining Clinton'sPublic Approvalin Spite of Scandal."PublicOpinion Quarterly66: 339-70. Sigelman, Lee. 1979. "PresidentialPopularity and Presidential Elections."PublicOpinionQuarterly43: 532-34. Simon, Dennis M., and CharlesW Ostrom,Jr. 1989. "TheImpact of Televised Speeches and Foreign Travel on Presidential Approval."PublicOpinionQuarterly53: 58-82. Sniderman,Paul. 1993. The New Lookin PublicOpinion Research. In Ada Finifter,ed., PoliticalScience:TheStateof theDisciplineII. Washington,DC: AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation. Stimson,JamesA. 1976. "PublicSupportforAmericanPresidents." PublicOpinionQuarterly40: 1-21. Tatalovich,Raymond,and Alan R. Gitelson. 1990. "PoliticalParty Linkagesto PresidentialPopularity:Assessing the 'Coalitionof Minorities'Thesis."Journalof Politics52: 234-42. Tedin, Kent. 1986. "Changeand Stabilityin PresidentialPopularity at the IndividualLevel."PublicOpinionQuarterly40: 1-21. Waterman,RichardW, RobertWright,and GilbertSt. Clair.1999. TheImage-is-Everything Presidency:Dilemmasin AmericanLeadership.Boulder,CO: WestviewPress. Weisman,StevenR. 1984. "Canthe MagicPrevail?"NewYorkTimes Magazine29 April, pp. 38-56. West, DarrellM. 1991. "Televisionand PresidentialPopularityin America."BritishJournalof PoliticalScience21: 199-214. Wood, B. Dan. 2000. "WeakTheories and ParameterInstability: Using Flexible Least Squares to Take Time VaryingRelationof PoliticalScience44: 603-18. ships Seriously."AmericanJournal Zaller,John R. 1992. TheNatureand Originsof MassOpinion.New York:CambridgeUniversityPress. . 1998. "MonicaLewinsky'sContribution to Political Science."PS:PoliticalScienceand Politics33: 182-89. Received: March 11, 2003 Accepted for Publication: March 18, 2003 gronke@reed.edu bpn@duke.edu