University of Utah
FDR to Clinton, Mueller to ?: A Field Essay on Presidential Approval
Author(s): Paul Gronke and Brian Newman
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 501-512
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FIELDESSAY
FDR to Clinton, Mueller to ?:
A Field Essay on Presidential Approval
PAUL GRONKE, REEDCOLLEGE
BRIAN NEWMAN, DUKEUNIVERSITY
Since the 1930s, polling organizations have asked Americans whether they "approveor disapprove of the job
[the incumbent]is doing as president."In the early 1970s, John Muellerstartedan academicindustryby
askingwhatdrivestheseevaluations.Americanpoliticsand the tools availableto examineit havechangeddramaticallysince then, inspiringa burstof researchon presidentialapprovalin the 1990s. We reviewthis new
body of literature,arguing that it builds on but differs importantly from earlier approval studies. Since Mueller's
writing,scholarshave expandedhis relativelysimplemodel, takingaccountof presidents'goalsand personal
otherpoliticalactors,the ubiquitousmedia,and an inattentivepublic.We describethreewaves
characteristics,
of research,focusingon the most recentwave. We suggestthat history,along with new intellectualcurrents,
data,and methodshave enabledeach wave to incorporatemore of political,social,and psychologicalreality.
Finally,we identifythe issues most likelyto motivatepresidentialapprovalresearchfor the next ten years.
study of the Americanpresidency,RichardNeustadt (1980:
81, n. 9) arguedthat reportsof these ratings"arevery widely
read in Washington"and are "widelytaken to approximate
reality."Higher approvalratings tend to pay off electorally,
both for the president and for his party in Congress
(Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003; Newman and Ostrom
2002; Sigelman 1979) and also affectthe president'spolicymaking goals, legislativestrategy,and success in promoting
his agenda.2
The American political universe has undergone important changes since the early 1970s, and the presidencyhas
not been immune. The office of the president has endured
two majorcrises. RichardNixon resigned, almost certainto
be impeached, and left office with 24 percent approval.
William Jefferson Clinton was impeached, yet ended his
second term with a 64 percent approvalrating, the highest
final ratingon record.In addition, presidentialapprovalhas
become increasinglyvolatile. One President Bush experienced almost universal acclaim after the first Gulf War,
only to watch this support whither by over 50 percentage
points in a matterof months. A second PresidentBush was
the 1930s, the Gallup organization began asking
Americans "do you approve or disapprove of the way
[the incumbent] is handling his job as president?"Since
then, the question has been asked "withtenacious regularity" (Mueller 1973: 196). In the early 1970s, John Mueller
(1970, 1973) sparked something of a political science
movement when he treatedthe Gallupapprovalratingsas a
dependent variable. Coalitions of minorities, rallying
aroundthe flag, economic decline, and war,Muellerargued,
drove changes in approvalover time.
Since then, scholarly studies of presidential approval
have been almost equally tenacious and regular.In fact, a
conservative estimate finds over 70 books, articles, and
chapters that attempt to explain approval ratings.' The
attention is well placed. In the era of "the public relations
presidency"(Braceand Hinckley 1993: 382), approvalratings play a critical role in presidentialpolitics. The president's performancein this "new referendum"(Brace and
Hinckley 1992: 18) is a key to understandingpresidential
power in the postwar era (Neustadt 1980). In his classic
In
The actualnumberis certainlyhigher.We included only a subset of these
studiesin the bibliography.We apologizein advancefor the many books,
articles,and workingpapersthatwe have omitteddue to spacerestrictions.
2
NOTE: An earlierversion of this articlewas presentedat the 2000 Annual
Meeting of the AmericanPolitical Science Association,Washington, D.C. The authors thank Matt Baum, RichardBrody,Harold
Clarke,JeffreyCohen, RobertEisinger,ConstantineSpiliotes, and
anonymous reviewers for their comments and CarrieLiken and
Jennifer Merolla for their researchassistance. This researchwas
supported in part by the National Science Foundation SBR9730854, the NSF Research Experiences for Undergraduates
(REU)program,and the Stillman-DrakeFund at Reed College.
PoliticalResearchQuarterly,Vol. 56, No. 4 (December2003): pp. 501-512
501
These claims are established in the voluminous literatureon elections,
presidentialapproval,and presidentialleadership.Four recent volumes
include Brody (1991), Braceand Hinckley (1992), Kernell(1997), and
Kingand Ragsdale(1988). On how popularityaffectslegislativestrategy,
see Canes-Wroneand Shotts (2002); on legislativesuccess, see CanesWrone and de Marchi (2002). Additional treatments include Kernell
(1997); Peterson (1990); Rivers and Rose (1985); Rohde and Simon
(1985). Many argue that those effects are variableand not always substantial (e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990; Cohen 1997). We consider the
debate over approval'sinfluence on Americanpolitics a significanttopic,
one that makes studying approvalas a dependent variablemeaningful.
However,we cannot do this topicjustice in the space providedand focus
on literaturetaking presidentialapprovalas the dependent variable.
502
502
POLITICAL
RESEARCH
RESEARCH
QUARTERLY
POLITICAL
QUARTERLY
catapulted to 90 percent approvaljust after the terrorist
attacks of September 11th and retained remarkablyhigh
approvalfor more than a year afterwards.Further,the "avalanche of opinion polls"(Jacobsand Shapiro2000, xi) provides an almost daily renderingof the president'sapproval
rating. During the Lewinsky scandal, for instance, John
Zaller(1998) examined more than 30 differentpolls over a
20 day period, all of which dealt with Clinton'sjob performance. Presidents'private polling has also dramatically
increased, as has scholarly attention to these activities
(Jacobsand Shapiro2000).
In the academicworld, new analyticaltools have shaped
approvalstudies. Longer time series have provided greater
leverage on comparisons across administrations. Rich
datasetsderived from presidentialarchiveshave provided a
farmore detailedtreatmentof presidentialagendas.Increasingly sophisticated analytical methods have been introduced and applied to these new datasources, as well as provided a fresh look at the traditionalGallupseries.
Scholarly scrutiny of the presidency and presidential
approvalhas intensifiedin response to these developments
and especiallyin reactionto the GeorgeH. W Bushand Clinton presidencies.What has not occurred,however,is a comprehensiveoverviewand criticalexaminationof the literature
during this same period. We providethis here. We tracethe
developmentof the study of presidentialapprovalover the
last 30 years, from Muellerthrough the present. We argue
that by and large,students of approvalhave taken Mueller's
self-described"ratheraustererepresentationof a presumably
complex process"and put it into a richer context, taking
account of presidents' goals and personal characteristics,
other political actors, the ubiquitous media, and a public
made up of generallyinattentivecitizens (1973: 217-18). We
describethreewavesof research,but focus on the most recent
wave, which has emergedover the past decade.3We suggest
thathistory,new intellectualcurrentsfromthe broaderpublic
opinion field, and new data and methods have enabledeach
wave to take more of political,social, and psychologicalreality into account. Finally,we identifythe questions and puzzles which are most likely to motivatepresidentialapproval
researchfor the next ten years.
THE THREEWAVES OF APPROVALRESEARCH
the quarter century since. Despite his sparse and selfdescribed "irreverent"
approach, Mueller anticipatedmany
of the ways his model would be extended, refined, and
enriched.Analytically,he tried to account for the seemingly
inevitable decline in approvalover each presidentialterm.
He arguedthat this was most likely the result of a "coalition
of minorities"that builds during an administrationas the
president is forced to act on controversialissues, consequently alienatinggroups of real or potentialsupporters.He
operationalizedthe "coalitionof minorities"thesis simply as
time in office. Second, he noticed that approval increases
during foreign crises, the "rally round the flag" effect.4
Muellerwas the first,but certainlynot the last, to realizethat
measuringrallyevents is fraughtwith difficultyTo resistthe
temptation to find a rally point to match every bump in
approval, fitting the model to sample data, he adopted a
priori criteriafor rally events, a recommendationthat has
been followed irregularlysince.5Third, Muellerarguedthat
"aneconomy in slump harmsa president'spopularity,but an
economy that is improvingdoes not seem to help his rating"
(1973: 215).6 Finally,given his interest in public opinion
during wartime, he included dummy variables for the
KoreanWarand Vietnamconflict. Ultimately,he found that
all of these variablessignificantlyaffectedapproval.7
When Mueller initially estimated his model, only the
time variable was statisticallyor substantively significant.
The expected relationships with war, the economy, and
other rally events appearedonly once he added a dummy
variable for each administration(or a presidency-specific
time counter). This simple finding turns out to be a fundamental issue in the study of approvalratings and in presidency research generally:how do we resolve the tension
between elegantmodels that capturesystematicforcesactive
across presidencies and the harsh empirical realities of
importantidiosyncraticfeaturesthat characterizeindividual
presidents? Mueller'sposition on this debate is clear: he
claimedthat "anyanalysisofpresidential
popularitycannotrely
variables..
the
on
[substantive]
., but mustalso incorentirely
to
the
allow
for
specialcharacterof
porateparametersdesigned
each administration"(1973: 222, italics in original). He
embracedwhat he considered the more empiricallyplausible model, taking into account idiosyncratic and unmeasured effects of each presidencywith the lament "so much
for beauty"(ibid.).
TheFirstWave-Muellerand Reactions
The first wave of researchconsists of Mueller'swork and
immediatereactionsto it. Mueller'sinitial article(1970) and
his elaborationon it in his book (1973: chs. 9-10) identified
much of the agenda that has occupied approvalstudies in
3 Naturally,breakingthe literatureinto three waves oversimplifiesreality
and draws sharp boundaries where they do not exist. Many pieces fit
imperfectlyin this structure,anticipatingnew trendsor hearkeningback
to earlierquestions and methods. We offerthis view of the literaturenot
so much as a mutuallyexclusive and exhaustivecategoricalanalysis,but
as a bit of intellectualhistory and an organizingframework.
Muellercites KennethWaltzas the originatorof the idea that the public
will "rallybehind their chief executive"(1973: 208) duringcrises, but he
is the first to our knowledge to use the term "rallyround the flag"to
describeit. As best we can tell, the term comes from a well-known Civil
War song.
5 Events had to be
international,to involve the U.S. and particularlythe
president directly,and to be "specific,dramatic,and sharply focused"
(1973: 209).
6 However, he honestly notes that coding his economic variable so that
only increasesin unemploymentand not decreasescould affectapproval
was "theonly way the data can be made to come out 'right"'(1973: 215).
7 Mueller found that approvaldeclined during the KoreanWar,but not
significantlyduring the Vietnamconflict.
4
FDRTO CLINTON,
CLiNTON,MUELLERTO
TO??
FDR
Although his final model explained 86 percent of the
variancein approval,Muellerpointed to severalpuzzles and
paths for future research.First, he suggested that the rally
variablecould be expanded (1973: 238). He experimented
with a domestic rally variable,a variabletapping scandals,
and splitting events into positive and negative categories.
Although he found these experiments unfruitful, he suggested that "more precise social, political, and economic
indicatorscan be sought"(1970: 33). Second, he suggested
that greaterattention to individual presidents might prove
beneficial.Eisenhower'sapprovaldid not fit the coalition-ofminorities thesis and Mueller conjectured that something
about him in particularmay account for the finding. He
argued, tongue in cheek, that "ifa presidentwants to leave
office a popularman, he should either (1) be Dwight Eisenhower, or (2) resignthe day afterinauguration"(1973: 233).
He suggested that taking account of individual presidents'
attributes,like their style, integrity,competence, and "personal warmth,"might explain the Eisenhowerphenomenon
and other differencesacross administrations(1973: 233).
He also suggested that future research examine different
economic indicators,group differences,other officeholders,
and executives in other countries.8Finally,he points out
that serial correlationplagues his analyses, noting that the
Durbin-Watsonstatistic "reachedat best only about .70"
(1973: 233, n. 28). Impressively,subsequent researchhas
taken up all of these puzzles, problems, and suggestions.
The initial reactionsto Mueller'swork fill out the rest of
the first wave. The two main reactions both addressed
Mueller's"coalitionsof minorities"thesis, or more specifically, what it means to include a time counter in a timeseries context. Stimson (1976) agreed that approval was
trended, but argued that it drifted downwardquadratically
rather than linearly.Thus, approvalimmediately declines,
but eventually bottoms out and near the end of the term
approval rises again (although not to its original level).
Stimson gave this decline a differentsubstantiveinterpretation. He argued that it results from relativelyuninformed
citizens having exaggeratedexpectations of the president
after a successful election campaign, and their inevitable
disappointmentafterthe president took office. The end-ofterm boost, Stimson believed, simply indicates another
build up of expectationsas the reelectioncampaignbegins.9
In sharp contrast,Kernell(1978: 521) rejectedthe view
that time dominates approval and argued instead for the
impact of "real events and conditions." Time, Kemell
8
We will not reviewthe extensiveliteratureon executiveapprovalin other
countries,but point to Paldamand Nannestad(1994) for a review.Several
studiesexamineapprovalof Congress(e.g., Durr,Gilmour,and Wolbrecht
1997), the SupremeCourt(e.g., Caldeiraand Gibson 1992), statelegislatures (Patterson,Ripleyand Quinlan 1992), and governorsand senators
(see a special issue of State Politics& PolicyQuarterlyedited by Niemi,
Beyle,and Sigelman(vol.2, no.3, Fall 2002) for six articles).
9 Mueller outlined almost identical disillusionment reasoning for the
decay of approvalover time, but ultimatelyargued that the coalition of
minoritiesexplanationfit the data best.
503
503
argued, "as a variable has no inherent meaning" and is
simply a convenient statistical shorthand for real world
forces, such as the economy, wars, Watergate,and international events (508). After operationalizingthese factors in
ways that "reflectmore reasonableassumptions about the
world," he found approvalresponds to events and conditions ratherthan the marchof time (521). Similarly,Monroe
(1978) argued that Stimson underestimatedthe effects of
economic variablesvia the use of a time counter.She found
that when inflation and militaryexpendituresare included
in the model, and their effects estimated in appropriately
nuanced ways, approvalreactsto these "realworld"indicators. Both articlestied approvalto elements of the political
and economic context and sought to measureand estimate
their effectson approvalmore realistically,effortsthat would
continue in laterwaves.
TheSecondWave-Advancementsin Specification
and Estimation
The second wave of research,published in the early to
mid-1980s, took up many of the themes outlined in the first
wave, attempting to specify more realistically the links
between the economy,politicalevents, and approval.Scholars used more sophisticated time series techniques in an
effort to determinewhether the effects Mueller and others
observedwere real or just artifacts.They tried to determine
how long rally events (MacKuen1983) and economic conditions affect approval (e.g., Norpoth and Yantek 1983).
These efforts spurred methodological debates as scholars
offered differentmodel specificationsand disagreed about
the durationof effects,appropriatelag structures,functional
forms, and estimation techniques. Not surprisingly, the
period saw a significantadvance in the technical nature of
the field and many took note of the substantiveimplications
of different statistical approaches (see Ostrom and Smith
1992 and Beck 1991 for summaries of differentmethods
and their implications).10
Arguments about the duration of various effects were
importantbecause the question holds substantiveimplications. If effectshave a relativelyshort duration,approvalat
any given time depends mostly on recent conditions, a
"whathave you done for me lately"assessmentratherthan
a long-term summary evaluation. If effects are more
durable, past conditions contribute to overall evaluations,
making it more difficult to change approval and to use
approvalat any give time as an indicatorof the public'sreaction to recent actions (MacKuen1983).
In addition, scholars in the second wave responded to
Mueller'scall for a more nuanced treatmentof events. Many
examined the effects of election campaigns, speeches and
10 It is
interesting to note that approval models have often been at the
methodologicalfrontierin political science. Although immediatelydiscardedin favorof more advancedmethods, Mueller(1970) points out
that his use of multiple regressionwas relativelyrarein politicalscience.
504
504
other public appearances, domestic crises, significant
domestic policy accomplishments, scandals and other
events involving the presidentpersonally,such as the assassination attemptagainstReagan(see especially Ostrom and
Simon 1985 and MacKuen1983). They found that domestic events affect approval and that events could boost or
depress approval.ll
Two important theoretical developments mark the
second wave. In both cases, Mueller'sinitial ideas were put
into richer political context. First, scholars began to take
account of presidents' incentives to gain and maintain
approval. Although presidents may have limited control
over the economy,they have both the power and the incentive to create dramaticsymbolic events such as speeches,
trips, legislative proposals, or even international engagements that boost approval(Ostromand Job 1986; Ragsdale
1984; but see Simon and Ostrom 1989). By paying more
explicit attention to the president'sincentive structureand
the public'sattractionto drama,second wave studies made
these models significantlymore political and realistic.
Second, some scholars began to think more explicitly
about approvalat the individual-level.For example, Kerell
and Hibbs (1981) and Hibbs, Rivers,and Vasilitos(1982a,
1982b) wrestledwith the consequencesof the way approval
ratings are typically conceptualizedand constructed.They
took seriouslythe factthatapprovalratingsareaggregations
of
individualopinionsratherthan the opinion of an aggregate.
Although data limitations often constrained second wave
studies to analyzingaggregatedata ratherthan modeling the
individual-levelresponsesdirectly,some scholarsbuilt explicitly micro-level theories and tested their implications for
aggregateapproval(e.g., Ostrom and Simon 1985; but see
Kinder1981 and Tedin 1986 for two analysesof individuallevel data). Conceptualizingapprovalas an aggregationof
individual opinions led some analysts to consider whether
differentpartisanor class groupsemployeda differentmix of
considerationswhen evaluatingthe president (Tedin 1986;
Hibbs, Rivers,and Vasilitos1982a). Regardless,the distinctive featureof the second wave was an elaborationof the statistical technology used to estimate aggregate models of
approval.This wave culminatedwith severaldefinitivestatements, MacKuen's(1983) treatment of "politicaldrama,"
Hibbs, Rivers,and Vasilitos'(1982a, 1982b) analysisof the
economic underpinnings of approval, and Ostrom and
Simon's(1985) comprehensivemodel of approvaland legislativesuccess. Littlemore needed to be said.
By the mid-1980s, then, the presidentialapprovalfield
had reached something of a standstill. Continued progress
was being made, particularlyas carefully conceived data
collection effortsand increasinglysophisticatedattentionto
design and method enrichedour knowledge of the determinants of approval.However,Mueller'soriginalclaims largely
drove the intellectualagenda.
11Competingevent coding schemes, however,became a continuingpoint
of controversy,which we discuss below.
QUARTERLY
POLITICAL
RESEARCH
TheThirdWave-Media, Elites,Individuals,
Public
and a Heterogeneous
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, presidentialapproval
studies experienceda renaissance,largelyin response to the
"new look" approachto public opinion (Sniderman1993).
The new look emphasizes the explicit efforts of politicians,
parties, and other elites to shape and change political attitudes and behavior. Reflecting the new look perspective,
scholarsthought beyond the usual theoreticalsuspects, and
considered how the media stand as an intervening force
between presidentsand the public, and how elite discourse
about events and conditions shape public attitudes. This
most recent wave of researchalso wrestleswith heterogeneity, explicitly modeling group- and individual-levelvariations in approval.
AlthoughBrodyand Page (1975) cited media coverageas
a significantinfluence on approval,this insight was seldom
exploited until recently,when scholars emphasized media's
capacity to shape individual reactions to events and economic conditions, therebyaffectingaggregateapproval(e.g.,
Nadeau et al. 1999; Goidel, Shields, and Peffley1997; Mutz
1992, 1994; West 1991). Brody(1991) provided the clearest statementof the way media content shapes approvalratings. He constructed a media-based reinterpretationof
empirical regularities like honeymoon periods and rally
events (see also Callaghanand Virtanen1993), arguingthat
public reactions to events and new presidents were best
understood via a two-step process, as events are first interpretedand evaluatedamong opinion elites, then these interpretationsand assessmentsare transmittedto the public via
the mass media. For example, Brody argued that honeymoon periods result from an overwhelminglypositive balance of media coverageat the beginning of a term as most
elites tend to offer little criticism, withholding judgment
until the president begins to take controversial actions.
Once this happens, opponents offer criticism,media coverage becomes more negative, and public support falls as a
result. He explained the rally phenomenon similarly.
One psychological process by which media coverage
influences public attitudes-priming-has also become an
important part of the approval literature. According to
Miller and Krosnick (2000: 301), "primingoccurs when
media attention to an issue causes people to place special
weight on it when constructingevaluationsof overallpresidential job performance."The notion of priming rests on
the claim that when individualsmake a choice, they rely on
salient and accessible information.This tends to be information emphasized"bythe prevailingeconomic, social, and
political conditions of the time,"which in turn are generally
portrayedvia mass media (Krosnickand Kinder1990: 500;
see also Iyengarand Kinder1987).
Mediacoveragecan changethe ingredientsof presidential
support by making some considerations more salient or
accessiblethan others (Iyengarand Kinder1987) and salient
considerationsaffect approval more than other considerations do (Edwards,Mitchell,and Welch 1995). For example,
FDR TO
TO CLINTON,
CLINTON, MUELLER
MUELLER TO
TO??
FDR
Krosnickand Kinder(1990) found that opinions about foreign affairshad greaterinfluence on approvalin the wake of
Iran-Contrarevelations. Similarly,Krosnick and Brannon
(1993) found that evaluationsof Bush'shandling of foreign
affairshad greaterinfluence on overallevaluationsafterthe
GulfWarthan they had previously(see also Goidel, Shields,
and Peffley1997; Peffley,Langley,and Goidel 1995).
The primingliteratureraisesan importantquestion:does
the public hold constant expectations of presidents over
time? In statistical terms, does one model account for
approvalat all times? Mueller initially raised this question
and concluded that models must take the idiosyncrasiesof
each presidentinto account. However,Mueller,like almost
all afterhim, estimateda single coefficientfor events and the
economy,assumingthat their effectsdid not vary over time.
Some argue explicitly that the public holds stable expectations across presidencies. Ostrom and Simon (1985: 336)
argue that "all presidents are expected to maintain peace,
prosperity,domestic tranquility,and both the authorityand
integrity of the office" (emphasis added). On the other
hand, the priming literaturefinds that they can vary with
current conditions. New estimation techniques that allow
for time varying coefficients(Wood 2000) or data sets that
pool cross sections over time (Gronke1999) may help solve
this puzzle.
History also raises this question on occasion. For example, despite enduring "the worst recession since the Great
Depression,"a foray into Beirut that cost 265 American
lives, a host of scandalsinvolving appointees, and the IranContraAffair,Reagan'sapprovalremainedhigh, resultingin
claims that "heis The Manin the TeflonSuit;nothing sticks
to him" (Weisman 1984: 39). It seemed that the conventional wisdom regardingpublic approvalno longer applied.
Similarly,flying in the face of researchfinding that approval
declines in response to scandal (e.g., Norpoth 1996; Ragsdale 1987; Ostromand Simon 1985), Bill Clinton'sapproval
remained high during and after the Lewinskyscandal and
impeachment, again suggesting that he was evaluated by
differentcriteria.The spectacularrise and fall of Bush the
elder'sapprovalafter the Gulf War and his son's dramatic
and long lastingboost afterSeptember11 also seem to challenge general explanation. Can a single model account for
all these presidencies?
Remarkably,the answerseems to be "yes."The same factors that accounted for variations in approval from 1948
through 1980 continue to operateboth before and after.For
example, Ostromand Simon (1989) found that Reaganwas
not made of Teflon after all. The elder Bush'sapprovalfollowed expected patterns (Clarke, Rapkin, and Stewart
1994). Clinton'sapproval fits well within the findings of
extant research(Newman 2002). Baum and Kerell (2001)
even found that the standardset of indicators account for
public approvalof FranklinRoosevelt.At least some factors
consistently affect approvalacross a wide variety of conditions and presidencies.
Beyond paying greater attention to media and elites,
scholarsin the third wave explicitlyincorporatedaspects of
505
the mass public into their models, including individuals'
own assessmentsof the politicaland economic environment
ratherthan objectiveindicatorsof those environments.This
marks a significant departure from the first two waves,
which relied on aggregateand objective measures. Several
studies, including Brody's,unpack the public's reaction to
rally events, examining exactly who rallies-what types of
people change from disapproval to approval. They find
much more than blind patriotismis behind rallies.12In fact,
panel studies with waves sandwiching a rally event
(Edwardsand Swenson 1997; Peffley,Langley,and Goidel
1995) and time series analyses disaggregatedby partisanship and education (Baum 2002; James and Rioux 1998)
find that individual-levelpredispositions and attention to
media coverage of events shape attitudes toward the event
and the president.13
Many have taken a similar approach to study the link
between economic conditions and approval. Rather than
measuringaggregateresponses to objective economic indicators, studies examined perceptions of the economy and
their links to presidential approval (e.g., Norpoth 1996;
Clarkeand Stewart 1994; MacKuen,Erikson, and Stimson
1992). Manyof the majordisputes in this period shift from
the correctstatisticalspecificationof the effectsof the economy to the correctpsychologicalfoundationsof the way the
public thinks about the economy. Most notably, scholars
sparredover whether individualsare "peasantsor bankers,"
relying on retrospectiveor prospective assessments of economic conditions when evaluatingthe president (Norpoth
1996; Clarke and Stewart 1994; MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson 1992, 1996).
These studies posited differentviews of how individuals
connect their perceptionsof the economy to evaluationsof
the president.One side arguesthat the public, in the aggregate, acts remarkablysophisticated,punishing or rewarding
presidentsbased on its expectationsof futureeconomic performance (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992).
Although a sophisticated public defies mountains of
research(Delli Carpiniand Keeter 1996), MacKuen,Erikson, and Stimson argue that the public lets economic
expertsmake forecasts,which media sourcesbroadcast,and
the attentive portion of the public responds, adjusting
approvalin line with expectations.On the other side, scholars argue that the public evaluatescurrentand past conditions, punishing or rewarding the president accordingly
(Norpoth 1996; Clarke and Stewart 1994). As Norpoth
(1996: 777) put it, "therequirementsfor that kind of behavior are far more modest regardingboth the averagecitizens'
capabilities and motivations to follow politics." Although
12
13
See Edwards(1983) and Hibbs, Rivers,and Vasililtos(1982a) for earlier examinationsof partisandifferencesin response to Watergateand
rally events.
In additionto disaggregatingapprovalby partisanship,Jamesand Rioux
(1998) furtherenrich the study of the rally phenomenon by incorporating insights from international relations theory and taking into
account the costs of reactionsto internationalcrises.
506
the precisenatureof the links between economic elites, economic news, mass perceptionsof the economy,and evaluations of the presidentremainunder debate (e.g., Nadeau et
al. 1999), explicitly specifying these links is a significant
step forward.All sides of the debateoffera richerview of the
American public than that offered in early studies of
approval.Ratherthan models of a public that almost mechanistically responds to economic conditions, these works
offer more explicit models of the public'sinteractionwith
the economic and media environment.
In addition to taking perceptionsof rally events and the
economy into account, several studies incorporatedmicrofoundationsin a more direct way-they estimatedindividual-level models. Although studying approvalat the individual-level differs significantly from the aggregate,
discovering that individual-level analyses largely corroborate the findings of aggregate-levelstudies lends credenceto
our general understanding of approval. Individual-level
studies consistentlyconclude that economic conditions and
perceptionspowerfully affect approval(e.g., Gronke 1999;
Gilens 1988; Ostrom and Simon 1988), as do assessments
of the way presidentshave handled significantinternational
and domestic crises, i.e., rally events (e.g., Greene 2001;
Edwards and Swenson 1997; Peffley,Langley,and Goidel
1995). We expect continued effortsto compare and bridge
individualand aggregatemodels of approval.
Beyond corroboratingaggregate-levelfindings, however,
individual-levelstudieshavepointedto importantfactorsthat
affectapproval,which aggregatestudies cannot isolate.First,
these studies arebetterable to takepredispositionslike partisanshipinto account(Fischle2000). The unsurprisingeffects
of partisanshiphave importantimplications.The weakening
of partisanties among the public, ties that stabilizeindividuals' evaluations,may have made aggregateapproval more
volatile over time and individualevaluationsmore uncertain
at any given time (Gronkeand Brehm2002; Gronke 1999).
Second, individual-levelstudies find that policy attitudes
affectapproval(e.g., Gronke1999; Gilens 1988; see Erikson,
MacKuen,and Stimson 2002 for a discussion of policy attitudes and approvalat the aggregatelevel). Third,individuallevel studies point to the significantrole assessmentsof the
president'scompetence and integrityplay in overallevaluations (e.g., Newman 2003; Greene2001).
Individuallevel theorizingalso highlightssignificantheterogeneity within the public, raising the possibility that
variableshave differenteffects on differentsegments of the
population. This is hardly a new idea, as Muellerdisaggregated approvalby partisanshipin his book (1973: ch. 10;
see also Monroeand Laughlin1983 and Hibbs, Rivers,and
Vasilitos1982a). However,thereseems to be renewedattention to differences across the public as recent work has
examined heterogeneity across gender, racial, and party
groups, across informationlevels, and at the level of individual attitudes.
Examininggroup differencesin approvalprovides three
important insights that aggregatestudies easily overlook.
First, studies examining group differencescan point to the
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sources of those differencesand how these differencesrelate
to the politicaland social positions that these groupsoccupy
in Americansociety (Newman 2003). Groupdifferencescan
result from two sources, differencesin the levelsof the independent variables(e.g. blacksmay perceive,or experience,a
differenteconomy than whites) or differencesin the weights
that they attach to variables,or both. For example, in their
individual-level studies of approval by men and women,
Gilens (1988) and Newman (2003) conclude differencesin
attitudes(levels of independentvariables)explainedmuch of
the "approvalgender gap." However, Gilens (1988) also
found thatwomen weighed theirmoreliberaldefensespending views moreheavilywhen evaluatingthe President(in this
case, Reagan) than did men. Furthermore,Clarke et al.
(2000) found that approvalamong men responds more to
pocketbook considerations,while approvalamong women
respondsmore to sociotropicassessments.
Other studies similarly find that independent variables
have differenteffects across differentgroups. For example,
Ostrom and Simon (1988), using three panel waves in
1980, found that news coverage of the Iran Hostage Crisis
droveDemocrats'approval,inflationwas the strongestinfluence on Republicans' assessments, and unemployment
influenced independents. Others have found differential
reactions across income and partisan groups (Baum and
Kernell2001; Ragsdale1987), while Dawson (1994) found
that AfricanAmericansrespond more to economic conditions, particularlyunemployment, than do whites. Future
work should continue to examine subgroup differencesin
the weights that groups attach to various economic and
political considerations.
Second, focusing on differences across the public can
help to isolate stability and change among the public. Not
everyone in the public is equally likely to change his or her
evaluation (Kernell and Hibbs 1981). Focusing on who
changes and why will provide insight into approvalat the
aggregate level. For example, Tatalovich and Gitelson
(1990) found that out-partisanswho initially support the
president fall into disapproval over time, leading to a
decline in approvalover the term.14 Further,Tedin's(1986)
analysis of panel data found that out-partisanswere the
most unstablein their opinions (see also Ostromand Simon
1988; Ragsdale1987).
Other approval studies focused on whether the most
sophisticated (Miller and Krosnick 2000; Krosnick and
Brannon 1993) or the least sophisticated (Krosnick and
Kinder1990; Tedin 1986) are most likely to altertheir evaluations of the president, and what the implications are for
the quality of the public'sjudgments. These studies have
primarilyexploredwhetherprimingis more powerfulat different levels of political knowledge. Some found that the
least knowledgeable were most susceptible to priming
14
Again, Mueller outlined almost identical reasoning for the decay of
approvalover time, but arguedthat the coalition of minoritiesexplanation fit the data best.
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MUELLER TO
TO??
FDR TO
(Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Iyengar et al. 1984), while
others found no knowledge-baseddifferences(Iyengarand
Kinder 1987). Most recently,Krosnickand Brannon(1993)
and Millerand Krosnick(2000) found that primingis most
likely among those with greaterstores of political knowledge. While previous work suggested that political novices
were helpless against the tide of media coverage, more
recent work argues that considerable sophistication is
required to "interpret,store, and later retrieve and make
inferences from news stories"(Miller and Krosnick2000:
312). The responsiveness of presidentialapproval to elite
and media priming, the relative stability or instability of
approvalcompared to other political opinions, and differences between sophisticatedand less sophisticatedrespondents remain open questions. Nevertheless, raising these
questions has enriched the study of presidentialapproval.
TheDevelopmentof the ThreeWaves
We believe four factors drove this broad trend toward
richer, more contextualized models, and we suspect that
many of these factors will continue to shape the research
agenda in the future. First, as alreadymentioned, events of
the past 30 years forced scholars to extend, elaborate,and
challengeconventionalwisdom. For example, GeorgeH. W
Bush'srapid rise and decline in the polls during and after
the Gulf War prompted studies of priming (e.g., Goidel,
Shields, and Peffley1997; Krosnickand Brannon1993) and
volatility (Gronke and Brehm 2002; Brace and Hinckley
1992). Likewise,many scrambledto make sense of Clinton's
rising approvalin the face of scandal(e.g., Shah et al. 2002;
Fischle 2000; Miller 1999; Rozell and Wilcox 1999; Zaller
1998).15The simple passageof historywill continue to force
the literatureforward.
Second, changes in the field of public opinion-the
emergenceof the "newlook"-encouraged scholarsto consider political competition, elite discourse, media coverage,
and heterogeneityin their studies of presidentialapproval,
thus pointing the way toward the individual-level and
group-centricanalysesof approvalcited above.
Third,rapid advancesin methodologicaltechniques and
the accumulationof richer data sources undoubtedly stimulated, and were stimulatedby, these trends in opinion and
approval research. The first wave's focus on aggregate
approvalwas in large part due to the availabilityof a sufficiently long, systematic,and consistent Gallup time series.
While some disaggregateddata were available as early as
Mueller's(1973) writing, disaggregatedtime series data and
cross-sectional studies only recently became available.
Today,the Galluptime series, disaggregatedby majordemographicsand partyidentification,is easily obtainablein both
printed (Ragsdale 1998) and electronic form (the Gallup
15
Manyof these pieces fit nicely into the thirdwave, focusing on individual level changes, emphasizing media coverage and elite debate, and
examiningdifferencesin reactionsacross groups.
507
and Roper archives). Severalindividual-levelsurveys have
built up considerable time series. The National Election
Studies began to ask a presidentialapprovalitem in 1972.
Unlike the Gallup survey,the NES allowed respondents to
"strongly"approveand disapprovefrom 1980 on, providing
a scale with twice as many response categories.In addition,
NYT/CBSpolls, administeredroughly on a monthly basis,
have included a presidentialapprovalitem since 1976 and
are available.These data have not been tapped to their full
potential to study presidentialapproval.16
Fourth,methodologicaladvances-the growingpopularity of experimental and quasi-experimental research
designs, the increasingsophisticationof time series analysis,
and the development and popularization of discrete
response models-have enabled scholars to model
processes more precisely and have strengthenedour inferences about cause and effect. Experimentaltechniqueshave
led to greater attention to the individual-level processes
underpinning evaluations, helping us understand public
reactionsto rally events and the assignmentof rewardand
blame for economic change.17Time series advances have
allowed scholars to test when and for how long independent variables affect approval.l8 Discrete response models
(e.g., binomial, ordered, and heteroskedastic probit and
logit) make individual-levelmodeling of approval feasible
(Gronke 1999). Studentsof presidentialapprovalhave a far
more variedset of datawith which they can explorevarious
questions and a dramaticallymore sophisticated toolkit
with which to test their ideas.
PRESIDENTIALAPPROVALAND DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCE
These innovations have been far more than data-fitting
exercises. Presidentialapproval research speaks to larger
16
Approvaldata are readily availableover the worldwide web and electronic databases.Variouswebsites like pollingreport.comoffer aggregate-levelresults. The "pollsand surveys"section of Lexis-Nexiscan be
used to accumulate a large number of survey observations, although
only at the aggregatelevel. Gallup recently announced a feature,available to subscribersto the "TuesdayBriefing,"which will allow downloading of individuallevel survey data. The Roper Center's"Poll"service has long been a way to access individual Gallup studies, although
the cost to assemble a largenumber of individualpolls can be prohibitive. Scholarsand students affiliatedwith the Inter UniversityConsortium for Politicaland Social Researchcan obtain NES surveys, as well
as media polls (ABC,NY Times). Individuallevel Harrissurveys, from
the 1960s-1990s, are availableat the Universityof North Carolina.
17 For instance, Krosnick and Brannon (1993) took advantage of wellplaced panel surveys before and afterthe Gulf War to develop a quasiexperimentaldesign to assess the way the political environmentshapes
the criteriaof evaluation.Otherstudies (e.g., Iyengarand Kinder1987;
Miller and Krosnick 2000) set up explicitly experimental designs to
assess the degree to which media coverage may prime the public to
evaluatethe presidentin particularways, or how the Stateof the Union
boosts approval(Druckmanand Holmes 2003).
18 E.g., Box-Steffensmeierand Smith (1998, 1996); DeBoef and Granato
(1997); see also a special edition of ElectoralStudies(Lebo 2000) and
volume 4 of PoliticalAnalysis(Freeman1992), which summarizesvarious techniques.
508
508
questions rooted in democratic theory.Does the president
have any power to improvehis standing?The answerto this
question, positive or negative, has implicationsfor democracy In a perfect world, if higher approval means greater
power, the public would rewardthe president for meeting
realistic and appropriateexpectations. Then the president
would have an incentive to meet those expectations and
would benefit from doing so. However,if the public holds
the presidentaccountablefor outcomesthathe has little control over, or has unrealisticallyhigh expectations,then the
president'spower depends on the whims of the economy and
history,setting up the presidencyfor almost inevitablefailure. On the other hand, if presidentshave too muchcontrol
over approval,they could boost it without meeting appropriateexpectations,manipulatingtheir way to power.
Scholarshave tried to assess the president'sabilityto control approvalsince the firstwave'sdebateover the decline of
support.Mueller,who arguedthat presidentsface the "inexorabledescent"of their approval,offereda bleak view of the
presidency,an officealmostdoomed to failure(Mueller1973:
213). Similarly,Stimson'sanalysis led him to suspect that
"presidentialapprovalmay be almostwholly independentof
the President'sbehavior in office, a function largely of
inevitableforcesassociatedwith time"(1976: 1). The only way
presidentscanshapeapprovalis by runningfor reelectionand
"using their office to control events, particularlysymbolic
events"to boost approval(1978: 10, emphasisin original).
For his part, Kernell contended that presidents are
judged on the basis of "outcomes in the form of current
events and conditions"ratherthan what the presidentactually does in office (1978: 515). Kernellarguedthat holding
presidents responsible for outcomes "should prompt the
system'smost powerful actor to engage in problem solving"
(ibid.). Others,however,would laterarguethat holding the
president responsible for outcomes he can do little to control leads inevitablyto public disillusionmentand cynicism,
and ultimately,presidentialfailure(e.g., Waterman,Wright,
and St. Clair 1999; Lowi 1985).
Studies in the third wave offer more hope for the president, finding that perceptionsof the political and economic
environment,not just objective indicators, drive approval.
Perceptionsdo not always perfectlyfollow objectiveindicators (e.g., Nadeau et al. 1999), and can be cultivatedmore
easily than objectiveindicatorscan be altered.Furthermore,
the priming literaturesuggests that presidentsmay have an
even subtlertool. Ratherthan changingcitizens'minds, presidents may be able to change how they make them up. If
presidentscan shape media coverage,which they sometimes
succeed in doing (e.g., Edwardsand Wood 1999), they may
be able to affectapprovalindirectly.19
Thus, public expectations may be met more easily than previouslythought.
19
For example, just days after revelationsof the Lewinsky scandal, Bill
Clinton tried to refocus the nation's attention during his State of the
Union address, not once mentioning the scandal, a strategythat may
have worked to boost his approval(e.g., Zaller 1998).
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However, these features also hold darker prospects.
Faced with impossible expectations,presidentsmay be left
little choice but to create the image that they are fulfilling
expectations, using the powers of office to stage symbolic
events, public relations derbies to effect favorableperceptions, resulting in nothing more than an "image-is-everything presidency"(Waterman,St. Clair,and Wright 1999;
see also Brace and Hinckley 1992). In the extreme, some
fear the possibility that the presidentmay use his power in
the internationalsphere in hopes of creatinga rallyevent to
divert attention from other less favorable considerations,
trying to induce the so-called "wag the dog" effect (see
James and Rioux 1998 for an overview of literatureon the
"diversionaryhypothesis").
In the end, it appearsthat presidentsare neither entirely
at the mercy of outside forcesnor in total command of their
approval.As usual, the truth is somewhere in the middle.
Sorting out when and to what extent the president shapes
approvaland under what conditions the public resistspresidential efforts to boost approvalwill provide insight into
the natureof presidentialpower and the characterand quality of accountabilityin the Americansystem.
QUESTIONAND PUZZLESFOR THE FUTURE
Although the general flow toward greatercontextualization has taught us much, this trajectoryhas left important
questions unanswered. First, who or what determines the
criteriathe public uses to evaluatepresidents?The first two
waves took these criteria as largely exogenous, while the
priming literatureof the third wave suggests that they are
endogenous to the political, economic, social, and media
environments.Extantliteraturedoes not tell us much about
the conditions under which the public will resist priming,
but there appearto be some. For example, in his analysisof
the Lewinsky scandal, Zaller (1998: 185) argued that the
public ultimately returns to "bottom line politics" and is
concernedwith "politicalsubstance."As he put it, "however
poorly informed, psychologically driven, and 'mass mediated'public opinion may be, it is capableof recognizingand
focusing on its own conception of what matters"(1998:
186). Still, the bases of expectationsabout presidentialperformanceremainsurprisinglyunexplored(see, for example,
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's1995 penetrating analysis of
Congressionalapproval).
Second, while research to date has demonstrated the
importanceof the two pillars of presidentialapproval-the
economy and foreign affairs-little researchhas considered
whether and how the changing internationalenvironment
may affect presidentialpolitics, presidentialapproval, and
ultimately the power of the presidency In the economic
realm, globalization and economic interdependence has
reducedthe abilityof the presidentto controlmacroeconomic
forces (if the president ever had such control in the first
place). If Americaneconomic conditions are deeply affected
by a regionalrecession,tradingdisputes,or the crashof a foreign stock market, will the president be held accountable?
FDR
CLINTON,MUELLER
TO??
FDR TO CLINTON,
TO
Perhapsfuturemodels of approvalwill have to include international,as well as national,economic conditions.
Anotherrevolutionarychange has taken place in foreign
affairs.In the last decade, since the end of the Cold War,the
U.S. militaryhas been engaged in frequent,low-level international conflicts. Under the conventional model, these
should result in a series of "rallyevents." Foreign affairs,
however, have always had something of a contradictory
impact on approval. Internationalconflict is supposed to
boost approval,even if just temporarily,while ongoing conflict tends to undermine it. This provides little insight into
how we should expect the public to react to militaryactivity in the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, or at the time of this
writing, possibly Iraq. Does the public receive these differently than peacekeeping missions in Kosovo or Bosnia, or
an ongoing, undefined war on terrorism?There are some
indicationsthat the public does see some nuance in foreign
affairs.The public, both at the mass and elite levels, have
displayedfarless consensus with respectto foreignaffairsin
the post Cold War era (Holsti 1996). Thus, presidential
action in the international sphere may produce more
divided responsesthan has historicallybeen the case. To our
knowledge, therehave been few scholarlyattemptsto examine the impact of these changes on presidentialapproval,
beyond simply coding these conflicts as foreign policy
"events"(e.g., Gronkeand Brehm2002; Braceand Hinckley
1993). If nothing else, these changes in the economy and
foreignaffairsopen up a rich new avenue of researchfor the
next ten years.
Third, while we are considering revolutions, future
researchmust be sensitive to the changing media universe.
Massmedia are undergoingtremendouschange, as newspapers merge and disappear,cable television stations proliferate, and the Internet continues to revolutionize the way
informationis disseminatedand viewed. The rapiddiffusion
of the Starr Reportprovided just a glimpse of this future:
informationthat disseminatesat "warpspeed"duringthe 24hour news cycle (Kovach and Rosenstiel 1999). How this
may affect the president'sability to marshalpublic opinion
remains unclear. Some have begun to tackle this question,
finding that the growth of cable television has diminished
the president'sabilityto dominatethe news (Baumand Kernell 1999). Furthermore,trust in media has decreased,
potentiallyalteringits affectson approval.Millerand Krosnick (2000) found that trusted media sources were more
effective in priming viewers (see also Druckman 2001).
Futureresearchmust take these changesinto account.
Fourth,most studies have contextualizedapprovalin different ways, resulting in a patchwork of increasinglyrich
models thatdo not fit togethereasily.We have surveyedstudies of individual-,group-,and aggregate-levelapproval,some
of which focus on economics,otherson dramaticevents, and
others on media effects. Future researchwill have to bring
togetherthe variousfeaturesof mediabehavior,the economy,
events, presidentialdrama, and individuals'predispositions
and long-termexpectations.Furthermore,it will have to deal
with significantheterogeneityacrossthe public. This work of
509
509
synthesis will prove difficult but is essential for progress
towarda generalmodel of approval.
Fifth, most studies have ignored problems of simultaneity bias that often creep into analyses of presidential
approval and presidential governance. Analyses of single
wave surveys certainly suffer from this as individuals may
first decide whether they approveof the president'sjob performance,and then use thatjudgment to inform their other
responses.In addition,some have arguedthat presidentsare
more likely to score legislativevictorieswhen their approval
ratings are high, and then these same accomplishments
enhance theirapprovalratings(see Ostromand Simon 1985
for an example of dealingwith this issue).20Froma very different direction,Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) argue that the
popular view of the presidencyand the polls is backwards.
Superficially,it seems like presidents are slaves to public
opinion, but Jacobs and Shapiro demonstratethat, in fact,
presidentshave a specific politicalagenda,and use the polls
as a guide to achieving that agenda. Often thought to be a
data issue, these examples show that simultaneityis more
broadly an issue of researchdesign and causal interpretations. To date, no simple solution presents itself. It seems
that carefulconceptual and theoreticalthinking, along with
using a varietyof data sourcesand analyticaltechniques,are
the best strategiesavailable.
Finally, we think the field would benefit from greater
unity in data and measures. We have reviewed a large
number of studies and very few of them draw upon the
same set of survey data or event series. Each new scholar
seemingly builds the dataset anew. Selection of events is
especially inconsistent across studies.2' We realize that different substantive questions may call for different operational approaches, but we echo Mueller'sinitial call for
developing better measures to capture political realities.A
unified event series would save significant labor, ease the
temptationto use events to boost model fit, and limit suspicions that others have done so. Further,a unified and available dataset, containing Gallup, Harris, and New York
Times polls, would be a boon to the field.
In the end, we think much has been gained by 30 years
of pushing, refining, and contextualizing the basic arguments Mueller advanced. Our understandingof how and
why the economy,events, time, individualcitizens,and individual presidentsaffectapprovalis more rich, realistic,and
comprehensive.Future researchmust continue to deepen
our understanding,bringingtogetherinsights that currently
remainsomewhat in isolation. Doing so will lead to greater
20
21
This particularissue is moot if approvalreally does not affectthe president'spower in congress (e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990).
Comparingtwo careful operationalrules for identifying events (Brace
and Hinckley 1992; Ostromand Simon 1985; Ostromand Smith 1992)
is illustrative.Over the 1953-1988 period that each study examined,
the Ostrom, Simon, and Smith strategyidentified 122 events and the
Braceand Hinckley strategyidentified 98. Only42 eventswereidentified
by bothstrategies,less thanhalf of the eventsidentified.Further,17 of the
42 commonly identified events were coded as affectingapprovalin differentmonths.
QUARTERLY
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POLITICAL
RESEARCH
QUARTERLY
510
understanding of that "unfocused" but politically important
question of whether individuals approve or disapprove of the
president's performance in office (Neustadt 1980: 81).
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Received: March 11, 2003
Accepted for Publication: March 18, 2003
gronke@reed.edu
bpn@duke.edu